MALAY SIA IN THE COURT OF

APPEAL

Holden in the Federal Territory of Putrajaya

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. P-05(S)-[110&111]05/12

BETWEEN

PUBLIC PROSECUTOR APPELLANT

AND

...

MOHD AZAM RAJA BIN ABDULLAH ...RESPONDENT

(In the matters of Criminal Appeal No. 45-4-2011 Before the High Court of Malaya in Georgetown, Penang)

BETWEEN PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

1

And MOHD AZAM RAJA BIN ABDULLAH

WRITTEN SUBMISSIONS OF THE PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

TABLE OF CONTENT 1. 2. 3. INTRODUCTION THE FACTS OF THIS CASE THE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL 3.1 Whether the presence of stolen PAGE 3 5 8 items

belonging to the deceased indicates that the respondent is responsible for the death of the deceased 9

3.2 Whether the appellant succeeded in raising any reasonable doubt against the murder charge 22

4.

CONCLUSION

24

If it pleases your Lordships

1. INTRODUCTION
The respondent was charged at the instance of the Public Prosecutor before the High Court of Malaya sitting in Georgetown, Penang for an offence of murder

under section 302 Penal Code and the charge is as follows

Bahawa kamu pada 2.3.2010, jam lebih kurang di antara 5.00 pagi hingga 9.00 pagi di rumah No. 34, Jalan Gurdwara, di dalam Daerah Timur Laut, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah melakukan kesalahan membunuh Soh Lian Thye [No. KPT 340122-02-5072] dan oleh yang demikian kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 302 Kanun Keseksaan.

His Lordship, the Learned High Court Judge amended the charge at the end of the prosecutions case to one under section 457 Penal Code to the following charge

Bahawa kamu pada 2.3.2010, jam lebih kurang di antara 5.00 pagi hingga 9.00 pagi di rumah No. 34, Jalan Gurdwara, di dalam Daerah Timur Laut, di dalam Negeri Pulau Pinang telah melakukan pecah rumah dengan memasuki bangunan tersebut kepunyaan Soh Lian Thye [No. KPT 340122-02-5072] yang digunakan sebagai tempat kediaman manusia, untuk melakukan suatu kesalahan tertentu yang boleh dihukum dengan hukuman penjara iaitu kesaiahan mencuri 3 utas rantai tangan bernilai antara RM100.00 hingga RM200.00 dan oleh yang demikian, kamu telah melakukan suatu kesalahan yang boleh dihukum di bawah seksyen 457 Kanun Keseksaan.

The amended charge was marked P2A.

P 2A was read and explained to the accused. He pleaded guilty thereto and understood the nature and consequences of his plea.

His Lordship found the appellant guilty, convicted and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment term with effect from the date of arrest and also 16 strokes of whipping.

The Public Prosecutor filed an appeal against the said acquittal.

2. THE FACTS OF THE CASE

My Lords The facts of the case may be surmised as follows

On 2 March 2010 at about 7.30 am, Mr Lim Beng Keong woke up, and he went down to the ground floor to look for the deceased.

He then tried to open the door at the kitchen of his house to look for his wife (the deceased) but failed because there was another person on the other side who blocked the door. He saw a pair of hands of a dark skinned person holding a piece of wood on the other side of the door.

Mr Lim became frightened when he saw the pair of hands and rushed upstairs to his brothers room (Lim Lean Kheong) who was still asleep and locked the door. He went to the window and cried

out for help to neighbours and the public that there is a thief in his house.

Mr Ong Kor Peng who was on duty as a Community Policing Unit (RELA) at the time, received the information through his wireless communication set (walkie-talkie) at about 8.30 am of the entry of the thief into the house. When Mr Ong arrived at the scence of the incident, he saw the window above the shop house of Mr Lim Beng Keong and heard Mr Lim crying out for help.

Mr Ong went to the back portion of the shop house to inspect but found nothing there. When he heard Mr Lim Beng Keongs attempt to jump through the front window, he went to the front area of the shop to assist but getting a ladder to help Mr Lim out.

At that time, he also received information that the thief has escaped but running through the roof of the shop house. Mr Ong ran after the thief and saw the thief jumping down from the roof of the far end of the row of linked shop houses. Mr Ong managed to catch the thief but only after a scuffle because the thief fought back to free himself.

The thief turned out to be the appellant.

There were blood stains at the elbow and abrasion wounds on his hands. A physical search on the body of the appellant was made and an identity card was found which was later surrendered to the police MPV.

After the appellant was apprehended, Mr Lim Beng Keong came down to the ground floor of the house to look for the deceased. There she was, lying down at the toilet of the ground floor.

The appellant was later taken to Jalan Patani Police Station where the police made a body search and found a watch and 3 bracelets. A forensic team was called to the scene of the incident where swabs were taken of blood traces found and a few other items from the scene of the incident.

The body of the deceased was brought to the Penang Hospital, where it was identified by Mr Lim Beng Keong. A post mortem revealed that that the cause of death was SEVERE HEAD INJURY DUE TO BLUNT TRAUMA TO THE HEAD.

His Lordship, the Learned High Court Judge found that the prosecution has failed to prove a prima facie case against the appellant under section 302 Penal Code but found that there is prima facie evidence against the appellant under section 457 Penal Code and His Lordship, the Learned High Court Judge amended the charge at the end of the prosecutions case to one under section 457 Penal Code.

The amended charge was marked P2A.

P 2A was read and explained to the accused. He pleaded guilty thereto and understood the nature and consequences of his plea.

His Lordship found the appellant guilty, convicted and sentenced him to 14 years imprisonment term with effect from the date of arrest and also 16 strokes of whipping.

3. THE ISSUES IN THIS APPEAL

My Lords The issues may be enumerated as follows 3.1 Whether the presence of stolen items belonging to the deceased indicates that the respondent is responsible for the death of the deceased

3.2 the appellant succeeded in raising any reasonable doubt against the murder charge

We shall address the issues accordingly.

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3.1 Whether

the

presence

of

stolen

items

belonging to the deceased indicates that the respondent is responsible for the death of the deceased

My Lords The facts of this case is in pari passu to the case of KRISHNA RAO GURUMURTHI PP AND ANOTHER v. APPEAL [2009] 2 CLJ 603 where

the finding of the bodies of the first three victims at No. 82, Laluan Tasek Timur 16, Taman Seri Dermawan, Bercham, Ipoh was the result of the initial investigation by the police after Harminderjit Singh (PW33) lodged a police report of what he saw at around 1am on 13
11

March 1998. PW33 was on his way for supper when he was attracted by the sound of the burglar alarm that went off in the jewellery shop known as Kedai Emas Chitra. He also saw a Proton Iswara with registration no. PCV 7749 parked outside the shop with a person inside seated on the driver's seat. Subsequently two other persons came out of the jewellery shop. The parked car then left the vicinity with PW33 following but only to lose it along Jalan Gopeng. The bodies found were that of victim 2, the wife of Nalliah Periasamy (PW26) who was the owner of the jewellery shop, his son victim 1 and the maid, victim 3. All had been brutally killed with victim 1 and victim 3 tied up with red and yellow fibred rope. PW26 was away in India at that time attending to his other son's graduation. On the morning of 12 March 1998 victim 2 and victim 3 came to the shop and were seen returning home in the evening on the same day. In the house the police did not find the keys to the shop which were normally kept by victim 2. However two blood stained blades (exh. P12A and P24A) which came from a pair of scissors were found. One of them had its end broken. Investigation by the police in the shop revealed that there was no forced entry. But the padlocks found inside the shop still had the keys attached to them. All the jewellery in the shop were
12

missing. By midday on 13 March 1998 the police managed to arrest two suspects, namely the 2nd appellant and the 3rd accused at No. 14A, Lahat Lane, Ipoh. Subsequently on the same day the 1st appellant was arrested at Room 502, Hotel Ritz Kowloon, Ipoh. Two vehicles one of which was seen by PW33 parked outside the shop the night before were also seized by the police on the same day . While being questioned by the police after his arrest the 1st appellant gave certain information and led the police to the discovery of the body of victim 4, the watchman of the jewellery shop. His body was also tied with red and yellow fibred rope. Cautioned statements from all the arrested persons were also recorded by the police. However the trial judge did not admit any of them as evidence. About a day and the half after he had given his cautioned statement to the police the 2nd appellant gave certain information and led the police to the area known as Baling Bom as it was used by the Police Field Force Ulu Kinta to dispose of hand grenades. There the police discovered items of the jewellery that had been removed from the jewellery shop. Incidentally the 2nd appellant was previously a member of the Police Field Force.

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One of the issue was that whether the murder committed in the cause of a robbery may bring an inference that the thief is the murderer. The Federal Court has this, to say, inter alia,

[50] Although there was a reference by the learned trial judge to s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 he was in fact relating to factual inferences based on the given circumstantial evidence adduced. In our opinion he was perfectly entitled to do so. It is not a case of where the learned trial judge cast upon the appellants, in particular the 2nd appellant, the burden of proof so that they have to establish probability in their favour. Neither is it a case of being merely in possession of the jewellery which made the 2nd appellant guilty for the murders. This is a case of where the theft and murder are taken as one transaction. As such it is the cumulative effects of each of the circumstantial evidence adduced that were considered. We do not find any error in such approach. After all finding facts by way of inferences from sets of primary proved facts is a common task for a trial court. It is trite law that an appellate court will not disturb finding of facts of a trial court based on inferences from primary facts if such inferences, having regards to the evidence and circumstances, are reasonable.

[51] The Court of Appeal took the same course albeit no reference to the said section. 'One does not pass from the

14

realm of conjecture into the realm of inference until some fact is found which positively suggests, that is to say provides a reason, special to the particular case under consideration, for thinking it likely that in that actual case a specific event happened or a specific state of affairs existed.' (See: Jones v. Dunkel [1958-59] 101 CLR 298).

[52] Learned counsel for the 2nd appellant argued that the theft and murders should not be taken as one transaction. Gleaned from that perspective learned counsel contended that the defence of the 2nd appellant should not even have been called. Such argument is only plausible if the version of the 2nd appellant on the event is believed. However the learned trial judge who had the advantage of listening and seeing him in the witness box disbelieved it. He gave reasons for his findings which we do not find unreasonable or irrational. Thus, being an appellate court we should therefore be slow in disturbing such finding of facts . (See: Nathan v. Public Prosecutor [1972] 1 LNS 99).

In our instant appeal, the appellant was found by his Lordship, the Learned Trial Judge to be in possession of bracelets, belonging to the deceased in the following words,

However, I am of the considered view that the prosecution has

15

succeeded to prove a case of house breaking with the intention to commit theft and in fact theft of three pieces of bracelets valued between RM100.00 to RM200.00 was committed, an offence under s 457 of the Penal Code.

The bracelets were seized by the police from the accuseds right trousers pocket. The bracelets were identified by the deceaseds daughter, SP 7 as hers. SP 7 kept her costume jewelleries in the wardrobe in the bedroom, she shared with the deceased.

I have no doubt, by way of inference that the accused has entered the deceaseds house at No. 34, Jalan Gurdwara, Georgetown and stole the said bracelets and thereafter exited from the said premises. The accused has, therefore, committed house breaking and theft of three bracelets, an offence under s 457 of the Penal Code.

By

the

high

authority

of

KRISHNA RAO GURUMURTHI (supra) that is, This is a case of where the theft and murder are taken as one transaction. As such it is the cumulative effects of each of the circumstantial evidence adduced that were considered.... which brings to the point that the 2 offences are so related that it is not

16

reasonable to separate them very much akin to that of a Siamese twin.

The High Court in PP v. KRISHNA RAO GURUMURTHI & ORS [2000] 1 CLJ 446, his Lordship, the Learned High Court Judge has this to say (which was confirmed by Court of Appeal and Federal Court)
The Law On Presumptions

By themselves the information were incapable of inculpating the accused with the charges. But in assessing the case for the prosecution the court is obliged to apply deductive reasoning to draw such inferences or to arrive at such factual presumptions as necessary from these information. The power to do so has always been an integral tool of trade of a court of law. Nevertheless, in our jurisdiction the power has been written into our law of evidence in the form of s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950which provides as follows:

114. Court may presume existence of certain fact The court may presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened, regard being had to the common course of natural events, human conduct, and public and private

17

business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.

Illustrations The court may presume (a) that a man who is in possession of stolen goods soon after the theft is either the thief or has received the stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, unless he can account for his possession;

((b) to (j) i to x not relevant for the present consideration.)

The instances which the court may draw such presumptions are inexaustive. There is no precedent here in our jurisdiction where a presumption under the main section of s. 114 is drawn in a case falling within the factual matrix of this trial, although there is one where a presumption had been drawn under the provision of illustration (a) to which I shall revert to later in this judgment

To provide the necessary persuasive authority to make my point therefore, I have to rely on a series of Indian authorities with respect to their interpretation of s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act 1872 which is in para-material with the same section of our own Evidence Act 1950.

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In RE MADUGULA JERMIAH [1957] AIR Andhra Pradesh 611. (Subra Rao, CJ and Bhimasankaram, J) the Supreme Court of India said that:

Section 114 deals with presumptions of fact. The section enables a Judge to infer one fact from the existence of another proved fact having regard to the common course of natural events or human conduct. The illustrations given to the section set the are not or exhaustive. The Court may always rely on the main section in regard to a different of facts to draw of facts combination presumption

embodied in that section. As the section only enables a rule of guidance evolved out of human experience, it gives as option to the Judge whether to draw such a presumption or not having regard to the circumstances of each case.

Having said this the Supreme Court went on to hold that:

It is an established rule that, if murder and robbery form parts of the same transaction, a presumption may be drawn against the accused for murder if he is found to be in possession of the jewels worn by the deceased in the absence of a reasonable explanation by him .

The ruling was however predicated by a strong caution, for the court went on to say:
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But as the presumption is one of fact, great care must be taken before drawing a presumption particularly in the case of a serious offence on slender material for it would be a leap in the dark with disastrous consequences. Unless, therefore, some definite fact connecting the accused with the murder is established, the Courts should be chary to draw the presumption of murder from the mere fact of possession of the articles worn or in the possession of the deceased.

The rationale for drawing such a presumption however was explained in another case - in the judgment of Devadoss J (in a panel of three) in the Madras High Court case of SOGAIMUTHU PADAYACHI V. KING EMPEROR, ILR 50 Mad 274 (AIR [1926] Mad 638) where he said:

If a person who retires to bed in a normal state of health is found next morning lying dead and his safe rifled and his valuables stolen and if it comes to light that the man did not die a natural death, but was murdered and that if the property which was in the safe shortly before the murder is found in the possession of persons who are unable to account for them the jury is entitled to draw the inference and the law requires them to draw the inference that the persons in possession of such property are not only the thieves but also murderers. If the persons with whom the stolen property is found have an explanation to

20

offer which explanation if accepted would prove them to be innocent, it is for them to offer it.

Another Indian case of high authority that may serve to illustrate the point further is WASIM KHAN V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH [1956] Supreme Court Reports 191. In that case, the deceased, a shopkeeper had gone to Lucknow to purchase goods for his shop. Having purchased the goods, on the return journey he engaged the appellant to carry the goods from the railway station to his village of Jarwal by using the appellant's cart. Along with the deceased two other persons also got on the cart.

The cart and the goods did not reach Jarwal which was situated some distance away from the railway station. The body of the deceased was found near a bridge the next morning. On the 4th day of the occurence, following police interrogation, the appellant handed over the personal belongings including the goods of the deceased to the police. In his defence the appellant had explained that three men had come to look for the deceased at the bridge. The deceased had gone off with them and had asked the appellant to wait for him at the bridge. When the deceased did not turn up he decided to take the goods back to his house, and had eventually handed them over to the police. The Sessions Court of Bahraich rejected his explanation and convicted the appellant. On appeal the High Court of Allahabad upheld the conviction. Upon further appeal the Supreme Court of India (comprising of B.P. Sinha, Jafer Imam and Chandrasekhara Aiyar, JJ,) dismissed the appeal. It ruled that:

21

Possession of recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against a prisoner on the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on the charge of murder.

In making the ruling, Imam J writing for their Lordships of the Supreme Court, reviewed a number of Indian authorities. For the persuasive value that they carry, I propose to reproduce them in this judgment to illustrate the legitimacy to which the presumption under s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 can be drawn against an accused who is found in possession of the belongings of a deceased victim - a fortiorari, where the accused is found with the corpus of the deceased.

In THE EMPEROR V. SHEIK NEAMATULLA ([1913] 17 CWN 1077) the accused was found to be in possession of stolen property belonging to a deceased. Sir Lawrence Jenkins J in that case after referring to s. 114 of the Indian Evidence Act, approved the following passage from Wills on Circumstantial Evidence:

possession of stolen goods recently after the loss of them, may be indicative not merely of the offence of larceny, or of receiving with guilty knowledge, but of any other more aggravated crime which had been connected of with in theft. cases This of particular which fact of presumption commonly forms also a material element evidence murder; special

22

application recognised.

of

it

has

often

been

emphatically

In dealing with a similar factual situation in QUEEN - EMPRESS V. SAMI AND ANOTHER [1890] ILR 13 Mad. 426, the learned judges of the High Court observed that:

Under these circumstances, and in the absence of any explanation, the presumption arises that any one who took part in a robbery also took part in the murder. In cases in which murder and robbery have been shown to form parts of one transaction, it has been held that recent and unexplained possession of the stolen property while it would be presumptive evidence against the prisoner against the charge of robbery would similarly be evidence against him on a charge of murder. All the facts which tell against the appellant, especially his conduct indicating a consciousness of guilt, point equally to the conclusion that he was guilty as well of the murder as of the robbery ...

In EMPEROR V. CHINTAMONI SHAHU AIR [1930] Cal. 379, the same opinion was expressed by the High Court that:

The possession of stolen goods recently after the loss of them may be indicative not merely of the offence of larceny or of receiving with guilty knowledge but of any other more aggravated
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crime which has been connected with theft; this particular murder. fact of presumption forms also a material element of evidence in the case of

In fairness to the defence, I must pause here to recall the former Court of Appeal case of ABDULLAH BIN SAAD V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1955] 1 LNS 3; [1956] MLJ 92 wherein it was held that a presumption in respect of the possession of stolen goods under illustration (a) (as opposed to drawing a presumption under the main provision) of s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950had not been made out.

In that case the deceased met his death on 15 May 1955. It was proved that on 16 May 1955 appellant pawned some jewellery which belonged to the deceased. Apart from this piece of evidence, there was nothing to connect the appellant with the crime. Nevertheless the High Court convicted him on murder. On appeal the Court of Appeal, (Mathew CJ delivering the judgment of the Court) held that this did not provide sufficient evidence on which to found a conviction for murder as it was not certain that the jewellery were on the deceased's person on the day of his death. The appeal was allowed and the conviction was set aside. The Abdullah bin Saad case was applied by Mohamed Azmi SCJ later in the Supreme Court case of NG THIAN SOONG V. PP [1990] 1 CLJ 202 (Rep); [1990] 1 CLJ 1107 [1990] 2 MLJ 148 to reinforce the already known principle of caution relating to circumstancial

24

evidence similar to that enunciated in RE MADUGULA JERMIAH (supra), wherein at p. 150 His Lordship said:

where

the

strands

of

circumstantial

evidence

connecting the accused with the crime are capable of more than one inference, it is not sufficient for the trial judge merely to tabulate the indirect evidence. He must go one step further by directing the jury what other reasonable inferences could be drawn from each strand of circumstantial evidence, and leaving it to the jury to decide which inference they wish to adopt. It is only when the combined strength of these inferences accepted by the jury when twisted together is strong enough to constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt that a finding could be arrived at the guilt of the accused.

I must admit that the facts in the Indian court cases are not on all fours with the facts in the present trial. But they serve to demonstrate the legitimacy of drawing presumptions in similar circumstances where the accused are implicated through the production of belongings of persons whom he is accused of killing.

The Abdullah bin Saad case on the other hand can be distinguished on the facts. In that case the prosecution did not rely on any information under s. 27 of the Evidence Act 1950. It was relying merely on the proof that the jewellery was pawned by the accused

25

thereby leaving open the question of how he could have come by it. In the instant trial however, the presumptions that may be drawn arose not only from the discovery of the body and the jewellery but also from the information provided by accused themselves.

The Presumptions That Must Be Drawn The presumption that must be drawn against the 1st accused under s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 from the fact of the discovery is that he had killed the watchman.

By reason that the same type of strings used to tie the watchman was similar to the ones used to tie up the boy and the maid in the house, and considering that their killings were executed in the same transaction as the killing of the woman, it must be presumed that he had also killed the boy, the maid and the woman at the house.

The presumptions that must be drawn against the 2nd accused under the provision of s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 are that: (a) that he was in possession of the jewellery;

(b) that he was the person who stole the jewellery from the locked safe in the shop;

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(c) that he had killed the watchman as the stolen jewellery was at that time in the control of the watchman;

(d) that he had also killed the woman in the house as to obtain the jewellery in the shop he must first obtain the key to the safe which had always been in the possession of the woman deceased in the house. This is clear from the evidence of Nalliah the owner of Chitra Jewellery (PW26).

(e) that he had also killed the boy and the maid in the house as their killings were in the same transaction.

His Lordship held that " The presumption that must be drawn against the 1st accused under s. 114 of the Evidence Act 1950 from the fact of the discovery is that he had killed the watchman. By reason that the same type of strings used to tie the watchman was similar to the ones used to tie up the boy and the maid in the house, and considering that their killings were executed in the same transaction as the killing of the woman, it must be presumed that he had also killed the
27

boy, the maid and the woman at the house.... is the reason the interwining of the 2 facts together that cannot be ignored by choice or otherwise.

At the risk of being repetitive, the Federal Court reiterated This is a case of where the theft and murder are taken as one transaction. As such it is the cumulative effects of each of the were circumstantial evidence adduced that

considered.... which conclude in our instant appeal that the appellant is indeed the murderer.

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3.2

the appellant succeeded in raising any

reasonable doubt against the murder charge

My Lords In MUNIANDY A/L SUBRAMANIAM V PUBLIC

PROSECUTOR [2006] 6 MLJ 623, a decision of the Court of Appeal and affirmed by the Federal Court recently, it was held at page 638 para F, inter alia:

An appeal is merely a continuation of the trial and throws open all the evidence to re-examination in order to determine whether or not the various findings of the trial court are correct (see Tan Boon Teck v Public Prosecutor [1950] MLJ 44).

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MOHD JOHI SAID & ANOR V PP [2005] 1 CLJ 389 , His Lordship Court of Appeal Justice Gopal Sri Ram stressed at page 397 para d, inter alia:

Unlike civil appeals, where the appellant carries the burden of showing that the judge at first instance went wrong, in a criminal case the duty of the court is to consider whether the conviction is right. The correct approach is therefore not whether the decision is wrong but whether the conviction is safe...(Emphasis ours)

In view of the fact that the offence committed by the Respondent was one of murder and applying the principles as enunciated by the cases aforesaid, the public interest would warrant that this appeal to be heard on its merits

We ask my Lords to do likewise.

4 CONCLUSION
My Lords
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We cannot do better than quote the case of RAMLI KECHIK V. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR [1986] 1 CLJ 308, where the Supreme Court quoted the case of Reg v Sang to explain justice in a criminal trial, inter alia,
...Lord Goddard's dictum could not be understood by many but it was restored to its rightful position by Lord Diplock in Reg. v. Sang [1980] AC 402 at 437 where in delivering the main judgment of the House of Lords he held at p. 437:

Save with regard to admissions and confessions and generally with regard to evidence obtained from the accused after commissions of the offence, the Judge has no discretion to refuse to admit relevant evidence on the ground that is was obtained by improper or unfair means.

Earlier on, at p. 436, His Lordship also made the following statement on the constitution of a fair trial:

... the fairness of a trial according to law is not all onesided; it requires that those who are undoubtedly guilty should be convicted as well as that those about whose guilt there is any reasonable doubt should be acquitted.( emphasis ours)

My Lords

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The

evidence

against

the

respondent

is

just

overwhelming.

We ask this Honourable Court to set aside the order of discharge and acquittal by the High Court and order that the respondent to enter on his defence on the original charge under Section 302 Penal Code

With that, we rest our submissions, unless we can be of further assistance to your Lordships.

Much Obliged Dated at the Federal Territory of Putrajaya this 18th day of April in the year 2013 By the authority of the Public Prosecutor,

AWANG ARMADAJAYA BIN AWANG MAHMUD Deputy Public Prosecutor MALAYSIA

32

The address for service of the Respondent is: The Public Prosecutor, Appellate and Trial Division, 5th Floor, Attorney Generals Chambers, Block 4G7, Precinct 4, The Federal Government Administrative Centre, 62100 Putrajaya

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