Judicial Power

Standing: Citizen Standing: Natural person or business must prove a distinct injury and the nature of the wrong that will negatively affect him in a distinct way from anyone else similarly situated. Limited Tax Payer Standing: A taxpayer must show a special injury distinct from that suffered by other taxpayers. Associational Standing: Granted when: 1) a substantial number of associations members affected. 2) subject matter is within associations general scope of interest/activity. 3) the relief requested is of a type appropriated for a trade association to receive on behalf of members. Standing by Statute: Ex. Fl stat. 680.531 provides standing to sue 3rd parties who damaged leased goods.

Standards of review Strict Scrutiny: compelling state interest + narrowly tailored to achieve, least intrusive/restrictive means Suspect Class - race, religion, nation of origin, disability -Fundamental Rights, right to work, right to privacy Rational Basis: Clearly enunciated reasonable/rational purpose to justify a legitimate state interest/purpose Non-suspect class - Age, gender -Equal protection violation
Art V - Judiciary 2 - Administration; practice and procedure sup ct shall adopt rules for the practice and procedure in all cts power to repeal rule by 2/3 vote (but cant make new one) in event that legislature does repeal a rule by 2/3 vote, they can't put a new rule in place - it's basically a veto conflict bw legis enactment and judicial rules doesnt mean ct will find implied repeal of the rules implied repeal of civil rules? if legislature passes a statute that seems to put in place some procedures that are inconsistent w express rules, but it doesnt expressly repeal the rule that its in conflict with? think there would be a repeal in that circumstance? NO the fact that there's a conflict bw legis enactment and judicial rules doesn't mean ct will find that there is an implied repeal of the rules trying to protect the integrity of the judicial branch from legislative interference can render advisory opinions (as opposed to federal that cant) sup ct by constitution has the ability to render advisory opinions 14 d - judiciary shall have no power to fix appropriation 15 - sup ct has power to regulate admission to bar and discipline Express separation powers provision in the FL Const (more express than fed) any intelligible principle that ct can use when ***, then fed cts will find no violation of the "non delegation power" Kaplan - P 61 Standing as a result of *** in fed cts,

comes up in state cts - allows a citizen to call into question illegal expenditure of funds (private indiv acting as a private atty general..they're proceeding as) focus on basis for sup ct jx (consistent w fed scheme...) If you look at kaplan on 32, bar has the same basis ... separation of powers on 33 - express separation of powers provisions in state constitution and ...non delegation case law? federal doc ..? any intelligible princ that ct can use when reviewing..to det whether its consistent w the statute, if there is any intelligible principle then the fed cts will find no violation of the non delegation doctrine state non delegation doctrine is a little more robust express...they give examples then 61 in Kaplan state rules bar on generalized 3d pt standing particularized grievances taxpayer standing.. have to show some particular... associational standing - association can advance a claim on behalf of its members standing as a result of statute.. in fed cts, ...? this kind of standing is diff..allows legislative body to assign a citizen to proceed on behalf of another....one way it comes up is in private atty general statutes - you'll have a statute that allows a citizen to file an axn on behalf of the public to call into question or challenge the legal expenditure of funds fed cts have recognized in limited circumstances that 3d pt standing look up the basis for sup ct jx..?

Massey v David
Facts omalpractice axn by client against atty...he gets ****, atty seeks expert witness costs.... oon appeal, client argues that award of expert witness fees is improper b/c atty didn't comply w state law 57.071 (you can't tax for expert witness fees unless you ****) otrial ct refuses to apply that limitations on recovery of expert witness fees in 57.071 b/c ct had already found that law unconstitutional b/c it violated Art 5 section 2 which specifically *** oclient also ***** - whether 57.071 violates art 5 section 2 a ct holds that 57.071 is a procedural rule and conveys no substantive right and so is unconstitutional this case is best example of how this line is drawn - it isn't always clear, but it gives you good examples of what is seen as procedural and why and what is seen as substantive and why ct recognizes like in Erie that line is difficult to draw o** substantive law creates, defines, opractice and procedure encompasses... obut where a statute that is primarily substantive and operates in an area of public concern, then if it has some procedural aspects, it won't violate art 5, section 2 have to look at statute as a whole, to det whether its mostly about substantive rights or wheth its about procedure ct relies on the actual substantive entitlement to fees was created in a diff section - so they didnt create a substantive right to *** DeMarois case Knealing case contrasted w: VanBibber case PRIMARY THRUST ANALYSIS oif procedure is entwined w substantive scheme, like VanBibber, its fine ohere, telling us we can't tax expert witness fees that are given elsewhere unless we do certain things

 grounds that ct finds it unconstitutional: o57.071 didn't create right to recover expert witness fees (if it had, then this would have been part of ***) - it just delineated new procedural hurdles that the pt had to satisfy in order to recover onote 5 - rejects dissents attempt to **** if legislative branch could just say no recovery of witness fees unless a, b, c, then ***** ofact that this case buts up against our own rules of discovery and *** - this is one factor that tends to show they're meddling w art 5, section 2 power

Procedural Posture Appellant former client sued appellee attorney for malpractice. A jury found the attorney negligent but awarded the client no damages; the trial court awarded the attorney expert witness fees. The client appealed the fee award on grounds the attorney had not complied with 57.071(2), Fla. Stat. (1999). The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) affirmed, finding that 57.071(2) was unconstitutional. The client appealed. Overview The attorney represented the client in a personal injury case. Pursuant to their retainer agreement, they submitted their dispute about settlement to arbitration. The arbitrator decided the client should accept the settlement. The attorney filed a motion to approve settlement with the trial court. The trial court granted the attorney's motion and directed the client to sign the settlement; the client refused, discharged the attorney, and hired other counsel. The trial court appointed a guardian ad litem to sign the release on behalf of the client; it divided the contingency fees between the attorney and new counsel. This suit followed. The client argued that the intermediate appellate court erred in finding 57.071(2), which provided a time limit for filing a written report, unconstitutional. The high court disagreed. As it was 92.231(2), Fla. Stat. (2007), that created the right to tax expert witness fees as costs, 57.071(2), Fla. Stat., was exclusively procedural in nature. It thus impermissibly encroached on the high court's rulemaking authority conferred by Art. V, 2(a), Fla. Const., thereby violating the separation of powers provision, Art. II, 3, Fla. Const. Outcome The judgment was affirmed. Art. V, Sec. 2(a): FL supreme court has exclusive authority to adopts rules for procedure and practice in all courts.

Dept of Ag v Bonnano
Facts ocitrus canker was discovered in FL, dept of agric created teams to det if trees had canker and if so, they would be destroyed oset up a commission to hear cases for compensation othis was consolidation of cases challenge regarding right to jury trial - rejected b/c this is **** - where person says you've taken my prop and sues oright to jury trial inquiry - what kind of actions enjoy the right to a jury trial at the time the *** were ratified o*** second arg oviolates separation of powers (admin scheme for compensation does) b/c it had presumption of certain values -where this should be a judicial function to det value in takings cases obut ct finds no violation b/c statute just creates a presumption of the value that doesn't have to be *** and also allows for appellate review also, the admin agency is like a ct, which violates art 5, b/c it is setting values.....? ** Kruger challenge - due process argument - ct dismisses it (p. 30?) - b/c admin scheme sets up a statutory mechanism --- ***

Citrus plants destroyed because of canker program requirements, dept. of ag tried to stop court from exercising jurisdiction over a case by bonnano for inverse condemnation(for compensation for destroyed citrus). Outcome: Concluded that court has no jurisdiction over this matter because FL stat. provided for compensation in this matter and no rights of jury trial were taken away from Plaintiff.

Bush v Shiavo
Facts oTerri's Law statute - delegated to governor right to stay a termination of support (as long as patient was in vegetative state and didn't have advance directive); Schiavo brought action seeking jment that it was unconstitutional Sup Ct finds it unconstitutional oencroaches upon *** oas applied, it violates the separation of powers valid final court order by judicial branch that is targetted and reopened by legislative branch legislative branch essentially trying to undo the final decision of the judiciary odelegation of legislative authority when we see executive branch perf *** - want to look at whether there are adequate standards...so if you see a statute that is very vague, make a few points about it *** Governor's issue of an executive order was a considered an unconstitutional violation of (1) separation of powers doctrine, (2)right to privacy, (3) retroactive legislation. The exec order reversed a final judgment, imposed an "unreviewable" stay of action. Courts have right to decide cases, only to be reviewed by higher courts (not exec branch)

Assoc Prof Lobbyist

Facts olobbying org challenged an Act (prohibition on accepting and giving gratuity, gives penalties for violation, enforcement was thru audits and filing of sworn complaints, was for legislative and executive lobbying) ofor leg lobbying, subj to investigation by a designated committee *** ofor exec lobbying, subj to investigation by commission on ethics - if finds violation, submits findings to governor **** Two sep of powers args ofirst arg infringes on executive or judicial power no branch may encroach upon the powers of another no branch may delegate to another its const power ct finds it does not rep encroachment on executive power - FL const doesn't exhaustively list each branch's powers...and b/c const. doesn't specifically give legislature the exclusive power to discipline lobbyists, it also doesn't prevent it from doing so osecond arg act infringes on the FL Sup ct's jx to regulate lawyers or the practice of law ct says act is drafted to specifically exclude practice of law from definition of lobbying - so no encroachment **** other arg act wasn't validly enacted by the FL legislature Lobbyist challenged Florida Act (that allowed legislature the power to issue advisory opinions, investigate violations, and recommend punishments for infractions of the act, it regulated and disciplined lawyers acting as lobbyists). Lobbyist said it violated separation of power, was vague and overly broad. Outcome: no violations of sep. of powers, validly enacted (procedure followed), and no infringement found. Art. II, Sec. (3): Prohibits one branch of government from exercising any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein. -no branch can encroach upon the powers of another

-no branch can delegate its own powers to another Art. III, Sec. 7: Procedure for enacting a bill, originates in either house, must pass by a majority in both.

Legislative Power
Art. III, Sec. 1: senate composed of one senator elected from each senatorial district and a house of representatives composed of one member elected from each representative district. Art III 8 - general purpose bills ** - appropriation bills 12 - supposed to act as a single subject rule wrt appropriation bills Governor may veto *** 6 - Single subject rule: every law shall embrace but ONE SUBJECT and matter properly connected therewithin, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in title. no law is revised or amended by reference to title only. must start "be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Florida"

Franklin v State
DF filed motion to correct his sentence as a habitual offender and claimed that the 3 strike violent felony offender act violated the single subject clause of the state constitution Sup Ct of FL held that: othe subject of the Act is sentencing, othe section that requires the clerk of court to furnish the alien's sentence to Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was properly connected to the Act's subject, and othe section which expands the substantive crime of burglary to add railroad vehicle to the definition of conveyance was properly connected to the Act's subject ct gives us examples of failures - Thompson case (career criminals and domestic violence), Johnson (wrongfllyu confined *** and ** ), Critchfield... ob/c there was ....that was enough odistinguish b/w Doring case so under old law, he wasn't considered a habitual offender but under new law, he was two sections of the chapter law requiring clerk of court to furnish alien's sentence and redefining act saying it's related to sentencing but to change the substantive effect..? opposing harsher sentences on habitual offenders ct says purpose of statute was to protect the public, and the provision about aliens and the other one are related and logically connected (the alien provision puts the offender on notice of possible deportation), there is also a reasonable explanation, and it tends to promote the overall purpose of the act don't confuse object of the act and subject of the act (this deals w subject of the act) if title is overly broad, they'll look at legislative process (kind of like rational basis on federal level) single subject defect only relates to these chapter laws that come out at the end of the *** but there are two ways that legislature can fix --- Salters case - 758 So. 2d 667 (2000) case... when the legislature gets wind that the lower court is holding it in violation, it can separate the offending provisions to comply w the single subject act, and another way - biannually, the FL legislature wraps up all of its chapter laws and incorporates them into the code - once it's inc into code, the single subject window closes Procedural Posture The Dade County Circuit Court (Florida) convicted defendant of armed robbery and resisting arrest, due to acts that occurred after the effective date of 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 188, and sentenced him as an habitual offender under Fla. Stat. ch. 775.084 (1999), which was amended by 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 188, 3. The Third District Court of Appeal certified a conflict with a case decided while an appeal was pending. This matter followed.

Overview At issue in the instant action was the constitutionality of 1999 Fla. Laws ch. 188 known as the "Three-Strike Violent Felony Offender Act" (Act). The specific constitutional question presented was whether the provisions of the Act embraced but one subject and matter properly connected therewith as mandated by Fla. Const. art. III, 6. The instant court first determined that defendant had standing to assert a single-subject challenge, notwithstanding the fact that he was not directly affected by either 11 or 13 of the Act. Second, the court held that there was a natural or logical and thus proper connection between the requirements of 11 that sentences of non-citizen offenders be provided to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS). This conclusion was buttressed by the fact that in requiring the transmission of sentences to the INS, 11 also promoted the Act's purpose of protecting the public from persons sentenced as serious or repeat violent offenders. Third, 13 made effective one of the purposes included within the subject--imposing harsher sentences on violent offenders. Thus, the provisions at issue did not violate the single-subject rule. Outcome The sentence was upheld as non-violative of the single-subject rule. Art. III, sec. 6: every law shall embrace but ONE SUBJECT and matter properly connected therewithin, and the subject shall be briefly expressed in title. no law is revised or amended by reference to title only. must start "be it enacted by the legislature of the state of Florida"

Critchfield
guy has 4 DUIs and under old law he could get drivers license, but under new drivers license law he couldn't when you see something butt up against something, you know you have a single subject issue ct found no natural or logical connection to the drivers license law (bw passing bad checks and the process for debt collection, and the subject of the law shown on the short title) ohere tho there is no short title, so what does the ct do? they look at the overall thrust - suspension of drivers license, registration, operation of a motor vehicle single subject rule requires that they are all related to the proposed bill, so that you don't have ppl trying to shove in things there's also a notice reqmt - single subject rule is supposed to provide legislatures and the people w inquiry notice of what the bill is about Procedural Posture Appellant Florida Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (DHSMV) appealed from the affirmance of the trial court's entry of summary judgment for appellee driver by the Florida District Court of Appeal, which held that 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 223 violated the single subject rule in Fla. Const. art. III, 6. Overview The driver claimed that 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 223, 2 lacked a logical or natural connection to the subject matter of ch. 223. The supreme court agreed that the law violated the single subject rule of Fla. Const. art. III, 6. 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 223, 2, which involved assigning bad check debt to a private debt collector, had no natural or logical connection to the law's subject matter: driver's licenses, operation of motor vehicles, and vehicle registrations. The subject matter of ch. 233 was defined in part by the substantial revisions to a state house bill. When the house bill was returned by the state senate, the bill's subject was changed to driver's licenses, vehicle registrations and operation of motor vehicles. The bill was passed at the end of the legislative session. In enacting ch. 223, the legislature unconstitutionally combined two subjects into one law. The DHSMV's argument that 2 correlated to 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 223, 1, 3 did not consider 2's complete lack of correlation to 1998 Fla. Laws ch. 223, 6-14. There was no connection between assigning bad check debt to a private collector and driver's licenses, vehicle registrations, and motor vehicle operation. Outcome The judgment was affirmed.

Brown v Firestone
ohow do they have standing here? Kaplan p. 61 - limited taxpayer standing (general rule is the Ripplehouse rule -taxpayer may bring suit upon special injury, but Firestone helps us see that the ct, in a case called Horne, when it comes to appropriations, claims advanced based on appropriation qualify for analagous flask...? claims advanced under article 3, 8 and 12 provides standing absent a showing of individual injury ) oArticle 3, Section 12 - ct makes a distinction b/w general appropriations (from art 3 section 8) and substantive law (which is focus of art 3 section 6) (keep this big picture in mind) - language from art 3 section 12 seems more limited, but ct doesn't place any emphasis on that (**and seems to say art 3 section 12 is general appropriations within meaning of art 3 section 8??**) otwo principles follow from the overarching goals of art 3 section 12 appropriations, not substantive law qualification or restrictions on appropriation has to be directly and rationally related to the appropriation the reason here is that the leg branch has the power **..and when they're appropriating, they have the power to qualify how that money is spent, as long as that **** is related oif the appropriation is very general, then the ability of the governor to veto it is very small, but the ability of the *** to limit it, is more broad obut if they (**** who?**) want to limit it, they have to do it under ... **** ?? oif the governor could just veto the qualification or restriction but keep the funds, then he would have the benefit of a law the body didn't pass owhat is specific appropriation? firestone gives examples p. 21 of west printout smallest identifiable integrated fund for a specific purpose in the case of a qualification or restriction (imp b/c this is what attracts the governor's veto) **** oGlades correctional facility- appropriation was to cover salaries for penal facilities, and trying to lower inmate pop in one specific facility was what the qualification attempted to do...governor vetoed it, ct held it wasnt a valid qualification b/c they aren't logically and related to the purpose of the appropriations vill, so the governor's veto was also invalid (there's no specific appropriation - therefor the governor can't go after it that way...if he wants to veto it, he has to veto the whole thing) oUSF - 2.6 mill going to teaching program, ct found it wasn't clear whether it was going to start a new hospital (it would be improper - creation of a new one wouldn't be related...starting a whole new teaching program is like a substantive law) but if it was going to the already standing hospital it would be fine okeep in mind, there's general appropriations and substantive law, and the big picture is that the 3 sections are trying to keep these separate oDivision of Corporations - purpose was to fund salaries for more personnel, provided some contingencies; directly counters substantive law (which we see in Collier and Gindl) - this is seen as a separate substantive law that has to deal with distribution of trust funds, and the appropriation Division of Rec and Parks - keep this one in mind in contrast w Glades and Correctional Facility Procedural Posture Petitioners taxpayers and citizens prayed for writ of mandamus seeking a judicial determination invalidating respondent governor's vetoes, the issuance of an order requiring respondent secretary of state to expunge the vetoes from the official records of the state, and preventing respondent comptroller from disbursing state funds based on such vetoes. Overview Respondent governor exercised his veto power on several items within the general appropriation bill. The veto of a proviso regarding inmate population violated Fla. Const. art. III, 8(a), because it did not veto an identifiable appropriation, but only a qualification within a fund. Veto of a proviso related to the establishment of a new state supported teaching hospital was proper because it vetoed an entire appropriation and not only a limited portion thereof. A qualification to conditionally fund salaries of additional personnel for a government division did not constitute an appropriation, and veto of the qualification was not therefore constitutional. It was constitutional for

respondent governor to veto a qualification for recreation and parks because the qualification represented its own specific appropriation. Vetoes of specified sums for purchase of books and scientific equipment for community colleges was constitutional because each sum was a specific appropriation amount. Mandamus was granted as to vetoes of qualifications regarding inmate population and funding of personnel, but denied for the remaining vetoes. Outcome Mandamus was granted as to respondent governor's vetoes of qualifications that did not constitute appropriations because this was an unconstitutional exercise of veto power. Mandamus was denied as to vetoes that were of specific appropriations, and the appropriations bill was reduced by the amount of the appropriations to which those vetoes related.

Gindl v. Dept of Ed
ct released their decision in Collier County case that held that the 1978 Appropriations Act didn't modify the distribution of formula funds under section 236.081(6)(c), altho it did add dollars to some school districts basd in part on the formula set out in that statute Collier and Gindl - where state has a funding blend, congress can't use an appropriation to *****, but it can use the appropriations process to go above the funding level set by state law - there's the appropriations, but there's substantive law ...***LISTEN Procedural Posture Appellants challenged an order from the circuit court of Leon County (Florida), in which the court upheld the constitutionality of the Appropriations Act (Act), Fla. Stat. ch. 77-465, and Fla. Stat. ch. 236.081(3). Overview Appellants brought suit alleging that the Appropriations Act (Act), Fla. Stat. ch. 77-465, and Fla. Stat. ch. 236.081(3) were unconstitutional. Appellants alleged that the Act and section 236.081(3) related to a subject other than appropriations, and was unconstitutionally violative of Fla. Const. art. II, 3, in that it constituted an unlawful delegation of legislative authority, was vague and ambiguous, and violated the equal protection clause. The lower court entered judgment in appellees' favor. On appeal, the supreme court affirmed the judgment. The supreme court held that the Act was constitutional because it dealt with appropriations and that, when read in conjunction with section 236.081(3), it was neither vague nor indefinite. The supreme court held that by utilizing common sense and interpreting the plain meaning of the statutes, the administrators arrived at a formula which constituted the most reasonable interpretation of the provisions. Moreover, the supreme court held that the appropriations did not violate the equal protection clause. Outcome The supreme court affirmed the judgment upholding the constitutional of the Appropriations Act (Act) because the Act death with appropriations and was not vague and ambiguous.

Dept of Ed v Collier County

Dept of Ed. challenged a bill that guaranteed a minimum increase in school funding for all counties except those that had a millage value per student of more than 20% over the statewide average. Collier was excluded from funding increase under this bill, but Legis can give more money to poorer counties. Outcome: Appropriations bill was constitutional and did not inappropriately modify or amend the existing rule. Art. III, sec. 12: Appropriation Bills, laws making appropriations for salaries of public officers and other current expenses of the state shall contain provision on no other subject.

Thompson v Graham

Speaker of the house sought a writ of mandamus to have certain vetoes of governor to be expunged from official records. Gov Graham vetoed several specific appropriations in a bill, Pt. claims this violated Art. III, Sec. 8(a). Outcome: No writ issued, because the appropriations in the bill were subject to line item veto (partial veto) by the governor. Art. V, Sec. 3(b)(8): Supreme court has jurisdiction over writs of mandamus and quo warranto (challenge to the right to hold office) to state officers and state agencies.

Chiles v Milligan
Governor petitioned for a writ of mandamus for the expunction of proviso language (a condition or qualification) related to the use of school funds for instructional material and transportation of students. Outcome: The proviso language was unconstitutional. The language attempted to amend an existing statute on a subject other than appropriations, violated Art. III, Sec. 12.

Martinez v FL Legislature
Governor argued his veto of portions of an intent document were valid because the letter transmitting the intent document expressly incorporated the intent document into the appropriations bill. Intent document found to NOT be part of the appropriations bill and could not be vetoed. Outcome: Affirmed expunging gov. veto of specific portions of the appropriations. Intent documents are not part of a bill, but mere documents of guidance.

Executive Power
Thompson v State
The review of a motion to suppress evidence seized by authorities (For charge of possession of stolen vehicles) Argued the agent did not have the authority to obtain or execute search warrant and that the statute that granted this authority was an invalid delegation of legislative power to the executive branch. Outcome: Decision to deny the suppression of evidence affirmed, the statute that provided authority for search was constitutional.

FL House v Crist
A petition for a writ of Quo Warranto (removal from office for usurp of power) filed against Crist for signing a gaming compact with the Seminole tribe, that authorized some class III gaming that was prohibited by existing law. Governor argued necessary business clause gave him power. The compact violated separation of power clause (Art. II, Sec. 3) Outcome: Gaming compact violate separation of powers, a duty of the legislature only. Granted petition but withheld writ. Art. IV, sec. 1: The governor shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed, commission all officers of the state and counties, and transact all necessary business with the officers of government.

FL Society of Opthalmology
A petition for a writ of mandamus to publish a bill as law, after the governor vetoed the bill 15 days after presentation of bill and 16 days after the legislature adjourned sine die the regular season. The court determined the veto was timely due to the gubernatorial veto power of Art. III, sec. 8(a).

Outcome: The court allowed the governor 15 days to act on a bill after the legislature adjourned sine die.

Chiles v Public Serv Nom Comm'n

Procedural Posture Petitioners, governor and governor-elect, filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent respondent Public Service Commission Nominating Council from exercising its authority under Fla. Stat. ch. 350.031 (1989) to appoint two public service commissioners to fill vacant positions after petitioner governor failed to timely make such appointments. Overview After petitioner governor failed to timely appoint two public service commissioners to fill vacancies, petitioner governor and petitioner governor-elect filed a writ of prohibition seeking to prevent respondent Public Service Commission Nominating Council from exercising its authority, pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 350.031 (1989), to make the appointments. Petitioners contended that respondent's exercise of its statutory authority unconstitutionally limited petitioner governor's appointing authority. The court denied the petition, rejecting petitioners' argument that the general appointment power of petitioner governor to fill vacancies controlled over any general law. The court also rejected petitioners' assertion that ch. 350.031 directly conflicted with Fla. Const. art. IV, 1(f). The court held that the Public Service Commission was an entity of the legislative branch and that the legislature had the authority to establish by law how legislative branch members, including Public Service Commission members, may be selected. Outcome The court denied a petition for a writ of prohibition filed by petitioners, governor and governor-elect, seeking to prevent respondent Public Service Commission Nominating Council from exercising its statutory authority to appoint public service commissioners to fill vacant positions. The Public Service Commission was an entity of the legislative branch, and the legislature had the authority to establish selection of legislative branch members.

Whiley v Scott
governor issues executive order that directs state agencies to stop rulemaking, creates OFARR, and orders independent agencies to submit their proposals to OFARR before submitting them remember there is no general taxpayer standing (Horn case holds that Flask like exception to bar on taxpayer standing) - now we have quo warranto (where governor has violated the separation of powers, this quo warranto provides standing to public citizen--if it looks like a citizen coming in and challenging s/thing that doesn't seem like they had specific injury, think about this quo warranto) separation of powers power is rulemaking; says its legislative function governor argues that he has power to do this under art 4 section 6 (that officers serve the pleasure of the governor makes him the chief administrator - the administration of each *** shall be placed under the direction of ****) plus vesting powers of executive authority omajority says even tho officers serve pleasure of governor, (in this opinion, they located some of the executive power...they are saying we put leg power in the executive branch, and b/c we did that, this guy can't direct them...he's in there branch but he can't *** them) -- they distinguish the supervisory power from the removal power...they are locating part of the executive power outside of the governor's chain of command... ohere there is no Chevron (fed ccase which recognizes ***** are supposed to take their **** wrt policymaking from the ****) chevron recognizes that there's nothing wrong w it, there's no conflict, all he is doing is inserting himself prior to the process of the APA first, the administrative procedure act (APA)already created the process for providing notice and OFARR Governor Rick Scott issued Executive Order 11-01 as his first official act upon taking office earlier this year. The executive order directed all state agencies under the Governors control to suspend rulemaking and not to proceed with administrative rules until approved by a new Office of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform. The

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executive order also requested that non-gubernatorial agencies also suspend rulemaking. These directives and requests were intended to ensure Florida administrative rulemaking would not be an impediment to job creation and advancing Floridas economy through the current economic slowdown. The Governor eventually signed Executive Order 11-72 superseding Executive Order 11-01, although the new executive order had a similar intent. The Governors executive orders presented an interesting separation of powers issue in Florida administrative rulemaking. A challenge to the Governors actions made its way to the Florida Supreme Court in the form of Whiley v. Scott. In this case, the petitioner sought to establish that Governor Scott exceeded his authority by directing agencies under his supervision to suspend rulemaking. In a 5-2 decision, the Supreme Court found that the Governor indeed exceed his constitutional authority. The Supreme Court accepted the case because it raised serious constitutional questions relating to the authority of the Governor and the legislature relating to rulemaking. The Supreme Court found that the executive orders related to the governmental function of rulemaking, and in Florida rulemaking is a derivative of lawmaking in that rules must implement a specific law and must be based on a legislative grant of rulemaking authority. The Supreme Court expressed concern with provisions in the executive orders inserting the Office of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform in the rulemaking process by requiring that it approve rules before they could be proposed. The Governor, in essence, changed the Florida rulemaking process. The Supreme Court reasoned that the Governors actions then infringed on the legislatures delegation of rulemaking power. Two justices dissented and presented alternate analyses. These justices pointed to provisions of the Florida Constitutional declaring that the Governor is the head of the executive branch. Given that the executive orders were binding only on executive branch agencies, those executive orders had the effect of simply advising agencies under the Governors control that the Governor would have an internal process for approving rules before the rules could be formally proposed. The dissenting justices argued that the executive orders were within the Governors aut hority to direct agencies under his control, and the majoritys decision improperly limits the Governors ability to oversee the affairs of his own agencies. In the end, Whiley v. Scott presents an interesting analysis of administrative rulemaking requirements in Florida. Under the decision, rulemaking is traceable to a delegation of power from the legislature to the executive branch, and once delegated the executive branch cannot infringe on that power absent an amendment to the Administrative Procedure Act or other expression of intent from the legislature Wiley v. Scott, the Florida Supreme Court dealt a blow to Governor Rick Scott's attempt to fulfill a campaign practice by "signing executive orders to freeze job-killing regulations." In Executive Order 11-01 entitled "Suspending Rulemaking and Establishing the Office of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform" Scott established the office, known as OFARR, within the Executive Office of the Governor and directed the suspension of rulemaking except as approved by OFARR. After a lawsuit was brought but before today's opinion, Scott superceded EO 11-01 with EO 11-72 in which he no longer used the word "suspend." The Florida Supreme Court deemed this change more apparent than real, labeling it "nothing more than a sleight of hand." In Wiley, the Florida Supreme Court (pictured below) issued the extraordinary writ of quo warranto - - - a proper writ, according to a previous case, to "challenge the 'power and authority' of a constitutional officer, such as the Governor." Having agreed to consider the case, the per curiam opinion, over two dissents, forumulated its "precise task" as being "to decide whether the Governor has overstepped his constitutional authority by issuing executive orders which contain certain limitations and suspensions upon agencies relating to their delegated legislative rulemaking authority and the requirements related thereto." The Florida Supreme Court found that the Governor usurped the legislative role under the strong separation of powers principles in the Florida Constitution. Rulemaking is a derivative of lawmaking. An agency is empowered to adopt rules if two requirements are satisfied. First, there must be a statutory grant of rulemaking authority, and second, there must be a specific law to be implemented. After an extensive analysis, the court concluded that the Governors executive orders, to the extent each suspends and terminates rulemaking by precluding notice publication and other compliance with the state administrative procedure act absent prior approval from OFARR, infringe upon the very process of rulemaking and encroach upon the Legislatures delegation of its rulemaking power. The court noted that whether "the Governor exceeded his authority derived from state law does not turn upon the number of times the encroachment occurred or whether petitioner was personally affected by it."

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 Two Florida Supreme Court Justices dissented, joining each other's opinions but writing separately. Justice Ricky Poston's dissent is longest, nearly as lengthy as the court's per curiam majority opinion. Poston relies on Article IV, section 1(a) of the Florida Constitution that provides that the "supreme executive power shall be vested in a governor" and argues that the Governor has broad powers. Polston also argues that because EO 11-01 has been superceded and OFARR is approving rulemaking, the Florida Supreme Court's opinion is merely advisory. The opinion, however, relies upon state constitutional separation of powers provisions and principles to invalidate the acts of a controversial governor seeking to create a super-administrative agency within the Executive branch to control all other agencies. As such, it might be read with interest by other state supreme courts, and perhaps other governors.

Procedural Posture Petitioner citizen brought a petition against respondent governor, seeking a writ of quo warranto directing the governor to demonstrate that he had not exceeded his authority, in part, by suspending agency rulemaking through Executive Order 11-01 and Executive Order 11-72. Overview The executive orders suspended and terminated rulemaking by precluding notice publication and other compliance with ch. 120, Fla. Stat. absent prior approval from the Office of Fiscal Accountability and Regulatory Reform (OFARR). The court found that to this extent, the executive orders, contrary to the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), infringed upon the process of rulemaking and encroached upon the legislature's delegation of its rulemaking power, and that the governor exceeded his constitutional authority. Separation of powers was recognized by Art. II, 3, Fla. Const. Pursuant to 120.52, 120.536(1), Fla. Stat. (2010), rulemaking was a derivative of lawmaking and was a legislative function. Pursuant to the APA, under 120.54(3)(a)(1), Fla. Stat. (2010), agencies were required to provide notice prior to the adoption, amendment, or repeal of any rule (other than an emergency rule). Executive Order 11-72 mandated that agencies receive OFARR approval before taking any of the three rulemaking actions. The executive orders supplanted legislative delegations by redefining the terms of those delegations through binding directives to state agencies. Outcome The petition was granted, but issuance of the writ of quo warranto was withheld.

Agency for Health Care Admin v Assoc Ind of FL the const creates a limit on the number of departments in the gov't (purpose is to limit executive gov't - it was getting
so big (think of how it was back in the 18th century - the king kept creating all these branches and the executive became a being unto itself..and this shows attempt to limit the gov't) here, they have an agency department, and the ct says that could be okay, but in order to satisfy this 25 limit, the agency head has to answer to the department head -- here it isn't, and so the ct says they're basically trying to create a 26th department by just naming it an "agency" in federal ct, this would pass muster under the departmental test?? here, it is very deferential review Procedural Posture In appellee association's declaratory judgment action, the trial court found that appellant agency's structure violated Fla. Const. art. IV, 6 and that certain provisions of the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act, Fla. Stat. ch. 409.910 (1995), were unconstitutional. The parties filed cross-appeals, and the First District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified that the judgment required immediate resolution by the state supreme court. Overview After the governor ordered relevant executive branch officials to recover Medicaid expenditures only from the tobacco industry, appellee association sought a declaratory judgment that the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (the Act), Fla.

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Stat. ch. 409.910 (1995), was unconstitutional and that appellant agency was structured in violation of the Florida Constitution. When the trial court found significant portions of the Act unconstitutional, the appellate court certified the parties' appeal. The court partially affirmed and reversed, holding that appellant's structure did not violate the 25 department limitation in Fla. Const. art. IV, 6. The court then held that the Act's abrogation of affirmative defenses was facially constitutional, but this did not preclude a later action challenging the Act's application. Moreover, the authority to pursue an action without identifying individual Medicaid recipients had to be stricken; the abolition of a statute-of-repose defense was ineffective to revive time-barred claims; and the provision for combining theories of market share liability and joint and several liability had to be stricken even though either theory could be used separately. Outcome The court partially affirmed and partially reversed the trial court's ruling on the constitutionality of appellant agency and the Medicaid Third-Party Liability Act (the Act), holding that appellant's structure was constitutional and that the Act was facially valid except that the state had to identify individual Medicaid recipients; and that market share liability and joint and several liability theories could not be used together.

Jones v Chiles
Procedural Posture Petitioner compensation claims judge sought a writ of mandamus requiring respondent governor to reappoint him under Fla. Stat. Ann. 440.45 (1991). Overview Petitioner compensation claims judge sought a writ of mandamus requiring respondent governor to reappoint him under Fla. Stat. Ann. 440.45 (1991). Petitioner argued under the retention process statute that respondent was required to reappoint him because the nominating commission voted to retain him. Respondent contended the statute impermissibly restricted his gubernatorial power to appoint executive branch members. The court denied petitioner's requested relief, concluding the statute unconstitutionally violated separation of powers to the extent it eliminated respondent's choice in the reappointment of executive branch officers. The court explained workers' compensation claims judges were placed in the executive branch by the state legislature's choice to place them in the department of labor. The court noted that, despite the performance of a quasi-judicial function, compensation claims judges were still a part of the executive branch. As a result, the court found respondent governor had the power to appoint executive branch officials under Fla. Stat. ch. 93-415 40. Outcome The court denied petitioner's requested writ of mandamus requiring respondent to reappoint him as a compensation claims judge, in respondent governor's favor, because workers' compensation claims judges were executive branch members of the state department of labor and statutory appointment procedure was unconstitutionally violative of separation of powers to the extent it restricted respondent's power to appoint executive branch members.

Separation of Powers
Art. II, 3 - Branches of government.The powers of the state government shall be divided into legislative, executive and judicial branches. No person belonging to one branch shall exercise any powers appertaining to either of the other branches unless expressly provided herein. FL Sheriffs case - preservation of rights means what you had at that time is preserved (it didn't say w/e your deal was at that time was preserved)

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oso empl saying my deal, my K is xxxx...and preservation of rights statute says that's my deal until i get out obut that doesn't make sense...b/c then one legislative body could bind future ones going forward (and you could never modify retirement scheme) in United Faculty, when they say that right to coll barg doesn't attach ***** FL v PBA tells us what's necessary for coll barg to bring a K into existence...once K comes into existence, then ****United Faculty? tells us right to collective barg attaches...? Hillsborough strict scrutiny test. But if you have a K that isn't collectively bargained, then you wouldn't do that test. you mght have impairment of K issue- you'd do diff test. oimpairment - private K (Pompanio case) vs public K (Pompanio case without deference - *** the test doesn't change, just the scrutiny changes..if it's a private K, b/c the state isn't a PT, ****; public K where state is trying to *** - deference isn't given ***should look into what fails it and what doesn't in case law since it's a balancing test

Chiles v United Faculty of FL

oOnce the executive has negotiated and the legislature has accepted and funded an agreement, the state and all its organs are bound by that agreement under the principles of K law. The act of funding through a valid appropriation is the point in time at which the K comes into existence. The conclusions are compelled by the FL Constitution. if we let him do this, they undermine the whole appropriations process...power to reduce is incident to the power of appropriation...the veto is all or none (is this for Chiles v Children case?***) Facts: unions representing public employees sued after legislature eliminated collectively bargained pay raise. sup ct held that legislature's unilateral modification and abrogation of agreement, which had been funded, violated employees' right to collectively bargain and constituted impermissible impairment of K ***** w/e the prop it can't be created until you get the legislative branch involved Procedural Posture On a motion for clarification from the District Court of Appeal, First District (Florida), the court was asked the court clarify its opinion with reference to the period of time during which certain pay raises would be effective and the availability of interest on amounts wrongfully withheld from employees. Overview On a motion to clarify, the court was asked to clarify its opinion with reference to the period of time during which pay raises for state workers would be effective and the availability of interest on amounts wrongfully withheld from them. The court declared that the legislature was a constituent element of the state, which was bound by the contracts negotiated with employees once those contracts were accepted and funded. Thus, the court held that the legislature was bound by its contract, as would be any private employer. However, the court held that the legislature's legal obligation terminated on June 30, 1992. Therefore, the court declared that the legislature was under no legal obligation to provide the same level of funding beyond that date. Outcome The court held that the state was bound by its contract with state workers, but the state was not obligated under its contract with state workers beyond the date the legislature terminated its obligations.

Chiles v Children A, B, C
oUnder the doctrine of separation of powers, the legislature may not delegate the power to enact laws or to declare what the law shall be to any other branch. Any attempt by the legislature to abdicate its particular constitutional duty

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is void. The legislature, under Fla. Const. art II, 3, may not delegate its lawmaking function to another branch notwithstanding policy considerations or the fiscal operations of other states that do not have the constitutional prohibitions against the delegation of powers. note 11 - implying that there's a fundamental floor worried that guy who tells you how much money you get, and the ppl put it in the branch most closely tied to them...anything that undermines that scheme is suspect Procedural Posture Appellant administration commission members brought a direct appeal from the decision of the Dade County Court (Florida) that granted declaratory and injunctive relief holding Fla. Stat. ch. 216.011(1)(ll) and 216.221 to be unconstitutional. Appellants were enjoined from attempting to restructure 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-193, 1, pursuant to the budget reduction procedure established in Fla. Stat. ch. 216. Overview Appellee foster children sought declaratory and injunctive relief against appellant administration commission members. The action stemmed from the state's determination of a general revenue shortfall in the budget requiring state agencies to prepare revised financial plans reducing their current operating budgets. The trial court granted appellees' request, held Fla. Stat. ch. 216.011(1)(ll) and 216.221 to be unconstitutional, and enjoined appellants from attempting to restructure an appropriations act, 1991 Fla. Laws ch. 91-193, 1, pursuant to the budget reduction procedure established in Fla. Stat. ch. 216. On appeal, the court affirmed the trial court's order. The court held that the statutes, Fla. Stat. ch. 216.011(1)(ll) and 216.221, were unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers because the statutes were an impermissible attempt by the legislature to abdicate a portion of its lawmaking responsibility and to vest it in an executive entity, resulting in the powers of both the legislative and executive branches lodged in one body. This concentration of power was prohibited by the tripartite system of constitutional democracy. Outcome The court affirmed the grant of declaratory and injunctive relief and the trial court's order holding that the budget reduction procedure statutes were unconstitutional as a violation of the doctrine of separation of powers based on the delegation of the legislative function to the executive branch because the state constitution specifically provided for the state legislature alone to establish fiscal priorities.

Florida v FL PBA
o Where the legislature provides enough money to implement the benefit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change the benefit, the changes will not be uphld, and the negotiated benefit will be enforced. This result would not impede pon the leg's exclusive power over public funds, b/c the funds would already be there to enforce the benefit. Where the legislature doesn't appropriate enough money to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, then the conditions it imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if contradictory to the negotiated agreement. Facts: unions representing public employees sought judicial review of unilateral legislative changes to collective bargaining agreement. Sup ct held that 1. public employees' collective bargaining rights were subject to legislature's appropriations power, and 2. unilateral changes to agreement necessitated by failure to appropriate enough money to fund agreement as written were permissible note 6 is this an impairment of the right to K that's guaranteed by state constitution? no, b/c K has to fit the appropriation level, and if it doesn't fit appropriation level, it isn't a valid K. two steps..governor has to *** and *** w/e the right is to collectively bargain...w/e the scope is, it has to be **** the rt to collective bargaining has to be seen as subject to the understanding that ***** remand b/c - ****

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Procedural Posture Appeal from the judgment of the District Court of Appeal, First District (Florida) for appellees, declaring a proviso in a state appropriations bill unconstitutional after appellants enacted legislation altering the leave policy for appellees' career service employees. Overview Appellants enacted legislation that altered the leave policy for appellees' career service employees. Appellees claimed that appellants' actions abridged their right to collectively bargain, which was guaranteed by the state constitution. The trial court granted summary judgment for appellees. The Supreme Court reversed the trial court's decision declaring Fla. Const. 9.3 (A) 5 of the 1988 Appropriations Act unconstitutional. The court stated that where the legislature provides enough money to implement the benefit as negotiated, but attempts to unilaterally change the benefit, the changes will not be upheld, and the negotiated benefit will be enforced. Where the legislature does not appropriate enough money to fund a negotiated benefit, as it is free to do, then the conditions it imposes on the use of the funds will stand even if contradictory to the negotiated agreement. Outcome The court's decision declaring a proviso in the state appropriations bill unconstitutional was reversed because appellants had the right to impose conditions on the use of funds so long as they appropriated enough money, even if it was contradictory to the negotiated agreement with appellees.

Scott v Williams - Exec on Legislature

Facts: oGovernor, Atty Gen, and Chief Financial Officer, in their capacity as the State Board of Admin of FL, and Secretary of the Dept of Management Services of FL appealed a jment of the Circ Ct ruling that amendments, converting the FL Retirement System (FRS) from noncontributory by employees to contributory, violated FL Constitution. The Distr Ct of Appeals certified that the appeal was one presenting issues of great public importance that req'd immediate resolution. oSup Ct held that 1. statutory amendments to FRS, requiring a 3% employee contribution as of certain date, and continuing thereafter, and elimination of cost-living adjustment (COLA) for service performed after that date, were prospective changes w/in authority of legislature to make, and 2. on their face, statutory amendments didn't unconstitutionally impair or abridge the right of public employees to bargain collectively the rights you have prior to the change are K rights...nothing in this change takes away your K benefits up unto that time prior to the statute, in Anders? the ct held they could go back and retroactively... but here, as of 1974, what they got before has vested...and once that happens, the impairment of K right attaches... FL Sheriffs case - preservation of rights means what you had at that time is preserved (it didn't say w/e your deal was at that time was preserved) oso empl saying my deal, my K is xxxx...and preservation of rights statute says that's my deal until i get out obut that doesn't make sense...b/c then one legislative body could bind future ones going forward (and you could never modify retirement scheme) in United Faculty, when they say that right to coll barg doesn't attach ***** FL v PBA tells us what's necessary for coll barg to bring a K into existence...once K comes into existence, then ****United Faculty? tells us right to collective barg attaches...? Hillsborough strict scrutiny test. But if you have a K that isn't collectively bargained, then you wouldn't do that test. you mght have impairment of K issue- you'd do diff test. oimpairment - private K (Pompanio case) vs public K (Pompanio case without deference - *** the test doesn't change, just the scrutiny changes..if it's a private K, b/c the state isn't a PT, ****; public K where state is trying to *** - deference isn't given ***should look into what fails it and what doesn't in case law since it's a balancing tes Background: Governor, Attorney General, and Chief Financial Officer, in their capacity as the State Board of Administration of Florida, and Secretary of the Department of Management Services of Florida appealed a judgment

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of the Circuit Court of the Second Judicial Circuit, Leon County, ruling that amendments, converting the Florida Retirement System (FRS) from noncontributory by employees to contributory, violated Florida Constitution. The First District Court of Appeal certified that the appeal was one presenting issues of great public importance that required immediate resolution.

Holdings: The Supreme Court, Labarga, J., held that: (1) statutory amendments to FRS, requiring a 3% employee contribution as of certain date, and continuing thereafter, and elimination of cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) for service performed after that date, were prospective changes within authority of legislature to make, and (2) on their face, statutory amendments did not unconstitutionally impair or abridge the right of public employees to bargain collectively. Reversed.

Advisory Opinion Re: Protect People, Especially Youth, From... Tobacco

Atty Gen requested review of a proposed const amend designed to protect ppl, esp youth, from hazards of tobacco already legislatively approved tobacco settlement w the tobacco industries, ways that the initiative power can be tamed Sup Ct's inquiry when det validity of initiative petitions, limited to two legal issues: owhether petition satisfies single-subject reqmt of state const and Single subj rule for a const amend by initiative prevents logrolling by letting citizens vote on singular changes in govt ID'd in the proposal and to avoid accepting part of a proposal which they oppose in order to obtain a change they support, and prevents a single const amend from substantially altering or performing the functions of multi aspects of gov't (single subj rule ensures that the amendment's impact on the const is limited and accurately disclosed) in det compliance, Sup Ct examines amendment to det whether it may be logically viewed as having a natural relation and connection as component parts or aspects of a single dominant plan or scheme (unity of object and plan is the universal test) won't auto fail single subj test when it affects several branches of gov't - it violates the ss test when it substantially alters or performs the functions of multi branches whether ballot titles and summaries are clear and unambiguous ***LISTEN this case is like High speed monorail b/c don't have ***... 1. 2. doesn't hijack *** and 3. initiative is approving a settlement agreement already approved by the legislature Public Education Fund For the reasons stated, we hold that the initiative petition and proposed title and summary meet the legal requirements of article XI, section 3 of the Florida Constitution, and section 101.161(1), Florida Statutes (2005), and that the financial impact statement is in accordance with section 100.371(6), Florida Statutes (2005). Accordingly, we approve the amendment and financial impact statement for placement on the ballot. We note, however, that no other issue is addressed herein and this opinion should not be construed as expressing either favor for or opposition to the proposed amendment. No motion for rehearing will be permitted.

Amer Bankers Ins v Chiles

insurers challenged constitutionality of statute establishing CAT Fund

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 legislature enacted chapter 93-409 Laws of Florida which created the FL Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (CAT Fund) which is funded by assessments on insurers...the insurance companies claimed that chapter 93-409 violated art. III of 19(f)(1) of FL Const (which requires that no trust fund be created except "in a separate bill for that purpose only" oinsurers argue that art III 19(f)(1) restricts a bill creating a trust fund to items necessary to the creation of the fund and that chapter 93-409 contains provisions unnecessary to the creation of the trust fund art III section 19 became effective in 1992, and in 1993 the legislature amended section 215.3207 (the statute that sets forth the criteria for creating a trust fund) in order to conform to the reqmts of art 3, section 19 - showing an interpretation of art 3, section 19 to mean items relating to the purpose, admin, and funding should be included w/in a bill creating a trust fund) (a contemporaneous construction of the constitution by the legislation, such as 3 yrs bw a constitutional amendment and the enactment of a statute by the legislature construing the amendment, is strongly presumed to be correct) *** LISTEN

Procedural Posture In petitioner insurers' action challenging 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93-409, the First District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified the question of whether a legislature could include within a bill creating a trust fund all items that related to the purpose, administration, and funding of the trust fund, or whether the bill should have been limited to those matters logically indispensable to the trust fund's creation. Overview 1993 Fla. Laws ch. 93.409 created the Florida Hurricane Catastrophe Fund (fund), which was funded by assessments on insurers. Petitioner insurers filed a complaint attacking the fund. The trial court found that the statute was constitutional. The district court agreed, finding that all of the challenged provisions were directly related to the purpose, funding, administration, and regulation of the fund. A portion of the district court's certified question asked whether the statute that created the trust fund should have been limited to those matter logically indispensable to the trust fund's creation. The appellate court found that the statute complied with Fla. Const. art. III, 19(f)(1), which required a three-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the legislature in a separate bill for that purpose only. The court held that the statute complied with the constitutional provision by limiting its provisions to items related to the purpose, administration, and funding of the fund. That portion of the certified question was answered in the negative and the district court's decision was approved. Outcome The state statute creating a fund that was funded by assessments on insurers, including petitioners, complied with a state constitutional provision requiring the statute to limit its provisions to items related to the purpose, administration, and funding of the fund.

Lewis v Leon County

counties filed declaratory jment action challenging constitutionality of statute requiring counties to fund overhead costs for office of Regional Conflict Counsel (RCC)

Procedural Posture Appellee counties sued for a declaratory judgment that ch. 2007-62, 19, Laws of Fla., was unconstitutional under Art. V, 14 Fla. Const. and Art. VII, 18(a) Fla. Const. The court granted the counties final summary judgment. Appellants, the State of Florida and state officials, appealed to the First District Court of Appeal (Florida). The intermediate appellate court affirmed the trial court's decision. The State and the officials appealed. Overview The issue presented was whether ch. 2007-62, 19, Laws of Fla., unconstitutionally shifted the State of Florida's responsibility for funding certain costs of court-appointed counsel from the State to the counties in violation of Art. V, 14 Fla. Const. The state supreme court found that ch. 2007-62, 19, Laws of Fla., violated the constitutional

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requirement that the State fund the overhead costs of all judicial offices that were not expressly listed in Art. V, 14(c) Fla. Const. Outcome The intermediate appellate court's decision was affirmed to the extent that it held that the law violated the Florida Constitution.

Askew v Cross Key Waterways

The Florida Supreme Court holds those portions of the state's Environmental Land and Water Management Act which provide for administrative designation and regulation of areas of critical state concern invalid as an unconstitutional delegation of legislative authority. The court rules that the statutory criteria for such designations fail to delineate priorities among competing areas and resources and thus delegate to an administrative body the fundamental legislative tasks of determining which geographic areac are in the greatest need of designation and what principles should guide development in those areas. The court distinguishes as inapposite decisions upholding statutory scheme in other states which regulate development in legislatively defined areas such as wetlands or the coastal zone. Noting that the Florida Constitution, unlike that of the United States and some other states, expressly prohibits the exercise by a member of one branch of government of any powers vested in either of the other branches, the court declines to adopt the "modern" view that the non-delegation doctrine should no longer be strictly applied. The court emphasizes that its decision need not impair the state's ability to protect critical areas because the legislature may designate such areas either in advance or through ratification of administratively developed recommendations. Procedural Posture Appellant governor sought review of two decisions of the First District Court of Appeal (Florida) in favor of appellee land developers based on rulings that provisions of Fla. Stat. ch. 380.05(1) and 380.05(2)(a) and (b) were unconstitutional. Overview Against the challenge of appellee land developers, appellant governor sought approval of the provisions of Fla. Stat. ch. 380.05 which empowered an administrative body to designate areas of critical environmental concern and establish regulations for development of those areas. The standard by which land development regulations were to be measured was not articulated by the legislature but was to be determined as the sole province of the administrative agency through formulation of principles. This violated the doctrine of nondelegation of legislative power. Under this doctrine, fundamental, primary policy decisions should have been made by members of the legislature who were elected to perform those tasks and administration of legislative programs should have been pursuant to some minimal standards and guidelines ascertainable by reference to the establishing enactment. The court held that the statutory standards for exercise of the power to designate areas of critical state concern were inadequate and that the delegation consequently violated Fla. Const. art. II, 3. Outcome The court affirmed the decisions of the lower court upholding the challenges of appellee land developers against appellant governor, finding that the statute was an unconstitutional delegation to an administrative body of legislative power to make fundamental policy decisions without adequate standards for doing so.

Now we have looked at 2 cases - single subject that were non appropriations, and we looked at diff bw appropriations and subl ? ...looked at evo/ego provisions?

Finance and Taxation

Fls constitution limits the right of the state to tax. Article 7, 1 - the state may only levy taxes in pursuance of law a. Ad Valorem Taxes are property taxes. i. Only Local Govts (not the state) may levy ad valorem (property) taxes on real estate or tang pers prop ii. Only state may levy an AV tax on intangible property (notes, bonds, other obligations for payment) but tax may not exceed 2 mills

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1. Milliage rates (mills) is the formula for determining property taxation: $1 per $1000 value x # of mills authorized by particular government entity. a. No govt in FL may impose AVT on cars, boats, planes, trailers, or mobile homes (license fees are permissible) b. Exemptions from AV taxation: Property owned by a municipality and used exclusively for public purposes is exempt, but exemption applied to property owned by munic and leased to profit making venture. A county or munic may grant AVT exemption to new bus and expanding existing bus. Applies only to improvements to RP (expanding bus) and to tangible personal prop of (new bus), not RP. c. Assessment of Fees by local governments to supplement revenue against users of government facilities. Fee restriction as to amount and use: fee amount must be pegged to per capital cost of facility; and use of fee must be applied toward the facility. d. Finance state must be self-sufficient. The state may generally borrow $ for capital improvements, such as buildings, bridges, roads & airports. i. May not borrow 4 ordinary operating expense; no $ withdrawn from treasury unless appropriated by law. e. Revenue Bonds issued for traditional municipal purposes and are secured by the revenue of the project, e.g. toll bridge. referendum needed for approval of RBs. f. General Obligation Bonds are issued by the state or its subdivisions in order to finance capital projects for a public purpose. Because the taxing power of the state is being used, there must be authority to issue the bonds. i. Local GOBs must also be approved by referendum.

Taxation, General/Special, and Preemption concepts - strong parallels to federal gen/special laws - didn't want state gov't to ***** in the state - that's why no special laws...that's the main reason for that the following set of *** is preemption but here is state preemption vis a vis counties or municipalities (same fundamental tensions in the fed structure are present in the states, and they generate the body of law that tracts the fed law from state preemption persp) Kaplan outline is better for p. 93 Special assessments Art 7 - look at Barbri outline**** Art 7 1 (a) - taxation appropriation The state may not levy taxes on real property or tangible personal property (ie Ad Valorem taxes) Local governments are only permitted to impose property (ad valorem) taxes In Rutledge, the question presented: is the state engaged in unconstitutional ad valorem taxation? The case tells you what ad valorem taxation is - theres argument that the state is taxing tangible personal property, which is an ad valorem tax. The case also tells you that all taxes are either direct or indirect. Indirect is on a right or privilege or coroporate franchise. Excise taxes... **** Art 7 1 (a) - tells us ad valorem vs other kinds of taxes. Rutledge gives us the test to differentiate the two. The ct holds no, its an excise tax - a tax on the privilege of selling liquor that is calculated according to the liquor in possession. It kind of looks like an ad valorem tax, but you look at the purpose of the statute, as well as the direct vs

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indirect concept. The ct says ad valorem is a tax on the value. And the second component of ad valorem is that somebody has to appraise the value. In Board of Pub Instr of Brevard v State Treasurer, there is a municipality system that is out of the town's control. but state law requires that the local community college be supported by funds created by ad valorem taxation. but constitution divies up tax base to allow each of these entities/ political subdivisions to be able to financially support its operations. but the county arg is that the state is free riding on their tax base...the counties have control (or was it that they didnt have control? ****) of the community colleges...but are being forced to turn over some of their tax base/funds to support the state existence. tension - a division of tax base bw state and others and now issue is that it doesn't mean very much if the state can just do what it wants and say you guys pay. here holding is that there is nothing in constitution that gives express prohibition. and also here, the state scheme is consistent w the division of tax base bw state vs local b/c the state isn't taking ad valorem tax revenues from the local govt and hoisting them for a state purpose. here, it is bootstrapping ad valorem tax base to support community colleges - which is in keeping w the overall scheme of saying that ad valorem taxation should be used for local purposes. the state isn't going into the county pockets to fund a state venture. instead, they're saying we're going to support the community college system to some measure, but you have to also. SO ad valorem taxation - for what purposes? local purposes here. A-okay! Now, if it was for a state purpose - say going over to miami, then that would be a problem Impact fees He likes Kaplan outline for this part - B. 8. Impact Fees p 91 one of the outlines tells us about the single subject rule, and then all the ways/strategies each of the branches employs to get around the system that restrains them. Here, there is a similar idea. Art 7, 9 B - caps of ad valorem taxation - so what is a municipality or town going to do? they're capped at ad valorem taxation. so they try to engage in taxation but try to put a different label on it - a fee. So we have to draw a further line bw taxes and fees. that's where City of Port Orange comes in The structure divides the tax base between the state and other entities, now we see the fun and games where ppl try to cross the lines in favor of their side. They want revenue - they cap my revenue? well then its a user fee! or an impact fee! In City of Port Orange, the city wanted citizens to pay a fee based on the use of roads. It becomes a question of tax vs fee. The city wants money and they know there's a cap bc of Art 7 9 (b) so they say it's a fee. The tax ct said it was okay b/c it was like a user fee. BUT, Sup Ct of FL said its a TAX, and NOT a user fee. It held that transportation utility fees used to finance bonds were unauthorized taxes rather than a valid user fee - they were a tax masquerading as a user fee. we learn that if it's a true fee it is okay - it isn't a tax that violates the limit. so we have to det what's a tax vs what's a legit user fee, vs what's a legit impact fee. something about voluntariness*** user fee for a road would be a toll. bc there has to be a meaningful connection bw actual use **** driving on the road is pretty voluntary. impact fees - say you have a sewer system and gonna hook up a subdivision w 500 houses. that's going to upset the system we have now. we know it's going to tax our system. THATS an impact.

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so weve learned that we have ad valorem taxation ( Rutledge has a nice discussion on it - ad valorem vs other kinds of taxes) ...then we have general caps, 10 mill caps, and then we have exceptions ( City of Port Orange has a nice discussion of taxes, user fees and impact fees)

Exemptions state is immune from taxation - municipalities may be exempt from taxation if the use meets the public purpose test - Art 7, 3 (a) (taxes and exemptions) - all prop owned by municipality and used exclusively for municipal or public purposes will be exempt from taxation. So question becomes, what qualifies as a state? Canaveral Port Auth discusses what a state is In Canaveral Port Auth v Dept of Revenue - question of whether canaveral port auth considered a political subdivision or not. b/c if it's a political subdivision it can be immune from the state tax. county assessed ad valorem taxes on the port authority - on the interest of the real prop owned by Canav port auth. issue was that they leased prop to a private entity not engaged in govt activity. so question was whether that prop should be exempted from activity. kaplan outline - p 93 - state is immune from taxation. well, what's the state? we learn here, state is limited to counties, entities, providing a public system of education, and agency depts or branches of state govt that perform the administration of state govt. ct says legislature doesn't have the power to say "this entity is exempt from taxation and just going to call it something" - don't have power to designate which entities are immune from taxation, bc its expressly provided for in the constitution. there's a tax base given ...exemptions provided for in the constitution, and ct is serious about preserving the tax base given to counties and other areas and not allow state to exempt..?

Prop Used for Public Purposes Exemption from Art 7 3 A - Property owned and used by a municipality for a public purpose is exempt from taxation. (Kaplan 10 a *** ... Barbri outline - something 4 sub f? ****) So the exemption provided in Art 7 3 (a) is focused on use and also on the purpose - municipal or public purpose in order to qualify for an exemption. So question becomes, what is a public purpose? FL Dept of Revenue v City of Gainesville discusses what a public purpose is In FL Dept of Revenue v Gainesville, (***put better facts here and what ct said about what constitutes a public purpose***) the court, upon reviewing the applicable statutes and the meaning being various terms such as municipal purpose, held that providing telecommunications services did not, as a matter of law, always serve municipal or public purposes and, therefore, ad valorem taxation of a municipality's telecommunications facilities was not facially unconstitutional. The court agreed that telecommunications services were essential services but that, in providing those services, a municipality did not as a matter of law engage in an activity essential to the welfare of the community.

Art 7 1 - Ad Valorem Taxation - Rutledge v Chandler Art 7 3 - Taxes and Exemptions: Public Purpose - FL Dept of Rev v Gainesville Art 7 8 - Bd of Pub Instruction v Treasurer Art 7 9 - Caps of AVT: Fees - City of Port Orange Local Bonds - Volusia County v State Pledging credit - JAA v Jacksonville**** ?

Rutledge v Chandler

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CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellants sought review of a decision from a trial court order that enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting taxes, imposed pursuant to Fla. Stat. ch. 83-349, 17, against appellees' inventory of alcoholic beverages. The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) certified this matter for direct appeal to the Florida Supreme Court as requiring immediate resolution. OVERVIEW: After a trial court concluded that Fla. Stat. ch. 83-349, 17, which imposed a "floor tax" against appellees' retail inventories of alcoholic beverages, was an unconstitutional ad valorem tax, under Fla. Const. art. VII, 1(a), and permanently enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting the taxes, the appellate court certified appellants' challenge to the trial court's order. The court reversed the trial court's order. The court ruled that 17 was not a property tax because it was not levied on value assessed by assessors and that it also affirmatively satisfied the criteria for an excise tax. The court noted that 17 tax was imposed against appellees' retail inventory as it existed on the effective date of a state-wide increase in the alcoholic beverage tax, and that the 17 tax was intended, among other things, to ensure that all alcoholic beverages sold by retailers after the effective date bore the same tax rate. As such, the court concluded, the tax was not on inventory, but on a privilege as measured by appellees' inventory, and was therefore not an unconstitutional ad valorem tax. OUTCOME: The court reversed an order that permanently enjoined appellant Division of Alcoholic Beverages and Tobacco from collecting taxes that were imposed against appellees' inventory of alcoholic beverages. The taxes imposed by the statute at issue were not impermissible ad valorem taxes on appellees' inventory, but were taxes on appellees' privilege to sell alcohol, measured by their inventory. The tax was thus a constitutionally imposed excise tax.

direct v indirect tax...it looks like an ad valorem tax; but ad valorem is a tax on the value so there would need to have been an appraiser that went out there All taxes, other than polls, are either direct or indirect property taxes. A direct tax is one that is imposed directly upon property, according to its value. It is generally spoken of as a property tax or an ad valorem tax. An indirect tax is a tax upon some right or privilege, or corporate franchise, and is most often called an excise or occupational tax. An excise and a property tax, when the two approach each other, ordinarily may be distinguished by the respective methods adopted for laying them and fixing their amounts. If a tax is imposed directly by the legislature without assessment, and its sum is measured by the amount of business done, income previously received, or by the extent to which a taxable privilege may have been enjoyed or exercised by the taxpayer, irrespective of the nature or value of such taxpayer's assets or his investments in business, it is to be regarded as an excise tax. But if the tax is computed upon the valuation of the property, and assessed by assessors, either where it is situated or at the owner's domicile, although privileges may be included in the valuation, it is considered a property tax.

Bd of Pub Instruction v Treasurer

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant county school board, having brought a declaratory judgment against appellee state officials, sought reversal of the order of a Brevard County (Florida) trial court declaring Fla. Stat. chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7) to be constitutional. OVERVIEW: Appellant county school board filed suit against appellees state treasurer, state board of education and education commissioner, and junior college board of trustees, seeking a declaratory judgment that Fla. Stat. chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7) (1967) were unconstitutional. Appellant contended that it had the exclusive power to set local school taxes and to regulate the free educational system in the county, and that in consequence, junior colleges either should be controlled by it or should not be permitted to receive local funding under the provisions of chs. 230.0111(2) and 230.0117(7). The trial court found the statutes constitutional. On appeal, the court affirmed. The court held that when a local district which promoted the establishment of a junior college later withdraw that funding, the state could likewise withdraw state support for the local school district pursuant to the challenged statutes. The court determined that junior colleges were part of the public school system authorized by Fla. Const. art. IX.

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OUTCOME: The trial court's order that declared statutes regarding junior college funding to be constitutional was affirmed. The state constitution's provisions dealing with the state's free educational system permitted the state to require local governments to help fund junior colleges within their localities.

Fla. Const. art. IX, 1 recognizes that there are three areas of public education (1) a uniform system of free public schools, (2) institutions of higher learning and (3) other public education programs Fla. Const. art. IX, 3 authorizes long terms for any appointive board dealing with education, and that provision clearly contemplates that boards may be established by law to function in the operation of the various phases of the state school program subject, of course, to the control of free public schools by the local boards Fla. Const. art. IX, 4(b), in addition to authorizing local school boards to operate, control and supervise the free public schools within their districts, also requires that they determine the rate of school district taxes within the constitutional limits - however, some of the taxes so levied by the local school district can properly be used for local school purposes other than the support of the free public schools when so provided by law (see following note) Fla. Const. art. VII, 9 places a limit of 10 mills on taxes for all school purposes. "All school purposes" is certainly broader than the phrase "free public schools" used in Fla. Const. art. IX. This implies that while the local school board must determine the rate of all school district taxes, some of the taxes so levied by the local school district can properly be used for local school purposes other than the support of the free public schools when so provided by law. Fla. Const. art. VII, 8 provides that state funds may be appropriated to the several counties, school districts, municipalities or special districts upon such conditions as may be provided by general law Subject to the power of the legislature to establish a uniform system of free public schools, the control of the free public schools in each district is vested in the local school board. This does not prohibit the legislature from placing upon the local school districts the duty to render financial support to junior colleges which are not under the control of the local school boards but which have been established at their request. Thus, statutes providing for local support of junior colleges which aren't under the control of the local board of public instruction but which have been established at board's request are constitutional and valid Fla. Const. art. VII, 1 prohibits state ad valorem taxes. Ad valorem taxes levied by school districts for support of junior colleges are local taxes levied for local purposes. Thus, even ad valorem taxes levied by county board of public instruction for support of junior colleges which aren't under the control of the local county board but which have been established at board's request are "local taxes" levied for local purposes, rather than prohibited state ad valorem taxes. Legislature may not circumvent prohibition against state ad valorem taxation by any scheme or device which requires local ad valorem taxes and then channels proceeds into essentially state functions which are not also local functions

State v City of Port Orange - Impact Fees

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant state sought review of the decision of the Circuit Court for Volusia County (Florida), which found appellee city's proposed transportation ordinance valid. OVERVIEW: Appellee city enacted a transportation ordinance requiring its citizens to pay a fee based on their usage of appellee's roads. Appellant state contended that the ordinance was not valid because it was a tax, and as such, it had to be authorized by general law. The trial court held that the ordinance was valid because it imposed a user fee on appellee's residence, rather than a tax. On appeal, the supreme court reversed the trial court's judgment, holding that the ordinance imposed a tax on appellee's residents that was not authorized by general law. The supreme court determined that the fee was a tax because it was a mandatory charge imposed on all residents. Moreover, the supreme court determined that the ordinance did not impose a user's fee because a user's fee was paid voluntarily. The supreme court concluded that if a resident did not pay the fee imposed by the transportation ordinance, a lien

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would be placed on the resident's property. The supreme court further concluded that residents had no choice but to pay the fee. OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed the trial court's decision because appellee city's proposed transportation ordinance imposed a tax on appellee city's residents that was not authorized by general law. The supreme court held that the ordinance did not impose a valid user's fee because residents were required to pay the fee or have a lien placed on their properties.

Canaveral Port Auth v Dept of Rev

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Petitioner port authority and respondent revenue department moved for rehearing and clarification of the decision of the Fifth District Court of Appeal, Brevard County (Florida), holding that petitioner's feesimple interest in property was not immune from ad valorem taxation. OVERVIEW: The county in which petitioner port authority was located assessed ad valorem taxes against petitioner pursuant to Fla. Stat. Ann. 196.199(4) on the fee interest of real property owned by petitioner and leased to private entities engaged in nongovernmental activities. Petitioner filed suit challenging the assessment. Immunity from ad valorem taxation, which was necessary for the proper functioning of state government, was to be kept within narrow bounds, and not extended to exempting of commercial establishments operated for profit on property leased from the government. Therefore, fee interest in petitioner's property was not exempt from ad valorem taxation because the property was leased to a nongovernmental entity for a nongovernmental use. OUTCOME: Decision holding that petitioner's fee-simple interest in property was not immune from ad valorem taxation was affirmed, where the property was leased to a nongovernmental entity for nongovernmental use

FL Dep of Rev v Gainesville

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant, the Florida Department of Revenue, challenged the judgment of the District Court of Appeal (Florida), which affirmed a trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of appellee city. The city had brought suit seeking a declaration that the portions of Fla. Stat. ch. 97-197, imposing the tax obligation on its telecommunications facilities, were unconstitutional under Fla. Const. art. VII, 3(a). OVERVIEW: The city became involved in the business of providing telecommunication services. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the city and declared 2 and 3 of Fla. Stat. ch. 97 - 197 facially unconstitutional. The lower court affirmed, holding that the property in question was being used by the city for a municipal purpose and that the legislature's attempt to condition the provision of those municipal services on the payment of an amount equal to any ad valorem tax liability was in direct conflict with Fla. Const. art. VII, 3(a). The court, upon reviewing the applicable statutes and the meaning being various terms such as municipal purpose, held that providing telecommunications services did not, as a matter of law, always serve municipal or public purposes and, therefore, ad valorem taxation of a municipality's telecommunications facilities was not facially unconstitutional. The court agreed that telecommunications services were essential services but that, in providing those services, a municipality did not as a matter of law engage in an activity essential to the welfare of the community. OUTCOME: The court reversed the decision of the lower court that held that the statutory provisions imposing ad valorem taxation on telecommunications facilities were facially unconstitutional.

Strand v Escambia County

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant intervenor challenged a final judgment validating a proposed bond issue from the Circuit Court of the First Judicial Circuit, in and for Escambia County, Florida. Appellees were Escambia County, Florida, etc., et al.

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OVERVIEW: The intervenor raised three issues: (A) whether the circuit court abused its discretion in denying his motion for continuance, (B) whether the circuit court's final judgment was supported by competent, substantial evidence, and (C) whether the bonds required a referendum pursuant to art. VII, 12, Fla. Const. On the first issue, given the adequacy of the notice provided and the circuit court's accommodation, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion. With regard to the second issue, the intervenor argued that the circuit court's adoption of the County's proposed final judgment was an improper delegation of authority. This contention was without merit because the intervenor was afforded a meaningful opportunity to review the County's proposed final judgment, make objections, and make his own proposals. Next, the court stated that the findings in the Ordinance and Resolution were not shown to have been clearly erroneous. Finally, the third issue was controlled by the court's decision in Penn, in which the court previously affirmed the Circuit Court's validation of bonds issued under a similar tax ordinance and resolution and issuance structure. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the final judgment of validation of the Escambia County Circuit Court.

Class Notes: Ct said what was critical was constitutionality of the bonds bonds were going to create a trust fund non ad valorum revenue available?

Jackson-Shaw
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: On appeal from a federal district court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit certified two questions. It asked the present court to determine whether an aviation authority had become a joint owner with a private entity or whether it had given, lent, or used its credit to aid a private entity in violation of Art. VII, 10, Fla. Const. OVERVIEW: The agreement was for a private commercial development company's long-term use of vacant land owned by the authority. The court held that the agreement did not violate the constitutional prohibition against joint ownership. Although an option to ground lease required the authority to construct a road extension, it had already been planned and budgeted, so the authority was not using public funds to create a prohibited joint ownership. The authority was also obligated to provide land for wetlands mitigation, but this provision did not make the parties to the agreement joint owners. Furthermore, the agreement did not meet all of the elements of the test for a joint venture. Next, the authority was not impermissibly pledging its credit to aid the company. The constitutional prohibition contemplated not just the use of public funds but the imposition of a new financial liability and a direct or indirect obligation to pay a debt of a third party. Under this standard, the authority had not given, lent, or used its credit to aid the company. Thus, the transaction needed to only serve a public purpose, which was fulfilled to the extent that the revenue might ultimately provide tax relief. OUTCOME: The court answered the certified questions in the negative and returned the case to the Eleventh Circuit.

Gallant v Stephen
CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant taxpayer sought review of the decision of the Pinellas County Circuit Court (Florida) upholding the constitutionality of Fla. Stat. chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r) in an action brought by appellant against appellee county board members to block the creation of municipal service taxing units. OVERVIEW: Appellee county board members adopted a resolution under Fla. Stat. chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r) creating a municipal service taxing unit spanning the unincorporated area of the county to fund the services provided to that area. Appellant taxpayer and property owner in this area, sued appellees challenging the newly imposed tax under Fla. Const. art. VII, 9. The trial court upheld the constitutionality of chs. 125.01(1)(q), (r). The court affirmed the trial court's order. In finding ch. 125.01(1)(q), ( r) constitutional, the court relied on the language of art. VII, 9, which provided for the imposition of taxes by a county in order to provide municipal services separate and apart from the

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requirement that other types of taxes be approved by a referendum. The court also relied on the legislative intent that ch. 125.01(1)(q), (r) was to ensure that individuals living in the unincorporated area of the county also receive municipal services. Moreover, the court found that the tax did not violate Fla. Const. art. VII, 2 because the tax was applied in a uniform rate within the unincorporated area. OUTCOME: The court affirmed the trial court order's declaring the law authorizing a county to furnish municipal services funded by ad valorem taxes in an unincorporated area without a referendum constitutional because the legislative intent was to provide such services, and the state constitution contemplated the imposition of such taxes without a referendum.

Fl Dept of Rev v Howard

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant Florida Department of Revenue sought review of a decision of the District Court of Appeal, First District (Florida), which declared that Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) violated the mandate of Fla. Const. art. VII, 4. OVERVIEW: The appellate court had ruled that Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) was unconstitutional because it interfered with a property appraiser's discretion to determine just value, and it favored tangible personal property owners who had received a reduced assessment from an administrative value adjustment board (VAB) in a previous tax year. The supreme court disagreed. Chapter 193.016 required an appraiser to consider the results of an appeal before VAB in the year prior in determining the current just value of tangible personal property. Fla. Stat. ch. 193.011 (2001) set out eight factors that were to be considered in valuing property. Fla. Stat. ch. 193.016 (2001) merely provided a ninth factor for consideration. It did not arbitrarily create a class of property for favored tax treatment. Further, ch. 193.016 did not require an appraiser to follow the VAB's assessment, it only required an appraiser to "consider" it. The statute's second sentence, which required an appraiser to justify his or her reasons for a decision to depart from a VAB assessment, simply regulated the procedural, not substantive, method of assessment where there had been a successful appeal to a VAB. OUTCOME: The supreme court reversed the appellate court's decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with the supreme court's decision

Capital City Country Club

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The First District Court of Appeal (Florida) affirmed the judgment that Fla. Stat. Ann. 196.199(4) (1991) did not exempt petitioner, a private lessee of city property on a lease entered into before 1976, from paying real estate taxes and that petitioner's payment of tangible tax on the lease did not cause the value of the lease to be excluded from the value of the property, and certified these questions to the court. OVERVIEW: Petitioner entered into a 99-year lease in 1956 to lease city-owned land for the use as a private golf course. The lease required petitioner to pay all ad valorem taxes. Petitioner paid intangible tax on the lease, and sued for an exemption from real estate taxes under Fla. Stat. Ann. 196.199(4) (1991), or to have the value of the lease excluded from the value of the land for real estate tax purposes. The trial court entered judgment against petitioner, and the appellate court affirmed the judgment and certified the question of the exemption and the exclusion. The court held that because 196.199(4) (1991) did not expressly exempt leases entered into before 1976 from taxation, and because Fla. Const. art. VII, 3(a) exempted city owned property from taxation only if it were being used for a public purpose, petitioner was not exempt from paying real estate taxes. Because the intangible tax on the lease and the real estate tax were two separate taxes on different types of property, there was no double taxation and the value of the lease could not be excluded from the value of the land for real estate for tax purposes. Therefore, the court affirmed the decision. OUTCOME: The court approved the decision affirming the denial of a real estate tax exemption or reduction to petitioner because the state constitution did not give petitioner, a private lessee of city land on a lease entered into before 1976, an exemption, thus the statute could not give exemptions to pre-1976 lessees, and because the value of the lease did not affect the value of the real estate and could not be excluded for tax valuations

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Volusia County v State

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellant County of Volusia, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, challenged a judgment from the circuit court (Florida), where appellant's complaint for validation of capital improvement bonds was denied. Appellant claimed that it would pledge all unused revenue from regulatory fees. OVERVIEW: Appellant County of Volusia, a political subdivision of the State of Florida, challenged a judgment from the circuit court, which denied the complaint of the County of Volusia for validation of capital improvement bonds in the amount of $ 40,000,000, pledging unused revenues from regulatory fees and user charges to pay for the bonds. The Florida Supreme Court affirmed the order denying validation. The pledge of all available funds had more than a mere incidental effect on the exercise of ad valorem taxing power. It required a referendum under the Fla. Const. art. VII, 12. The pledge of all available revenues, together with a promise to maintain the programs, would have had a substantial impact on the future exercise of ad valorem taxing power. The taxpayers of Volusia County had to have an opportunity to vote on the bond issue. OUTCOME: The state supreme court affirmed the circuit court's denial of appellant county's complaint to validate capital improvement bonds because the pledge of funds, offered by appellant, required a referendum under the state constitution

Donovan v Okaloosa County

CASE SUMMARY PROCEDURAL POSTURE: Appellee county filed a bond validation complaint pursuant to Ch. 75, Fla. Stat. (2008) seeking a determination of its authority to incur bonded debt relating to a beach restoration project. Appellant owners of property subject to the related assessments intervened, filing an answer and counterclaims. The Circuit Court in and for Okaloosa County (Florida) issued an order validating the bonds. The property owners appealed. OVERVIEW: The owners argued, among other things, that, in adopting the Assessment Resolution, the county failed to comply with its Municipal Service Benefit Unit (MSBU) Ordinance, and as a result, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to validate the bonds. The appellate court found, however, that the county fulfilled the 75.03, Fla. Stat. condition when it adopted the bond resolution, authorizing issuance of bonds to finance the underlying project. With this condition satisfied, the county was authorized to file the complaint. As all the requirements of the initial assessment resolution were fulfilled before the hearing, a separate hearing was not needed for consideration of the initial resolution and both the initial and final resolutions could be adopted jointly. Further, the requirements of the MSBU Ordinance were met. The MSBU Ordinance did not require a separate hearing to adopt first an initial and then a final assessment resolution. The property subject to the assessment derived a "special benefit" and the assessment was properly apportioned among the specially benefitting properties. Even if the paramount public purpose test applied, the project met that standard. OUTCOME: The judgment was affirmed

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