4 | Loss Prevention Bulletin 217

February 2011

Incident

Fires and explosions initiated by static electricity case histories

Martin Glor* and Alexis Pey**
*Swiss Institute for the Promotion of Safety and Security, Basel, Switzerland **Instituto Suizo de Seguridad, Barcelona, Spain

Summary
Five different cases are presented where static electricity was the most probable ignition source. All the cases occurred during the open handling of flammable liquids in drums, containers, hoses or RIBC during transfer or cleaning operations. In four cases the charge was accumulated on a rather conductive liquid handled or processed in insulating equipment. For each case a short description of the incident, an analysis of the charging and ignition mechanism and proposals for preventive measures are given. Keywords: Static electricity; Flammable; RIBC

main solvent filling system by means of a manual fuel nozzle on a flexible hose as shown in Figure 1. After filling about half of the solvent into the second drum, ignition of the solvent vapour in the drum occurred. This operation was performed many times in the past without any problems. Fortunately nobody was injured and the fire could be immediately extinguished so that the damage was very moderate.

Further information
The floor at the drum filling station was dissipative and the operator was wearing dissipative shoes. The hose and the filling nozzle were conductive and earthed. The metal drum had an internal coating with a thickness of approximately 0.05 mm. The breakdown voltage of the highly insulating coating was 1.1 kV to 1.9 kV. According to the statement of the operator the earthing clamp was connected to the drum. The earthing clamp was equipped with sharp and hard tips. Tests showed a good earth contact of the drum each time the clamp was connected to the drum.

Introduction
If an explosion occurs, static electricity is blamed again and again as the ignition source, simply because no other reasonable ignition sources could have been identified. Such a procedure is also often applied for the following reasons: Very often it is not so easy to prove the contrary and with the exception of obvious earthing failures usually nobody can be blamed for any negligence. This approach is however very dangerous, since no adequate countermeasures will be taken and the explosion may happen again sooner or later. Admittedly, it is never possible to really prove that static electricity was responsible for a fire or explosion but it is normally possible to show with reasonable evidence whether static can be blamed for an incident or not. The systematic procedure described in a previous paper1 may help to identify and verify whether static electricity can be blamed for a fire or explosion or not.

Explanation of the incident

Since it could not be proven with certainty that the drum was adequately earthed during the filling operation two ignition hypotheses have been put forward: (i) Ignition by a spark from the not earthed drum, which became charged despite being filled with a rather conductive liquid.

Case 1: Ignition during filling of a metal drum Description of the incident

A flash fire occurred at a production site of a process industry company when filling 200 litre drums with isopropyl acetate. An operator was splash filling the drums from the Figure 1: Case 1: Photograph of drum filling simulation experiments

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(ii) Ignition by a spark from the highly charged rather conductive liquid electrically insulated from the earthed metal drum by the highly insulating coating. Clearly, to explain the ignition with the second hypothesis, an extremely high charge build up had to be postulated in order to reach a potential of 1 kV to 2 kV required for a break down through the insulating coating despite the very high capacitance of the isolated liquid. Therefore 1:1 scale measurements at the production site have been performed showing that both hypotheses are realistic1.

Preventive measures
Earthing of the drum is absolutely required but it is not sufficient. Since isopropyl acetate becomes very highly charged it must be in contact with earth within the drum from the beginning of the filling operation. This can be achieved by using earthed conductive drums without any coating or with a conductive coating. Another possibility is to put an earthed conductive rod, sheet or plate into the drum prior and during the filling operation.

Figure 2: Case 2: Schematic drawing of equipment and procedure with the hand forklift the outer metallic grid of the RIBC was in contact with the metallic parts of the hand forklift and thus in contact with earth.

Case 2: Ignition of a closed RIBC Description of the incident

A RIBC was used to handle toluene. The RIBC material was non-conductive plastic with an outer metallic grid. The RIBC had a hole on its top and a discharge valve at the bottom. The material of the bottom valve was non-conductive plastic as well and a metallic screw was placed perforating the valve wall with the aim of connecting the inner liquid with the outer metallic grid via an electric wire. The RIBC was placed on a wooden pallet and its volume was 1000L. The RIBC contained toluene recovered from the process. It was loaded into the RIBC as a result of a phase separation operation. The loading procedure was carried out by using a conductive and grounded dip pipe, during loading the outer metallic grid of the RIBC was earthed. When filled, the RIBC was closed and left in an intermediate storage area. After three days, the RIBC was picked up in order to load the recovered toluene into a reactor (see Figure 2). The toluene was loaded by using vacuum and a conductive and grounded dip pipe, which was introduced through the top hole. During this operation the outer metallic grid of the RIBC was earthed with a grounding clamp. After removing the amount of toluene which could be sucked out through the dip pipe, the earth clamp was removed, the top cover was put back thus closing the RIBC and a hand forklift was used to move the RIBC away. Once the hand forklift had run about 3 metres from its starting position an explosion occurred inside the RIBC causing the top cover to fly away. In addition a flame came out through the top hole and a fire, which rapidly extinguished, was seen inside the RIBC.

Explanation of the incident

During the decantation operation of an organic phase in a synthesis process, a few litres of the aqueous phase were introduced into an RIBC. The aqueous phase remained undetected at the bottom of the RIBC. A few days later, the toluene in the RIBC was loaded into a reactor; therefore air was introduced into the RIBC generating a flammable mixture with toluene vapours. The dip pipe could not suck all the liquid of the RIBC, a few litres remained, mainly the aqueous phase which remained at the bottom of the RIBC. Once the operation finished, the RIBC was closed with the flammable atmosphere inside, explosive at that time due to the closed enclosure. The movement of the RIBC caused water to slip over the bottom. As the RIBC walls were made from non-conductive plastic, the system configuration was a conductive and not-grounded conductor slipping over a non-conductive surface, therefore both became charged. Additional charge buildup on the water could have been achieved by electrical induction. It cannot be ruled out that the inner surface of the RIBC became already charged during its contact with toluene. The resulting electrical field may then have charged the water slugs as soon as those were not grounded. At a certain moment the movement of the RIBC caused part of the aqueous phase to approach the bottom valve of the RIBC again, where the metallic screw was present. As the screw was grounded, via the connection cable, the outer shell and the hand forklift, it provided a grounding point to which the conductive, yet charged, liquid phase could be discharged. This configuration most probably caused a spark at the bottom of the RIBC, near the valve. As the RIBC was filled with an explosive atmosphere it ignited causing the effects described. Even if the hand forklift, which was in contact with the metallic shell, would not have been reliably earthed, the ignition of the toluene vapour could as well be explained by electrostatics, due to the big capacitance difference between

Further information
The investigation of the incident showed that some liquid was remaining inside the RIBC even after the fire. The amount of liquid was measured and the volume obtained was about 7 litres. This liquid was mainly identified as water. It was checked that during the displacement of the RIBC

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February 2011

the hand forklift and shell system and the water slug. The higher capacitance of the hand forklift and shell is, by far, high enough to act as low potential counter electrode with respect to the water slug charged to a much higher potential.

Preventive measures
In order to prevent this accident it should have been considered that during the phase separation operation some conductive non-miscible liquid could be poured into the RIBC. Therefore, the use of an RIBC with anti-static walls would be recommended in order to prevent any conductive substances inside the RIBC from being kept ungrounded. If conductive or dissipative RIBC were used, the remaining risk would be that linked to the fact of handling flammable nonconductive liquids, such as toluene. The use of RIBC with non-conductive walls and a conductive outer shell helps prevent the risk of discharges from conductive walls and a conductive outer shell helps prevent the risk of discharges from the RIBC walls to the outside when the shell is grounded, but the risk inside should also be taken into account especially if the presence of conductive liquids cannot be ruled out.

Figure 3: Case 3: Schematic drawing of equipment

Preventive measures
Use of flammable solvents to rinse non-conductive drums should be avoided regardless of the conductivity of the solvent. The presence of a highly non-conductive surface may cause a high charge generation during a rinsing operation independent of the conductivity of the solvent. As a result a spark or a brush discharge may be generated, which both may be effective for the ignition of flammable solvent vapours.

Case 3: Ignition after rinsing a drum Description of the incident

A drum was being used to contain an aqueous, thus conductive and non-flammable solution. The material of the drum was non-conductive plastic and its volume was 200 litres. After emptying the drum, an operator decided to dry the drum by rinsing it with acetone and then letting the flammable solvent evaporate. This procedure, even if not written in any document, was considered as common practice on site. To perform this operation, the operator poured two litres of acetone into the drum and forced the drum to roll over the ground in order to ensure a good mixing of the remaining water with acetone while thoroughly wetting the walls with the solvent. Once the drum rolled enough, according to the operators criteria, he emptied the drum by turning it upside down and pouring the acetone on the surface of the concrete floor. Afterwards, the operator proceeded in the same way with another water wet drum. When the operator emptied the second drum a flash fire followed by a pool fire occurred in the area where the acetone was being poured (see Figure 3).

Case 4: Ignition during rinsing a hose Description of the incident

A hose admitted for the transfer of chemicals was used to transfer toluene from drums into a reaction kettle. The transfer occurred with a drum pump. At the end of the transfer the remaining toluene was emptied from the hose and the hose was laid down on the concrete floor in the production area (see Figure 4) . When the hose was rinsed with a water jet from one end a flash fire occurred at the other end.

Further information
The hose had a total resistance from flange to flange of less than 1 M and a highly insulating internal coating.

Explanation of the incident

The highly insulating interior surface of the hose was still charged from the previous toluene transfer and the hose was still filled with a flammable toluene vapour atmosphere. Rinsing the hose with water jets produced so-called water slugs in the hose which became charged by induction or

Explanation of the incident

The acetone inside the drum is a conductive liquid which is isolated from ground and is flammable. The rinsing operation caused the liquid to get charged, therefore a spark can be generated when the liquid approaches a grounded conductor. After rinsing the first drum, the ground was wet with acetone, thus increasing the conductivity of the surface. A spark could be generated with ease under these circumstances. In addition acetone vapours were already present due to the evaporation of the solvent used in the first drum.

Figure 4: Case 4: Schematic drawing of equipment and procedure

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contact with the still highly charged inner surface of the hose. When these water slugs reached the earthed metal flange at the other end of the hose a spark occurred and ignited the toluene vapour.

Preventive measures
Isolated wet parts on insulating surfaces represent an ignition hazard and must be avoided. The cleaning procedure must not be performed in an open way without inert gas blanketing or the hose should be replaced by a hose with a conductive or dissipative inner coating in contact with the flanges.

Case 5: Ignition during the transfer of a flammable liquid from a RIBC into a reactor Description of the incident
The incident occurred in a company where mixtures of petrol with different additives were produced. A 10.5 m3 mixing vessel was simultaneously filled with petrol and an additive. The petrol was pumped into the vessel via fixed stainless steel piping from the tank farm. The additive was loaded by gravity using a flexible hose between the RIBC and a large hole on the top of the vessel. After transferring around 1000 litres of petrol and several hundreds of litres of additive, a flash fire occurred around the loading hole on the top of the vessel (see schematic drawing in Figure 5). Fortunately the operator was only slightly injured and due to the quick response of the fire brigade the damages of equipment and installations could be kept within acceptable limits.

The additive was a liquid of low conductivity with a flashpoint of approximately 50C. The flow speed during the transfer operation was around 3.4 ms1. The hose had a length of 1.8 m. The inner wall of the hose was conductive, with a resistance to the metallic hose coupling of less than 108. Since the valve was insulating, the inner conductive part of the hose was not bonded to the metal part of the RIBC. The outlet end of the hose was introduced a few centimetres into the hole on the top of the vessel. Since the outer part of the hose was insulating the conductive inner part of the hose was not bonded to the earthed metallic rim of the inlet port of the vessel. When the flash fire occurred no operator was present in the area around the vessel or the RIBC. Therefore a spark from the operator could be ruled out.

Explanation of the incident

Since the conductive inner part of the hose as well as the metallic part of the RIBC was not earthed both became charged during the transfer of the additive. Due to the much higher separation speed between the additive and the hose than between the additive and the inner wall of the RIBC, the charge build up on the hose was much higher. There was most probably a spark discharge between the end of the hose and the inner wall of the inlet hole, which was metallic and earthed. In this area there was also the highest probability of presence of an explosive atmosphere (transition of the saturated inner part of the vessel to air outside the vessel).

Preventive measures
In the first place it can be observed in this example that even if the RIBC had been earthed correctly, the incident would have still occurred, because the conductive hose had no conductive connection to the metallic part of the RIBC. Once more this example demonstrates how important earthing and bonding of all parts of equipment and installations is. It shows nicely that very often the devil is in the detail. In case of the RIBC used in this company there was another very misleading and confusing detail: an electric wire was present between the metallic structure of the RIBC and the black plastic valve. At the valve the cable was fixed with a large screw penetrating into the interior of the RIBC. At first sight this cable could seem to ground the plastic valve and supported the assumption that the valve was conductive. The real reason of this cable and screw was however to provide a conductive connection between the liquid within the RIBC and the metal part of the RIBC. In this way a conductive liquid could be earthed by having a ground connection inside the totally insulating plastic container of the RIBC. Though this measure is reasonable from the point of view of static electricity it led to a wrong interpretation. This demonstrates once more that in the field of safety, testing is better than believing. Most conductive plastics are black, but not all black plastics are conductive. Finally it is important to point out that the open handling of such large amounts of flammable liquids should no longer

Further information
The diameter of the transfer pipe for the petrol was 50 mm and the flow speed was 1.15 ms1. The piping as well as the vessel was earthed. The RIBC was made of a non-conductive plastic container enclosed by a metallic frame in the form of a coarse meshed metallic grid placed on a metallic pallet. The RIBC had a hole on its top and a discharge valve at the bottom. The bottom valve was made from black plastic but it was not conductive. The whole RIBC was standing on a wooden pallet and lifted with a fork lift to about 1 m above ground level. It was not actively earthed with a grounding cable.

Figure 5: Case 5: Schematic drawing of equipment and procedure

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be performed nowadays. Such operations must be done in closed systems under an inert atmosphere.

Conclusions
The analysis of the five cases shows clearly that many people in industry are not aware of the hazards associated with the charge build up on the product they handle. This particularly applies to rather conductive liquids not in good contact with earth. Another common occurrence is the fact that in all cases transfer or cleaning operations have been performed in the open in such a way that an explosive atmosphere could hardly be prevented. All the operations are performed by operators who are very close or even within the explosive atmosphere. Thus in case of an explosion or flash fire the consequences for the operators can be fatal. Since electrostatic ignition hazards may arise from rather difficult or tricky to identify factors, it is highly advisable to strictly consider, implement and manage safety regulations that have been developed to prevent this type of ignition source24. No detail should be left to improvisation or at the own discretion of people not familiar with this subject while dealing with prevention of electrostatic discharges. In this sense, in relation with mobile containers, advice must be urgently given against using normal RIBC or

insulating drums for the storage of flammable liquids and independent of its content against their use in hazardous areas in general. Only mobile containers certified for such products and areas must be used under such circumstances.

References
1. M. Glor, Evaluation of two dust explosions initiated by static electricity, Proceedings of the 12th International Symposium Loss Prevention and Safety Promotion in the Process Industries held in Prague, 2004. 2. ESCIS (Expert Commission for Safety in the Swiss Chemical Industry) Booklet 2 2005 revised 2nd edition, Static Electricity Rules of Plant Safety. 3. Technische Regel Betriebssicherheit 2153 Vermeidung von Zndegefahren infolge elektrostatischer Aufladungen (TRBS 2153, ehemals BGR 132), Deutschland, Juni 2009. 4. CENELEC Technical Report CLC/TR 50404 Electrostatics Code of practice for the avoidance of hazards due to static electricity, June 2003. 5. M. Glor, Ignition Source Static Electricity Incident Investigation, Journal of Electrostatics 67 (2009) 242246.

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