qaysart hur.

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http://www.qaysarthur.net/pro tests-the-state-and-the-co mprado r-bo urgeo isie/

Protests, the State, and the Comprador Bourgeoisie

by Qays Arthur

T his post is in response to a request by students to f urther comment on the matter of the revolts that have gripped this part of the world with particular consideration to the question are they halal or not. I will not attempt to give a ruling, I am a madrasateacher, not a mufti. What I will attempt to do is add to the discussion, started by Imam Z aid Shakir in a recent commentary on these revolts in emel magazine, then of f er some advice. Imam Z aid mentions some key f actors that need to be taken into account when assessing revolts such as those we are witnessing in the Arab World, from the point of view of political theory. T hese f actors are thoughtf ully chosen and comprehensive in scope and make a suitable point of departure f or f urther discussion. Bef ore stepping into the discussion however, I should like to state that my perspective is not one of a scholar of political science or international relations. It is, however, based on the f act I that I am of eligible voting age, am Guyanese and thus a survivor of one of Washingtons post-colonial cold war political adventures, and a Muslim student of sacred knowledge who loves dearly, and currently resides in the Muslim World. So be warned. To proceed; it is important to acknowledge, as Imam Z aid mentioned, that it may not be said that all protests are halal or haram . In the f inal analysis each case merits it own consideration. It seems to me that there is no real disagreement on this matter as even those recent fatwaswhich give a blanket ruling, whether one of permissibility or otherwise, do so with particular def initions of protests or muzaharat in mind. It is also important, when looking at contemporary legal (whether Sharia or otherwise) issues, to recognize that it is absurd to expect any legal corpus to address the specif ics of new matters; if the texts addressed the matter it would not be new. However, a mature legal system, such as the Shar al-Sharif , may be expected to address all matters in principle and provide a basis f or new situations. I intend to demonstrate, later in this article insha Allah , that in the Hanaf i school while rebellion is permitted as a departure f rom the basis, it is not to be undertaken in the manner we have seen since the beginning of the 20th century in the Muslim World, and that the basis regarding regimes in Muslim nations today is that they are legitimate even if terribly f lawed.

THE BOURGEOISIE STATE

T he basis or asl, however, is the starting point and there are situations when one may or must depart f rom it. Yet discerning when to depart f rom it requires sound understanding. It is theref ore necessary, bef ore considering the legality of any particular protest, f or both the jurist as well as the politically astute observer to attempt to correctly understand the Arab Spring in the broader context of the Ummah. And it is with regard to achieving such an understanding that the f actors mentioned by Imam Z aid are particularly usef ul. T he f irst of the f actors mentioned is the nation-state. Given what I can discern of the basis in the Hanaf i school, that rule is legitimate once it is established even if it is established by illegitimate means (out of necessity more on that later), it may be said that so long as the nation-state may be ef f ectively used to establish order, its philosophical and political underpinnings are secondary to whether or not it works. Furthermore the f act that it is adopted as the f ramework f or

social organization in the Muslim World does not necessarily mean that all of its underpinnings have been accepted or even understood by rulers or the populaces. So to my mind the nation-state is signif icant regarding revolutions in the Muslim world not because of its nuances, merits or demerits in political theory, but rather due to the historical dynamic that it is part of . T he modern nation-state was all but imposed on Muslims through a unique process of colonization of minds via education. T his process, aimed at altering Muslim attitudes towards religion and society and dividing their ranks, began at least as early as the 18th century in the Ottoman empire when Ottoman leaders, convinced by the marvels of European military technology, invited the French to set up schools to teach things like artillery methods in the empire. T hese schools, which were being set up at a cost of course, were opposed by many of theulama on the grounds that they were teaching not only artillery methods but secular thought. T hey were nevertheless maintained by the rulers and were run parallel to religious schools ormadrasas. T hese secularizing institutions played a vital role in the emergence of a new intelligentsia, within the leadership of the Empire, who, it seems, were incapable of other than post-enlightenment European thought.T hat brings our discussion to another important f actor mentioned by Imam Z aid. T hrough those military institutions, this intelligentsia would rise to prominence, at the expense of the ulama (and their madrasas), and would supervise the gradual replacement of the organic Sharia-based Ottoman model of social organization with the nation-state. T hat class of elites would be reproduced, through the same means, at other power centers in the Muslim world such as Egypt. T his intelligentsia was, in f act, the early manif estation of Imam Z aids comprador bourgeoisie, or proxy middle class, who would, I contend, wittingly and unwittingly but ever consistently act in the interest of f oreign powers. Earlier ref orm-minded Ottoman rulers like Salim II and later nationalists like Kemal Ataturk, and, in Egypt, Ahmed Orabi or Saad Z aghlul were examples of that one class. T heir ethnic causes may have dif f ered but their methods and goals were very similar. Post colonial elites sought the promotion of liberal Western thought and mores (with all that entails of the marginalization of religion), and technology by establishing Western laws and institutions, the most f undamental of which was the nation-state. T hat agenda would be advanced as one of modernization and ref orm. Ref orms of Ottoman sultans, Salim II and Mahmud II (with his Tanzimat) in the 1800s, f or example, helped land the Ottoman empire in massive debt and set in motion powerf ul f orces that would ultimately result in Ataturks imposed secular nation-state. T he program of Sultan Mahmud II was said to be aimed at modernizing and ref orming the military and government while addressing the empires decline and widespread corruption. Innocuous as such objectives appeared what was being ref ormed was more than a f ailing bureaucracy. It seems the religious establishment, in more than one territory represented by ulama and dif f erent military divisions such as the Janissairies, was keenly aware of that. T he result was sundry revolts throughout the ailing empire[1]. T he Sultans court nevertheless persisted, crushing those who opposed ref orm. T hus by 1860 not only had paper banknotes along with a French f inance and legal system been introduced, but the Janissaries and jizya were abolished (the f ormer, typically vilif ied in many Western sources, were brutally eliminated), nationalistic ideals were introduced under islahat (ref orms) that removed provisions associated with religious af f iliation and promoted French revolution liberty, the turban was all but outlawed in the civil service, and homosexuality was decriminalized. Clearly, since that time islah or ref orm, in the Muslim World, meant something that targeted the religious and social f abric of society as well as politics and bureaucratic practices. T hus would the nation-state, the comprador bourgeoisie, Western technology and education, nationalism and secularism come to Muslim shores. T he empire of course would continue its decline despite those enlightened remedies, and debt, unprecedented corruption, and loss of the leaderships religious identity would result. Additionally, modernization and ref orm would bring something else that would render all f ormer

Ottoman provinces, not excluding those in the Arab World, dangerously unstable and prone to manipulation: revolutionary ideology of the particularly French variety.

REVOLUTION AND REFORM

It is truly astounding that so many regard the revolutions of the Arab Spring as novel and unprecedented. How this can be said to be the case when so many of the comprador bourgeoisie who are being challenged today are themselves retired revolutionaries is beyond me. T he Egyptian revolution f or example, the truly unprecedented one that saw demonstrations and strikes across Egypt by students, elite, civil servants, merchants, peasants, workers, and religious leaders, where normal lif e was brought to a halt, a mass movement characterised by the participation of both men and women spanning the religious divide between Muslim and Christian Egyptians, where women were in the streets and on public platf orms, occurred f irst, not in 2011 but, in 1919 against the British. T hat revolution was heavily inf luenced if not lead by the nationalist leader, Saad Z aghlul who, like Ahmed Orabi bef ore him, represented ethnic nationalism. T hey sought a nation-state which, to secular revolutionaries of the time (like the Young Turks in Turkey and the Fatat or youths in the Arab world), was a moral imperative synonymous with independence. T he 1919 revolution, not unlike Orabis revolution in the late 1800s, would ultimately serve European interests in the region. How could it have been otherwise when the revolutionaries f elt entitled to rule in the f irst place due to their own conf ormity to European, in particular Victorian British, thought? So af ter the non-violent 1919 revolution, and about 800 dead, the British granted f ormal statehood and independence to an entity that we now know as Egypt. Sudan, which was part of Egypt bef ore the revolution and whose people participated in it, was annexed meaning the nation was split and the British military remained to keep an eye on the Suez and other interests. T he new nation-state with its constitutional system was one that Western powers could and did manipulate to their advantage as was evident in events that unf olded thereaf ter which would eventually lead to the 1952 revolution by the young Free Of f icers Movement and eventually Mubaraks long rule, bef ore, yes, yet another youth revolution. Little did the youths: young Turks; young Arabs, young of f icers, all over the Muslim world realize that they were helping to build systems that would be ef f ectively used by f oreign powers against their peoples interests. T he scheming of f oreign powers plays a most signif icant part in all this, but it is also clear f rom our history to date that the success of such scheming depended heavily on Muslims and Arabs not being suf f iciently genuine to Islam and even Arab traditions to pursue paradigms that dare to challenge Western philosophical and political dogma. T he point of the f oregoing is that it seems revolutions in the Muslim world, since the 20th century, with their static, patronizing rhetoric of ref orm, their seeking the imposition of Western values (even if they manage to conscript Islamists f or cultural legitimacy) and institutions, and almost religious f aith in and reliance upon f oreign technology, have represented little more than competition and struggles f or power among the comprador bourgeoisie to enf orce the agenda of non-Muslim powers in Muslim lands. Indeed the very impetus f or the 1919 Egyptian revolution was the revolutionaries conviction that Egyptian society was suf f iciently Westernized (monogamous and Victorian in morality) to be granted independence (which was a condition of the British f or granting f ull independence)[2]. It was, as such, not so much a revolution against f oreign rule and inf luence as it was against f oreign rulers. T he type of education revolutionaries like Z aghlul and other effendis (the Egyptian intelligentsia) received under the Khedive then the British ensured that they were in no position to question the social and political underpinnings of f oreign rule much less divest themselves or others of them.

Such revolutions are part of a dynamic that sees power conf ined to a class of people who, since the 19th century, seem suf f iciently educated to imitate but not suf f iciently motivated to innovate.T he misguided if , at times, sincere ef f ort of that group speaks f or itself . Today the Muslim World is a volatile, utterly divided, pseudo-secular landscape that struggles to hold on to its religion, culture, and resources. What this indicates to me is that f or any revolution in the Arab Muslim world to be truly revolutionary it needs to demonstrate a Muslim and Arab self -awareness that has hitherto been absent f rom revolutionary discourse in the region (but that is f or another post). To sum up, as I said f oreign powers have depended on this complex dynamic that negates both genuine Islam and genuine Arabness (I dont see the latter as f ar removed f rom the f ormer) by f acilitating a comprador bourgeoisie to set up nation-states that negate the religious and cultural f abric of Muslim societies leaving them f ractured, prone to exploitation, and subordinated by having to perpetually learn (as opposed to master) ever changing systems of social organization, not to mention technology, that are not at all indigenous. T he question theref ore with regard to the Arab Spring of 2011 is whether that dynamic has changed. Insha Allah my next post will examine just that. Notes: [1] See: Boyar and Fleet, . Cambridge University Press, 2010. [2] See: Haney and Pollard, . Routledge, 2003.