Ernest Sosa

In Moser, P. The Oxford Handbook of Epistemology. Chapter 8, Tracking Competence, and Knowledge Externalists have supplemented or replaced the requirement of justification with external requirements beyond the contents of the subjects mind and beyond merely logical or evidential relations among propositions.

Knowledge in Perspective: Selected Essays in Epistemology Chapter 8 Reliabilism and Intellectual Virtues 138 Intellectual virtue or faculty is a competence in virtue of which one would mostly attain the truth and avoid error in a certain field of propositions F when in certain conditions C. 139 In fact a fact or virtue would normally be a fairly stable disposition on the part of a subject relative to an environment. 140 Intellectual virtue is something that resides in a subject, something relative to an environment. A subjects intellectual virtue V relative to an environment E may be defined as Ss disposition to believe correctly propositions in a field F relative to which S stands in conditions C, in environment E. to be a certain environment is not just a matter of having a certain spatio-temporal location, but is more a matter of having a complex set of properties, only some of which will be spatial or temporal. 144 My proposal is that justification is relative to environment. Relative to our actual environment A, our automatic experience-belief mechanisms count as virtues that yield much truth and justification. Of course relative to the demonic environment D such mechanisms are not virtuous and yield neither truth nor justification. 145 Three ways in which virtue perspectivism is distinguished from generic reliabilism: Virtue perspectivism [Sosas view] requires not just any reliable mechanism of belief acquisition for belief that can qualify as knowledge; it requires the belief to derive from an intellectual virtue or faculty;

Virtue perspectivism distinguishes between aptness and justification of belief, where a belief is apt if it derives from a faculty or virtue, but is justified only if it fits coherently within the epistemic perspective of the believer perhaps by being connected to adequate reasons in the mind of the believer in such a way that the believer follows adequate or even impeccable intellectual procedure. This distinction is used as one way to deal with the new evil-demon problem. Virtue perspectivism distinguishes between animal and reflective knowledge. For animal knowledge one needs only belief that Is apt and derives from an intellectual virtue or faculty. By contrast, reflective knowledge always requires belief that not only is apt but also has a kind of justification, since it must be belief that fits coherently within the epistemic perspective of the believer .

Chapter 10 The Raft and the Pyramid Raft = coherentism Pyramid = foundationalism 189-90 A way out = intellectual virtues.

Virtue Epistemology: Apt Belief and reflective knowledge, Volume 1. Oxford University Press, 2007. Preface S distinguishes two levels of knowledge, the animal and the reflective. Lecture 2 A Virtue Epistemology 22 - When an archer takes aim and shoots, that shot is assessable in three respects. First, we can assess whether it succeeds in its aim, in hitting the target Second, we can assess whether it is adroit, whether it manifests skill on the part of the archer

[Third, ] A shot can be both accurate and adroit, however, without being a success creditable to its author.the wind may be abnormally strong, and just strong enough to divert the arrow so that, in conditions thereafter normal, it would miss the target altogether. However, shifting winds may next guide it gently to the bulls-eye. The shot is then accurate and adroit, but not accurate because adroitSo it is not apt, and not credible to the archer. 22-3 - An archers shot is thus a performance that can have the AAA structure: accuracy, adroitness, aptness. So can performances generally, at least those that have an aim, even if the aim is not intentional. A shot succeeds if it is aimed intentionally to hit a target and so on. A heartbeat succeeds if it helps pump blood, even absent any intentional aim. 23 Performances with an aim, in any case, admit assessment in respect of our three attainments: accuracy: reaching the aim; adroitness: manifesting skill or competence; and aptness: reaching the aim through the adroitness manifest. Beliefs too might thus count as performances, long-sustained ones, with no more conscious or intentional an aim than that of a heartbeat. At a minimum, beliefs can be assessed for correctness independently of any competence that they manifest. Beliefs can be true by luck, after all, independently of the believers competence in so believing, as in Gettier cases. Beliefs fall under the AAA structure, as do performances generally. We can distinguish between a beliefs accuracy, i.e., its truth; its adroitness, i.e., its manifest epistemic virtue or competence; and its aptness, i.e., its being true because competent. 24 Animal knowledge is essentially apt belief [without requiring defensible apt belief, i.e., apt belief that the subject aptly believes to be apt, and whose aptness the subject can therefore defend against relevant skeptical doubts], as distinguished from the more demanding reflective knowledge [apt belief + defensibly apt belief]. These are the core ideas of Sosas virtue epistemology. 25 Another idea thats part of virtue epistemology: the safety of a belief. This idea is also applicable to performances. A performance is safe if and only if not easily would it then have failed, not easily would it have fallen short of its aim. What is required for the safety of a belief is that not easily would it fail by being false, or untrue. A belief that p is safe provided it would have been held only if (most likely) p. Someones belief is sensitive if and only if were it not so that p, he would not (likely) believe that p.