*l?

oroo"""n

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

oER-MGH-09-005 M.G.HULME, JR. WellGontrolIncident RiserUnloading

NOTTO BE RELEASED TO CLIENT

5v so
Exhibit No. Worldwidc Court llenorters. Inc.

Raviewed and Approved by: ONSHORE USE ONLY

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-o1143039

of litlgatlon. in corlemplation document.Prepared Prlvileged and mnf,dential

Tlansoean

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAUINCIDENT

Factsrelevant to the incident team Investigation of Incident Detailed description Timeline Summary ActualConsequences
a a

Potential consequences of findings Summary in Detail o Timeline o Organization o People Events o Similar o Environment o Technology Conclusion Opportunities Conective Opportunities lmprovement Appendices

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FEB 2OOt

PAGE2 OF 2I

Fom No:

EAUPS+R{IOI Fll:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-lNV-o1143040

l-r,.rooo".r,

Prlvileged and mn8dentlaldoorment Prepared in contemplation of lltlgation.

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

DATEA NTE OF tNCIDEilT: LOCANOil OF II{CIDENT: TYPEOF INCIOENT; e.g. P.rsonal

lhftrd llErHit Fhdhnhshl J'

Approximately 20, 2009 07:06on February M.G.HULME, Jr Rlg Floor Well Control Incident- Risr Unloading N/A N/A

IilJUREDPERSON (IP): JOA DESCRIPTION Hrc on shift N/A Daln on Rig

N/A

Time in Posilion

N/A

Time Offshor!

iUA

Asc

I N/A

TMTNESqES):

Honry Owirilr6 {rillor. - Floorman. FelixEniepamo CollnDrcr- OlM. Kennv Fullerloh- Tmlrusher TDS Motor, Dr8r,\ruro?ks Brak BandE,OlverterElemont,Los6 ot wI LAT 5 ' 2 2 ' 3 8 . 9 1 "N LONG4'37'12.Y E OYO5-HORmBlockOML12O

DAIIAGE TO EQUIPilEiIT: RKI LOGATION: CLIENT: IIETEOROLOGICAL COilDMONS AT flilE oF THE lNClDElrlT:

ENI.NAE WIND: DIRECTIoN & eEFF^

VSIBILITY:

2soo@Eknts,
10 Miles

Bll_olttErlllc
trRFSqr rFtF'

rol2 mB
ZTC

AIRTEMPERruRE:

SEASTATE: /SWELL& PERToD:

Wave PBriod: 5sm Dir.:2600 Highi:l ft StvcllDir:240' SwellPeriod:

Heaye -0.0 ROLUPITCH/HEAVE: Pitch -0.2 Roil 0.2

GENERAL MET CONDITIONS: Eg FOG or FtatN d nt rh cd/Ftr

Clear- Cloud Basc 2000fi scetqrcd,

NAME
BemardBerjeaud Wagner Geoffrey DaveFoster TonyAston
Sergio Fazio

POSITION
Performance Assurance Director Performance Manager, EAU
Seniof Engineer- Well Construc{ion QHSE Advisor

COMPANY
Transocaan, Paris
Transocean, Paris

Transocean, Houston Transocean, Lagos

ENl, Milan

Fluids Drilling and Gompletions

Snecialist

METHOD& OBJECTIVES OF INVESTIGATION in Appendices. See Termsof Reference for Transocean investigation an investigation Their The Client(Eni)is conducfing in accordance with their own procedures. initialteamhas beenappointed by the Eni CorporateOffice.
REV2 FEB2OOS PAGE 3 OF 21 FomNo: EAUPS.PR.001-FI|:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-rNV-o1143041

-l-to*

oflitiEatlon. in contemplation doctment Prepared PrivileEed and confldenual

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAUINCIDENT

DESCRIPTION DETAILED Whiledrillingaheadon Oyo 5 - HOR at a waterdepthof 303 metersthe baseline drilling parameterswere as follows: 800 gpm (plus350 gpm when boosting) 60 rpm 5k torque 2-3 tons weight-on-bit 1.2 SG MudWeight(10ppg) pumps#1 &#2 on the hole,#3 boosting the riser Mud pumpassignment: circulation.E-CDwas utilized Device(E-CD)was in use to ensurecontinuous The Eni Circulating sections) and was not (particularly on deepernearhorizontal hole stability on this well to maintain plannedto be usedfor well controlpurposes. Figure 1: E-CD Syslem

and was then controlled duringthe earlysectionof drilling was 30*40m/hr The rateof penetration shalegas and therefore settingin this area includes to 20 m/hr. The geological and restricted gas levelsis important, with an inoeasingtrendin this parameter of background monitoring zone. over-pressure indicating a possible were for the mudloggers to closelymonitor The standingordersfor the nightpriorto the incident total gas and at 5% to informthe drilleras well as the controlroomin orderto have a generalPA midnight and 07:30 madeto haveall hot work and smokingsuspended.Between announcement being hot work due to totalgas recorded hrs therewere 3 separatePA's madefor suspending above5% (basedon the Bridgelogbook). evening(Feb 19th) Therewere severalissueswiththe gas systembetween18:00hrs the previous gas at 19:30 hrs on the 19th.This trap and 07:00hrs.The firstwas to switchto the backup
RE\f 2 FEB 200t PAGE' OF 21 Form No: EAU.oPS.PR{o1 Fll:0101A

TRN-lNV-01 143042

Transoean

Prlvileged and conlldential document.Prepered in contemplatlon oflltlgation,

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

remainedin use from then on. ln the early moming,around03:05hrsthe primarygas analysis systemin the mudlogging unitwent down and, duringa connection, the engineeriwitchedto ttre up system. Just under an hour just less than 10 minutes of reliable gas time-based data and 9q9t drillingparametets was lost.Approximately 4 metersof hole was drillediuring this time. On two occasions duringthe eveningthe NightToolpusher expressed concemaboutthe mud weightto the NightCompanyMan; on the secondoccasion(at approx.0300hrs)the Night CompanyMan woke the Day CompanyMan and the Geologist who discussed the situation and whetheror not it was necessary to weightup. They agreedto continue to drill aheaduntil07:30 when they could call town. The NightToolpusher was not involvedin this conversation but was informedof the decisionby the NightCompanyMan . At approximately 06:00OIM instructed the Drillerto halt all transfersand controlall crane movements to ensureaccurate activevolumemeasurements. From06:05- 07:00whiledrillingaheadon the momingof the incident there was increased torque with increased weight-on-bit to maintain the same ROP and no reduction was observedin the activepit volumefor 30 minutes, while drillingdown last single;effectively a 5.5 bbl gain. At 06:15the Drillerobserved a washouton a pistonon the #1 mud pump (whichwas on the hole), and calledthe Toolpusher who asked him to stop drillingand changeover to put the boostpump (#3) on the hole while #1 gets repaired The pump changeoveroccuned efficientfy,and pumps were offlinefor only2-3 minutes. From06:25the drillercontinued to drillaheadwith pumps2 & 3 on the hole. From 6:50to 07:00therewas an increasing total gas trendfrom 3.8% to 5.5% with severalspikes recorded, a PA announcement was made to stop all hot work and smoking. From07:00to 07:06therewas a slightincreasing trend on the rig retum flow show over a period 6 minutes(observable only becausethe riserwas not beingboosted). At approximately 07:04the Shakerman calledto alertthe Drillerthat he was takingincreased returnsat the shakers. The Drillerpickedup, spacedout, tumed off the mud pumps,and turned closethe well in on the upperannular. At this time mud was blowingthroughthe rotarytableand the Shakerman was attempting a secondcall to the Driller. Oncethe well was closedin on the upperannularthe well was observedto continueto flow and the Drillerdecidedto closethe lower annular as well. In totalapproxirnately 650 barrelsof mud was lost, eitherthroughthe rig floor or to the well, the Diverterelementwas pushed out of rotary table, and due to the force of the mud exiting fingerboard latcheswere liftedallowing2 drillpipestandsto fall acrossthe derrick. Withthe well shut in the rig team contacted the office.

REV 2

FEB 2OOt

PAGE5 OF 2I

Fo'm l{o:

EAUOPS+R{!oi Fll:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-|NV-01143043

of lltlgation. in contemPlation document.Prepsred and confidentlal Privileged

Tlarrcocean

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAU INCIDENT

Figure 2: Picture of rig floor after incident

Figure 3; Stands across denick

ACTUALCONSEOUENCE . . . r . ' o r . o . lnflux to wellbore Riser Unloaded Casingshoe brokendown Partiallyevacuatedwellbore Loss of BHA packerdislodged from the housing Diverter Masterbushingpushedthroughthe rotarytable from rotarytable Outerbushingdislodged Fingerboardlatcheslifted and 2 standsfell acrossthe derrick Gas enteringformationfrom brokenshoe up aroundthe well head and at three pointsca. 60 m from the well head in an Gas bubbling pattem triangular
FEB 2OOE
PAGE 6 OF 21

RE\I 2

Fmilo:

EAU-OPSfR{01_Fi|:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-INV-o1 143044

Privileged and mnfidendaldoolment, Prepared in contemplation of lltlgation.

liansocean
. . r . r

EAUINGIDENT INVESTIGATIoN REPoRT

OBM comingup overthe denick,coveringthe Derrick,Rigfloor, maindeck Environmental release Loss of Well Financial loss Loss of reputiation

POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCE . . r . . . r Minor/ Majw damageto the rig Total loss of rig SeriouslnjuryCases/ Fatalities Majorenvironmental damage Furtherloss of reputation Furtherloss of valueto shareholders govemmental Possible regulatory repercussions

TIMELINE SUMMARY

9ele
2$FetsO9 FromApprox. 0305to 0415
2GFeb-09 Approx.0600

Aetivitv Geoservicemain gas computer mafftrnclion,change over to backup unit.

Giving falsereadings. Pickup ofi bottom, reciprocate stringwhilecirculating. gasdetection Geoservices conectedbackup unit.(MainGas Unitstilldown). ShiftHandover ReportToolpushers'Expecting 25%Gas around1294m. Standing instructions to Drillers ftom Toolpusher ltem# 3 "Efira vigilence required duringdrillingof gas zone@1294m.Inform controlroomwhengas levelgoesabove5% and stopall fansfers.Cranemovement mayneedto be restricted as welP

2GFeb-09 Approx.0630

Righasa swableaking on pumpNo 1 whichis on thestring. All pumps are shutdownPumpNo 1 is isolated andpumps No2 & No 3 are linedup dorn the stringto continue this process tooklessthan 5 mins. drilling, Wellflowedsuddenly with mudblowing up through rotarytableand overrig. packer, Diverter masterand outerbushings dislodged fom rolarytable.Shutin well on upperthenlowerannulars.

2OFeF09 0706 FromApprox.

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PAGE7 OF 21

FomNo:

EAU-OPSPR-001-Fi|:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-01143045

of lltlgation. docrment. PrePared in contemplation and cmfldentlal Privileged

Transoean

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAUINCIDENT

formatas follows: in the TOP-SET are documented The Findings . . . . . . Timelinein detail Organization People SimilarEvents Environment Technology

Time Line in Detail

&tr
7-Feb-09 13-Feb09

9!98 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Actlvltv Ronnie meeting heldonboard MG Hulmeby ClientRepresentative Pre.spud Roy.(Noattendance recordkept) meeting. meeting Pre-spud heldin towndurlngweeklycontrector to Toolpusher ltem#20"Potential lnstructions fromCo-man DailyDdlling - Gasat 1275m TVDmsl,131lmAH. hazard was madeby Enito perform a LeakOfiTestinstead of a Formation Decision mudweight. Test,test resulted in 1.4SG equivalent Integrity had beenincreased from 1.16 SGto 1.2 SG;withSCRsperformed MudWeight 2300. at approximately Toolpushers "Expecting 25%Gasaround1294m. ShiftHandover Report instructions fromToolpusher ltem# 3 "Enravigilance Standing to Drillers control roomwhengas duringdrilling of gaszone@1294m.Inform required maynedto be Cranemovement levelgoesabove5% andstopall transfers. restricted as well" + 70rpm, from 1184mto 1243m. 3.4kftlbs, 800gpm DrillwithE-CDStands wt - 220klbs up,222$bsdn, 290gpm 2570psi, 3-4klbs WOB,String booster ROPat 223klbs roln.Controlled overto backup unitduring maingas computer malfunction, change Geoservice Pickup off bottom, reciprocate string connectron. Stillgivingfalsereadings. gasdetection Gas whilecirculating. backup unit.(Main Geoservices conected Unitstilldown). + 800gpm to 1275m.70rpm, 3-4kftlbs, wlth E-CDstandslrom 1243m Drllllng dn, wt - 220klbs up, 222klbs booster 2570psi, $4klbs WOB,String 290gpm rotn. 223klbs areshut on pumpNo 1 nhichis on thewell.Allpumps Righasa swableaking No2 & No 3 arelined up downthe down. Pump No 1 is isolated andpumps this process tooklessthan5 mins. stringto continue drilling,

18-Feb09 19-Feb09 19-Feb09 FromApprox.1200to 0000 20-Feb09 Approx. 0600

20-Feb09 Approx. 0000to 0400 20-Feb09 FromApprox. 0305to M15 20-Feb09 FromApprox. O430 to 0700 20-Feb09 0630 Approx.

I I

10 11

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PAGEt OF 21

FormNo: EAU-OPS+R{01-FI|:01DtA

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-|NV-o1143046

Tlansooean
20-Feb09 Approx. 0706

Pdvileged and contldentlal dodlment. prepared In contemplation oflitigation.

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

call madefromshakerman to Driller to informof increase flowoverthe shale shakers.

20-Feb09 FromApprox. 0706to 0800

13

Well.flowed suddenly.with mud blowing up throughrotarytablereadring the heightof the crownblock.Diverter packerelement was iushed out of D-iverter housing. Shutin well on upperthenlowerannular. pressure. = 140psiSICP= 990psi pit Gain= SObbls Monitored SIDpP +3mins. 2 Drillplpe Stands fell acrossdenlckwhenfingerboard latches werelifredby mudflort'r. contactedffice. Aftempt to hangoff on Middlepipe Rams.uniule to raisebloc*sobstructed by standsacrossdenick.clearedstandsobstructing blocks. ROV,already in the water,observing sea bed- no flowat sea bed. Attempt to Unable to Stripup thru- OpenLolrer lang.ofi on MiddlePipeRams(MPR's). Annular. still unableto hangoff. BHApossibly stuck.Discuss fonrardplanwith ofrice. Starlbuilding mud1.3SG. ROVnotedsignilicant increase in gasbubbles comingup around30"casingat seabed.Discuss with ECR. ROVreportseabedflourworsening: Muster and beginimplementation of evacuation personnel. of non essential Musterand beginimplementation of evacuation personnel. of non essential TotalHelicopters 5. TotalPersonnel evacuated 52. Flight #1 Flight #2 Flight#3 Flighttl4 Flight#5 13 off BJC. 10 off BlJ. 14 otr BJC, 08 off BGF. 07 off BJC- 2 personnel to rig,ENI Rep and MGHRigManager.

20-FeF09 FromApprox. 0800to 1000 20-Feb09 FromApprox.'1000 to 1230

14

15 16

20-Fets09 FromApprox.1230to 1300 20-Feb09 From Approx.1300to 1330 20-Feb-09 FromApprox.13i10 to 1600 20-Fets09 FromApprox.1600to 1800

17

18

- 500- 6,40psi. CircdownDP at 0.4bpm DpP1'10 SlCp 1680psi steady. Shut downpump3.2bbls pumped. - open SIDpP reduced to 120psi. Drillers Method choke CP 1670- 1630psi, pumprateto 2bpmDpp increased increase to 3400psi with2.4bblspumped. - 140psi Shutdownpump.Closecioke. SIDpPdecreased to 3400psi in 3 mins. SICP1630- 1680psi in 3mins. Discussed with ERCoffice. probably Annulus packedoff. lnstructed to mix 1200bbls to 1.3 SG SOBMfor bullheading. As nextERCrequest. Bledoff SICPto TripTank.SIDpP80psiconstanr SlCp - 1590psi - 1500psi 1710 3mins4.2bbl TT. 1590 3minsGas. Shutin With (SlW)SICPincreased1500- 1560psi Smins.Discussed withECRofficeplan to killwell usingVolumetric Pumpand Bleedprocedure. 1500bbls 1.30SG mudavallable. Fillriser with347bbts of 1.3 SG Mud. perform Submit volumebic planfor approval squeeze fromTransocean. overall riskassessment.

19 20

20-Feb09 FromApprox.1800to 1930 20-Feb09 FromApprox.1930to 0000

21 22

FEB 2OOt

PAGE9 OF 21

FormNo:

EAU.OPS+R{01_FI|:01014

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-o1143047

of litigation' in contemplation doc{ment. Prepared and confldentlal PrlvileEed

Transooean
Oroanizatlon

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAU INCIDENT

system. circulating . The well programmadeno mentionof the use of the E-CDcontinuous highlight the reasonsfor using materialdid not adequately o The well programand pre-spud with it's use. associated the E-CDsystem,nor the hazardsand mitigations for use of the E-CDsystembu . A Task Specific ThinkPlan (TSTP)was saidto be developed quantiff the hazards, and did not adequately the TSTP was not approved upon investigation "TSTP" list was a procedural controls.The or mitigating nor did it discussthe preventative equipment. group the E-CD operating was the from WEl, which that was supplied (TRA)was performed on the task of usingthe E-CD equipment. r No Task RiskAssessment was and as a resultno exemption . Management addressed of Changewas not adequately proposed of flow checksduringconnections. for the omission that he couldshutthe . Due to the use of the E-CDequipment the Drillerdid not understand did not occur. pumpsdown at any timeto llow checkthe well;adequatecommunication r Transocean has usedthe E-CDsystemon otherwellswith Eni. coverthe procedures . Well Controltrainingand Well Controlmanualdoes not adequately is not the the diverter use of also blowout situation; in well during a for closing a adequately covered. Peepb
LOCATION DrillFloor House Shaker / Pitroom Pumproom Galley GeoseMces Shacft Control Room OIMOffice OFFTOUR (working 18:0F06:00)
PERSONNEL Driller - Henry Owiriwa Floorman- Felix Eniepamo Floorman- Segun Ukana Denickman - Samuel Anyahie Pumpman - Ojakovo Gabriel Floorman- Tunii Olanipekun Floorman- Mtalis Amadi Geoservices- Ayodele Adepoju AD - Michael Ugboaia OIM - Colin Dyer Day Tool Pusher - Kenny Fullerton NightTool Pusher- Phil Scrimshaw Geoservices- Oscar Navarro

. r . . r

that he couldshutthe the Drillerdid not understand Due to the use of the E-CDequipment pumpsdown at any time to flow checkthe well as normal. but the Driller Therewas a Tour changeat 06:00with the Nightpusherbeingrelieved remaining on Tourfrom00:00to 12:00. on the Rig, he has servedas a reliefDrilleron the unit The Drillerwas new in the position he was a Drilleron a Jackup. in the past but mostrecently Day Toolpusher did not go to the rig floorfirstthingon Tour,he was to headto rig floorto this was discussed duringthe morningmeetings. drillingof criticalhole section; supervise for frivolous callsto the officeat night As statedby Eni the CompanyMen had a reputation and thereforemay have been reluctantto take any action,eitherto call town at an pointin operations, to weightup, untilwithinnormal or to take actionthemselves important hours. business Man;from boththe NightCompanyMan and the Day Gompany Eni has released but was that this was to occurpriorto the incident conversations we understand acceleratedas a result.
FEB2OO8
PAGE IO OF 21

REV2

FomNo:

EAU-OPS+R{01-Fil:01014

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-o1143048

Tlansocear
Simllar Events r

PrMlegedand confidentlal dodJmenLPrepared in contemplation of litlEaflon.

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATTON REPORT

There is a history withinthe drillingindustryof unloading the riser,but there is no prior historyof unloaded the riserwhile usingthe E-CDsysteh.

Environment r . . Generalweatherconditions at the time of the incidentdaylighqclearwith scattered clouds. Vesselmotions: Heave:0.0meter/pitch: 0.2 degrees/Roll:0.2 degrees. As a resuftof the incident the rig was coatedin oil basedmud witfrapproximately 650 banels beinglost from the well to eitherthe formation, the rig, or the'environment.

Technoloov The use of the E-CDsystemis a significant changefrom conventional drillingand this changewas not recognized by the rig management. . The Transocean flow show indicatorhas had enatic and noisyreadingsever sincethe rig f_eft the shipyard,approximately two years ago, most likely 3 pumps isloo much for the 12" llow line and the paddleis at maximumall the time but this is still'tobe verified. r Transoceanpersionnel did not utilize the flow show indicatorprovtdedby Geoservices. . The Geoservices flow show indicator was inoperable due to a faulty sensor,failedat 03:30 on the 19th. . The Geoservices retumflow indicatoris not a conventional flow show paddleor sensor.lt is efiectively a PW pit levelsensoras used to measurepit volumes,which has been installed in the mud box and basesflow out on the tevetof mud in this headerbox. . Therewere severalissueswith the gas systembetween18:00hrs the previous evening and 7:30 hrs when the well was shut in. The firstwas to switchto the backupgas trap at 19:30hrs. This remained in use from then on. In the early moming,aroundbS:OShrs the primarygas analysis systemin the mudlogging unitwent down duringa connection and the engineer switched to the backupsystem.Just underan hour of reliabletime-based gas dala and just under 10 minutesof drillingparameters was lost.Approximately 4 metresof hole drilledduringthis time. r

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FEB 2OO'

PAGE 11 OF 2I

Fom No:

EAU.OPS+R.|!0I Ft:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-01143049

in contemplatlon oflitlgation. dodJment.Prepared Privileged and conlldentlal

Trarreoean

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAU INCIDENT

of what below,first as a hypothesis of the investigation the conclusions We have summarized involved.At the end of the sectionis a root occurredand then as they relateto each individual Tree'. cause analysisin the form of a "\A/hy earlierthan of eventsis that the gas zonewas penetrated as to the sequence Our hypothesis depth)and of the prognosed (butwithinthe enor tolerance postedon the drillersinstructions occunedwhen all pumpswere with pump#1. The initialflow from formation beforethe problem when drillingresumed if the influxcontinued lt is inconclusive shut downfor pump#1 problem. again to balance the well and ECD may havebeen sufficient and blew expanded, out of the wellborethe gas cameout of solution, As the influxwas circulated and underbalance led to increasing the reduction in hydrostatic throughthe rotarytable;possibly of the well substantial evacuation as they actions,and failingsby position responsibilities, The next sectioncoversthe individual and its results. contributed to the incident Driller . and containing the incident. for savingthe rig, personsonboard, Singlyresponsible and did not run away,shut in the well and stayedin the dogFollowed shut in procedures houseregardless of havingthe windowopen and beingcoveredin mud duringthe incident. abouthow rnuchtime he Did not closethe divefterwith flow in the riser,questionable or well control in the shut-inprocedures actuallyhad and this was not a pointhighlighted training. that he couldperformstaticflow checksin spiteof usingthe Eni Did not recognize Device(E-CD). Circulating to llow checkwhen all pumpswere offlinedue to self imposedpressure Did not perform ECD.in contradiction to an earlierstatement maintain devicessuchas flow show measurement the importance of secondary Did not recognize thosefrom Geoservices.

. . r r

Day Toolpusher . . . . . by the use of the E-CDequipment. Did not recognize the changeintroduced devicessuchas the importance of secondary flow show measurement Did not recognize thosefrom Geoservices. instructions to Drilleron use of diverterin shut-inprocedures. Did not provideadequate to CMS. that lack of performing staticflow checksrequires an exemption Did not recognize was in placepriorto use,a Did not ensurethat a TSTPfor the use of E-CDequipment nor did it adequately coverany risk TSTPwas in development but was not approved for performing the it was only a set of procedures mitigation or hazardidentification, connections. inexperienced Not on rig floorfor drillingof criticalsectionwhen therewas a relatively drilleron the brake.

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FEB 2OOt

PAGE12 OF 2t

Fm

No:

EAU-OPS+R-1t01-Fltl:01014

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-lNV-01143050

1-r,.,r=o*r'
Night Toolpusher
a a

Privileged and conf,dentlal documenl Prepared In contemplaton oflitiEation,

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

a a

Did not recognize the ctrangeintroduced by the use of the E-CD equipment.. Did not recognizethat lack of performingstatic flow checks requiresand exemptionto CMS. Did not recognize the importance of secondary flow show measurement devicessuch as those ftom Geoservices. Did not provideadequateinstructionsto Driller on use of diverter in shut-in procedures. Did not ensurethat a TSTP for the use of E-cD equipment was in place priorto use, a TSTP was in development but was not approvednor did it adequately coverany risk mitigationor hazard identification, it was only a set of proceduresfor performingthe connections.

Offshore Installation Manager(OlM)

a a
I

a a

Orderlyresponse to the incident, with properemergencymanagement. Did not recognize the changeintroduced by the use of the E-CDequipment. Did not recognize the importance of secondary flow show measurement devicessuch as those from Geoservices. Did not recognizethat lack of performingstatic flow checks requiresand exemptionto CMS. Did not provideadeguateinstructions to Drilleron use of diverterin shut-inprocedures. Did not ensurethat a TSTP for the use of E-CDequipment was in placepriorto use, a TSTP was in development but was not approvednor did it adequately coverany risk miUgation or hazardidentification, it was only a set of procedures for performing the connections. Did not followup on ensuring that the Transocean flow show indicator was accurateor addressedafter known past problems. OIM distracted from daily responsibilities projectload. due to ongoingcontinuous

Rig ManagerPerformance
t a

a a

Orderlyresponse to the incident, with properemergency management. Did not challenge Eni on the qualityof the pre-spudmeetingor the adequacyof the well planning material. Did not ensurethat a TSTP for the use of E-CDequipment was in place priorto rlse,a TSTP was in developmentbut was not approved nor did it adequatelycover any risk mitigation or hazardidentification, it was only a set of procedures for performing the connections. Did not ensureCompanyManagement Systemcompliance nor did he ensurethat all necessary exemptions to the CMS were in placefor the actionsoccurring on the rig. Did not followup on ensuring that the Transocean flow show indicator was accurateor addressedafter known past problems. Assigneddriflerwith limited Floater experiencewithout a proper risk assessment. Did not challenge the rig team to ensurethat all systemsnecessary to performcriticat taskswere operational. (FlowShow)

REY2

FEB 2OOI

PAGE13 OF 2I

Form No:

EAU-OPS+R-1101_FI|:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-rNV-o1143051

liansocean
Rig Manager Asset .

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAUINcIDENT

Did not challengethe rig team to ensurethat all systems neoessaryto performcritical tasks were operational.(Flow Show)

TransoceanHuman Resources r size need to have a reservepoolof adequate of drillers, specificcompetency Inadequate and training. to development suchthat time can be dedicated

TransoceanTraining . about a kick in the riserand a lack of explanation No specifictraininggivenfor handling the properuse of the diverter.

Eni Day Gompany Man . . . . . Did not recognizethe drillinghazardnor the differencesbetweenOyo 4 and Oyo 5 thus decidingnot to weightup the mud priorto the criticalsection. Wantedto delaythe call untilthe openingof officehours. Did not challengethe rig team to ensurethat all systems necessaryto performcritical tasks were operational.(Flow Show) deviation staticflow checkswas a significant Did not recognize that lack of performing mitigating controls. from conventionaldrilling and wouldrequireadditional devices measurement of secondary nor communicate the importance Did not recognize such as those ftom Geoservices. the importance of havingcriticalspare communicate with Geoservices Did not adequately partsavailable to ensureequipment reliability.

Eni Night GompanyMan . . . . r Did not recognizethe drillinghazardnor the differencesbetweenOyo 4 and Oyo 5 thus decidingnot to weightup the mud priorto the criticalsection,did wake up the Day mud weightincrease. CompanyMan and Geologist to discusspotential Did not challengethe rig team to ensurethat all systems necessaryto performcritical tasks were operational.(Flow Show) deviation Did not recognizethat lack of performingstaticflow checkswas a signfficant mitigaiing controls. and wouldrequireadditional from conventionaldrilling measurement devices of secondary nor communicate the importance Did not recognize such as thosefrom Geoservices. of havingcritical spare the importance with Geoservices Did not adequately communicate partsavailable reliability. to ensureequipment

EniGeologist . hazardnor the differences betweenOyo 4 and Oyo 5 thus Did not recognize the drilling not to weightup the mud priorto the criticalsection. deciding

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PAGE14 OF 2I

Form No:

EAU-OPafR.{101-Fll:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-lNV-o1 143052

-l-ro*
Eni Onshore . r

Privileged and conf,dential dodrment. Prepared In contemplauon of lltlgatlon.

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

Qualityof pre-spud meetingwas substandard and thus did not identifo criticaldrilling hazardsnor the use of E-CD system. Well programdid not adequately highlightpotential drillinghazards.

Geoserylces . . . . . Did not havecriticalspare partsavailable onboardto ensureequipment reliability. Did not recognize the importance of flow measurement and thereforedid not movesensor pitsto bringthe flow sensorback online. from inactive gas measuring Did not havefully redundant capability availablepriorto drillinga critical hole section,backuprequiredsoftwaremodification priorto use. gas analysisunit onlinewith questionable Broughtsecondary readings. Lack of appropriatescrutinyof mud propertiesand drilling parametersdue to ongoing problems, equipment competence of night mud-logger was questioned by Eni.

RE\I2

FEB 2OOt

PAGE15 OF 21

Fom No:

EAU-OPWR.oo1FI:0101A

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-o1143053

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Privileged and confidefitlal docilment,

Prepared in contemplation of lltigalion'

REPORT INVESTIGATION EAU INGIDENT

Was there a Plan?

Yes Drilling Progpamand Daily Drilling Program from Company Man. Daled l8h Februaru 2009.

Whatwas the Plan?

Who wes Informed about the Plan?

Planhe appendix of the report. DailyDrilling SeeAttached

F{an wat discussed at Pre Tour Meetings with all Transocean and SeMce Dersonnel prsent at meting.

/Tools wereinspected? Whatequipmenu Materials

Who Conductad the Inspections? l/lrhat were the findings of the Inspections? \fVhatHazards $rere identilied prior to conducting the Trck? Who ldentified thes hazards?

Equipment, Ddlling E-CDManifold.

Driller and Drill Crew- WEI SeMce Personnel. None

GasZoneexpectd @ 1294mtrs. Fmmprevious welldrilledOYO04 and Drlllers at Pre TourMeeting andon Toolpushers Mentioned Hsndovers.
Driller to be vigilant - Gas levels had reached 5% + all mud transfers, mixing was stopped and Crane movements restricted- Hot work and smoldno was stooDed, Toolpusher, Driller.

of the Hazards? Whowas Informed

Wrat Control measures were put in place to ensure lhe job was conducted safely? Who was responsiblefor implementingthe control

l/Vhatinstruclions were givento eacfi personpriorto the incident? Who gavelhe Instructions?
Have the lP and / or other qewmembers received trainino in conductino he ooeration? Was equipment bing operated at the time of the
inair{ant?

As per PreTour Meeting Toolpusher and ClientRepresenlative. andpriorto starting Yes.Previous WellDrilledusingsamesystem
rrcinn F-Cf'l nn lhic well

Equipnrent, TDS,MudPumps and E-CDsystem. Drilting Drawworks,

Driller and WEI for E-CD Manifold. On the Driilfloor and Mud Pumproom Mud increase over Shakers, Mud bubbling out ofwell over RotarvTable and uo Denick.

Who \t'rasoperaling lhB equipment?

withthe located in association Whereis the equipment

inaialenl caFha?

What did the witnesses See / Hear / FeelWhen the lncident occuned?

occuned? Seereport whenrhe Incident Wherewerethe Wltnesses

What wre the conditions of lhe Work area during the
incidani?

Good.

What Llghling was provided? What was the availability of Help - Mechanical
Saruinpq?

Yes. Yes.
Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicable Not Applicabla Not Applicable

What baniers (lf any) wete in place at the time of the incident? \Alhat lock out / tag out (lf any) devices were in place at
tha tima rrl tha in.i.lehl?

What work prmlts were in flace at the tlme of the incid6nl? What PPE (and its Condition) was in use by lP at the time of the incident? Any other relevant Observalions

RE\' 2

FEB 2OO8

PAGE20 OF 2t

Fonn No:

EAUPS{!0I FM:0l0lA

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-|NV-o1143058

-l-rr"n "o"".,

Privileged and confidentlal docilment, Prepared In contemplation oflitlgadon.

EAU INCIDENT INVESTIGATION REPORT

Supporting Evidence,i.e. Statements, Photographs, Drawings, Copies of documentation etc.

PAGE?I tr 21

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-tNV-o1143059