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Pylkknen Center of Excellence in the Philosophy of Social Science Department of Philosophy, University of Helsinki, Finland Department of Cognitive Neuroscience and Philosophy University of Skvde, Sweden
activitity, characterized by the high standards of argumentation and clarity typical of analytical philosophy
philosophy of mind (behaviourism, functionalism, eliminative materialism) are impressive But they have one problem: they leave out the mind (consciousness)!
physics
(quantum
theory
and
relativity)
is
competely
irrelevant
in
the
explanation
of
consciousness
For
example,
consciousness
could
be
reducible
to
processes
at
the
classically
describable
level
of
reality
e.g.
mechanistic
computation
implemented
in
us to change radically our general world view In the context of such a new world view we may be able to understand consciousness in a new light Let us consider some such new world views
James Ladyman and Don Ross Every Thing Must Go: Metaphysics Naturalized Oxford University Press, 2007
mental on the physical, the token identity of mental states and physical states, the existence of a hierarchy of levels of reality, and the claim that all causation is physical causation. (38-39)
naturalized
metaphysics
In
particular,
to
unify
weakly
the
special
sciences
by
reference
to
fundamental
physics
So:
the
key
point
is
unication,
and
fundamental
tested by every measurement that could be taken at any scale of reality and in any region of the universe.
sciences (including the parts of physics that are not fundamental) But: it doesnt track information at the multiple scales necessary for capturing most of the real patterns (Dennett 1991) that are the objects of study in chemistry, biology, geology, economics and so on.
there is no fundamental level the real patterns criterion of reality is the last
word
in
ontology
there
is
nothing
more
to
the
existence
of
a
structure
than
what
it
takes
for
it
to
be
a
real
pattern.
rejects
the
assumption
that
the
world
consists
of
little things & that real causation consists of bangings of these things
patterns that behave like particles or spacetime points respectively, just as A tiger is any pattern which behaves as a tiger
there are ultimate constituents of the world, which are not themselves to be understood in structural terms. So far as I am concerned its turtles all the way down (2003d, 129). Or: real patterns all the way down
levels in the rst place. The standard way in which these levels are distinguished is according to size.
colony or the world economy, and evolutionary theory can be applied to entities of any size (even, according to Smolin (2000), to the whole universe).
regard
the
structure
of
space
and
the
metric
used
to
measure
length
as
themselves
emergent
structures.
framework
within
which
to
describe
the
levels
against
which
everything
else
exists!
(2007:
179)
except
those
of
fundamental
physics
are
detectable
at
some
scales
but
not
at
others.
The
same
point
applies
to
everyday
phenomena
tracked by reference to the parochial practical purposes of people, such as tables, hockey games and capital cities
concepts in philosophy of science such as causation and laws in terms of recurrent types of structural relations among real patterns.
the
history
of
modern
science
describe
such
structural
relations
in
mathematical
terms
of
theory
change
in
approximate
form.
what people can ever be expected to be in a position to specify. Ours is thus a realism of lush and leafy spaces rather than deserts, with science regularly revealing new thickets of canopy. Quine appreciated deserts But: LR think the facts now suggest that we must reconcile ourselves to life in the rainforest.
knowledge of the world is purely structural and that qualia are the unknowable non- structural components of reality. On our view, things in themselves and qualia are idle wheels in metaphysics (p.154)
concepts
do
not
track
any
real
patterns
then
the
theory
of
mind
will
have
to
go.
LR
do
not
at
present
think
that
behavioural
and
cognitive
sciences
are
tending
in
this
direction
though
they
do
think
that
the
folk
theory
of
mind
intuitions
when
reasoning
about
the
place
of
consciousness
in
nature
But:
LR
remind
us
that
intuitions
are
the
basis
for
...
everyday
practical
heuristics
...
they are not cognitive gadgets designed to produce systematically worthwhile guidance in either science or metaphysics. (2007:10)
concepts and intuitions about the real patterns we are tracking may be widely mistaken, as with intuitions about qualia and phenomenal conscious states (Dennett 1991b). So: LR leave out consciousness!
world view implied by contemporary physics and the special sciences But: for those whose intuitions suggest that conscious experience is real their project is frustrating
metaphysics
which
are
more
consciousness- friendly?
One
such
is
David
Bohms
implicate
order
framework
Which
includes
the
more
narrow
and
specic
recurrent,
but
externally
related
elements
making
up
relatively
autonomous
sub-totalities,
to
be
described
in
terms
of
an
explicate
order
34
RAINFOREST REALISM
IMPLICATE
ORDER
Accepts the levels metaphor up to a point Qualitative innite of nature There is no fundamental level
RAINFOREST
REALISM
IMPLICATE ORDER
Context relative (a thing is real in its context, e.g. an atom) Movement is fundamental Implicate order prevails in the movement and gives rise to explicate order
RAINFOREST
REALISM
IMPLICATE ORDER
Sceptical of their existence Why? Our intuitions about qualia and phenomenal conscious states are widely mistaken Result of their vericationism
Allows for the existence of qualia and phenomenal experience, at the higher levels of the implicate order Inference to the best explanation The best explanation for the fact that we seem to be conscious is that we are conscious
phenomenal structure of consciousness in both LRs rainforest realism and Bohms implicate order
Kant
&
the
phenomenologists
Van
Gulick:
challenge
is
to
explain
the
order
and
connectedness
we
nd
within
experience,
its
conceptual
organization
spatio-temporal
structure
emotive
tones
and
moods
the
fact
that
our
experience
is
that
of
a
(more
or
less)
RAINFOREST REALISM
IMPLICATE
ORDER
Individuals
are
derived
via
The important real patterns in science are not reducible to facts about the intrinsic properties or natures of individual objects. LR defend a metaphysics that does not take individual things to be fundamental
abstraction from the whole Individuals are approximately separable, stable and recurrent, and externally related elements They make up relatively autonomous sub-totalities, to be described in terms of an explicate order
RAINFOREST REALISM
IMPLICATE ORDER
causation and laws are reconstructed in terms of recurrent types of structural relations among real patterns.
A causal interpretation of quantum theory is possible (Bohm 1952) Non-local interactions go beyond traditional notions of causality
INDIVIDUALS ACROSS SCIENCES: A REVISIONARY METAPHYSICS? Paris, Paris-Sorbonne University, May 18-20, 2012
This conference will gather metaphysicians, philosophers of biology and philosophers of physics and chemistry to oer a reection on criteria of individuality in dierent sciences and to try to develop a unied account on the notion of what an individual is. http://individuals2012.sciencesconf.org/