The Cosmological System of Pierre Bayle Author(s): Juliette Carnus Reviewed work(s): Source: Philosophy of Science, Vol. 8, No.

4 (Oct., 1941), pp. 585-597 Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of the Philosophy of Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/184517 . Accessed: 20/09/2012 11:41
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The

Cosmological System
Pierre
BY

of

Bayle

JULIETTE CARNUS HE philosopher whose work best represents the type of thought and expresses the aspirations of the French writers of the eighteenth century is, beyond any doubt, Pierre Bayle (I647-I706). Not so well known as many of the others, it was he, nevertheless, who started the dialectic movement of philosophic thought which was very characteristic of that era. Furthermore, in his extensive writings, he accumulated material from which his successors could draw freely and copiously. It is the controversial and critical works of Bayle in particular which his commentators have made known to posterity; his work of criticism is vast. There is, however, a positive phase of his writings which has not been adequately expounded (or which has, to some extent, escaped the attention of philosophers), and I have taken the positive philosophy of Pierre Bayle as the topic of this paper. Bayle did not formulate a connected and coherent system of ideas; he merely disseminated throughout his books, especially in his Dictionnaire Historique et Critique (I720), ideas which have to be gathered from a mass of details, observations, and systems of thought, which are apparently self-contradictory. But his positive views, when put together connectedly, present an interesting cosmological system for they exhibit a mind operating at its apogee, the motives which animated it during its struggle
585

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Cosmological System of P. Bayle

against the despotism of tradition and the use of a scientific method that was more and more comprehensive of the aspects of reality. Bayle had had the opportunity to analyze the pros and cons of the various religious sects which were struggling against each other at this period of history. He was the son of a Protestant minister and was, naturally, brought up in his father's religion; he became converted to Catholicism, but later reverted to the faith of his childhood. Persecuted and forced to resign his position as professor of philosophy at the University of Sedan, he fled to Holland. During his exile here, at Rotterdam, he participated in the fights occurring between Protestants and Catholics. He lost his faith but he did not withdraw from the fray. By comparing the arguments advanced by the different religious sects, he ascertained that these controversies and disagreements were not the result of unchallengeable reasons but that, most frequently, they could be traced to motives which were human and capricious. Of a dispute between two parties, Bayle stated that it seemed to him "that it made no material difference which side you chose to take; that both arguments are justified by Holy Writ." 1 Thus he came to associate the idea of religion, no matter which particular creed it might be, with that of intolerance. He looked upon religion as an aberration of human thought and thence he proceeded to the study of religions as well as the philosophies which supported these religions so as to discover the cause of this intellectual vice. It was not mere curiosity which prompted him to this investigation; he was desirous of setting thought right; he himself had been subjected to many annoyances which had shown him how absurd intolerance was. He believed that he perceived in reason the very cause of the countless contradictions which he had observed in the various religious sects because reason lays down a priori postulates, dominates inexorably the realm of speculative thought and disregards the data of experience. Now it was from the standpoint of experience that Bayle proceeded
1 (Euvresdiverses, I737 (4 vol.), vol. I, "Lettre a son pere," 21 Septembre, 1671 (p. lob).

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to criticize the postulates of reason, the bases of theological and metaphysical dogmas. Thus he came to consider religious controversies merely as intellectual pastimes of unparalleled futility. If the mind is here triumphant, the triumph so obtained has no
significance apart from the satisfaction thus derived and experi-

enced by the mind. But the dogmas founded on speculation assume the right of directing the mind and of influencing the will. Now the will lies outside their jurisdiction; and this is what Bayle undertakes to prove. Man's actions are not motivated by his philosophic or theological ideas; the theatre of human behavior is the world we live in, the world of facts and it is altogether different from the world of speculative thought and from the domain of the absolute where reason reigns. "The real motive of our actions has so little foundation in the speculative judgments which we form about the nature of things that nothing is more commonplace than to see orthodox Christians who live bad lives and free thinkers who lead good ones." 2 In comparing the various philosophic systems, Bayle notices that some of them (which he designates as the "dogmatic") accept only the rational verities and reject the data of experience while the others, "the sceptics," reject the rational verities and limit themselves to empirical knowledge. Therefore the criterion of truth, which is evidence, can be found in reason or in experience. Bayle will give its due to both reason and experience, but for him reason is not absolute but relative. Ideas derived from reason in order to be true must be capable of being verified by our ex"Such, for example, are the propositions that the whole is greater than the part. If you take away two equal parts from two equal quantities, what remains will be equal. Two and two make four. These axioms have the advantage not only of being very clear in our minds but they also come within the range of our senses. Our daily experiences confirm them; consequently, it would be unnecessary to try to prove them. The same is not true of those propositions which lie beyond the range of our
2 Dictionnaire historique et critique, 1734 (5 vol.). p. 420b.

perience.

Arc6silas, Dictionnaire, t. I,

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Cosmological System of P. Bayle

senses or which can be refuted by other propositions; such propositions need to be discussed and proved." 3 Among these latter are to be found all the propositions of speculative reason, on which are based theology and dogmatic philosophy. A clearly evident proposition can be refuted by another just as evident; whereas facts offer irrefutable proof of their existence. At this conjuncture we perceive the idea of a scientific method developed in the mind of Bayle which was to be reinforced, not particularly in the eighteenth century which was too absorbed in logical and mathematicalclarity but subsequently, and which was recognized and appreciated before the advancement of scientific knowledge made it possible to establish its importance. History is the science which reveals the facts of life better than any other branch of learning and we must go to history, asserts Bayle, if we desire to discover truth. He compares historic certitude with mathematical certitude,-which was, at that time, regarded as all-important; and he concludes that the former is superior to the latter. He says: "I maintain that the truths of history can attain to a degree of certitude more incontestable than that which can be attained by the geometric truths; be it understood, of course, that we weigh these two kinds of verities according to the degree of certitude peculiar to each of them." 4 One encounters contradiction as soon as one states propositions such as: "Bodies have a distinct space; bodies do not have a distinct space." One of these maxims cannot be true unless it is absolutely and immutably true and uncontradictable. Consequently there is either in the first or in the second proposition a necessary truth or an impossible falsehood. Each of these propositions, however, is supported by such strong proofs, or rather, refuted by so many overwhelming and inextricable objections that it is very difficult to decide whether we find the arguments advanced in favor of the true more convincing than those advanced in favor of the false." 5
S. v., Maldonat, Dictionnaire, v., 79n. 4 "Dissertation a du Rondel," Dictionnaire, t. V, p. 711. 6 Commentairephilosophique, 0., xi, I9.

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Evidence is not a perfectly clear notion, such as Descartes believed it to be. "Everyone knows, or ought to know, that evidence is a relative quality." 6 History shows that metaphysical systems, just as religious doctrines, vary according to the country, the people and the epoch. "I admit to you," he says, "that I hardly ever read history for the sake of learning about past events but only to find out what was said in the different countries and by different persons about what was going on." 7 Bayle strives to disassociate from the notions the a priori part which they contain and to expose the contradictions therein discovered. He experiences, first of all, a neophyte's joy; but this joy soon becomes purely intellectual curiosity. In particular, he analyzes very thoroughly the notions on which dogmas are based, likewise the philosophic systems which substantiate the dogmas, that of Descartes, for instance, and especially that of Spinoza. Whatever cannot be corroborated by experience is discarded as unreal and untrue. At the same time Bayle retains from these philosophies whatever has the mark of truth and which will help him to construct his cosmological system. His system, consequently, represents an eclectism of philosophic thought at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Bayle offers it not as a system of absolute and immutable truths but rather as an hypothesis which seems to him to be the best and the one most capable of explaining reality in its total compass. Again, we have proof of his feeling for a genuine scientific method which reveals to him that the truths we believe we have discovered are simply points of view taken from reality and which are destined to be superseded by the progress of knowledge and philosophy. If the Cartesian notion of clear and distinct evidence is not the one that Bayle adopts, he nevertheless realizes that Descartes knew how to fix clearly the limits of the domain of the mind and the body. It is Cartesian physics that he prefers, but he holds that extension is not a notion which has more importance than any other of the qualities that we discover by experience and this
6Ibid., p. 396. divseses, I , Io6. 7"Critique gen6rale de l'histoire du Calvinisme," CEuvres

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made him hesitate to consider extension as a substance and he accepts the atomistic theory, of which the works of Gassendi had made him see the advantages. The void, however, is an incomprehensible and therefore inadmissible idea; but, apart from that, the atomistic theory is the best fitted to account for phenomena that we observe in our daily life. Bayle repudiates the substance One of Spinoza for it is contrary to our experience and what we understand by the notion of perfection or God; indeed, our observation shows us that "extension is composed of parts actually separate and distinct one from the other."8 Extension, therefore, is a composite entity; moreover "how can one imagine that an independent nature, which exists per se and which possesses infinite perfections to be subjected to all the misfortunes of the human species."9 Such, for example, as are to be seen in the destruction and decomposition of matter. Neither can Extension be a mode because we should have no way of knowing what substance is. And Bayle prefers Descartes' point of view because the latter considers extension as an essential element of substance. However neither the Cartesian mechanism nor the atomism of Democritus could account adequately for phenomena. But causes must not be multiplied unnecessarily, and, although Bayle takes care to see only facts, he also is dominated by an idea, which is that knowledge is one, that everything in the universe is connected, and that a single principle must be sufficient to explain all phenomena. It is an exigency of the analytical method which influences at the same time his conception of the world. There must be one single substance if we are to have unity of knowledge. Now thought seems to be a real substance and extension as well, especially since Descartes has definitely asserted it to be so. On the other hand, we have a variety of experiences; for example, we notice things external to ourselves, such as bodies which are the objects of our experience of the world about us. Also, there are phenomena of another nature, such as feeling, conscience, thought; these constitute another form of
8 Article, Spinoza, Dictionnaire, vol. V, Rem EE, p. 226a. 9 Article, Spinoza, Dictionnaire, vol. V, Rem N., p. 3x3b.

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experience which is not less real than the external one. The Cartesian mechanism can explain only bodies, that is, phenomena whereof we perceive extension, impenetrability, and movement; but if one observes, as one does in living beings, a special activity, which is life, this points to an adaptation of means to a single end, and this presupposes choice. Consequently, in our choice of what we shall make of the substance, we must consider finality. If thought also exists with laws different from those which governthe body, it must also be a part of the substance, "because in the living body the only thing that the arrangement of the organs can do is reduced, like in a clock, to one local movement that is diversely modified. The difference is only one of degree. But since the arrangement of the various wheels which make up a clock would not be able to produce the effects of this machine if each wheel, before being set in a certain way, did not have impenetrable extension which is necessary to produce movement when it is set in motion. I say, further, that the arrangement of the organs of the body would not be able to produce thought if each organ before being put in its place did not actually have the power of thinking; or this power is something other than impenetrable extension for all that you can do to this extension by pulling it, striking it, pushing it in every imaginable direction, is a change of situation of which you fully perceive the entire nature and essence without needing to assume the existence of any feeling."10 Bayle wishes to include movement in the atom, but he hesitates because this notion seems to lead him to the occult forces of the schoolmen, which Descartes had rejected in his Physique. Furthermore the notion of thought has nothing in common with the notion of extension; consequently it cannot be united to, nor affect extension. He states that Leibnitz did not offer a more satisfactory solution by explaining the internal development of the soul by its spontaneity and liberty; that is contrary to fact because "if this were the case, how are we to explain the concatenation of opposite feelings which succeed each other fortuitously according to the impressions coming from without in
10Dictionnaire, II, 628a, s. v. "Dic6arque."

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such a way that a feeling of pain may follow a feeling of pleasure."" Bayle thinks that the hypothesis of the English philosopher Cudworth (with whom he was personally acquainted) is not clear, because if matter and mind are not enough to explain the organization of living beings, the "plastic natures" are not enough either, these beings which are neither extended nor immaterial, are incomprehensible and useless; they are the "active principles which carry out God's plan almost in the same way that certain men
carry out the plan of an engineer."12

It is God, in the last analysis, who acts and one comes back to "accepting the Cartesian dogma which one had wished to reject."l3 It is interesting to note the criticisms that Bayle makes of each system. If he also indulges in reasoning, it is always so as to throw into relief that part of truth in each system which is in conformity with the facts of experience, and to separate the rational from the empirical. He criticizes Locke, who said that perhaps matter was capable of thinking; but Bayle does not believe that this is impossible and therefore he includes in substance, in addition to extension, movement and thought because, in his opinion, these three factors can explain all the phenomena of experience. "If every atom had sensibility, we could understand that a collection of atoms could form a composite capable of undergoing certain special modifications; as much in respect to sensations and knowledge as well as movement. The diversity of passions that one notices in rational and irrational animals could be generally explained by the various combinations of the
atoms."14

But each of these factors is only a quality of a single unknowable substance and which moreover Bayle does not consider it worth while knowing. He thinks that in addition to extension, movement and thought other qualities may exist but they are not manifested to our ex11 "Rponses aux questionsd'un provincial," p. 13 Oeuvres diverses, IV, 183. 14 Dictionnaire, s.v., Leucippe,III, 647a.
2 Oeuvresdiverses, IV, 183. I4,

3e partie, ch. XV, p. 94ib.

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perience. Thought is only a quality; it cannot be a substance because the soul would think continuously; now we perceive that thought functions only intermittently and, besides, is apparently influenced by the body. "The experience everyone has of the control which his body exercises over his soul shows how feeble reason is in infancy, in old age, in illness and even in a healthy man when asleep."15 Other proofs abound which reveal the influence of the body over the soul and which were the topics of numerous discussions at that time. The sensibility of animals seems to be of the same nature as man's; it differs only in degree. If we concede an immortal soul, a spiritual substance to man, we must also concede it to animals. In making sensation or thought a quality of substance, Bayle will easily be able to solve the question of the immortality of the soul; the most important dogma of the majority of religious and metaphysical beliefs. By endowing the atom (which is uncreated and eternal) with movement, he explains all physical and corporeal phenomena without the instrumentality of a prime mover, and thought effects the selection of the means for a single end-that is to say, thought will be able to account for organic finality. Thought also explains the phenomena, found in man, rational thinking; the interdependence of mind and body will account also for a fundamental phenomenon which is man's instinct and man's passion. For it is passion that motivates man's actions more than reason. Reason represents only our past experience which has been favorable to the individual and to the species; it is not something ready-made and perfect at the moment when it begins to function; it develops, and takes a good deal of time to do so. Bayle has shown the relativity of our knowledge and our means of acquiring knowledge; in this way he drew attention to the study of history wherein human experience can be observed in the process of changing into intelligence. But like Fontenelle (I657-I757), from whom he got the idea, Bayle holds that experience furnishes reason with more elements than it can assimilate so as to transform them into
15 Oeuvresdiverses,t. III, 3e partie,chap. "R6ponsesaux questionsd'un provincial," XV, p. 94Ib.

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intelligence. These observations supplied Auguste Comte, in the following century, with the idea which enabled him to formulate the Law of the Three Stages of the development of the mind. Although Bayle does not seem to have been influenced by the i'reatiseon the Passions of Descartes, he attaches great importance to the interdependence of mind and body not only so as to explain human nature without the help of religious dogma but especially to explain many facts, in particular the role that passion plays in human conduct, likewise in human reasoning. It is by passion that Bayle explains error which results from the feebleness of the mind and not from our corrupt nature "because however little thought we may give to the way in which our soul is united to our body, we realize that owing to this union our knowledge is limited and defective; for besides this union compels the soul to think in conformity with the impressions which objects make on the brain, it is also necessary for the mind to have an infinity of thoughts which have to do with the preservation of the body, which are only confused feelings, or passions and not the distinct image of any object such as it is in itself, being, most of the time affected by modifications which do not clarify it, which do not amplify its true knowledge and which persuade the soul to judge objects by deceptive appearances without its knowing what they
really are like."'6

This idea of the influence of the body on the soul was analyzed in detail and in a systematic manner by Cabanis (I757-I808), a scholar and a doctor, who drew attention to what should constitute genuine medical science in his work: Rapports du Physique et du Moral de l'homme. Bayle shows that morality has nothing to do with religion and it is a mistake to believe that men behave according to their religious beliefs. "It is temperament, a natural inclination for pleasure, the desire for contact with objects, a habit formed in association with friends, or some other disposition which rises from the depth of our nature."'7 "Human life is nothing but a continual struggle between the
16 "Supplement du Commentaire philosophique," 0., XI, 494b. 17 "Pensees diverses," Oeuvres diverses, t. III, sect. CXXXVII, p. 88.

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passions and conscience, in which the latter is nearly always defeated. What is most strange and singular in this conflict is that very often the side is victorious which clashes with our ideas of integrity and also with our temporal interest.'18 Passion is confused thought, that is, thought which is unelaborated in consciousness; it shows the influence either on the mind of external things to which we are exposed or of our own temperament. Here Bayle has indicated that something can be done to better human conduct by improving human environment. Helvetius (I715-I77I) profited from this idea in his work De l'esprit. Bayle looks upon social groups as natural products arising from the needs of human nature. He was the first to show what Montesquieu (I689-1755) afterwards expressed in his work L'Esprit des lois. Moral virtues result from social life; morality, therefore, has no significance apart from human society-a standpoint that d'Holbach (I723-I789) supported in his work Le Syst?me de la Nature. But Bayle does not glorify man as Rousseau did; man has passions which he strives to satisfy; some are good, others are bad, but both have their part to play and their usefulness; and thus Bayle solves the problem of evil-the object of so many controversies. "If the mind, by its subtlety, contrives deceptive stratagems, it can also inspire great confidence and provide several ways of circumspection. If, in a republic such as those of Athens and Rome, where one made no boast of intellect or of liberty, plots and conspiracies against the government were inevitable; yet there were people to be found to overthrow these plans. I may add that in countries where the people are astir, restless and clever, one faction will restrain another by its constant viligance."19 Biological science was beginning to engross the attention of scholars. Bayle was interested in it, but he would not admit the vitalist hypothesis of Boherhave. He could view human nature only from the true positive angle. He repudiated all that was
18"H l1ne," Dictionnaire, III, 263b. 91"Continuation des Penses diverses,"Chap. CXIX, 0., t. III, p. 354b.

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ascribedto the interventionof an immaterialcause which could change the courseof natural laws. Moreover,he rejected whatever was innate whereby certain English deists of his time explained prevailinggeneral notions such as the existence of God; Bayle showed that there were races who had no conceptionof a divine being. In his philosophicalexplanation Bayle was confronted with several difficultieswhich he attempted to solve: i. a collection of atomscannotmakea unity of substance; the assembled of thoughtcannotmakea unityof conelements sciousness; be unitedto how can thoughtwhichis indivisible 3. furthermore, whichis divisible? extension
2.

These problemsembarrassednot only Bayle but also all the other philosophersof the eighteenth century; they were due to the concept of substance which Descartes and the schoolmen entertained and which they could not elucidate so as to explain phenomena. Bayle offers a solution of these problems,but does not attach great importanceto them becausehe is more concernedwith the explanationof phenomenathan with the solving of metaphysical questions. Since he accepts the atom which is an indivisible entity, he can unite thought to it without taking away the latter's identity. As to the unity of consciousness,he believes it to be each other like the elements of extension. Therefore they can be reciprocallypenetratedso as to give a unity of consciousness. Bayle's cosmological system marks a stage of progress of philosophicthought and also shows the applicationof scientific methods to the study of man and his behavior. Undoubtedly many discoverieshave been made and much astonishingprogress, which show the amount of ground covered since Bayle's philosophic contribution. But to him belongs the credit of pointing out the way and he had courageenoughto attack fallaciousthinking which,morethan anythingelse, hinderedintellectualprogress.
conceivable because the elements of thought are not exterior to

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His idea of the animated atom suggested to Diderot (1713-1784) the possibility of a single living matter which was subsequently known as the organic cell. Bayle believed less than the other philosophers in mathematical reasoning or in philosophic dialectic. If he were better known and better understood, he would acquaint us with a philosophy that would be more human, more true, and more constructive.

BrooklynCollege.