Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes 1981, Vol. 7, No.

4, 334-347

Copyright 1981 by the American Psychological Association, Inc. 0097-7403/81/0704-0334S00.75

Stimulus Interaction and Between-Trials Proactive Interference in Monkeys

Thomas J. Reynolds
Rockefeller University

Douglas L. Medin University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

Most theoretical accounts of proactive interference in delayed-matching-to-sample paradigms focus on processes linked to time. Two experiments questioned this exclusive focus on temporal facts. Between-trials proactive interference was studied in a situation in which the similarity of consecutive trials was varied along the dimensions of color, form, and position. All of these factors as well as the similarity of sample and test contexts contributed to memory performance. A mathematical model based on the assumptions that similarity strongly influences memory-based judgments and that overall similarity is determined by the multiplicative interaction of component dimensions gave an excellent qualitative and quantitative account of the data in both experiments. These results support a broader view of factors determining proactive interference and are inconsistent with the idea that these multiple factors can be treated as independent.

The theoretical analysis of memory processes in animals has advanced steadily in recent years (D'Amato, 1973; Medin, Roberts, & Davis, 1976; Spear, 1973, 1976, 1978; Wagner, 1976). One ultimate advantage of broad theories is that processes that are inferred on the basis of empirically denned relations can be compared and tested across experimental paradigms and subject populations. Since this generality is reached in only the advanced stages of theory development, current theories of animal memory still tend to be bound to the specific experimental procedures and questions from which they were developed. The recent progress that has been made in analyzing particular paradigms, however, suggests that it may be timely to evaluate the extent to which concepts arising in one subarea of memory research might be fruitfully applied to other areas. In the present article, we analyze proactive interference in a delayedThis research was supported by U.S. Public Health Service Grant MH 32489 and National Science Foundation Grant BNS 79-22678, The first author was also supported by U.S. Public Health Service Postdoctoral Fellowship MN 07551. Carolyn Mervis and Mark Altom provided helpful comments on earlier drafts of the manuscript. Requests for reprints should be sent to Douglas L. Medin, Psychology Department, University of Illinois, 603 E. Daniel, Champaign, Illinois 61820.

matching-to-sample paradigm in relation to our own ideas concerning the interaction of component cue dimensions in discrimination learning (e.g., Medin, 1975, 1976). Two prominent theories of animal memory, the independent trace strength and competition model (Roberts & Grant, 1974, 1976) and the temporal discrimination hypothesis (D'Amato, 1973), are largely based on data collected with the delayed-matching-to-sample (DMTS) paradigm. In the basic task, a sample stimulus is presented, and after a delay interval, a test is given between the identical sample and a new stimulus, with choice of the sample being correct and rewarded. Commonly used variations on the basic task include a required response to the sample, which may or may not be rewarded, fixed intertrial interval versus subject-initiated trials, and nonreward versus time out following incorrect responses. (See Medin et al., 1976, for a review of DMTS procedures.) Typically, animals are given extensive practice with a small number of sample and comparison stimuli. Both theories provide an account of proactive interference that focuses on temporal factors as determinants of forgetting. The major assumptions of trace strength theory are (a) that choice probability is directly related to memory trace strength, (b)

334

PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE

335

that strength for a stimulus is accumulated as a negatively accelerated function of exposure time and decays as a negatively accelerated function of time since presentation, and (c) that memory traces for different stimuli grow and decay independently (Grant, 1975; Grant & Roberts, 1973; Roberts & Grant, 1974, 1976). In this model, forgetting (as well as remembering) is strictly a function of temporal parameters. Proactive interference occurs because incorrect choice stimuli acquire strength from earlier trials when they appeared as the sample and were correct. That is to say, when a small number of stimuli are used, the incorrect stimulus on one trial might have been correct on an immediately preceding trial. In a similar way, the temporal discrimination hypothesis (D'Amato, 1973) emphasizes the role of time as the major factor in DMTS performance. Since each stimulus appears frequently as both the sample and the incorrect test alternative, the task becomes one of determining which stimulus has appeared most recently. Thus, the sample from the current trial recedes into a set of sample events organized in time, and successful DMTS performance requires not simply memory retrieval but also accurate relative recency judgments. Both theories have been quite successful in predicting many of the DMTS results in the literature, including delay, sample duration, sample set size and sample interference effects (see Reynolds & Medin, 1979, for a recent review). Worsham (1975) showed that the choice accuracy of capuchin monkeys could be predicted qualitatively on the basis of the relation between successive trial stimuli. When the sample on trial had been the incorrect test stimulus on Trial n 1 ("hard sequence"), performance was significantly worse than when the Trial sample had not appeared for the previous three or four trials ("easy sequence"). Similarly, Grant (1975) observed that pigeons were less accurate when the correct and incorrect stimuli reversed roles between trials than in a control condition in which only the second trial was presented. Further, strong proactive interference was found when the correct choice on Trial had been incorrect

on Trial n - 1, but no interference was exhibited if a new stimulus was correct on Trial n. These results can be readily handled by either of the two theories so far considered. There are other results, however, which suggest that an exclusive emphasis on timelinked processes may be ignoring important determinants of matching performance. Medin (1976) tested monkeys in a DMTS paradigm in which form was the relevant dimension and color was the irrelevant dimension and constant within, and variable between, trials. The stimuli were two circles and two triangles, one of each painted black and the other white, and thus choice tests were always between a circle and a triangle of the same color. On consecutive trials, either the same or the different form was correct in either the same or the different color and occupying either the same or the different position. The factorial combination of these three conditions yielded eight relations which were presented equally often on trials. The results indicated clearly that interference magnitude depended on overall similarity between trials. Although form was the only relevant dimension, both color and position contributed to performance. When the same form, color, and position were correct on consecutive trials, the monkeys averaged .77 correct. A change in either the color or the position of the correct object between trials reduced accuracy by approximately .10, and performance was at chance when the correct form was changed. Finally, if the correct and incorrect stimuli reversed roles between trials, accuracy fell below chance to .32 correct. These results are consistent with the idea that stimulus similarity is an important factor in between-trials proactive interference. In the past, it has often been convenient to ignore stimulus similarity in treatments of DMTS, since by design, discriminability may not have been an important factor. Similarity does become critical, however, when information about individual stimulus components must be used in the evaluation of a current choice test. Before elaborating this point, the idea of stimulus similarity needs to be developed in some detail. While similarity effects have been largely

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THOMAS J. REYNOLDS AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN

ignored in theoretical treatment of DMTS, tween independent and interactive similarity stimulus similarity and generalization have rules and not at the specific memory process always been central issues in the discrimi- model that embodies these assumptions. In applying the context model to the benation learning literature. It is natural, then, to look to theories of discrimination learning tween-trials paradigm, it is assumed that on as a guide to how stimulus similarity effects a choice test, performance may be controlled should be represented in DMTS. In the re- by the memory representation of the current mainder of this article, we develop and adapt sample, the immediately preceding choice Medin's (1975, 1976) context model of dis- test, or both. The probability of control is crimination learning to the between-trials computed as a direct function of the physical proactive interference DMTS paradigms. In and temporal similarity of the test to the two the process, we emphasize how proactive in- prior events, as determined by the multipliterference is critically dependent on the sim- cative rule. This analysis suggests an interilarity of the test cues and context to the play of factors determining the relative insample and interfering events. It is argued fluence of the sample and the preceding test that temporal factors comprise just one of representations: While sample has the admany dimensions along which similarity vantage of being closer in time to the test, must be represented and just one of the fac- the preceding test may have greater physical similarity to the current test setting. tors modifying performance. The context model assumes that when a Whereas the context model assumes that stimulus is presented, information concern- individual dimensions interact in producing ing the stimulus and its context is stored to- their effects, there are other discrimination gether in memory. For retrieval to occur, learning theories that assume that compoboth the cue and its associated context must nent dimensions are independent and addiactivate the cue-context node in memory si- tive (e.g., Spence, 1936; and models remultaneously. Explicit predictions are de- viewed by Flagg & Medin, 1973). In order rived from the assumptions that (a) proba- to determine which view more nearly debility of retrieval of a cue and its context is scribes the data, separate mathematical forreduced by changes in either component, mulations of the interactive and indepenwith differences along each cue and context dence assumptions are fit to the experimental dimension represented by a similarity pa- data. These experiments also provide some rameter between 0 and 1. A parameter value estimate of the magnitude that factors other of 1 represents identity along a dimension, than time have in influencing performance. and a value of 0 indicates total lack of generalization for that dimension, (b) The simExperiment 1 ilarity parameters for all dimensions are In the first experiment, monkeys with excombined by an interactive, specifically multiplicative, rule yielding a single similarity tensive DMTS experience were tested with measure governing transfer and interfer- a between-trials proactive interference (PI) procedure similar to that used by Medin ence. Although the context model developed by (1976). The roles of color and form were Medin (1975, 1976) uses the language of reversed in order to extend the generality of retrieval processes, the central idea that cues the Medin (1976) results. The basic design and context are represented in memory as is shown in Figure 1. Conditions are dean integrated event, with similarity of indi- scribed in terms of relations between convidual components combining by an inter- secutive trials. In the figure, the preceding active rule, does not depend on the retrieval trial consisted of a black square presented construct. A recognition process model could as the sample stimulus and then appearing be developed which embodies the same in- on the left for the choice test. For any pair teractive assumptions in terms of selection of trials, the correct color may be the same from active short-term memory representa- or different, the form may either remain the tions based on similarity. The current ex- same or shift between trials, and the position periments are directed at the distinction be- of the rewarded stimulus may be the same

PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE

337

or different. Thus an SSS trial is an exact repetition of the preceding trial; SDD refers to a trial in which the same color is correct but the form has been changed and the position of the rewarded object has shifted between trials. Note also that sample presentations as well as correct test responses are rewarded. Before presenting the quantitative models, it may be helpful to develop some qualitative predictions. All models would expect condition SSS to yield better performance than condition DSD. In each case the test conditions are the same on consecutive trials, but for DSD the reward conditions have been reversed and for SSS the reward conditions have not been reversed. The independence and interactive assumptions make contrasting predictions concerning the relative difficulty of other trial types. Consider conditions SSS and SDS. According to the context theory, the change in form associated with condition SDS should decrease the likelihood that the representation associated with the preceding trial will influence performance. Since responding on the basis

of information from the preceding trial should facilitate performance, condition SDS is predicted to produce lower performance than condition SSS, which is not associated with a change in form. By the same logic, when a preceding trial might interfere with performance, a change in form between trials should reduce this interference. Thus condition DDD is predicted to yield better performance than condition DSD. The independent cue model does not share these predictions. If we compare conditions SSS and SDS, both should be helped by positive transfer from the preceding test along the relevant color dimension. In addition, SSS also matches the prior stimuli along the irrelevant (form) dimension, and thus a constant amount of generalization is added to both test objects in this condition. Whether this added generalization facilitates, impairs, or has no effect on performance depends on the particular choice rule employed. If it is assumed that the information underlying choice performance follows Weber's law, than adding a constant to both test alternatives makes differences

SAMPLE TEST

TRIAL

N-l

|w|
SSS

[wj
SSD

[w)

(B) (B)

(w;
SDS

SDD

TRIAL N

Wj
DDD

' Wj +

[WJ +
DOS DSS DSD

Figure 1. Relations between consecutive trials in Experiments 1 and 2. (In Trials SSS, SSD, etc, S = same and D = different; each set of letters indicates color, form, and position, in that order. B = black; W = white).

338

THOMAS J. REYNOLDS AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN relation between trials affected performance, a "set-up" trial, chosen at random from the 12 stimulus-delay conditions, was given as the initial trial of each session. The trial conditions were run in one of six quasi-random orders which were constructed such that each combination of condition and delay was preceded by each other trial sequence about equally often in six sessions. Each monkey was given a different sequence of set-up trials, so that no two subjects were ever tested with precisely the same combination of stimuli and trials.

harder to detect, and the independent, additive model would predict condition SDS to be easier than condition SSS. Medin, Reynolds, and Parkinson (1980) reviewed alternative choice rules and concluded that none has been proposed that simultaneously predicts condition SSS to be better than SDS and condition ODD to be better than DSD. Thus, the additive and multiplicative models make distinctly different qualitative predictions. These qualitative predictions as well as the more formal quantitative predictions are tested in the following experiments. Method
Subjects. The subjects were three 5-8 yr-old jungleborn female rhesus monkeys (Macaco mulatto) with extensive discrimination and DMTS training (see Medin, 1980; Medin et al., 1980, for details). They were maintained on a 12:12 hr light/dark cycle initiated at 0700 hours and were fed laboratory chow daily after testing. Apparatus. The monkeys were tested in a darkened room with external sounds masked by white noise. Two comparable Wisconsin General Test Apparatuses (WGTAs), one painted gray and the other black, were used, with a given monkey always tested on the same equipment. The gray WGTA was lighted by two 15-W fluorescent bulbs; the black one was illuminated by four 60-W incandescent bulbs. The three food wells on the formboards were spaced 15 cm center to center. The stimuli were two circles (radius = 3.5 cm) and two squares ( 6 X 6 cm) cut from .64-cm-thick plywood, one of each painted black and the other white. Procedure. The monkeys were tested twice daily, 49 trials/session, 5 days/wk for a total of 24 sessions. Each trial began with the presentation of a sample stimulus over the center food well, which the monkey displaced for a raisin reward. Then, after a delay of 6, 12, or 24 sec, a choice was given between the sample stimulus and an alternative choice stimulus. The two choice stimuli differed in color but had the same form and were presented over the side food wells. Choice of the sample was rewarded with a raisin. A noncorrection procedure was used, and the intertrial interval was a constant 15 sec. The main variable of interest was the between-trials relations as outlined in Figure 1. For any two consecutive trials, either the same color or the different color was correct, the form (circle or square) of the sample and choice stimuli either remained the same or shifted, and the position of the correct test stimulus was either the same or different. These variations produce a total of eight main between-trials relations (SSS, SSD, SDD, SDS, ODD, DOS, DSS, and DSD, where S and D refer to same and different, respectively, and to color, form, and position, in that order). Color was the relevant dimension on all trials, and form was constant and irrelevant within a trial and variable between trials. Each of the 24 combinations of conditions and delay was given twice in a session. Since the major focus was on how the

Results The monkeys averaged 91% correct on the set-up trials which began each day. The mean proportion correct for each betweentrial condition as a function of delay is presented in Table 1 (each subject contributed 48 observations to each point). At all delay intervals, condition SSS was better than SDS and condition DDD was better than DSD, results consistent with the context model's interactive assumptions and inconsistent with the independent generalization model. Overall, performance ranged from 92% correct to 42% correct, which indicates rather dramatic effects of trial conditions. The data were also very stable across subjects. For each monkey, condition SSS was better than SDS and condition DDD was better than DSD. Error data were analyzed by a Delay X Trial Type X Practice (six session blocks) within-subjects analysis of variances. There was a significant main effect of delay, F(2, 4) = 14.1, MSe = 56.3, p< .05, with slightly more errors occurring at the 24-sec than at the 6- and 12-sec delays. There was also a main effect of trial type, F(7, 14) = 26.5, MSe = 102.2, p < .01, with the four same color conditions being equally good and with condition DSD being worse than DSS which was in turn worse than all the other conditions (Newman-Keuls, ps < .05). Finally, there was a significant practice effect, F(3, 6) =12.5, M5 e =13.7, />< .01, with improvement evident between the second and third six-session blocks (Newman-Keuls, p < .01). None of the interactions was significant, and, for purposes of theoretical analysis, data were collapsed over practice and delay. Theoretical Analysis Context model. Assumptions: In applying the context model to the between-trials

PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE Table 1 Mean Proportion Correct for Each Trial Condition as a Function of Delay in Experiment I Trial condition: Form
S S D D D D S S

339

Color
S S S S D D D D

Position
S D D S D S S D

6 .92 .90 .87 .90 .87 .88 .75 .56

Delay (in sec) 12

.92 .90 .88 .89 .76 .76 .61 .46

24 .90 .80 .81 .72 .69 .67 .58 .42

Note. The N = 3. S = same; D = different.

interference paradigm, it was assumed that the representation of the sample from the current trial and the representation of the immediately preceding choice test influenced performance on the basis of their similarity to the current test cues and context. Higher order effects arising from other still earlier samples and choice tests were assumed to be negligible and were not represented in the model. The probability of control by the sample or the preceding test was computed directly from the overall similarity of the presented test cues and context to the previous sample and test events, according to a multiplicative rule. Similarity along each dimension was represented by a parameter between 0 and 1 (c = similarity of black to white; / = similarity of circle to square; p = similarity of right to left food well positions; / = similarity of time of retrieval to time of storage; x = similarity of context between a single sample stimulus presented over the center food well and two choice stimuli presented over the side food wells). Probability of control, P(CON), was then simply equal to the product of the relevant similarity parameters (multiplicative rule). In other words, P(CON) was reduced by any changes in either cues or context between events. Time is simply treated as acting like any other stimulus dimension. Reference to Figure 1 may make these assumptions clearer. The probability that the testing setting would favor control by the preceding test is just t for conditions SSS and DSD, since time is the only dimension

of difference between the two consecutive test trials. For conditions SSD and DSS, the corresponding probability would be t-p, since position is an additional dimension of difference. By the same rationale, the probabilities would be t -/for conditions SDS and ODD and t-f-p for conditions SDD and DOS. Now consider the probability that the test setting will favor control by the information associated with the sample presentation. This is the product of the parameter for temporal similarity (t) and the parameter for representing the similarity of the single sample context to the test setting (x). The value of the temporal parameter should be higher for the sample and test than for two consecutive test trials, since the sample and test are close in time. In practice, the value for the sample representation is always a product ( x - t ) , and in the present experiments these parameters cannot be estimated separately. The control probabilities for the sample and the preceding test are summarized in Table 2. The subscripts associated with the temporal similarity parameters recognize the difference in time between the sample and current test and the preceding test and current test. It is assumed that the value of t decreases with the retention interval but that other parameters are time-independent. Table 2 also embodies our assumptions concerning the probability of making a correct response, given that either the sample event or the preceding test trial provides the basis of performance. Again reference to

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THOMAS J. REYNOLDS AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN

Table 2 Context Model Control and Choice Probabilities for the Eight Trial Conditions Trial condition: Color
S S S S D D D D

Form
S S D D D D S S

Position
S D D S D S S D

P(CON) sample: A

P(rn test: B

Choice

probabilities Prior test

1
\+cp
c+p P c+p 1 \+cp cp \+cp c c+p c

Sample
1

x-t,

/b

1+C

p-tb

1 1+c 1

x-t,

/P-fb

/'b
/'b

T+7 i i+c i
1+C

X-tt

/P-' b
p-fb

1 T+T i 1

x-t, x-t,

1+C

~c+p
cp

/b

1+C

1+cp

Note. S = same; D = different.

Figure 1 is helpful. It is assumed that the probability of a correct response is equal to the ratio of similarity of the correct object to the controlling event divided by that value plus the similarity of the incorrect object and the controlling event. On trials in which the sample event controls performance, for example, the correct object differs from the sample in time (t) and position1 (p), and the incorrect object differs from the sample in position (p), time (t), and color (c). The probability of a correct response is then pt / ( p - t + c - p - t ) or 1/(1 + c). The same reasoning applies to trials on which the preceding test trial controls performance. On SSS trials the correct object differs from the correct object of the preceding trial in time, while the incorrect object differs in time, color, and position. The probability of a correct response is t/(t + tc-p) or 1/(1 + c-p), as is indicated in Table 2. Note that in this case performance is actually predicted to be greater when the preceding test controls response, since 1/(1 + cp) is greater than 1/(1 + c). The overall probability of a correct response is computed as the probability that the sample event controls performance mul-

tiplied by the probability of being correct, given that the sample controls performance, plus the probability that the preceding test controls performance times the probability of being correct, given that the preceding test controls performance, plus the probability that neither controls performance and the animal guesses correctly. Combining information. Given that the probability of control by the current sample and the probability of control by the preceding test are independent, four logical possibilities exist: (a) sample only controls performance [A(l B)]; (b) prior test only controls performance [B(l - A)]; (c) both sample and prior test control performance (AB); and (d) neither controls performance [(1 - A)(l B)]. In cases a and b, it was assumed that choices were based entirely on the single controlling information. When neither event was involved, it was assumed that the monkey guessed (with probability correct = .5). Finally, for the cases in which
1 This value of p would not be expected to be the same as the value of p associated with shifts in position between trials. On trials in which the sample controls performance, however, p cancels out of the prediction equations so we need not be concerned with its specific value.

PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE

341

both the sample and test information were eralization model and then evaluate the abilinfluential, two possibilities were investi- ity of the models to predict the data. gated. Submodel PI assumed that the monIndependent generalization model. In key was equally likely to use either event as order to evaluate the interactive assumptions the basis of responding. Submodel No PI of the context model, an alternative model assumed that choices were based on the cur- that hypothesizes that generalization from rent sample whenever it could control per- component dimensions is additive and informance and that interference from the dependent was also formulated. Specifically, prior trial occurred only when the sample it was assumed that the choice stimuli had was not influential. some initial base strength (j) that could be These two submodels have five indepen- incremented by an amount r when a stimulus dent parameters. Three are related to phys- appeared as a sample and that the reward ical similarity (c, f, p), one is associated with from the preceding trial added strength to the temporal similarity of the correct and the choice stimuli in proportion to their simpreceding test trial (/b), and the other is the ilarity (in color [c], form [/], or position combined temporal and contextual similar- [p]) to the correct object on the preceding ity of the current test and the current sample trial. On an SSS trial, for example, the cor(x-f a ). Both models embody the interactive rect stimulus would have a strength equal similarity assumptions, but the No PI model to i (initial value) + r (from sample reassumes that the prior test trial does not alter ward) + (c + f + p [from the preceding the probability that the current sample will test]), and the incorrect stimulus would have be used as the basis of performance. We next just strength /' +/(from the preceding test). develop predictions for an independent gen- On a DSD trial, the correct object would
Table 3
Predictions of the Independent Generalization Model Trial condition: Color
S S S S D D D D

Form
S S D D D D S S

Position
S D D S D S S D

Predicted proportion correct (i+r+c+f+p) (i+r+c+f+p) + (/+/) (i+r+c+f) (i+r+c+f) + (i+f+p) (i+r+c) (i+r+c) + (i+p) (i+r+c+p) (i+r+c+p) + (0
(t+r) (i+r) + (i+c+p)

(i+r+p) (i+r+p) + (i+c) (i+r+f+p) (i+r+f+p) + (1+f+c) (i+r+f) (i+r+f) + (i+f+c+p)

Note. The symbols are ; (initial strength), r (strength from sample reward), and c,f, and p (strength from sharing same color, form, or position, respectively, as were rewarded on the immediately preceding test trial). S = same; D = different.

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THOMAS J. REYNOLDS AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN

have strength i + r + f, and the incorrect object would have strength i + c + / + / . Choice probabilities for this model were computed as the ratio of accumulated strength for the test stimuli; for example, the predicted proportion correct on SSS trials would be (/ + / + c + f + p ) / [ ( i + r + c + f + p) + (i + f)]. The predictions for the various trial types are summarized in Table 3. The choice rule of the independent generalization model leads to the prediction discussed earlier that SDS trials will be better than SSS trials. Looking at the corresponding prediction equations, one may note that condition SSS differs from SDS only in the factor/which will tend to move performance in condition SSS closer to chance. Data fits. Each of the models under consideration has five parameters to be estimated. For this purpose, a grid search procedure was run on a PDF 11/10 computer for the independence model and each of the interactive submodels in order to find parameter values that minimized the mean squared deviation (D2) of predicted and observed proportions. The best fitting paramTable 4

eters are presented in Table 4, along with D2, mean absolute deviation (\B\), chisquare for goodness of fit, and r2. For the interactive model fits, the quantity x-t&, while theoretically the product of two components, could not be meaningfully separated. Thus a single parameter value was estimated for the product. In addition to incorrectly predicting that condition SDS would be easier than SSS, the quantitative fit for the independence model was quite poor, with a mean absolute deviation of .07 and r2 equal to only .63. The idea that the component dimensions exert an independent influence on PI does not seem to capture the main trends in the data. The interactive model that assumes that the current sample alone controls performance in the case in which both the sample and the previous test potentially share control (the No PI submodel) fares somewhat better, but the r2 value is still only .88 and the average absolute deviation of predicted and observed values is .04. The version of the context model incorporating proactive interference produced ex-

Best Fitting Parameters for Independence and Interactive Models Experiment Best fitting parameters and indices of fit Independence model
/
r
.95

1
2

.16

.34 .32 .65

/ .09 .15 .00

P
.08 .16 .90

D2
.007 .003 .005

\D\

X 2 0)
123.9 31.9 50.5

r2
.63 .76 .82

.07 .04 .06

Close Far

.25 .67

.86 .87

Interactive models

x-t.
No PI 1 2 Close Far PI 1 2 .77 .53 .44 .42

(b .91 .62 .97 .78 .94 .99

c
.00 .01 .32 .08 .25 .41

/
.19

P
.53 .35 .14 .59 .60 .16

D2
.002 .002 .002 .000 .000 .001

\D\
.04 .04 .04 .01 .01 .02

X2(3) 106.6 28.3 25.6

2.8 1.2 5.8

r2

.88 .84 .91

.45 .52 .20 .44 .48

.99 .99 .98

Close Far

.99 .73

Note. In Experiment 1, N = 3; in Experiment 2, each group N = 2. PI = proactive interference.

PROACTIVE INTERFERENCE

343

cellent fits to the data. The average absolute deviation of predicted and observed values was less than .01, and the model accounted for 99% of the variance. Although the fitting procedures were designed to minimize squared deviations rather than chi-square, the actual chi-square value was nowhere near statistical significance. Observed values for the eight main trial types, along with predicted values for the PI submodel, are shown in Table 5. Discussion The results of the first experiment supported both the qualitative and quantitative predictions of the interactive models, while being clearly inconsistent with the assumption that color, form, and position were additive and independent in their contributions. The data fit for the No PI interactive submodel indicated further that interference was important even when the current sample information exerted some control over performance. The best account of the data was provided by the interactive model that assumes that PI occurs to the extent that the preceding trial event influences performance. An important implication of this model is that proactive interference is not solely time-dependent but is also a function of the similarity of the test and potentially interfering situations. According to the parameter esTable 5
Mean Proportion Correct for Each Trial Condition

timates of the PI submodel, the probability that the preceding test trial was influential ranged from .09 on SDD and DDS trials to .78 on SSS and DSD trials. The fact that performance ranged from 48% to 92% correct in the various conditions reinforces the conclusion that PI exerts large influence on performance, an influence nicely accounted for by the submodel. To test the generality of these models and to further explore their implications, we ran a follow-up experiment in which we attempted to experimentally manipulate the relative likelihood that the representations associated with the current sample and the preceding test would control performance on the subsequent choice test. This was done in Experiment 2 by altering the contextual similarity of the sample and the test presentations. Experiment 2 Relations between the sample and the test setting were varied by changing the separation of the food wells and the color of the formboard. These changes were designed to either increase or decrease the distinctiveness of the sample and the test presentations. In the Close condition, the food wells were moved close together, and the entire formboard was painted a neutral tan. For the Far condition, the food wells were widely sepa-

Experiment 2 Trial condition: Color Form Position Experiment 1 Obtained Predicted Close Obtained Predicted Obtained

Far
Predicted

S S S S D D D D Set-up trial N

S S D D D D S S

S D D S D S S D

.92 .86 .85 .84 .77 .77 .65 .48 .91 3

,92 .86 .83 .85 .76 .79 .64 .48

.82 .78 .79 .81 .65 .75 .65 .48 .77 2

.83
.77 .79

.81 .66 .73 .65 .48 2

.83 .60 .64 .74 .48 .71 .66 .27 .73

.85 .62 .64 .75 .48 .66 .66 .30

Note. Predicted values are derived from the proactive interference version of the context model. S = same; D different.

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THOMAS J. REYNOLDS AND DOUGLAS L. MEDIN day, 5 days/wk, for 24 days. The Close and Far conditions were alternated between sessions according to an ABBA sequence, and the two tricolored formboards were used on alternate Far sessions. Once again, no two subjects saw the same sequence of stimuli and trials, since each had a unique set-up trial order. The intertrial interval was a constant 15 sec.

rated, and the background surrounding the center (sample) food well was painted tan, the background of one choice food well was red, and that of the other was green. The primary purpose for Experiment 2 was to investigate how the model's parameter values changed with explicit changes in the stimulus situation. First of all, the value of p should be sensitive to the distance between choice food wells, with the Close condition associated with greater position similarity than the Far condition. It might also be expected that color and form differences would be more salient (have smaller similarity values) when the stimuli are closely juxtaposed than when they are widely separated. A third prediction is that the relative likelihood of the representations of the preceding test and current sample being influential will vary with food well separation, with the current sample exerting more control in the Close condition than in the Far condition. When all of these factors are combined, one can make a reasonably clear prediction concerning the overall difficulty of the Close and Far conditions. Having the food wells close together should increase the likelihood that the sample presentation will control performance, and if the color difference is more distinctive when the stimuli are close, then that too will facilitate performance. Overall, then, the Close condition should yield better performance than the Far condition, particularly on those trial types in which control by the preceding test trial would lower performance substantially (e.g., different color and different position trials).

Results

Performance on the Close and Far set-up trials averaged 77% correct and 73% correct, respectively. The slightly lower performance on these trials may reflect disruption associated with the new formboards. The mean proportion correct for each trial condition is from two monkeys, since the third developed a strong position bias in the Far condition which persisted through 20 sessions. As in Experiment 1, between-trials conditions heavily influenced performance, and again SSS was the best and DSD the worst condition. As predicted, the Close condition yielded better performance than the Far condition, and this difference was greater when rewarded color or position shifted between trials. The relative difficulty of different trial types was again very stable across subjects. For both the Close and Far conditions, each monkey performed better on SSS trials than on SDS trials and better on DDD trials than on DSD trials, as expected by the context model. Table 6 presents the mean proportion correct by trial condition and delay for the Close and Far conditions. Preliminary analyses of six-session blocks indicated that there were no significant practice effects (F < 1), and the data were therefore collapsed across days. The overall analysis of variance indicated that the main Method effects of delay, F(2, 2) = 54.47, MSe = 1.48, p < .05, and trial types, F(l, 7) = Subjects and apparatus. The three monkeys from Experiment 1 were tested again on the same WGTAs, 16.86, MS; = 33.75, p < .01, as well as the but new formboards were used. For the Close condition, interactions of Close versus Far condition the three food wells were spaced 7.7 cm center to center, with trial types, F(l, 7) = 4.27, MS = 13.69, e and the entire board was painted tan. For the Far condition, the food wells were spaced 20.3 cm center to p < .05, and of trial types with delays, F( 14, 14) = 3.21, MS, = 7.79, p < .05, were sigcenter, and one third of the board was painted red, one third green, and the middle third tan. Two boards were nificant.
constructed, one with red on the left and green on the right, the other with red and green reversed. Procedure. Experiment 2 was run with the same overall procedure as Experiment 1. Briefly, the 24 combinations of experimental conditions and delay were presented twice/session plus a "set-up" trial for a total of 49 trials/session. The monkeys were run two sessions/

Theoretical Analysis The data fitting procedures followed those used in Experiment 1. Parameters were estimated separately for the Close and Far

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Table 6 Mean Proportion Correct for Each Trial Condition for the Close and Far Conditions and as a Function of Delay
Close

Far
Delay

Trial condition: Color

S
Form Position

Delay

6 sec .87 .73 .77 .79 .76 .85 .75 .49

12 sec .85 .85 .84 .89 .61 .73 .58 .53

24 sec .74 .77 .76 .75 .57 .68 .62 .42

6 sec .84 .54 .64 .71 .55 .80 .64 .31

12 sec .84 .68 .69 .81 .45 .68 .71

.23

24 sec .79 .57 .60 .71 .44 .65 .65 .27

s S s
D D D D

S S D D D D S S

S D D S D S S D

Note. S = same; D = different.

conditions, with performance collapsed over delay intervals.2 A grid search was conducted to minimize mean squared deviations for each of the models under consideration. The independent generalization model did not fit the results accurately. Condition SSS was better than SDS, contrary to its prediction, and the average absolute deviation was .04 in the Close condition and .06 in the Far condition. The No PI version of the interactive model yielded an average absolute deviation of .04 in both conditions, but the PI submodel was much more accurate in its predictions. The PI version of the context model had an average absolute deviation of .01 for the Close condition and .02 for the Far condition, and it accounted for nearly all the variance. These estimates are detailed in Table 4, and the predicted and observed values for the model are given in Table 5. Not only does the PI interactive model fit the data accurately, but also the associated parameter estimated changed in the expected manner. The similarity parameter for position is much higher in the Close condition than in the Far condition. Similarity parameters for color and form, in contrast, are higher in the Far condition. Finally, estimates for x-tz and rb indicate that compared with the Far condition, the Close condition increased the likelihood that the representation associated with the current sample would control choices and decreased the probability that the representation as-

sociated with the preceding test trial would exert an influence. General Discussion The major empirical results, and their associated theoretical implications, were reasonably clear-cut. In each experiment, changes in color, changes in form, and changes in position all affected betweentrials proactive interference. Color was the relevant dimension, position was variable and irrelevant, and form was constant within trials and irrelevant, yet each of these factors contributed to performance. In the second study, separation and distinctiveness of the food wells also produced differences in proactive interference. It seems clear, therefore, that theories of animal memory that focus exclusively on temporal information in their accounts of forgetting are severely limited. The present results imply that changes in a variety of attributes interact to determine memory performance. The data of these experiments have been related to a theory that assumes that overall similarity is the product of similarities of
Ideally, we would like to address the models directly to delay effects. Although the effect of delay was statistically reliable, it was not of sufficient magnitude to allow us to distinguish among different treatments of forgetting. The main conclusions would not be changed if separate fits of the models were conducted at each delay interval.
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individual components and that performance is controlled by prior events, provided that the test cues and context are similar to their memory representations. A mathematical model incorporating this perspective, the PI version of the context model, gave an excellent account of the observed data in both experiments. According to this model, overall similarity is determined by a multiplicative rather than an additive combination of component dimensions. This implies that a salient difference along a single dimension between the test situation and some earlier event can be sufficient to prevent the representation of that earlier event from influencing test behavior despite the presence of similarity along many other dimensions. Even though color was the relevant dimension and form was irrelevant and constant within trials, a salient change in form between trials could eliminate any betweentrials proactive influences (i.e., if the form similarity parameter,/, were zero). A model assuming that component dimensions are independent and additive in their influence, by way of contrast, was neither qualitatively nor quantitatively supported. As discussed earlier, the process model chosen to specify the mechanism of control by the memory of a prior event is quite separate from the interactive similarity assumptions. A retrieval model can be developed by assuming that retrieval is a function of similarity and that the control of performance by prior events depends solely on memories that have been activated. Alternatively, a recognition short-term memory (STM) model could be derived by assuming that control of performance is determined by selection from active STM representations, where selection itself depends on similarity. These possibilities, of course, are not mutually exclusive. The version of the context model giving the best account of the data assumed that when both the sample event and the preceding test control choice behavior, animals are as likely to use the preceding test as they are to use the sample as the basis for responding. The submodel that assumed that the preceding test controls performance only when the sample does not exert any influence on the test did not fit the data nearly as well.

This difference supports the claim that proactive interference in this paradigm involves a direct competition of memory traces rather than a guessing bias in the absence of relevant information. In the present experiments, the sample presentations were always rewarded, a practice that is not uniform in DMTS experiments. Although one could argue on some grounds that rewarding a sample presentation should allow it to compete more effectively with the prior test trial, it may have had the opposite effect. The fact that both sample presentations and tests were rewarded may work to blur the distinction between them. It is quite possible that if sample presentations were not rewarded, betweentrials proactive interference would be reduced considerably. In applying the context model to the present experiments, we assumed that delay intervals change the parameter for temporal similarity while leaving the other similarity parameters intact. An alternative possibility that deserves serious consideration is that stimulus and context attributes may become less distinctive with time, in which case their similarity parameters would be expected to increase. Unfortunately, neither of the experiments produced delay effects of a sufficient magnitude to allow the evaluation of these alternative possibilities. The present results concerning proactive interference and its relation to similarity are consistent with other work in our laboratory examining retroactive interference in DMTS (Medin et al., 1980). Stimuli interpolated between a sample presentation and the test produced no effect, interference, or facilitation, depending on the similarity of the sample and the interpolated stimulus and whether the two stimuli were associated with same or different outcomes. Those data support both the general notion that a stimulus event accesses similar stored information and the specific idea that overall similarity is governed by a multiplicative combination rule. Those results as well as the results of the present experiments are consistent with the proposition that different stimulus events can be treated as independent only for the case in which stimuli are very dissimilar. Since most delayed-matching studies use

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small sets of alternative sample stimuli, there inevitably are numerous opportunities for earlier stimulus episodes to be accessed by later stimulus events. Nor can one escape consideration of cuing effects by using different stimuli on every trial. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the similarity of the sample context to the test context influenced the likelihood that the sample presentation would control performance on a subsequent choice test. For certain purposes one can minimize cuing effects, but it seems clear that such effects are fairly general and merit closer scrutiny. Taken as a whole, the present studies make a strong case against the practice of treating proactive interference effects in DMTS solely in terms of processes linked to time. Similarity along both relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions as well as contextual similarity contributes importantly to memory performance. The test setting is not some neutral context in which response tendencies to the correct and incorrect choice objects competerather, the test setting is more appropriately conceived of as a potent cue determining access to similar prior events. References
D'Amato, M. R. Delayed matching and short-term memory in monkeys. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 7). New York: Academic Press, 1973. Flagg, S. F., & Medin, D. L. Constant irrelevant cues and stimulus generalization in monkeys. Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 1973, 85. 339-345. Grant, D. S. Proactive interference in pigeon short-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 1975, /, 207-220. Grant, D. S., & Roberts, W. A. Trace interaction in pigeon short-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology, 1973, 101, 21-29. Medin, D. L. A theory of context in discrimination

learning. In G. H. Bower (Ed.), The psychology of learning and motivation (Vol. 9). New York: Academic Press, 1975. Medin, D. L. Animal models and memory models. In D. L. Medin, W. A. Roberts, & R. T. Davis (Eds.), Processes of animal memory. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum, 1976. Medin, D. L. Proactive interference in monkeys: Delay and intersample interval effects are noncomparable. Animal Learning & Behavior, 1980, 8, 553-560. Medin, D. L., Reynolds, T. J., & Parkinson, J. K. Stimulus similarity and retroactive interference and facilitation in monkey short-term memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Behavior Processes, 1980, 6, 112-125. Medin, D. L., Roberts, W. A., & Davis, R. T. (Eds.), Processes of animal memory. Hillsdale, N. J.: Erlbaum, 1976. Reynolds, T. J., & Medin, D. L. Strength vs. temporalorder information in delayed-matching-to-sample performance by monkeys. Animal Learning & Behavior, 1979, 7, 294-300. Roberts, W. A., & Grant, D. S. Short-term memory in the pigeon with presentation time precisely controlled. Learning and Motivation, 1974, 5, 393-408. Roberts, W. A., & Grant, D. S. Studies of short-term memory in the pigeon using the delayed-matching-tosample procedure. In D. L. Medin, W. A. Roberts, & R. T. Davis (Eds.), Processes of animal memory. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1976. Spear, N. E. Retrieval of memory in animals. Psychological Review, 1973,50, 163-194. Spear, N. E. Retrieval of memories. In W. K. Estes (Ed.), Handbook of learning and cognitive processes (Vol. 4). Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1976. Spear, N. E. The processing of memories: Forgetting and retention. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1978. Spence, K. W. The nature of discrimination learning in animals. Psychological Review, 1936, 43, 427-449. Wagner, A. R. Priming in STM: An information processing mechanism for self-generated or retrieval-generated depression in performance. In T. J. Tighe & R. N. Leaton (Eds.), ffabituation: Perspectives from child development, animal behavior, and neurophysiology. Hillsdale, N.J.: Erlbaum, 1976. Worsham, R. W. Temporal discrimination factors in the delayed matching-to-sample task in monkeys. Animal Learning & Behavior, 1975, 3, 93-97.

Received July 14, 1980 Revision received May 4, 1981