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Cc:
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t:
Subject:
Dan Leopold on behalf of Info
Monday, February 02, 2004 3:42 PM
Team 5
Chris Kojm
FW: Atten: Chris Kojm/National Commission, Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.
-Original
From: Tom Pabst | 9/11 Personal Privacy |
Sent: Friday, January 30, 2004 11: 16 AM
To: Info
Cc: Thomas Philip Pabst
Subject: Atten: Chris Kojm/National Commission, Terrorist Attacks on the U.S.
I believe the 9-11 attacks were preventable at least in part. The Honorable Mary Ryan is
correct that Consular Officers handle up to 200 visa cases per day, as did I at Tijuana,
Lisbon, and Bordeaux. With about a minute per interview, how can a Visa Officer be
expected to fully review an applicant's information and be sure he/she is not an intending
terrorist, or not otherwise unqualified for the visa they seek? Further, because most
Visa Officers are performing their visa work as an entryway or way station to mainstream
(non-Consular/Visa) diplomatic and foreign relations work, they are transferred out of
visa processing once they develop expertise. And visa supervisors cannot possibly review
any but a small fraction of cases. The institutional visa knowledge of the Bureau of
Consular Affairs is perpetually handicapped, because most visas are processed by officers
who are always in a de facto trainee status. Superb as their efforts are, probably 75% of
the visa officers are marking time until they move into Political, Economic, or
Administrative work at the State Department. A Visa Function transferred to the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) would not suffer such a handicap. All visas, all
the time, for the duration of the career. Because handling visa processing for an Officer
is by nature challenging, complex, difficult, and exhausting, the conditions of employment
could reflect a maximum number of hours per day of face-to-face interviews, frequent
, maximum use of technology, and good pre-screening by local nationals where
Respectfully, and with great hope your Commission recommends that the visa function is
moved to the DHS, or alternatively, that criminal penalties are imposed on State
Department Officers who divert Visa resources away from the Consular function, as did the
Service O f f i c e r , 1980-19951 9/11 Personal Privacy |
I hope that this letter will assist you in responding to the State
Department's request for funding in the yearly budget process.
I believe there were numerous violations of federal law committed by Mr. Heimann,
including but not limited to interference with a Foreign Service Officer (me) in the
performance of his duties, assaults on staff members, continued removal at night by Mr.
Heimann of classified materials from the Consulate, interference by Mr. Heimann with
official cash and financial transactions, and appropriation of government time and
resources for personal use. Through the 1990s I have attempted to obtain from the State
Department potentially clarifying information concerning inter alia the name of Mr.
Heimann's supervisor at Bordeaux, the precise nature of Mr. Heimann's duties at
Bordeaux (if any), Mr. Heimann's place on the Consulate staffing pattern and personnel
roster (if any), Mr. Heimann's obligation to account for the services he misappropriated
from the U.S. Government, and the ultimate disposition of the many thousands of secret
and confidential documents that Mr. Heimann removed from the Consulate, principally at
night when the Consulate was closed to the public. My efforts have not met with success
to date. It is no wonder that the 9/11 hijackers obtained visas from the State Department.
My direct personal experience illustrates that State Department Consular Officers are
prohibited from carrying out their duties by their supervisors in the field.
Dear Sir,
This is to request that your office investigate activities that I witnessed and experienced
firsthand at a U.S. Consular post (U.S. Department of State) overseas in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. I also request that your office investigate the lack of response by the
U.S. Department of State to my inquiries about these matters.
Please find enclosed a copy of a letter summarizing these activities, which I have three
times in 1999 and 2000 transmitted to the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S.
Department of State. To wit, in 1999, and again in February of 2000, and again in May
of 2000,1 sent the original of the enclosed letter (below) to the Office of the Deputy
Director of Personnel at the State Department requesting information about, or an
explanation of events, concerning a security problem at a U.S. Consulate where I worked
some years ago, as set forth in the letter. I have never received any response or reply,
not even an acknowledgement of receipt, from the Department of State. Even a response
from the Department of State indicating that it/they cannot or will not provide me a
substantive response to my letter, and the reasons why not, would be helpful. In
September 2000 I requested my then Congressman, Brad Sherman (CA-D) to transmit
the letter to the Office of the Inspector General of the U.S. Department of State. The
Congressman's office did so, and his office never received a reply of any kind.
I have other materials pertaining to this matter that are too voluminous to include with
this transmittal. I can provide them to you on request. I thank you very much for your
time and attention.
Thomas S. Pabst
TO: Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of State May 23, 2000
The following questions pertain to the activities of a Mr. John Paul Heimann at the U.S.
Consulate Bordeaux, France during the period September 12, 1988 to September 12,
1990. For that period Mrs. John Margaret Heimann (Judith) was the Consul General and
I was the Consul. Mr. John Paul Heimann was the spouse of Mrs. Heimann.
In advance of my report ot the federal law enforcement agencies, what I seek is official
Departmental documentary evidence that could shed some light on the official status of
Mr. Heimann at Bordeaux and the range of his permissible activities, as was authorized
by the Department in advance in writing or otherwise, if applicable. I was a direct
eyewitness to some of his conduct and activities there, and can testify to them myself
under oath before federal law enforcement and investigative authorities, if necessary.
I request only that the Department conduct a search of its records. I specifically request
that no one be interviewed by the Department at this time, and that the Department not
undertake any fact gathering other than a physical search of its records. I specifically
request that the Department not contact either Mr. John Heimann nor Mrs. John
Heimann.
Questions:
What precisely was the status or statuses of Mr. John Paul Heimann at the U.S. Consulate
Bordeaux for the period under question of September 12, 1988 to September 12, 1990?
Was he a Permanent Employee at the Consulate? Temporary Duty Employee?
Independent contractor? Other? Please be specific.
What was the name, title, and position of the supervisor of Mr. John Paul Heimann, if
applicable?
According to the Department of State in Washington, D.C., precisely what duties if any
was Mr. John Heimann permitted or authorized to perform at the American Consulate
Bordeaux for the period in question in advance in writing by the Department? What was
he not permitted to do?
What duties did Mr. Heimann in fact perform, if applicable, according to Departmental
records?
Were any written evaluations of Mr. Heimann's performance at the Consulate made? By
whom? His wife?
If applicable, how much money was actually paid by the U.S. Department of State to Mr.
Heimann for services allegedly rendered by him in the specified time period of
September 12, 1988 to September 12, 1990? Note here that I am not asking for his rate
of pay, but rather the dollar amount that he was actually paid for any services actually
rendered at the Consulate for the period in question.
Did the Department of State in Washington, D.C. give express permission to Mr.
Heimann to physically transport classified (confidential and secret) documents physically
out of the Consulate? If so, under whose supervision? With what frequency? For what
reason?
Assuming arguendo that the U.S. Department of State did authorize Mr. John Paul
Heimann to transport or otherwise carry classified documents outside of the Consulate
Building at Bordeaux, what steps were taken to ensure that Mr. Heimann handled the
classified materials according to the State Department rules and regulations and specified
procedures applicable to the handling of classified materials. What is the name and
position or title of the person who supervised him and to whom he was accountable?
Please explain how the physical transfer by Mr. John Paul Heimann of classified
documents out of the Consulate building was a part of the duties of his position, assuming
arguendo that Mr. Heimann held a position with the State Department at Consulate
Bordeaux for the period in question.
Was Mr. Heimann authorized by the Department of State in Washington, D.C. to
physically access (enter) the consulate during regular working hours on either a
systematic or random basis, physically access the secure classified storage area, make
copies of classified documents, and physically carry those documents outside the
consulate during regular Consulate working hours?
Did Mrs. John Heimann (Judith Heimann) ever obtain written permission from the
Department to supervise her husband John Heimann at Consulate Bordeaux?
Did John Heimann ever obtain written permission from the Department of State in
Washington, D.C. to supervise Mrs. John Heimann at the U.S. Consulate Bordeaux
during the period in question?
Was Mr. John Heimann authorized in advance expressly or impliedly by the Department
of State in Washington, D.C. to issue instructions and orders to members of the staff
including me at the Consulate Bordeaux during the period in question, inside the
Consulate office building and during working hours? If so, please provide a copy of the
authorization.
Was Mr. John Heimann authorized by the Department in Washington, D.C. to interact
with, advise, and consult with members of the Consulate staff as to their employee duties
and responsibilities at the Consulate? If so, please provide copies of the authorization.
Was Mr. Heimann authorized by the Department in Washington, D.C. to access and
handle cash monies of the U.S. Consulate Bordeaux?
Was Mr. John Paul Heimann authorized by the Department in Washington, D.C. to
access and handle and purchase and dispose of personal property at the U.S. Consulate
Bordeaux for the period in question?
When Mr. Heimann physically entered and exited the Consulate after regular working
hours, would he have been required to sign the after hours entry and exit log, under
Departmental Regulations?
hi the early 1990s I filed an extensive grievance against the Department in connection
with activities at the U.S. Consulate Bordeaux for the period 1988 to 1990, including
falsely prejudicial and retaliatory performance evaluations written by Mr. Heimann's
wife, Mrs. John Paul Heimann. The case was eventually resolved at the Grievance
Board level against me. I did not have the financial resources to appeal to the U.S.
District Court.
In the factual development of that grievance, I believe that some material was generated
by the Grievance Staff (William Kingsbury) that pertains to Mr. Heimann and his
activities at the Consulate during the period in question. It is possible this material
would be accessible to the Department and could assist in answering my inquiry. Note
also that in October 1994 in connection with the grievance, Mrs. John Heimann gave
testimony that was recorded for transcription, during which she, inter alia, answered
questions put to her by my representative about the activities of her husband, John Paul
Heimann, at the U.S. Consulate Bordeaux, 1988 to 1990. The Department might make a
diligent search of its records for any and all material in the grievance file that pertains to
the activities of Mr. John Paul Heimann, including Mrs. John Heimann's testimony about
her husband, relevant to what Mr. Heimann was and was not authorized to do. The
Department might make a comparison of the statements made by Mrs. John Paul
Heimann at the hearing in October 1994 with any separate records on file with the
Department pertaining to Mr. Heimann's activities at the Consulate. This would be
consistent with the records search parameters of my request.
As I indicated in the first page of this letter, in preparing any response to this letter, I
request that the Department only conduct a search of its existing written records, nothing
more. I specifically request that no one, such as prospective witnesses, be contacted or
interviewed by the Department at this time, and that the Department not undertake any
fact gathering other than a physical search of its records. I specifically request that the
Department not contact Mr. John Heimann and not contact Mrs. John Heimann in
connection with this letter or in the preparation of any response to this request.
I request that the Department treat this letter as sensitive and use it only for properly
authorized government purposes. I request that the letter be shared only with those
persons and entities who have a genuine operational need to view the letter, or be made
familiar with its contents, in connection with preparing a response to it. I request under
all appropriate and relevant laws that this letter at no time be released to anyone by the
Department or the USG in connection with a FOIA or similar request.
Senate Commerce, Justice, State Appropriations Subcommittee Nov. 20,1999
United States Senate
Room S 146A Capitol Bldg.
Washington, DC 20510
fax number : (202) 224-2698
Thomas S. Pabst
(new address as of 10/21 /2002)
9/11 Personal Privacy
This letter is intended for members of the above-referenced Subcommittees, or their staff
assistants or aides who help to set and allocate the Budget for the U.S. Department of
State, specifically the Consular overseas portion of the State Department budget. The
basic thrust of my message is that the State Department does not spend on Consular
functions, those funds allocated by Congress to the State Department "Consular
Account". Rather, the overseas Consular funds in effect have been and presumably could
be again unofficially shifted to non-Consular activities overseas, and Congress, OMB,
OPM, and other regulatory and oversight bodies are not likely to learn of it, or to learn of
it in a timely manner. My conclusion is based upon direct personal experience in the
Foreign Service, briefly summarized below,
I was a Foreign Service Officer with the U.S. Department of State from November 1980
to June 1995, almost 15 years. For my last of three overseas tours, I was assigned in 1988
as a Consular Officer to a Consular Position at the U.S. Consulate in Bordeaux, France,
from September 1988 to September 1990. (That Consulate was closed.) The position to
which I was assigned was programmed as Consular, and that never changed.
Upon my arrival at the Consulate in September, 1988 to begin my tour of duty in this
Consular position, my supervisor (the Principal Officer) assigned to me 100 percent
NON-CONSULAR DUTIES strictly on her own private initiative. That is, all of the
duties that she assigned to me were administrative and reporting (journalistic), with
absolutely no consular element or component to the duties. On the books in Washington,
however, the position was never reprogrammed out of Consular with the concomitant
shift in funds in the accounts, and was always a designated, funded Consular position. To
reiterate, the position was funded for the performance of Consular duties, and not
reporting or administrative duties that it was improperly and illegally(?) used for. I was
required by the Principal Officer (my supervisor) to perform wholly non-Consular
services in a Consular position. This is not what the Congress and the taxpayers
"contracted for" and paid for. They were defrauded.
Extensive discussion with the Principal Officer, my supervisor, failed to convince her of
the impropriety and arguable illegality of assigning 100 percent non-Consular duties to a
funded Consular position. To my knowledge, she never made any attempt either in
writing or verbally, to inform Headquarters in Washington, or to cause Headquarters to
be informed by her superiors, of this assignment of 100 percent non-Consular duties to a
Consular position. Further, the Department (to my knowledge) made no effort to verify
that Consular duties actually comprised the elements of this officially designated
Consular position in the field, or to monitor the management of the position. Worse,
there does not appear to be any mechanism in place to endure that resources are being
spent properly as programmed by the Department of State overseas. (I was required by
my supervisor to perform duties that were not what State "Headquarters" had sent me out
to perform. Because of this, serious problems at the post ensued, which ultimately led to
a lengthy lawsuit). But what should be of importance to you is that the taxpayers were
not getting what they paid for. My supervisor at the post could have forced me to paint
landscape portraits all day long and the Department of State, as well as Congress and the
taxpayers, would have no way of knowing that their funds are/were not at all being used
as programmed.
In sum, in this case the State Department permitted to be spent official Consular-
designated funds, that is, funds programmed for consular, on wholly non-Consular
purposes. If it happened at one post (Bordeaux), one could arguably assume that this
misuse or misapplication of State Department Consular funds has occurred and does
occur at other Department of State Consular posts overseas.
The House and Senate Committees on Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations
Subcommittee should not assume that the State Department in fact will spend allocated
Consular Funds on Consular activities, functions, and obligations. Because there is no
system in place to ensure that Consular funds are being used for Consular purposes, the
State department is willfully, but more likely through benign neglect, permitting funds
officially programmed for Consular work to be used for non-Consular purposes, most
likely reporting, although not in a way that is easily detectable or visible to outside
auditors, inspectors, Congressional oversight, and the like, hi my view, this is a clear and
improper use of federal funds, i.e., use of funds for a purpose not intended by Congress or
the taxpayers.
If you wish to investigate or further research this matter, the State Department has an
extensive file on the lawsuit that was generated by this misuse of Consular funds. I invite
you to contact them about this to hear their side of the story. The Department of State and
I have differing views on this matter, but they cannot deny the misuse of Consular funds.
I am not confident that State would be fully forthcoming about the facts or documents in
this matter that would cast that agency in a negative light or jeopardize their funding from
Congress. For information about the case, your contact there, after going through
through the State Department Bureau that handles Congressional relations, would be Ms.
Joanne Lishman of Per/G or Mr. William Kingsbury of PER/G. The general number of
the State Department is (202) 647-4000.
I hope that this letter will assist you in responding to the State Department's request for
funding in the yearly budget process.
I thank you for your attention in this matter.