[Classification]

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Event: Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) New York Air Route Center
Type of event: Interview
Date: Tuesday, September , 2003
Special Access Issues: None
Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown
Team Number: 8
Location: FAA New York Air Route Center, Rokonkomo, New York
Participants - Non-Commission: Alfred , FAA General Consul
Participants - Commission: John Azzarello, Miles Kara, Geoffrey Brown

NOTE: Unless otherwise noted, the following paraphrases the response and opinion of
the interviewee. Please refer to the interview transcript for a complete account.

PETER MCCLOSKEY
1147EDT
With mark DePalma and sandy lane, FAA attorney

November 2,1982, reported to ZNY in 1983 area b.

Airspace and procedures office, three and a half years traffic management coordinator
(on 9/11), now area d ATC.

Shift coordinator and arrival director. Dealing with restrictions, reroutes at watch desk.
Was at shift coordinator, arrivals inclusive at morning 9/11.

First notification of unusual air traffic. Phone call from Boston at 829edt, conference call
with Cleveland, Herndon command center, ZNY ZBW - not actual air traffic areas, it was
all traffic management units, it's a hotline but it patches all facilities together through the
command center: shut off transponder, hard left turn near Albany, weren't tracking them.
Appeared that there was also criminal activity and possible hijacking. No information on
what was overheard. Got off Telcon. Immediately told Pete mulligan (supervisor) -
everyone thought kidding, but got serious quick. Pete mulligan called Herndon for more
information. Wasn't listening to Pete's conversation.

When pulled up on scope didn't see him. Too many primary targets. So had to spread it
out and hone in on the position north and listen for area b to give more precision from
airplanes in air. Called area b and c to inform of hijack. Based on what Boston said. Hard
left and due south, 180 heading, would have hit sector 56 area b, or could have entered
sector 34 area c. CIC area b confirmed UAL 175 said AA11 passed below. Could then
track him as primary target. Didn't have call sign on screen, but knew AA11 from
Boston. Probably 30 miles north of Kennedy.

Chaos started. Pete called ZBW back- spoke to shift coordinator position of traffic
management. Everything done through command center. Always a middle man so
command center has view of what's going on in system, told him hijack confirmed.
ZBW said they heard something, and confirmed hijack. Got off immediately.
In meantime trying to track him on screen, notify area b airplane headed their way. Told
ZDC and informed. Called Tracon New York. Told jimmy Kurz.

Determine speed on a primary by the way they track and the actual spacing between the
lines on the trail. Can leave up to 5 histories. Can adjust it to none, or anything that's 1-5.
Spacing between these histories gives an idea of where going. Radar updates every 12
seconds. 5 histories is a minutes worth of information.

Then got phone call from someone at watch desk on ELT in vicinity of lower Manhattan
(NY Tracon). When report came in target was gone. Waited for confirmation. Word came
in that someone hit WTC, but small airplane, was hoping that was true. Taught to rely on
facts. Didn't really have a chance to think, "downshift", area B CIC (Ivonna) came
around corner and told about UAL 175 lost.

Immediately brought it up on the radar screen. Could find the solid beacon code and
picked him up. Based on what Ivonna said knew it was 3321 beacon. Saw since in fact
AA11 might have been plane that hit WTC, and that 3321 beacon was headed towards
lower Manhattan, there was a major problem. Called NY Tracon, looked for 3321, they
picked him up. They kept looking for information. Said I think it's UAL175, "heads up,
here comes another one", now that process is in mind thought it was headed to hit new
York city. Called Tracon on the outside hard line. Arrival director on outside hard line.
Frustration, NY Tracon knew something was going on and helpless feeling. Next
comment was "I think he just crashed", had no idea where. Immediately hung up since
there wasn't anything else to say.

CNN showing live learned from people in cafeteria that another tower had been hit. Had
no doubt in mind of which aircraft had hit which tower. Shared opinion with Pete
Mulligan, "everybody up front assumed it was AA11. We had no confirmation. But when
united hit, we didn't need confirmation." Bruce Barrett was up front during process.
Don't know if mike McCormack was there or not when second plane hit.

Military assistance: ZBW did not mention military assistance on way for AA11.
Understanding of procedures for military assistance for hijack not aware of. Air traffic
procedures would be to render any assistance asked for and notify supervisor. No
knowledge of what supervisors do in hijack situations. Knowledge based specifically on
role as ATC. No separate training from position at TMU. Everyone in TMU is an ATC.
Pre-9/11 had CBI, classroom, ATP air traffic procedures and such in manual.

8:29 phone call from Boston. Certain. NY Tracon is very small precise area so
assumption would be in vicinity of New York City if they had received ELT.

Command center Herndon recorded. ZBW recorded. Outside hard line to NY Tracon
recorded.

Shown Chapter 7: 76.4 - never received training regarding military.

Not aware of any military with AA11 or UAL 175.

Post 9/11: hijack procedures received no real changed instructions. Would still do
whatever is necessary to accommodate aircraft, and notify supervisor.

Prior 9/11 - as ATC would detect a hijack by 7500, by verbal or by the code word.

Now detect a hijack without pilot telling you? No, virtually impossible since so many
other things are taking place. Personally, if they are going off course, "going to ask him"
- "do you realize you are off course?" not received any training to be more aware in a
formal sense. FAA has thrown MBI mandatory briefing item to be read and initialed.
Have gotten a document. But as an ATC there really isn't anything to be done to make
you more aware. N7110.332 - never seen notice. Doesn't recall it. And considering the
subject, would be looked at. Paragraph b - indicates 11 items of suspicious activity. In
that document states when not establish communication, many things that could cause
that. Prior to 9/11, model was based on signal from pilot, now is there an understanding
as an ATC to detect things differently? Now when not talking to aircraft when supposed
to, notify supervisor.

Not really familiar with NEADS and what role they play. Had small dealings as an ATC
as a controller. Area b alongside warning areas, and some restricted areas. Prior to 9/11
never participated in any joint FAA/military exercise. Not post either. No idea of military
roe on hijacks. Unaware of escort and engage order officially, but assumes they have that
authority know. FAA could have a role in vectoring military aircraft to target. After 9/11
military and FAA had a lot of "knee jerk" reactions. A lot of general aviation pilots
strayed into prohibited areas post 9/11, and this involved military scrambles. Went
smoothly. After 9/11 there was a NEADS hotline in TMU. NEADS would ask "do you
deem it necessary to scramble?"

If had target with only primary, had no altitude. Doesn't know if military has radar that
can do that. If transponder off no information.

No thought that 9/11 scenario would occur.

NY at ATC zero: made phone call. UAL 175 hit second tower, stunned for a second,
spoke with Pete mulligan urging him to stop traffic. Pete mulligan gave instruction.
Normal line 46 busy that would have gone to information hub, used 90 line for severe
weather to get through to command center, spoke to Wanda, advised her ZNY going to
ATC zero. Immediately, one minute or two minutes after, instruction is given. 46 line
busy did not interfere at all. They took it from there. Single point of notification and they
are in charge of "going system wide".

Not familiar with DEN hotline. But been out of traffic management for over a year.

UAL 175: AA11 out of equation, changes code, no radio, serious course deviation. Lots
need to know ahead of time. Could think of various problems, but because of the hard left
time would think something very serious going on. In position he made that hard turn
would think he has a problem and is running to land in Philadelphia. Pre9/l 1 would not
have though hijack. Would have said some kind of mechanical electrical error since there
was no notification, covert or overt from pilot. Once AA11 in mix, as well as WTC crash,
changes the result.
Didn't give any verbal statements. No knowledge of the morning's meeting. Turf war, no
controllers like traffic management since they perceived the position of being useless.

DEPALMA:
That meeting was area b only. It involved factual recollection. Management taped it
person by person on what they experienced factual and emotional in that meeting. From
Depalma's perspective that meeting was to get facts.

Did not participate in any watch desk timelines on what happened that morning.

Statement made for UAL 175 package. Never made statement on AA11.

Rebirth of AA11: Heard of that. No one knew for sure. So were continuing to try and
track where they were. No confirmation that they were the ones that defiantly had hit.
Effort made at watch desk. NY tower had view of towers. So had conversation with them.
Kept looking for a fast moving primary in that vicinity. Only way to get confirmation was
a reliable visual report. ELT went off in lower Manhattan. Don't know in hindsight if
anyone saw AA11 was first impact. Can look at primary data to see when the plane
actually stopped. From Herndon or FAA headquarters all calls going to Bruce Barrett and
Pete mulligan. Didn't hear any rumors of AA11 hitting pentagon. When heard of
pentagon thought the lost plane over Indy was the one that hit pentagon. Got information
of loss over Indy from speaking with Herndon. AA11 would have kept picking him up on
radar and since he wasn't there anymore never thought he had gone that much further
south.

No recollection of delta 1989.

RECOMMENDATIONS:
Would disassemble Herndon. They're useless. ATCs cannot control hijacks. 9/11 is a
nightmare for an ATC. ATC can only watch it. Military options are limited. Hijacker
headed towards a nuclear plant, perhaps better to shoot down? Way outside ATC. FAA
has to coordinate with that fighter aircraft, should Herndon be involved? No.
Decision making should be made facility to facility. It worked much better before
command center.
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PERSONNEL STATEMENT '. " •
FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
NEW YORK AIR ROUTE TRAFFIC CONTROL CENTER

ACTION: Complete inaccordance with FAA Order 8020.1 IB, Aircraft Accident and Incident Notification, Investigation, and.
Reporting, paragraph 75, Personnel Statements.

BACKGROUND: Much of the information concerning the circumstances surrounding this accident/incident can be retrieved via
some type of recorded data source. However, some of the facts concerning what you saw and what you did may not have been
completely captured. The purpose of this statement is to provide any facts within your personal knowledge that you beUeve will
provide a more complete understanding of the circumstances surrounding this accident/incident Therefore, speculations, hearsay
opinions, conclusions, and/or other extraneous data are not to be included m thh statcrnent Additionally, this statement may be
released to the public triroughFOLA or litigation activM^

INSTRUCTIONS: This statement is to be PRINTED and signed by you. Statement times and dates shall correspond with SISO.
Your signature below certifies the accuracy of mis statement It will neither be edited nor typed, and, once signed, will constitute
your original statement .

This statement concerns the accident/incident involving £/,&£- /7A .'»t A/£tQ Vf^'fC. f fiJ "/"
..... O./.i V^f /<? 2 (callsign)
on / / // . &£** I .at /303 UTC.
(year) (hour)

Mvnameis
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1 am emptoYcd as an T&Af&t /VJ^aM^flib-ffww FAA at the New York ARTCC, Ronkonfcoma. New Yott.
(official title)

I was working the O £-_ positionfrom/£<?!> UTCto/&&D UTC.

TEXT OF STATEMENT: (use other side if necessary)

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I certify^WJthe best of my knowledge and recollection, the above statement is correct

(date)
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