BETWEEN RABITHOOD AND RABBIT STAGES

ONTOLOGICAL AND CONCEPTUAL UNCERTAINTIES IN QUINE AND DAVIDSON

1. INTRODUCTION It seems only fitting, seeing as I am writing a paper in a language that is not my native tongue, to base the discussion to follow on translation. I will argue, starting from the proposed notion of radical translation, that the concept of ontological relativity put forth by Quine is not to be understood as a sort of conceptual relativism in a Davidsonian sense. Although, truth be told, there are certain similarities, they differ massively in scope. But, how could they be expected to differ, if they didnt also have something in common? Indeed I will argue that both Quine in his Ontological Relativity and Davidson in his On the Very Idea of the Conceptual Scheme actually reach the same conclusion a fairly intuitive one at that that one cannot speak meaningfully of the uniqueness of conceptual schemes, just as one cannot speak meaningfully of a multiplicity of different conceptual schemes. I will start out by commenting on the notion of conceptual scheme as described by Davidson and move on to discuss radical translation in Quine. As to the latter, I will argue that it aims purely at constructing a critique of absolute reference (that is to say, reference independent of a frame of reference), and is not to be construed as involving anything in the direction of Cartesian skeptical scenarios1 , as may be objected. 2. ONTOLOGICAL RELATIVITY AS DIFFERENT FROM CONCEPTUAL RELATIVISM 2.1. Worf and Davidson (or how to translate conceptual scheme into Hopi)

Robert J. Fogelin, Quines Limited Naturalism, in The Journal of Philosophy, XCIV: 543-563, 1997, apud. Herbert Harchovec, Ontological relativity reconsidered: Quine on Lwenheim-Skolem, Davidson on Quine, http://sammelpunkt.philo.at:8080/archive/00001078/01/quine_skolem_orig.pdf

Conceptual Schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of experience; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures and periods survey the passing scene. There may be no translating from one scheme to another [and] reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another., says Davidson as he begins what seems to be a fierce argumentation against conceptual relativism: Conceptual relativism is a heady and exotic doctrine, or would be if we could make good sense of it. The trouble is, as so often in philosophy, it is hard to improve intelligibility wile retaining the excitement.2 Conceptual relativism is more or less the same as linguistic relativity. The latter was a proposal of some notoriety at the beginning of the 20th century. Many endorsed this theory, but the one that is of such notoriety as to rival the theory itself is Benjamin Lee Worf. What follows is an account of linguistic relativity provided by Chris Swoyer.3 According to Swoyer, linguistic relativism in general is comprised of the following two claims: Linguistic Diversity: Languages, especially members of quite different language families, differ in important ways from one another. Linguistic Influence on Thought: The structure and lexicon of one's language influences how one perceives and conceptualizes the world, and they do so in a systematic way.4 There is of course a sense in which both claims, and thus linguistic relativism itself, are intuitively obvious. After all, there are some 5000 languages spoken on Earth, and it would be simply absurd to suppose that there is no difference between how representatives of each of these 5000 linguistic communities see the world. There is, on the other hand, another sense in which accepting linguistic relativism leads to quite

Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, p 5

Swoyer, Chris, Relativism in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2003 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2003/entries/relativism/
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Ibidem

unacceptable theories. Let me, for now, detail some of the claims that Worf makes that I do believe to be intuitively acceptable. According to Worf, when languages are similar, there is little chance of significant difference in the associated world-views of the various linguistic communities. He goes on, however, and states that differences are inevitable between the conceptual schemes of communities of very different linguistic background. He identifies language with a structure of categories, which, in a very Kantian sense, serve to organize all experience. We dissect nature along lines laid down by our native languages. The categories and types that we isolate from the world of phenomena we do not find there because they stare every observer in the face; on the contrary, the world is presented in a kaleidoscopic flux of impressions which has to be organized by our minds--and this means largely by the linguistic systems in our minds (p. 213). no individual is free to describe nature with absolute impartiality but is constrained to certain modes of interpretation even while he thinks himself most free (p. 214).5 Which actually comes down to stating that no one is able to step outside of language. So far, both Quine and Davidson would agree. Davidson goes further than Quine (only to come back to the latters conclusion) and argues that it is impossible to make sense of the different points of view that the linguistic relativity thesis would propose, seeing as, different point of view make sense, but only if there is a common co-ordinate system on which to plot them.6 Davidson then makes the essential assumption that two or more languages share a conceptual scheme if they can be, to use Worfs coined term, calibrated, that is to say if one can be translated into the other. With a very vague idea of
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Benjamin Lee Worf, Science and linguistics, 1940, apud Swoyer, Chris, Relativism Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, p 6

translation in mind, Davidson then goes on to notice that even such languages as Worf found impossible to calibrate in English can somehow be rendered comprehensible in English. However, Davidson states that, in much the same way in which completely different points of view cannot be made sense of, because difference requires some sort of commonness to begin with, we can be clear about breakdowns in translation when they are local enough, for a background of generally successful translation provides what is needed to make failures intelligible. I believe that Davidsons argument here is inescapable, but at the same time, I find it highly unsatisfactory, because it relies on a very limited notion of translation. I am quite sure that the members of the Hopi tribe have a different point of view from mine, sitting here at my desk, writing about how different they seem from me on account of the language they speak. And in an absolutely intuitive sense, it simply makes no point to argue against these differences. In another sense, however, I will grant that differences in conceptual schemes will never make two languages on Earth impossible to translate into each other. The Earth itself is common ground enough for us all to stand on. I do believe, however, that we must always pay attention to precisely those points where translation does not run smoothly, as they will offer a great deal of insight into what the differences, rather than the common background, are. And it is precisely this that Davidson does not do. Granted, nor does Quine, but Davidson seems to really be trying to prove how little sense it makes to speak of different conceptual schemes, while Quine takes the relatively more modest (but more satisfying) stance of saying that one can simply not speak meaningfully of such things. Davidson throws an assault on conceptual relativism only to give up on it and resign himself to the silence that his own linguistic frame of reference sentences him to (at least on this subject). We have found no intelligible basis on which to say that schemes are different. It would be equally wrong to announce the glorious news that all

mankind [] shares a common scheme and ontology. For if we cannot intelligibly say that schemes are different, neither can we say that they are one. Nonetheless, no one can accuse Davidson of not trying. On the contrary, he is intensely dedicated to his task. Here lies the difference between his and Quines approaches. The latter aims at proving the impossibility of meaningful talk in matters of which Davidson tries with all his might to say something meaningful. Now the time has come to render comprehensible what I understand to be Quines purposes. 2.2. The inscrutability of reference (or on seeing in complementary colors) First I will discuss the notion of radical translation set forth by Quine in his paper Ontological Relativity7. Radical translation is intended to mean translation from a previously unfamiliar language. The model for such a practice is that of the field linguist, learning a language only by immersion, with no theoretical aid, as no theory of that language has yet been constructed. The field linguist is thus, in a sense, in the position of a child acquiring his first language in that he can only rely on the observation of native speakers speech behavior. In another sense, thought, he is very different from a child acquiring language (and this will prove to be an essential distinction) for unlike the child, that presumably does not translate words, but only learns how to use them in certain contexts, any form of language acquisition that follows that of ones native tongue will necessarily imply translation into this first acquired language. That is to say that it will not suffice for the field linguist to simply understand the conditions of use of various native expressions, he must also relate them to equivalents of his own language. This then, would mean, as Quine says, that the field linguist constructs a theory of the language he is studying, but the language of the theory itself is the theorists own native tongue. Thence, Quine draws the conclusion that it makes no sense to say what the

W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity, in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 65, No.7 (Apr.1968), pp. 185212

objects of a theory are in themselves, beyond explaining how to interpret or reinterpret that theory into another.8 How, then, does one succeed in constructing a translation manual for a language that is completely remote from, if I may anticipate the concept, our ontological frame of reference? By observing the speech behavior of the natives. The manual will be, at first, not so much a dictionary, in the sense that to each basic unit (not to say word) of the new language there corresponds an English word. Rather in the beginning, the field linguist will look at observational sentences, that is, at compounds used recurrently in certain situation. For example, if every time a rabbit appears, the natives are predisposed to exclaim Gavagai! (to use Quines famous example), then the field linguist will make an analytical hypothesis by which he identifies this statement either with the English word rabbit, either with a sentence of the type: Lo! A rabbit!. All the radical translator has to go by are the causal connections between 'the forces that he sees impinging on the native's surfaces and the observable behavior, vocal and otherwise, of the native'. 9 As the argument goes, there seems that there is really no way of knowing whether the field linguist has indeed made the correct associations. Lets take the classic example(also provided by Quine) of seeing in complementary colors. Neither the person with complementary vision nor anybody else can ever be sure that indeed what is green to them is green to everyone else, and not red. The only condition is that they reverse the entire color spectrum, not only green for red and the other way around. That is to say that the complete set of translated propositions in the field linguists manual could in fact be only permutations of the true references that the natives sentences achieve. For any language L, there are at least two translation manuals M 1 and M 2 which satisfy two conditions (WO 6872; PT 478):

This is to be compared with what Davidson says of translation: In the general case, a theory of translation involves three languages: the object language, the subject language, and the metalanguage, Donald Davidson, Radical Interpretation in Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Second Edition, Calderon Press, Oxford, 2001, p.129 9 Hans-Johann Glock, Quine and Davidson on Language, Thought and Reality; Cambridge University Press, 2003, p. 171, quote from W. V. Quine, Word and Object,

i. ii.

they are behaviorally equivalent in that they fit the facts about the linguistic they are semantically incompatible in that the English sentences which they

behavior of the speakers of L equally, and unimprovably, well. assign to a given sentence of L do not intuitively speaking mean the same, and hence are not interchangeable in English contexts. From this argument Quine deduces what he dubs the behavioral inscrutability of reference. This is a consequence of the radical translation performed by the linguist, i.e. translation of the language of a hitherto untouched people10. The underlying principle is ontological relativity, which states that when there is no common frame of reference, the only translations that can be performed will be radical and will always be referentially inscrutable due to the fact that the translator will never be able to transcend his own frame of reference. I have already anticipated a future section, but let me go on. Surely, when we speak of frames of reference, to say that one exists is to admit of a multiplicity of such frames. Why then would we not say that Quine does in fact accept that there may be more than one conceptual scheme, why would we not admit to associating Quinean ontological relativity to Davidsonian conceptual relativism? In the least, it seems clear that Quine is ready to accept that two languages could be so different as to make one impossible to calibrate11 (to use a concept of Worfs) into the other. I will argue that Quine is no more supports such a theory than Davidson could be said to. 2.3. A commonsensical notion of translation This is first and foremost my attempt to clarify the concept of translation for myself, but it has proved very useful to the argument I am attempting to build up. Translation, I believe, must be understood as the opposite of attributing reference. The latter proceeds from the speakers intention (which, I believe, can be understood as identifying the meaning that one wishes to communicate, but this is a point to be argued separately and I will not do so here) goes through the structure of language (that is, of
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W. V. Quine, Word and Object, p.28 B.L. Worf, The Punctual and Segmentative Aspects of Verbs in Hopi apud Donald Davidson, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 47, 1973 - 1974 (1973 - 1974), p 6

course, grammar) and reaches its reference through some almost mystical process that philosophers have pondered for ages, and which I will most certainly not discuss here. Suffice it to say that speech refers. Translation starts from the opposite end it first identifies the reference of what is said, then proceeds to mark the recurrence of the forms of speech that refer to one object (or to classes of objects), so as to reconstruct the grammatical structure of the language (rules for the use of language), and at the very end it arrives at the meaning of the utterance. The intermediary step of reconstructing structure ensures that meaning is only truly arrived at after recurrence has established it as constant in given contexts, and therefore actually connected to the expression our field linguist wishes to translate. It is already evident that meaning can never be verified, only falsified, and that, moreover, in translation, meaning depends on and since I postulated that translation begins from reference, the step that Quine takes towards showing reference to be inscrutable is only a blink away. Let me now comment on the famous gavagai example: whenever a rabbit passes by, the natives are inclined to exclaim gavagai!. The sensible (as Quine calls him) field linguist would observe the recurrence of this exclamation in similar contexts and deduce that gavagai must either mean rabbit, either something of the type: Lo! A rabbit!. If we too are sensible, we will of course accept his translation. If we are philosophers, however, we may not be all that willing to accept it. A Quine or a Davidson might object to our uncritical acceptance to the field linguists conclusion. He might have mistakenly interpreted the passing rabbit as the reference of their utterances. Indeed, Davidsons suggestion was that they were perhaps referring to a rabbit fly that accompanied the rabbit on every instance observed, and with which the translator is not acquainted. Moreover, and philosophically more challenging, how may we know that the natives do not have in mind something more along the lines of rabbit part, rabbit stage or rabbithood when they utter gavagai? The answer is that we may never know for certain. The indeterminacy of translation rears its ugly head, and reveals a very Quinean perspective. Both meaning and reference (the former in fact depending on the latter) are inscrutable. What makes them so? As I said in a previous section, the cause is radical translation.

Radical translation assumes that the language for which the field linguist attempts to construct a translation manual is completely unknown. To reiterate my initial comparison, the linguist in this case is in the position of learning an unfamiliar language as children learn their native tongue, without theoretical aid. The essential difference between the linguist and the child is that, as far as language goes, the child is in a prelinguistic phase, which means that it is of no relevance which language he will acquire, he would learn any just as easily, whereas the linguist has for a long time been caught within a certain linguistic structure that of his native tongue. He is no longer capable of acquiring a language without translation into his own language. So he is not simply acquiring a language, he is fitting it into his already formed frame of mind. Quine points to this when discussing what criteria the field linguist would have in mind when choosing one meaning for the identified reference instead of another: An enduring and relatively homogenous object, moving as a whole against a contrasting background, is a likely reference for a short expression. If he were to become conscious of this maxim, he might celebrate it as one of the linguistic universals, or traits of all languages, and he would have no trouble pointing out its psychological plausibility. But he would be wrong. The maxim is his own imposition, toward settling what is objectively indeterminate.12 This shows clearly that Quine does endorse a notion of linguistic structure as constitutive of our conceptual schemes. In this paragraph Quine states precisely what Davidson states throughout his On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme that one cannot step outside ones language, hence, outside ones conceptual scheme. Moreover, the gavagai example in itself is quite relevantly construed. When Quine assumes that the natives may be speaking of rabbit parts or stages and not whole rabbits, he is subtly pointing at the objectifying nature of at least Indo-European languages. We speak of objects, and predicate with regard to them. This in grammar is evident in our inescapable subject-predicate structures. This structure seems to be so fundamental that the field linguist will impose it on any language he interprets. And indeed the result would not suffer too much on account of this, seeing as translations are constructed for speakers of the translators language. It would however seem that Quine accepts at least the
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W. V. Quine, Ontological Relativity, p. 191

possibility for linguistic structures sufficiently different from our own to make them impossible to translate. It would seem we are entering Davidsonian territory with what I consider to be a strong objection to Davidsons theory. How different would two languages have to be in order for Davidson to admit that they portray reality differently to their speakers? Would not the understanding of rabbits as processes rather than enduring objects qualify as a radically different world-view? It does at this point seem that Quine endorses conceptual relativism. Why then do I insist that this is not truly so? Because of what radical translation states. 2.4. What Radical Translation Leads To Quine does indeed state: radical translation begins at home13, but I believe that this is a statement he brings before us with the purpose of disproving it. As I have mentioned, radical translation leads to inscrutability of reference. Quine shows that indeed it is not necessary to interpret my neighbors utterances as similar to my own. Indeed my neighbor and I do from time to time use words to refer differently, and in such cases, we need to interpret each other. To be quite honest, I do not believe that such actions are rightfully called radical translations, but raising this objection would be pointless as Quine himself immediately responds to it. If radical translation is possible between my neighbor and I, then surely it is possible to extend it to ourselves. This path obviously leads to absurdities. I cannot in fact radically translate my own utterances to myself, nor is it necessary for my neighbor to radically translate mine. Radical translation does not in fact exist at home, at least not if were ever to correctly attribute reference and thus communicate! Radical translation at home is made pointless by the shared structure of our language, and it is this structure that allows us to understand each others utterances without radically translating them: This network of terms and predicates and auxiliary devices is, in relativity jargon, our frame of reference, o coordinate system. Relative to it we can and do talk meaningfully and distinctively of rabbits and parts, numbers and formulas.
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Ibidem, p.198, and this too must be associated to a similar remark from Davidson: The problem of interpretation is domestic as well as foreign: it surfaces for speakers of the same language in the form of the question, how can it be determined that the language is the same?, in Radical Interpretation, published in Inquiries on Truth and Interpretation

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How could we not, since all of these, both rabbits and their parts, numbers and formulas alike exist in our language, in our frame of reference! I proceed to interpret the concept of radical translation as set forth by Quine as stating, once again, that one is trapped within the frame of ones language. Quine has been accused of a Cartesian skeptical approach14. I believe this interpretation would surely clear him of such a charge. His approach does not try to question language, but on the contrary, it attempts to show that language, as frame of reference, must be simply taken for granted if we are to ever speak meaningfully. He does not question or discuss our reference frame or any other frame for that matter. Why? I believe it is quite obvious and a natural sequence of the argument. If we can only speak meaningfully from within a frame of reference, and if to pass from our frame of reference to any other one implies radical translation, which leads to the impossibility of meaningful talk (perhaps not impossibility, but at least to the uncertainty of such talk), then indeed ours is the only frame of reference within which we may speak with meaning. And if it is so, as I believe Quine intends to prove, then we simply cannot speak of the existence of any other system of coordinates. It is impossible to say whether others have a different conceptual scheme, just as it is impossible to say that they have the same one. These facts are neither verifiable neither falsifiable, for to do either, one would have to assume a position outside of our own conceptual scheme, system of coordinates, frame of reference. Quine knows this to be impossible. For this reason, I maintain that Quine does not, and indeed could not consistently, hold any view as to the existence or non-existence of different frames of reference. Thence, Quine is not, and cannot be a conceptual relativist. 3. Why Davidson assumes more than Quine (or Final Remark) To conclude, ontological relativity is not the same as conceptual relativism. This, in spite of the fact that ontological relativity does indeed stipulate dependence on a given linguistic frame of reference, and due to the fact that it stops precisely at that it claims no more than this dependence. It can go no further to speak of one or more systems of coordinates. Ontological relativity is a device of critique that draws attention on the
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impossibility of objective meaning and reference, but at the same time accepts that within a frame of reference, both meaning and reference must be accepted as objective (more or less more taken for granted) so as to make possible meaningful talk. Whilst Quine, in Ontological relativity presents us only with this critical approach meant to point at our inevitable positioning within a system of coordinates, and Davidson in On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme could very well be said to do the same thing, the latter could also be said to stray dangerously from his self-advised neutral stance with regard to language he attempts to generalize Quines concept of radical translation and says, in his Radical Interpretation: All understanding of the speech of another involves radical interpretation.15 As I explained in the previous section, I dont believe radical translation (which I believe is what Davidson had in mind here) is meant to apply to two people belonging to the same frame of reference. Radical translation must be limited to such contexts as alien cultures, in order to maintain the possibility of meaningful talk of things that are themselves part of our own frame of reference. Davidsons attempt to rid himself of all pre-assumptions fails gloriously as it turns into the search for a place outside of language from which to interpret language. In this sense, I believe Quines stance, limited though it may be in scope, assumes far less than Davidsons interpretation theory, presumably completely free of assumptions. One always needs a point of reference to regress to, as Quine knows all too well. When leaving no such point, we are simply lost within our own language.

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Donald Davidson, Radical Interpretation, p.125

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