2 nd

PA 38948 LT SHAHID YOs 23

CAPT C/ADV AQEEL SIGS

DS REMARKS

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Teaching Points BATTLE OF HUSSAINIWALA

Introduction 1. 106 Bde was given the task of defending the area of responsibility from incl Sheikhpur Nao to incl vill Rangewala. To hold the area of responsibility, coys of 41 Baloch were depl on the FDLs and on Dipalpur Canal as Bde res. Other supporting units were 3 Punjab, coy R& S and 95 Fd Engrs (on Inf role). 2. The units after arrival in the conc area carried out extensive recce and were ordered to gradually prep their def posns. Altn of Def Works Const Fund and provision of iron scrap under div arrangements from West Pakistan Rly gave a further impetus to dev of the def, which were completed by mid Nov 71. However, improvement of def incl laying of mines cont till the end of Nov 71. 3. Concurrently with the main task of defending its area of responsibility, 106 Bde was asg the additional task of elimination of Hussainiwala enclave on the outbreak of hostilities. This msn set in motion a new round of recce and planning at all levels. Comd 106 Bde presented the attack plan on 26 Oct 71 to GOC 11 Div, which was approved. It may be of interest to mention here that Gen A M Yahya Khan then President of Pakistan and Gen Abdul Hamid Khan then COAS of Pakistan Army visited 11 Div on 4 Nov 71 and were apprised of the plan. Gen Abdul Hamid Khan remarked It is a tough nut to crack, I wish you best of luck.

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4. Aim. To study and analyze the Battle of Hussainiwala. 5. Sequence of Presentation. The scheme of my presentation will be:a. b. c. d. e. f. Area of Ops Hussainiwala enclave is sit North and NW of the river Sutlej engulfing Hussainiwala Headworks and portion of Kasur-Ferozepur rd. It has an area of about 18 sq miles and consists of 16 vills. Terrain in close vicinity of rd Kaur-Ferozepur consists of numerous bunds, which provide good obsn and firing posns. The area two creeks, which run through the middle of this enclave from NE to SW. These creeks contain water in rainy season but remain dry in winter months. Hussainiwala Headworks has 29 gates that regulate the flow of River Sutlej. Two canals, namely Eastern Canal and Bekaner Canal (Gang Canal) originate from the southern side of the Headworks and irrigate Ferozepur-Fazailka-Abbhusar areas. The regulator of old Dipalpur Canal is loc on the Northern side of the Headworks that was closed under an agreement between two countries. There are two brs (one rd and one rly) over the Headworks. Rd br acts as a link between Ferozepur and enclave area and is cl 70. Rly br is at present not op but Area of Ops Orbat Attk Plan Phases Conduct of Battle Lessons Learnt

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6. can be used as an altn br with some improvement. Other important tac features are: a. Perimeter b. Guide Bund c. Rly Bund d. Banks of disused Dipalpur Canal e. Qaiser-e-Hind f. Abutment Bund g. JCP (Joint Check Post) h. Hockey spur j. k. l. m. n. o. Indian Ulleke Bund Ulleke Post Rajoki Post and Vill Shameke Post Chandi Wala vill Area watch Tower no 9

Hussainiwala Enclave provided a good springboard to the en for launching an offensive with a sizeable force towards Kasur and then either towards Raiwind or Lahore. The en build up in Ferozepur area particularly the conc of his First Armd Div in area Farid Kot-Kot Kapura-Muktasar prior to war indicated that there was a possibility of en taking advantage of this enclave for any offensive. Therefore the elimination of Hussainiwala Enclave became more important with a view to improving our def and denying the use of existing br H to the en.

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En. Info gathered through various sources indicated that

Hussainiwala Enclave was held by two bns; one being regular bn and the other a BSF bn. Through Pws captured during the battle of Hussainiwala it came to lt that 35 Inf Bde which was a part of 14 Indian Inf Div was responsible for the def of Hussainiwala area. The depl was as fols: i. 15 Punjab (1) One coy of old Dipalpur canal. (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) One coy One coy One coy One coy One coy One coy One coy One coy Area Rly Bund Area Qaiser-e-Hind Area Guide Bund Area Hockey Spur Area Ulleke Post Area Rajoke Post Area Shameke Post Area Watch Tower Area perimeter Both banks

j. 25 BSF Bn

k. 13 Punjab. In area Barke across River Sutlej. l. 15 Dogra. Bde res in Ferozepur m. Sqn of Tks. Area South of Fakhr-e-Hind n. Arty 4. 5. DS Regt of 35 Inf Bde. Some regts of Div/Corps Arty in area Ferozepur.

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En def works consisted of pillboxes, concrete emplacement and

bunkers. En had laid extensive minefd, and barbed wire obs around their posns. An A/Pers ditch (10 deep and 7 wide) and about 40 yds long was const by the en parallel to the left bank of old Dialpur Canal to act as a trap for aslt Inf from that dir. 15 Punjab posn was very compact and was org as a bn str pt in the most vital areas of Hussainiwala Enclave i.e area br, Perimeter and Qaiser-e-Hind. 25 BSF was covering a wider frontage and their def was org on coy strong pt basis. A 100 ft steel tower in area Fakhr-e-Hind across the river, Qaiser-e-Hind and Watch Tower No 9 provided good obsn to the en over the entire area. En def were mostly based on various bunds posts and other built up areas. 9. En had dumped lot of ammo, rats and other stores in the area,

which indicated that en was planning to fight to the last. 10. Own. 106 Bde had fol grouping for the asg task: a. Under Comd 6. 7. 8. 9. 41 Baloch 3 Punjab 9 Punjab B Coy ex 26 Punjab (R&S)

10. 95 Fd Coy Engrs

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11. Hussain Khan Wala Mjd Coy 12. Khudian Mjd Coy 13. Two Coys Rangers b. In DS. 45 Fd Regt Arty c. In Sp. Div Arty in Range

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12.

Attk Plan.Wng O for attk on Hussainiwala was received b y Comd 106 Bde at about 1500 hrs on 3 Dec 71. He immediately issued his Wng O to the units and then attended GOCs O gp that was held at Kasur at 1600 hrs on 3 Dec 71. It may be stated here that GOC had received info regarding PAF sir strikes against Indian air bases from Corps Comd at about 1455 hrs that day, which indicated that war to start by the evening 3 Dec 71. Gist of GOCs orders is as under: a. 106 Bde to capture Hussainiwala Enclave as per plan ASP. b. No change in atts and dets. c. H hr 1800 hrs. Later on changed to 1830 hrs. d. B-sqn ex 4 Cav to op under orders comd 106 Bde. e. Fire SP plan attk to be silent. Fire SP to be provided on call. orders comd 106 Bde. f. Fire SP plan attk to be silent. Fire SP to be provided on call. g. Comd 106 Bde held his O gp at Ganda Singh Wala at 1700 hrs 3 Dec 71. Briefs confirmatory notes of the orders for the actual attk were issued to the units before H hr.

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h. Since, the Div Arty Regts were not depl in their actual posns to sp 106 Bde attk due to security reasons, it was not possible for them to be able to come into action at the given H hr i.e. 1800 hrs. The readjustment of the gun posns and other essential coord req some more time. In view of this the H hr was changed from 18oo hrs to 1830 hrs and it was also decided to make it a noisy attk and timed programmed (H-15 to H+35).

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13. Phases. CO 41 Baloch plan for capture of asg obj is as under: a. A coy to capture right bank of Dipalpur Canal incl Dipalpur Canal br. b. B coy to capture area Rly Bund to incl Qaser-e-Hind. c. C coy to capture area astride rd Kasur-Ferozepur from JCP upto Dipalpur Canal br. d. Bn Tac HQ was to mov behind A coy.

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Conduct of Battle a. A coy under comd Maj Muhammad Hanif (Shaheed), started the aslt at the given H hr. Soon afterwards the coy came under hy en auto fire from both banks of the canal and other adjoining locs. The coy inspite of hy en firing and shelling kept up the momentum of the aslt and cleared en bunkers one by one with hand-to-hand fighting right through the obj. During the aslt, the comd, Maj Muhammad Hanif got a burst of MG fire and fell martyred. Sub Muhammad Iqbal, SJCO of the coy immediately took over the comd of the coy and personally

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led the aslt tps right up to Dipalpur Canal br and captured the asg obj. b. Capture of Qaser-e-Hind 1. B coy under comd Maj Zahid Yasin started the attk from the dir of JCP at the given H hr. Immediately after crossing the start line the coy came under hy en auto fire from en bunkers in area Rly Bund. However, the coy kept on aslt posn and got engaged in hand-to-hand fight with the en from bunkers. After tough fighting the coy captured the Rly Bund in disused Dipalpur Canal br. The coy comd, Maj Zahid Yasin, realizing that he had over shot his own obj and yet had to attk Qaiser-e-Hind about and mov back in the dir of Qaiser-e-Hind. 2. The gallant soldiers of B Coy were struggling to enter the mighty fortress under hy en auto fire from the top and base of Qaiser-e-Hind, when Maj Muhammad Ashraf, another Coy Comd arrived with a depleted str of one pl and joined his comrades of B Coy. The Western Face of this fortress would defy even the most determined onslaughts as it had a huge wall with numerous firing holes spread all over it. A no of attempts to enter the mighty fortress had not born fruits as the apch to the fortress was exposed to en obsn in a clear moonlight ni. The Indian arty shelling further compounded the sit.

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The B Coy comd Maj Zahid Yasin,SJ had already requested the Bde HQ toto push fwd the tks that were to knock out the inf to go through it. After a lapse of about half an hr or so, when the tks still had not arrived the two coy comd decided to make another suicidal attempt without the tks. 3. The en inside and on the top of Qaiser-e-Hind was not only stubborn but also desperately and courageously sticking to the pride of its def, the Qaiser-e-Hind. The tks were still awaited. En guns after a few mins of silence would again start roaring. Another similar attempt was again conceived but this time with a change in selection of pers who would now make the attempt. New volunteers were asked for. A complete silence prevailed. Since no of attempts to enter Qaiser-e-Hind had already failed. No one was now willing to put himself in the jaws of death. After a lapse of a few moments, Maj Muhammad Ashraf who had conceived the plan decided to exec it himself. He knew that the loss of his life would not jeopardize the op as his other comrade Maj Zahid Yasin,SJ , present with him might still survive to complete the task

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4.

At about 2000 hrs in a clear moon lit ni, after the sec Super Energa had been fired Maj Muhammad Ashraf dashed fwd with a hand gren in his right hand and a sten in left for accomplishing the sacred and onerous task that he had set upon himself. The dash brought him immediately close to the southern portion of the mighty fortress where he suddenly loc stairs leading up into the base of the fortress. Instantaneously the first gren was flying in the air and landing inside. Shrieks and cries of the en from inside echoed in the air. While running and climbing the stairs Maj Muhammad Ashraf lobbed yet another two grenades and then he were at the entrance of the main hall. Luck that was still with him now appeared to be leaving him. When he tried to spray the area inside, his sten refused to fire. He changed the magazine but without any success. He really now could not help but smile at the irony of fate.

5.

On immediate recovering from the shock of this serious set-back, Maj Muhammad Ashraf lobbed the remaining three grenades, Maj Muhammad Ashraf now rightly presumed that the en must have completely been wiped out

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from the base but he was mistaken. With the explosion of the last grenade four/five en survivors rushed out of the northern entrance who were instantaneously ambushed and killed by Maj Zahid Yasin ,SJ from

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outside, while Hav Mansab Dar stood guard on the Southern entrance. After some interval the surviving en soldiers inside again suddenly became alive and facing a very dangerous sit. Ironically he after having succeeded in entering the mighty Qaiser-e-Hind had no other altn but to retrace his steps. Therefore, He had to rush out of Qaiser-e-Hind but he became still more determined to accomplish the msn that he had set upon himself. He now exchanged his sten with a rifle, armed himself with more grenades and made yet another desperate and last attempt. The complete base was again sprayed with fire. It appeared that the en was now completely annihilated from the base. 6. En was still holding on to top of Qaiser-e-Hind and engaged this coy with MG fire from the top floor. Maj Zahid Yasin with some selected men tried to go on top Qaiser-e-Hind but en tps from the top started bringing down hy auto fire and also threw hand grens. Although the gr floor had been taken but it was not possible to climb up as the en had blocked the stair case eff. Firefight between own tps down below

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and en on the top cont throughout the ni. To destroy en occupying the top floor of Qaiser-e-Hind with main gun as a result of which the en posn was destroyed and tps of B coy rushed upstairs and captured the top floor by about 0700 hrs 4 Dec 71. 7. C Coy less pl under comd Sub Safdar Ali Shah

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started the aslt from the JCP astride rd KasurFerozepur. The task given to this coy was to bring flanking fire onto A and B Coys tps and also to clear the rd with a view to enabling the tks to rush fwd and secure the mouth of the br. As soon as they crossed the SL they came under hy auto fire and encountered opposn from area bks adjacent to the rd. the Coy under the dynamic ldrship of Sub Safdar Ali Shah went round the built up area and eliminated the en with hand to hand fighting. After clearing the bks area, they cont their aslt on either side of the rd and successfully reached Dipalpur Canal br and lined up with A coy which had by then captured the rt bank of Dipalpur Canal upto the br.
8. 41 Baloch had created an adhoc coy of two pls under comd Maj Muhammad Ashraf which was to stay behind as res to be aval to the bn comd for reinforcing any attacking coy or dealing with unforeseen. Coys had suffered lot of cas this coy was employed to boost up the fighting str of attacking tps. This coy successfully assisted B coy in capturing Qaiser-e-Hind and

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During the later part of the ni secured foothold in area Canal br and assisted A and C coys of 41 Baloch and D coy of 3 Punjab in the reorg phase. The coy comd Maj Ashraf was wounded due to en air strafing on 4th morning and was evac. 9. Throughout the attk of 41 Baloch the CO

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displayed extra ordinary courage and moved with the assaulting tps while they were fighting through the obj. during the attk 41 Baloch wrls comm. Between broken CO and Coy which comds created completely down

problems of comd and con. Inspite of hy en shelling and firing he kept on moving from one posn to another exhorted his men thoughout the aslt stage.

15.
and bravery: a. b. c. SJs TJs

Honor And Awards. 14 Baloch and affiliated sp arms

were given fol gallantry awards in recognition of their courage, valour 7 8 1 1xoffr and 66 OR. 120 all ranks.

Imtiazi Sanad Shaheed. Wounded.

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CAS. 41 Baloch suffered fol cas in this op: a. b. c.

En suffered hy cas.

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Teaching Points 17. Captured Eqpt. Fol eqpt was captured: Wpns Ammo Vehs

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106 MM RR 3 Carts 106 MM RR 15 Cwt Dodge 1 3 Mor 3 Bombs 3 Mor Ton Jeep 4 2 Mor 8 Bombs 2 Mor 1 Ton Dodge 2 7.62 MM MMG 5 Rkts 3.5/83 MM 1 Ton Truck 1 7.62 MM LMGs 8 Carts .303 (10 Trucks)

.303 LMGs 11

.303 MGs 5

3.5 RLs 7

7.62 MM Rifles 77

.303 Rifles 75

9 MM Sten 41

9 MM Pistol 3

Pistol 10

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a.

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Lessons Learnt Multi Directional attk. En def was mostly based on Phil boxes, concrete emplacements and bunkers that were interlinked. Qiaser-e-Hind with other few posns was well fortified with fairly deep minefds. To overcome such def, multi directional attk is the answers because en could not eff engage the tps aslt from flank and rear. In addition bunkers/wpns loc at beat back any aslt. Capture of Qaisere-Hind is a good example to quote. b. Recce. Thorough recce and briefing down to sec level was carried out. The op was discussed in detail in conf, on models and on the gr. Even they have gone to the extent of rehearsing the attk plan. It was through extensive recce that revealed most of en auto wpns with numerous holes designed to provide firing slits in Qaisere-Hind. Most of ptls were led by offrs incl coy comds. Even during broad day light while wearing Rangers Uniform offrs did the ptl in order to have a good look on en def. c. Motivation. Tps were fully motivated. All comds down to sec comds and tps knew as to what was req of them and what they were expected to achieve. Sub Manzoor Hussain who was profusely bleeding on receiving a tk burst on chest was forcibly evac from scene of battle to Bn HQ. On seeing his CO, he managed to utter few words with difficulty, Sir, I have fulfilled my promise given to you that I would bear the en bullet on my chest

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Surprise. Since the attk was launched at 1830 hrs (an unexpected time) complete surprise was achieved. En got confused from multi directional attk and fight by small aslt gps. Thus was unable to judge wt and dir of attk. Simultaneous attk on Dipalpur Canal br, Rly Bund and Qaiser-e-Hind added to shock. e. Aggressive. Repeated attempts to enter mighty fortress under hy en auto fire from top and base of Qaiser-e-Hind had failed. The Indian Arty shelling further compounded the sit but tempo of attk was never allowed to die down. Yet another suicidal attempt by Maj Muhammad Ashraf and his team was made to enter Qaiser-e-Hind forcibly which they managed. In this msn prince was enormous but the prize was equally tempting. f. Comds Well Fwd. All comds were well fwd. In fact in most of cases were leading the aslt on en. Extra ordinary courage and valour displayed by the Bn/Coy/Pl Comds was one of the maj contributing factor in success of this attk. One of the 41 Baloch obj was in close vicinity of disused Dipalpur Canal and which was being attk by A Coy. This could not have met success when coy comd Maj Muhammad Hanif,SJ (Shaheed) received the burst and was breathing his last. It was CO, Lt Col Habib Ahmed,SJ who was fol close behind, decided to lead the attk and fill up the vacuum created on Shahadat of coy comd. Because name and pride of 41 Baloch and country was at stake.

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g. Use of Tks. Tks was boldly used in this attk. En Soldiers who had refused to surrender, barricaded themselves in one of the tower, were eventually shot down with tk fire personally dir by Bde Comd 106 Bde, Brig (Now Maj Gen) Muhammad Mumtaz Khan,HJ. h. Ldrship. When coy comds fell in battle, their JCOs and even CO was not found wanting and in total disregard to their life went charging to complete the unfinished task. Zahid Yasin,SJ to enter first in Qaiser-e-Hind. prevailed. j. Fire Sp. Although detailed fire sp had been worked out incorporating all wpns well before start of war but due to late dumping of ammo at the gun ends and late provision of tgt data to the GPOs only 5 fire units opened initially to sp the attk. 3 more joined later. Despite all this en tps did not even remember where to seek refuge. k. Security. Through out the pd of 3 months, preceeding the battle tps arriving in battle loc, dusk and dawn recces and obsns were screened in such an appreciable manner that en was totally un prep for this attk. So much so that tps mov to respective FUPs went unnoticed. Finally Maj Muhammad Ashraf

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l. Fire and Mov. Tps conducted the CQB extremely well but team craft i.e. fire and mov was missing. Success came through surprise that had paralyzed en tps. The aspect of fire and mov is still wanting in the Army. m. Re-Org. After the capture of obj reorg should be rapid to face any C attk. Tps must be ready to repulse such attempts by en. It was not done in remaining phases of bn attk thus suffered hy cas. n. A Tk Wpns. Long-range A Tk wpns that were depl in FUP/fire base did not fire to sp the attk. Further upon when, during battle thwarted by en built up defs and tps in Qaiser-e-Hind these wpns were not brought fwd to blast such opposn and create entrance. o. Wpn Serviceability. Before leaving for battle loc, one must test all wpns. Sten carried by Maj Muhammad Ashraf did not fire when he had forced his entry to Qaiser-e-Hind. Even on changing mags sten still would not fire. Ironically he had to retrace his steps. After exchanging his sten with a rifle, entered again in Qaiser-e-Hind and completely annihilated en from the base.

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Conclusions. On 3 Dec 71 at 1830 hrs 41 st Baloch that had not

yet even completed its eight months of life was ordered to attk and captures the Exit of Hussainiwala Headworks and Qaiser-eHind. The bn suffered considerable cas but the en that was equally stubborn could not deter the grim determination of the CO Lt Col Habib Ahmed,SJ, the offrs, JCOs and men of this young but brave bn. The bn objs, The invincible Qaiser-e-Hind and the Exit of Hussainiwala Headworks were all successfully captured by the bn but after having fought one of the fiercest and bloodiest battles in the annals of history.