Walking on Eggshells: Balancing the Spratly Islands between the Peoples Republic of China, the Philippines and the

United States
Sun Hoo Kim and Andrew Dousette Marsh Govt-451 Conflict in Asia D r. P h i l i p K a r b e r Due 20 November 2012

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I.

Introduction
The end of the Cold War changed international relations irrevocably or at least

that is what international relations scholars and military strategists thought in 1991 when they were redrawing their world maps to reflect the new world order. More accurately, the end of the Cold War represented a shift in the world paradigm, away from a bipolar system where the fate of the world depended on the stability of Soviet Union and the United States, to a multipolar region with strong regional powers and the United States haphazardly refocusing and redefining what would be important as the world marched headlong into a new millennia. The fall of the Berlin Wall and Russian communism signaled the end of the predominance of Russia as the central communist world power and refocused it to The Peoples Republic of China, who, as of the early 1990s, was experiencing a period of economic growth and international expansion so much so that both countries in the region and the United States were taken by surprise. But no significant power vacuum is complete without the existence of conflict. Among the many problems the end of the Soviet Union caused, none were more potentially dangerous and unstable than the situation that existed in the South China Sea. Overnight, the power of balance shifted in the South China Sea when the Cold War came to an end. The United State withdrew from Subic Bay in the Philippines and the former Soviet Union withdrew its forces from Carman Bay in Vietnam.1 Suddenly, the Peoples Republic of China stood in the best position to take advantage of the resulting power vacuum and assert its dominance to take control of some of the most strategic and economically significant islands in the entire South China Sea, the Spratly Islands. But The PRC was not the only power to lay claims on the Spratly Islands. Vietnam, Taiwan, Malaysia and Brunei and the Philippines all have separate
1

Hindley, Michael, and James Bridge. "South China Sea: The Spratly and Paracel Islands Dispute." The Word Today 50.6 (June 1994): 109-12. Royal Institute of International Affairs. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40396612 .>. p. 110

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claims to parts or all of the South China Sea and its islands. However, addressing the claims of each and every country is a long and complex process. For the purposes of this paper, only the relationship between the PRC and the Philippines will be addressed, taking into consideration their historical claims to the Spratly Islands, the strategically economic reasons both claim to poses in holding the islands and why international law has failed to resolve this over 50 year old conflict. The role of the United States will also have to be taken into consideration in this analysis as the US has had a significant geopolitical, economic and military presence in the region. Finally this paper will describe the military balance in the region and analyze if or when The PRC and the Philippines will engage in a hot conflict in light of their claims to the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea. Overall, this paper seeks to determine the causes of the conflict in the South China Sea and address the power balance between The PRC and the Philippines in the event that either nation decides to engage in military action against the other.

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II.

Claims to the Spratly Islands and Historical Background

Simply stated, the PRCs basis for its claim to the Spratly Islands comes on the

1. The PRCs Historical Claim in Context principle of the right of prior discovery.2 The PRC claims to have first settled and staked its claim to the Spratly Islands in 1282 during the Yuan Dynasty and since then, every dynasty and political regime has technically held the islands. In fact, it was not until 1931 that the Chinese claims to the Spratly islands were seriously challenged when the French Quai DOrsay sent a note to the Republic of China legation in Paris claiming that the Vietnamese had historical sovereignty in the area. They sighted the examples of the 1816 Emperor Gia Long formally governing the islands and the 1835 Emperor Minh-Mang who had sent some of his subjects to build structures, including a pagoda and a stone tablet on one of the islands.3 Later, in 1935, the French claimed both the Paracels and the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, declaring to both Europe and the Chinese government they no longer could claim dominion on the island chains.4 However, the French did acknowledge that the only people living on the islands at the time of occupation were in fact Chinese and not Vietnamese. At the time, the Chinese government lodged a formal complaint, claiming that the French had invaded Chinese territory, citing the fact that there were only Chinese people living on the islands.5 Moving into the late 1930s the PRC continued to exchange notes with France over the ownership of the Spratly Islands until it became unnecessary in 1939 when Japan would change the course of history in the region. In 1939, Japan, seeking to

Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace." Asian Survey 17.12 (Dec., 1977): 1167-181. University of California Press. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643419 .>. p 1176 3 Ibid. pp 1178 4 See People's Republic of China, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "China's Indisputable Sovereignty Over the Xisha and Nansha Islands," Beijing Review 37, 18 February 1980, pp. 14-15. 5 Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace." Asian Survey 17.12 (Dec., 1977): 1167-181. University of California Press. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643419 .>. p. 1178

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enlarge its imperial holdings, expanded their control to cover Hainan, the Paracel Islands, and the Spratly Islands.6 Backing up their claim with military power, the PRC had no choice but to allow the Japanese to claim the islands and the South China Sea as part of Imperial Japans bourgeoning empire. It was Japans conquest and subsequent surrender that has caused much of the uncertainty as to whom the Spratly Islands belong. This uncertainty, as will be discussed later on, still lingers on today and it the matter of political, economic and military balancing in the region. On 26 August 1945, the Japanese formally surrendered to the United States, withdrawing their forces from the Spratly Islands after a lapse of one year and three months as was specified in their surrender agreement.7 Following the Japanese withdrawal, the Republic of China, before the ROC was exiled to Taiwan, sent a naval contingent with representatives from the Ministry of Internal Affairs and officials from the Kwangtung Provincial government to take over the Islands.8 It would appear that the PRC had retaken the islands and was now in control of them as they always had been. This however proved not to be that case as two major developments took place starting in 1950. The first of these two developments came after the ROC government was forced into exile in 1949. By 1950, the PRC government landed troops on the Hainan Island, forcing the ROC government on Taiwan to withdraw their forces from the Paracel and Spratly Islands back to Taiwan.9 Before the PRC could reoccupy the Spratly
6

Jie, Chen. "China's Spratly Policy: With Special Reference to the Philippines and Malaysia." Asian Survey 34.10 (Oct., 1994): 893-903. University of California Press. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2644968>. p. 896 7 USS Missouri Instrument of Surrender, WWII, Pearl Harbor, Historical Marker Database, www.hmdb.org, [accessed 2 November 2012]. 8 Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace." Asian Survey 17.12 (Dec., 1977): 1167-181. University of California Press. Web. [6 November 2012] <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643419 .>. p. 1179 9 Marlay, Ross. "China, the Philippines and the Spratly Islands." Asian Affairs 23.4 (Winter, 1997): 195-210. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. [accessed 6 November ] 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172414>. p. 197

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Islands, the second major development of the period took place. In order to legally conclude the Second World War, the Japanese Peace Conference was held in San Francisco in August of 1951. The then foreign minister of the PRC who attended the conference, Chou En-Lai, declared that Whether or not the U.S.-British Draft Treaty contains provision on this subject, and no matter how these provisions are worded, the inviolable sovereignty of the PRC over Nanwei Island (the Spratly Islands) and Sisha Islands (the Paracel Islands) will not be in any way affected10 While the Chinese government believed their declaration would be considered as legal reality based on their historical occupation and administration of the Islands, such was not the case. The Treaty of San Francisco, while stipulating that Japan would renounce its claim to the Spratly Islands, did not specific to whom they were to be assigned.11 This vagueness in the language laid the ground for the Philippines to eventually make their claim to the Spratly islands later in the 1950s. 2. The Philippines Historical Claim in Context Unlike Chinas claim to the Spratly Islands and the entire South China Sea, the Philippines claim to the island chain are found in more contemporary history and in the ambiguities of the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco. Legally, the 1951 treaty left the territory that comprises the Spratly Islands open to be claimed according to the principle of Res or terra nullius. Res nullius is the legal principle whereby res, or an object that can be anything, is not yet the object or rights of any specific subject. These types of objects are in principle ownerless and can freely to be claimed or owned.12 As the 1951 treaty left the Spratly Islands ownerless they became the
10

Hung Dah Chiu and Park Choon Ho, "Legal Status of the Paracel and Spratly Islands," Ocean Development and International Law, 3:1, pp. 9-12. 11 Treaty of Peace with Japan (including transcript with signatories: Source attributed : United Nations Treaty Series 1952 (reg. no. 1832), vol. 136, pp. 45164.)". Taiwan Documents Project. [accessed 13 November 2012] 12 Marlay, Ross. "China, the Philippines and the Spratly Islands." Asian Affairs 23.4 (Winter, 1997): 195-210.

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object of Res nullius and therefore open to be claimed by anyone. Though the PRC foreign minister, Chou En-Lai, said the islands belonged to China again, the PRC never properly reclaimed the islands after 1950. Under the legal qualifications of international law as it was understood then, the Spratly islands did not legally belong to the PRC. This fact was not lost on one enterprising citizen of the Philippines in 1956. A private Filipino citizen named Tomas Cloma traveled to the Spratly Islands in 1956 and unilaterally declared a new state on 53 of the islands in the South China Sea, calling it Freedomland.13 In respond, the Republic of China sent a navel contingent to patrol the Spratly Islands but Cloma had already left. Before he had left however, Cloma had asked the Philippines to buy the territory from him and make the islands he had claimed as Freedomland into a protectorate of the Philippines. In 1978, the Philippines annexed the islands on this basis and called them the Kalayaan. Further, the then President, Ferdinand Marcos, issued Presidential decree No. 1596, declaring the Spratly Islands as Philippine territory.14 The primary problem with this decree is that it was anachronistic as the Philippines did not register these claims until the 1970s and Cloma made his original claim to statehood followed by protectorate status in 1956. In the time between these years, both the PRC and ROC has revisited the islands and at numerous times, claimed them.15 It is worth mentioning briefly that among the reasons the Spratly Islands and the South China Sea represents is the fact that there is no owner spelled out in international law. At various times to the present, the PRC, ROC, Vietnam, Brunei, the Philippines, and Malaysia have all registered claims to the
Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. [accessed 6 November 2012] <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172414>. p. 197 13 "PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1596 - DECLARING CERTAIN AREA PART OF THE PHILIPPINE TERRITORY AND PROVIDING FOR THEIR GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION". Chan Robles Law Library. June 11, 1978. 14 Ibid. 15 Furtado, Xavier (December 1999). "International Law and the Dispute over the Spratly Islands: Whither UNCLOS?".Contemporary Southeast Asia: 386404. pp, 397

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South China Sea or parts of it with no clear way to discern to whom it belongs. The next section will consider the ambiguities and failures of international law to settle the conflict over the Spratly Island while creating the grounds for potential conflict in their international relations and power balancing.

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III.

Why the Spratly Islands? Economics and International Law: The Grounds for Conflict

The Spratly Islands consist of over a hundred, small rather unimportant islets, coral reefs, atolls, cats, rocks, sand banks, and sea mounts spread over three hundred and forty thousand square miles in the South China Sea between the Philippines and Vietnam, almost 1000 miles to the South of the PRC.16 Seen from the air, they have relatively little value, are mostly barren, have no natural harbors and are regularly submerged during high tide or when a typhoon hits.17 So why have these relatively useless islands become the flashpoint for a potential conflict between the Philippines and the PRC? There are two primary reasons why these islands have become so important in modern international relations. The first finds its base in the economic abundance of the South China Sea, particularly in the natural resources to be found in the Spratly Island chain beneath the seabed. The second is a strategic argument that finds its beginning in international law and has evolved to become one of strategic balance and fragile international relations. The next two sections will explore these themes. 1. Economic Value and Strategic Interests Above almost any other reason, economic incentives in the South China Sea have provided a reason for the PRC and the Philippines to claim sovereignty over the Spratly Islands as well as giving the United States a reason to stay involved in the region to the present. In 1968 oil was discovered in the region. Currently, the Mineral Resources Ministry of the Peoples Republic of China estimates that the Spratly area holds oil and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons, bigger than the estimated 13 billion

16

Marlay, Ross. "China, the Philippines and the Spratly Islands." Asian Affairs 23.4 (Winter, 1997): 195-210. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172414>. pp 200 17 See D.M. Johnston and M.J. Valencia Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions (Boston: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 12834. p. 129

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tons held by Kuwait, placing it as the fourth largest reserve bed in the world.18 Internationally, the claims from both the PRC and the Philippines have intensified the situation and propelled territorial claims on the region from a number of countries in the region. Adding tension to the situation, on 11 March 1976, the Philippines discovered oil off the coast of an island called Palawan, in close proximity to the Spratly Islands. As of 2010, these oil fields account for about 15% percent of all petroleum consumed in the Philippines.19 Confusingly, as will be seen later, the PRC in 1992 signed a cooperation contract between the China National Offshore Cooperation and Crestone Energy, as US Company based in Denver, Colorado. Their purpose was to mutually explore an area of the South China Sea that includes the Spratly Islands.20 This contract and the vagueness of who owns the territory only adds more fuel to a fire that is barely contained between the PRC and the Philippines. Additional economic sources of conflict can be found in the form of commercial fishing. Since the early 1980s, the South China Sea has been become one of the most lucrative fishing grounds in the world, accounting for almost 8% of the world catch and this number has most certainly risen.21 PRC analysts have estimated that the South China Sea holds combined fishing and oil and gas reserved worth in the area of one trillion dollars. This estimate has caused numerous clashes between the PRC and the Philippines as they claim their territory has been trespassed under the auspices of each countrys Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) as established by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).22

18

Baker et al., Cooperative Monitoring for South China Sea Disputes; and Lin, Taiwans South China Sea Policy, 324. Cf. Central Daily News Taiwan, 2 December 1992, p. 4. 19 Ibid. p. 5 20 Marlay, Ross. "China, the Philippines and the Spratly Islands." Asian Affairs 23.4 (Winter, 1997): 195-210. Taylor & Francis, Ltd. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/30172414>. p. 201 21 R. Haller-Trost, Clive Schofield, and Martin Pratt. "The Brunei-Malaysia Dispute over Territorial and Maritime Claims in International Law" International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, UK. 1997 22 "The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective)". United Nations

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Strategically, the region is also one of the busiest shipping lanes in the world. At the moment, more than half the worlds supertanker traffic passes through the regions water every year. Tanker traffic through the South China Sea is over three times greater than through the Suez Canal and five times more than the Panama Canal. These high numbers mean that over 25% of the worlds crude oil passes through the South China Sea.23 These numbers present two distinct problems. Controlling the Spratly Islands and therefore the shipping lanes in the South China Sea would give its possessor vast economic powers and control over the economy of the region. This has served as a flashpoint for conflict between the PRC and the Philippines over the last couple decades. What is also means is the United States has chosen to stay actively involved in the region. As recently as July of 2012, Secretary of State Hilary Clinton is quoted as saying that Washington is focused on ensuring free navigation, unimpeded commerce and stability in the West Philippines Sea.24 It is estimated that each year, approximately $5.3 trillion of trade goes through the South China Sea with nearly $1.2 trillion of this total accounting for US trade accounts.25 In light of these numbers, it is not difficult to discern why the United States has such a distinct interest in making sure a conflict does not escalate between the PRC and the Philippines. While these economic reasons provide greater detail as to why both the PRC and the Philippines both claim the region, it does not provide any details as to why this situation exists in the first place nor does it tell what how the conflict has

Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea. Retrieved November 11, 2012. 23 R. Haller-Trost, Clive Schofield, and Martin Pratt ."The Brunei-Malaysia Dispute over Territorial and Maritime Claims in International Law". International Boundaries Research Unit, University of Durham, UK, 1997 24 Will the US defend Philippines if China Attacks. Jojo Malig, ABS -CBNnew.com. Posted at 07/25/2012 10:58 PM | Updated as of 7/25/2012 11:15 PM, Retrieved on 11/4/2012. http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attacks 25 Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012), <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> [accessed 1 October 2012]

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manifested itself in their international relations. The next section will address these problems. 2. International Law and Relations: the Peoples Republic of China, the Philippines and the United States Balancing. The history and carefully balancing act between the Peoples Republic of China, the Philippines and the United States is a long a nuanced one, too long for the scope of this paper. For the purpose of giving as succinct analysis of this relationship, this section will be confined to discussing the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 3) of 1973 as this where the groundwork for the modern day causes of conflict come from. In regards to international relations and prior conflicts between the PRC and the Philippines, this paper will be limited in scope to only consider events that have occurred since the election of President Ramos of the Philippines and the appointment of Jiang Zemin as General Secretary of the Communist Party of China in 1989. A. The Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 3) was convened in 1973 and did not end until 1982, entering into force on 16 November 1994. In 1968, the Soviet Union took the initiative of convening a new conference with the express purpose of seeking acceptance for a twelve-mile territorial water principle for fishing zones, freedom of transit across international waters, and machinery to accommodate costal states special interests.26 Unsatisfied with the Soviet requests and being left out of the conference initially, Latin American countries held two conferences that ultimately came up with the idea of the Patrimonial Sea. Under this idea, costal states have the right to the renewable and non-renewable resources found in the waters in the seabed and in the sub-soil of an
26

L. D. M. Nelson, "The Patrimonial Sea," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1973, pp. 673 and 674.

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area adjacent to the territorial seas, and this territory would not exceed a 200 nautical miles circumference. Under the law, freedom of navigation would be ensured.27 Concurrently and with the aid of this compromise in international law, countries like Indonesia and the Philippines were further defining what a 200 mile economic zone would mean for their countries as they were technically archipelagos.28 By the time the UNCLOS 3 concluded and was ratified by 1982 and entered into force, it was understood that archipelagos could maintain an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) for 200 nautical miles around their islands as long as rite of passage was given to any ship sailing through territorial waters. This right was called the Doctrine of Innocent Passage.
29

Though UNCLOS 3 entered into force in

1994, it created a problem that has plagued relations in the South China Sea since the early 1990s. The PRC did not ratify or approve UNCLOS 3 immediately, the Philippines did. The PRCs main objection is that it did not want to restrict its actions in regards to the South China Sea nor did it want to be tied down to the strictures of international law as it was spelled out by the First World. Instead, the PRC sent out a letter that affirmed its rejection of innocent passage in a nations territorial waters. Further, the PRC substituted the terms 200-mile maritime right for 200-mile territorial sea, describing this zone not as a territory but as an exclusive economic zone.30 This statement left much ambiguity as to what the PRC was eventually going to do in regards to the 200-mile zone. Ultimately, the PRC did ratify UNCLOS 3, using this assumption as their basis for ratification.

27

L. D. M. Nelson, "The Patrimonial Sea," International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 22, 1973 p. 677 28 H. P. Rajan, "Toward a Codification of Archipelagos in International Law," Indian Journal of International Law., July, September, 1973. 13:3, p. 468. 29 Katchen, Martin H. "The Spratly Islands and the Law of the Sea: "Dangerous Grounds" for Asian Peace." Asian Survey 17.12 (Dec., 1977): 1167-181. University of California Press. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2643419 .>. pp 1175 30 Jerome Alan Cohen and Hung Dah Chiu, People's China and International Law, Vol. 1, p. 548. Letter between delegation of China Fishery Association and the delegate of Japan. China Fishery Council, 1963.

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It is at this point the vagueness of international law comes through clearly. If UNCLOS 3 holds as customary international law as it has since entering into force in 1994, then both the PRC and the Philippines can legally lay claims to the Spratly Islands as a part of their economic or territorial zones. Ergo, the question of to whom the territory legally belongs has become the basis for conflict between the two regional powers in the modern era. B. International Relations, Balancing and the Grounds for Conflict It is prudent to state at the beginning of this section that relations of any sort between the Philippines and the PRC are not a new development. Although the PRC and the Philippines only reestablished diplomatic relations in 1975, there has been ongoing trade and migration between the two countries for centuries and this has only increased in the past decade due to the expanding Chinese economy. However, the last two decades of RPC-Philippines relations have left the question of potential conflict today very open as the last 20 years have shown there to be only an forced stability between the two countries. An analysis of their diplomatic affairs since 1992 should demonstrate this fact. As of 1993, the Philippines had a military presence in the Spratly Islands. At the time, President Ramos of the Philippines was informed by the Chairman of the Standing Committee of the National Peoples Congress, Qiao Shi that the PRC was determined to contribute and help maintain peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region and had no intention of attacking the Philippines military installation in the Spratly Islands.31 Going forward, the PRC supported the idea that the ASEAN Regional Forum could serve as a meeting and dialogue venue for both nations to communicate with one another and facilitate negotiations the state reached with one another during the Presidents state visit to the PRC in 1993. 32
31

A New Regional Order in South-East Asia: ASEAN in the Post Cold War Era' , by Amitav Akhara (Adelphi Paper 279, August 1993). p. 64 32 Ibid. p. 65

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Moving forward to 1995, the PRC and the Philippines were able to broker a dispute within the ASEAN Regional Forum, agreeing that each nation would inform the other of any and all military movement within the Spratly Islands and that there would be no further construction on any of the islands. This agreement was immediately violated by the PRC when they sent in naval vessels to repair fishing shelters they claimed where damage in a storm. In response, the Philippines lodged a formal protest with both ASEAN and the United Nations, insisting that the PRC remove its structures on the Spratly Islands. The Philippines also increased naval patrols in Kalayaan and invited American politicians to come and inspect PRC bases by plane.33 This was a low point in Sino-Filipino relations during the 1990s that almost saw military escalation and conflict. Despite these early indications of potential conflict in the 1990s, the first 12 years of the 21st century has arguably seen tensions at its worst and diplomatic relations at its best between the Philippines and the PRC. In 2001, Gloria MacapagalArroyo became President of the Philippines and she propelled the PRC to become one of the Philippines largest trading and business partners, signing over 100 socalled cooperation agreements during her term that ended in 2010. 34 Concurrently, the Philippines also pulled troops out of Iraq in 2004, leading to a temporary but memorable chill in relations with the United States during which time Arroyo and Hu Jintao in Beijing saw a warming of relations.35 Throughout this early period, almost all questions of maritime disputes between the Philippines and the PRC were subdued in preference to amicable relations. But this amicable period did not last forever. Since the Philippines gained its freedom from the United States, the US and Philippines have always enjoyed cordial relations; both countries do military exercises with the other on an annual basis

33

Landler, Mark. "Offering to Aid Talks, U.S. Challenges China on Disputed Islands". The New York Times. (2010-07-23) 34 D.J. Yap, China Admits Close PH-US Relations, Philippine Daily Inquirer, December 12, 2010. 35 Ibid.

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while the Philippines and the PRC are always cautious not to upset the tenuous bonds they have with one another. The Chinese have acknowledged the fact that the relationship the US shares with the Philippines is fundamentally different from PRCFilipino relations.36 The elections of President Obama in 2008 and the election of President Aquino of the Philippines in 2010 marked a shift in the power balance in the region. At the beginning of the Obama administration, President Obama promised that America would refocus or pivot its attention back on Asia after eight years of a Bush Presidency that largely ignored Asia as it waged war in the Middle East and reaffirm Americas commitment to its allies in South East Asia.37 In April of 2012 this commitment was put to the test. On 10 April 2012, the PRC and the Philippines became embroiled in a navel standoff in disputed territorial waters in the South China Sea.38 The conflict occurred when the Philippine Navy Frigate, BRP Gregorio del Pilar, was sent to investigate the reported sighting of eight Chinese fishing boats at Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly Island chain and discovered that one of them was carrying coral, giant clams and live sharks, all things that are protected under Philippine law. Both sides claimed the other had violated the others sovereignty and lodged diplomatic complaints with the other. In the subsequent months, the Chinese government advised its nationals against traveling to the Philippines and raised trade barriers on goods from the Philippines.3940 Later, on 16 May 2012, both nations implemented a fishing ban in

36

Steven Rood, U.S. Military and the Philippines: What do Philippine Citizens Really Think? The Asia Foundation, February 1, 2012. 37 Carlyle Thayer, Standoff at Scarborough Shoal: Implications for USChina Relations, China US Focus, May 9, 2012, http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/standoff-at-scarborough-shoal-implicationsfor-us-china-relations/ (accessed November 4, 2012). 38 Thayer, Carlyle A. "Standoff at Scarborough Shoal: Implications for Us-China Relations. "China-US Focus:. 2011 China-United States Exchange Foundation, 9 May 2012. Web. 19 Nov. 2012. <http://www.chinausfocus.com/peace-security/standoff-at-scarborough-shoal-implications-for-us-chinarelations/>. 39 Damian Grammaticas. "China bangs the war drum over South China Sea". BBC. (May 9, 2012) Retrieved

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the Scarborough Shoal and by June, both nations had withdrawn their vessels from around the shoal. As of September, the PRC still maintains ships near the Shoal and turn away Filipino vessels that try to enter the area around the Shoal.41 In essence, there is a basic strategic calculation that is taking place here: the first nation to leave the Shoal will be perceived internationally and domestically as ceding sovereignty. This current situation puts the United States in a difficult place. The United States has long been neutral on the sovereignty issues involving the South China Sea. The question is, should it be? In 1951 the United States and the Philippines signed a Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) that among other things recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on either of the Parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common dangers in accordance with its constitutional process.42 What this basically means is that there are three contingencies that could result from this guarantee. The first envisions a direct attack on the territory of the Philippines or the United States. Second, a direct attack on the island territories under the Philippines or the United States jurisdiction in the Pacific. Finally, an attack on either partys armed forced, public vessels or aircraft in the Pacific.43 The text of the MDT leaves it very much open as to whether the US commitment to the Philippines in this situation is credible. Under the second envisioned scenario, the Philippines sees the Spratly Islands and therefore Scarborough Shoal as their sovereign territory. However, thanks to the ambiguity of the UNCLOS 3 and the inability of international law to determine to whom the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea belong, the US has chosen to remain inactive and neutral throughout the
Novemeber 11, 2012. 40 Barbara Demick "China cancels tours to Philippines over South China Sea dispute". Los Angeles Times. (May 10, 2012). 41 "China to enforce fishing ban in disputed waters". The Jakarta Post. May 14, 2012. Retrieved November 17, 2012. 42 See, "Republic of the Philippines". U.S. Department of State. Retrieved 11/18/2012. 43 Lohman, Walter. "Scarborough Shoal and Safeguarding American Interests." Issue Brief 3603 (May, 2012): 1-4. The Heritage Foundation. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://report.heritage.org/ib3603>. p. 2

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conflict thus far. The International Crisis Group (ICG) commented that While the text calls for the US to respond to an armed attack against the Philippines, Manila only received vague assurances that Washington would uphold the treaty during the Scarborough standoff.44 However, there are conflicting messages. In the same ICG brief, Foreign Affairs Secretary Albert del Rosario is reported as issuing a statement through the Obama administration, stating the US renewed its commitment to the defense of the Philippines if the PRC attacks Filipino forces in the Spratly Islands. It is hard to ignore this statement when two months after the standoff in the Spratly Islands began, both President Obama and President Aquino reaffirmed their commitment to the US-Philippine Mutual Defense Treaty, as well as to the peace and security of the Asia-Pacific region, during their bilateral meeting at the White House in June of 2012.45 Still, the US has done nothing and there are still Chinese vessels stationed off of Scarborough Shoal in the Spratly Islands. This begs a few questions. If the US is willing to do nothing militarily and the Chinese have already shown they are willing to engage in war over sovereignty claims in the Spratly Islands, where does this leave the PRC and the Philippines? Thus far, this paper has addressed both nations historical and legal claims to the Spratly Islands. Taken into consideration has been the economic and strategic advantage both sides would exclusively gain if they were to control the Spratly Islands. Also under examination here was the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea and why international customary law has thus far failed to resolve the issues in the South China Sea. Finally, the current and past conflicts in the region under the Arroyo presidency and now, the current sovereignty dispute and standoff over Scarborough Shoal under President Aquino has shown the US unwilling to commit itself militarily under the auspices of the 1951 MDT, leaving
44

Will the US defend Philippines if China Attacks. Jojo Malig, ABS -CBNnew.com. Posted at 07/25/2012 10:58 PM | Updated as of 7/25/2012 11:15 PM, Retrieved on 11/4/2012. http://www.abs-cbnnews.com/depth/07/25/12/will-us-defend-philippines-if-china-attacks 45 Lohman, Walter. "Scarborough Shoal and Safeguarding American Interests." Issue Brief 3603 (May, 2012): 1-4. The Heritage Foundation. Web. 6 Nov. 2012. <http://report.heritage.org/ib3603>. p.3

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the Philippines on its own to defend against a potential armed conflict with the PRC. However, the fact of the matter is if the Scarborough Shoal conflict escalates into a real international crisis between the Philippines and the PRC, under the conditions of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty, the United States will be forced to fulfill its role as an ally to the Philippines and seek to intervene in the crisis. Given what has been said from Washington in recent months, such an attack would have to be a direct assault initiated by the PLA against either a Filipino vessel on the seas, or a direct assault against the mainland Philippines. Which side is likely to win in a conflict? How would this conflict play out? The next section of this paper will address these questions and more in an in-depth military analysis and balance.

Kim and Marsh 19

IV. Military Balance

1. Premises The Peoples Republic of China and the United States are powerful countries with both nuclear and advanced conventional capabilities. As a result, military balance can mean different things in different contexts. It is therefore necessary to discuss the circumstance under which they may get involved in military conflicts, which would limit the weapons they may use and scope of the battle. First, each side will engage in and continue military conflict only if the benefit exceeds cost. The PRCs interests include natural resources, control of trade and navigation, prestige, and so on. The US, on the other hand, would want to continue free navigation through South China Sea, maintain its prestige in the region, and prove its loyalty to its allies. Moreover, both countries have interest in not losing their men and equipment, possibly the US more than the PRC. Thus when military conflicts are expected to result in more losses than gains of these interests, one side will avoid the conflict and give into the other sides demand. Second, mutual nuclear deterrence is assumed to hold. Nuclear warfare may increases the cost of warfare dramatically, and a rational country, which we assume U.S and PRC to be, is unlikely to engage in a nuclear warfare. Moreover, they have interests in maintaining the stigma attached to the use of nuclear weapons, which would be eliminated the moment a country actually uses a nuclear weapon. Neither country would threaten to use nuclear weapon, either, for this would increase pressure for the other side to preemptively launch a nuclear weapon. Indeed throughout the history, most countries did not use their weapons of mass destruction (WMD) even when faced with the prospect of imminent defeat. German did not employ its chemical weapon during World War II, and neither did Iraq during the First Gulf War.46 This is not to say that nuclear warfare is impossible. The

46

Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point -of-Departure Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010),

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US may decide to carry out a preemptive nuclear strike if it believes that it can successfully eliminate all Chinese nuclear weapons through it47 and that such victory brings more benefit than cost to the US. In such case, the analysis presented in this paper would not be applicable. Related to the first and second assumption, a conflict that may take place in South China Sea would be quick and limited. While the PRC and the US both have important interests in South China Sea, they would not risk an escalation into a prolonged major warfare. For example, while the US would defend the Philippines in order to honor their alliance, the US would try to reach peace after the initial exchange. Thus, the only forces included in this balance analysis are the entire Philippine force, the forces of Guangzhou Military Region for the PRC, the forces in the West Pacific for the US. Again, a military conflict can escalate into a larger warfare, in which case our analysis would be inapplicable. Fourth, amphibious and land operations, if they are carried out, would follow the initial naval and aerial victory rather than happening simultaneously. Air and surface support is crucial in carrying out an amphibious mission,
48

and this means air and

surface combatants may have to fight inefficiently to maximize the protection of the amphibious forces. Thus it is irrational for a country to carry out an amphibious operation against islands that are nearly 800 miles away while fighting enemy air force and navy. For this reason, land or marine forces are not included in this analysis of balance in South China Sea. In this paper, we are interested in which side can win the first decisive victory, and it would be this victory that would determine

<http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 50. 47 Scholars such as Lieber and Press argued that the U.S. is now capable of eliminating all the Russian or Chinese nuclear weapons with through initial strike. See there article The Rise of U.S. Nuclear Primacy, Foreign Affairs, vol. 85, (2006): pp. 42-54. 48 st Amphibious Operations in the 21 Century, (Quantico, VA: United States Marine Corps Base Quantico, 18 March 2009), <http://www.quantico.usmc.mil/seabasing/resources/Articles/amphib%20Ops%20in%20the%2021st%20C entury.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 28.

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what may follow. 2. Naval Balance

Table 1 Naval Forces of the PRC, the Philippines, and the US Naval Force Type PRC South Sea Fleet Philippines U.S. (CSG 5, SUBGRU 7) Philippines + US Aircraft Carriers 0 0 1 1 Cruisers 0 0 2 2 Destroyers 5 0 7 7 Frigates 24 1 0 1 Diesel-Electric Submarines 18 0 0 0 SSNs 2 0 3 3 SSBNs 1 0 0 0 Sources: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 54-68, 233-42, 276-7. COMCARSTRKGRU FIVE, Ameircas Navy, <http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ccsg5/Pages/ourship.aspx#.UKm4TeQ8CSq> [accessed 1 October 2012]. COMDESRON FIFTEEN, Ameircas Navy, <http://www.desron15.navy.mil/> [accessed 1 October 2012]. Ships, Submarines, & Units, Commander Submarine Group 7, <http://www.ctf74.navy.mil/engagements/forces.htm> [accessed 1 October 2012]. Commander Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, Ameircas Navy, <http://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/Pages/USNavyPacificFleetShipsbyClass.aspx#> [accessed 1 October 2012].

As shown in Table 1, the United States has clear advantage when it comes to balance of surface combatants. The Peoples Republic of China does not have any aircraft carrier or cruiser and has fewer destroyers than the United States. In the absence of all other forces, the United States dominates the naval surface balance. However, when it comes to undersea balance, the United States is severely disadvantaged, to the point that it can tip the overall naval balance in favor of the PRC. All of the 21 submarines except for the nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarines (SSBN) are equipped with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs).49 Moreover, as a result of the Peoples Liberation Armys (PLA) modernization effort, the submarines can use more and better weapons, as well as better avoid
49

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2012), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 23.

Kim and Marsh 22

detection.50 On the other hand, the United States has almost no submarines that can be deployed to South China Sea when China initiates a military conflict. Only three nuclear powered Los Angeles-class submarines (SSNs) under Submarine Group 751 cover entire areas of responsibility of the 5th and 7th fleet or as their website proudly states, nearly half the world.52 While they are technological superior to their Chinese counterparts and are armed with guided cruise missiles, they cannot be counted upon to be of great help in case a conflict occurs in South China Sea. The speed of these submarines are approximately 25 knots,53 and thus unless one of the three submarines happens to be near South China Sea at the moment a conflict occurs, they would cannot come back in time to tilt the balance towards the USPhilippine force. Lack of submarines in West Pacific is especially a serious problem for the United States because the submarines play a major role in anti-submarine warfare,54 which is the biggest weakness of the United States. In late 2006, a Chinese submarine stalked a US carrier battle group led by USS Kitty Hawk without detection until it was less than five miles away from the group, which is well within the firing range of its missiles and torpedoes.55 ASW capable weapons in the battle group included sox S-3B Viking ASW aircrafts and four SH-60F Seahawk ASW helicopters, attached to
50

The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 23. 51 Ships, Submarines, & Units, Commander Submarine Group 7, <http://www.ctf74.navy.mil/engagements/forces.htm> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 52 Home, Commander Submarine Group 7, <http://www.csg7.navy.mil/index.htm> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 53 U.S. Navy Fact Sheet: Attack Submarines - SSN, Ameircas Navy, <http://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_print.asp?cid=4100&tid=100&ct=4&page=1> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 54 Eleni Ekmektsioglou and Matthew Hallex, Chinese Submarines and U.S. Anti -Submarine Warfare Capabilities, e-International Relations, (27 August 2011), <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/27/theundersea-balance-in-the-western-pacific-chinese-submarines-and-u-s-anti-submarine-warfarecapabilities/> [accessed 1 October 2012] 55 China Sub Stalked U.S. Fleet, Washington Times, (13 November 2006), <http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/nov/13/20061113-121539-3317r/?page=all> [accessed 1 October 2012].

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USS Kitty Hawk, and one attack submarine that was part of the battle group. This case suggests that in an actual conflict, the 21 Chinese submarines would be able to inflict major damage to U.S surface combatants. Dong-feng 21D (DF-21D) anti-ship ballistic missile (ASBM) is another major factor that may potentially give the PRC advantage in a naval conflict. As seen in figure 1, this ballistic missile is capable of mid-course ballistic correction as well as terminal guidance after re-entering the atmosphere.56 This makes the missile highly capable of hitting moving targets such as US aircraft carriers, against which it is designed.57 The terminal guidance can also extend the missiles range by hundreds of nautical miles compared to other medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBM), as shown in Figure 2. Therefore, in the event of a military conflict with the United States in South China Sea, DF-21D can target any of the US ships involved. Combined with the undersea superiority, this ASBM serves as a great to any US ships engaging in a battle with PLA Navy within the keep out zone.58

56

The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 26. 57 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2012), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2012_CMPR_Final.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 22 58 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point -of-Departure Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010), <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/> [accessed 1 October 2012], pp. 21-22

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Figure 1 ASBM Concept of Operations

Source: The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 27.

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Figure 2 The Range of DF-21 ASBM, Comparison with That of Other Chinese Ballistic Missiles and Combat Radius of Strike Aircraft

Source: Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010), <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 18.

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Figure 3 PRC's "Keep Out" Zone

Source: Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point-ofDeparture Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010), <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 22.

There are three ways that the United States can neutralize DF-21. First, it can preemptively destroy the missiles before it is launched. This option is not practical because DF-21D missiles are mounted on highly mobile transporter erector launcher (TEL).59 As a result, not only are they difficult to locate in the first place, but they may have moved by the time pre-emptive strikes are launched against them. Second, the US can intercept the missile is launched. If the US intercepts it using a nuclear missile, the US risks escalation into a nuclear war by giving the PRC a justification to use nuclear weapons. If the US uses conventional weapons, the missile is extremely hard to shoot down. Hitting a normal ballistic missile already requires extreme precision; hitting a ballistic missile that adjusts its course twice is
59

The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 27.

Kim and Marsh 27

near impossibility.60 The last option, and the most practical one, is to disable the radars and ISR nodes, on which an ASBM relies for targeting.61 This will be further discussed in the section about operation. One major issue with DF-21D ASBM is that its full operational capability has not been confirm. Thus it is known whether it can actually track the aircraft carrier after re-entering the atmosphere and successfully hit its target. Details regarding the development of DF-21D are shown in Table 2.
Table 2 Development of DF-21D Date Event 2002.12.19 2003 2004 2006 2008 2008 2009 2010.8.3 2010. 2011.2.18 2011 successful test flight of the terminally guided DF21C MRBM.104 First mention of the CSS5 MRBM in DoD annual report. The Science of Second Artillery Campaigns book details potential operational uses for an ASBM. The Office of Naval Intelligence references Chinas interest in developing an ASBM. The Defense Intelligence Agency acknowledges Chinas development of an ASBM. First mention of the ASBM in DoD annual report. DF21D variant constructed, initial operational capability estimated at 2012. Private sector analysts estimate the initial operational capability (IOC) of an ASBM to be a ways off. 12Admiral Willard (Commander, U.S. Pacific Command) announces that Chinas ASBM has reached IOC. Chinese media reports that the ASBM is already deployed in the army. General Chen Bingde (Director, PLA General Staff Dept.) publicly confirms that the ASBM is in development.

Source: Amy Chang and John Dotson, Indigenous Weapons Development in Chinas Military Modernization, (Washington, DC: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, 5 April 2012), <http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2012/China-Indigenous-Military-DevelopmentsFinal-Draft-03-April2012.pdf>, [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 21.

60

The People's Liberation Army Navy: A Modern Navy with Chinese Characteristics, (Suitland, MD: Office of Naval Intelligence, August 2009), <http://www.fas.org/irp/agency/oni/pla-navy.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], pp. 26-27. 61 Jan van Tol, Mark Gunzinger, Andrew Krepinevich, and Jim Thomas, AirSea Battle: A Point -of-Departure Operational Concept, (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 18 May 2010), <http://www.csbaonline.org/publications/2010/05/airsea-battle-concept/> [accessed 1 October 2012], pp. 59-61

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In sum, while the US-Philippine force has overwhelming advantage in terms of surface combatants, overall naval balance is tilted toward the PRC because of its undersea superiority. Once the capacity of the PRCs new ASBM is confirmed, the balance would further shift toward the PRC. 3. Air/Air Defense Balance
Figure 4 Military Regions and Major Formations of PLA

Source: The Military Balance 2011: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), p. 197.

Analyzing aerial balance is complicated because the number of deployable aircrafts depends on the countrys proximity to the area in which conflict occurs and its capacity to refuel aircraft in air. In the case of the fighters of Peoples Republic of China, only the fighter regiments in Chengdu Military Region, Guangzhou Military

Kim and Marsh 29

Region, and Nanjing Military Region that consist of F-8 (J-8)62 or F-10 (J-10) fighters were counted. This decision was made based on 2010 report by National Air and Space Intelligence Center that PLA Air Force has limited aerial refueling capability and thus is able to refuel only F-8 and F-10 aircraft.63 No Chinese fighters can be expected to fight around Spratly Islands, which is at least 800 miles away from most Chinese air bases, without aerial refueling. Thus the only fighter regiments included for the PRC side were a regiment of F-8H aircraft under 9th Naval Aviation Division of South Sea Fleet, a regiment of F-10 aircraft under 2nd Fighter Division of Guangzhou Military Region, a regiment of F-10 aircraft under 9th Fighter Division of Guangzhou Military Region, and a regiment of F-10 aircraft under 44th Fighter Division in Chengdu Military Region. 3rd Fighter Division in Nanjing Military Region also had a regiment of F-10 aircraft, but it was excluded because it was too far in the north. The numbers of aircraft are given in a range because only approximate number of aircraft per regiment could was available, which was between 16 and 30.64 Four bomber and ground attack regiments were included regardless whether they can be refueled in air. The 2011 annual report of US Department of Defense writes that the engage enemy surface combatants located up to 1,850km away from Chinese coast with long-range cruise missiles.65 Therefore, a regiment of B-6G (H6G) bombers under 8th Naval Aviation Division of South Sea Fleet, a regiment of FB7A (JH-7A) ground attack fighters under 9th Naval Aviation Division of South Sea Fleet, two regiments of B-6H (H-6H) and B-6K (H-6K) bombers under 8th Bomber
62

I use the names used by the Annual Report of the Department of Defense, which are used for export versions of the aircraft. Names in parentheses are the ones used within the PRC. 63 People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010, (Wright-Patterson, OH: National Air & Space Intelligence Center, 1 August 2010), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla_af_2010.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 7 64 People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010, (Wright-Patterson, OH: National Air & Space Intelligence Center, 1 August 2010), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla_af_2010.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 71. 65 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washi ngton, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 29, 33.

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Division in Guangzhou Military Region are included in the analysis.66 The United States have much better refueling capacity, so all the US aerial forces in West Pacific were included in the balance analysis. There are twelve KC-130J Super Hercules tankers in under US Marine Corps in Okinawa, each of which can carry over 12,000 gallons of fuels and refuel two aircraft simultaneously.67 Moreover, as long as the US planes can make it to Philippines and carry out initial battle, it can land on Philippine airfields and refuel there.68 Lastly, the USS George Washington can also provide some refueling to aircraft engaging in battle. Those are Fifth Air Force in Osan, South Korea, which is about 2000 miles away from Spratly Islands; Seventh Air Force in Okinawa, Japan, which is about 1300 miles away from Spratly Islands; and Carrier Air Wing 5, which belongs to Carrier Strike Group 5. While the exact number aircraft of Fifth and Seventh Air Forces were available, the number of aircraft under Carrier Air Wing was approximated based on The Military Balance 2012, which said a Nimitz-class aircraft carrier consists of 55 F/A-18 Hornet FGA aircraft.69 Because of its proximity to Spratly Islands, the Philippines can deploy all its aircraft even without aerial refueling capability. However, the Philippines had no aircraft that can engage in an actual military conflict.

66

Although B-6H and B-6K are not mentioned in the report, they are included here because they are upgraded versions of B-6G. 67 KC-130J SUPER HERCULES, US Marine Corps, <http://www.marines.com/operating forces/equipment/aircraft/kc-130j-super-hercules> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 68 Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, (Washington, DC: Council on Fo reign Relations, April 2012), <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> [accessed 1 October 2012] p. 2. 69 The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics , (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), p. 57.

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Figure 5 Locations of the Land-Based Fighters of the PRC and the US that Can Be Deployed to Spratly Islands

Table 3 Aerial Forces of the PRC, the Philippines, and the US

Aircraft Type FTR/FGA Bombers/Ground Attack Bombers Average Training Hours FTR/FGA Average Training Hours PRC 64-120 64-120 100-150 100-150 Philippines 0 0 0 N/A U.S. 203 0 260 189 Philippines + U.S. 203 0 260 189

Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 54-68, 233-42, 276-7., People's Liberation Army Air Force 2010, (Wright-Patterson, OH: National Air & Space Intelligence Center, 1 August 2010), <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/nasic/pla_af_2010.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 72

Even if all PLA fighter regiments consist of 30 aircraft, the PRC is largely outnumbered by the US fighters. Considering that the US has better technology in general and that the US pilots are much better trained, the United States has a clear advantage over the PRC in air. The PRC has a significant number of bombers which can launch long-range

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ASCMs. They can contribute to anti-access/area denial (A2AD) in combination with PRCs superior the ASBMs and submarines.70 However, because the US has much stronger and numerous fighter forces, PLA bombers activities against surface combatants can be effectively thwarted. Thus USs superiority in fighters limits the PRCs A2AD capability. In order to offset the huge disadvantage it has in carrying out air combats in a distant sea, the PRC has improved air defense capability of its navy.71 All five destroyers and nine of 24 frigates under South Sea Fleet are armed with surface-toair missiles, and both the number and quality of surface combatants with anti-air capability continues to increase over time. 4. Space/Counterspace Balance
Table 4 Satellites of the PRC, the Philippines, and the US
Satellite Type Communication Positioning/Navigation/Timing Meteorology/Oceanography ISR Electronic/Signals Intelligence Space Surveilance Early Warning PRC Philippines 4 10 0 15 11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 U.S. Philippines + U.S. 31 31 6 10 20 1 5 31 31 6 10 20 1 5

Source: The Military Balance 2012: the Annual Assessment of the Military Capabilities and Defence Economics, (London, UK: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2012), pp. 54-68, 233-42, 276-7.

Balance in the space is significant because it determines how much intelligence a country has and how well it can target enemies ships, launchers, etc. In terms of the number of satellites, the United States is clearly superior; it has more satellites than the PRC in all but one types. The Philippines has no satellite that can be used for
70

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 29. 71 Ibid., p. 4.

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military purpose. In terms of anti-satellite (ASAT) capability, exact data is not available. However, from the fact that the PRC tested its first ASAT missile against its weather satellite in January 2007,72 22 years after US did its first test,73 it can be assumed that the US has superior ASAT capability as well. However, neither side has actually used an ASAT weapon against an enemy satellite, and whether they would be able to in a real combat is still in doubt.74 However, it seems that the PRC is not necessarily trying to win the space balance. US Air Force officers Richard J. Adams and Martin E. France have pointed out, Chinese interests in space weapons do not hinge on winning a potential US-Chinese ASAT battle or participating in a space arms race. Rather, the purpose of the PRCs space program is to counter the space-enabled advantage of US conventional forces.75 In other words, all that the PRC is aiming at is to overcome the advantage the US has in conventional warfare by developing some space and counterspace capability. According to the 2011 Annual Report of the Department of Defense, the PRC seems to be largely successful in achieving this goal; it reports that the PRCs space activities have significant impact on its A2AD effort.76 Not only has the PRC become mostly independent in positioning, navigation, and timing (PNT) and communication functions, the it is even supplying those satellites to other countries. Also, the PRC has enhanced its ability to track satellites and attack them using both

72

Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2011, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 37. 73 AFSPC Milestone: First US ASAT Intercept, Air Force Space Command Public Affairs, (15 September 2012), <http://www.afspc.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123317577> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 74 Baohui Zhang, The Security Dilemma in the U.S. -China Military Space Relationship, Asian Survey, vol. 51, (2011): p. 317. 75 Baohui Zhang, The Security Dilemma in the U.S. -China Military Space Relationship, Asian Survey, vol. 51, (2011): p. 312. 76 Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic o f China 2011, (report prepared for the U.S. Congress, by the Office of the Secretary of Defense; Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Defense, May 2011), <http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf> [accessed 1 October 2012], p. 35.

Kim and Marsh 34

kinetic and non-kinetic means.77 Lastly, The PRCs C4ISR based on satellites and over-the-horizon (OTH) radars is increasing its capacity to identify, track, and target enemy combatants,78 and this would play a crucial role in the use of its ASBM. 5. Operations and Overall Balance The course of actual military conflict among the PRC, the Philippines, and the US can be predicted based on three factors: first, our premise that neither the PRC nor the US would start a nuclear war or cause an escalation into one; second, historical precedents of Chinese actions in South China Sea; and third, military balance analyzed above. The conflict will begin when the PLA Navy attacks the Philippine ships or occupations in Spratly Islands. The Philippines would not start a war since it has an extremely weak military, and since it expects the US support only when it is attacked by an adversary. The US has little justification for initiating a fight in South China Sea, and the US attack of Chinese territory or ships in South China Sea is likely to escalate into a total war, which the US would not risk. Besides, as long as the PRC does not cut off the US navigation in South China Sea, the US would not have an incentive to start a conflict. On the other hand, the PRC has interests that can be achieved only through the use of military. The PRC have to fight the Philippines in order to establish its hegemony in the region or capture the natural resources. If the PRC does start a battle, it would do so by attacking the Philippine ships or occupations in Spratly Islands, not by attacking the US ships directly. Attacking the US ships first, even if strategically desirable in order to achieve a quick decisive victory, risks starting a total war, as the Japanese attack of Pearl Harbor exemplifies. It is also possible that the PRC may unintentionally initiate a military conflict while simply trying to scare the Philippine forces away. The uncertainty regarding exactly what action will trigger the US intervention reinforces the possibility of the PRC starting
77 78

Ibid., p. 37. Ibid., p. 38.

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an unintended battle. Once a major conflict begins between the PRC and the Philippines, the US would intervene in order to fulfill its ally obligation. It is in the best interest of the US to take out the PRCs ISR satellites using ASAT weapons; this would not only show that the US is willing to use force but also cripple the Chinese ASBMs and ASCMs. If the PRC is unable to use its ASBMs, the PRC may back down because it of its huge disadvantage in fighter aircraft and surface combatants. However, if the PRC is still able to successfully launch its ASBMs, whether it is because the US ASAT missiles fail or because the OTH radars provide sufficient information regarding the locations of the US surface combatants, the submarines would be able penetrate the US ASW defenses.79 The huge advantage that the US enjoys in fighters and surface combatants would become meaningless since its ASW capability is so lacking. This means that the US would have to back down, virtually acknowledging the Chinese hegemony in South China Sea.

79

Eleni Ekmektsioglou and Matthew Hallex, Chinese Submarines and U.S. Anti -Submarine Warfare Capabilities, e-International Relations, (27 August 2011), <http://www.e-ir.info/2011/08/27/theundersea-balance-in-the-western-pacific-chinese-submarines-and-u-s-anti-submarine-warfarecapabilities/> [accessed 1 October 2012] pp. 3-4.

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V. Conclusion
1. Where is it headed? The Spratly Islands reflects the volatile nature of the existing conflict between the PRC and the Philippines. The end of the Cold War signaled a shift in the regional paradigm and it has become clear through the course of this paper that China has become the regional balancer against which all other play. In the South China Sea, China has tried to assert this power but for the past 20 years, stopped short of waging an all-out conflict. The United States is still a player in the region and this is nowhere more clear that in its longtime ally and mutual defense partner, the Republic of the Philippines. However, reality does not always reflect a nice balancing act of powers were things remain status quo and stable. Since the 1990s, China and the Philippines have engaged in heated conflict over the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea and to whom they belong. Theoretically, the issue of sovereignty should have been addressed and resolved through the United Nation and the Third United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea but as history and international customary law shows, this was not the case. The combined factors of no clear owner of the Spratly Islands from the 1951 Treaty of San Francisco under the principle of Res nullius and the ability of states to claim sovereignty in their 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones have created an inherently unstable situation between China and the Philippines. While Arroyo and Hu Jintao were able to keep maritime disputes at bay in favor of economic cooperation and mutual investment, the last two years have seen this legacy erode as the most recent conflict over the Scarborough Shoal begins a new chapter in the dispute between the new nations. At the present moment, the Scarborough Shoal crisis has not concluded, neither side willing to withdraw focus or momentum from the area as any conciliatory action would be interpreted as ceding sovereignty to the other. Neither is willing to do this. While it is the hope of

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the international community that this crisis does not turn hot, there is always the possibility of an armed conflict between the China and the Philippines unfolding if the situation there is not soon resolved. Presuming that the conflict might turn hot and the Philippines calls on the United States to fulfill its obligations under the MDT, what can be expected to happen and how will this affect the balance of power in the South China Sea? 2. Options for the US Assuming that the DF-21D is or soon will be fully operational, the balance in South China Sea is in favor of the PRC at the moment. This can be problematic for the US, especially since a military conflict seems to be likely. The US has three options it can take in order to prevent a military conflict and protect its interest in the region. First is to enhance its military forces in Asia to match that of the PRC. Currently, the major weakness of the US is its ASW capability. With limited ability to locate and destroy enemy submarines, its advantage in surface combatants and fighters would be meaningless. The best way for the US to bolster its ASW capability by concentrating more of its submarines in the region and narrowing the area they have to cover. However, the major flaw of this option is that this would encourage the PRC to further enhance its military capability in the region. The PRC protested when the US decided to install an early-warning radar, which is a purely defensive equipment.80 If the US places more submarines, which have both defensive and offensive capabilities, in the region, the PRC would react by strengthening its forces further. This resulting arms race would threaten the stability and security in the region. The second option for the US is to strengthen the Armed Forces of the Philippines. The Philippines has extremely weak military and relies completely on
80

Adam Entous and Julian E. Barnes, U.S. Plans New Asia Missile Defenses, The Wall Street Journal, (23 August 2012), <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10000872396390444812704577605591629039400.html> [accessed 19 November 2012].

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the United States for the defense of its islands.81 This may be more justifiable than the US deploying more of its forces in the region. That said, the PRC may still protest against the US providing military aid to those to a country that is so close to the PRC. Moreover, since the PRC already worries about the US using the Philippines as a basis to carry out its offensive against the PRC,82 the arming of the Philippines may also result in arms race and instability. Given that first two options may worsen the security in the region, the last option seems to be the best: stop trying to balance the PRC militarily, establish means through which disputes in the region can be settled peacefully, and acknowledge the Chinese hegemony in Southeast Asia as long as it does not invade other countries or threaten the core US interests. However, this is much easier said than done. First of all, it is extremely difficult to settle territorial disputes conclusively without violence. Glaser proposes applying the Svalbard example; in the dispute over Svalbard, the sovereignty over the island was given to Norway, while the resources were split among disputants.83 The problem in the case of South China Sea is that the PRC has no incentive to share the resources with other countries, especially since it enjoys superiority in military or economic power compared to its neighbors. It is also extremely challenging to acknowledge the hegemony of the PRC while protecting the US interests. This may simply whet the PRCs appetite; after all, giving the Sudetenland to Nazi Germany encouraged them to be more assertive rather than stopping them. Thus the US has to find a way to convince the PRC that US will punish the PRC if it harms the US interests without making the PRC feel threatened.
81

A former Chief of Staff of the Philippine Armed Forces, said to Robert Willard, then Commander of U.S. Pacific Command that Philippines would not be part of a shooting war because in the first place, we have nothing to shoot with. Dona Pazzibugan, Peace RPs only option in Spratlys, Philippine Daily Inquirer, (19 August 2012), <http://newsinfo.inquirer.net/inquirerheadlines/nation/view/20100819-287601/Peace-RPsonly-option-in-Spratlys> [accessed 1 October 2012]. 82 Thammy Evans, The PRCs Relationship with the ASEAN Regional Forum: Realpolitik, Regime Theory, or a Continuation of the Sinic Zone of Influence System? Modern Asian Studies 37:3 (July 2003), p. 738 83 Bonnie S. Glaser, Armed Clash in the South China Sea, (Washington, DC: Council on Foreign Relations, April 2012), <http://www.cfr.org/east-asia/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883> [accessed 1 October 2012] p. 5.

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The case of the PRC, the Philippines and the United States, any balance will be difficult to achieve. It has been shown the politically, the situation is already unstable. If the situation deteriorates into an armed conflict, the results could be worse as two of the options explored above lead to an arms race and this will only serve to destabilize the region even further. This paper sought to show the inherent instability of the current situation in the South China Sea through the lens of the Spratly Islands as a flashpoint for political and military balancing between the Peoples Republic of China, the Republic of the Philippines and the United States. Balance is difficult to achieve and peace is even more elusive. Until the day a peaceful solution can be found to stabilize the South China Sea, each country will have to walk on eggshells so as not to upset the already fragile and breaking balance.

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