Charity Tax Credit 7 Week Seniors 09

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY
SENIORS 2009
TAX CREDIT CPs / CHARITY TRADEOFF

Government Fails Generic TAX CREDIT CPs / CHARITY TRADEOFF................................................................................................................................1 Government Services Fail General [1/2].......................................................................................................................................4 Government Services Fail General [2/2].......................................................................................................................................6 Government Services Fail - Mistrust...............................................................................................................................................8 Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [1/3].................................................................................................................................................9 Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [2/3]...............................................................................................................................................10 Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [3/3]...............................................................................................................................................11 Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [1/3].............................................................................................................................12 Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [2/3].............................................................................................................................14 Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [3/3].............................................................................................................................15 Key to Civil Society 2NC [1/3]...................................................................................................................................................16 Key to Civil Society 2NC [2/3]...................................................................................................................................................18 Key to Civil Society 2NC [3/3]...................................................................................................................................................20 Civic Engagement Good Racism................................................................................................................................................22 Civic Engagement Good Tyranny...............................................................................................................................................23 Civic Engagement Good Democracy..........................................................................................................................................25 Civic Engagement Good Environment.......................................................................................................................................26 Charity Good AIDS.....................................................................................................................................................................27 Coercion Net Benefit [1/2]..........................................................................................................................................................28 Coercion Net Benefit [2/2]..........................................................................................................................................................29 Spending Net Benefit..................................................................................................................................................................30 Charities Solve Better 2NC [1/5]................................................................................................................................................31 Charities Solve Better 2NC [2/5]................................................................................................................................................32 Charities Solve Better 2NC [3/5]................................................................................................................................................33 Charities Solve Better 2NC [4/5]................................................................................................................................................34 Charities Solve Better 2NC [5/5]................................................................................................................................................35 CTC Solvency: Legal Services......................................................................................................................................................36 CTC Solvency: Hunger..................................................................................................................................................................37 CTC Solvency: Internet..................................................................................................................................................................39 CTC Solvency: Women of Color...................................................................................................................................................40 CTC Solvency: Credits Rid Government Action ..........................................................................................................................41 CTC Solvency: Credits Rid Government Action ..........................................................................................................................42 CTC Solvency: Laundry List.........................................................................................................................................................43 CTC Solvency: Pennsylvania Proves.............................................................................................................................................44 CTC Solvency: Spurs Innovation...................................................................................................................................................45 CTC Solvency: National Charity Expansion.................................................................................................................................46 CTC Solvency: Volunteerism Doubles..........................................................................................................................................47 CTC Solvency: 1st Amendment.....................................................................................................................................................48 AT: Free-Riding.............................................................................................................................................................................49 AT: Market Failure........................................................................................................................................................................50 AT: No Donations..........................................................................................................................................................................51 AT: No Donations..........................................................................................................................................................................52 AT: No Safety Net.........................................................................................................................................................................54 AT: CTC Less Commitment to Poor........................................................................................................................................55 AT: CTC Doesnt Solve Cities/Rural............................................................................................................................................56 AT: Fraud.......................................................................................................................................................................................57 AT: CTC Dependency...............................................................................................................................................................58 Flip-Flop Link Charity/Tax Credits............................................................................................................................................59 Tax Credits Unpopular...................................................................................................................................................................60 Tax Credits Popular........................................................................................................................................................................61 Democrats Support Tax Credits ...................................................................................................................................................62 Charities Oppose Tax Credits........................................................................................................................................................63 Conservatives Support Tax Credits................................................................................................................................................64 Conservatives Oppose Tax Credits................................................................................................................................................65 Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 1
MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS SENIORS CHARITY 2009 CTCs Dont Cost Political Capital.................................................................................................................................................66 Free Market Unpopular (Congress)............................................................................................................................................67 Free Market Popular....................................................................................................................................................................68 Free Market Popular (Republicans) ...........................................................................................................................................69 Urban Homesteads CP 1NC........................................................................................................................................................70 Health Care Tax Credit 1NC.......................................................................................................................................................71 Health Care Tax Credit 2NC [1/2]..............................................................................................................................................72 Health Care Tax Credit 2NC [2/2]..............................................................................................................................................73 Government-based Health Care Fail/CP Key to Solve..................................................................................................................74 Current Health Care Fails [1/2]......................................................................................................................................................75 Current Health Care Fails [2/2]......................................................................................................................................................76 AT: Problems with CP Mechanism/Defense of Mechanisms........................................................................................................77 AT: Medicaid/Focus on Uninsured Key........................................................................................................................................78 AT: Perm Do Both.........................................................................................................................................................................79 AT: Universal v. Targeted Care.....................................................................................................................................................80 Coercion Net Benefit...................................................................................................................................................................81 Pro Bono Tax Credit 1NC..........................................................................................................................................................82 Pro Bono Tax Credit 2NC...........................................................................................................................................................83 AT: Perm do both...........................................................................................................................................................................84 AT: Ending mandatory pro bono work bad...................................................................................................................................85 Coercion Net Benefit...................................................................................................................................................................86 Education Tax Credits CP 1NC..................................................................................................................................................87 Solvency: General..........................................................................................................................................................................88 Solvency: Competition...................................................................................................................................................................89 Solvency: Lessens Government Interference.................................................................................................................................90 Solvency: Avoids Legal Challenges, Regulations.........................................................................................................................91 Solvency: Donations Help Low-Income Families ........................................................................................................................92 Solvency: Donations Help Low Income Families.........................................................................................................................93 Solvency: Public Popularity...........................................................................................................................................................94 Spending Net Benefit..................................................................................................................................................................95 Postal Service Privatization CP 1NC..........................................................................................................................................96 2NC Solvency Cheaper/More Effective......................................................................................................................................97 Coercion Net Benefit...................................................................................................................................................................98 Microfinancing 1NC......................................................................................................................................................................99 Microfinancing Solvency 2NC [1/3]............................................................................................................................................100 Microfinancing Solvency 2NC [2/3]............................................................................................................................................101 Microfinancing Solvency 2NC [3/3]............................................................................................................................................102 Coercion NB.................................................................................................................................................................................103 Contracts CP 1NC.....................................................................................................................................................................104 Contracts Solvency 2NC...........................................................................................................................................................105 Maximus Solvency 2NC...........................................................................................................................................................106 Maximus Solvency Health Care................................................................................................................................................107 Maximus Solvency Child Care.................................................................................................................................................108 Maximus Solvency Immigrants................................................................................................................................................109 Contracting Better for the Free Market........................................................................................................................................110 AT: Contracts Link to Coercion...................................................................................................................................................111 AT: Contracts Link to Politics.....................................................................................................................................................112 Big Government Good Economy..............................................................................................................................................113 Aff Free Market Doesnt Solve.................................................................................................................................................115 Aff Government Key to Solve Poverty.....................................................................................................................................116 Aff Privatization Bad................................................................................................................................................................117 Aff AT: Government + Charity ...............................................................................................................................................118 Aff Tax Credit Doesnt Solve [1/2]..........................................................................................................................................119 Aff Tax Credit Doesnt Solve [2/2]..........................................................................................................................................120 Aff Tax Credits ARE Welfare...................................................................................................................................................121 Aff CTCs destroy welfare.........................................................................................................................................................122 Aff CTCs Corruption...........................................................................................................................................................123 Aff CTCs kill Tax Code ...........................................................................................................................................................124 Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 2
MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS SENIORS CHARITY 2009 Aff CTCsFed Abandoning Impoverished.............................................................................................................................125 Aff CTCs Exclude Legal Services, Voter Education................................................................................................................126 Aff Health Care Tax Credits Fail [1/2].....................................................................................................................................127 Aff Health Care Tax Credits Fail [2/2].....................................................................................................................................128 Aff Health Care CP Links to Politics........................................................................................................................................129 Aff AT: Urban Homesteader CP...............................................................................................................................................130 Aff AT: Postal Service CP........................................................................................................................................................131 Aff AT: Microfinancing............................................................................................................................................................132 Aff AT: Pro Bono Tax Credits..................................................................................................................................................133 Aff - AT: Education Tax Credits.................................................................................................................................................134 Aff: AT Microfinancing...............................................................................................................................................................135 Aff AT: Maximus [1/3].............................................................................................................................................................136 Aff AT: Maximus [2/3].............................................................................................................................................................137 Aff AT: Maximus [3/3].............................................................................................................................................................138 Aff AT: Contracts.....................................................................................................................................................................139 Aff Contracts/Maximus Link to Politics...................................................................................................................................140
Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick
SENIORS 2009
Government Services Fail General [1/2]

Inflexibility and political pressure cripple government services- only privatization can effectively distribute social services Winston 07 [Clifford, senior fellow of economic studies @ Brookings Institute, Public Production: Government Failure vs Market Failure, Hearing
before the Committee on Financial Services, March 23, http://www.house.gov/financialservices/hearing110/htwinston032307.pdf]
Common explanations for the inefficiencies of public production focus on the political pressure exerted by interest groups who benefit from the current state of affairs and the inflexibility and limited vision of federal agencies. To be sure, the federal government has recently indicated its support for public private partnerships and its interest in congestion pricing experiments that could lead to improvements in efficiency. However, my view is that more significant institutional change in the form of privatizing public facilities and services will be necessary to dramatically improve efficiency and spur growth. Increasing concerns about the waste associated with public financing of vital social services is motivating interest in whether the private sector could do a better job than the public sector is currently doing to finance and offer these services. In theory, privatization would enable private firms to operate in a competitive environment without bureaucratic controls and political pressures. Private firms would have a financial incentive to reduce existing inefficiencies, introduce innovative services, and respond to users preferences . Government intervention in social services fails- rigorous rules, paralysis, and government dole delay implementationonly by opening the sphere to free market rules will people take the initiative and solve Abram 06 [Ted, qualifications in first sentences of card, The Government Programs are Doomed to Fail, Feb 5,
http://www.institute.sk/article.php?975]
A: From 1974 to 1990 I was a trial court judge, handling everything from traffic tickets to murder and complex civil litigation. Since 1990 I have been working on implementing The Full Employment Program in Oregon and many other states. From 1990 to 2000 Chuck Hobbs, the former Domestic Policy advisor to President Reagan, was my partner in politically enacting The Full Employment Program. We traveled to nearly all the states, and we extensively discussed the rise of the welfare state. Chuck was brilliant and knowledgeable in the history of welfare in America. I had a unique prospective on the political thought and culture of America. From
that background I began a study of comparative governments and the functions of government. I realized that government programs, though well intentioned, are doomed to fail. First, government programs are guided by rules and regulations. Second, ultimately, institutional paralysis dominates. That is, the preservation of the government institution is more important than the mission. Finally, less fortunate humans become trapped by the government dole. I strongly believe that government programs will eventually fail in attempting to assist people in financial or moral need. Government programs, by legislation and rule, classifies groups of people in need, and government distributes remedies to the groups according to prescribed government rule. Group classification induces an acceptance of inferiority and culture of dependence by the people that government intends to assist. To the contrary, each person is unique. Only people helping people - family, friends and neighbors - can devote the time, energy and love to assist and encourage another human being in need. Family, friends, and neighbors will respond to the needs of people in need. Because of the obvious failure of the welfare state, we are seeing the return of people and organizations helping their fellow citizens. Empirically, the government fails at enforcing social service measures- resulting in legal measures against the aff George and Wilding 84 [Victor and Paul, social scientists, The Impact of Social Policy, published by Routledge, page 16,
http://books.google.com/books? id=NK89AAAAIAAJ&pg=PA16&lpg=PA16&dq=government+policies+social+services+fail&source=bl&ots=7tJQdwifl3&sig=eGMhB7wSKPmwXGRW9 Q7NlNxmp_Y&hl=en&ei=KwRASrKkItmM_AaBmdHdAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=8]
Standards set by the central government have been of two different types during the period covered by this study.
First, there have been statutory minimum levels of provision the physical conditions of houses, hospitals, old peoples homes, etc which have to be observed by government departments or by local authorities.
Failure to observe such standards can result in legal action against the defaulting authority. Second, there have been government guidelines of various kinds which government departments or local authorities ought to take into account when planning their services. Such guidelines have normally been targets which should be reached by a certain year in the future. Failure to achieve such targets cannot result in legal intervention but it can, depending on the governments priorities, mean government pressure on local authorities . The discussion that follows provides numerous instances of these two types of government standards. It also shows that the difference between minimum standards and guidelines is more important in theory than in practice. Governments have persistently failed to enforce minimum standards, even in services provided directly by government departments, let alone local authorities or other bodies . Complexities around federal policies deter investment and turn case Midgley and Livermore 08 [James and Michelle, both have PhD in social sciences, The Handbook of Social Policy, 2nd edition,
http://books.google.com/books?id=C5NxKCcf6N4C&pg=PA12&lpg=PA12&dq=government+policies+%22social+services %22+fail&source=bl&ots=IuSXjHmy2m&sig=UvOw4rGyfpLF5NU13f3vT3YH2bo&hl=en&ei=PQhASvCJO4X0_AbAjaDdAQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct =result&resnum=10]
Although, at first, it may appear that social policies can be readily understood by reading the statutes or studying the way the different social services operate, clearly, both the formulation and implementation of policy are complicated. In addition, government policies may have complex effects. Although the legislation that enshrines policies may have clearly stated goals, it may also have hidden or Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 4
MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS SENIORS CHARITY 2009 unstated goals. Social policies and programs as well may have unintended consequences, may fail to achieve their goals, and may even have contradictory goals and effects.
SENIORS 2009
Government Services Fail General [2/2]

Welfare proves that government services fail Tanner, 96 Director of Health and Welfare Studies at the Cato Institute and Widely Published Author and Expert on Welfare and Private Charities (Michael, Replacing Welfare, Cato Policy Report, November/December 1996, Excerpt from The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in the Civil Society, Online at the Cato Institute, //MDP)
Welfare may have started with the best of intentions , but it has clearly failed. It has failed to meet its stated goal of reducing poverty . But its real failure is even more disastrous. Welfare has torn apart the social fabric of our society . Everyone is worse off. The poor are dehumanized, seduced into a system from which it is terribly difficult to escape. Teenage girls give birth to children they will never be able to support . The work ethic is eroded. Crime rates soar. Such is the legacy of welfare . Instead of "reforming" failed programs, we should eliminate the entire social welfare system for individuals able to work . That means eliminating not just AFDC but also food stamps , subsidized housing, and all the rest. Individuals unwilling to support themselves through the job market should have to fall back on the resources of family, church, community, or private charity. As both a practical matter
Eliminating the Welfare State and a question of fairness, no child currently on welfare should be thrown off. However, a date should be set (for symbolic reasons, I like nine months and one day from now), after which no one new would be allowed into the welfare system. There are two distinct populations of welfare recipients. Those who currently use the system as a temporary safety net will be out of the system relatively soon. Immediately ending their eligibility would have only a minor impact on the system but would risk flooding the job market and private charities without allowing for a transition. There are serious problems with expecting hardcore, long-term welfare recipients to be able to find sufficient employment to support themselves and their families. When we established the incentives of the current system, we may have made a Faustian bargain with those recipients. Now it may be too late to change the rules of the game. We should do whatever we can to move those people out of the system but recognize that success may be limited. It is far more important to prevent anyone new from becoming trapped in the system. That will be possible only if the trap is no longer there. What would happen to the poor if welfare were eliminated? First,
without the incentives of the welfare state , fewer people would be poor. For one thing, there would probably be far fewer children born into poverty . The availability of welfare leads to an increase in
out-of-wedlock births, and giving birth out of wedlock leads to poverty. If welfare were eliminated, the number of out-ofwedlock births would almost certainly decline. How much is a matter of conjecture. Some social scientists suggest as little as 15 to 20 percent; others say as much as 50 percent. Whatever the number, it would be smaller. In addition, some poor women who did still bear children out of wedlock would put the children up for adoption. The civil society should encourage that by eliminating the present regulatory and bureaucratic barriers to adoption. Other unmarried women who gave birth would not be able to afford to live independently; they would choose to live with their families or with their boyfriends. Some might even
Poor people would also be more likely to go to work , starting to climb the ladder that will lead out of poverty . A General Accounting Office report on women
choose to marry the fathers of their children.
who lost their welfare benefits after the Reagan administration tightened eligibility requirements in 1981 found that, on average, the women increased the number of hours they worked and their hourly wage and had a significantly higher overall earned income. Two years after losing their eligibility, a significant minority of the women (43 percent in Boston, for example) had incomes as high as or higher than they did while receiving benefits. Similarly, in 1991 Michigan abolished its General Assistance program, which provided cash assistance for poor adults without children. Two years later, a survey for the University of Michigan found that 36.7 percent of those people were working in the month before the survey. Of those with at least a high school education, 45.6 percent were working. Two-thirds of former General Assistance recipients, regardless of
It is important to recognize that job opportunities do exist for individuals willing to accept them . That can be seen in the experience of
education, had held a job at some point during the two years before the survey. unskilled immigrants who enter this country with disadvantages at least as significant as those of welfare recipients. Many have less schooling than the average welfare recipient and many cannot even speak English. Yet the vast majority find jobs, and most eventually prosper. Of course, it may be necessary for people to move where the jobs are. In some ways, the availability of welfare disrupts normal labor migration patterns by allowing people to remain in areas with low employment. If welfare had been in place at the beginning of the century, the great migration of black sharecroppers and farm workers from southern farms to northern factories would never have taken place.
People forced to rely on themselves will find a variety of ways to get out of poverty . Richard Vedder and Lowell Gallaway of Ohio University examined
the movement of poor individuals out of poverty. They found that 18.3 percent of poor people receiving welfare moved out of poverty within one year. However, 45 percent of poor people who did not receive welfare were able to escape poverty. Even many liberals understand that without welfare many poor people would find other options. As Gary Burtless of the Brookings Institution says, "My guess is that if welfare recipients realize their benefits are going to stop . . . it will cause them to search much, much harder for alternatives." Of course, many people will still need help. As the Bible says, "The poor always you will

have with you." The civil society will not turn its back on those people. Instead, they will be helped through a newly invigorated system of private charity.
SENIORS 2009
SENIORS 2009
Government Services Fail - Mistrust

Citizens dont trust government social services- only individual action can stop poverty- this is a moral obligation Associated Content News 07 [news service, Mistakes in Our Government Failed Policies Lead to Mistrust in American Ethics, November 19,
http://www.associatedcontent.com/article/444881/mistakes_in_our_government_failed_policies_pg3.html?cat=9]
There is no resolve about poverty and Social Services across America-the dramatization of our government has made the educated person to indulge in the truth of our depressed nation. American people are not foolish-nor oblivious to what is happening to our economy, and
are very concerned with the lack of effort to correct these pressing issues.
We may possibly need to modify our present Government standards, maybe the working class should march to Washington DC to bolster and voice all of our unsolved rights. Our predecessors were not afraid or intimidated by our government; everything that was
done was inspired by unconscious courage that displayed a rare mix of bravery and honor. The demographics of poverty and despair are wide felt throughout the nation.
As a nation-we should defy anything that subjects us to conformity, never should we get complacent in your living arrangement-our rights are indelible. There are certain rights we need to stand and battle for, many US citizens are wary of our government policies at hand-traces of our past history politics have subjected us to falsehood and ecological inequality.
In closing-Angrily we face the sun, our heartbeats are unclothed-raging upon the successive predator-we need not defy the day of becoming, our citizenship bears the burden of our actions and defiance in the face of diversity.
SENIORS 2009
Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [1/3]

The United States federal government should establish a dollar-for-dollar tax credit for any charitable donations directed at _____________________________. Private sector charity should replace failed social services. Government intervention crowds out private sector charities that better solve the case any permutation fails. Lingle, 07 Writer and Analyst for The Freeman The flagship publican of the Foundation for Economic Education (Christopher, Casualties of the War on Poverty, December 2007, Volume: 57, Issue: 10, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/casualties-of-the-war-on-poverty, //MDP)
But relative poverty can never be fully resolved without implementing an incentive-destroying policy of equal income regardless of effort or talent. History provides little evidence that forced income redistribution
through taxation can alleviate mass poverty . And so it is that despite massive amounts of spending by governments, poverty remains at a high rate in the United States. Or perhaps it is better said that public-sector welfare and other aid programs are causing poverty since the poor become dependent on handouts instead of looking for work or starting a business . (See Charles Johnsons article on page 12 to understand why the poor have trouble starting businesses.) Government officials who spend so much of other peoples money have weak incentives to see that it is spent well . Indeed, the so-called war on poverty has been no more effective than the war on drugs and probably less so than the war in Iraq. Perhaps a better response to poverty would be to reduce the reliance on governments. The slack could be made up by elements of civil society, such as private charities, that are more effective than welfare programs in serving the poor. As it is, 85 million American households give a total of $250 billion to charities each year. Interestingly, private Americans gave more to the victims of the Asian tsunami than the federal government did. Giving is not limited to the very rich. The working poor give as large a percentage of their incomes as do the rich and a lot more than does the American middle class. Were it not for so many public policies that undermine private giving, this amount would almost certainly be larger. For example, private foundations face punitive regulation, and government subsidies to nonprofits crowd out charity. On the one hand, subsidies reduce the incentive for those groups to seek voluntary contributions , and on the other they reduce the incentive for individuals to donate since they already gave at the office when taxes were withheld from their paychecks . Moreover, many policies reduce disposable incomes of major donors . It is important to know what lies behind the data on the extent of poverty and giving in America . It is wrong to think that Americans are shirking their obligations to needy neighbors or that the U.S. government should do more.
SENIORS 2009

A dollar for dollar tax credit makes charities more robust only the CP saves civic engagement Barwick, 98 Research Associate at the Commonwealth Foundation A Public Policy Research Institute in Harrisburg (Peter S., Author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyrevie w/3566647.html, //MDP)
Welfare reform, by shattering the notion of goveernment-funded dependency, represents one of conservatisms great victories in recent years. It also presents one of the movements toughest challenges: If government is not to be the safety net of first resort, then what is? If charities and other private agencies are the alternative to the failed welfare state, then how can we effectively shift resources in their direction? Charity tax credits are emerging as one of the most important--and most hotly debated--responses to that question. Most versions give either a partial or a full tax credit for donations to organizations whose primary purpose is fighting poverty. Unlike a deduction, the credit would be applied directly against a persons tax liability. The Renewal Alliance, a caucus of 30 members of Congress committed to the promotion of civil society, has chosen a charity tax credit sponsored by Senator Dan Coats and Representative John Kasich as one of its three principal legislative priorities for 1998. The Coats-Kasich bill would provide a credit of up to $500 per family at a cost to the Treasury of $23 billion over five years, according to the Wall Street Journal. Apart from the question of how to pay
for it, the charity tax credit has been criticized by a number of conservatives who fear that it will skew charitable giving toward direct provision of services rather than character-building institutions, and that it will amount to a taxpayer subsidy of public-policy advocacy by (mostly left-wing) charities. In Pennsylvania, a bill was recently introduced to establish a state-level version of the tax credit concept. Drafted with help from the Commonwealth Foundation, the legislation offers a 50 percent credit for donations to charities that directly help the poor. It also tries to address many concerns of conservative critics. The credits advocates often urge that charitable tax credits be financed by dollar-for-dollar reductions in government welfare spending--thus directly transferring resources and responsibility for poverty-fighting from the state to civil society. However, the Pennsylvania proposal for a charity tax credit does not include commensurate reductions in government spending. Everyone agrees with the ultimate objective: to encourage taxpayers to become more generous and more savvy in their charitable giving. Will the charity tax credit become the legislative fulcrum on which the culture of caregiving in America will be shifted? Or will it play into statist assumptions about government and civil society? The recent dramatic decline in the nations welfare rolls is attributable in large part to the practical and psychological impact of reforms intended to create a more "conservative" welfare bureaucracy: expanded work requirements, eligibility restrictions, and a lifetime limit on benefits. These long-needed reforms are changing the culture of welfare from one of entitlement to one of reciprocity and individual responsibility. Its time to take the next step. Conservatives should use the momentum generated by recent successes to move toward the ultimate goal of reform:
The best way to recover the role of private charity is through a charity tax credit, implemented initially at the state level. Its aim is simple: to give citizens greater control over their tax dollars by allowing them to claim a credit against their personal income-tax liability for contributions made to charitable organizations that assist the poor. The ideal plan is a charity tax credit that is budget-neutral--that is, one in which public spending is reduced by the same amount credited to taxpayers. This would ensure that resources are transferred from ineffective government programs to private charities that successfully reclaim lives. Such a credit would help to revive volunteerism and a sense of civic responsibility in American society by reminding people that providing for the poor is the responsibility, not of government, but of individuals in their local communities. The credit would also have a beneficial impact on private charity. By encouraging greater reliance on individual contributions, it would stimulate a "market" in charitable giving. This would strengthen groups that help the poor effectively while eliminating or reforming those that do not. Beyond its practical benefits, a charity tax credit would address what is perhaps the fundamental weakness of the conservative movement: its inability to articulate a vision of society that speaks to the sense of moral obligation people feel for the less fortunate. The goal is not simply a warmed-over version of the statist forms of "compassion" favored by liberals. Rather, the credit would help address the needs of the poor in a way that is consistent with the ideal of limited government and with the American tradition of active reliance upon the institutions of civil society . Another advantage of a charity tax credit is that it will target assistance to those most directly affected by welfare reform. So far, caseload reduction has primarily involved those recipients easiest to employ. The real test will come over the next several years as work deadlines and lifetime limits on assistance kick in for the rest. If substantial suffering results, pressure will build to abandon these policies. A charity tax credit will help prevent this outcome and allow us to implement welfare reform as it was originally conceived.
shifting responsibility and resources from the welfare state to privately funded, local charities.
10
SENIORS 2009

A loss of civic engagement causes extinction eliminates the ability to solve every global challenge Boggs 97 Professor of Social Sciences at the University of Los Angeles (Carl, The Great Retreat, Theory and Society 26.6, jstor, //MDP)
The false sense of empowerment that comes with such mesmerizing impulses is accompanied by a loss of public engagement , an erosion of citizenship and a depleted capacity of individuals in large groups to work for social change. As this ideological quagmire worsens, urgent problems that are destroying the fabric of American society will go unsolved perhaps even unrecognized only to fester more ominously into the future. And such problems (ecological crisis, poverty, urban decay, spread of infectious diseases, technological displacement of workers) cannot be understood outside the larger social and global context of internationalized markets, finance, and communications. Paradoxically, the widespread retreat from politics, often inspired by localist sentiment, comes at a time when agendas that ignore or sidestep these global realities will, more than ever, be reduced to impotence.
In his commentary on the state of citizenship today, Wolin refers to the increasing sublimation and dilution of politics, as larger numbers of people turn away from public concerns toward private ones. By diluting the life of common involvements, we negate the very idea of politics as a source of public ideals and visions.74 In the meantime, the fate of the world
hangs in the balance. The unyielding truth is that, even as the ethos of anti-politics becomes more compelling and
even fashionable in the United States, it is the vagaries of political power that will continue to decide the fate of human societies. This last point demands further elaboration. The shrinkage of politics hardly means that
corporate colonization will be less of a reality , that social hierarchies will somehow disappear, or that gigantic state and military structures will lose their hold over people's lives. Far from it: the space abdicated by a broad citizenry, well-informed and ready to participate at many levels, can in fact be filled by authoritarian and reactionary elites an
already familiar dynamic in many lesserdeveloped countries. The fragmentation and chaos of a Hobbesian world, not very far removed from the rampant individualism, social Darwinism, and civic violence that have been so much a part of the American landscape, could be the prelude to a powerful Leviathan designed to impose order in the face of disunity and atomized retreat. In this way the eclipse of politics might set the stage for a reassertion of politics in more
virulent guise
or it might help further rationalize the existing power structure. In either case, the state would likely become what Hobbes anticipated: the embodiment of those universal, collective interests that had vanished from civil society.75
11
SENIORS 2009
Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [1/3]

Government subsidies and funding for social services cause a crowd out of private charities, which are comparatively more effective. The impact is the total elimination of civic engagement. Messmore, 09 William E. Simon Fellow in Religion and a Free Society in the Richard and Helen DeVos Center for Religion and Civil Society at The Heritage Foundation (Ryan, Proposed Decrease in Charitable Tax Deduction Crowds Out Civil Society, April 10, 2009, Backgrounder #2258, Accessed Via the Heritage Foundation, //MDP)
In addition to receiving less money from wealthy donors , charitable organizations could face a more subtle yet significant challenge under the Obama plan : Government could crowd them out of social welfare provision . This phenomenon occurs when government claims increasing responsibility for tasks traditionally performed by civil society and absorbs a larger percentage of the resources dedicated to carrying out those tasks. Studies have shown that government spending on charitable causes leads people to give less to charity. According to Arthur Brooks of the American Enterprise Institute , a dollar in government spending on nonprofit activities displaces up to 50 cents in private giving .[6] One study, for example, reveals that: Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal programs sharply reduced churches' charitable giving to the poor : The researchers noticed a 30 percent drop in church-based charity from 1933 through 1939, as federal spending to aid the needy went from zero to more than 4 percent of GDP. The researchers concluded that government funds were directly responsible for nearly all the drop in private church charity .[7] This "crowding out" effect does not occur only when government actually spends money on social programs for the poor. Brooks found that merely endorsing such policies simply believing that government should move in that directiondisplaces giving: The evidence...connects charity with beliefs, not policies. The data tell us that it matters little whether the government is actually redistributing income and lessening inequality what appears to displace charity is a person's support for these policies.[8] Such evidence demonstrates the subtle but significant power that policy proposals exert on citi zens' assumptions, expectations, and actions. Shifting Focus President Obama defends his proposal as a way of "equalizing" tax breaks for donors in different tax
Crowding Out Civil Society brackets. In his news conference on March 24, 2009, he said it would not be fair to allow wealthy donors to write off more than can be written off by lower-income or middle-income donors who give the same amount: "[U]ltimately, if we're going to tackle the serious problems that we've got, then in some cases those who are more fortunate are going to have to pay a little bit more."[9] However, the President ignores the fact that the less than 5 percent of workers who earn more than $250,000 annually pay 48 percent of all federal income taxes.[10] That they may use the deduction to redirect a portion of this to private charities does not change the simple fact that the wealthy shoulder a larger burden for social welfare under the present tax system. President Obama's statement about the "more fortunate" paying more is not the issue because they already pay more. The point, rather, is that he seems to believe that the federal bureaucracy can deploy the resources of the wealthy more effec tively than nonprofit civil society organizations can. Furthermore, the concern for equalizing tax breaks for donors risks distracting attention from President Obama's stated concern for helping "folks who have fallen on very hard times."[11] The President admits that his plan will reduce charitable giving. Ironically, however, he seems to be letting his desire to equalize differences among donors undercut his desire to help the poor. To remain consistent with his rhetoric, he should instead create conditions in which individuals can maximize their voluntary donations to charity, especially in tough economic conditions. The Wrong Message Perhaps most important, President Obama's proposal sends the wrong
message about the value of civil society and the role of government . Choosing to raise taxes while
reducing charitable deductions for high-income earners indicates that the President thinks government can best determine how to dis tribute people's money. In their influential book To Empower People, Peter Berger and the late Richard John
Neuhaus describe the importance of "mediating institutions" to a healthy democratic society. Such institutions include the family, churches, and nonprofit organizations, which stand between citizens and the large institutions of public life .[12] Mediating institutions are essential for generating and maintaining the operative values of American society . They are also well equipped to provide a helping hand to people in the context of face-to-face
Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 12
SENIORS 2009
relationships. They have intimate knowledge of those in need, and they understand social problems in up-close-andpersonal ways. Driven by deep convictions and compassion , such organizations can provide loving forms of assistance and care that government programs cannot offer , and often for less money. Smaller and more flexible than most government bureaucracies, local church congregations and charities can also spawn creative social innovations that benefit those in need. Berger and Neuhaus argue that public policy should "cease and desist from damaging mediating structures."[13] More than that, public policy should protect mediating institutions and , where possible without co-opting them , empower them in their efforts to promote the common good. The tax plan in President Obama's budget blue print runs counter to the basic philosophy under lying
these propositions. The President's proposal conveys the belief that government can decide bet ter than individuals how their dollars should be spent. It also implies that the state should assume responsibility for people's needs even at the expense of vital mediating institutions. Ultimately, it communicates the notion that America is better off with expansive and intrusive government than it is with limited government.
13
SENIORS 2009

Government social service subsidies cause a complete charitable crowd out Garrett, 09 Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis **Department of Economics at St. Marys College of Maryland (Thomas A. and Russell M., Government growth and private contributions to charity, http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-012.pdf, //MDP)
Economists have developed several theories as to why individuals give to charity (see Eckel et al. 2005 and Andreoni 1989, 1990, 2006). The theory of perfect altruism assumes that donors are concerned with the total amount of funds that a charity receives. If the charity receives funding from other sources, including governments, the donor will reduce his contribution by that amount . The implication is that government spending completely crowds out charitable giving if the appropriate funding level in the eyes of the donor is met . Perfect altruism is hypothesized to result in full crowding out regardless of whether or not fiscal illusion is present (Eckel et al.
2005). Under the warm glow theory of giving, donors receive utility from the act of giving (Andreoni 1990). Donors prefer that gifts are made by themselves rather than others, and they consequently view a $1 contribution by themselves as different from a$1 increase in government spending on the charity. The implication of the warm glowt heory under the assumptions of fiscal illusion and no wealth effects on donors (Andreoni1989) is that government spending will result in partial or no crowding out A final reason for giving is prestige (Glazer and Konrad 1996). This theory ofgiving suggests it is a signal of donors wealth when their names and contributions arepublished. Thus, charities can increase donations by reporting donors names and contribution amounts. The prestige theory of giving implies government spending will have no effect on contributions absent any wealth effects (Andreoni 1989). Although most of the hypothesized reasons for charitable giving
suggest crowding out, there are also several potential reasons why government spending may crowd in private contributions (see Brooks 2000a). The first reason is that some government grants are in the form of matching funds, so every dollar of voluntary donations is matched by a government contribution of one dollar . This effectively lowers the price of charitable giving.
Second, some donors may interpret a government grant to a charity as proof of quality or reputability. Here a certain charity may be viewed by donors as high quality since it receives government funding and is thus worthy of donation.
Cointegration and grander causality tests prove the crowd out link Garrett, 09 Research Division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis **Department of Economics at St. Marys College of Maryland (Thomas A. and Russell M., Government growth and private contributions to charity, http://research.stlouisfed.org/wp/2007/2007-012.pdf, //MDP)
This paper examined the short-run and long-run relationship between various categories of government spending and charitable contributions over the period 1965 to 2003, a period marked by rapid growth in federal and state government
Cointegration tests revealed that a significant long-run and negative relationship does indeed exist between charitable giving and government spending , most notably total giving and education giving. The relationship is less than one-for-one, thus suggesting partial crowding out. Granger causality tests revealed increases in state and local government welfare and education spending do reduce charitable giving to these respective categories . To summarize the results, we find limited evidence of crowding-out. Historically, state and local government revenue
spending.
to higher education has accounted for roughly 30 percent of higher education revenues whereas federal government revenues to higher education hasaccounted for about 14 percent (see Digest of Education Statistics 2006, Table 335).
14
SENIORS 2009

Providing Charity Tax Credits and Government Welfare programs simultaneously would be colossal failurethe crowding out effect would prevent private spending from aiding poverty Matthews, 98 (Matthews Jr., Merrill, vice president of domestic policy for the National Center for Policy Analysis, a nonpartisan, nonprofit public-policy research institute based in Dallas, Texas, Charity Tax CreditsAnd Debits January and February 1998 < http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html>)
The 1996 welfare legislation took reform a huge step forward by giving states more control over their welfare programs. Now we should consider shifting control to taxpayers themselves with the charity tax credit. The charity tax credit would permit individual taxpayers to allocate a portion of their welfare tax dollars to any qualified charity and receive a tax credit for that contribution. Depending on the proposal, the tax credit would refund part or all of each dollar donated. Though the charity tax credit proposal is still being considered by Congress, the states are also beginning to look at variations of the proposal. It may well be that the states will adopt the approach first. Unfortunately, the proposal has prompted a number of criticisms, primarily from those who benefit financially from the current system. However, critics seem either to misunderstand how the proposal would work or fear letting charities compete for welfare dollars. Among their arguments: If people were able to direct their tax
dollars to private charities, they would scale back their overall commitment to aiding the poor. In fact, just the opposite would likely occur. Most economists recognize what is called the "crowding out" effect: When government spending increases, private spending declines. In a 1984 article in the Journal of Political Economy, Russell Roberts found that private relief
expenditures rose steadily in the United States until 1932, and declined steadily thereafter as government welfare spending rose. An article in the National Tax Journal that same year found that cuts in government spending resulted in increased interest in private contributions. Thus it is entirely possible that reducing government welfare spending through a tax credit for charitable giving might result in an increase in total spending on the needy. Private-sector charities are too small to handle the huge number of welfare recipients. The charity tax credit would create a dynamic welfare system in which taxpayers assess
each charitys record of meeting the needs of the poor. To the extent that taxpayers direct tax dollars to private-sector charities, those organizations would have the funds to grow and meet the needs of more people. The wealthy prefer to help those closest to them, so the poor living in the inner cities or other places far from the wealthy would receive very little help. Extensive research done on this issue--such as Charles T. Clotfelters Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?--found that there is no evidence that wealthier people give disproportionately to organizations that are closer to or primarily benefit upper-income families. Furthermore, the premise of this criticism is that only wealthy people would get a tax credit. However, since the tax credit would be extended to everyone who pays taxes, many lower and middle-income working families who live near poor communities in need of help would be able to participate. In addition, private-sector charities seeking to inform people about their missions would reach out to groups such as schools and churches whose membership often encompasses a wide range of incomes. Fraud would increase under a decentralized system. Its hard to imagine fraud thriving any more than under the old federal-state system. However, we could put safeguards into place. For example, existing IRS regulations governing nonprofit organizations prohibit the misuse of a charitable organization for personal or financial gain--and the charity tax credit would relax none of those restrictions. But the key to eliminating welfare fraud is to give individuals rather than bureaucrats an incentive to police the system by determining which charities provide the best value for their money. If lifting the poor out of poverty is the goal, then government welfare programs have been a colossal failure. According to the Congressional Research Service, this country has spent more than $5 trillion on public welfare programs since 1960, yet the poor as a percentage of the total population has slightly increased, to about 15 percent. It is time to give private-sector charities a chance by giving taxpayers a choice. The charity tax credit would give them the ability to fund those charities they think are
doing an effective job.
15
SENIORS 2009
Key to Civil Society 2NC [1/3]

Government social services collapse civil society only private charity can invigorate civil society Tanner, 96 Director of Health and Welfare Studies at the Cato Institute and Widely Published Author and Expert on Welfare and Private Charities (Michael, Replacing Welfare, Cato Policy Report, November/December 1996, Excerpt from The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in the Civil Society, Online at the Cato Institute, //MDP)
Finally, and perhaps most important, private charity requires a different attitude on the part of both recipients and donors. For recipients, private charity is not an entitlement but a gift carrying reciprocal obligations. As Father Robert Sirico of the Acton Institute describes it, "An impersonal check given without any expectations for responsible behavior leads to a damaged sense of self-worth. The beauty of local [private charitable] efforts to help the needy is that . . . they make the individual receiving
Private charity demands that donors become directly involved. Former Yale political science professor James Payne notes how little citizen involvement there is in government charity: We know now that in most cases of government policy making, decisions are not made according to the democratic ideal of control by ordinary citizens . Policy is made by elites, through special interest politics, bureaucratic pressures, and legislative manipulations. Insiders decide what happens, shaping the outcome according to their own preferences and their political pull . The citizens are simply bystanders. Private charity, in contrast, is based on "having individuals vote with their own time, money, and energy." There is no compassion in spending someone else's money-the aid realize that he must work to live up to the expectations of those helping him out." even for a good cause. True compassion means giving of yourself. As historian Gertrude Himmelfarb puts it, "Compassion is a moral sentiment, not a political principle."
Welfare allows individuals to escape their obligation to be truly charitable. As Robert Thompson of the University of Pennsylvania said a century ago, government charity is a "rough contrivance to lift from the social conscience a burden that should not be either lifted or lightened in that way ." Civil Society That is the essence of the civil society . When George
Washington warned that "government is not reason, it is not eloquence--it is force," he was making an important distinction.
Government relies on force and coercion to achieve its objectives , including charity. In contrast, the civil society relies on persuasion--reason and eloquence--to motivate voluntary giving. In the civil society people give because they are committed to helping , because they believe in what they are doing. Thus private charity is ennobling of everyone involved , both those who give and those who receive. Government welfare is ennobling of no one . Alexis de Tocqueville recognized that 150 years ago. Calling for the abolition of public relief , Tocqueville lauded private charity for establishing a "moral tie" between giver and receiver. In contrast, impersonal government relief destroys any sense of morality. The donor (read taxpayer) resents his involuntary contribution, while the recipient feels no gratitude for what he receives and inevitably believes that what he receives is insufficient.
Robust private charity is essential to civil society De Vous, 03 Public Policy Manager of the Acton Institute (Phillip W., What Gives? The Possibilities of Private Charity, ttp://www.acton.org/commentary/commentary_144.php, //MDP)
Recognizing and incentivizing the power of private charity is absolutely essential in encouraging civil society solutions to our nation's social ills . Back in April, one step in this direction was
the passage of the CARE Act in the United States Senate. The positive--though paltry--measures proposed in this legislation would accomplish a great deal in bolstering charitable giving through the use of tax incentives. The Senate legislation allows non-itemizing taxpayers to take deductions for donations to charity and would allow older Americans to take a deduction for charitable gifts made from their retirement accounts. Currently, the measure is stalled in the House of Representatives over a controversial provision that would force charitable foundations to spend more of their assets on an annual basis. Given the
16
SENIORS 2009
enthusiasm that the House leadership has shown in the past for incentivizing the funding entities of civil society, it remains unclear why they would needlessly attempt to micromanage an important source of private sector charity. Congressional intransigence on this matter could lead to harmful effects for philanthropy in 2003. Despite more than two years
of
negative economic news, American charitable giving is at record levels, consisting of more than 2% of the gross domestic product of the United States . It is now time for leaders at all levels to reject the selfishness thesis that permits only the paltriest incentives for private charity. Adopting a pro-growth agenda for private charity will ensure, even in bad economic times, that individual generosity will remain a growing and vibrant sector of the U.S. economy .
17
SENIORS 2009

Private charities are crucial to a robust civil society Tanner, 03 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Michael, The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society, p. 10-11)
the way in which they are decided will either improve or undercut PRWORA. Yet, in the end, this is not the debate that we should be having. Rather than quibbling over the details of reform legislation, we should be asking how we can best create a country where every American can reach his or her full potential, where as few people as possible live in poverty, and where no one must go without the basic necessities of life. This is not a question of funding levels, work requirements, time limits, or child-care subsidies. Rather, it is a question of the fundamental role of government about the balance between government and civil society. The answer to poverty does not lie with government. If we are to be successful in fighting poverty and creating opportunity for all Americans, we must think outside the box of government programs no matter how well intentioned, no matter how efficiently operated. We must develop a new paradigm, based not on government and political society but on civil society. Civil society is that sphere of human behavior that lies outside of government or political society. It does not rely on force or coercion to achieve its goals; it relies on voluntary cooperation and persuasion . It provides the widest possible latitude for people to live their lives without interference, so long as they do not harm others. Civil society would not use government either to redistribute wealth or to shape poor peoples' behavior. Neither would it be indifferent to the plight of the poor. It would, in fact, unleash our natural tendencies toward generosity and compassion . Of course, civil society would stress selfreliance and individual initiative, but it would also provide a vigorous network of private, localized, nonbureaucratic charities that were far more capable than government of actually helping those in need. In the coming pages I will examine the American welfare system, looking at how we changed from a system that combined small, local welfare programs with private charities and civic and fraternal organizations to today's massive welfare state . I will explore the problems
Those are all important issues, and that the welfare state has caused: family disintegration, a diminution of the work ethic, crime, and increased poverty. I will show that, as a practical matter,
welfare can never be reformed enough to eliminate its destructiveness and perverse incentives. Rather than waste more timeand more liveson further tinkering, we should end government welfare once and for all. That step alone would reduce poverty in America. Fewer children would be born to poor single mothers unable to care for them. More poor people would find the road out of poverty through work and education .
Charities are key to civic empowerment by demanding donors become directly involved, which is key to the democratic ideal Tanner, 03 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Michael, The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society, p. 10-11)
Private efforts have been much more successful than the federal government's failed attempt at charity. America is the most generous nation on earth. Americans already contribute more than $212 billion annually to charity . 33 In fact, more than 85 percent of all adult Americans make some charitable contribution each year . 34 In addition, about half of all American adults perform volunteer work; more than 15.5 billion hours were worked in 2000 . 35 Putting a dollar value to that volunteer work would add another $239 billion in charity . 36 Volunteer work and cash donations combined bring American charitable contributions to more than $450 billion per year, not including the countless dollars and time given informally to family members, neighbors, and others outside the formal charity system .

Finally, and perhaps most important,
SENIORS 2009
private charity requires a different attitude on the part of both recipients and donors. For recipients, private charity is not an entitlement but a gift carrying reciprocal obligations. As Father Robert Sirico of the Acton Institute says: An impersonal check given without any
expectations for responsible behavior leads to a damaged sense of self-worth. The beauty of local [private charitable] efforts to help the needy is that . . . they make the individual receiving the aid realize that he must work to
live up to the expectations of those helping him out . 47 Private charity demands that donors become directly involved. Former Yale University political science professor James Payne notes how little citizen involvement there is in government charity : We know now that in most cases of government policy making, decisions are not made according to the democratic ideal of control by ordinary citizens. Policy is made by elites, through special interest politics, bureaucratic pressures, and legislative
manipulations. Insiders decide what happens shaping the outcome according to their own preferences and their political pull.
19
SENIORS 2009

Private charity is key to civil society allows direct empowerment on the citizens and an important check on coercive government policies Tanner, 03 Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute (Michael, The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society, p. 97-98)
Private efforts have been much more successful than the federal government's failed attempt at charity. America is the most generous nation on earth. Americans already contribute more than $212 billion annually to charity . 33 In fact, more than 85 percent of all adult Americans make some charitable contribution each year . 34 In addition, about half of all American adults perform volunteer work; more than 15.5 billion hours were worked in 2000. 35 Putting a dollar value to that volunteer work would add another $239 billion in charity . 36 Volunteer work and cash donations combined bring American charitable contributions to more than $450 billion per year, not including the countless dollars and time given informally to family members, neighbors, and others outside the formal charity system . There is no compassion in spending someone else's moneyeven for a good cause. True compassion means giving of yourself. As historian and social commentator Gertrude Himmelfarb puts it, Compassion is a moral sentiment, not a political principle. 51 Welfare allows individuals to escape their obligation to be truly charitable . As Robert Thompson of the University of Pennsylvania said a century ago, government charity is a rough contrivance to lift from the social conscience a burden that should not be either lifted or lightened in that way . 52 That is the essence of civil society. George Washington is reported to have said that government is not reason, it is not eloquence it is force. He was making an important distinction. Government relies on force and coercion to achieve its objectives, including charity. In contrast, civil society relies on persuasion reason and eloquence to motivate voluntary giving. In civil society people give because they are committed to helping, because they believe in what they are doing. Thus private charity ennobles everyone involved, both those who give and those who receive. Government welfare ennobles no one. Alexis de
Tocqueville recognized that 150 years ago. Calling for the abolition of public relief, Tocqueville lauded private charity for establishing a moral tie between giver and receiver. In contrast,
impersonal government relief destroys any sense of morality. The donor (read taxpayer) resents his involuntary contribution, while the recipient feels no gratitude for what he receives and inevitably believes that what he receives is insufficient. 53
Inducing Charity would galvanize future American civic responsibility and giving Barwick 98 (Peter S. Barwick, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit.et al. Charity Tax Credits and Debits <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html )
The best way to recover the role of private charity is through a charity tax credit, implemented initially at the state level. Its aim is simple: to give citizens greater control over their tax dollars by allowing them to claim a credit against their personal income-tax liability for contributions made to charitable organizations that assist the poor . The ideal plan is a charity tax credit
that is budget-neutral--that is, one in which public spending is reduced by the same amount credited to taxpayers. This would ensure that resources are transferred from ineffective government programs to private charities that successfully reclaim lives. Such a credit would help to revive volunteerism and a sense of civic responsibility in American society by reminding
people that providing for the poor is the responsibility, not of government, but of individuals in their local communities. The credit would also have a beneficial impact on private charity. By encouraging greater reliance on individual contributions, it Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 20
MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS SENIORS CHARITY 2009 would stimulate a "market" in charitable giving. This would strengthen groups that help the poor effectively while eliminating or reforming those that do not.
21
SENIORS 2009
Civic Engagement Good Racism

A lack of democratic participation leads to inequality and racism Verba et al, 95 Professor at UC Berkeley (Sidney, Carl H. Pforzheimer, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics, Harvard University Press, p. 1-2, //MDP)
No democratic nationcertainly not the United Stateslives up to the ideal of participatory equality. Some citizens are active: they vote or engage in more demanding forms of participation. Others are not. In fact, a majority of Americans undertake no other political activity aside from going to
the polls. In addition, those who do take part are in critical ways not representative of the citizenry as a whole. They differ in their social characteristics and in their preferences, needs, and priorities. Citizen activists tend to be drawn
disproportionately from more advantaged groupsto be well-educated and well-heeled and to be White and male. In consequence, the voice of the people as expressed through participation comes from a limited and unrepresentative set of citizens. The democratic ideal may be equal consideration for the needs and preferences of all, but the reality of participation is quite different. This book is about political participation in the United States. It is about whose voice
is heard. And it is about the process that amplifies the voice of some citizens and mutes the voice of others by differentially endowing citizens with the motivation and capacity to be active, and with access to the recruitment networks through which requests for participation are channeled. Voice and Equality provides a comprehensive account of the participatory process in the United States.>
Racism risks extinction Barndt, 91 Pastor and Co-director of Crossroads Ministry working to dismantle racism (Joseph, Dismantling Racism: The Continuing Challenge to White America 155-6, //MDP)
To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty,
the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom . Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cul tural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down, once and for all, the walls of racism. The danger point of self-destruction seems to be drawing ever more near . The results of centuries of national and worldwide conquest and colonialism, of military buildups and violent aggres sion, of overconsumption and environmental destruction may be reaching a point of no return . A small and predominantly white minority of the global population derives its power and privilege from the sufferings of the vast majority of peoples of color. For the sake of the world and ourselves, we dare not allow it to continue .
subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust;
22
SENIORS 2009
Civic Engagement Good Tyranny

Reversing the decline in voluntarism is critical to the growth of civil society and to check tyranny Smith 99 Public Affairs Professor at University of Washington (Steven, 62 Law & Contemp. Prob. 169, //MDP)
Putnam argues persuasively for more voluntarism for another reason. n2 He observes that participation in voluntary groups and associations such as the Kiwanis Club, the Girl Scouts, and bowling leagues has fallen significantly in the post-war era. In his view, voluntary organizations with a high degree of interpersonal contact are critical to building a vibrant civil society . Thus, more voluntarism, especially in organizations where a person can build a long-term relationship with others in the community, should be very beneficial for society as a whole. Voluntarism can create social capital - that is, social networks of trust and cooperation - that can then promote greater political involvement and citizen participation in public affairs . The civic infrastructure, broadly defined, will be stronger. Other scholars supportive of voluntarism worry about threats to individual liberties and freedoms associated with the growth of the state. This perspective [*170] has a long tradition in the United States. Alexis de Tocqueville, writing in the 1830s, was particularly impressed with the penchant of Americans to join voluntary associations, which he regarded as essential to political pluralism and, relatedly, critical bulwarks against state repression and tyranny . n3 More recently, Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus echoed this theme in their 1977 book. n4 They argue that "voluntary associations are important laboratories of innovation" and help "sustain the expression of the rich pluralism of American life. " n5 They worry that America is headed in the direction of pluralism and reduced liberty due to the weakening of voluntary associations by the state. n6 Other scholars worry about a decline in participation in public affairs that threatens democracy and the accountability of government to its citizens . Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry Brady, in 1995, noted a marked drop in political participation, especially among lower-income individuals, producing a growing inequality in political participation . n7 Theda Skocpol worries that much of the growth in voluntary political organizations in recent years has been in advocacy organizations with few members who actually participate in the affairs of the organization. n8 For example, advocacy organizations such as the Sierra Club and National Abortion Rights Action League ("NARAL") are primarily staff-driven organizations where the only involvement of the members is to send money. There is little of the face-to-face interaction characteristic of associations such as the Parent Teacher Association ("PTA") or the Junior League. Skocpol argues that we need to recreate the broad cross-class alliances and associations typical of earlier eras in American politics, although she is doubtful of any immediate
Robert turnaround. n9
Tyranny risks incalculable death VanDeMark, 01 United States Naval Academy (Brain, November 578 Annals 186 l/n//MDP)
"The chief business of twentieth-century philosophy," wrote R. G. Colling-wood, "is to reckon with twentieth-century history." And what a bloody century it was--almost beyond imagination. The flower of a generation of European youth was wasted in the muddy trenches of Flanders during World War I. British and American bombing of Germany and Japanese cities during World War II led to the death of hundreds of thousands of noncombatants. The victims of Stalin's tyranny
numbered in the millions. The number of Mao's victims was greater. And Pol Pot killed a higher proportion of his own population than either Stalin or Mao . More recently, there was the terrible bloodbath in Rwanda. Yet even after taking stock of all of these brutalities, to ponder Hitler's campaign of genocide against the Jews of Europe is to look into the very
23
SENIORS 2009
heart of darkness. No explanation or apology is needed for giving the unprecedented inhumanity of the twentieth century a central place in recent history.
24
SENIORS 2009
Civic Engagement Good Democracy

Civic engagement is vital to democracy Watson, 04 Assistant Professor of sociology and gerontology coordinator @ Stephen F. Austin State University (J.B. Watson, A Justification of the Civic Engagement Model, p. 73-74, Service Learning: History, Theory, and Issues, //MDP)
The civic engagement of ordinary citizens with voluntary associations, social institutions, and government in local communities is a central feature of strong democracies . Further, a fundamental feature of democratic governmental structure is its relationship to civil society, defined as "voluntary social activity not compelled by the state" (Bahlmueller, 1997, p. 3). Through voluntary participation in civil society associations at the local and regional level, citizens pursue activities that potentially serve the public good. Through this rudimentary civic engagement, citizens learn the attitudes, habits, skills, and knowledge foundational to the democratic process-(Patrick, 1998). Unfortunately, in 1998 the National Commission on Civic Renewal (NCCR)
highlighted the declining quantity and quality of civic engagement at all levels of American life. A number of other studies concur on the decline of involvement in civic activities (Bahlmueller, 1997; McGrath, 2001; Putnam, 1995). This concern
about the nature and extent of civic engagement in the United States has impacted the debate on the proper role of higher education in a democracy . Higher education institutions, as transmitters of essential elements of the dominant culture, struggle with the development of mechanisms to socialize the next generation about democratic values. A national debate has emerged on the higher
education response to this perceived need for revitalizing constructive democratic engagement, building civil society, and increasing citizen participation in government at all levels. Colleges and universities have responded with
a number of civic engagement initiatives, including university-community partnerships, empirical studies of political engagement, community-based (collaborative) research, and the development of new (or expanded) service-learning programs (Jacoby 2003).
Democracy prevents extinction Diamond, 95 Senior Fellow Hoover Institute (Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s p. 6, //MDP)
in the coming years and decades. In the nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate . The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered . Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.
This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being former Yugoslavia
25
SENIORS 2009
Civic Engagement Good Environment

Civic engagement key to the environment Grant, 04 Department of Sociology (Don, Do Facilities with Distant Headquarters Pollute More? How Civic Engagement Conditions the Environmental Performance of Absentee Managed Plants Social Forces, November, projectmuse, //MDP)
Rather than presuming that absentee managed plants will or will not exploit communities and their habitats, literature on civil society suggests the conditions under which such plants might identify with local places and seek to preserve their physical integrity. This research stresses the ability of communities, as organizations, to address
problems, including those posed by "external" organizations . This literature has its origins in the
classical thought of Tocqueville ([1835] 1862), Durkheim ([1933] 1984) and the early Chicago school, as well as the recent writings of Dahl (1971), Key (1984), Bollen (1980), and especially Etzioni (1996) and Putnam (1993, 2000). According to these scholars, local institutions such as churches, associations, and so-called "third places" (barber shops, cafes, and other sites of informal public life) create community solidarity and serve as forums for civic engagement . In turn,
these institutions help root actors to places and enhance the local quality of life. Consistent with this logic, several studies document how residents and business leaders become integrated in communities through their participation in churches and volunteer associations (for a review of these studies, see Cassel 1999). Others report that in communities with more social capital, rates of poverty, unemployment, and crime tend to be lowe r (Tolbert, Lyson & Irwin 1998; Sampson &
Groves 1989; see also Green & Haines 2001). That civic engagement might mitigate the harmful social effects of absentee managed plants has been examined by Lyson and his colleagues. They find that in agriculture dependent counties dominated by absentee managed farms, community welfare is higher when residents are civically engaged (Lyson, Torres & Welsh 2001). In another study, they find that in counties with many absentee managed plants, rates of poverty and infant mortality are lower where civic engagement is high (Young & Lyson 1993). Going one step further, some scholars suggest
that civic engagement may also influence environmental outcomes . Mesch and Manor (1998), for example, argue that residents and business leaders develop an emotional bond with their neighborhood's physical environment as they invest more of themselves in local institutions. Scholars also document how civically engaged residents succeed in preserving their neighborhoods' physical
beauty (Mesch 1996; Molotch, Freudenberg & Paulsen 2000) and can persuade businesses to contribute to local environmental projects (Sklar & Ames 1983). [End Page 194] Particularly relevant to our study, scholars at the World Bank have begun exploring how civic engagement affects the emissions of individual facilities (Hartman, Huq
contend that in developing countries, where formal regulation (e.g., uniform air quality standards, mandated pollution technologies) tends to be weak or nonexistent, informal regulation exercised by communities (e.g., public appeals, protests) may strongly influence corporate environmental performance . They speculate that civic engagement may also influence certain types of corporate pollution in the U.S. that are largely unregulated, such as toxins released by manufacturer s.3 In short, a growing body of research suggests that communities can improve the environmental performance of manufacturing plants by reducing the social distance between themselves and plants. According to this work, unless plants develop social ties to their host communities, they are unlikely to participate in public conversations about local environmental priorities. However, where there are numerous institutional settings that allow residents and plant managers to meet and develop a common appreciation of place, plants are more likely to participate in public conversations about the environment and curb their emissions.
& Wheeler 1997; Pargul & Wheeler 1995; Pargal et al. 2002). They
26
SENIORS 2009
Charity Good AIDS

Charities key to solve AIDS Lamberti, 08 (Tom, The Metropolitan, Liberating charities in their fight against AIDS)
Tim Mak pointed out that one of the major challenges in the fight against HIV/AIDS is the need to further support charities focused on researching a cure and supporting those who are living with this condition. What is most notable about Mr. Mak's approach was that he proposed a unique alternative to the current norm, which usually revolves around lobbying for increased government funding for social spending programs. Instead, Tim Mak argued that private charitable organizations were preferable for four reasons. First, competition between charities for donations creates real incentives for more efficient performance . Second, charities generally have specific goals and are closer to the problems they are trying to fix than government bureaucrats . As a result, they are more adaptable to changing circumstances on the ground. Third, charities are crucial to the creation of a sense of community. Finally, charities allow for personal freedom in that no one is ever forced to give to a cause they do not support.
McGill student and former Fraser Institute intern for charitable and voluntary sector issues
AIDS will spread globally and cause extinction Muchiri, 2k (Michael, Staff Member at Ministry of Education in Nairobi, Will Annan finally put out Africas fires? Jakarta Post, March 6, l/n)
The executive director of UNAIDS, Peter Piot, estimated that Africa would annually need between $ 1 billion to $ 3 billion to combat the disease, but currently receives only $ 160 million a year in official assistance. World Bank President James Wolfensohn lamented that Africa was losing teachers faster than they could be replaced, and that AIDS was now more
Statistics show that AIDS is the leading killer in subSaharan Africa, surpassing people killed in warfare. In 1998, 200,000 people died from armed conflicts compared to 2.2 million from AIDS . Some 33.6 million people have HIV around the world, 70 percent of them in Africa, thereby robbing countries of their most productive members and decimating entire villages . About 13 million of the 16 million people who have
effective than war in destabilizing African countries. died of AIDS are in Africa, according to the UN. What barometer is used to proclaim a holocaust if this number is not a sure measure?
There is no doubt that AIDS is the most serious threat to humankind, more serious than hurricanes, earthquakes, economic crises, capital crashes or floods . It has no cure yet. We are watching a whole continent degenerate into ghostly skeletons that finally succumb to a most excruciating, dehumanizing death . Gore said that his new initiative, if approved by the U.S. Congress,
would bring U.S. contributions to fighting AIDS and other infectious diseases to $ 325 million. Does this mean that the UN Security Council and the U.S. in particular have at last decided to remember Africa? Suddenly, AIDS was seen as threat to world peace, and Gore would ask the congress to set up millions of dollars on this case. The hope is that Gore does not intend to make political capital out of this by painting the usually disagreeable Republican-controlled Congress as the bad guy and hope the buck stops on the whole of current and future U.S. governments' conscience. Maybe there is nothing left to salvage in Africa after all and this talk is about the African-American vote in November's U.S. presidential vote. Although the UN and the Security Council cannot solve all African problems, the AIDS challenge is a fundamental one in that it threatens to wipe out
The challenge is not one of a single continent alone because Africa cannot be quarantined. The trouble is that AIDS has no cure -- and thus even the West has stakes in the AIDS challenge. Once sub-Saharan Africa is wiped out, it shall not be long before another continent is on the brink of extinction. Sure as death, Africa's time has run out, signaling the beginning of the end of the black race and maybe the human race.
man.
27
SENIORS 2009
Coercion Net Benefit [1/2]

Charitable tax credits avoid the link to coercion Barwick 98 [Peter, contributor to the Policy Review journal, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan and Feb edition, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html]
The recent dramatic decline in the nations welfare rolls is attributable in large part to the practical and psychological impact of reforms intended to create a more "conservative" welfare bureaucracy : expanded work requirements, eligibility restrictions, and a lifetime limit on benefits. These long-needed reforms are changing the culture of welfare from one of entitlement to one of reciprocity and individual responsibility. Its time to take the next step. Conservatives should use the momentum generated by recent successes to move toward the ultimate goal of reform: shifting responsibility and resources from the welfare state to privately funded, local charities. The best way to recover the role of private charity is through a charity tax credit, implemented initially at the state level. Its aim is simple: to give citizens greater control over their tax dollars by allowing them to claim a credit against their personal income-tax liability for contributions made to charitable organizations that assist the poor. The ideal plan is a charity tax credit that is budget-neutral--that is, one in which public spending is reduced by the same amount credited to taxpayers. This would ensure that resources are transferred from ineffective government programs to private charities that successfully reclaim lives. Such a credit would help to revive volunteerism and a sense of civic responsibility in American society by reminding people that providing for the poor is the responsibility, not of government, but of individuals in their local communities. The credit would also have a beneficial impact on private charity. By encouraging greater reliance on individual contributions, it would stimulate a "market" in charitable giving. This would strengthen groups that help the poor effectively while eliminating or reforming those that do not.
Counterplan results in less coercive action than the plan as an interim measure and solves poverty better than the affirmative Tanner 3 [Michael, Senior Fellow at the Cato Institute, The Poverty of Welfare: Helping Others in Civil Society, QuestiaSchool]
Another option is a proposal, supported by the National Center for Policy Analysis and others, to provide all taxpayers with a dollarfor-dollar tax credit for private charitable contributions. This would be a tax credit, not a tax deduction. That is to say, if an individual gave one dollar to charity, she could reduce her tax liability by one dollar. Since current federal welfare spending is equal to approximately 41 percent of personal income tax revenue (for all meanstested programs), the amount of the credit could be capped at 41 percent of total tax liability. 93 The Massachusetts-based Beacon Hill Institute estimates that this could generate as much as $125 billion per year in additional giving. 94 President Bush has discussed allowing married couples to claim a credit for up to half of the first $1,000 of their charitable contributions; single taxpayers could claim up to half of the first $500 of charitable contributions. In theory, the credit would be only for increased or new charitable contributions, although establishing a baseline for such determinations would appear to be difficult. 95 These approaches are not perfect of course. At their heart, they remain a coercive mechanism for financing charity. Still, they would give individuals greater control over where their charitable dollars go and put day-to-day operation of charity in private hands. Unlike direct government funding of private charitable organizations (see Chapter 6), the funds would not come with strings or government control that could undermine the effectiveness or character of the charity. Nor would the government be in the position of deciding which charities are worthy of funding. Individuals would be contributing their own funds to the charity of theirnot the government's choice. Government policy would simply be providing them with an incentive to do so. As an interim measure, this would certainly be preferable to the current welfare system.8
28
SENIORS 2009
Coercion Net Benefit [2/2]

Coercion is a net benefit Private charities prevent government intrusion Awenius, 84 Retired Attorney and Freelance Writer (Robert, Why Not Private Charity?, November 1984, Volume: 34, Issue: 11, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/why-not-private-charity, //MDP)
The adoption of welfare state procedures and plans tends to encourage the destructive activity of the modern state in the mass liquidation and redistribution of wealth . The normal and hitherto accepted role of government has been to maintain law , justice, and order, defend the nation abroad, and to permit every man the ownership of his property . In general, the governments business in the past was to protect the common welfare of its citizens . The destructive effect of the welfare state is manifested in its expropriation , taxation, or arbitrary creation of money and creditall done in the name of the poor . The effect of this damaging tendency is to abolish the independent citizen and foster the idea that all the people should look to Washington for subsistence i.e., to become parasites, wholly dependent on government for all their needs and wan ts. With this tendency, the politicians follow a short-term expediency of approving sophisticated theft (in redistributing the wealth) without regard to ultimately damaging long-term results . The very people who have done so much and will do so much in aiding private charity the great middle classare economically squeezed by the welfare state and find its capacity to support private charity greatly diminished
29
SENIORS 2009
Spending Net Benefit

The adoption of CTCs would cost much less money than the welfare programs of the status quo Barwick 98 (Peter S. Barwick, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit., et al. Charity Tax Credits and Debits <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html )
Most Americans insist that something tangible be done to help those in need. As a result, they would sooner keep the current welfare system in place, bad as it is, than sharply reduce it and hope that policy reforms save the day. Those who fail to provide a concrete alternative to the welfare bureaucracy end up guaranteeing the status quo. A charity tax credit, in contrast, would provide a basis for gradually reducing the government role in welfare by transferring this responsibility to individual taxpayers. Conservatives who argue against the credit idea because of the welfare mentality of many private charities worry
especially about these groups using it to expand their political advocacy. Admittedly, large government-funded nonprofits would be eager to do this very thing. But this credit is designed specifically to exclude such groups and to favor local, privately funded charity (see box page 35). The combination of eligibility criteria proposed in the Pennsylvania bill--including a cap on
government funding--is not found in any other charity tax credit plan. Together, these criteria ensure that the credit does not become a cash cow for advocacy groups on the Left.
30
SENIORS 2009
Charities Solve Better 2NC [1/5]

Charities are comparatively better at alleviating poverty (despite market failure, collective consumption, resource misallocation, or government key arguments). The perm fails causes charity crowd out. Beaulier and Hal, 08 Department Chair and Assistant Professor of Economics, Stetson School of Business and Economics, Mercer University (Scott and Joshua C., Collective Consumption Externalities and Charitable Giving, New Perspectives on Political Economy, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 23-40, //MDP)
This paper has examined a particular economic justification often given for government involvement in helping the poor.
The
lack of charitable giving may not be a market failure at all . In addition, it is unclear that interdependent utility functions are as rampant as some theorists suggest . Moreover, even if the collective consumption characteristics of charity did lead to a reduction in charitable giving because of interdependent utility functions , the undersupply of charitable giving would not be economically inefficient in the sense of misallocating resources . More importantly, private charity and redistribution are more robust in the sense of finding ways to align the incentives of potential donors and the poor . In doing so, free markets help to foster sympathy for the less well-off and a culture of approbation for those who help them . Government intervention, on the other hand, transforms a private, voluntary transaction into a public obligation. This places a strong presumption in favor of laissez-faire. Ultimately, the difference between those who want government involved in charity and redistribution and those opposed comes down to a belief in the individuals ability to help himself and his fellow man. Just because some people are different than others is not , ipso facto, an argument for paternalism, but, rather, an argument for leaving people alone. Efforts to force people to contribute to anti-poverty programs takes away from the richness and general culture of society and inhibits trial, error, and learning. Those in favor of government involvement in poverty alleviation are guilty of making the perfect the enemy of the good . This attitude regards almost all government intervention as desirable and sees many areas where more government involvement could improve market outcomes . But, it suffers from the same problem that all arguments for big government encounter: it assumes other people the expertsare outside above the economic order. The experts are said to be better at deciding for everyone whats best. By trying to make their values (or, to be more precise, the values of the rational actor) the values everyone should live by , they are failing to recognize the beauty of millions of people pursuing their own interests according to their own values . Government as a corrective to market failures is an inferior solution to alleviating poverty problems when compared to the private sector . The crowding out of a whole range of private charitable organizationsmost of which were quite effective at dealing with free riders and deviant behavioris one of the greatest, and largely unaddressed, costs of big government. In the absence of government, we do not and cannot know what specific mechanisms might arise to deal with the free rider, but we do have some historical experiences where mutual aid arrangements worked quite well (Beito 2000; Chalupnek and Dvorak 2007; Friedman 1962, 190-91).
31
SENIORS 2009

Comparative studies prove private charity is preferable to government intervention multiple reasons Beaulier and Hal, 08 Department Chair and Assistant Professor of Economics, Stetson School of Business and Economics, Mercer University (Scott and Joshua C., Collective Consumption Externalities and Charitable Giving, New Perspectives on Political Economy, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 23-40, //MDP)
Abstract Charitable giving suffers from market failure, which means government redistribution and other forms of social insurance can be justified. According to market failure theorists, charitable giving for poverty alleviation suffers from a freerider problem. In a free market, giving will therefore be underprovided. Using insights from public choice theory and Austrian
our paper finds market failure arguments to be an insufficient justification for government intervention. Private charity and redistribution respects autonomy and is more robust in creating incentives for people to help the poor . In America today, classical liberals and conservatives are alarmed by the runaway level of government involvement in our lives, interventions affect and complicate nearly every facet of our lives and impose tremendous explicit and implicit costs. The sheer number and complexity of the rules governing our behavior seems to be at an all-time high, and the rapid increase of government interventions in our everyday lives in order to make them better off deserves explanation. Alternative opinions about the overall scale and
economics, scope of government intervention depend, of course, on ones more general theoretical understanding of the welfare state. Analysis of the current state of poverty alleviation programs in America cannot be separated from ones general model of the welfare state. We take as our point of departure Thomas Sowells discussion of the welfare state (2003, B7). According to Sowell, The welfare state is not really about the welfare of the masses. It is about the egos of the elites. Like Sowell, we think
government intervention hampers peoples lives and increases in intervention beget more intervention. Our main purpose is to critically examine one argument for government intervention into the market
for charitable giving to the poor. Historically, the economic justification for government involvement in programs for the poor was based on public goods theory. In his classic book, Capitalism and Freedom, Milton Friedman (1962, 191) discussed the public goods justification for poverty alleviation when he wrote, I am distressed by the sight of poverty; I am benefited by its alleviation; but I am benefited equally whether I or someone else pays for its exclusion.
Close linkage between the donation and outcome makes charity preferable Beaulier and Hal, 08 Department Chair and Assistant Professor of Economics, Stetson School of Business and Economics, Mercer University (Scott and Joshua C., Collective Consumption Externalities and Charitable Giving, New Perspectives on Political Economy, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 23-40, //MDP)
The self-reinforcing cycle where people give because they seek the approbation of their fellow citizens is instead replaced by representative democracy, where resources are often transferred to the middle class in the name of helping the poor. While giving for purely altruistic reasons might be nice to contemplate, we do not live in such a world and charities must appeal to self-interest as well as altruism in order to get donations. If it were possible to compare the transfers to the
poor under a completely private system of charity versus a more public system, a completely private system would be superior because of closer link between donation and outcome. Even if many United Way fundraisers are organized by real estate agents and owners of car dealerships because it is good for business (Hartford 2006), a less than ideal arrangement is superior to a world where people have no incentive to become involved in private charity at all.12 Even if people gave out of entirely altruistic reasons and had interdependent utility functions, however, government intervention is not warranted because there is no misallocation of resources.13 The collective consumption externality pointed out by Hochman and Rodgers (1969) is a pecuniary
externality, which does not lead to market failure (Holcombe and Sobel 2000). In fact, pecuniary externalities are necessary for competitive markets. To understand why pecuniary externalities do not lead to economic inefficiency, it is important to better understand the distinction between pecuniary and technological externalities.
32
SENIORS 2009

No bureaucratic regulation makes charities more efficient Tanner, 96 Director of Health and Welfare Studies at the Cato Institute and Widely Published Author and Expert on Welfare and Private Charities (Michael, Replacing Welfare, Cato Policy Report, November/December 1996, Excerpt from The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in the Civil Society, Online at the Cato Institute, //MDP)
Private efforts have been much more successful than the federal government's failed attempt at charity. America is the most generous nation on ear th. Americans already contribute more than $125 billion annually to charity. In fact, more than 85 percent of all adult Americans make some charitable contribution each year. In addition, about half of all American adults perform volunteer work; more than 20 billion hours were worked in 1991 . The dollar value of that volunteer work was more than $176 billion. Volunteer work and cash donations combined bring American charitable contributions to more than $300 billion per year , not counting the countless dollars and time given informally to family members , neighbors, and others outside the formal charity system. Private charities have been more successful than government welfare for several reasons . First, private charities are able to individualize their approach to the circumstances of poor people in ways that governments can never do . Government regulations must be designed to treat all similarly situated recipients alike . Glenn C. Loury of Boston University explains the difference between welfare and private charities on that point. " Because citizens have due process rights which cannot be fully abrogated . . . public judgments must be made in a manner that can be defended after the fact , sometimes even in court." The result is that most government programs rely on the simple provision of cash or other goods and services without any attempt to differentiate between the needs of recipients .
Take, for example, the case of a poor person who has a job offer. But she can't get to the job because her car battery is dead. A government welfare program can do nothing but tell her to wait two weeks until her welfare check arrives. Of course, by that time the job will be gone. A private charity can simply go out and buy a car battery (or even jumpstart the dead battery). The sheer size of government programs works against individualization . As one welfare case worker lamented, "With 125 cases it's hard to remember that they're all human beings. Sometimes they're just a number." Bureaucracy is a major factor in government welfare program s. For example, a report on welfare in Illinois found procedures requiring "nine forms to process an address change, at least six forms to add or delete a member of a household, and a minimum of six forms to report a change in earnings or employment." All that for just one program. In her excellent book Tyranny of Kindness, Theresa Funiciello, a former welfare mother, describes the dehumanizing world of the government welfare system--a system in which regulations and bureaucracy rule all else. It is a system in which illiterate homeless people with mental illnesses are handed 17-page forms to fill out, women nine months pregnant are told to verify their pregnancies, a woman who was raped is told she is ineligible for benefits because she can't list the baby's father on the required form. It is a world totally unable to adjust to the slightest deviation from the bureaucratic norm. In addition
to being better able to target individual needs , private charities are much better able to target assistance to those who really need help . Because eligibility requirements for government welfare programs are arbitrary and cannot be changed to fit individual circumstances, many people in genuine need do not receive assistance , while benefits often go to people who do not really need them. More than 40 percent of all families living below the poverty level receive no government assistance . Yet more than half of the families receiving means-tested benefits are not poor. Thus, a student may receive food stamps, while a homeless man with no mailing address goes without. Private charities are not bound by such bureaucratic restrictions. Private charity also has a better record of actually delivering aid to recipients . Surprisingly little of the money being spent on federal and state social welfare programs actually reaches recipients. In 1965, 70 cents of every dollar spent by the government to fight poverty went directly to poor peopl e. Today, 70 cents of every dollar goes, not to poor people, but to government bureaucrats and others who serve the poor . Few private charities have the bureaucratic overhead and in
SENIORS 2009

Charitable tax credits would address the needs of the poor while maintain limited government- targeting direct assistance and alleviating suffering Barwick 98 [Peter, contributor to the Policy Review journal, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in
Beyond its practical benefits, a
charity tax credit would address what is perhaps the fundamental weakness of the conservative movement: its inability to articulate a vision of society that speaks to the sense of moral obligation people feel for the less fortunate. The goal is not simply a warmed-over version of the statist forms of "compassion" favored by liberals. Rather, the credit would help address the needs of the poor in a way that is consistent with the ideal of limited government and with the American tradition of active reliance upon the institutions of civil society. Another advantage of a charity tax credit is that it will target assistance to those most directly affected by welfare reform. So far, caseload reduction has primarily involved those recipients easiest to employ. The real test will come over the next several years as work deadlines and lifetime limits on assistance kick in for the rest. If substantial suffering results, pressure will build to abandon these policies. A charity tax credit will help prevent this outcome and allow us to implement welfare reform as it was originally conceived. CTC removes government dependency and is a prerequisite to welfare system success Barwick 98 [Peter, contributor to the Policy Review journal, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in
A charity tax credit supplies this transitional mechanism. Such a credit would nurture a private-sector alternative to the government welfare system. As people come to recognize the efficacy of this alternative, they would be able to accept the idea of further reducing the direct government role in welfare. Eventually, the credit itself could be phased out, so long as the revenue used to pay for it is returned to taxpayers.
Consider the impact of individual retirement accounts (IRAs) on the debate over privatizing Social Security. Thirty years ago, conservatives such as Barry Goldwater who even suggested the possibility of Social Security privatization were laughed out of the room. But now that we have practical experience with the advantages of privately investing for retirement, support for the idea is growing. Conservatives should not delude themselves that the welfare problem has been solved. They should instead propel reform to the next stage by advancing the fundamental issue of the debate: the need to recover the role of private charity.
Seventy years ago, Americans thought of private charity as the primary social safety net. To the extent that government had a role in assisting the poor, it was a provider of last resort, at the local level. A charity tax credit offers a way to recover this arrangement and the understanding it reflects. Without progress toward this larger goal, welfare reform cannot be considered a true success.
34
SENIORS 2009

Government welfare makes people lazy increasing poverty, unemployment, and diminishes productivity private charity eliminates the inefficiency. Awenius, 84 Retired Attorney and Freelance Writer (Robert, Why Not Private Charity?, November 1984, Volume: 34, Issue: 11, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/why-not-private-charity, //MDP)
Welfare tends to impede progress against poverty . Since welfare offers incentives counter to self-sufficiency and production , relatively few of those on welfare will have the heart or sufficient will or resolution to become self-sufficient and pay their own way in the world. Thus, welfare tends toward diminished productivity and production and it encourages those on the welfare rolls to accept unemployment . This insidious Federal dole induces idleness among its beneficiaries , subsidizes this very indolence, and results, for example, in the loss of hope of the poor owning their homes , accumulating any savings, or to educate their children for a better future than their parents realized. The economic future of this nation depends on production of more and more material wealth, but the welfare state presents us with a paradox: namely, welfare benefits go to people who for various reasons are relatively unproductive; but money for welfare comes from persons who are relatively productive. Thus we have a Federal dole system that sustains and increases poverty. Welfare itself is a problem. The sheer cost and inconclusiveness of government charity is of itself a telling argument in support of private charity . In general, government is grossly inefficient, and coupled to this is the cupidity of the vested bureaucracy that feeds on the money flowing from the Federal treasury . Our concern is to aid and assist the people in the nation by a method that does the most for them , and to shun measures that do not treat the causes of poverty. In general, we all are our brothers keepers and we should undertake that responsibility, but
Welfare Measures Promote Rather than Prevent Poverty
along avenues that truly raise the poor to a productive place in our society. The history of mans climb from savagery to a civilized status would indicate that the truest, surest, and most efficient method of aiding a poor man is along the lines of freechoice inducements. When a poor man sees that work will provide more material reward than idleness on a government dole,
With private charity dispen-sing funds to the poor , the nation would avoid the stultifying vice of idleness providing more gain than derived from common labor . Thus, private charity would accomplish more for the poor than government charity . And with private charity directing the dispersing of funds , there is a far greater likelihood of these monies treating the causes of poverty than simply treating the symptoms . Therefore, the writer believes there is an estimable case for the general adoption of private charity in place of public charity.
he will choose work.
35
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Legal Services

Legal Aid Charities are Suffering now, and are in dire need of funding that seems to never be available from the federal government
NYT, 9 (The New York Times Editorial Board, Sins of Omission: The Forgotten Poor February 2, 2009, Lexis)
Also lost in the wrangling over the huge House economic measure were two programs for the poor that are in urgent need of Congressional attention: legal services and access to family planning. The proven national program of civil legal aid for impoverished Americans, created in the 1960s, is suffering from multiple blows in funding.
While the poor are caught increasingly by foreclosure, eviction and food-stamp fights for their daily bread, deficit-bedeviled statehouses across the country are cutting support for legal services or dropping the programs outright. Creative funding that taps lawyers' escrow accounts has evaporated because it is tied to the Fed's fading interest rate . Local governments, charities and pro bono law firms are similarly tight-pursed. Scores of legal aid societies are cutting their staffs just as requests for help are booming, according to The Times's Erik Eckholm. Bar associations continue to help, and even in these tough times probably could do more. But federal funding is the ultimate hope
in a dire situation. In 2008, Congress chipped in $350 million for the nonprofit Legal Services Corporation, which then distributed the money throughout the country.
Given the tough times -- underfunded programs and ever more desperate clients -- more money is needed. Congress still has the
opportunity to renew the regular appropriation in a coming omnibus budget bill, but it must bolster that with extra support for the program.
NOTE: You should specify in text, based on the card, what the CTC can do
36
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Hunger

Tax Credits solve Hunger FEED programs come from charity
Dole, 7 (Elizabeth, an American politician who served in both the Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush presidential
administrations. She served as North Carolina's first female Senator from 2003 to 2009. She is a member of the Republican Party and former chair of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, Floor Statement of Senator Elizabeth Dole on National Hunger Awareness Day, June 5, 2007, http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/Floor_Statement_of_Senator_Elizabeth_Dole_on_National_Hunger_Awareness_Day ) Today is the Sixth National Hunger Awareness Day a day to reflect on the fact that in this nation alone more than 35 million people are experiencing hunger or are at risk for hunger. It is also a day to recognize the tremendous efforts of individuals who graciously give their time and resources to help those in need.
Hunger is far too prevalent, but I think Washington Post columnist David Broder hit the nail on the head when he wrote: America has some problems that defy solution. This one does not. It just needs caring people and a caring government, working together. I agree, the battle to end hunger in our country is a campaign that cannot be won in months or even a few years but it is a victory within reach. And I am motivated to do what I can to make a positive difference in this fight against hunger both in the United States and beyond our borders. In America the land of prosperity and plenty some people have the misconception that hunger plagues only far-away, undeveloped nations. The reality is that hunger is a silent enemy lurking within one in 10 U.S. households. In my home state of North
Carolina alone, nearly one million of our 8.8 million residents are struggling with food security issues. In recent years, oncethriving North Carolina towns have been economically crippled by the shuttering of textile mills and furniture factories. People have lost their jobs and sometimes their ability to put food on the table. I know this scenario is not unique to North Carolina, as many American manufacturing jobs have moved overseas. While many folks are finding new employment, these days a steady income doesnt necessarily provide for three square meals a day. To help struggling families and individuals, our nation is blessed to have many faith-based and other non-profit service organizations that work to fight hunger. Over the last year, I have toured a number of these organizations in my home state such as MANNA FoodBank in Asheville, Second Harvest Food Bank of Metrolina in Charlotte, and Meals on Wheels of Senior Services in Winston-Salem. I also have visited the DC Central Kitchen here in Washington just a few blocks from the Capitol. At each of these organizations, I am inspired by the dedicated staff and volunteers who have such a passion for helping others. Another hunger relief organization that I hold in the highest regard is the Society of St. Andrew, which gleans produce from farms, and then packages, processes and transports excess food to feed hungry people across the country. When I think of gleaning, I often think of Ruth in the Old Testament. Her story takes place during a famine in Bethlehem, and Ruth gleaned so that her family could eat. In Biblical times, farmers were encouraged to leave crops in their fields for the poor and for travelers. Its a practice we should be utilizing much more extensively today considering that in this country, 27 percent of all the food produced annually is lost at the retail, consumer and food service levels. This means we are wasting about 3,044 pounds of good food every second! The Society of St. Andrew recently passed a milestone saving and distributing a total of 500 million pounds of food since 1983! This translates into more than 1.5 billion servings! Already this year, the organization has provided more than 5.5 million pounds of produce. Amazingly, it only costs about 2 cents a serving to glean and deliver this food to those in need. And all of this work is done by the hands of tens of thousands of volunteers and a very small staff. Ive gleaned in North Carolina fields with my friends at the Society of St. Andrew, and they are truly a remarkable group. Like any humanitarian endeavor, the gleaning system works because of cooperative efforts. Private organizations and individuals are doing a great job but with very limited resources. One of the single largest concerns for gleaners is transportation how to actually get food to those in
need. To help address this problem, I am proud to reintroduce today the Hunger Relief Trucking Tax Credit Act, which would change the tax code to give transportation companies tax incentives for volunteering trucks to transfer gleaned food. Specifically, my bill would create a 25-cent tax credit for each mile that food is transported for hunger relief efforts by a donated truck and driver. This bill would provide a little extra encouragement for trucking companies to donate space in their vehicles to help more food reach more hungry people. I am grateful to my colleagues, Senators Lincoln, Burr, Durbin, Vitter
and Allard, for joining this effort, and I welcome the support of relief organizations like the Society of St. Andrew, the American Trucking Association and Americas Second Harvest. In addition, Senators Lautenberg, Lincoln and I plan to
soon reintroduce the Food Employment Empowerment and Development Program Act, or the FEED Act. The idea behind this legislation is simple: combine food rescue with job training, thus teaching unemployed and homeless adults the skills needed to work in the food service industry. With support from the FEED Act, community kitchens will receive much-needed resources to help collect rescued food and provide two million meals each year to the hungry. Successful FEED Act-type programs already exist. For example, in Charlotte, North Carolina, the Community Culinary School recruits students from social
service agencies, homeless shelters, halfway houses and work release programs. And just around the corner from here, 25 students recently began training in the DC Central Kitchens 68th culinary job training class. This is a model program, which began in 1990, and it is always a great privilege to visit the Kitchen and meet with the individuals who have faced adversity
37
SENIORS 2009
but are now on track for a career in the food service industry. We also must do more to help Americas 12 million hungry children get on the right track. As a result of hunger, these children have higher levels of chronic illness, depression and behavior problems. This is a travesty that can and must be prevented, and school feeding programs
provide a critical means to this end. The National School Lunch Program feeds 30 million children in more than 100,000 schools each day. While reduced price meals are available to students whose family income is below 130 percent of the poverty level, state and local school board members have informed me that many families struggle to even pay this fee. In too many cases, this is creating an
insurmountable barrier to participation. Thats why I am a strong supporter of eliminating the reduced price fee for these families and harmonizing the free income guideline with the WIC income guideline, which is 185 percent of poverty. In 2004, we succeeded in having a five-state pilot program authorized, and since then, a number of colleagues have joined me in urging funding for the program.
38
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Internet

Counterplan solves the internet private charities could run a program avoids coercion link
Gasman 98 (Lawrence June 25th 1998; Senior fellow at the Cato Institute; President of Communications Industry Researchers, Inc., a consulting company specializing in the telecommunications, computer, and cable television industries. Universal Service: The New Telecommunications Entitlements and Taxes. Cato Institute Policy Analysis no. 310, June 25, 1998. <http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-310.html> That raises the question of why special programs should be put in place for telecommunications. Approximately 72 percent of families that are considered "poor" have clothes washers; for nonpoor families the figure is 93 percent.[51] Yet we do not expect the government to subsidize clothes washers. Presumably, the point of welfare programs is to supply individuals and families with enough money to afford the essentials, which should include basic telephone service as well as laundry. That telephone service is in practice subsidized under a number of separate programs is little more than a historical accident stemming from the arcane separations process. Minor changes to existing legislation could establish a lifeline program to provide funding only for those low-income consumers whose health would be at risk if they did not get a subsidy. Under such a scheme money would, for example, be available for the low-income elderly woman with heart disease who lived alone on the grounds that, were she to suffer a seizure, her life would depend on her ability to summon an ambulance. Quite possibly, private charities could ultimately run such a program. The initial government program would be narrow in scope, as few people would qualify for funding under it. Even for those who believe that civil society, not the government, should be primarily responsible for helping the poor, such a plan would be tolerable. As a practical matter, federal and state regulators are in no position to demand that low-income telephone subsidies be transferred to larger means-tested welfare programs.[52] Congress alone could carry through such a reform. But though supported by a broad consensus of economists, [53] means-tested universal service schemes funded from general tax revenues (telephone stamps) get little political support and almost no discussion.
39
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Women of Color

CTCs could particularly help women of color
Abrams, 2001 tax attorney at Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan law firm in Atlanta Georgia, focusing on tax exempt organizations, with additional practice in health care matters. (Stacey Y., Southern University Law Review, Income, Deductions, and Wealth: A survey of Policy Remedies to the Intersection of Color, Gender, and Taxation Fall 2001, lexis) Critics often measure the relevance of proposals by the benchmark of political feasibility in a constricted, fervently loyal legislature, one tied to antiquated and self-preserving ideals of useful policy. Yet, reliance on the group most likely to lose by establishing sound progressive policy is folly. Even more, it is counterproductive. However, one feasible and radical idea for essential change to how institutions interact with women of color is the charity tax credit (the "CTC"). The credit would be available to any individual or joint filer who donated money to a confined list of poverty-servicing charities, e.g., a soup kitchen or free medical clinic. The concept deserves the support of anyone interested in mitigating the impact of welfare reform on those least able to respond. The credit draws on existing habits of our tax policy to encourage economic behavior in pursuit of public policy goals. By creating a tax credit that can be accessed by all citizens, regardless of economic status, both women of color and the institutions that assist them can benefit. Devolution and welfare reform have wreaked havoc on women of color and the families they support. With government abdicating its responsibility to fill the void caused by structural inequities in employment and income production, women of color must turn instead to the nongovernmental institutions that historically provide poverty services. However, where these institutions once served as adjuncts in the fight against poverty, both governments and recipients now view charities as a primary source of deliverance. As most of those recipients are women of color with children, the destabilization of charities is of direct concern to our audience of care. Nationwide, millions of hungry families, once dependent on food programs as last resorts, now rely on the same programs [*259] for almost monthly assistance. n7 When restrictions in federal aid eligibility are combined with stagnant poverty rates and wages, low-income families must turn to charities for assistance. When the economic inequities are combined with the immediacy of housing shortages and collapsed food programs, tax policy is an obvious remedy. The charity tax credit can supplement the financial needs of these institutions and simultaneously expand our tax policy to concede the reality of philanthropy among even the poorest of our society. Essentially, the tax credit encourages individual donations by allowing the donor to reduce her tax bill by some amount. Unlike the charitable deduction that only allows a taxpayer to reduce his taxable income, the credit is money deducted from the final tax bill. For example, if a taxpayer in the 28 percent tax bracket donates $ 100 to the symphony and itemizes her tax return, she can reduce her taxable income by $ 100 and her tax bill by only $ 28. With a 50 percent CTC, if the same taxpayer donated that same $ 100 to a homeless shelter or a qualified free medical clinic, she would reduce her final tax bill by $ 50. The CTC subsidizes the individual's decision to give to a poverty-servicing charity, both encouraging giving and expanding the breadth of donors that give. The CTC advantages women of color, who are both recipients of aid and dedicated donors. n8 When a donor realizes that a donation of $ 100, with a 50% tax credit, means that it only cost her $ 50 to give, she receives a transfer of wealth to institutions that directly service her needs and those of her constituency. The CTC ignores the traditional gender and racial roles of women of color as consumers of charity and not as donors. The donative choice, with tacit complicity from the very system that is often the source of distress, endows a long-ignored sector with the psychic benefit of participation. Certainly, this psychic benefit is of little value to one facing the degradation of poverty inflicted by a capricious and pitiless socio-economic system. However, as a method of equalization among the various classes of taxpayers, the credit has a substantial impact. Poorer women of color otherwise do not benefit from charitable deductions, as constructed. Donors who give with an eye to charitable deductions are typically those individuals who itemize their tax returns. Although the charitable deduction was not always so limited, the 1986 tax reform effectively stripped many middle and lower middle income taxpayers of this donative benefit. These groups historically opt for the standardized deduction because they cannot afford the charitable deduction [*260] option that is premised on higher income levels having greater contributive benefit to society. The deduction option allows taxpayers to decrease their taxable income, rather than their final tax bill. With a tax credit for giving, those using the 1040 EZ could reduce their tax bill by contributing to qualified PSCs. For those who are among the lowest income earners, as taxable income has little bearing on one with near or poverty-level income, this option of reducing a tax bill is irrelevant. More substantive is a credit refunded at tax time, in conjunction with their receipt of the earned income tax credit. For those women of color in higher income brackets, there is also a benefit. Studies of existing tax credit programs show that people give more to charity when the cost or tax price of giving decreases, a function of giving elasticity. Thus, by extension, women of color will likely give more to those poverty-servicing charities when offered the additional boon of a CTC. Then there is the rationale of direct choice. When the credit is applied only to certain qualifying charities, donors may take a second look at their donative choices. With the ability to determine which charities receive their assistance, women of color taxpayers both conservative and liberal - will enjoy a greater freedom in directing their taxes to organizations they deem worthy and all of which serve the target population. By broadening the base of donors with an option that does not require tax itemization, the CTC offers an excellent opportunity for women of color to expand the private contribution pool to organizations that they deem worthy and to simultaneously gain as recipients, a historical truth quite common to other segments of civilized society. Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 40
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Credits Rid Government Action

A tax credit will spur creative efforts to help the poor while reducing government action Barwick 98 (Peter S. Barwick, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit., et al. Charity Tax Creditsand Debits <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html )
The credit envisioned here is specifically designed to promote these ends, in two ways. First, it adopts a broad definition of assistance, thereby making room for creative efforts to help the poor, such as microlending to encourage entrepreneurship. Second, by requiring qualifying groups to limit their advocacy and their dependence on government funding, it effectively excludes those groups most likely to adopt the handout mentality. Conservative opponents of a tax credit are absolutely right to emphasize the importance of policies designed to help the poor become self-sufficient--employment-based welfare programs, school choice, economic deregulation, and the like. But what is to be done about the numerous individuals who, for one reason or another, continue to fall through the cracks? According to some conservatives, we have met our obligations to them as long as we support policies that improve the general lot of the poor. This position is an abdication of moral responsibility. In practice, it amounts to washing our hands of the problem.
41
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Credits Rid Government Action

A federal tax credit is necessary to allow charities to truly help the impoverished while freeing them from government control Abrams 99-- state representative who represents part of Atlanta in the Georgia General Assembly (Stacey Abrams Can A Charity Tax Credit Help the Poor? July 1, 1999 http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles? article=can_a_charity_tax_credit_help_the_poor )
State governments have begun to see the logic of the CTC approach; more than 20 now operate some version of the charity tax credit. As you would expect, studies of these existing programs show that people give more to charity when the cost of giving decreases. But while some policymakers favor a state credit, the federal tax credit is the better option. The funding lost to
welfare reform is federal money, so the federal government should bear the primary duty of recompensing donors. In addition, because the state programs vary so widely--from youth rehab to community service support--charities easily run the risk of losing out to nonprofits not directly affected by welfare reform . More important, federal taxes are obviously much larger than state taxes--and donors would rather take a credit on their larger, federal tax bills. Legislating the federal CTC into existence would be both a symbolic and a practical gesture. It would acknowledge the existence of the discrepancy between what's expected of direct service charities and what resources are available to them. And the revenue it generates would allow charities to meet the growing needs of the poor abandoned by welfare reform. What's more, freedom from government purse
strings and the regulations that accompany them might allow greater opportunity for innovations in service delivery.
42
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Laundry List

The tax credit would allow give more money to the war on poverty, greater efficiency in giving, and less waste in funding Tuerck 96 (David G., executive director of the Beacon Hill Institute and chairman and professor of economics at Suffolk University, Charity Tax Credit is Workable June 1996, The Tribune < http://www.beaconhill.org/Editorials/charity.htm>)
The welfare debate is deadlocked over the false question of whether we should give taxpayers a break at the expense of helpless children. Marian Wright Edelman, leader of the recent "Stand for Children" rally in Washington, has described as "evil" the welfare cutbacks proposed in Washington and enacted in some states. The tax credit proposal, labeled by some as a "compassion tax credit," offers a chance to stand for children and the taxpayer as well. Because of its very win-win nature, the Dole/Coats proposal is likely to get serious attention from Congress in the months to come and now, possibly also from a future president. Defenders of the existing, failed welfare system are thus rushing to kill the tax-credit infant in its crib. Even before the idea gets a serious public hearing, the business press and the halls of Congress are abuzz with dark warnings about the consequences of an idea that would end the government welfare monopoly. As the debate gathers momentum, therefore, it is useful to consider some of the criticisms that are being voiced. Some of these criticisms and the rebuttals to them follow. "The tax credit would cause total assistance to the poor to decrease because the resulting tax-revenue losses would cause government to cut programs." In fact, the tax credit would give taxpayers a chance to increase the total assistance going to the poor. The reason lies in the greater efficiency with which their tax dollars would be spent when placed in the hands of private charities rather than welfare bureaucrats. Research shows that, once offered a tax credit, taxpayers would respond vigorously, eventually taking full advantage of the opportunity provided to direct their tax dollars where those dollars would do the most good. Indeed, the reason Dole/Coats and other proposals impose a limit on contributions eligible for the credit is to prevent taxpayers from channeling all their tax liability into the credit. Thus there would be no decline in total assistance - just a change from one provider (government) to another (private charities). "The tax credit would cause total assistance to the poor to decrease because people who already contribute to the support of the poor would receive an additional unnecessary tax break." Individual contributions to private charities account for less than 10 percent of all public and private assistance to the poor (provided under means-tested, nonmedicaid programs). This shortfall would be made up in part by the greater efficiencies achieved and by the greater success private charities could be expected to enjoy in ending dependency. If concerns still remain, the law could include a threshold making only new contributions eligible for the credit (letting contributions below the threshold remain eligible only for the existing deduction). "The tax credit would create a preferential status for charities that qualify for the credit, causing taxpayers to increase their contributions to these charities at the expense of others." That is, people would take money previously given to the symphony (for which they would only get a deduction) and give it to the Salvation Army (for which they could now get a credit). Giving to the Salvation Army is no substitute for attending the symphony or for supporting the arts, as demonstrated by research showing a strong, positive correlation between giving to different types of charities. As for preferential status, government currently takes hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars to fund that particular charity which is the government welfare system. "Money diverted to private charities would 'leak' into activities that do not help the poor and would increase administrative costs." In fact, there is likely to be far less waste and leakage under the tax credit than there is now. By one estimate, only 41 percent of poverty-level families receive any government benefits and some 67 percent of all federal welfare spending ends up in the pockets of nonpoor. Yes, government oversight would be necessary to prevent abuse, as it is with the existing tax deduction. But with billions of new dollars pouring into the system, private organizations would be formed to rate or monitor individual charities for their efficiency. "Private charities would lack the capacity to handle the increased demand for their services." About 85,000 private charities provide social and legal services to the poor and others. Many more would be formed as the tax credit made new funds available to support them. These charities would find that the most effective way to attract funds is to come up with effective methods of ending dependency while providing transitional assistance. Concerns about the tax credit are voiced mainly by large public charities that have vested interest in preserving the status quo. Examples are United Way, which gets 40 percent of its support from government, and Catholic Charities, which gets 62 percent. It's little wonder that they are reluctant to scrap the existing system for one in which they would have to compete, along with every other charity, for support from millions of individual taxpayers. As the debate over the tax credit idea unfolds, there will be other concerns that deserve careful consideration. What is important to avoid, however, is a rush to judgment against this idea, based on a panicky reaction by the welfare lobby and an underestimation of the ability of the private sector to combine efficiency with compassion.
43
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Pennsylvania Proves

Pennsylvanias Tax Credit program has greatly increased donations to and greatened the ability of charities to aide others Celley, 2003 (Scot D. Celley, Journalist for 17 years, covering small-town central Pennsylvania and winner of 2000 Keystone Press Award, Pennsylvania Businesses Able to Give Money to Charity, Receive Tax Credit. November 12, 2003. York Daily Record. Access My Library)
In a tough economy, sometimes it is tough to give to local organizations. Dallas Smith, head of Smith Village Home Furnishings in Jacobus, has found a way to do it through the Educational Improvement Tax Credit program. The program, which is administered by the state's Department of Community and Economic Development, allows businesses to deduct up to 90
percent of the gift if the gift goes to state-approved organizations for two years. Smith said that element is important. "We couldn't afford to make that kind of contribution," he said. He said the trick is to fill out the application early in the state's fiscal year, which begins July 1. The program is so popular, Smith said, that it fills up quickly. When the program first started, Smith Village made a smaller donation to Junior Achievement. In this fiscal year, a total of $30 million in tax credits was authorized for scholarships for students attending both public and private schools. It also allows for giving to education programs in public schools. According to the state Web site, the tax credits can be applied to the corporate income tax, capital stock franchise tax, bank and trust company shares tax, title insurance company shares tax, insurance premiums tax or mutual thrift institutions tax. Two months ago, Smith Village Home Furnishings sent checks totaling $10,000 to three local
organizations: $4,000 to Junior Achievement of South Central Pennsylvania; $3,000 to the York County Library System; and $3,000 to the Susan P. Byrnes Health Education Center. Lyn Buckler-Bergdoll, president of Junior Achievement of South Central Pennsylvania, said about 20 companies have given to her organization because of the tax credit. "Junior Achievement is funded through contributions and fund-raising," said Buckler-Bergdoll. "Some schools do make contributions, but they only pay for about one-fifth of the cost." Katie Herrington of the Susan P. Byrnes Health Education Center said the money is used to help schools bring some 60,000 students to programs there. She said "quite a few" businesses have taken advantage of the tax credit. Most of the contributors have been donors all along, and the credit has enabled them to increase their gifts. "It's a
win-win for everyone," Smith said. "It's great for them (the charitable organizations) and good for us that we can help some local organizations."
44
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Spurs Innovation

CTCs spur development and innovation in the social service sector Barwick, 97 (Peter S., research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit, Let Charity Begin at Home: A tax credit approach to welfare funding in Pennsylvania May 1997, Commonwealth Foundation)
A charity tax credit will also help to spur innovation in the provision of welfare. In contrast to government programs, which are burdened with onerous regulations, private charities have great flexibility in structuring their efforts to assist persons in need. They are better positioned to take local and individual circumstances into account in designing their programs , and have a far
greater capacity than the government to adapt to change. By requiring charities to compete with each other to earn peoples voluntary support. a tax credit program will encourage continual innovation and improvement.
45
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: National Charity Expansion

Charity tax credit expands national contribution pool Abrams 99-- state representative who represents part of Atlanta in the Georgia General Assembly (Stacey Abrams Can A Charity Tax Credit Help the Poor? July 1, 1999 http://www.prospect.org/cs/articles? article=can_a_charity_tax_credit_help_the_poor )
We must modify the definition of nonprofits to favor those that serve the poor, so that the tax code no longer treats contributions to the symphony as equivalent to contributions to a food bank. A direct service charity would be required to meet one of two prescriptions. Either it would be organized and operated so that the majority of annual expenses are dedicated to poor relief; or it would be organized to solicit and collect gifts and grants to be distributed to qualified charities that meet the first requirement. Limits on what qualifies as a charity are an important starting point for targeted tax policies. Policymakers can generate legislation to aid the food bank without having to justify why the symphony will be left to fend for itself. (Establishing a minimum percentage of annual expenses to be spent on poor relief would prevent organizations from attempting to take advantage of the proffered exemptions and subsidies without a meaningful commitment to servicing the poor.) But under current conditions, even an increase in charitable giving cannot entirely offset the impact of federal cuts in social welfare programs. Private giving to true charities would have to increase by at least 50 percent a year in order to offset government cutbacks. Under the existing tax code, private contributions can realistically only compensate for maybe 5 percent of the reductions in government spending; more conservative estimates place the figure as low as 1 to 2 percent. To meet the needs of the poor through private donations, contributions would have to increase by more than four times the current projected growth rate. Is there any way to resolve this resource crunch? One possible solution is the charity tax credit (CTC). Although CTC legislation is not new, then-senator Dan Coats reintroduced it in 1995 to address the impact of welfare reform. Essentially, the tax credit encourages individual donations by allowing the donor to reduce her tax bill by some amount. Unlike the ordinary charitable deduction, which only allows a taxpayer to reduce the amount of taxable income, the charity tax credit is actually deducted directly from the final tax bill. For example, if a taxpayer in the 28 percent tax bracket donates $100 to the symphony and itemizes her tax return, she can reduce her taxable income by $100 and her tax bill by $28. With a 50 percent CTC, a donation of $100 to a homeless shelter or a qualified free medical clinic would reduce her final tax bill by $50. The tax credit increases the tax subsidies to genuine charities for the poor. Giving $100 to a homeless shelter would actually only cost $50; giving the same amount to the symphony would cost $72. Donors who give with an eye to charitable deductions are more often those individuals who choose to itemize their tax returns. Thus taxpayers who opt for the standardized deduction are not usually enticed by the charitable deduction option. The charitable tax credit, on the other hand, would allow even those filing the 1040 EZ form to reduce their tax bill by contributing to qualified charities. By broadening the base of donors with an option that does not require tax itemization, the charity tax credit offers an excellent opportunity for charities to expand the private contribution pool. Wealthy donors tend to restrict their giving to their own ethnic and racial groups; the fact that the proposed tax credit doesn't require itemizing the tax form assures access to a wider pool of donors and maximizes the potential for diffuse contributions to a variety of agencies.
46
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: Volunteerism Doubles

CTCs encourage and almost double the rate of volunteerism
Tuerck and OBrien 97-PhD, Executive Director of the Beacon Hill Institute at Suffolk University and PhD, Resident Scholar at the Beacon Hill Institute at Suffolk University (David G. and William F., Rethinking Welfare in the Age of Devolution April 1997, < http://law.richmond.edu/rjolpi/Issues_Archived/1997_Spring_Welfare_Reform/TUERCK_O%27BRIEN_FIN.htm> ) Voluntarism. Just as the tax-credit option would encourage taxpayers to pay stricter attention to how their "welfare" dollars were spent, it would encourage them to volunteer for the charities to which they contribute.47 BHI has estimated that its proposed tax credit would roughly double the number of volunteers, from 3.76 to 6.95 million, for charitable organizations that provide social services.48
47
SENIORS 2009
CTC Solvency: 1st Amendment

CTCs allow first amendment protected donations while getting tax credits
Carlson-Thies, 97
Senior Fellow at the Center for Public Justice in Washington, D.C. (Stanley W., Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy, Dont Look to Us: The Negative Responses of the Churches to Welfare Reform 1997, lexis) In Washington, two distinct strategies have been proposed to make government more supportive of the anti-poverty efforts of religious and community groups. The most publicized plan is the "Project for American Renewal" proposed by Sen. Dan Coats (R-Indiana). Launched in September 1995 at a Capitol Hill press conference by Sen. Coats and William Bennett (of The Book of Virtues), the initiative consists of more than a dozen separate proposals designed to promote the renewal of civil society by putting government influence and resources on the side of "private and religious institutions that shape, direct, and reclaim individual lives." n6 At a press conference in June, 1996, Rep. John Kasich (R-Ohio) joined Sen. Coats as co-sponsor of the Project's "Phase II," a campaign in both chambers for enactment of the bills. The "centerpiece and symbol" of the Project, says Coats, is a federal charity tax credit, a dollar-for-dollar reduction in federal income taxes of up to $ 500 ($ 1000 for joint filers), to match [*671] donations to qualified charities. Eligible charities are defined narrowly: they must be able to demonstrate that their "predominant activity" is the provision of anti-poverty services to poor persons and families; they must devote at least seventy percent of their expenditures to direct anti-poverty services; and in calculating that service ratio, they may not count as service to the poor any expenditures to influence policy making or to provide legal assistance. n7 On the other hand, church ministries and religious charities, if they are organized as tax-exempt nonprofit organizations, are eligible to participate. Indeed, Coats seeks in particular to undergird religious charities, for they "not only feed the body but touch the soul," n8 and he has featured them in his hearings on the effectiveness of non-governmental social-service providers. n9 Coats conceives his federal charity tax credit to be a way for government to support such organizations without either hobbling them with red tape or "offending the first amendment." n10 In his conception, the tax credit is not a substitute for the social safety net, but rather a way to supplement it and make it more effective by increasing the resources of religious and private charities. n11 A second strategy for expanding the anti-poverty role of those charities has been championed in Congress by Sen. John Ashcroft (RMissouri). He originally introduced his "charitable choice" plan to direct a portion of federal welfare funds to charities in his own bill to transform the AFDC program. When the Republican leadership's welfare bills were put into play in 1995, Ashcroft was able to get the charitable choice provision included. Charitable choice was accepted by Congress at the end of 1995 as part of the Republican welfare reform legislation (H.R. 4), although the legislation was vetoed by the President in January, 1996. However, Ashcroft's idea was retained when Congress took up welfare reform again in the summer of 1996, and it became [*672] the law of the land when President Clinton signed the federal welfare reform bill on August 22, 1996.
48
SENIORS 2009
AT: Free-Riding
Free-riding does not occur the economic argument of independent utility functions proves Beaulier and Hal, 08 Department Chair and Assistant Professor of Economics, Stetson School of Business and Economics, Mercer University (Scott and Joshua C., Collective Consumption Externalities and Charitable Giving, New Perspectives on Political Economy, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 23-40, //MDP)
Friedmans claim was picked up by others.2 Shortly after Friedman, Hochman and Rodgers (1969) claimed that private charity and transfers were underprovided in a free market because of people free-riding on the donations of others. At the core of their argument was the notion that people have interdependent utility functions, i.e., the utility of person A is dependent in part on the utility of person B. In this paper, we question whether charity will be underprovided in a free market because of free-riding on others donations. We first look at the overall role interdependent utility functions play in a persons decision to give. Most charitable giving seems to occur because of the direct benefits received by the
donor. To the extent people do have interdependent utility functions , interdependence does not seem to matter on the margin since most attempts to solicit donations do not appeal to the welfare of those helped by the additional donation . Private motivations for giving significantly reduce the argument for government intervention because private charity will reduce or eliminate the gap between the market failure level of charity and redistribution and the socially optimal level of charity and redistribution . Second, even if interdependent utility functions exist and free-riding occur s, the resulting outcome is not inefficient because no resources are misallocated. Interdependent utility functions generate pecuniary externalities, which do not misallocate resources. The ideal condition, where no free-riding occurs, is analogous to a market environment with no competition . Just as an absence of competition would not be good for competitive markets , an absence of pecuniary externalities in charitable consumption would not be good because much of the innovation in charitable fund-raising flows from the pecuniary externality associated with charitable giving.
49
SENIORS 2009
AT: Market Failure

Market failure makes zero sense many reasons Beaulier and Hal, 08 Department Chair and Assistant Professor of Economics, Stetson School of Business and Economics, Mercer University (Scott and Joshua C., Collective Consumption Externalities and Charitable Giving, New Perspectives on Political Economy, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 23-40, //MDP)
market failure literature in economics has also helped to justify and make popular many government proposals. According to market failure theory, people do not care about the spillover benefits/costs of their behavior. Therefore, government must enter markets with externalities to correct for the alleged failures. The remedies to market failure can take many specific forms, but, in general, disincentives are necessary to curb negative externalities and positive incentives are needed to subsidize markets where positive externalities are present. For advocates of market failure theory, correcting for market failures was a rather straightforward task
While mans desire for more regulation has played an important role in the rise of the regulatory state, the (Samuelson 1947; 1961). More sophisticated critics of market failure theory recognize the epistemological challenge involved in sorting out the failing and well-functioning markets, estimating the size of the failure, and prescribing corrective remedies (Wagner 1989). Public choice economists also criticized market failure theorists for their naivet :
even if bureaucrats and politicians had the necessary information about external costs , they lack the proper incentives to be correcting for market failures (Shleifer and Vishny 1998).5 Over time, policymakers in Washington have ignored the criticisms of market failure theory and latched on to the academic writings of market failure theorists . The new literature on market failure theory helped politicians justify interventions , and it undoubtedly affected the general publics attitude towards government . As Lord Keynes (1936, 383) put it: the ideas of economists
and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Hayek (1960 [1949], 371) concurred with Keynes, when he wrote, [intellectuals] have probably never exercised so great an influence as they do todayby shaping public opinion. For both Keynes and Hayek, the views of the intellectual come to shape the political landscape in an extremely watered down fashion. When policymakers latch onto an academic idea , errors often occur. Many
of the ideas selected by policymakers are not the best ideas or the right ones, but, rather the ideas progressive intellectuals and policymakers stand behind . Market failure theory is one such idea. It is hard to imagine there ever being a time where a majority of economists supported widespread interventions to correct for market failure . Yet, market failure arguments gained traction because they provided intellectual support for a variety of government interventions. The implicit assumption of the market failure literature is that with enough regulation, all problems can be solved. By constantly passing new laws and massaging our fear to be free, politicians supply the false sense that government is solving market failures. Like Demsetz (1969), we think market failure theory suffers from the nirvana fallacy. In its simplest form, the nirvana fallacy is a comparison of real markets with perfect government. When it comes to charity and redistribution , the public good characteristics of charity makes it prone to free-riding behavior . The mere possibility of public good characteristics in charity is then taken as sufficient proof of the need for government intervention. But, government interventions are determined by fallible men and women with their own biases and agendas. : (1) evaluate a market failure argument on its own terms (i.e., is it really a market in the sense of misallocating resources ), and (2) compare the robustness of markets and government in addressing the failure in the short and long run . Comparing the robustness of markets over the short and long run is important because government could be more efficient in mitigating the short-run effects of a market failure but crowd out the evolution of decentralized institutional mechanisms , which would be superior in the long run .
SENIORS 2009
AT: No Donations
This argument has a political bias people give astronomical amounts to private charity this assumes all their warrants. De Vous, 03 Public Policy Manager of the Acton Institute (Phillip W., What Gives? The Possibilities of Private Charity, ttp://www.acton.org/commentary/commentary_144.php, //MDP)
With red ink predicted as far as the eye can see due to soaring state and federal budget deficits and with overall economic recovery still a hope to be realized, there is one area of the economy that is thriving despite all
predictions to the contrary --private charity. According to Giving U.S.A.'s annual report, published by the American Association of Fundraising Counsel (AAFRC), Americans gave an estimated $240.92 billion to charity in 2002. Even more surprising, Giving U.S.A. reports that, in a year that was
very hard on the corporate bottom line, charitable contributions by corporations and corporate foundations came in at $12.19 billion, an 8.8% increase over the previous year. The fact that charitable giving remains so high even
while economic growth is so low runs counter to the arguments of many who advocate statist models of charity. Given the disparity between the dire predictions of self-interested stinginess employed by welfare state advocates and the truly expansive nature of American generosity, one is led to inquire: What gives? Contrary to the agitations of many on the political left, America is a generous nation, and as a matter of fact, the most generous nation in the world. While it is true that American culture is often overly materialistic, there is also a deep current of altruism that pervades the American character. Leo P. Arnoult, chairman of the AAFRC Trust sums up this spirit: ( Charitable) giving did hold its own in spite of reports of great difficulty in fundraising . Giving is still pervasive and broad, perhaps because our culture treats all philanthropic activity , even the widow's mite, respectfully. It is this culture of respect for philanthropic activity , which is the concrete realization of people's desire to assist in addressing legitimate charitable needs , that motivates the vast majority of charitable giving, Obviously, this remains true even when the bottom line is much diminished due to economic circumstances . This reality undermines the selfishness thesis that underwrites much welfare state advocac y. Most welfare state advocates have a low estimation of the potential of altruism , generally preferring schemes of income redistribution over individual charity in meeting the needs of people . Given the pervasive and resilient character of American charitable giving, the present high levels of charitable giving point out the wisdom of further realizing in policy those incentives that would increase the ability of private charity to meet the needs of the common good. A policy agenda that recognizes the power of private charity could go far in strengthening the culture of respect for philanthropic activity that characterizes the citizenry of this nation .
Even if thats true- CTC allows them to grow enough to solve Matthews 98 [Merill, vice president of domestic policy for the National Center for Policy Analysis, a nonpartisan, nonprofit public-policy research
institute based in Dallas, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html]
Private-sector charities are too small to handle the huge number of welfare recipients.
The charity tax credit would create a dynamic welfare system in which taxpayers assess each charitys record of meeting the needs of the poor. To the extent that taxpayers direct tax dollars to private-sector charities, those organizations would have the funds to grow and meet the needs of more people.
51
SENIORS 2009
AT: No Donations
There are a lot of reasons people donate to charities their motivations are extremely complex Beaulier and Hal, 08 Department Chair and Assistant Professor of Economics, Stetson School of Business and Economics, Mercer University (Scott and Joshua C., Collective Consumption Externalities and Charitable Giving, New Perspectives on Political Economy, Volume 4, Number 1, pp. 23-40, //MDP)
One of the primary economic arguments for the public provision of charity is that it the supply of charitable activities will be underprovided in a free market because charitable giving has the properties of a collective consumption good . Technically speaking, collective consumption
goods are those for which a many people can simultaneously consume the good without reducing the amount available for consumption.6 National defense is the classical example of a collective consumption good. An increase in a countrys population increases the number of people consuming national defense without reducing any other citizens consumption. The incentive to free ride increases with collective consumption goods, such as national defense, because people can enjoy the benefits of national defense without contributing to it. If we make a few simplifying assumptions about a persons willingness to pay for collective goods, government interventions, such as compulsory taxation, can improve upon the voluntary outcome.
People donate time and money to charitable organizations for many reasons. Some donate for personal edification while others donate because they care about the increased utility of those helped through an organizations programs . When a persons utility depends on the utility of others, they said to have interdependent utility functions . Charitable donations increase the
utility of people with interdependent utility functions because when we know the recipients of charity are better off, we are made better off. If donors have interdependent utility functions, charitable giving is a collective consumption good where all potential donors benefit when someone gives to charity. If I am a potential donor whose utility depends on the utility of the African poor, my utility increases when The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation donates $47 million to help treat tropical diseases plaguing Africas poor (Dugger 2006). Just as in the case of national defense, people can enjoy the warm glow from knowing the poor are being made better off without having to contribute. According to Hochman and Rodgers (1969), some people will free ride on the charitable donations of others, which means the supply of charitable giving in a free market will be underprovided. Maximizing utility, they argue, requires government intervention to ensure the optimal level of transfers is made to the poor (Holcombe and Sobel 2000). The possibility of an insufficient supply of giving has led to government
There are many problems with this argument. At the most basic level, what if people do not have interdependent utility functions? Or to put it another way, why dont all donors free ride? Many people obtain personal pleasure in giving even though they cannot observer the effect of their actions on the welfare of the recipients (Arrow 1972). While Arrows formulation of donor motivation is surely not true for all donors (Rose-Ackerman 1982), a considerable amount of donor motivation for giving does not appear to be about the welfare of the recipient . Donors appear to care about the warm glow associated with charitable giving, and benefit from the wealth signal they send when they giv e (Glazer and Konrad 1996). When we look at the way in
programs that aim to increase giving, such as the charitable deduction (Hochman and Rodgers 1977).
which charities solicit donations, they are clearly not appealing to donors altruistic motives. Development officials do not rely primarily on stories regarding the charitys work to raise money. While the charitable works are always part of the marketing
actions of development officials point towards donors being motivated by the approbation flowing from giving or the signaling value of a donation. One manifestation of the signaling motivation is in naming rights, where a new facility or program is named after a donor. Or charities provide different tiers of giving, with the choicest of status gifts being given to the highest donors (e.g., gold circle members receive regular updates from the president and monthly donor receptions). The warm glow is also a powerful motivator . Donors not only want to see the poor better off, but they want to feel good about having been part of the effort. Andreoni (1990) quotes the Red Cross using the slogan Feel good about yourself Give blood! Donors appear to be motivated by many reminders of their charitable deeds , either for internal reasons or because of external approbation of their effort s. Spreading charitable giving around instead of focusing on the one cause a person feels best about is more evidence against the altruistic giving explanation .8 McGranahan (2000) examines seventeenth-century English wills and finds more bequests left to the poor when the
campaign, the
52
SENIORS 2009
deceased had fewer immediate family and friends . Even in death, people appear to be more concerned with how they are perceived by others . In economic models where preferences are modeled as
being purely altruistic, public giving reduces private giving dollar-for-dollar: if all you care about is the welfare of the recipient, government financed transfers will cause you to reduce your voluntary donation by the amount of the forced transfer. Yet field tests fail to find considerable crowding out of private charitable donations (Clotfelter 1985; Kingma 1989; Ribar and Wilhelm 2002).9 The fact that there is not complete crowding out suggests that donations to private charities are often motivated by factors other than the welfare of the recipient.10 If for example, you also care about the warm glow you receive from donating to help the poor, you are not going to stop doing so because the government is now taxing you to provide charity.11 We are
not making a normative claim about peoples motivations for giving . Rather, we are arguing against the idea that people are primarily motivated by altruistic concerns . We do not believe giving for purely altruistic reasons has any moral superiority over other kinds of giving. Adam Smith (1759 [1790], section III.I.6) said it best in The Theory of Moral Sentiments when he wrote, To be
amiable and to be meritorious; that is, to deserve love and to deserve reward, are the great characters of virtue; and to be odious and punishable, of vice. But all these characters have an immediate reference to the sentiments of others. Virtue is not said to be amiable, or to be meritorious, because it is the object of its own love, or of its own gratitude; but because it excites those sentiments in other men.
53
SENIORS 2009
AT: No Safety Net

Private charities provide a better safety net than the government Tanner, 96 Director of Health and Welfare Studies at the Cato Institute and Widely Published Author and Expert on Welfare and Private Charities (Michael, Replacing Welfare, Cato Policy Report, November/December 1996, Excerpt from The End of Welfare: Fighting Poverty in the Civil Society, Accessed Online at the Cato Institute)
private charity is much more likely to be targeted to short-term emergency assistance than to long-term dependence . Thus, private charity provides a safety net, not a way of life. Moreover, private charities may demand that the poor change their behavior in exchange for assistance. For example, a private charity may reduce or withhold benefits if a recipient does not stop using alcohol or drugs, look for a job, or avoid pregnancy. Private
Second, in general, charities are much more likely than government programs to offer counseling and one-on-one follow-up rather than simply provide a check.
54
SENIORS 2009
AT: CTC Less Commitment to Poor

Thats factually incorrect- economists agree Matthews 98 [Merill, vice president of domestic policy for the National Center for Policy Analysis, a nonpartisan, nonprofit public-policy research
If people were able to direct their tax dollars to private charities, they would scale back their overall commitment to aiding the poor. In fact, just the opposite would likely occur. Most economists recognize what is called the "crowding out" effect: When government spending increases, private spending declines. In a 1984 article in the Journal of Political Economy, Russell Roberts found that private relief expenditures rose steadily in the United States until 1932, and declined steadily thereafter as government welfare spending rose. An article in the National Tax Journal that same year found that cuts in government spending resulted in increased interest in private contributions. Thus it is entirely possible that reducing government welfare spending through a tax credit for charitable giving might result in an increase in total spending on the needy.
55
SENIORS 2009
AT: CTC Doesnt Solve Cities/Rural

Extensive research disproves your argument- charities affect a wide range of income and geography Matthews 98 [Merill, vice president of domestic policy for the National Center for Policy Analysis, a nonpartisan, nonprofit public-policy research
The wealthy prefer to help those closest to them, so the poor living in the inner cities or other places far from the wealthy would receive very little help.
Extensive research done on this issue--such as Charles T. Clotfelters Who Benefits from the Nonprofit Sector?--found that there is no evidence that wealthier people give disproportionately to organizations that are closer to or primarily benefit upper-income families. Furthermore, the premise of this criticism is that only wealthy people would get a tax credit. However, since the tax credit would be extended to everyone who pays taxes, many lower and middle-income working families who live near poor communities in need of help would be able to participate. In addition, private-sector charities seeking to inform people about their missions would reach out to groups such as schools and churches whose membership often encompasses a wide range of incomes.
56
SENIORS 2009
AT: Fraud
Turn- the CTC gives individuals an incentive to watch for fraudulent operations Matthews 98 [Merill, vice president of domestic policy for the National Center for Policy Analysis, a nonpartisan, nonprofit public-policy research
Fraud would increase under a decentralized system.
Its hard to imagine fraud thriving any more than under the old federal-state system. However, we could put safeguards into place. For example, existing IRS regulations governing nonprofit organizations prohibit the misuse of a charitable organization for personal or financial gain--and the charity tax credit would relax none of those restrictions. But the key to eliminating welfare fraud is to give individuals rather than bureaucrats an incentive to police the system by determining which charities provide the best value for their money.
If lifting the poor out of poverty is the goal, then government welfare programs have been a colossal failure. According to the Congressional Research Service, this country has spent more than $5 trillion on public welfare programs since 1960, yet the poor as a percentage of the total population has slightly increased, to about 15 percent.
57
SENIORS 2009
AT: CTC Dependency

CTC promotes self-sufficiency and creates room for broad, creative ways to help the poor- the antithesis of a government handout Barwick 98 [Peter, contributor to the Policy Review journal, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in
A liberal definition of charity. Some
conservatives dislike the charity tax credit because they believe that, by restricting eligible contributions to groups that provide direct assistance to the poor, it implicitly accepts a "liberal" definition of charity as a dependency-inducing handout. These critics argue that establishing such a credit will simply replace government handouts to the poor with private-sector charity that operates on the same model. In their view, public officials should stay out of the business of trying to define charity and
concentrate instead on creating the conditions under which the poor can escape poverty.
It is true that many private-sector charities have been compromised by a handout mentality. But this argument overlooks the ability of individual citizens to make discerning choices in their charitable giving and to create new forms of assistance that promote self-sufficiency. Such a position is at odds with conservative philosophy, which trusts the common-sense judgment of ordinary citizens. It is also challenged by the existence of the many charities that promote self-sufficiency while providing assistance to the poor.
A good example of such a group is Bridge of Hope, a Christian nonprofit based in eastern Pennsylvania that helps single mothers formerly on welfare achieve financial independence through employment. The program works by linking each participant with a "mentoring group" of 8 to 12 volunteers from a local church. The members of this group provide an indispensable network of support for the single mother and her children as she achieves self-sufficiency. Although relatively small, Bridge of Hope has been remarkably successful. Since it first began working with single mothers in 1989, more than two-thirds of the women it has helped have retained permanent housing and full-time employment. Over the past three years, the success rate has averaged more than 80 percent. We dont know how many groups like Bridge of Hope exist in the private charitable sector. Whatever the number, it is certainly not enough. However, this
is not an argument against the charity tax credit but for it, since a credit would help to spur the formation of more such groups, and would raise the profile of those that already exist. The credit envisioned here is specifically designed to promote these ends, in two ways. First, it adopts a broad definition of assistance, thereby making room for creative efforts to help the poor, such as microlending to encourage entrepreneurship. Second, by requiring qualifying groups to limit their advocacy and their dependence on government funding, it effectively excludes those groups most likely to adopt the handout mentality.
58
SENIORS 2009
Flip-Flop Link Charity/Tax Credits

Obama has pledged to cut funds for charitable organizations in his budget
Newsvine 09 [Obama Plan Would Reduce Charitable Deduction for Some Wealthy Donors, March 23,
http://wmolaw.newsvine.com/_news/2009/03/23/2585671-obama-plan-would-reduce-charitable-deduction-for-some-wealthy-donors]
In a document outlining his 2010 budget plans, the president proposes to limit the tax rate for itemized deductions at 28 percent for families making more than $250,000. That would reduce by as much as 20 percent the amount wealthy taxpayers could reduce their federal tax payments for charitable donations. Under the current system, taxpayers who are in the 33 percent or 35 percent tax brackets use that rate to claim deductions.
59
SENIORS 2009
Tax Credits Unpopular

Recent tax exemption program proves deductions to charities are unpopular
Marr 09 [Chuck, contributor a the Planned Giving Design Center, a news site on charities, MAINTAINING CURRENT VALUE OF ITEMIZED
DEDUCTIONS FOR HIGH-INCOME TAXPAYERS COULD HELP PAY FOR HEALTH CARE REFORM, June 10, http://www.pgdc.com/pgdc/cbpprecommends-congress-retain-value-itemized-deductions-high-income-taxpayers]
Under this proposal, the banker in the example cited above would still receive a higher subsidy rate on his or her home purchase and charitable donations than the teacher, but the advantage would shrink from 20 cents on the dollar (35 minus 15) to 13 cents on
the dollar (28 minus 15). The tax treatment of itemized deductions would still be inequitable and inefficient, but less so.
Despite its merit, the proposal has generated considerable political opposition, in part because of overblown claims about its impact on charitable giving. Research about the effects of tax incentives on donations suggests that the proposal would reduce total charitable giving by a little less than 2 percent .[5]
Significant political opposition to CTCs Eisenberg, 99currently a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute. Prior to his coming to Georgetown in January 1999, he served for 23 years as Executive Director of the Center for Community Change, a national technical assistance and advocacy organization working with low income and minority organizations and constituencies throughout the country. (Pablo, Can a Charity Tax Credit Help the Poor? July, 1999-August, 1999, The American Prospect, lexis)
Substantial political opposition to the measure would also come from many other nonprofits that have either lost money in recent years or are currently struggling to make their budgets. Arts and culture groups, educational institutions, recreation groups, and main-stream health organizations are among those that would mobilize support against the charity tax credit. Many of these organizations do expend a portion of their funds on antipoverty activities, even though these are not a major part of their overall effort. If antipoverty groups had most-favored status, other nonprofits might reduce their work with low-income people on the grounds that it was more expensive for them to undertake it.
60
SENIORS 2009
Tax Credits Popular

Democratic leaders like legislation funding charities New York Times 6/25/09 [Obama and Congress Clash on How to Pay for Health Care, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/26/business/26cost.html] He proposed to collect a projected $267 billion over 10 years by making taxpayers in the top income tax brackets, now 33 percent and 35 percent, deduct their mortgage interest, state and local taxes and charitable donations at the 28 percent income tax rate. Democratic leaders immediately objected that that would hurt charities, universities and other entities dependent on taxdeductible donations, as well as taxpayers in high-tax cities and states, including New York City and other places home to Democratic leaders.
Liberal Congress proves- companies know theyll have an easier time securing funds for charitable organizations
Washington Examiner 6/26/09 [How the Left's charitable activists manipulate grants,
http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/columns/david-freddoso/David-Freddoso-on-how-the-Left-49172157.html]
Previously, The Examiner reported how the liberal NCRP and its directors have been both subtly and overtly threatening new federal regulations that would force foundations to give half their money to a narrow set of causes, and with few strings attached. The simplest explanation is that left-wing non-profits, hungry for more foundation money, see an opportunity for a liberal Congress to help their cause. But NCRP's stated reason deserves attention as well. NOTE- NCRP = National Council for Responsible Philanthropy, a charitable organization
CTCs will be supported by both sides of the aisle- liberals like supporting charity and conservatives like reducing the size of government Edlin, 5Professor of economics and law at the University of California at Berkeley, and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. He is coauthor with P. Areeda and L. Kaplow of the leading antitrust casebook. He was formerly the senior economist covering regulation, antitrust, and industrial organization at the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and has taught or held research positions at Yale, Stanford, and Columbia. Ph.D., J.D, Stanford, 1993; A.B., Princeton, 1998. (Aaron S, The Choose-your-Charity Tax: A Way to Incentivize Greater Giving, 2005, The Economists Voice, Vol 2, Issue 3, Article 3 < http://works.bepress.com/aaron_edlin/41/>)
The Choose-your-Charity Tax ought to garner bipartisan support. Liberals should like the tax, because it will route more money to their favorite causes. And conservatives should like it because it moots the problem they often raise: that big government bureaucracies are often ineffective and inefficient at dealing with problems. Conservatives favor private, not public solutionsand have long said that private charity is more efficient than higher taxes. In this case, they get the best of both worlds: The matching advantage of the tax system that I described above, and the ability to greatly amplify the thousand points of light that they see in private charities.
61
SENIORS 2009
Democrats Support Tax Credits

Liberals understand the importance of faith and welfare and should support charity tax credits accordingly Kuo, 97 (David, Fall 1997. Poverty 101: What Liberals and Conservatives Can Learn from Each Other The Brookings
Institution, < http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1997/fall_poverty_kuo.aspx> ) Liberals first. Faith matters. Ironically for a liberal welfare tradition that had its roots in religious revival, many of today's liberals acknowledge that religious faith is certainly a matter of importance, while ignoringor being actively hostile toits policy potential as a catalyst for radical change in people's lives. During the last welfare debate, for instance, Senator John Ashcroft's "charitable choice" provision to allow states to contract with private and religious charitable organizations using federal funds was broadly attacked by many on the left. Yet its basic purpose was simply to level the playing field for faithbased not-for-profits. Overwhelming evidence coming from groups as diverse as the Heritage Foundation and Public/Private Ventures suggests that faith is not only important, it may be the factor in determining whether an at-risk child, a welfare mother, or a convicted criminal is able to turn his or her life around. It is vital that political liberals embrace this idea. The next year will give them opportunities to do so: new efforts to encourage this kind of religious element in welfare include the charity tax credit and further implementation of charitable choicetype measures.
62
SENIORS 2009
Charities Oppose Tax Credits

Large charitable organizations like the United Way do not support CTCs, citing unintended consequences Waller, 01Director of The Mobility Agenda. Previously she was Visiting Fellow at the Brookings Institution, with a joint
appointment in the Economic Studies and Metropolitan Policy programs. Prior to Brookings, she was Senior Advisor on domestic policy in the Clinton-Gore White House. (Margy, The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, Charity Tax Credits: Federal Policy and Three Leaning States, May, 2001. < pewforum.org/publications/articles/charitytaxcredits.pdf >) United Way of America (UWA) has also stated that it does not support charity tax credits because the policy could have unintended consequences for the network of community based organizations which support human services as well as for the people and communities they serve. The issue statement indicates that UWA will not support proposals that displace existing funding or treat charitable donations differently depending on the subset of charities they benefit. UWA also supports tax proposals that increase overall charitable giving, and notes that there is no evidence that charity tax credits would do so.
63
SENIORS 2009
Conservatives Support Tax Credits

Conservatives would embrace tax credits because they would ultimately reduce public spending
Barwick 98 (Peter S. Barwick, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania,
and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit., et al. Charity Tax Creditsand Debits <http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html )
Beyond its practical benefits, a charity tax credit would address what is perhaps the fundamental weakness of the
conservative movement: its inability to articulate a vision of society that speaks to the sense of moral obligation people feel for the less fortunate. The goal is not simply a warmed-over version of the statist forms of "compassion" favored by liberals. Rather, the credit would help address the needs of the poor in a way that is consistent with the ideal of limited government and with the American tradition of active reliance upon the institutions of civil society. Another advantage of a charity tax credit is that it will target assistance to those most directly affected by welfare reform. So far, caseload
reduction has primarily involved those recipients easiest to employ. The real test will come over the next several years as work deadlines and lifetime limits on assistance kick in for the rest. If substantial suffering results, pressure will build to abandon these policies. A charity tax credit will help prevent this outcome and allow us to implement welfare reform as it was originally conceived. The purpose of the credit is not to create a token supplement to the welfare bureaucracy, but to begin shifting both resources and responsibility for assisting the poor from government to private-sector charity. To that end, a charity tax credit should reduce public spending--including spending on welfare programs--by a dollar for every dollar credited to taxpayers under the program . Conservatives would adore a CTCit would drastically remove the federal government from solving societys harms Eisenberg, 99currently a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute. Prior to his coming to Georgetown in January 1999, he served for 23 years as Executive Director of the Center for Community Change, a national technical assistance and advocacy organization working with low income and minority organizations and constituencies throughout the country. (Pablo, Can a Charity Tax Credit Help the Poor? July, 1999-August, 1999, The American Prospect, lexis)
Conservatives in Congress and elsewhere would like to see the federal government out of the poverty business, its role taken over by churches, nonprofits, and philanthropic institutions. A charity tax credit would accelerate such a transition. So would other tax credits and further domestic budget cuts.
64
SENIORS 2009
Conservatives Oppose Tax Credits

Conservatives fear CTCs will skew charitable giving and be a taxpayer subsidy Matthews et al 98vice president of domestic policy for the National Center for Policy Analysis, a nonpartisan, nonprofit
public-policy research institute based in Dallas, Texas. (Merrill Matthews, Peter S. Barwick, Grace Marie- Arnett, Stanley W. Carlson-Thies, Robert Rector, The Hoover Institution at Stanford University, Charity Tax CreditsAnd Debits, January and February, 1998. < http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html >) Apart from the question of how to pay for it, the charity tax credit has been criticized by a number of conservatives who fear that it will skew charitable giving toward direct provision of services rather than character-building institutions, and that it will amount to a taxpayer subsidy of public-policy advocacy by (mostly left-wing) charities. In Pennsylvania, a bill was recently introduced to establish a state-level version of the tax credit concept. Drafted with help from the Commonwealth Foundation, the legislation offers a 50 percent credit for donations to charities that directly help the poor.
65
SENIORS 2009
CTCs Dont Cost Political Capital

Charity tax credits deflect arguments from both parties Goodman, 01PhD, NCPA president and CEO of the National Center for Policy Analysis. (John C., National Center for
Policy Analysis, An answer to Critics of Mixing Faith, Charity, & Tax Dollars, May 14, 2001. <
http://www.ncpa.org/commentaries/an-answer-to-critics-of-mixing-faith-charity-tax-dollars> )
When taxpayers donated to a qualified charity, they would be permitted to claim a credit on their federal income tax returns. Ideally, each dollar donated would reduce a taxpayer's tax liability by one dollar. The loss of revenue from the tax credits would be offset by reductions in block grants or matching fund payments to the states in which the taxpayers reside. All the decisions would be made by individuals, not by government. And for that reason, taxpayer choice has none of the problems left- and right-wing critics are currently complaining about. We have a long tradition of allowing individuals to deduct contributions to religious institutions. Taxpayer choice would continue that tradition, allowing taxpayers to support those organizations they believe are the most effective. There would be no tax credit for donations to churches. There would be credits for donations to relief services organized by churches. But no one would have to subsidize someone else's religious views - either directly or indirectly.
66
SENIORS 2009
Free Market Unpopular (Congress)

The free-market is unpopular empirically proven AFP, 08 Americans For Prosperity is a Grassroots Libertarian Organization (Ed Frank and Phil Kerpen, 110th Congress Didn't "Make the Grade" on Free-Market Issues, Americans for Prosperity Scorecard Reveals, Accessed Online via Google, //MDP)
When it came to core free-market issues, the average U.S. lawmaker did not even vote with taxpayers half of the time on key votes, according to the grassroots free-market group Americans for Prosperity
(AFP), which released its 110th Congress Scorecard today. The Scorecard is based on 18 roll call votes in the House and 17 roll call votes in the Senate that include votes against tax hikes, in favor of fiscal discipline, against undue regulation, and for free trade. The full scorecard is available online at www.AmericansforProsperity.org. CLICK HERE. Citizens who want to know whether their federal legislators made the grade on taxpayer issues can consult our Key Vote Scorecard, which grades
on average, lawmakers voted more often in favor of big-government special interests than with taxpayers interests. Our scorecard is a useful tool for citizens to see how their individual lawmakers stack up, and where there is need for improvement. AFP identified 18 key Senate votes and 17 key House votes that would have a significant positive or negative impact on the growth of government .
lawmakers on their efforts to restrain the growth of government, said AFP President Tim Phillips. Unfortunately,
Among those were votes on misguided proposals to eliminate the secret ballot in union organizing elections, expand the State Childrens Health Insurance Program, implement a cap-and-trade regulatory regime, and hike taxes on domestic oil producers. On the flip side, AFP also scored votes on proposals to implement earmark reform measures, permanently repeal the death tax, and preserve the 2001 and 2003 tax cuts.
67
SENIORS 2009
Free Market Popular

There is bipartisan support for free market policies and bipartisan opposition to central planning Rasmussen, 09 Rasmussen Reports is a Political Think-tank that Analyzes Congressional Opinion and Public Opinion Trends (Support for Free Market Economy Up Seven Points Since December, Accessed Via Google, www.rasmussenreports.com, //MDP)
Seventy-seven percent (77%) of U.S. voters say that they prefer a free market economy over a government-managed economy. Thats up seven points since December. just 11% now prefer a government-run economy , down from 15% four months ago. Free markets are preferred by 94% of Republicans , 64% of Democrats and 78% of those not affiliated with either major party. Adults under 30 favor free markets by a 79% to eight percent (8%) margin.
The latest Rasmussen Reports national telephone survey also found that
Support for free markets does not equal support for a purely laissez faire approach, however. Voters are evenly divided over the need for more government regulation of big business: 46% support the idea, and 43% are opposed. In December, 52% favored more regulation, and only 35% were opposed. (Want a free daily e-mail update? Sign up now. If it's in the news, it's in our polls.) Rasmussen Reports updates also available on Twitter. The 77% support for free markets provides an interesting contrast to another recent survey which found that just 53% prefer capitalism over socialism. It appears that many people make a significant distinction between capitalism and a free market economy. Free
markets are seen in a better light than capitalism because of the recent behavior by Americas largest corporations , notes
Scott Rasmussen, founder and publisher of Rasmussen Reports. Its hard for people to embrace a system that lets big business keep profits in good times and then asks for taxpayer bailouts when times are tough. If thats the way capitalism is perceived, it should be no surprise that people prefer free markets . Seventy percent (70%) of voters believe that big business and big government are generally on the same team working against the interests of consumers and investors. A plurality of voters (46%) say that small businesses benefit more from free markets than big business. Thirty-five percent (35%) hold the opposite view. Most Democrats think big businesses benefit more from free markets, while most Republicans and unaffiliated voters say small businesses are more likely to benefit. By a 62% to 23% margin, voters also believe that small businesses are hurt more by regulations than big business. This finding is likely driven by public understanding of the way Congress works. Earlier surveys found that 68% say most business leaders contribute to political campaigns primarily because the government can do so much to help or hurt their business. Other data shows that 59% of American adults believe that when members of Congress meet with regulators and other government officials, they do so to help their friends and hurt their political opponents. In a solid display of agreement across party lines, a majority of
most Americans still think that the federal bailouts were a bad idea. But Americas Political Class holds an entirely different view. A number of
Democrats, Republicans and unaffiliateds share this view. Looking back, same time,
indicators suggest some growing short-term optimism about the economy along with a decline in long-term optimism. At the
there is a growing concern that the government may do too much in responding to the nations economic crunch. The image of corporate CEOs has hit rock bottom as they are viewed less favorably
than members of Congress. Small business owners are viewed in a very positive light.
Big government policies are publically unpopular Toomey, 08 President of the Club for Growth (Patrick J., Swing Voters Not for Big Government, Accessed Via Google, http://reddauphin.com/5/Swing_Voters_Not_for_Big_Government, //MDP)
they should not mistake their victory for a big-government mandate. The evidence tells a very different story . A poll commissioned by the Club for Growth in 12 swing congressional districts over the past weekend shows that the voters who made the difference in this election still prefer less government -- lower taxes, less spending and less regulation -- to Sen. Obama's economic liberalism. Turns out, Americans didn't vote for Mr. Obama and Democratic congressional
Barack Obama and congressional Democrats won big on Tuesday night, but candidates because they support their redistributionist agenda, but because they are fed up with the Republican politicians in office. This was a classic "throw the bums out" election, rather than an embrace of the policy views of those who will replace them.
68
SENIORS 2009
Free Market Popular (Republicans)

Republicans hate big government and prefer the free-market WSJ, 06 Wall Street Journal (Bridge to Somewhere The House GOP needs a new generation of leaders, Online at the Wall Street Journal, http://www.opinionjournal.com/editorial/feature.html?id=110009222, //MDP)
As they lick their wounds, Republicans are no doubt wondering what went wrong and what to do now. The answers aren't all that complicated: Revive the reform convictions that earned them power in the 1990s, and start that process in the House of Representatives by electing a new slate of leaders. Twelve years ago, the Newt Gingrich-led Republicans swept into power as reformers who ran against corruption and pledged to make government "smaller and smarter." Somehow, across the years, that conviction was replaced by Tom DeLay and the quest for permanent incumbency, Appropriations Chairman Jerry Lewis and the "earmark" brigade, and a retinue of Beltway retainers symbolized by Jack Abramoff. The current leadership let it all happen, and if Republicans want a shot at regaining control in 2008 they'll turn to a new generation to lead them. If we had to pick the precise moment when House Republicans lost their way, it would be three years ago during the floor vote over the Medicare prescription drug bill. So unpopular was the bill among conservatives, and rightly so, that House leaders kept the vote open for an unheard of three hours as they dragooned reluctant Members to vote aye . The other great symbol of GOP failure is the proliferation of earmarked spending. In 1994 there were 1,500 such projects stuffed into Democratic spending bills, and Republicans called this a fiscal disgrace . This year Republicans approved closer to 15,000 earmarks at a cost of more than $10 billion. The current leadership defended this earmarking even after such embarrassments as the Alaska Bridge to Nowhere were exposed. When they finally agreed to minimal transparency, it was too late. Here's one telling exit poll result: In battleground districts, only one in five voters said Republicans would do a better job to "keep government spending under control"; almost twice as many voters said Democrats would do a better job. Yet this week a separate poll found that 59% of
Americans still favor fewer government services and lower taxes compared with 28% who favor more government services and higher taxes . "Big government conservatism" was a nice think-tank
proposition; it merely lacks support from actual voters.
69
SENIORS 2009
Urban Homesteads CP 1NC

Text The United States Supreme Court should strike down all obstacles to urban homesteading that does not violate property rights. Johnson, 07 Writer and Analyst for The Freeman The flagship publican of the Foundation for Economic Education (Charles, December 2007, Scratching By: How Government Creates Poverty as We Know It, December 2007, Volume 57, Issue 10, www.thefreemanonline.org, //MDP)
In a free market, vacant lots and abandoned buildings could eventually be homesteaded by anyone willing to do the work of occupying and using them . Poor people could use abandoned spaces within their own communities for setting up shop , for gardening, or for living space. In Miami, in October 2006, a group of community organizers and about 35 homeless people built Umoja Village , a shanty town, on an inner-city lot that the local government had kept vacant for years . They publicly stated to the local government that We have only one demand . . . leave us alone. That would be the end of the story in a free market : there would be no eminent domain, no government ownership, and thus also no political process of seizure and redevelopment; once-homeless people could establish property rights to abandoned land through their own sweat equitywithout fear of the governments demolishing their work and selling their land out from under them . But back in Miami, the city attorney and city council took about a month to begin legal efforts to destroy the residents homes and force them off the lot. In April 2007 the city police took advantage of an accidental fire to enforce its politically
Urban Homesteading fabricated title to the land, clearing the lot, arresting 11 people, and erecting a fence to safeguard the once-again vacant lot for professional affordable housing developers. Had the city government not made use of its supposed title to the abandoned land, it no doubt could have made use of state and federal building codes to ensure that residents would be forced back into homelessnessfor their own safety, of course. That is in fact what a county health commission in Indiana did to a 93-year-old man named Thelmon Green, who lived in his 86 Chevrolet van, which the local towing company allowed him to keep on its lot. Many people thrown into poverty by a sudden financial catastrophe live out of a car for weeks or months until they get back on their feet. Living in a car is cramped, but it beats living on the streets: a car means a place you can have to yourself, which holds your possessions, with doors you can lock, and sometimes even air conditioning and heating. But staying in a car over the long term is much harder to manage without running afoul of the law. Thelmon Green got by well enough in his van for ten years, but when the Indianapolis Star printed a human-interest story on him last December, the county health commission took notice and promptly ordered Green evicted from his own van, in the name of the local housing code. Since
government housing codes impose detailed requirements on the size , architecture, and building materials for new permanent housing , as well as on specialized and extremely expensive contract work for electricity, plumbing, and other luxuries, they effectively obstruct or destroy most efforts to create transitional , intermediate, or informal sorts of shelter that cost less than rented space in government-approved housing projects , but provide more safety and comfort than living on the street .
70
SENIORS 2009
Health Care Tax Credit 1NC

The United States federal government should phase out _______________________________. The Internal Revenue Service government should create a refundable, advanceable, and assignable universal tax credit for health insurance for _______________________. The counterplan solves health care for all Americans with a non-coercive and politically popular option. Free market approaches lowering taxes and limiting government involvement in health care are key to successful health care. Blevins, 97 (Susan A, President of the Institute for Health Freedom, Restoring Health Freedom: The Case for Universal Tax
Credit for Health Insurance Policy Analysis, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-290es.html) Instead of continuing the current employer-based tax exclusion policy that limits employees choice of health plans, the government should eliminate it and replace it with a universal tax credit Unlike current tax exemptions, a universal tax credit would neither discriminate against those who purchased health insurance individually (by giving a preference to those who purchased insurance through employers) nor reward those who paid for health care services through insurance rather than out of pocket. A universal tax credit would render neutral the government's treatment of health insurance taxation, thus allowing individuals to purchase health insurance and health care in the way that best meets their needs. The credit amount should be a flat amount for all taxpayers. A flat tax credit for health insurance would most benefit lower income families. Here is why: The CBO estimates that the average tax subsidy for employment-based health insurance was $690 per family in 1994. The subsidy amount ranged from $10 for lower income families to $1,390 for families earning over $200,000.The universal health insurance tax credit policy would correct that by increasing the amount of subsidy that currently goes to middle-income workers. By capping the total amount of the tax credit, we can minimize the amount of distortion caused by granting a tax preference to health care as opposed to other goods or services. While it is important to treat all health care equally, which the tax credit does, it is also important not to dramatically expand current distortions in the system. While the tax relief for some families will be less than that provided by the current exclusion, those families can compensate by moving to a low-cost, high-deductible policy combined with a tax-deductible MSA. High-deductible insurance plans make more economic sense in any event, because they lead to less health care consumption and lower costs. In determining the amount of the tax credit, the first question to ask is, Should the new universal tax credit be budget neutral? Some advocates of less government would answer no. In fact, they would argue that there should be no ceiling placed on the amount of money that Americans can exclude from taxation for health insurance. But in today's political environment, where politicians are more focused on balancing the federal budget than on actually reducing the overall size of government, it would be difficult, if not impossible, to implement a tax credit policy for health insurance that costs more than today's employersponsored tax subsidy. For that reason, this study calls for a budget neutral universal tax credit for health insurance. A budget neutral universal tax credit for health insurance could be implemented by distributing the current $74 billion tax subsidy equally among some 108 million families; each family would receive an average of $690 in 1994 dollars.
71
SENIORS 2009
Health Care Tax Credit 2NC [1/2]

The counterplan solves more efficiently through eliminating dependency and gives health care for all citizens avoids coercive action and is netcost saving to the status quo. Blevins, 97 (Susan A, President of the Institute for Health Freedom, Restoring Health Freedom: The Case for Universal Tax
Credit for Health Insurance Policy Analysis, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-290es.html) In designing the universal tax credit policy, four rules should be followed. First, the health insurance tax subsidy should be distributed as tax credits, not refundable vouchers. Tax credits are much more efficient than vouchers. If the tax subsidy were handed out in the form of vouchers, many Americans might come to view the voucher as a "right"--the way they view Medicare. And if health care costs continued to climb as they have during the past few decades, consumers would likely demand higher voucher amounts to offset increased health insurance costs. Credits, on the other hand, have several advantages. They make the cost of health care more obvious to taxpayers, they lead consumers to demand more for their money, and they give consumers greater control over their health care choices. At the same time, credits reduce the amount of red tape necessary to distribute taxpayer-financed health care dollars. Second, the tax credits should be administered by the federal treasury and should be tied to the existing tax system. Under the universal tax credit policy, all taxpayers would qualify for a credit against their annual income for all or part of the amount they spent on (1) health insurance, (2) out-of-pocket health care costs, and (3) contributions to a medical savings account for the previous year. Also, the tax credit should be made available on all federal income tax forms, including Forms E-Z and 1040A. That would give help to lower income citizens who do not typically itemize their tax deductions. Third, tax credits should go directly to individuals--not to special-interest groups such as the insurance industry--to avoid interest-group pressures. In the past, special-interest groups have heavily influenced programs that rely on the federal government for monetary disbursements. For example, industry groups such as the American Medical Association, the American Hospital Association, Blue Cross, Blue Shield, and the American Nursing Home Association designed Medicares administrative provisions. Senior citizens had very little role, if any, in designing Medicare coverage and payment systems. It is no surprise that Medicare restricts consumer choice. Fourth, because the government should not influence where insurance is purchased and how health care is paid for, the tax credit should cover insurance (whether employer provided or individually purchased), contributions to MSAs, and out-of-pocket health care expenses. The credit could be used to pay any health care providers or for services currently allowed as deductible expenses by the Internal Revenue Service. Those services are listed in Appendix 2. All told, the universal tax credit for health insurance is an efficient and fair way to help Americans gain greater control over their health care choices. If individuals did not like the choice of providers and treatments covered under their employer-sponsored health insurance plans, they would be free to buy other plans without paying higher taxes. That is especially important for the 48 percent of American workers who are offered only one health plan. The universal tax credit should be considered a viable policy option for covering the uninsured while restoring health freedom for all individuals.
72
SENIORS 2009
Health Care Tax Credit 2NC [2/2]

Health care tax credits solve equitable health care for everyone in America alternatives distort the market and fail to solve
Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005 Today, the tax code creates a significant tax advantage for those with employer-sponsored coverage by exempting the total value of the benefit from a workers taxable income. This distorts the health insurance market by favoring coverage obtained through the place of work and stifles the advancement of other coverage options. The Advisory Panels report brings attention to this distortion by suggesting a cap on the current, unlimited tax break found in employer-sponsored coverage.[1] Regrettably, however, the Panel chose not to recommend redirecting these revenues to help those who are most in need but who receive no assistance under the current health care system, leaving them either to buy private coverage without a comparable tax benefit or simply to go without. Forgoing this opportunity to expand coverage and increase private participation in the health insurance markets would be a major mistake. The Opportunity Congress should seize the opportunity offered by the Presidents Advisory Panel to make funda mental changes in the way the federal tax code treats health care benefits and to establish a system that is more equitable and efficient than the one that exists today. Members of Congress should go beyond the Advisory Panels recommendations and adopt a system of health care tax credits that offers an alternative for those who are not in the employer-dominated health insurance system. Ideally, the current employer exclusion should be replaced with a system of universal, individual health care tax credits. Such a system would: End the dramatic government discrimination against individuals who do not or cannot get health insurance at the place of work; Encourage the retention of insurance coverage in the transition between jobs or during spells of unemployment; Promote continuity of care for individuals who have come to rely on a specific set of doctors or medical specialists; and Encourage the efficient utilization of scarce resources, particularly federal subsidies, to directly assist those most in need. Individual health care tax credits are the best single approach to accomplishing these worthy objectives. [2] To offer health care tax credits to employers, who already receive a tax break for offering health insurance as a cost of doing business, would be to miss the point of this reform. Offering health care tax credits to employers would simply perpetuate the restriction of personal health care choice and the lack of portability in health care coverage, as well as undermine the freemarket competition that would otherwise obtain in a robust consumer-driven market. There are some basic design features that would make an individual tax credit most effective. Most notably, it should be refundable, advanceable, and assignable. There also are various other design choices that Congress should consider to tailor a credits scope and reach.
73
SENIORS 2009
Government-based Health Care Fail/CP Key to Solve

Current health care discriminates against the majority of the country and distorts the market ensures many are inevitably uncovered Blevins, 97 (Susan A, President of the Institute for Health Freedom, Restoring Health Freedom: The Case for Universal Tax
Credit for Health Insurance Policy Analysis, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-290es.html) While there is no doubt that Americans have lost control over their selection of health care benefits during the past decade, some economists argue that Americans have voluntarily given up their health freedom. They claim that if employees do not like the choice of providers and treatments covered under their employer-sponsored health insurance plan, they are free to buy another plan. For example, it has been noted that federal employees voluntarily purchase their health insurance through the Federal Employee Health Benefits Program (FEHBP).19 No law requires federal employees or other workers to purchase health insurance through their employers. But the current tax law does force workers to pay higher taxes if they buy health insurance on their own.20 Table 2 shows that a worker earning $25,000 per year would have to pay $540 more for health insurance if he purchased it individually rather than through his employer. In that way, the government manipulates the health insurance market, making employer-based insurance the preferred option for workers. The major problem with today's health insurance tax law is summarized by Rashi Fein, professor of the economics of medicine at Harvard Medical School: The influence of the way the tax system allocates its rewards and exacts its penalties should never be underestimated. Just as home ownership is stimulated by the deductibility of mortgage interest and local property tax payments, so the development of health insurance was stimulated by the tax code. But in addition, the code provided an incentive that shaped a particular (and inequitable) set of institutional arrangements. It did not assist individual enrollment or even group enrollment per se (such as neighborhood, religious, or fraternal associations). Rather, it subsidized the purchase of health insurance only when the employer paid the premium. It thus linked health insurance to employment. In doing so, the tax code molded the nature of American health insurance, its availability and distribution. In extending benefits to some, the tax code discriminated against others.21
Current health care ensures dependency and distorts the market terminally turns solvency for people in the health care system Blevins, 97 (Susan A, President of the Institute for Health Freedom, Restoring Health Freedom: The Case for Universal Tax
Credit for Health Insurance Policy Analysis, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-290es.html) Nobel laureate economist Milton Friedman explains that the current tax law affects the cost and choice of health care benefits in two ways: (1) It leads workers to rely on employers, rather than themselves, to finance and manage health care. (2) It leads workers to take a larger fraction of total compensation in the form of health care. Friedman concludes, If the tax exemption [for health insurance] were removed, employees could bargain with their employers for higher take-home pay in lieu of health care, and provide for their own health care, either by dealing directly with health care providers or through purchasing health insurance.22 The current tax law also encourages workers to join HMOs. In cases in which employers offer insurance only through an HMO,23 workers are forced to choose the HMO or forgo the tax exclusion for health insurance altogether.24 Thus, most people accept the health insurance plans offered by their employers, even if that means joining an HMO. Scott Holleran, executive director of Americans for Free Choice in Medicine, notes, Government virtually created managed care in the form of HMOs and encourages them through a tax code that forces Americans to get their health insurance through their employer. Don't blame the market for what the government has done to our system. The free market didn't create HMOs; government did.25 The growth in HMOs did not occur in the free market; it was spawned by federal legislation in 1973.26 Backed by the Nixon administration and Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.), the HMO legislation required employers to offer workers the option of joining an HMO.27 The number of Americans enrolled in HMOs grew Page 9 from 6 million in 1976 to more than 46 million in 1995.28 Today, some 70 percent of private employees are enrolled in some form of managed care.29 Keep in mind that employers often determine the price a worker pays for health insurance, so employers can set prices that encourage workers to join HMOs. The true demand for HMOs remains unknown, given that the federal tax law and HMO legislation have distorted the market.
74
SENIORS 2009
Current Health Care Fails [1/2]

Current employer-based health care fails those without employer-based coverage always lose coverage 80% of those without insurance are part of a working household Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Persistent Problems. While the employer exclusion for employer-sponsored coverage may work for some Americans, there are many other reasons why a health care system dominated by employer-based coverage can be problematic. First, the federal tax code does little for workers and their families who do not have access to employer-based coverage. Over 80 percent of the uninsured are part of a working household.[10] Some workers are not offered coverage at the place of work. Nearly 22 million workers are uninsured because their employer does not offer coverage. [11] This is a growing problem in the small-business sector, where fewer and fewer small employers are providing health care coverage. Some workers do not qualify for coverage through the place of work, even though their employer may offer coverage. For example, an individual may not work enough hours to qualify for benefits. Others choose not to participate in their employers coverage because of cost, other options such as coverage through a spouse, or other rea sons. Finally, some uninsured Americans do not work and thus do not have access to an employer-based policy.
Tax credit-based systems are key to personal choice only a free market can avoid this profound violation of personal choice and conscience Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Second, todays employer-based system limits personal choice. Workers must depend on their employers to select a plan and a plan design to meet their personal health care needs. Employers attempt to offer their employees health plans that will satisfy the diverse needs of their workforce. In large firms, a choice of plans is common practice. The situation, however, is very different with small firms. Today, 81 percent of small firms those with from three to 199 employeesoffer just one plan.[12] Ultimately, this one-size-fits-all approach does not and cannot accommodate diverse individual needs or preferences for coverage. Employers often do the best they can, but in order to control rising costs, they secure contracts with insurers or managed care companies that micromanage benefits, medical treatments, proce dures, or access to specialists. The result: employee dissatisfaction and more labormanage ment disputes. The bitter congressional Patients Bill of Rights debate in the late 1990s exposed the high level of patient and physician frustration with managed care arrangements that limited access on the basis of third-party determinations of medical neces sity. Also evident was great dissatisfaction with health plan choices made by employers relative to HMO gatekeepers or restrictive provider networks. Curiously, instead of doing the right thing and taking steps to expand patient choice and ownership of medical plans and procedures, the major congressional bills passed by the House and Senate would have added new avenues of litigation to the health care system, combined with a massive new layer of costly federal regulation of private health plans, driving the costs of health care even higher and pricing even more families out of the health care market. [13] Beyond the issue of access to medical treatments and procedures, there is the increasingly important issue of the ethical conflict involved in forcing individuals and families to pay for certain medical treatments and procedures that they may consider objectionable. For example, a worker and his family may have a serious moral objection to paying for abortions through their insurance premiums, but the employers health plan may include abortion in its standard coverage. Conversely, a worker may feel it is his or her right to purchase coverage for abortion or other procedures, but the employer may refuse to cover these procedures. Forcing Americans to pay through premiums for certain procedures they find morally objectionable or unethical is a profound violation of personal choice and conscience. With advances in biomedical research, such as the growth of medical treatments based on embryonic stem cell research, reproductive cloning, or genetic manipulation, Americans ethical and moral dilemmas will only become more pronounced as health coverage based on the fruits of this rapidly advancing research for medical treat ments expands.[14]
75
SENIORS 2009
Current Health Care Fails [2/2]

Health care coverage lacks portability disrupts continuity in care and causes frequent losses of insurance Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Third, employer-based coverage lacks portability. It is no longer typical, as it was when employer-sponsored coverage began, for an individual to get a job and health coverage at age 18 with a local manufacturer and remain with that employer until retirement. Todays workforce is far more mobile and does not fit well with a static employer-based health care system. Every time a worker leaves a job, he or she must leave coverage behind.[15] Workers at all income levels risk losing coverage when they change jobs, are laid off, take a temporary leave of absence from the workforce, or retire early. This loss or change in health care coverage also disrupts continuity in care. Each time a person changes jobs, and thus coverage, the persons access to the existing network of doctors, special ists, and other medical providers is placed at risk. This is bad health policy. Moreover, there is little incentive for employersespecially those in the small-business sector, where workers often change jobs for reasons as simple as a higher wageto invest limited resources in treatments and preventive measures for a temporary workforce, especially if these investments do not result in immediate savings to the companys bottom line.
76
SENIORS 2009
AT: Problems with CP Mechanism/Defense of Mechanisms

Refundability is key replacing billions of dollars of taxpayer subsidies creates an efficient, transparent mechanism to replace employer exclusion Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Basic Design Features. Three basic features are universally accepted, as well as programmatically desirable and policy consistent, in the design of an individual health care tax credit. Specifically, a credit should be: Refundable. A refundable health care tax credit would ensure that an individual, even one that owed little or nothing in taxes, would be eligible to receive the creditin effect a direct subsidy for the purchase of health care coverage. While some in Congress may object to the creation of yet another low-income subsidy, it should be recognized that an individual refundable tax credit could replace the current employer exclusion. In fact, The Heritage Foundation has proposed such an approach.[27] At a minimum, Congress could replace the existing set of billions of dollars in taxpayer subsidies for health care provided through public programs and uncompensated care for the uninsured. It would be a far more efficient, effective, and transparent subsidy than the disjointed and costly taxpayer mandates that exist today. The inescapable consequence of not mainstreaming low-income Americans into private coverage through this sort of direct subsidy is continued growth in the number of the uninsured and increased taxpayer funding of an inefficient system of uncompensated care and public programs.
Advanceability is key allows recipients to claim credit up-front, ensuring insurability for low-income individuals Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Advanceable. An advanceable tax credit would allow individual credit recipients to claim the credit up front when insurance premiums are due rather than wait until the end of the year for reimbursement. This would ensure that the subsidy is available for application in a timely fashiona particularly desirable feature for low-income individuals who may have limited disposable resources, which the credit is intended to relieve.
Assignability is key allows effective outreach and a strong participation rate Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Assignable. An assignable tax credit would be forwarded directly and automatically to the insurer of the tax credit recipients choice, leaving only the balance, if any, to be billed to the recipient.[28] This is a key feature advanced by the Bush Administration in its health care tax credit proposal. Congress might wish to add another feature to encourage a stronger participation rate: a system of automatic enrollment through the place of work, or through some other entity, to qualify individuals for the credit. This could also facilitate the provision of plan information from a menu of available coverage options.[29] It is imperative that the basic design features make the process of applying and receiving that tax credit as simple as possible. In a recent analysis of an existing tax credit, the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) tax credit, Economic and Social Research Institute policy analyst Stan Dorn and his co-authors conclude, among other things, that the tax credit process must have effective outreach and be consumer friendly.[30]
77
SENIORS 2009
AT: Medicaid/Focus on Uninsured Key

Focusing on all individuals, regardless of insurance status, is crucial for successful health care multiple warrants Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
It is certainly reasonable to argue that in the current fiscal situation, it is most urgent to help the currently uninsured. Not only do these individuals have no consistent medical protection, whether from catastrophic health emergencies or other problems, but they also are a drain on existing taxpayer-funded, uncompensated care. However, it can also be argued that a tax credit focused only on the uninsured is unfair and raises serious unintended consequences and equity issues. Limiting a credit only to the currently uninsured ignores those similarly situated individuals who take responsibility and purchase coverage on their own without preferential tax treatment. Furthermore, it also could encourage those with existing coverage to drop it, creating a gap in coverage, in order to qualify for the credit. Recommendation. It is far more preferable to treat all individuals equitably and not further segment eligibility based on existing coverage. Such an approach would avoid the conflict of penalizing individuals who sacrifice to obtain coverage while rewarding those who do not. Finally, focusing solely on the uninsured does not address the core failures of the current health care system; all it does is provide a stopgap to those who fall through the cracks.
Medicaid fails fraud, waste, and over-bureaucratic regulation New York Times, At Clinic, Hurdles to Clear Before Medicaid Care, October 17, 2005
The program - which consumes more than one-third of the state budget - is vulnerable to fraud and abuse by unscrupulous providers, wasting billions of dollars annually, experts and government officials say. But New York does less than other states to police payments to hospitals, nursing homes and ambulette companies, or to prosecute the guilty. And yet, life at Morris Heights makes clear how keenly New York scrutinizes ordinary patients trying to get into Medicaid, in the name of ensuring that ineligible people cannot slip through. "We do a better job than we'd do if we didn't have all of these requirements in place," said Dennis P. Whalen, executive deputy commissioner of the State Department of Health. But experts say that kind of cheating is a small part of Medicaid fraud. The problem, says Elisabeth Benjamin, former chief of health law at the Legal Aid Society, is that "the state looks at each applicant as a potential criminal." Yet the typical people striving to enroll in Medicaid are poor children and their mothers, clients who cost relatively little to cover. Children and able-bodied adults - mostly women - are about three-quarters of New York's Medicaid patients but account for about one-quarter of the expenses. Those costs pale next to what the state spends caring for disabled and elderly patients, who account for more than 70 percent of the spending - partly because New York spends far more than other states on services like nursing homes, home care and hospitals, while scrimping on the most basic form of care, doctor visits. Devoting more effort to screening ordinary patients than to examining providers "is pretty ludicrous," said Robert Goldberg, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, a conservative group critical of Medicaid. "Where they're looking isn't where the major money is, or where the major fraud is."
78
SENIORS 2009
AT: Perm Do Both

1. Perm severs - counterplan involves phase-out of ________, mutually exclusive with plan text voting issue for destroying negative counterplan ground 2. Perm still links 1NC Blevins evidence indicates that involving the government in directly providing insurance or a government equivalent such as Medicaid or Medicare for those in poverty always fails subsequent market distortion destroys the health care industrys ability to successfully fund the system and prevents those in need from getting insurance counterplan is necessary and sufficient to solve 3. Perm fails and links to politics eliminating superfluous spending necessary to solve Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
While some in Congress may object to the creation of yet another low-income subsidy, it should be recognized that an individual refundable tax credit could replace the current employer exclusion. In fact, The Heritage Foundation has proposed such an approach.[27] At a minimum, Congress could replace the existing set of billions of dollars in taxpayer subsidies for health care provided through public programs and uncompensated care for the uninsured. It would be a far more efficient, effective, and transparent subsidy than the disjointed and costly taxpayer mandates that exist today. The inescapable consequence of not mainstreaming low-income Americans into private coverage through this sort of direct subsidy is continued growth in the number of the uninsured and increased taxpayer funding of an inefficient system of uncompensated care and public programs.
79
SENIORS 2009
AT: Universal v. Targeted Care

Regardless of targeting, either approach works Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
The initialand unavoidablepolicy question for Congress focuses on the extent of change in the health care system that Members wish to design for the American people. If policymakers want a comprehensive approach to unravel decades of outdated health care policy, they could do so by instituting a universal credit that replaces the currently com plex health tax policy with a system of individually based tax credits. Individuals would receive a tax credit that would be used to pay for private health insurance premiums and other medical expenses.[31] If policymakers choose incremental change and focus on the problem of the uninsured, a tax credit targeted to a specific group or population could be designed. Such a targeted tax credit could be designed broadly to be available to individuals who purchase private health care coverage on their own, or it could be designed more narrowly to target subgroups, such as lowincome individuals or those working for small businesses. Nonetheless, policymakers should be aware that the more targeted the credit, the more complexity it brings to the tax code, thereby engendering a new set of administrative issues. The most common tax credit proposals target credits to lower-income individuals who lack employer-sponsored coverage. The Bush Administration has proposed such a credit, and variations of this approach have been proposed in Congress.[32] However, credits have been even more narrowly designed. In 2002, the President signed into law the Trade Act of 2002, which provides a health care tax credit to TAA workers who lose their jobs due to expanded international trade and to Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation beneficiaries.[33] Others have suggested extending such credits to all unemployed workers.[34] Tax credits could also focus on workers in the small-business sector that do not have coverage. [35] This is certainly a promising option since roughly eight out of 10 of the nations uninsured are found in working families and are disproportionately concentrated in small firms.
Focusing on all individuals, regardless of insurance status, is crucial for successful health care multiple warrants Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
It is certainly reasonable to argue that in the current fiscal situation, it is most urgent to help the currently uninsured. Not only do these individuals have no consistent medical protection, whether from catastrophic health emergencies or other problems, but they also are a drain on existing taxpayer-funded, uncompensated care. However, it can also be argued that a tax credit focused only on the uninsured is unfair and raises serious unintended consequences and equity issues. Limiting a credit only to the currently uninsured ignores those similarly situated individuals who take responsibility and purchase coverage on their own without preferential tax treatment. Furthermore, it also could encourage those with existing coverage to drop it, creating a gap in coverage, in order to qualify for the credit. Recommendation. It is far more preferable to treat all individuals equitably and not further segment eligibility based on existing coverage. Such an approach would avoid the conflict of penalizing individuals who sacrifice to obtain coverage while rewarding those who do not. Finally, focusing solely on the uninsured does not address the core failures of the current health care system; all it does is provide a stopgap to those who fall through the cracks.
80
SENIORS 2009
Coercion Net Benefit

Counterplan key to solve true health freedom and prevent coercive government involvement Blevins, 97 (Susan A, President of the Institute for Health Freedom, Restoring Health Freedom: The Case for Universal Tax
Credit for Health Insurance Policy Analysis, http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa-290es.html) The Health Freedom of Choice Index shows that today's HMOs and fee-for-service health insurance plans restrict consumers' freedom to choose their physicians and treatments. Those restrictions are the result of federal tax law. Current tax law virtually forces Americans to purchase their health insurance through their employers, rather than individually or through private associations. Consequently, many Americans are being shepherded into HMOs. Also, consumers are turning to government mandates as a way of getting their health care needs met, which raises prices even for those who would prefer cheaper, less comprehensive plans. The United States can help restore health freedom in the 21st century--without mandates-by changing the current tax law. The universal tax credit policy would give Americans the freedom to choose their own health insurance, whether fee-for-service plans, HMOs, or MSAs. Individuals would also be free to purchase their health insurance individually; through their employers; or through professional associations, churches, or labor unions. No existing health reform proposal or government mandate comes close to restoring that amount of freedom to health care.
Tax-funded health care is coercive mandatory charity only actual charitable tax credits solve Brian T. Schwartz, Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the University of Colorado, Graduate Science and Technology
Policy Fellow at the National Academy of Sciences, Eliminating the Charitable Tax Deduction: 3 Letters, Denver Post, March 30, 2009 Joel Steins commentary against tax-deductible charitable donations is penny-wise but pound-foolish. By favoring some types of spending and punishing others, the tax deduction indeed violates our freedom to spend our earnings as we please. He suggests that the increased tax revenue from eliminating the deduction could help pay for health care. But compared to the tax deduction, this is a much worse violation of our freedoms. Tax-funded health care is mandatory charity. Unlike voluntary charities, government charities need not compete for and earn your donations. The penalty for tax evasion effectively encourages your donations. If Mr. Stein wants more fairness toward charities, hed support allowing taxpayers to opt out of funding entitlement programs by donating to charities of their choice. For example, if you donate $100 to a low-income medical-care charity, Medicaid loses that funding and you pay $100 less in taxes.
81
SENIORS 2009
Pro Bono Tax Credit 1NC

The United States federal government should ban the practice of mandatory pro bono legal hours for lawyers. The United States federal government should create a refundable tax credit for pro bono legal work to _________________________________________________________________ __________________________________________________________________________. Counterplan solves legal services for the poor all advantages to it outweigh disadvantages Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
3. The Impact of a Pro Bono Tax Credit on Pro Bono Participation Like every initiative put forth endeavoring to enhance pro bono participation within the legal profession, certain advantages and disadvantages will be inevitable. Naturally, for a particular initiative to effectively impact the provision of pro bono services to the poor, the initiative's advantages need to noticeably outweigh its disadvantages. The expectation in structuring a pro bono tax credit is no different. The primary goal in proposing this pro bono tax credit, therefore, is that the advantages accompanying the tax credit will compensate for its disadvantages, and it will ultimately emerge as a practicable incentive for enhancing lawyers' participation in pro bono services. There are many advantages associated with a pro bono tax credit, especially in light of the ABA's and other state bars' inability to significantly enhance pro bono participation. Most importantly, a pro bono tax credit would alleviate the tension between the public's overwhelming need for free legal services and its general perception that the legal profession has proved incapable of meeting these fundamental needs. n229 The adoption of a pro bono tax credit would allow the poor to receive the free legal services they so desperately need, while simultaneously enabling [*381] lawyers to accrue tax benefits for providing such services. n230 The fact that lawyers would essentially be compensated for their services would not undermine the primary purpose of their Model Rule 6.1 ethical obligations. n231 In fact, allowing for compensation by means of a tax credit would not only positively impact lawyers' participation in pro bono activities, but it would diminish the legal profession's historical claim that pro bono is a tax on the practice of law. n232 In addition, structuring the incentive as a tax credit implies that all lawyers will be able to take advantage of the credit, regardless of their income.
82
SENIORS 2009
Pro Bono Tax Credit 2NC

There is no possible sequence of events in which a pro bono tax credit will not increase participation in pro bono legal activities Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
n233
All things considered, it is somewhat taxing (no pun intended) to contemplate a sequence of events in which offering a pro bono tax credit would not in some way enhance lawyers' participation in pro bono activities. Undeniably, increasing lawyers' participation in pro bono activities would benefit society as a whole. At the same time, a pro bono tax credit would offer the legal profession some needed relief in its efforts to provide legal services to all those in need, including those otherwise unable to financially obtain such services. Thus, the adoption of a pro bono tax credit would result in a rarely experienced "win-win" situation for society and the legal profession.
Tax credit will mean 50 hours a week for lawyers, Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
A pro bono tax credit is by no means an end all to the enhancement [*383] of pro bono participation, but it could provide a positive first step towards achieving the ABA's aspirational goals. It seems inconceivable that a pro bono tax credit would fail to enhance pro bono participation in some respect, although the degree of such enhancement remains debatable. Nonetheless, any measure that could shift the legal profession closer to collectively achieving the ABA's aspirational goal of at least fifty hours of pro bono service rendered would undoubtedly be a momentous first step. Thus, this is the primary justification for adopting a pro bono tax credit.
Empirical solvency in the context of poverty policy legal credits effectively use pro bono services Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
B. Income Tax Relief Measures Generally speaking, there are a number of tax credits currently available in the Internal Revenue Code. n204 These credits typically fall into four general classifications: "credits for certain taxes, credits for activities that benefit disadvantaged or low-income people, credits for activities that benefit the environment," and "credits for certain [*373] other investments." n205 Historically, the government has permitted the use of tax credits, as well as other tax incentives, as a means of achieving specific societal ends that would otherwise go unsatisfied without some form of governmental enticement. n206 Accordingly, tax credits by in large are designed for the benefit of either disadvantaged groups within society or the betterment of society as a whole. One of the more exemplary tax credits currently available is the Earned Income Credit (EIC), which is a tax credit designed for the benefit of low-income wage earners. n207 The basic function of EIC is to reward low-income working individuals by permitting these workers to recoup a portion of their income taxes withheld [*374] during the taxable year. n208 By allowing this type of legislative grace, EIC recipients are better equipped to provide for their families, improve their living conditions, invest in education, and even establish family savings plans. n209 In sum, the EIC promotes and encourages individuals to work, even though they may be earning meager incomes; it makes work worthwhile for low-income wage earners. n210 More importantly, by enticing individuals to actively participate in the workforce, the EIC "lifts nearly five million people out of poverty every year." n211 Accordingly, the EIC is widely recognized as a time-honored instrument that controls welfare by rewarding working individuals, thereby strengthening impoverished economies. n212 In addition to tax credits, various other tax incentives are available that promote and encourage participation in targeted activities. n213 One such noteworthy tax incentive, arguably more akin to a tax credit aimed at enhancing lawyers' participation in pro bono activities than those previously mentioned, is the recently enacted Teacher Tax Relief Act of 2002. n214 Analogous to a pro [*375] bono tax credit, the Teacher Tax Relief Act was implemented with the principal intent of serving the interests of a particular group, namely school children, rather than for the benefit of the individual actually receiving the tax benefit. In compliance with this Act, teachers are allowed to deduct the expenses for classroom supplies they personally purchase out-ofpocket for their classes. n215 The basis for allowing the deduction lies in improving educational standards by providing some relief for teachers who expend significant amounts of money to equip classrooms and enhance school programs, not on the individual teacher's financial wherewithal. n216 Like all forms of tax relief, however, certain [*376] requirements must be satisfied before the deduction will be allowed, and there are limitations on the expenditure amounts that can be deducted. n217 Though the Teacher Tax Relief Act is not a tax credit per se, similar policy considerations and rationales are implicated in the Act as those implicated in a pro bono tax credit. Therefore, the Teacher Tax Relief Act should be utilized as an ideal model for the establishment of a pro bono tax credit. Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 83
SENIORS 2009
AT: Perm do both

1. Perm severs - counterplan involves phase out of mandatory legal services, mutually exclusive with plan text voting issue for destroying negative counterplan ground. 2. Perm doesnt solve 1NC Thiemann evidence indicates lawyers will not participate in public service when they get more profitable private service 3. Perm fails tax credit alone is necessary for solvency, otherwise lawyers will crowd out and fail to participate Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
C. A Tax Credit for Pro Bono Services Rendered Thus far, this article has addressed the issue of substandard pro bono participation by discussing both the evolution of pro bono service and the various motivations and rationales underlying pro bono service, as well as considering the current incentives available for performing and supporting pro bono service. Though the need for free legal assistance to the poor is abundantly clear, the strategies currently in place to achieve that end are unmistakably ineffective. To date, anything short of a mandatory pro bono requirement has, at best, produced a diminutive impact on lawyers' involvement in pro bono activities. n219 Consequently, additional incentives need to be instituted to ensure the availability of equal access to the legal system, which in practice means increasing lawyers' pro bono participation rates. 1. Considerations of a Pro Bono Tax Credit The rationale for proposing a tax credit, as opposed to other forms of tax relief, is the preferential treatment tax credits receive under the Internal Revenue Code. n220 The underlying purpose of creating a tax incentive for lawyers to participate in pro bono activities is in creating a compelling incentive to promote pro bono participation. History has shown that less-then-favorable incentives correlate to less-than-favorable results. Instituting a pro bono tax credit, therefore, should afford lawyers a significant tax incentive to engage in pro bono services. It follows, theoretically at least, that a favorable pro bono tax credit would effectuate increased results in pro bono participation, which is precisely the result the ABA historically has sought to attain. In an ideal world, a pro bono tax credit would provide a compelling incentive for lawyers to engage in pro bono services, while at the same time not affording lawyers too great a latitude in [*378] avoiding taxation. As with all countervailing policy considerations, the most effective pro bono tax credit requires a delicate balancing of these considerations. For instance, an initial consideration involves determining the optimal limitation for the tax credit. n221 In addition, the proper formula for computing the tax credit needs to be considered. Notwithstanding the onerous task of balancing these considerations, the ensuing discussion seeks to construct a basic model for a pro bono tax credit.
84
SENIORS 2009
AT: Ending mandatory pro bono work bad

Ending mandatory pro bono work is crucial for ending a coercive tax on the practice of law Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
VI. Conclusion As the foregoing discussion identifies, the need for free legal assistance to the poor is overwhelmingly apparent. Despite its efforts, the ABA has thus far failed to adequately satisfy these needs. It is undeniable that more has to be done, but the question remains of how to effectively stimulate such a result. The answer is to create additional incentives that promote and encourage greater participation in pro bono services, including financial incentives that entice lawyers to undertake their pro bono obligations. The initiative discussed here is the adoption of a pro bono tax credit, which would in essence compensate lawyers for participating in pro bono services. It is a strategy for enhancing pro bono participation that warrants consideration, especially in light of the ABA's and other state bars' inability to significantly enhance pro bono participation through other initiatives. More must be done; additional measures must be taken to ensure that the legal needs of the poor are met. The adoption and implementation of a pro bono tax credit is one such measure . No longer should pro bono be perceived as a tax on the practice of law. Rather, the time has come for pro bono to be reclassified as a tax incentive for lawyers, and the adoption of a pro bono tax credit is a means to this end.
Mandatory pro bono work fails - lawyers wont follow the laws and only three states will report Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
Despite the ABA's continued efforts to enhance pro bono participation, the disparity between "pro bono aspirations and [*344] practices" persists. n67 Unfortunately, a variety of factors have seemingly foreclosed the ABA's ability to accumulate comprehensive data regarding pro bono participation. n68 The most significant factor is that only three states currently require their lawyers to report on their pro bono activities. n69 Moreover, liberal interpretations of pro bono services have resulted in the collection of distorted data regarding the extent of genuine pro bono efforts. n70 Finally, the inclusion of uncompensated legal services within the ambit of pro bono services, when compensation for such services was initially expected, has also limited efforts aimed at collecting comprehensive, accurate data. n71 Without this information, both the ABA and individual state bars have difficulty assessing the status of pro bono participation. As mentioned in the Introduction, however , the little information that is available indicates that an average lawyer provides "less than half an hour a week" and less than "fifty cents a day" engaged in pro bono activities. n72 Furthermore, less than twenty percent of the lawyers who do provide pro bono legal services are providing these services to indigents. n73
Mandatory pro bono work fails small firms cant provide services, which means legal services are inadequate Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
In spite of widespread lack of information on pro bono participation, the general rule appears to be "the bigger the firm, the greater the level of pro bono activity." n74 Though small firms and solo-practitioners have played an important role in providing pro bono services, it is the bigger firms that shoulder the burden of endorsing pro bono as a professional obligation. n75 Big firms possess many of the resources needed for pro bono activities that smaller firms simply cannot match, including the ability to furnish an abundance of lawyers, more easily absorb the cost, and organize and manage broader comprehensive efforts. n76 Despite the numerous advantages big firms enjoy, it is the legal profession as a whole which has the obligation to provide pro bono legal services to the poor, and small firm participation remains an important piece in providing these legal service needs. n77
85
SENIORS 2009

Tax credits for pro bono legal service are not coercive they have a different methodology that does not require a special tax on lawyers, reducing both taxes and increasing personal liberty Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
V. Pro Bono as a Tax Incentive Many in the legal profession argue that providing free legal services to the poor corresponds to imposing a special tax on lawyers since the government has historically declined to adequately fund legal aid services to the poor. n191 Their argument is bolstered by the justification that "if access to legal services is a societal value, society as a whole should bear its costs." n192 After all, the poor have fundamental needs for other of life's necessities, but society does not require those who provide such necessities to provide their resources free of charge in satisfying those [*371] fundamental needs. n193 Why should the legal profession be held to a higher standard? Numerous arguments have been set forth justifying the heightened burden society places upon the legal profession. n194 Notwithstanding the validity of these justifications, this article endeavors to achieve the same ultimate goal - increased pro bono participation within the legal profession - by way of a different methodology. Rather than debating whether pro bono places a special tax on the legal profession and, if so, whether society is justified in placing this burden on the profession, this article seeks to transform pro bono participation from a tax burden on the legal profession into a tax incentive for the legal profession. To accomplish this end, primary consideration will be given to the adoption of a tax credit designed for lawyers' participating in pro bono services.
86
SENIORS 2009
Education Tax Credits CP 1NC

Education tax credits would provide educational choices for the impoverished while saving states millions of dollars each year
Schaeffer, 8PhD, policy analyst with Cato's Center for Educational Freedom (Adam B., This Tax Credit Pays, October 21, 2008, The Cato Institute < http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php? pub_id=9734> ) Even as the debate continues on whether vouchers help improve education, New York lawmakers should have an eye on another important benefit of programs that make it easier for families to choose private schools: huge savings for state and local governments. New York state faces a budget hole as high as $2.5 billion this year, with even bigger shortfalls in the years ahead - and local governments are strapped, too. Meanwhile, the economic slowdown will prompt many families who can no longer afford both taxes and private-school tuition to move the kids into public schools - adding to the pressure. The schools will need to spend more - even as tax revenues drop. Because so many New York kids now attend private schools, governments face a potentially massive rise in costs from a spike in public-school enrollments. Public schools in Manhattan have already reported a surge in interest from private-school families hit hard by the financial meltdown. The trend is likely to move upstate as the economy dips into recession. At current levels of per-pupil spending, just a 1 percent drop in privateschool enrollment will put New York governments on the hook for about $100 million a year. A 10 percent swing means about $1 billion more in school spending. A look at the numbers explains why: New York has one of the largest private-school populations in the country, with almost 16 percent of all K-12 students opting out of government institutions. And when all costs are counted, the state's public schools spend a whopping $20,000 per pupil. Thankfully, there's a way to avoid getting slammed by huge new demands for public-school spending while saving even more money and improving education: A broadbased, moderate-sized education tax credit would help families stay in private schools, preventing their children from burdening taxpayers with the public school's (much greater) price tag. The credit would also help others make the switch to the private sector, easing the burden on taxpayers even more. Education tax credits reduce the amount a taxpayer owes the government for each dollar he spends on his own child's education or on scholarships for children who need them. That money comes straight off a person's tax liability, so it's a dollar-for-dollar benefit: You can either pay it to the government or use it on the kind of education you want to support. Tax credits for donations to scholarship organizations help support school choice for lower-income families, while personal-use credits help middle-class families send their own children to a good school. A recent Cato Institute analysis of model tax-credit legislation shows that New York stands to save more than $15 billion in the first 10 years. Fifteen years into the program, Empire State taxpayers would save an estimated $4.8 billion every year. With such savings from a reform that injects proven parental choice and competition into education, it's no surprise that tax credits are growing in popularity with US lawmakers of all parties. When Florida's donation tax-credit program became law seven years ago, only one Democratic legislator voted for it. This year, a third of statehouse Democrats, half the black caucus and the entire Hispanic caucus voted to expand that program. Arizona, Rhode Island and Iowa all passed education tax-credit initiatives in 2006, and Pennsylvania expanded its existing program. The Arizona, Iowa and Pennsylvania bills became law under Democratic governors, and the Rhode Island business-tax credit was born in a Democrat-controlled Legislature. The momentum is still building. A government fully controlled by Democrats in Iowa - governor and both legislative houses actually expanded the tax-credit dollar cap by 50 percent in 2007. Just this year, Georgia passed a $50 million program with no family-income cap on student eligibility.Gov. Paterson supports education tax credits because he knows school choice improves education and saves children from failing schools. Now he has billions more reasons to support it.The Legislature should join with Paterson to help improve education and the state's balance sheet. Education tax credits can make these trying financial times a whole lot easier for everyone.
87
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: General
Tax Credits for Education would give low-income families a way to send their children to better schools by providing a dollar-for-dollar reduction in taxes owed Reed, 2president emeritus of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy
(Lawrence W., Education Reform, School Choice, and Tax Credits April 18, 2002, The Mackinac Center for Public Policy < http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=4191> ) Tax credits are designed to provide parents with tax relief linked to expenses incurred when they select a school other than the government-assigned one for their children. That typically means a private school, but tax credits can also apply to expenses charged by a public school that accepts a student from outside its regular jurisdiction. The credit is usually a dollar-for-dollar reduction in taxes owed (whereas a tax deduction is merely a reduction in taxable income). Tax credits are typically applied against only state and/or federal income taxes, but property tax credits have been proposed as well. Tax credits might be allowed for any or all out-of-pocket educational expenses incurred by an individual, from tuition to textbooks to transportation to extracurricular fees-though tuition is the most common expense allowed in practice.Tax credits don't represent a claim by anyone on someone else's wallet. You don't get the credit if you don't pay tuition or if you don't pay taxes. A credit on your taxes represents your own money, period. And credits can be extended not only to parents paying educational expenses but to other citizens or even companies that contribute to scholarship funds that assist children in getting access to the school of their choice, public or private.Under a traditional credit plan, only a parent who pays private educational expenses for his child and who has a tax liability greater than the amount of the allowable credit will qualify. The problem with a traditional tax credit is that low-income parents who don't have the money to pay for a private school or have little or no tax liability will be left out in the cold. That deficiency could be remedied partially by making the credit "refundable," meaning the credit could result in a refund check from the government if your tax liability is low. Another very promising form of tax credit is possible and now getting much attention across the country. My organization, the Mackinac Center for Public Policy, is nationally known for pioneering it and showing how it would work as applied to a particular state as early as 1996. We were the first to give it the name, "Universal Tuition Tax Credit" or "Universal Education Tax Credit," and the first to design such a plan for an entire state-Michigan.
88
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: Competition
Education Tax Credits steadily take the government out of a familys choice, in turn, increasing competition, encouraging business support, and generating educational freedom Reed, 2president emeritus of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy
(Lawrence W., Ideas and ConsequencesSchool Choice via the Universal Tax Credit April 18, 2002, The Mackinac Center for Public Policy http://www.thefreemanonline.org/columns/ideas-and-consequences-school-choice-via-theuniversal-tax-credit/ ) School choicethe general concept that parents should have much more freedom and responsibility for their childrens education than they have nowis an idea that has captured the imagination and support of legions of freedom-loving Americans. Where the rubber hits the road, however, is how to achieve it. When all parents understand that a truly free society means that it is their responsibility to take care of their childrens education, not that of everyone else in general or agents of the government in particular, well have the best of all worlds. Freedom will be greatly enhanced, and the competitive market will do for schools what it has done for everything from cheeseburgers to computersproduce high quality at a good price. Complete separation of school and state will put parents back in the saddle and liberate schools and teachers from incessant meddling by politicians. Separation is the ideal, the goal we should all hope for and work toward. But since no one has the power to snap his fingers and make it happen tonight, some means for
moving in the right direction as quickly as possible, consistent with liberty, is required. Would vouchers get us there? Tax-funded vouchers are simply direct payments from the government to individuals to enable them to purchase a particular good or servicein this case, educationin the open market. Those payments can be in the form of checks that the beneficiaries deposit in their bank accounts and draw on to pay for the vouchered item. Or they can be coupons that beneficiaries give to private providers of the vouchered item; the providers then redeem them for cash from the government. Its abundantly evident that the opposition has succeeded in stigmatizing vouchers to the point where the V-word is shunned even by proponents. A significant number of private schools that might be eligible for vouchers dont want to touch them with a ten-foot pole because they understand that government shackles inevitably follow government shekels. Fortunately, there is a superior option that is not only more in line with the principles of liberty,
. Tax credits are designed to provide parents with tax relief linked to expenses incurred when they send their children to nongovernment schools. The credit is usually a dollar-for-dollar reduction in income or property taxes, unlike a tax deduction, which merely reduces taxable income. Proponents of educational tax credits prefer them to vouchers on the grounds that they entail less government regulation of private schools and less risk of entanglement between church (through religious schools) and state because of their indirect nature. Unlike vouchers, credits do not transfer money from the state to schools or taxpayers. Indeed, because vouchers are funded out of taxpayer money, some citizens will always argue that Some of my money will be going to send your
but is more politically viable as well. That option is tax credits child to a school I dont like. They will want government to regulate how, when, and where their tax money can be used. The legislators who appropriate it and the bureaucracy that dispenses it will be more than
Tax credits dont represent a claim by anyone on someone elses wallet. You dont get the credit if you dont pay tuition or if you dont pay taxes. A credit on your taxes represents your own money, period. School Stamps Heres another way to see this crucial difference: Vouchers are food stamps for education, a mechanism for the forcible redistribution of wealth from many citizens to some citizens. Tax credits are mechanisms for fairness, an accounting device that permits people to keep at least some of their own money they would otherwise pay for the government school they are not using. Some prefer vouchers to tax credits because, they argue, we should not use the tax system as a social-engineering tool. But a tax credit for education is fundamentally different from a tax credit for solar panels or electric cars or any other politically correct gimmick du jour: Not only is education mandatory, but taxes to pay for it are too, a sad fact thats not likely to change soon. A tax credit designed to get you, say, to buy a solar panel is not the same as one that refunds some
happy to oblige. With private schools dependent on voucher revenue, few will be able to wean themselves away when regulation becomes invasive. of what the government charges you for something you dont want to buy anyway. Most people are instinctively sympathetic to the element of fairness in a tax credit. What about parents who have little or no tax liability? The universal tax credit, which the Mackinac Center for Public Policy first proposed in 1996, allows any taxpayerindividual or corporate, parent or grandparent, neighbor or friendto qualify for a
. Would tax credits be sufficient to encourage businesses to contribute to scholarship funds? After explaining the concept, Ive asked CEOs all over Michigan this question: Suppose you had a choice. You could send a million dollars in taxes to government for the politicians to spend. Or you could send that million to one or more scholarship funds to help children who might be your future employees get a good education. Which would you do? Ive never met one who preferred option number one. Any school-choice plan should start with the recognition that
dollar-for-dollar credit by contributing to the education of anyones child. It envisions private scholarships financed with tax-credit money private schools are not the problem we face today. They are an important part of the solution. We must not bargain away their independence to get choice even if its in the form of a universal tax credit. We must not burden them with new government mandates cloaked in the guise of accountability. Private schools are already accountableunlike the governments schools, they have customers who can take a walk.
Some libertarians oppose a universal tax-credit plan because they see it as a halfway measure that doesnt immediately remove government from education. However, it would allow people to opt out of the government school system and use their money to buy education in the marketplace instead. True, it doesnt eliminate the government system for those who still want it, but it will do more to promote an array of flourishing, affordable, and attractive private options than any other politically viable plan afoot. In time, that will make it easier to convince almost everybody that separating school from state represents a bright future for all children.
89
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: Lessens Government Interference

ETCs are the best option to separate education from government and are politically popular Reed, 2president emeritus of the Mackinac Center for Public Policy
(Lawrence W., A New Direction for Education Reform..Part 2 April 18, 2002, The Mackinac Center for Public Policy < http://www.hawaiireporter.com/story.aspx?b8b78de7-9462-4a0a-aa7b-258d97c19fde > ) Nobel Laureate Milton Friedman has said he prefers vouchers over tax credits because we should not use the tax system as a social engineering tool. But a tax credit for education is fundamentally different from a tax credit for solar panels or electric cars or any other politically correct gimmick du jour. That's because not only is education itself mandatory, but taxes to pay for it are as well, and that's not likely to change any time soon. A tax credit designed to get you to change your behavior (to buy a solar panel, for instance) is just not the same as a tax credit that refunds some of what government charged you for something you don't want to buy. Instinctively, most people seem to understand this distinction. They are naturally more sympathetic to the fairness of a tax credit than the redistribution of a voucher. They are much more familiar with tax credits and their kissing cousin -- tax deductions -- because they've used them again and again year after year. When a survey of congressional and state legislative candidates was done in my state in 1998, we found many incumbents and challengers who favored tax credits for education but not vouchers, and none who favored vouchers but not tax credits.When a voucher plan was on the ballot in Michigan in November 2000, yard signs popped up all over the state declaring "No Vouchers!" It's hard to imagine a similar proliferation of "No Tax Credits!" signs, had that been the choice before voters.Even liberal Democrats like Bill Clinton, Al Gore, and our new U.S. Sen. Debbie Stabenow support tax credits for preschool and post-grade 12 education. Not surprisingly, of all the many statewide ballot initiatives for educational choice across the nation in the past 30 years, the one that holds the record for securing the greatest percentage of the popular vote is the 1998 Colorado tax credit initiative (about 41 percent).It was poorly crafted, vastly underfunded, and it came out way too late for its proponents to have enough time to inform the public. But it still beat by a good margin the highest vote percentage any voucher plan has ever won. Yes, any tax credit adds a complication (a line or two) to our tax forms, and thereby takes us a step away from a less complicated flat tax. As a staunch advocate of limited government, free markets, and a flatter income tax if we're going to have one at all, I confess to a small strategic compromise there. But our voucher friends need to acknowledge that vouchers are a whale of a bigger fudge than any tax credit. Most voucher proponents don't advocate food stamps, redistribution, or government subsidies for any other business or enterprise. A tax credit for education is not so much a compromise as it is simply the best mechanism we're likely to get for letting people keep what's theirs when they are paying taxes for education but don't want to buy it from the government. Tax credits for education can assume different shapes. Under a traditional credit plan, only a parent who pays private educational expenses (like tuition) for his child and who has a tax liability greater than the amount of the allowable credit will qualify.
90
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: Avoids Legal Challenges, Regulations

A new education tax credit would effectively cater to poor families while avoiding legal and regulatory difficulties
Hood, 8President and Chairman of the John Locke Foundation, a North Carolina think tank that issues policy studies (John, A Credible Route to Choice January 3, 2008,Carolina Journal Online < http://www.carolinajournal.com/jhdailyjournal/display_jhdailyjournal.html?id=4515>) With K-12 schools, it seems reasonable to conclude that the risk would be greater.Furthermore, as Adam Schaeffer discusses in an excellent new paper for the Cato Institute, vouchers have far greater legal and political challenges than do school-choice programs based on the tax code. Tax credits are less likely to be challenged in court, less likely to be overturned by a court, less likely to come with burdensome regulations, and less likely to accumulate regulations over time, Schaeffer argues. As it happens, educational tax relief has long been the core of the school-choice agenda advocated by John Locke Foundation analysts. To the extent that most of us endorsed voucher programs, the endorsement was limited to means-tested programs aimed as families whose income-tax liability was insufficient to benefit from a traditional tuition-tax credit. Poor families are also, of course, the most victimized by the current monopoly system, which blocks new entrants to the education marketplace by directing tax money only to government schools and maintaining a rigid cap on the number of such schools lying outside the control of governmental districts. But I now think that the problem of extending choice to these poor families can be solved by more innovative approaches to educational tax relief. Schaeffer outlines these solutions in his paper. One is to improve on the universal tax credit programs now in operation in Pennsylvania, Arizona, and other states. These allow individuals and companies to take tax credits for donations to educational-scholarship organizations that help low-income families afford private schooling. A key point is that state legislation should allow such scholarship organizations to use a portion of the taxrefunded donations, say 10 percent, for administrative and marketing expenses to ensure that potential recipients are aware of their new educational options. The second innovation Schaeffer endorses is to offer a tax credit not just against income taxes but also against state sales taxes and the portion of local property taxes devoted to education. This would allow more families of modest means to participate, and rightfully so sales and property taxes, no less than income taxes, reduce their wherewithal to spend their own money on better education for their children. The complexity of Schaeffers tax credit still concerns me a bit, and I part company with him in preferring a refundable income-tax credit, which could accomplish the same objective if properly structured. Indeed, one way it would be better is that it would offset the implicit property tax for renters, something that a formal property-tax credit probably wont be able to do. Different routes, same destination: school choice for all.
91
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: Donations Help Low-Income Families

Expanding the education tax credit coupled with a donation tax credit program would allow low-income families to move their children from failing schools to successful institutions Schaeffer, 9-- Adam B, policy analyst with the Cato Institute's Center for Educational Freedom, Round Yon Tax Credit,
December 21, 2007, The Cato Institute, http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=8862) A poll released last week by the Illinois Policy Institute and the Friedman Foundation revealed a surprising item on the Christmas wish lists of Illinois parents: a new school for their kids. Four out of five Illinoisans said they would opt out of traditional state public schools if given the chance. And they would choose private schools over public by a margin of two to one (39 percent to 19 percent). Legislators can help grant that wish and save money at the same time. How? By expanding the state's education tax credit program. Education tax credits are a great way to use private funds to improve education and expand school choice for all families while saving taxpayers money. The credits reduce the amount a taxpayer owes the government for each dollar he spends on education. If a business donates $4,000 to a scholarship-granting organization, it could deduct $4,000 from its tax liabilities. Similar benefits for donations can be applied to individuals or to parents on education expenses for their own children. Education tax credits, in other words, come in two forms. The first, tax credits for donations to scholarship organizations, can help support school choice for lower-income families. And the second, personaluse credits, can help middle-class families. Tax credits save the states money because the amount spent on each student on average is so much less. According to the National Center for Education Statistics, public schooling costs around $10,700 per child, while private-school tuition averages around $7,300. Education tax credits cover just what a family needs to send their child to a better school and turn what's pocket change to an education bureaucrat into a lifeline for thousands of children. Three states now have modest forms of personal-use tax credits. Iowa allows 25 percent up to $1,000, and Minnesota allows 75 percent of non-tuition expenses up to a maximum credit of $1,000 per child. Illinois allows families to claim credits worth 25 percent of their educational expenses up to $2,500, which means a small $500 tax benefit. That's far too little to save much money or expand choice significantly. Lawmakers should build on current law by allowing a 100 percent credit on education expenses up to half of current per-pupil spending in the public schools for each child. But a personal-use tax credit won't be enough for many lower-income families without a large tax liability. That's why lawmakers also need to pass a donation tax credit program for scholarships. Five states Arizona, Florida, Iowa, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island have serious donation credits. Pennsylvania allows a 90 percent credit for donations to scholarship-granting organizations and Florida allows a 100 percent credit, helping thousands of children from lower-income families attend good, independent schools. Tax credits have already been expanded in a number of states, with the support of people that you might not expect. Democratic legislatures or governors helped to pass tax-credit programs in Arizona, Rhode Island, and Iowa last year, and Pennsylvania expanded its existing program. This year a unified Democratic government in Iowa increased the tax-credit dollar cap by 50 percent to $7.5 million from $5 million. Many prominent African-American Democrats most notably, Newark Mayor Cory Booker support tax credits. Even New York's Democratic Governor Eliot Spitzer supports tax credits and proposed an education-tax deduction in his first state budget. So there should be plenty of bipartisan cover for Republicans and Democrats in the Illinois legislature to come together and promise taxpayers they'll do right by their children this Christmas and make good on that pledge in the New Year.
92
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: Donations Help Low Income Families

ETCs fail in the status quo because they dont incorporate donations; the CP combines donations and tax credits so low-income families can benefit Coulson, 4 director of Catos Center for Educational Freedom.
(Andrew, Tax-Credits in Theory and Practice, April 30, 2004. The Mackinac Center for Public Policy, < http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6536> ) The most basic form of education tax credit is one that allows parents to reduce the amount of state taxes they owe by one dollar for every dollar they spend on their childrens education. This personal use tax credit can be either open to all parents or means tested so that only parents below a certain income threshold are eligible. Whether means tested or not, personal use tax credits come in two flavors: refundable, and non-refundable. A non-refundable credit simply reduces the amount a taxpayer owes, down to a minimum of zero dollars. Refundable credits, by contrast, can actually produce a negative tax balance, meaning that the taxpayer receives money from the state instead of paying money to it. The term refundable is thus a misnomer, since the taxpayer need not have paid any taxes in order to qualify for the refund payment. Refundable credits are equivalent to vouchers in that they constitute an outlay of government funds, while lacking the simplicity of voucher programs. As a result, virtually all modern education tax credit programs and proposals are for non-refundable credits.[43]A problem with non-refundable personal use credits is that they cannot benefit families who have little or no tax liability. To fill that gap, taxcredit proponents developed the donation tax-credit concept.[44] Under donation credits, tax-paying individuals and/or businesses are credited for contributions they make to non-profit Scholarship Granting Organizations (SGOs). The SGOs, in turn, pay private school tuition for children from low- and middle-income families.The ultimate tax-credit solution is to combine conventional personal use tax credits with donation credits, creating what the Mackinac Center has dubbed Universal Tuition Tax Credits, or UTTCs. Under a UTTC program, any taxpayer who pays for a childs education can receive a credit, whether or not the child is his or her own. As yet, no state has implemented a UTTC program, though personal use and donation credits exist independently in a number of states. Because the credits may be applied to educational expenses other than tuition, this paper adopts the term Universal Education Tax Credits, or UETCs.
93
SENIORS 2009
Solvency: Public Popularity

Education Tax Credits have been popular with the public Coulson, 4 director of Catos Center for Educational Freedom.
(Andrew, Vouchers vs. Tax-Credits: Legal and Political Comparison of Optimal Programs, April 30, 2004. The Mackinac Center for Public Policy, < http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6540> ) As a counter-example to the above evidence, it has been suggested that the federal HOPE higher education tax credits created by the Clinton administration also raise [the] regulatory burden on private education.[63] As it happens, though, the requirements imposed by HOPE are strictly concerned with financial filing requirements and do not affect the freedom or financial responsibility of parents, the pedagogical autonomy or competitiveness of schools, or the legality of profit making. In other words, the burden imposed by HOPE tax credits is not as burdensome to the operation of market forces as is the case with typical voucher regulations. Recent Poll Results While it has already been noted that voter initiatives and referenda may not be the best avenue for passing market education legislation in most states,[64] due to the publics lack of familiarity with these programs, public opinion data are still relevant. Legislators will not generally support bills that they think will hurt their chances for re-election, so the relative popularity of vouchers and tax credits will likely affect their respective prospects for passage. According to a fall 2003 survey of voters in 10 states,[65] tax credits were consistently preferred over vouchers (see next page). As Table 14 reveals, majorities in each of the surveyed states approved of donation tax credits,[67] averaging 56 percent support to 36 percent opposition. The greatest margin of approval for tax credits was 39 points, in Louisiana. Vouchers won approval from a plurality of voters in each state, but not always from a majority, and averaged 50 percent support to 41 percent opposition. Once again, the greatest margin of support was to be found in Louisiana, at 28 points. States that support vouchers by a wide margin tend to be strongly behind tax credit programs as well, but the reverse is not always the case. In Maryland and Michigan, for example, tax credits enjoy a wide margin of support but voucher support exceeds voucher opposition by only three or four points. Among Republicans, vouchers and tax credits usually receive comparable levels of support, but the appeal of tax credits is substantially higher than vouchers among independents and especially Democrats.
94
SENIORS 2009
Spending Net Benefit

Education tax credits have brought money and educational freedom to the states who have adopted them in the status quo Salisbury, 2director of the Center for Educational Freedom at the Cato Institute.
(David, Are Education Tax Credits on the Way? June 22, 2002, The Cato Institute. < http://www.cato.org/pub_display.php? pub_id=3504> ) Several states have already adopted tax credits as a way to offer greater choice to parents and instill healthy competition into a stagnant public school system. Since 1998, Arizona's tax-credit program has raised over $31 million and provided 18,000 scholarships to low-income students. Florida, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Minnesota also offer tax credits for private or public school expenses. Research on the effects of school choice programs continues to show positive gains being made by students who participate in school choice programs. A recent Harvard University study shows that even students who remain in public schools benefit from improvements caused by increased competition. Rep. Schaffer and other reform advocates are right in thinking that increased choice and competition is what is needed to fix American education. But they should be cautious about taking action at the federal level. A federal tax credit may turn out to be a mixed blessing if it encourages further federal intrusion into the business of education. Education should be a local or state matter. It's far healthier for 50 different states to be experimenting with school choice programs than for Washington to propose a one-size-fits-all solution. Moreover, the U.S. tax code is already too complicated. To reduce the federal tax rate would be a simpler way to allow parents to assume financial responsibility for their children's education. Nonetheless, in a political climate driven by enthusiasm for national standards, a carefully crafted federal tax credit may help neutralize Washington's role in what should be a state matter. While the Schaffer tax credit won't revolutionize education, it may motivate states to take similar actions, expanding educational freedom for parents and children. The emergence of the Shaffer bill in Congress shows an increasing agreement that it is permissible to empower parents to choose the schools their children attend. Now states need to pick up the ball and begin to lead, as they should, on the issue of school choice.
ETCs are separate from government spending, the courts prove Coulson, 4 director of Catos Center for Educational Freedom.
(Andrew, Vouchers vs. Tax-Credits: Legal and Political Comparison of Optimal Programs, April 30, 2004. The Mackinac Center for Public Policy, < http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6540> ) The issue was also raised in two separate Illinois Circuit Court cases, both challenging that states 1999 tax credit law. In each case, the courts rejected the argument that tax credits are legally equivalent to government spending. Even scholars skeptical of market education as a whole generally acknowledge this difference. Two researchers writing for the predominantly anti-market Center for the Study of Privatization in Education at Columbia Universitys Teachers College concluded that ETCs [Education Tax Credits] because they are not government funds are less likely to face legal barriers compared to reforms such as educational vouchers.[80]
95
SENIORS 2009
Postal Service Privatization CP 1NC

The United States federal government should privatize the postal service. USPS is inefficient and unnecessary- Privatization of postal service would lead to a more efficient system UPS and Federal Express prove Machan 02 (Tibor Machan, research fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University. Liberty and Hard Cases. May
2002.p. 86-87 ) It seems odd to suggest that state action is the only way to address a problem (in this chapter, I am not bothering with the U.S.specic distinction between state governments and the federal government; I am using state in the generic political sense). But we grow accustomed to certain matters being the purview of the state, and then it becomes difficult to conceptualize the state not being involved. But our challenged imaginations are not the same thing as an argument. For example, the government has long been the operator of the postal service, and it is difficult for many people to imagine how they would get mail if there were no post office. But in the past two decades, the vast growth of UPS and Federal Express shows that it is possible for a private company to establish a nationwide system for routing, distribution, and speedy delivery of items. The conceptual failing is actually largely semantic: people cannot imagine life without the United States Postal Service, but what they are really having trouble conceiving is life without mail. But theres a difference between privatizing the postal system and eliminating the postal system, and no one actually suggests the latter. Similarly, with phone service: anyone over the age of thirty will remember the expression the phone company. Now a remark involving that phrase would be criticized for vagueness since there are many competing phone companies. Because there is a demand for telephone service and mail delivery, we can imagine that a free market would provide them, although there will be some argument about whether there should be a regulated or unrestricted market in those services.
96
SENIORS 2009
2NC Solvency Cheaper/More Effective

Privatizing the postal service would make it cheaper and more effective Alston 07, Wilton. Principal Research Scientist at Battelle Memorial Institute. What Would Happen If the Post Office Had
Competition? http://www.lewrockwell.com/alston/alston21.html Business use of the post office would disappear almost completely, practically overnight if the USPS had to compete head-tohead with other vendors. UPS and FedEx would likely offer incredible rates on first-class postage to existing customers who are already using their other services. That would leave the USPS with the job of basically delivering personal letters and junk mail. For a while, individuals would go with the name they trust, the USPS. Over time, though, more and more people would start using the mailroom at work and employers would offer the corporate rate for personal packages in many places, as they do with UPS/FedEx now. There would probably be discounts for sending from the UPS/FedEx store rather than having a pickup, too. A lot of "scan and send" type operations would likely spring up, so people could send paperwork over the Internet. Cheaper Rates Spooners experience already proved this conclusively. I found it interesting that Donna Hennessy, the spokesperson interviewed for that local story said, "41 cents is still a good bargain" when she talked about the rate increase. My question here is pretty simple. How does she know? If no one else can deliver the mail no competition exists how can anyone determine if the rate is good, bad, or indifferent?
97
SENIORS 2009

Empirically the federal postal service only survives by shutting down all competition Goodyear 81, Lucille. Spooner vs. U.S. Postal System American Legion Magazine, January 1981.
http://www.lysanderspooner.org/STAMP3.htm Spooner squared off for battle! With the loopholes his main ammunition, he organized his own postal service and audaciously named it "The American Letter Mail Company." The company offered to deliver letters, with no limit on weight at reduced rates. He even ran an ad on the front page of the "New York Daily Tribune" with the following information: "AMERICAN POST OFFICE - The American Letter Mail
Company has established post offices in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore and Boston, and will deliver letter daily from each city to the others - twice a day between New York and Philadelphia. Postage 6 1/4 cents per each half-ounce, payable in advance always. Stamps 20 for a dollar. Their purpose it to carry letters by the most rapid conveyances, and at the cheapest rates and to extend their operations (as fast as patronage will justify) over the principal routes of the country, so as to give the public the most extensive facilities for correspondence that can be afforded at a uniform rate. "The Company design also (if sustained by the public) is to thoroughly agitates the questions, and test the Constitutional right of the competition in the business of carrying letters - the ground on which they assert this right are published and
The public enthusiastically approved the venture. Congress, however, was sputtering and the Postal Department was howling - all of Washington was enraged . How dare Spooner fo this?; How dare he so openly flout the Constitution? Government postal revenues took a nose dive while "The American Letter Mail Company" went merrily on its way picking up the postal business everywhere. Washington lawmakers had no intention of sitting still for any "that Spooner's shenanigans." The midnight oil burned as attorneys pored over their books. Soon, the suits against Spooner and his cohorts began. Railroad heads were given full warning that government mails would be removed unless space and passage were refused to private letter carriers . It was "round one" for the government when an agent of Spooner's company was found guilty and fined for transporting letters in
for sale at the post offices in pamphlet form." a railroad car over a postroad of the United States. The "round two" went to Spooner when a U.S. District Judge advised a jury that owners of conveyances were not liable under law if, unknown to the owners, a letter carrier brought mail aboard a train of steamboat. The "not guilty" verdict was sustained by the U.S. Circuit Court which expressed doubt that the U.S. had the right to monopolize the transportation of mail. This was tantamount to a commendation of Spooner's theories. For the postal officials it was a low blow and they sought further legal means to put an end to Spooner and his trouble-making company. More court reversals followed. Finally, the Postmaster General felt he had to bow to the issues and went before Congress to plead for the authority to lower postal rates. In March, 1845, a reduction of postal rates was approved and put into effect that July. Letters weighing less than a half ounce could be sent any distance under 300 miles for five cents. Even the rates for newspapers were reevaluated and changed so they could be mailed without charge within a 30-mile radius. Spooner, feeling that his efforts and his company were doing a great deal of good for the citizens of the land, wasn't through fighting. His counteraction caused
In 1851, Congress again lowered rates and simultaneously enacted a law to protect the government's monopoly on the distribution of mail. Whereas threats of jail had not fazed or dampened Spooner's zeal in the fight, the latter move by Congress forced him into defeat .
even greater consternation to his opponents - he lowered his rates. So the battle of law and loopholes continued.
The federal postal service only exists because of massive government subsidization Alston 07, Wilton. Principal Research Scientist at Battelle Memorial Institute. What Would Happen If the Post Office Had
Competition? http://www.lewrockwell.com/alston/alston21.html Digging a little deeper provides the truth: the USPS is subsidized. One need only refer to the 2005 annual report to get some illustrative numbers. A line item showing as "U.S. government appropriations received" lists an amount of $503 million. The 2003 annual report shows a similar line item with a similar heading. That line item lists an amount of $762 million. Call me a nitpicker, but those listings both sound suspiciously like, well, government appropriations, A.K.A. taxpayer investment, to me. Looking further into the 2005 annual report we
find this. "We commenced operations on July 1, 1971, in accordance with the provisions of the Postal Reorganization Act (the Act). The equity that the U.S. government held in the former Post Office Department became our initial capital. We valued the assets of the former Post Office Department at original cost less accumulated depreciation. The initial transfer of assets, including property, equipment and cash, totaled
even without the (apparently) semi-annual infusions of "government appropriations" the USPS received something like $3 billion in "start-up" capital. That is about as far from "no taxpayer support" as one can get ! Additionally, these are economic benefits that private companies such as FedEx, UPS, and DHL do not receive and they are still kicking the Post Office's butt in the realm where the USPS is not protected by fiat. (Have you seen the FedEx boxes placed outside the USPS recently?) Clearly the USPS benefits from government subsidy, no matter what they choose to call it. Now back to the question at hand: how might things be different with competition?
$1.7 billion. Subsequent cash contributions and transfers of assets between 1972 and 1982 totaled approximately $1.3 billion, resulting in total government contributions of approximately $3 billion." So
98
SENIORS 2009
Microfinancing 1NC
The Minority Business Development Agency should establish a Microfinance Institution for Native Americans. MBDA can solve coordinates with Native American development centers and solves poverty Minority Business Development Agency The Basics of MBDA, 2006 http://www.mbda.gov/?
section_id=2&bucket_id=643&content_id=3143&well=entire_page Who are we? The Minority Business Development Agency (MBDA) is part of the U.S. Department of Commerce. MBDA is the only federal agency created specifically to foster the establishment and growth of minority-owned businesses in America. MBDA is an entrepreneurially focused and innovative organization committed to wealth creation in minority communities. The Agency's mission is to actively promote the growth and competitiveness of large, medium and small minority business enterprises (MBEs). MBDA actively coordinates and leverages public and private-sector resources that facilitate strategic alliances in support of its mission. The vision is to function as an entrepreneurial organization serving entrepreneurs. The mission is to enhance the growth and expansion of minority business enterprises. How Does MBDA Help Minority Businesses? MBDA provides funding for a network of Minority Business Development Centers (MBDCs), Native American Business Development Centers (NABDCs), and Business Resource Centers (BRCs) located throughout the Nation. The Centers provide minority entrepreneurs with one-on-one assistance in writing business plans, marketing, management and technical assistance and financial planning to assure adequate financing for business ventures. The Centers are staffed by business specialists who have the knowledge and practical experience needed to run successful and profitable businesses.
Microfinancing is a cost-neutral lending institution to induce actual work and provide economic self-determination without help from the federal government R. H. Tipton III, Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law, American Indian Law Review, 2004 / 2005,
29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 173 Many of the obstacles addressed in this comment may be overcome. We must recognize the unused human capital present on the reservations and amongst the tribes and develop it into the unique, sustainable businesses they have the potential to become. Further, each tribe has unique characteristics and specialties that add to the overall richness of the American Indian tradition and if there is a system - an institution - with the resources available to help guide these ambitious individuals, then each one will be able to overcome Group Three status. This will allow them to move into more sustainable and autonomous economic growth, which will afford them even more outside opportunity (with the federal government or more Group One or Two focused institutions). This will also improve the quality of life by bringing these individuals out of poverty status and into a working class status with a brighter future. The lessons learned from successful MFIs both abroad and domestically are vital to the success of the TMFI. In order to make a better life for these microentrepreneurs, the TMFIs must be cognizant of the corollary services that are necessary to cultivate sustainable businesses. TMFIs must provide the requisite lending as well as business, legal, accounting and insurance advice. These services are imperative in allowing the individuals to reduce their risk and will provide them with added incentive to make a more gratifying, self-sustaining life for themselves and their families. Although a TMFI will not completely solve the social and economic deficiencies facing tribes today, it has the potential to be a strong force in bringing about real change in the financial status of many individuals. If the [*192] leaders of each tribe embrace this bottom-up approach, the lives of the economically challenged can and will be changed forever.
99
SENIORS 2009
Microfinancing Solvency 2NC [1/3]

Counterplan solves allows Native American Tribes to move up the socioeconomic ladder R. H. Tipton III, Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law, American Indian Law Review, 2004 / 2005,
29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 173 1. Microfinance Theory Defined and Explained Microfinance (also referred to as microcredit), as a theory, seeks to foster economic development by providing the opportunity through small, usually collateral- free loans, for the poorest of the poor to create viable, sustainable self-employment business enterprises. n14 The theory revolves around the idea [*177] that, instead of relying on others or the government to cultivate the job market and force individuals to rely on others for their sole means of income, individuals should be given the opportunity to start their own "smaller than small business" n15 and be able to live out the American dream - taking an idea and seeing it through to a profitable fruition. 2. Microenterprise Defined and Explained A "microenterprise" refers to an individual business that consists of less than five employees and is generally organized as a sole proprietorship or family business. n16 It is often funded by a microfinance institution (MFI) and its owner is considered a microentrepreneur. Microentrepreneurs generally fall into one of three distinct categories (Groups) of small business owners found in America today. "Group One" small businesses are started by individuals who have attained a high school diploma or have acquired some form of higher education, n17 and who are experienced workers in a particular field who ultimately decide to branch out and start their own business. n18 These individuals have sufficient assets and net worth along with appealing credit status to obtain capital through conventional measures. It is because of this status that they are generally able to go to traditional commercial lending institutions and obtain traditional small business loans. "Group Two" small businesses are started by individuals who are not as educated as Group One entrepreneurs. Group Two entrepreneurs are "somewhat" educated individuals who may have obtained their education through either book learning or through hands-on work experience. These individuals may have specific "know how," but may lack a credit rating sufficient to access financing loans through traditional commercial lending institutions. n19 A Group Two entrepreneur may be considered a [*178] microentrepreneur depending on the size, nature and feasibility of the business. n20 As previously addressed, there are sufficient financing opportunities in America for individuals in this class of entrepreneurs. "Group Three" small businesses are the epitome of microenterprise and seem to have been forgotten by most American lending and governmental institutions. These microentrepreneurs are generally referred to as the poorest of the poor. n21 They are individuals with ideas and some skills, but they have absolutely no possible way of obtaining start up capital. Due to their low net worth and lack of collateral, these individuals are undoubtedly termed credit risks by commercial lending institutions and often fall through the cracks when it comes to microfinance programs in America. They are often times classified as impoverished, and generally their potential to be successful in the American economy is disregarded. This lack of faith and lack of opportunity has made it virtually impossible for Group Three microentrepreneurs to pull themselves from the vicious cycle of poverty. This comment focuses on Group Three microentrepreneurs and hopefully provides some hope and insight into the possible resources that are available or should be available to them. Combined, these three groups comprise an estimated two million microentrepreneurs in America. n22 Studies show that a 78% of the microentrepreneurs are women, n23 62% are minority n24 and 58% have some post high school education. n25 Group One makes up the majority of microentrepreneurs and therefore a majority of development is focused towards these individuals. However, this focus seems to be a shift from the original concept of microenterprise - assistance to the poorest of the poor. In order for microenterprise to work on the tribal level, there will need to be at least an initial focus on the poorest of the poor, the Group Three individuals. The answer to the social and economic development problem comes from providing assistance to Group Three individuals, thereby allowing them to move into Group Two. Then the focus can shift towards moving [*179] individuals from Group Two to Group One and finally into a successful business.
100
SENIORS 2009

Counterplan solves economic and social development through creating viable small businesses R. H. Tipton III, Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law, American Indian Law Review, 2004 / 2005,
29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 173 Economic and social development among American Indian tribes has long been a topic of discussion for academics and tribal leaders alike. n1 However, this discussion has often remained in the theoretical "big picture" and has rarely been brought down to the practical "hands on" realm that is needed in order to see real changes and positive growth in the movement. n2 Certainly, there is a place for the theoretical discussions. Without them we would not have a context in which we can now propose viable economic solutions to the current problems facing the tribes and citizens alike. However, there needs to be a renewed focus in academia on creating feasible solutions to these economic deficiencies. The purpose of this comment is to look at one of the many factors contributing to lethargic economic development among American Indian tribes. Rather than focusing on bringing in outside businesses or suggesting that the government create jobs as a form of economic development, this comment advocates a means for empowering tribal citizens through helping [*174] them create viable, sustainable small businesses in order to facilitate substantial and cognizable economic growth. Tribes have generally focused on fostering business development with other corporations and the government; however, they have failed to provide the necessary support to American Indian entrepreneurs.
Studies prove microfinancing solves poverty R. H. Tipton III, Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law, American Indian Law Review, 2004 / 2005,
29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 173 3. Microlending's Impact on Economic Development These forms of microlending have focused on economically challenged individuals, which corporate lending institutions would not normally serve. n50 This emphasis on the "little people" has had an enormous impact on their lives and on the economy as a whole. A recent study by the Aspen Institute's SELP - Self-Employment Learning Project, shows that of the microenterprises that were surveyed over a five year period, 53% had moved out of the poverty range. Additionally, 57% were still economically viable and sustainable after five years n51 - and as such are competitive with the estimated 60%-70% survival rate of SBA small businesses. n52 The average household income had risen by more than $ 8000 and the average household assets had also increased by approximately $ 15,000 over the five year period. n53
101
SENIORS 2009

Microloans empirically work to lift people out of poverty 98% return rate *This also answers arguments that poor dont have skills say People in poverty are able to use unterutilized skills to dig themselves out Financial Mail, Small lending makes a big difference, March 9, 2007, l/n
Small loans make a big difference New regulation could make microlending more attractive In 2006, Muhammad Yunus and the microfinance development bank he founded in Bangladesh, called Grameen Bank, were jointly awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for doing so much to alleviate poverty. Grameen Bank makes small loans (known as microcredit) to impoverished people without requiring collateral, as traditional banks do. The system is based on the idea that the poor have skills that are under-utilised, and what they need is a boost that will help them start small businesses to dig themselves out of poverty. Loans are given to groups (usually five people at a time, and generally women). The whole group is denied further credit if one person defaults. When Yunus started microlending, many said it wouldn't work, and that a bank offering tiny loans to people who weren't accustomed to banking would soon go out of business. But Grameen Bank has been hugely successful, with payback rates of more than 98%. It has been imitated all over the world.
Microfinancing can work for Native Americans microlending can start small businesses across Indian Countries we already do it in the rest of the world William J. Clinton, former President of the United States, FDCH Political Transcripts, August 6, 1998, DELIVERS
REMARKS ON IMPROVING THE ECONOMIES OF NATIVE AMERICAN COMMUNITIES, l/n The directive calls on several agencies to coordinate and strengthen our existing Native American economic development initiatives. And I might say, in particular, I think microcredit institutions have a terrific potential to do even more than some of you have already done for the last several years in Indian country. The community development financial institutions that we have established in this country in the last few years have played an important role in providing credit to people who otherwise could not get it to start small businesses or to expand small businesses. I have asked the Congress for a significant expansion in the Community Development Financial Institutions Act. I believe in my microlending. The United States, last year, through our aid programs, financed two million small loans in developing nations around the world. Think how much good we could do if we could finance two million small loans in developing communities in the United States of America.
102
SENIORS 2009
Coercion NB
Microfinancing institutions are cost-neutral gain revenue back from interest rates and capital is infused from willing tribe members who want to lend tiny loans back to their reservation MBDA only sets up the institution to make this possible R. H. Tipton III, Third-year student, University of Oklahoma College of Law, American Indian Law Review, 2004 / 2005,
29 Am. Indian L. Rev. 173 To date, research indicates only one tribe that has seen the vision of the potential impact microfinance could have on their reservation. Having noted that, the proposed Tribal Microfinance Institution (TMFI) in many ways embodies the spirit of the Cherokee Nation Micro-Enterprise Development Program. There are, however, significant differences which make the proposed TMFI more focused on Group Three entrepreneurs rather than on Group Two or better. Also, the proposed model is more of a full service MFI rather than just a microlending institution. This is in order to facilitate success amongst the microentrepreneurs by providing the necessary resources for success. A. Mission Statement As with any focused business enterprise, the purpose of the TMFI should be embodied in a mission statement. This mission statement should focus on the economic and social development of the Group Three members of the tribe. It should create an effort to affect the lives of the poorest of the tribe in a positive, feasible way. The goal of the TMFI is not profit maximization, but rather it is patterned after the Grameen Bank and is focused on empowering the individuals in their community. n75 So long as the tribal leaders keep this social consciousness throughout the duration of the program, the needs of the lowest class will be met in an efficient and effective way. Having said this, the mission of the TMFI should identify the target audience (the Group Three microentrepreneur) and should direct the institution to make all policy and technical decisions with this focus in mind. [*187] B. Initial Funding The technical discussion of the TMFI must start with the issue of funding. With all of the recent developments in tribal economics on the macro level, it is safe to assume that a majority of the tribes have sufficient funding to be able to enact a TMFI. n76 It is encouraging to see the many economic pursuits being met with a fruitful bounty; however, it is imperative to not forget about microentrepreneurs, who may further increase this advancement. The bottom line is that tribes should be able to funnel sufficient amounts of money into a TMFI in order to foster both the economic and social developments that will naturally flow from this institution.
103
SENIORS 2009
Contracts CP 1NC
Government contracts with service providers solve and gain the benefits of the free market
Guo 04 [Baorong, GWB School of Social Work in the Washington University at St. Louis, The Commercialization of Social Services: Toward an
Understanding of Nonprofits in Relation to Government and For-profits, July 14, http://www.istr.org/conferences/toronto/workingpapers/guo.baorong.pdf]
According to this welfare capitalism theory, the
market mechanism is deemed overwhelmingly powerful and subsumes all institutions into capitalism including nonprofits. With the apparent triumph of capitalism worldwide, market forces are being widely celebrated (Dees, 1998, p.56). Welfare and capitalismthe two parallel institutions in the pasttend to be absorbed into an integrated process of capitalistic production (Gilbert, 1983). The welfare reform in 1996 marked an even further step 11 towards welfare capitalism because government is more likely to award contracts to for-profit service providers. It is recognized that the new tolerance of for-profits undoubtedly reflects an increasingly conservative political climate that values the power of markets and the profit motive to create efficiency (Ryan, 1999, p.130). Since economic institutions are conventionally and presently the best representation of capitalism, by differentiating the economic market and the social market, Gilbert (1983) was able to recognize the distinct function of welfare institutions from that of economic institutions. The commercialization of social services precisely reflects the third phase of the development of welfare capitalism. The encroachment of for-profits is not only a feature of the commercial trend in social services but also a signal of the commercialization of the social market (welfare system).
Contracts are the only way for Maximus to survive-- theyll accept almost any terms
Sanger 03 [Mary, professor of Urban Policy Analysis and Management at the Robert J. Milano Graduate School of Management and Urban Policy, New
School University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institutions Center for Public Service, The Welfare Marketplace: Privatization and Welfare Reform, June, http://books.google.com/books?id=3f17oFQCJQC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=maximus+services+food+stamps&source=bl&ots=H8dkcuinpf&sig=Rld96cwrQkrGye_RIkE0kHpH0lA&hl=en&ei=1SJBSu _qEofKM9OvgM0I&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6]
The welfare-to-work market for the two largest players, MAXIMUS and Lockheed Martin IMS, have
been on a steady slope, but there is evidence that their efforts may be reaching a plateau. Few new markets remain where either could continue its recent rates of growth. MAXIMUS in particular has articulated a growth strategy that emphasizes a focus on large volume to achieve economies of scale. This market strategy is reflected in its success in bidding on and winning contracts that average $3.7 million a contract year.
Looking toward future markets, Holly Payne of MAXIMUS observed, As far as other cities, Philidelphia maybe, Chicago might grow, but really the cities that we have now are what we are concentrating on.
Maximus effectively distributes a wide range of social services

Sanger 03 [Mary, professor of Urban Policy Analysis and Management at the Robert J. Milano Graduate School of Management and Urban Policy, New
School University, and a nonresident senior fellow at the Brookings Institutions Center for Public Service, The Welfare Marketplace: Privatization and Welfare Reform, June, http://books.google.com/books?id=3f17oFQCJQC&pg=PA91&lpg=PA91&dq=maximus+services+food+stamps&source=bl&ots=H8dkcuinpf&sig=Rld96cwrQkrGye_RIkE0kHpH0lA&hl=en&ei=1SJBSu _qEofKM9OvgM0I&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6]
Whatever the ultimate distribution of companies in the welfare-to-work market, it is premature to predict the exit of larger
organizations. Indeed, they moved into the welfare market opportunistically, leveraging their expenses in large, technologically sophisticated social services. Both MAXIMUS and Lockheed Martin IMS have already begun to assess the opportunities for growth in other social service areas. MAXIMUS seems the most optimistic about the growth of the market, in which it sees as a $23.9 billion industry to administer state-operated programs such as Medicaid, Childrens Health Insurance, Food Stamps, TANF, Child Support Enforcement, Supplemental Security Income, and other general assistance and social services. Of these contracts, David Mastran of MAXIMUS predicted that $12 billion to $15 billion is possible for privatization. In order to move into these new service areas, MAXIMUS has been busy acquiring an assortment of twelve different firms. It has continued to acquire companies to help bolster its
consulting and government operations groups by providing specialized skills in everything from integration of school records to technology to track child-support payments. With an annula growth rate of 23 percent from 1997 to 2001and more than $487.2 milion in revenues (56 percent of which derives from government operations group), it is not difficult to discern the reason for David Mastrans optimism. Mastran joked the MAXIMUS would become the fourth column of government: executive, legislative, judicial, and MAXIMUS.
Given the recent slowdown in growth of contracts for outsourcing as the current recession endures (even as the size of caseloads has resulted in larger revenues under existing contracts), growth estimates may need to be revised downwards . Even so, 2001s 18.6 percent increase in revenues indicates
continued strength in all areas of the companys work.
104
SENIORS 2009
Contracts Solvency 2NC

Contracts are a unique form of privatization- delegation with a bid allows for fair competition and for company use of the same services the federal government would Rabin 05 [Jack, professor of Public Administration and Public Policy at the Pennsylvania State University, editor of the International Journal of Public
Administration, PhD in political science, Encyclopedia of public administration and public policy, page 221, http://books.google.com/books? id=eJ3Z29DSqVQC&pg=PA221&lpg=PA221&dq=free+market+government+contracts&source=bl&ots=mwD9wMDyR&sig=dKeftnzgj9Mgqd1uHDUWCai7ZKg&hl=en&ei=MFVCSoqgG4_SMJb6iMgH&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5] In a broad sense, transition of government function can be included in privatization. For instance, government can make
a contract
with private companies in order to enable the companies to provide public services in lieu of government .
Forms of Privatization There are several forms of privatization. Here, four representative forms of privatization are discussed based on the Savas clarification: contracting out, voucher, franchising, and sale. Contracting Out
Governments can delegate authority of a public service to a company via a competitive bid during a limited period. Through contracting out, governments can provide better services with less cost because of competitive bids between private companies.
Some state governments are using contracting-out strategy in order to stimulate public employees. Public employees can see that their jobs may be privatized unless performances of
When a government contracts out a service with a company, it should pay much attention to whether the company can sustain good quality of service after the service is contracted out. And governments should check whether the company persistently holds to its responsibility to the citizens. Most of all, governments should provide fair conditions for many private companies that are participating in a competitive bid.
their organizations are satisfactory.
A one-size-fits-all national plan fails- Congress should instead incentivize private companies Eckels 07 [Robert, former county judge in Texas, BEFORE THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS AD HOC SUBCOMMITTEE ON DISASTER RECOVERY, "OPEN ARMS: ANALYZING THE ROLE AND NEEDS OF HOST COMMUNITIES IN THE WAKE OF MAJOR DISASTERS AND CATASTROPHES, Dec 3, http://hsgac.senate.gov/public/_files/EckelsStatement.pdf]
The State of Texas issues thousands of Lone Star Cards for food stamps and state social service benefits . States, too, could manage this operation more effectively than the federal government. Congress should encourage states and communities to include the private sector in their disaster response planning. Congress should encourage regional private sector contracts and not force states and local communities into a once-size-fits all national plan.
105
SENIORS 2009
Maximus Solvency 2NC

Maximus has unique leverage with top consultants over development and implementation of an array of social servicescontracts are critical, its all the company relies on Reintsma 07 [Mary, CEO @ Reintsma Company, a Capital Markets Industry company, The political economy of welfare reform in the United States, p
152, http://books.google.com/books? id=y7OcPZROLxMC&pg=PA152&lpg=PA152&dq=maximus+services+food+stamps&source=bl&ots=lz25WjVBNl&sig=tqhpT6BDbo2q42oSqT338DZ7iA&hl=en&ei=TCRBSuf4EZa8M7u56NwI&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=5]
Relying entirely on government contracts for its revenue, Maximus places a great deal of emphasis on establishing relationships with past and present local and state government officials. The 1999 Annual report notes that: since state and local government administrators are subject to changing legislative and political mandates, the company has developed strong relationships with experienced political consultants who inform and advise the company with respect to strategic marketing opportunities and legislative initiatives (Ibid., p. 4). Its growth strategy includes recruiting top government management professionals and middle level consultants with a network of political contacts to leverage the companys client relationships (Ibid., p. 4). Focusing on government contracts shows promise of being an increasingly lucrative endeavor. The 1998 Annual Report states that:
The Company believes that providing program management and consulting services to government agencies represents a significant market opportunity. Federal state and local government agencies in the United States spend more than $250 billion annually on the health and human services programs to
which the company makes its services, including Medicaid, Food Stamps, Temporary Assistance to Needy Families, Child Support Enforcement, Supplemental Security Income, General Assistance, Child Care and Child Welfare. The state operated programs
alone cost an estimated $21.0 billion annually to administer (Maximus, 1998, p. 1).
Maximus empirically solves a wide range of social services and is highly effective at welfare programs
Business Wire 08 [MAXIMUS Awarded $8.1 Million Welfare-to-Work Contract by Los Angeles County, May 19,
http://www.allbusiness.com/government/government-bodies-offices-regional/10510748-1.html]
Under the Los Angeles Greater Avenues to Independence (LA GAIN) program, MAXIMUS County Department of Public Social Services regions. MAXIMUS
provides welfare case management services in two of the seven services address barriers to self-sufficiency and assist program participants in securing and maintaining long term employment at a living wage. To that end, the project offers a variety of services to prepare jobseekers to enter the workforce successfully , including remedial and vocational education, life skills training, and English as a Second Language courses. Special services for mental health, substance abuse, victims of domestic violence, homeless housing location assistance, and family support programs are also offered . LA GAIN program
participants also receive transportation and child care assistance. "MAXIMUS has been working to improve the lives of thousands of Angelenos in the LA GAIN program since 2000 and is pleased to have received this contract extension," said Richard Montoni, CEO of MAXIMUS. "Like our welfare to work efforts in neighboring Orange and San Diego Counties and other jurisdictions in the U.S. and abroad,
MAXIMUS is focused on the success of individuals and families in achieving self-sufficiency." MAXIMUS currently operates similar welfare-to-work programs in six other states including Alaska, Arizona, the District of Columbia, Hawaii, and, Wisconsin, as well as Australia and Israel. In the United States, through its welfare-to-work efforts, MAXIMUS has helped improve the lives of more than 375,000 people making the transition into the workforce . Government has limited capabilities- only firms like Maximus can effectively administer social programs Atkinson 03 [Robert D. Atkinson is the vice president of the Progressive Policy Institute and director of PPIs Technology & New Economy Project. He is
the author of the New Economy Index series which looks at the impact of the New Economy on the U.S., state, and metropolitan economies, Network Government for the Digital Age, May 1, http://www.ppionline.org/documents/NetGov_0503.pdf]
The role of non-federal actors has grown significantly in the last 30 years. States have gained administrative capabilities to run largescale and complex
programs. Nonprofit organizations of all kinds whose mission is to address social problems, from hunger to education to environmental protection, have sprung up throughout the country. The
private sector has become a more important partner in change on many fronts, including welfare-to-work (e.g., the for-profit company Maximus runs welfareto work programs for a number of states), transportation (e.g., companies institute telecommuting
policies to reduce travel), and environmental protection. Citizens are centralto more policy areas, whether they participate in civic environmental activities, volunteer to help build homes for the poor, or empower themselves through new tools on the Internet. Individuals increasingly act like Tofflers prosumers, collaborating in the production of goods and services, whether theyre placing online orders, providing feedback on product design, or paying bills automatically online. The same trend is beginning to emerge in government, where Web-enabled citizens increasingly co-produce government services. Federal
agencies are now often such a small part of the overall system, they cannot affect change on the needed scale if they act alone. In this new environment with many more actors involved, the operative governance model is not closed agencies carrying out their missions in isolation, it is networks. This is not to say that bureaucracy is ill-suited to all tasksroutine tasks like depositing social security payments in recipients accounts is something a large organization is well suited to do, although with electronic deposit, computers can do most of the work. When tasks are routine and the environment is predictable, bureaucratic organizations can do the job, especially if they are effectively managed. However, in a world in which problems are complex, multi-faceted, and rapidly changing, and where information is dispersed, traditional bureaucratic government cannot adequately handle complex situations of discontinuous change . As three leading analysts of reinventing government argue, Centralized bureaucratic government is unable unilaterally to control the complexities and pluralistic diversity which are fundamental characteristics of modern societies. 19 Clearly, bureaucratic government cannot reclaim the position it held in the old economy as the central governing steering authority. Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 106
SENIORS 2009
Maximus Solvency Health Care

Michigan proves Maximus is effective- high standards and quality enforcement- our evidence takes into account its criticisms state oversight allows for an extra safety net for its standards Baragar 97 [Lisa, Consultant for Public Policy at PSC (Public Service Consultants), MAXIMUS: Michigans Medicaid Enrollment Broker, September,
http://www.pscinc.com/documents/PSR/HPB/1997/0997.cfm]
Although many are concerned about the quality of services MAXIMUS will provide clients, Ms. Ruff, the projects manager, points out that the enrollment brokers contract establishes some very ambitious goals meant to ensure high standards. For example, she explains that the enrollment brokers contract requires it in the first year to help at least 85 percent of its clients choose a health plan rather than being assigned one; the rate must be 90 percent in the second year, and 95 percent in the third year. If the organization does not achieve
these goals, the state is entitled to terminate the contract.
In addition to these expectations, MAXIMUS must adhere to some other very strict guidelines and quality assurance measures: For example, the enrollment broker must answer 100 percent of calls it receives by the fourth ring, enrollment counselors may have no more than two calls each in the phone queue at any time, and counselors must spend sufficient time on each call to ensure that the recipient is given adequate information. Furthermore, the enrollment broker must ensure that its clients have adequate access to its services . For example, clients must be able to
communicate with MAXIMUSs counselors via mail and telephone, and the organization must make community presentations and conduct walk-in sessions and home visits.
Not only will the state be monitoring how well the enrollment broker performs each of these duties, there will be customersatisfaction surveys and the state will monitor use of MAXIMUSs complaint and grievance process .
Conclusion
Despite the challenges that MAXIMUS faces, the state stands behind its decision to privatize the enrollment broker process. "With enrollment counseling services in place, persons with Medicaid coverage will be able to make objective, informed decisions on the managed care options available to them and choose a plan that best fits their family needs ," concludes Ms. Isaacs. Ms. Garcia adds, "Health plans are encouraged by . . . the [move] to managed care. The enrollment of the Medicaid population [in such a program] will contribute to a healthier population."
Michigan proves Maximus is effective- high standards and quality enforcement- our evidence takes into account its criticisms state oversight allows for an extra safety net for its standards
Baragar 97 [Lisa, Consultant for Public Policy at PSC (Public Service Consultants), MAXIMUS: Michigans Medicaid Enrollment Broker, September,
http://www.pscinc.com/documents/PSR/HPB/1997/0997.cfm]
Although many are concerned about the quality of services MAXIMUS will provide clients, Ms. Ruff, the projects manager, points out that the enrollment brokers contract establishes some very ambitious goals meant to ensure high standards. For example, she explains that the enrollment brokers contract requires it in the first year to help at least 85 percent of its clients choose a health plan rather than being assigned one; the rate must be 90 percent in the second year, and 95 percent in the third year. If the organization does not achieve
these goals, the state is entitled to terminate the contract.
In addition to these expectations, MAXIMUS must adhere to some other very strict guidelines and quality assurance measures: For example, the enrollment broker must answer 100 percent of calls it receives by the fourth ring, enrollment counselors may have no more than two calls each in the phone queue at any time, and counselors must spend sufficient time on each call to ensure that the recipient is given adequate information. Furthermore, the enrollment broker must ensure that its clients have adequate access to its services . For example, clients must be able to
communicate with MAXIMUSs counselors via mail and telephone, and the organization must make community presentations and conduct walk-in sessions and home visits.
Not only will the state be monitoring how well the enrollment broker performs each of these duties, there will be customersatisfaction surveys and the state will monitor use of MAXIMUSs complaint and grievance process .
Conclusion
Despite the challenges that MAXIMUS faces, the state stands behind its decision to privatize the enrollment broker process. "With enrollment counseling services in place, persons with Medicaid coverage will be able to make objective, informed decisions on the managed care options available to them and choose a plan that best fits their family needs ," concludes Ms. Isaacs. Ms. Garcia adds, "Health plans are encouraged by . . . the [move] to managed care. The enrollment of the Medicaid population [in such a program] will contribute to a healthier population."
107
SENIORS 2009
Maximus Solvency Child Care

Recent acquisition of Technology Management Resources allows Maximus to effectively manage child services- widespread internet programs
Maximus Press Release 08 [May 2, MAXIMUS Acquires Technology Management Resources, http://phx.corporate-
ir.net/phoenix.zhtml?c=88279&p=irol-newsArticle&t=Regular&id=140847&]
May 2, McLean, VA (NYSE:MMS) -- MAXIMUS
announces the strategic acquisition of Technology Management Resources (TMR), a key provider of child support operations and system consulting services to state and local governments. TMR was purchased from SCB Computer
Technologies, Inc. Nebraska-based TMR will join MAXIMUS with 125 professionals located in their headquarters in Omaha and client sites across the nation. Revenues for TMR this fiscal year are projected to be $9.9 million. The merger will be accretive to MAXIMUS earnings in 2000.
TMR currently provides child support collections services in 17 states. TMR has specialized in the application of new technologies to enhance child support collections programs. The firm has software for locating absent parents through credit bureau systems; systems for employers to report new hires statewide to identify absent parents who change jobs; web-based technology for custodial parents to query databases on the status of child support payments; a web-based product for intercepting insurance settlements to delinquent absent parents; and tools for assisting in the development of large-scale child support systems. "TMR is a strong addition to our existing child support business and provides us with several new web-enabled services, " declared David Mastran, President and CEO of MAXIMUS. "TMRs Child Support Lien Network (CSLN), will be a valuable internet solution for all states confronting their mounting delinquent child support caseload. Further, TMRs web-based product that complements interactive voice response units by providing on-line payment and case profile information will revolutionize access to child support information, and help MAXIMUS provide better service in the process." Tom Ruffino, President of TMR, echoed Mastrans enthusiasm saying, "Joining MAXIMUS gives us the opportunity to significantly expand our reach into other states. Our systems consulting practice should blossom when aligned with the strong system qualifications of MAXIMUS. We are excited to be part of such a successful team."
108
SENIORS 2009
Maximus Solvency Immigrants

Maximus ESL programs allow for enhanced proficiency- helping immigrants achieve their basic needs Tumlin and Zimmerman 03 [Karen and Wendy, both are analysts @ the Urban Institute, Immigrants and TANF; A Look at Immigrant Welfare
Recipients in Three Cities, http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310874_OP69.pdf]
Another barrier to serving limited English speakers is the fact that in each of the three sites, welfare recipients English proficiency was rarely systematically assessed. In Los Angeles, recipients are tested for English proficiency as part of a vocational assessment only after they fail to find a job through the countys three-week Job Club (intensive job search) program. Only after this vocational assessment can recipients be referred to ESL. Though the county does not routinely assess English language proficiency it does test recipients for literacy in their native languagebut only for English and Spanish speakers. Those with low literacy scores are sent to a combination of part-time Job Club and adult basic education classes. The lack of a systematic assessment of English language ability and a parallel Job Club and ESL program were two key issues raised in an Office of Civil Rights complaint lodged by advocates . The largest employment services contractor in New York City, the for-profit firm Maximus, acknowledged the benefits of mandatory language assessments. The contractor cited the citys failure to provide these assessments and subsequent service referrals as the main barrier they faced in meeting the required work placement figures under their mammoth city contract (Lipton 2000). Specifically, Maximus noted that they simply could not place the large number of limited English speakers into jobs without additional language training.
Houston also lacks a formal language assessment process for welfare recipients. Instead, caseworkers determine a recipients initial time limit for assistance (12, 24, or 36 months) based on their work readiness, which accounts for past work history and education, but not English proficiency. Although
language does not factor into these assessments, administrators reported that most immigrants are assigned longer time limits because they have lower education levels. Immigrants with higher education levels, including many refugees, receive shorter time limits regardless of their English skills. The failure of our study sites to conduct systematic English language assessments reinforces the notion that limited English speakers have not been considered a special or hard-to-serve TANF population that requires additional consideration in program design.
109
SENIORS 2009
Contracting Better for the Free Market

Contracting is based on the least restrictive kind of free market economics- encouraging competition and bidding that allows companies to set their own foothold Berros 2K [Rubn, experienced analyst of international affairs, Contracting for Development: The Role of For-Profit Contractors in U.S. Foreign
Development Assistance, February, page 39, http://books.google.com/books?id=a_hvdYQ-8UUC&pg=PA39&lpg=PA39&dq=%22for-profit %22+contracts+free+market+government&source=bl&ots=d_EYgzyNPk&sig=nFP1Q937DXKtXA6pORDGcnd2jvE&hl=en&ei=A1JCSoXyKJmUMYViMEH&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=6]
The growth of contracting has been fueled by the move toward a less restrictive free-market-based economy. By opening up public services to market competition, advocates of contracting stress that there is potential for saving money and improving service quality. However, contracting sometimes departs from the competitive free-market model if there is no rigorous bidding. Instead, government agencies and private for-profit contractors develop over time long-term relationships governed by their own specific norms and expectations. These relationships could influence the delivery of services and the way contracting is measured. Contracts generate market competition for profit Smith and Ingram 97 [Steven, University of Washington President, Helen, Professor Emerita in Planning, Policy, and Design and Political Science,
and former Drew, Chace and Erin Warmington Chair in the Social Ecology, Institutions and Policies for Democracy: A Discussion Paper, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=csd]
Contracting for public services with private nonprofit and forprofit service providers is another form of the market model. By contracting for service, it is hoped that the costs can be lowered and quality improved by creating competition among service providers for public contracts and grants. Contracts form the backbone of privatization- the private sector has found ways to sidestep most government enforcement mechanism, diminishing the impact of contracts on the free market Hamowy 08 [Ronald, fellow @ CATO Institute, The Encyclopedia of Libertarianism, page 524, http://books.google.com/books?
id=yxNgXs3TkJYC&pg=PA524&lpg=PA524&dq=free+market+government+contracts+capitalist&source=bl&ots=8QVtb-Ly_S&sig=t3AeYGYR64PAeokmX2PB7coYww&hl=en&ei=TlZCSt_lIIrwMt3YhcEH&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=1]
Most people believe that a market economy requires that governments enforce private contracts. Although some people may recognize that simple face-to-face trades are possible without external enforcement, most people argue that government enforcement is necessary when contracts are complicated, include commitments over time, or involve large groups. In many real-world situations, however, enforcement
of contracts by public courts is too costly government courts are not perfect, after all or impossible, inasmuch as government courts often lack jurisdiction across political
The private sector, in contrast, has found numerous ways to promote contractual performance even when government enforcement is absent. From the discipline of continuous dealings in small groups, to reputation mechanisms or more formal private tribunals for large groups, numerous devices have emerged that have made possible contractual performance independent of government. Recognizing that private parties can overcome the potential problem of contractual performance brings into question whether government enforcement of contracts is necessary.
boundaries or the desire to enforce contracts in sectors not sanctioned by law. This topic is of growing interest to libertarians.
110
SENIORS 2009
AT: Contracts Link to Coercion

1. Not true- contracts are an agreement between a private company and the government- they do not HAVE to engage in the negotiations or sign the paper- only the plan has a unique instance of coercion [insert] 2. Even if we still use taxes its only a question of morality- if we win that we use less taxes than the plan then the aff is more morally repugnant than us- we also are inherently within the free market Beck 09 [David, member of Howrey's Construction and Government Contracts practices. Mr. Beck advises on the resolution of complex construction
disputes for various public and private construction, engineering and infrastructure projects, Obama's Government Procurement Reforms to Require Extensive Use of Fixed Price Contracting, March 23, http://www.constructionweblinks.com/Resources/Industry_Reports__Newsletters/20090323/obam.html]
In 2008, spending on government contracts accounted for more than $500 billion of the federal budget, twice the amount that was spent in
2001. 2/ Mr. Obama has ordered the Director of the Office of Management and Budget to collaborate with the Secretary of Defense, the Administrator of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, the Administrator of General Services, the
Director of the Office of Personnel Management and other agency heads to develop a plan to repair what Mr. Obama referred to at his March 4 press conference as the broken system of government contracting. Mr. Obamas plan calls for reform and increased regulation in three areas: 1) award of government contracts; 2) management of government contracts; and 3) outsourcing of inherently governmental services. Federal Acquisition Regulation Part 6.101 requires government contracting officers to promote and provide for full and open competition in soliciting offers and awarding Government Contracts. Full and open competition enhances the governments ability to negotiate price and generally results in more fixed-price contracts. In recent years, however, there has been a significant increase in the number of contracts awarded without full and open competition. That has led to an increase in the
number of cost-reimbursable contracts in which the final contract price is indefinite and the risk of cost overruns is significant. Since 2000, federal spending obligations under costreimbursable contracts have nearly doubled from $71 billion to $135 billion annually. 3/ To reverse this trend, Mr. Obama reiterated the policy that agencies should not engage in non-competitive contracts except in limited circumstances and declared a preference for fixed-price contracts. Mr. Obama instructed the agency heads to promulgate rules and regulations that will maximize the use of full and open competition and that will provide appropriate oversight for all noncompetitive contracts. Mr. Obama also directed the agency heads to develop rules that will increase and improve the oversight and management of private contractors. A GAO study of 95 major defense acquisition projects last year found cost overruns of 26 percent, totaling $295 billion. 4/ Mr. Obama believes that with increased oversight, including a process for ongoing review to identify wasteful and inefficient contracts, such cost overruns will be significantly reduced. Finally, Mr. Obama
wants to eliminate the outsourcing of services that are inherently governmental activities. The premise is that taxpayers will receive more value for their tax dollars when government agencies actually perform services within their area of responsibility. But, Mr. Obama has not defined what constitutes an inherently governmental service. Instead, he acknowledged that the line between what is
inherently a governmental service versus one that is not, and thus appropriate for private competition, is a blurry one. Therefore, he called on the government agencies to specifically identify when governmental outsourcing for services is and is not appropriate. 5/
3. The Counterplan results in citizen backlash against taxes- solving the link to coercion Smith and Ingram 97 [Steven, University of Washington President, Helen, Professor Emerita in Planning, Policy, and Design and Political Science,
and former Drew, Chace and Erin Warmington Chair in the Social Ecology, Institutions and Policies for Democracy: A Discussion Paper, http://repositories.cdlib.org/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1121&context=csd]
Further, the
greater use of private organizations for the delivery of public services makes the connection between government and the citizen more indirect. Many citizens may perceive that government is less relevant and important in their lives, even if government is directly supporting many of their local community organizations through grants, contracts and subsidies. The potential implications for citizenship and the place of government in society are profound. If government is not given credit for worthy projects even when it supports them, then citizens will turn more and more to private solutions and be less likely to support the taxes necessary to fund government operations. The result may be a longterm decline in government capacity which might reinforce negative perceptions of government performance . At the same time, inequalities in
citizen participation and access to services might become more severe.
The perm wouldnt solve this- the magnitude of our link and impact proves that any coercive control must be rejectedthe affs knee-jerk reaction to government control of the market is still present under the permutation
111
SENIORS 2009
AT: Contracts Link to Politics

1. No- all of our politics links are based off expansion of unpopular social servicescontracts are a common aspect of government funding and have rarely been controversial 2. Recent contract reform gives new popularity to the issue Weckstein and Maloney 09 [Kenneth and Michael, contributors @ Government Contract Blog, part of a news service, President Starts His Full-Court
Press Against Contractor (and Subcontractor) Fraud, May 28, http://www.brownrudnick.com/blog/governmentcontracts/]
President Obama
promised to cut out fraud, waste and abuse from government contracts, and Congress is on board with the President's program. Last week, Congress delivered and President Obama signed the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009 (FERA). This new law includes important changes to the federal False Claims Act that will make it easier for whistleblowers and their attorneys to file qui tam lawsuits against government contractors--and their subcontractors. 3. Welfare privatization doesnt cost political capital- lobbyists and multiple examples prove Dunlea 99 [Mark, contributor at Covert Action Quarterly, a news media outlet, The Poverty Profiteers Privatize Welfare, March 25,
http://mediafilter.org/caq/CAQ59.PrivateWelfare.html]
Welfare reform is only the latest manifestation of a major trend toward the privatization of formerly public functions. Elected officials of both
major parties are rushing to outsource everything from social security, to trash collection, to dispensing fines for delinquent parking tickets, to fire, ambulance, and policing services. Private prisons now house almost 80,000 people.
This drive to privatize gained political currency as "big government" replaced big corporations as public enemy number one. The US has always had strong populist movements, but historically they targeted the powers of robber barons and corporations.
However, one of the legacies of Barry Goldwater's failed presidential election besides paving the way for Ronald Reagan was to enable conservatives to redirect anger away from corporations and onto government. With ever-increasing corporate ownership of the media, it may be a long time before corporations replace government as the focus of populist enmity.
Big business, which has benefited mightily from the shrinking of government, has not been a passive bystander. Unlike welfare moms, corporations have the resources to lobby legislators and to feed the campaign coffers that are the way to many a politician's vote. The pattern of their buying influence and shaping legislation is well documented. A few years ago, for example, an
advocate on welfare issues for the Hunger Action Network of New York state was startled when she ran into lobbyists for Shea & Gould at the state legislature. The powerful New York law firm was pushing for the expansion of fingerprinting of welfare participants.
4. Blackwater proves Congress can be shielded from controversy in contracts Yeoman 03 [Barry, staff writer at Mother Jones Journalism, Soldiers of Good Fortune, May/June edition,
http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2003/05/soldiers-good-fortune]
The men listen attentively. They know that Torres, a Navy vet, honed his skills during nine years in the service, performing search-and-rescue operations and providing nuclearweapons security. But Torres no longer works for the military. These days he is an employee of Blackwater USA, a private company that contracts with the U.S. armed forces to train soldiers and guard government buildings around the world. Every day, the Navy sends chartered buses full of trainees from Naval Station Norfolk to the company's 5,200-acre facility in Moyock, North Carolina. Last fall, Blackwater California each year in
signed a $35.7 million contract with the Pentagon to train more than 10,000 sailors from Virginia, Texas, and "force protection." Other contracts are so secret, says Blackwater president Gary Jackson, that he can't tell one federal agency about the business he's doing with another.
112
SENIORS 2009
Big Government Good Economy

Big government is inevitable; the question is the best way to use it. History is filled with a litany of proof that the bigger the government the less chance of recessions. Madrick, 08 Senior Fellow at the Schwartz Center for Economic Policy Analysis at The New School and Editor of Challenge Magazine (Jeff, Growth factor How big government helps the economy take off, Accessed Online Via the Boston Globe, http://www.boston.com, //MDP)
If the big picture case against taxes is simply wrong, it suggests that instead of competing to offer tax cuts and less
America's presidential candidates and their parties would help the economy more by acknowledging that big government is a fact of life - and indeed is necessary to a healthy economy. Rather than harm the economy, the evidence shows that government spending , when done well, contributes critically to economic growth. Americans rely on the government for the free primary and high schools that educate the workforce. The government subsidizes college education and has built the immense transportation infrastructure that moves goods across the country and gets people to work. Federal, state, and local government have been essential to the nation's health, building clean-water systems and developing vaccines that have eliminated or minimized diseases like diphtheria, tuberculosis, and polio. The government can waste money, too. But the national rhetoric about the economy needs to stop focusing on how to shrink the government, and start focusing on how best to use it. Contrary to the romantic claims about the nation's laissez-faire past, American history is a story of government intervening, time and again, to support growth.
government, as Senator McCain and to some degree Senator Obama are doing,
Early America created a national bank to maintain its finances and currency, critical to a smooth-functioning modern economy, at the instigation of Alexander Hamilton, George Washington's treasury secretary. Under Thomas Jefferson, well-known for his laissez-faire sympathies, America bought the Louisiana territories in what amounted to a large federal spending program. He thus provided cheap land to farmers at federally controlled low prices, enabling them to feed themselves and the nation, but also soon to produce surpluses to feed Britain as well, adding to America's wealth. State and local government were also vital contributors to growth. New York State issued bonds to finance most of the Erie Canal, opened in 1825. Other states followed suit with canals of their own, creating an efficient transportation network essential to commercial development before the Civil War.
Led by Massachusetts, the states built free and mandatory primary schools based on property and other local taxes, producing a literate and able work force . After the Civil War, the federal government donated tens of thousands of acres of land to states with the express purpose of starting new technical universities, which helped launch the University of California at Berkeley, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Cornell University, among others. These research centers contributed vitally to American agriculture and manufacturing. The federal government financed much of the railroad development of the second half of the 1800s through massive provisions of land . The tens of thousands of miles of railroad created the nationwide marketplace that made possible America's first industrial revolution. Similarly, in the 20th century, the federal government built roads , dams, bridges, and, after World War II, the interstate highway system, which were the building blocks for the huge commercial growth of postwar America . It invested in research and development through the Defense Department, accounting for most of such spending in the nation in the decades after World War II. America sent its returning GIs to college , again raising the educational level of its workforce, and provided low-interest loans for their children to go to college as well . It aggressively subsidized medical research and educatio n. Throughout the 1950s and 1960s, taxes rose as a proportion of GDP, and the economy only grew more rapidly. Family income doubled in two decades, adjusted for inflation, even as more new social programs were funded . This was, in fact, true of all the developed nations of the West .
But a new wave of thinking began to arise in the 1970s as America became mired in high rates of inflation and unemployment. The economic guru of the time was the Nobel laureate Milton Friedman, the nation's leading advocate of laissez-faire economics. Friedman, whose mentors included the Austrian economist F.A. Hayek, author of "The Road to Serfdom," had been arguing since the early 1950s that big government led to economic inefficiencies and slower rates of growth. For decades, the strong economy proved him wrong. But by the 1970s, America longed for an explanation of its predicament, and Friedman and his followers provided a simple and convincing answer. Some of his followers, like Robert Lucas, another Nobel laureate from the University of Chicago, and Robert Barro at Harvard, held still more extreme antigovernment views, arguing that any and all government interference was at best neutral and at worst harmful. Voters began to rebel against taxes, starting in 1978, when California overwhelmingly passed Proposition 13, sharply reducing property taxes. Reagan swept into office on the promise of tax cuts and reducing government, and what followed were the boom years of the 1980s. To conservatives of the time, it seemed strong proof that the arguments of Friedman and his followers were
there is also a strong case that they were wrong . In 1992, President Bill Clinton succeeded in passing legislation to raise the income tax rate on higher income Americans .
correct. But
Harvard's Feldstein, who had served as Reagan's chief economic adviser, claimed that the tax increase would reduce the incentives to work and therefore the incomes of the wealthy.
It turned out to do nothing of the kind: the top

113
SENIORS 2009
. Nancy L. Stokey, of the University of Chicago, and Sergio Rebelo, of Northwestern University, looked closely at the period between 1913 - when the United States first adopted an income tax -
tier of Americans, in fact, made more money. A look at tax history suggests that this should have been no surprise
and 1942. In that period, the federal bite from income taxes rose from 2 to 15 percent of GDP. Discounting the data for business cycles, including the sharp downturns during the Great Depression, they found that the rate of growth remained consistently strong and positive over the years, despite ever-higher tax rates. In recent years, the underpinnings of antitax economics have been further questioned by a number of mainstream scholars. Economists like Robert Barro produced studies claiming that high taxes reduced growth. Feldstein similarly produced studies to show that high taxes undermined incentives to invest. But when Lindert, Slemrod, and many others took a closer look at the statistical methods, the results turned out to be fragile at best. Barro's early analysis, for example, was undermined by a handful of economists who found that if they simply added some new causal factors that Barro had left out, the conclusions evaporated. Even Friedman's key assertions about the relationship of the money supply to GDP were ultimately discredited, and have been discarded by the Federal Reserve. (Some of the contemporary antitax economists do acknowledge there are gaps in their analyses, but believe they will yet be proved correct.) Today, despite the long legacy of Reagan and the antitax economists, taxes paid in America are not lower than they once were. Americans pay less in income taxes than they once did, but a lot more in Social Security taxes. The overall tax bite is about the same, and government spending, despite the Reagan rhetoric, is still 20 percent or so of GDP. Even without a real tax cut, the economy has grown steadily - although it has never again reached the levels attained in the high-tax 1960s. Some countries provide strong counterexamples to antitax economics - nations with high taxes and generous levels of social spending where wages, productivity, and GDP are also high. A classic example is Norway, with very high tax rates, a generous welfare state, and productivity levels that exceed America's. Even Sweden, with the most luxurious of all welfare states, has been growing solidly again since its economic downturn in the early 1990s. None of this is to say that government is automatically beneficial for the economy. An objective look at the data does not suggest that big government itself always produces faster growth. Just raising taxes, of course, won't increase rates of growth. And no doubt, at some point, government can get too big. The question is how well the tax money is spent. America has almost given up on cultivating new manufacturing industries by, for example, investing in transportation infrastructure or alternative energy policies. Developing new roads, bridges, water systems, improved airports, and new energy technologies creates jobs at home, not overseas. America seems paralyzed about reforming its healthcare system, which if left as is will cost the nation 20 percent of its GDP, up from the current 16 percent, in only a few years. That will come to more than another half a trillion dollars a year. And despite the rise of the two-worker family, there is no high-quality national pre-K program in America. Such a program, we now know from
to a nation steeped in antigovernment economics, the idea that government cannot be of help - or that taxes are not worth paying - is now seriously jeopardizing its future. There is no rich nation in the world today , including America, that has grown wealthy without significant government involvement . And there will be no rich nation in the future that can stay wealthy without robust government , either.
contemporary research, could add substantially to prosperity by creating a still more productive workforce. The list is not complete. But
114
SENIORS 2009
Aff Free Market Doesnt Solve

There is too little coherent data and dependency is too hyped up- the counterplan is an extreme that bars effective policy Roberts 97[Major CAMPBELL ROBERTS, the National Director of the Salvation Army's Social Services, Our Social Problems Are they caused by
poverty or dependency?, The Jobs Letter No.69 /28 November 1997, http://www.jobsletter.org.nz/jbl06910.htm]
Government, the Business Roundtable and others take up the old argument that emphasise personal failure and a welfare system that has encouraged and contributed to this personal failure. It is an argument that says any support is too much. The solution proposed is a remotivation of the individual; the rediscovery of family suggests a sort of personal conversion type approach. The people who propound this view are the same group who have benefited and done well out of the reform process. The last few years have seen dependency on the welfare system, as an evil to be
targeted. The Welfare to Wellbeing Strategy of the Department of Social Welfare typifies the approach. Political parties representing the more affluent of the community have also propounded these policies.
I would question however the rigour of the data on which this policy is built. It would seem to me that this approach is often not based on research that clearly shows a link between dependency and the social problems we face, but rather is an adherence to the currently popular doctrines of individualism and economic rationalism. Philosophies that are the flavour of the time throughout the western
world.
It would be naive not to accept that any welfare system leads to some dependency. That is seen every day in every welfare agency. Similarly it is obvious that the nature of the human condition is that we are sometimes responsible for the failures that occur to us. Building however your whole social policy and system as though the personal failure of individuals alone is the cause of the problem is naive in the extreme.
If the community sector is right and poverty caused by structural maladjustments in the economic and social structure is the cause of the social timebomb then the solutions required are more than actions to motivate individuals but collective actions to put in place policies and structures that addresses the imbalance.
Only strict government intervention can enable the poor to obtain the social rights they deserve Bidstrup 07 [Scott, speech major @ Ricks College, Free Market Fundamentalism: Friedman, Pinochet and the "Chilean Miracle", Sept 22,
http://www.bidstrup.com/economics.htm]
Cutting, and eliminating when possible, expenditure for social services. Again, in
the name of reducing government interference in the market, it was not necessary for government to involve itself in social welfare programs. To explain the obvious sufferinng that results, it is therefore claimed that when the poor suffer, it is due to their own laziness that they do not better themselves. That the accumulation of money was equivalent to the accumulation of power, with its attendant distortion of the functionings of the market, was not a concern. That this led inevitably to the disempowerment of the poor was not a concern - the poor were blamed for their condition by claiming their "inferiority" or "bad decisions." Social justice was a non-issue. Incentives to private companies fail- no accountability Financial Times 03 [Americans deluded by free-market rhetoric?, May 24, http://www.pnhp.org/news/2003/may/americans_deluded_by.php]
Maine has tried to act like a big HMO, winning bulk-purchase rates for the last corner of American society that lacks them. The plan is very much in the US style of regulatory welfare. Through
the tax code and the Federal Register, private interests are given incentives or directives that amount to offers one cannot refuse. Maine has ascertained that there is spare profit in drug companies that it would rather use for consumer purposes than for product development. So it is essentially shifting private sector money out of research and into welfare. Americans still do not realise that the prescription-drug controversy, like discussions of national health policy everywhere, is at root an argument over terms of rationing. One enthusiast even calls Maine Rx a no-cost reform. Thats wrong. It is a hocus-pocus way of levying a tax on business to fund social services - minus the democratic accountability of a welfare programme. The vast sums that are moved this way never get recorded in the budget ledger, permitting Americans to delude themselves that they are less socialist and more independent than their European cousins.
115
SENIORS 2009
Aff Government Key to Solve Poverty

Government is critical to expand personal assistance- CTC encourages lobbying and regulations that hamper social services Carlson-Thies 98 [Stanley, contributor to the Hoover Institute Policy Review at Stanford, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition,
http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html]
The charity tax credit is an innovative way for government to encourage greater involvement by citizens and social institutions in helping the poor. But the
credit is no magic replacement for governments own anti-poverty role. Families in deep crisis need more than dollars and bureaucratic services, to be sure; they need assistance that is, in Marvin Olaskys words, "challenging, personal, and spiritual." A government that wants an effective welfare effort must find ways to expand nongovernmental and personal forms of assistance.
By offering a credit on taxes owed, government can stimulate taxpayer giving to anti-poverty groups and encourage greater citizen engagement with the needy. Because the governments support is indirect, there is little danger that it will turn the groups into simple vendors of government services or encroach on their moral or religious character. At the same time, because the credit is targeted to donations for anti-poverty action, government ensures that lower tax revenues and reduced social spending are offset by increased service by nongovernmental assistance programs.
Nevertheless, the charity tax credit is problematic in both its details and its overall design. Typical proposals define eligible charities narrowly as groups directly assisting the poor, so that increased giving will go to the needy and not to the orchestra or someones alma mater. But this risks reducing the anti-poverty fight to emergency help at the expense of long-term, transformative programs. Similarly, the proposals typically ban legal and political action by eligible charities so that they cannot lobby for more welfare spending. However, sometimes what the poor really need is a courtroom advocate against a shoddy business or an unjust landlord. Or they may need political action to sweep away laws and regulations that hamper entrepreneurial activity or to change the structure of the education system.
116
SENIORS 2009
Aff Privatization Bad

Turn- privatization of social services ONLY benefits the advantaged- not the poor who actually need it
Mandell 02 [Betty, welfare rights activist since the 1960s, co-edits Survival News, written by and about poor people. She is a member of the New Politics
editorial board, The Privatization of Everything, Summer, http://www.wpunj.edu/~newpol/issue33/bmande33.htm]
ADVOCATES OF THE FREE MARKET assume that the public interest will be automatically served if each individual follows his or her economic self-interest. It hasn't worked out that way for the poor and the vulnerable. Private companies have increasingly taken over the social services. In business to make a profit, they prefer to serve clients who will help them do that, which leads to "creaming" the clientele. The people whom private organizations find too difficult or intractable are left for the government to serve directly, if they are served at all. Social services (e.g., foster care and adoption, counseling, rehabilitation, private charity), have long been dominated by the non-profit sector. Private charity began before public charity, most often under the auspices of religious groups or religious-minded
individuals. Catholic Charities, the Federation of Protestant Welfare Organizations, United Jewish Appeal-Federation and the Salvation Army, for example, are large providers of private charity. However, voluntary
agencies are not really "private" any more because much of their funding comes from federal, state, and local governments in public-private partnership arrangements. Nonprofit agencies have, in effect, become "paid agents" of the government
to an extent that no one in the 19th century would have dreamed possible. They have increased their contracting with both state and federal governments since the 1980s. Nonprofit agencies are no longer exclusively concerned with the poor; in fact, they have increasingly disengaged from the poor. A study by the Urban Institute in the 1980s showed that over half of nonprofit human service agencies had few or no poor clients and only 27 percent had mostly poor clients. Research
shows that charity benefits the relatively advantaged rather than disadvantaged groups, well-established organizations rather than new, grassroots activities, community organizing, issue advocacy, or controversial public policy initiatives. Social and class elites are overrepresented on boards and have disproportionate power over priorities, though there is more risk taking with younger diverse board membership.47
Turn- privatization monopolies collapsing the market and decreasing the potential for success
The complexities, uncertainties, and ambiguities of imperfect information, inadequate distribution of existing information, barriers to market entry, and product differentiation are all assumed to be either nonexistent or trivial." 23 This model is labeled a "Pareto optimum" after Vilfredo Pareto, who claimed to follow the teachings of Adam Smith. It implies that
not only will a competitive market society enhance material wealth, but that as each individual acts in pursuit of his or her own gain, everyone is in fact helping to create the optimal possible amount of material satisfaction for everyone else in society."24 This market model has nothing to say about the fairness of any Pareto optimal outcome. The Nobel Prize winning economist Amartya Sen commented, "A society or an economy can be Pareto optimal and still be perfectly disgusting."25
The problem with this model, according to Sclar, is that the barriers to market entry for additional sellers are often high and purchasers often don't have access to good information on which to base their decisions to buy. The real economy is not a level playing field, but a "mountainous terrain that includes several high peaks from which well- endowed corporate and individual warriors swoop down to seize targets of opportunity."26 There is some real competition, mostly between small businesses, but the tendency is to try to monopolize the market in order to maximize profits. Small businesses generally don't have the capital to handle large contracts over a long period of time.
There is another reason, in addition to Sclar's, disproving the idea that privatization follows the Pareto principle. Privatization begins with getting government money. How is the Pareto principle followed when prisoners are forced to be in private prisons? And how is the Pareto principle followed when the government gives private corporations money to build and run those prisons? There (government money) destroys that.
is no buyer and seller. And since private schools depend on government money in the form of vouchers, there is no free enterprise commerce. If someone starts a private school and competes with public schools on an equal basis, that is free market competition, but the use of vouchers
Even if the government is inefficient- privatization is comparatively worse [this is especially true for contracting]
IT IS TRUE THAT PUBLIC OPERATIONS are sometimes inefficient. Public bureaucracies, "like sedentary people, tend to accumulate fat around the middle."39 They often collect more middle level managers than they need, some of who are political appointees. Sclar points out that the solution to this is not privatization; the solution is reorganization of the public service. Use of the spot market may lead to more efficiency and cost savings, but the picture is different when complex contracting is involved. There is no evidence that private corporations manage complex services more efficiently than governments. In fact, private corporations often hire managers from the public sector to manage their contracts. The substantive experience of the public managers is crucial to effective service delivery.
The British rail service is a good example of how privatization can break down partly because of the complexity of contracting and supervising the contract. Amid promises of greater efficiency, reliability, and returns from corporate taxes, the British railway was sold to Railtrack, a private corporation. The system was broken up into more than 100 separate businesses, some of which subcontracted parts of their responsibilities. By October 2000, there were two major collisions, caused by faulty signals, which killed a total of 38 people, while a third crash caused by a broken rail, killed another four. Last year, the number of train cancellations rose to 165,000, nearly three times the 1999 level. In October 2001, the government placed Railtrack in "administration" -- in effect, bankrupting it.40
The private corporations cut costs by firing workers, which caused problems ranging from cancellations due to few drivers being available to dangerous unstaffed stations. Maintenance companies cut their staff by about a third. Government subsidies to the railways were about three times higher than
before privatization. Public opinion polls show large majorities in favor of renationalizing the whole system.
117
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Government + Charity

The federal government shouldnt have any affiliation with charity, history proves
Williams, 5economics
professor at George Mason University (Walter, Capitalism Magazine, Charity is no function of the federal government, September 21, 2005 < http://www.capmag.com/article.asp?ID=4412> ) Last week, President Bush promised the nation that the federal government will pay for most of the costs of repairing hurricane-ravaged New Orleans, adding, "There is no way to imagine America without New Orleans, and this great city will rise again." There's no question that New Orleans and her sister Gulf Coast cities have been struck with a major disaster, but should our constitution become a part of the disaster? You say, "What do you mean, Williams?" Let's look at it. In February 1887, President Grover Cleveland, upon vetoing a bill appropriating money to aid drought-stricken farmers in Texas, said, "I find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution, and I do not believe that the power and the duty of the General Government ought to be extended to the relief of individual suffering which is in no manner properly related to the public service or benefit." President Cleveland added, "The friendliness and charity of our countrymen can always be relied upon to relieve their fellow citizens in misfortune. This has been repeatedly and quite lately demonstrated. Federal aid in such cases encourages the expectation of paternal care on the part of the Government and weakens the sturdiness of our national character, while it prevents the indulgence among our people of that kindly sentiment and conduct which strengthens the bonds of a common brotherhood." President Cleveland vetoed hundreds of congressional spending measures during his two-term presidency, often saying, "I can find no warrant for such an appropriation in the Constitution." But Cleveland wasn't the only president who failed to see charity as a function of the federal government. In 1854, after vetoing a popular appropriation to assist the mentally ill, President Franklin Pierce said, "I cannot find any authority in the Constitution for public charity." To approve such spending, argued Pierce, "would be contrary to the letter and the spirit of the Constitution and subversive to the whole theory upon which the Union of these States is founded." In 1796, Rep. William Giles of Virginia condemned a relief measure for fire victims, saying that Congress didn't have a right to "attend to what generosity and humanity require, but to what the Constitution and their duty require." A couple of years earlier, James Madison, the father of our constitution, irate over a $15,000 congressional appropriation to assist some French refugees, said, "I cannot undertake to lay my finger on that article of the Constitution which granted a right to Congress of expending, on objects of benevolence, the money of their constituents." Here's my question: Were the nation's founders, and some of their successors, callous and indifferent to human tragedy? Or, were they stupid and couldn't find the passages in the Constitution that authorized spending "on the objects of benevolence"? Some people might say, "Aha! They forgot about the Constitution's general welfare clause!" Here's what James Madison said: "With respect to the two words 'general welfare,' I have always regarded them as qualified by the detail of powers connected with them. To take them in a literal and unlimited sense would be a metamorphosis of the Constitution into a character which there is a host of proofs was not contemplated by its creators." Thomas Jefferson explained, "Congress has not unlimited powers to provide for the general welfare, but only those specifically enumerated." In 1828, South Carolina Sen. William Drayton said, "If Congress can determine what constitutes the general welfare and can appropriate money for its advancement, where is the limitation to carrying into execution whatever can be effected by money?" Don't get me wrong about this. I'm not being too critical of President Bush or any other politician. There's such a broad ignorance or contempt for constitutional principles among the American people that any politician who bore truth faith and allegiance to the Constitution would commit political suicide.
118
SENIORS 2009
Aff Tax Credit Doesnt Solve [1/2]

Turn- a CTC will increase government control and wont promote private investment in the poor Rector 98 [Robert, senior policy analyst for welfare and family issues at The Heritage Foundation, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition,
When Marvin Olasky wrote The Tragedy of American Compassion (1992), he offered a vital and challenging idea: the traditional wisdom of aiding the poor has been forgotten, for modern charity as practiced by both the government and the private nonprofit philanthropy is permissive and often destroys rather than aids the poor. The
difficult task ahead was to recover the lost wisdom of true charity. Since then, conservatives have tended to distort this robust idea into another theme that is more comfortable but false: Government welfare is largely bad and private sector charity is largely good. This is simply untrue. Although there are a few sound conservative organizations helping the poor, the bulk of nonprofit private charities serving them are more liberal and more permissive than their counterparts in government. Any criticism I have ever written about government welfare applies doubly to nonprofit charity. It is thus the most retrograde and corrupt part of the welfare system that the advocates of a charity tax credit are proposing to expand. Peter Barwick suggests a trade-off: Government welfare spending will be reduced and money re-channeled through the tax code to the private nonprofit philanthropy. In reality, it will not work that way. The philanthropies he seeks to subsidize are nearly unanimous in their claim that the United States must spend more on the poor. If a charity tax credit is created, it will not replace government welfare, but will merely be added on top of the vast existing welfare system that already absorbs 5 percent of GNP. CTC is hampered by political bureaucracy Rector 98 [Robert, senior policy analyst for welfare and family issues at The Heritage Foundation, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition,
Moreover, public-sector
welfare has one important advantage over private charity: Government funds are rarely used to intervene in the political process. Not so for private philanthropy. Indeed, most liberal and moderate charities believe that the noblest deed they can perform on behalf of the poor is to lobby for greater government welfare spending and expanded state power. In a
recent hearing in the House of Representatives, the chief lobbyist of Catholic Charities stated that, in the view of her organization, the best charity activity was voter registration!
Whenever similar charity tax bills have been introduced in Washington, the entire philanthropic industry has been mobilized to remove any ban on advocacy. As a result, most bills like this one deliberately include policy research and advocacy as a "service to the poor" worthy of subsidy.
Barwick does propose a ban on the use of tax-subsidized charity funds for policy advocacy. But this ban is an illusion and has no chance of survival in the long term.
Barwicks plan creates the opposite effect- CTC destroys any opportunity of investment while decreasing democratic participation in government Rector 98 [Robert, senior policy analyst for welfare and family issues at The Heritage Foundation, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition,
Barwick says he wants to create a marketplace for charity permitting individuals to choose where their monies go. In fact, he does neither. His proposal is narrow and corrupt because he mimics the core premises of the War on Poverty. His idea of "charity" bows in obeisance to the liberal icons of guilt, victim worship, envy, and indulgence. It is divorced from true benevolence. To mention one example among a thousand: he would subsidize hospice care for the indigent terminally ill, but not donations for medical research to cure diseases. This is a very bad idea. If we wish to strengthen civil society, reduce government, and combat moral deconstruction, we should consider enhanced tax relief for all philanthropic giving, not merely the narrow leftish aid to the "poor" envisioned by Barwick . Such an alternative would foster
true benevolence, rather than a stale repeat of the War on Poverty. To the extent speech and advocacy were funded, all ideas would be treated equally and public discourse would not be biased toward the Left.
CTC increases government involvement in the everyday activites of the programs- the exact kind of control their net benefits seem to critique Arnett 98 [Grace-Marie, formerly the executive director of the National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, is the president of the
Galen Institute, a not-for-profit tax and health policy research organization based in Alexandria, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html]
Who can argue that a tax credit for charitable contributions isnt worthwhile? Of the thousands of twists and turns in federal and state tax codes, one that promotes charitable giving to encourage civil society should be at the top of the list. But there are costs and trade-offs, and it is important that they be visible during
the debate. The advocates of hundreds if not thousands of worthwhile causes can and do make passionate and convincing cases for special tax favors to benefit their constituents. But
whenever a social cause is steered through the maze of the tax code, the donor, the recipient, and the beneficiary are subject to government intrusion to assure compliance. Further, any tax deduction or credit must be assessed with an eye toward its impact on the overall tax rate.
Just looking at the criteria that Peter Barwick has listed for eligibility for a charity tax credit suggests the complexity of the proposal: Under his plan, charities must prove that 75 percent of their budgets go to direct assistance for low-income individuals and that no more than 5 percent of the charities budget is spent on political activities.
Government bureaucrats would have to write detailed regulations to define what "direct assistance" means, charities would be required to provide volumes of paperwork to assure they are in compliance, and government agents would be free to scrutinize records detailing how the staff and volunteers of the charity spend their time and money . Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick 119
SENIORS 2009
Aff Tax Credit Doesnt Solve [2/2]

Turn- tax breaks only benefit those with high incomes- disproportionally affecting the poor Arnett 98 [Grace-Marie, formerly the executive director of the National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform, is the president of the
Galen Institute, a not-for-profit tax and health policy research organization based in Alexandria, Charity Tax Credits--and Debits, Jan/Feb edition, http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html]
Furthermore, tax
deductions and partial tax credits like the Pennsylvania proposal are much more likely to be used by those with higher incomes. It only makes sense: Those with higher incomes have more money left over, after providing for their housing, food, transportation, and clothing, to give discretionary income to charity. They can afford to spend money to save money on taxes. People at the lower end of the income-tax scale, on the other hand, are often least able to take advantage of tax preferences. A much higher percentage of their income--sometimes all of it--is consumed just to meet living expenses. They are limited in their ability to spend money on
something that government encourages in order to save money in taxes. Those who can afford to spend money on the tax credit can lower their effective tax rate; those who cant are stuck. These
loopholes create the perception that the rich are able to game the tax code, thus engendering resentment between the rich and the poor and hatred of the tax code.
120
SENIORS 2009
Aff Tax Credits ARE Welfare

Tax Credits Plans are Actually Masked Welfare-Government Interference isnt reduced
Ferrara, 8
director of entitlement and budget policy for the Institute for Policy Innovation. He served in President Reagan's White House Office of Policy Development, and as associate deputy attorney general under the President George H.W. Bush. (Peter, The Wall Street Journal, Obamas Tax Plan is Really a Welfare Plan, August 19, 2008. < http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121910303529751345.html >) Barack Obama's tax plan is the opposite of supply-side economics. He proposes to raise marginal rates for just about every federal tax. He also proposes a raft of tax credits that taxpayers can receive if they engage in various government-specified activities. Moreover, the tax credits would mostly go to those who pay little or nothing in federal income taxes. His trick is to make the tax credits "refundable." Thus, if the tax credit is for $1,000, but the taxpayer would otherwise only pay $200 in taxes, the government would write a check to the taxpayer for $800. If the taxpayer pays nothing in federal income taxes, the government would pay him the whole $1,000. Such credits are not tax cuts. Indeed, they should be called The New Tax Welfare. In effect, Mr. Obama is proposing to create or expand a slew of government spending programs that are disguised as tax credits. The spending on these programs is then subtracted from the total tax burden, in order to make the claim that his tax plan is a net tax cut overall. On the tax side of the ledger, the details released by his campaign last week confirm what a President Obama has in mind for our most productive citizens. The top individual income tax rate, for example, would be increased by 13%, to 39.6%; the next-highest rate would be raised to 36%. The top rates on capital gains and dividends would rise by a third, to 20% The Social Security payroll tax would be raised between 16% to 32% for families making over $250,000 a year. This means that the real returns these people get from their lifetime payments into the retirement program will be driven below 0%, according to my own previous research, which was published by the Cato Institute and elsewhere. Mr. Obama also wants a permanent federal estate tax, with a top rate of 45%; his health-insurance plan includes a new payroll tax on employers; and he also contemplates several increases in the corporate income tax, including a new so-called windfall profits tax on oil companies. Then there is the spending side of the ledger. Mr. Obama proposes a fully refundable Making Work Pay Tax Credit, which would have the government pay out $500 to each worker and $1,000 to couples -- reminiscent of George McGovern's 1972 election proposal for the government to send a $1,000 check to everyone. His American Opportunity Tax Credit would provide a $4,000, fully refundable tax credit for college tuition expenses. His Mortgage Interest Tax Credit would provide a 10% credit -- refundable -- to offset mortgage interest payments for lower- and middle-income families. His Health Care Tax Credits, which the campaign says "will ensure that health insurance is available and affordable for all families," include "a new refundable 50 percent health tax credit on employee premiums paid by employers." Currently existing tax credits would also become spending programs in the Obama tax program. The Savers Credit would be made fully refundable, and would be expanded, according to the campaign, "to match 50% of the first $1,000 of savings for families that earn under $75,000." The Child and Dependent Care Tax Credit would be made refundable and expanded to allow "low-income families to receive up to a 50 percent credit on the first $6,000 of child care expenses." The Earned Income Tax Credit is already refundable. Mr. Obama would expand it to "increase the number of working parents eligible for EITC benefits, increase the benefits available to noncustodial parents who fulfill their child support obligations, increase benefits for families with three or more children, and reduce the EITC marriage penalty, which hurts low-income families." In short, welfare spending is to be increased by paying more money out to low-income income tax filers. The latest Congressional Budget Office data shows the bottom 40% of income earners already pays no income taxes. Indeed, they receive a net payment from the federal income tax system -- meaning from the taxpayers -- equal to 3.8% of all federal income taxes, because of the refundable tax credits under current law. The middle 20% of income earners, the true middle class, pays 4.4% of federal income taxes. Overall, the bottom 60% of income earners pay less than 1% of federal income taxes on net. When "tax credits" primarily go to this group in the form of checks from the government (rather than a reduction in their tax burden) it is simply an abuse of the language to call the spending a tax cut. Consequently, to say, as the campaign does say, that the candidate's tax plan is a tax cut on net -- and that it would limit taxes to 18.2% of GDP -- is grossly misleading. The Obama tax plan would sharply increase real taxes. It also would come nowhere near to paying for the massive increases in federal spending he has proposed, including the spending that is disguised in the form of refundable tax credits.
121
SENIORS 2009
Aff CTCs destroy welfare

Charity Tax Credits will only be an addition to the list of welfare programs that the government has committed tocausing not only the CP but the entire social service sector to fail Rector, 98 (Rector, Robert, senior policy analyst for welfare and family issues at The Heritage Foundation, Charity Tax CreditsAnd Debits January and February 1998 < http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html>)
When Marvin Olasky wrote The Tragedy of American Compassion (1992), he offered a vital and challenging idea: the traditional wisdom of aiding the poor has been forgotten, for modern charity as practiced by both the government and the private nonprofit philanthropy is permissive and often destroys rather than aids the poor. The difficult task ahead was to recover the lost wisdom of true charity. Since then, conservatives have tended to distort this robust idea into another theme that is more comfortable but false: Government welfare is largely bad and private sector charity is largely good. This is simply untrue. Although there are a few sound conservative organizations helping the poor, the bulk of nonprofit private charities serving them are more liberal and more permissive than their counterparts in government. Any criticism I have ever written about government welfare applies doubly to nonprofit charity. It is thus the most retrograde and corrupt part of the welfare system that the advocates of a charity tax credit are proposing to expand. Peter Barwick suggests a trade-off: Government welfare spending will be reduced and money re-channeled through the tax code to the private nonprofit philanthropy. In reality, it will not work that way. The philanthropies he seeks to subsidize are nearly unanimous in their claim that the United States must spend more on the poor. If a charity tax credit is created, it will not replace government welfare, but will merely be added on top of the vast existing welfare system that already absorbs 5 percent of GNP.
122
SENIORS 2009
Aff CTCs Corruption

CTCs would only bog down welfare and turn it into a corrupted governmental program Rector, 98 (Rector, Robert, senior policy analyst for welfare and family issues at The Heritage Foundation, Charity Tax CreditsAnd Debits January and February 1998 < http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html>)
Moreover, public-sector welfare has one important advantage over private charity: Government funds are rarely used to intervene in the political process. Not so for private philanthropy. Indeed, most liberal and moderate charities believe that the noblest deed they can perform on behalf of the poor is to lobby for greater government welfare spending and expanded state power. In a recent hearing in the House of Representatives, the chief lobbyist of Catholic Charities stated that, in the view of her organization, the best charity activity was voter registration! Barwick does propose a ban on the use of tax-subsidized charity funds for policy advocacy. But this ban is an illusion and has no chance of survival in the long term. Whenever similar charity tax bills have been introduced in Washington, the entire philanthropic industry has been mobilized to remove any ban on advocacy. As a result, most bills like this one deliberately include policy research and advocacy as a "service to the poor" worthy of subsidy. A ban on commingling private and public funds is similarly nonenforceable. In reality, this proposal would lead to philanthropies using tax-subsidized private funds to aggressively promote expansion of government programs of which they were beneficiaries. Most of the liberal agenda, from civil rights to environmentalism, is already packaged as service to the poor. Under the tax-credit proposal, those seeking to raise taxes to expand the food-stamp program get a potent tax cut while supporters of a balanced budget do not. Advocates of expanded welfare, Head Start, and a hike in the minimum wage get a tax break not available to advocates of Star Wars and the flat tax. Backers of affirmative action to help disadvantaged groups get a subsidy but opponents of affirmative action do not. Virtually every liberal cause gets a subsidy while conservative ones do not, unless they twist their message severely in order to accommodate a left-leaning ideological litmus test.
123
SENIORS 2009
Aff CTCs kill Tax Code

CTCs would plague down the government with bureaucracy and burden the tax code
Arnett, 98 (Grace-Marie, research associate at the Commonwealth Foundation, a public-policy research institute in Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, and the author of "Let Charity Begin at Home," a study of the charity tax credit, Charity Tax CreditsAnd Debits January and February 1998 http://www.hoover.org/publications/policyreview/3566647.html) Who can argue that a tax credit for charitable contributions isnt worthwhile? Of the thousands of twists and turns in federal and state tax codes, one that promotes charitable giving to encourage civil society should be at the top of the list. But there are costs and trade-offs, and it is important that they be visible during the debate. The advocates of hundreds if not thousands of worthwhile causes can and do make passionate and convincing cases for special tax favors to benefit their constituents. But whenever a social cause is steered through the maze of the tax code, the donor, the recipient, and the beneficiary are subject to government intrusion to assure compliance. Further, any tax deduction or credit must be assessed with an eye toward its impact on the overall tax rate. Just looking at the criteria that Peter Barwick has listed for eligibility for a charity tax credit suggests the complexity of the proposal: Under his plan, charities must prove that 75 percent of their budgets go to direct assistance for lowincome individuals and that no more than 5 percent of the charities budget is spent on political activities. Government bureaucrats would have to write detailed regulations to define what "direct assistance" means, charities would be required to provide volumes of paperwork to assure they are in compliance, and government agents would be free to scrutinize records detailing how the staff and volunteers of the charity spend their time and money. Next, government could demand the lists of beneficiaries and ask for their income statements to determine if they meet the criteria of "low-income individuals" eligible for the "direct assistance." Then, taxpayers, as always, would need to keep records to provide documentation of their donations. Furthermore, tax deductions and partial tax credits like the Pennsylvania proposal are much more likely to be used by those with higher incomes. It only makes sense: Those with higher incomes have more money left over, after providing for their housing, food, transportation, and clothing, to give discretionary income to charity. They can afford to spend money to save money on taxes. People at the lower end of the income-tax scale, on the other hand, are often least able to take advantage of tax preferences. A much higher percentage of their income--sometimes all of it--is consumed just to meet living expenses. They are limited in their ability to spend money on something that government encourages in order to save money in taxes. Those who can afford to spend money on the tax credit can lower their effective tax rate; those who cant are stuck. These loopholes create the perception that the rich are able to game the tax code, thus engendering resentment between the rich and the poor and hatred of the tax code. The National Commission on Economic Growth and Tax Reform said in its 1996 report that there are important social and economic consequences to certain tax breaks such as the deduction for charitable contributions but that they should be considered "with an eye to their impact on the tax rate and the costs to the Treasury." The best way to encourage charitable contributions may be to lower tax rates across the board and trust in the generosity of the American people--as we have throughout our countrys history. The greater economic growth and wealth generated by a lower tax burden and a simpler tax system would provide people with the resources to give even more.
124
SENIORS 2009
Aff CTCs Fed Abandoning Impoverished

The CTC not only represents the federal government abandoning the impoverished, but causes vast shortfalls in required funding for charities Eisenberg, 99currently a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute. Prior to his coming to Georgetown in January 1999, he served for 23 years as Executive Director of the Center for Community Change, a national technical assistance and advocacy organization working with low income and minority organizations and constituencies throughout the country. (Pablo, Can a Charity Tax Credit Help the Poor? July, 1999-August, 1999, The American Prospect, lexis)
Stacey Y. Abrams has eloquently described the crisis that food pantries, homeless shelters, health organizations, and other service providers are undergoing in trying to meet the rapidly escalating demand for their services. She could have added dozens of other examples that reflect both the irresponsibility and meanness of those behind these developments. But however horrible the situation, Abrams's remedy, a charity tax credit, is neither wise nor politically and programmatically feasible. She points to the potential symbolic significance of such a credit: it would, she says, recognize the new role and worth of charitable organizations and lessen their dependence on federal purse strings. Not so. On the contrary, it would symbolize the federal government's abandonment of its role as protector of its citizens, especially the poor, as well as its renunciation of its capacity to tackle national problems of poverty, race, health, and income security. These are governmental responsibilities that cannot and should not be foisted on the nonprofit sector. Moreover, the latter will never be able to match the level of resources that the federal government can mobilize for essential social services, even with the most generous of tax credits. Food pantries and homeless shelters weren't worried about federal purse strings when they were receiving a greater amount of federal money to run their programs successfully. They would have to worry, however, about the uncertainties of receiving unpredictable funds from private contributors through the tax credit.
125
SENIORS 2009
Aff CTCs Exclude Legal Services, Voter Education

The proposed CTC excludes advocacy groups, meaning that legal services and voter education are ignored Eisenberg, 99currently a Senior Fellow at the Georgetown University's Public Policy Institute. Prior to his coming to Georgetown in January 1999, he served for 23 years as Executive Director of the Center for Community Change, a national technical assistance and advocacy organization working with low income and minority organizations and constituencies throughout the country. (Pablo, Can a Charity Tax Credit Help the Poor? July, 1999-August, 1999, The American Prospect, lexis)
The charity tax credit, introduced by former senator Dan Coats of Indiana in draft legislation and now endorsed by Abrams, would provide a tax credit up to $ 500 to all taxpayers who give charitable contributions to antipoverty organizations. These organizations would be defined as nonprofits organized primarily to serve the poor with budgets heavily weighted toward such services. (The Coats bill says at least 75 percent.) The Coats bill also stipulates that contributions could only be made to nonprofits that provide traditional services to the poor. Organizations engaged in advocacy, public policy, organizing, and voter registration would be excluded. Presumably Abrams agrees with this eligibility requirement, since she only mentions service providers. The distinction between service-providing organizations and other nonprofit organizations involved in antipoverty efforts is untenable. Tax credits channeled only to service groups would ignore the important role played by advocacy and organizing in antipoverty work, not to mention legal services and voter education and registration. With devolution, these strategies have become even more significant.
126
SENIORS 2009
Aff Health Care Tax Credits Fail [1/2]

Health care tax credits fail leave consumers without options, do not solve problem of uninsured, and leave consumers without control over health care Families USA, Talking with the Media About A 10-Foot Rope for a 40-Foot Hole REPORT, May 2002,
http://www.familiesusa.org/resources/tools-for-advocates/tips/10-foot-rope-report-talking-points.html As President Bush moves back to his domestic agenda, he will once again focus on his plan to give individual tax credits to low-income workers for the purchase of health insurance. Tax credits leave uninsured consumers out in the cold without any choice or control over their health care. Tax credits do not provide working solutions to low-income consumers who most need health insurance. Tax credits leave consumers without any choices: $1,000 health plans were unavailable to healthy, non-smoking 55-year-old women in all but three states. $1,000 health plans were unavailable to healthy, non-smoking 25-year-old women in 19 states. Only substandard plans with high deductibles, high out-of-pocket costs, and limited coverage were available in the remainder states. A tax credit proposal does not solve the problem of the uninsured: The tax credit proposal targets low-income individuals since all children living under 200% of poverty are covered under the State Children's Health Insurance Plan. Even after the tax credit, a healthy, non-smoking 55-year-old woman living at the federal poverty level ($8,860) would have to spend more than half of her annual income to purchase a health insurance plan. In 11 states, premiums for a healthy, non-smoking 25-year-old woman were above $3,000. The highest premiums, a little over $5,500, were found in the states of New Jersey and Michigan. Tax credits leave consumers with little control over their health care: By exploring the few options available to healthy, non-smokers, this report highlights the "best case scenario." People with even the slightest health problems such as allergies face even higher premiums and the possibility of being denied coverage by health insurance companies.
Health care tax credits dont solve cost or quality Washington Post, January 26, 1992, Health Tax Credits? A Sickly Idea; Here's a Plan That Won't Do Anything to Make
the System Work, Robert Ray is co-chairman of the National Leadership Coalition for Health Care Reform and president of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa, former Governor of Iowa, lexis Now consider how a tax credit would measure up against these needs. A tax credit would not slow health spending; in fact, it would increase it by pumping more money into the system. To control costs, and stop cost-shifting to business, we need to set a spending target and develop a fair fee schedule to keep total system costs at or below that level. That's the process used for hospital reimbursement under Medicare -- and it works. Nor would a tax credit improve quality. For that we need to do more and better research on alternative treatments and technologies -- and to develop practice guidelines, so that care providers have the best information available on how to help patients.
127
SENIORS 2009
Aff Health Care Tax Credits Fail [2/2]

Health care tax credits fail doesnt allow Americans to pay position up front, and only reduces 5 million uninsured Washington Post, January 26, 1992, Health Tax Credits? A Sickly Idea; Here's a Plan That Won't Do Anything to Make
the System Work, Robert Ray is co-chairman of the National Leadership Coalition for Health Care Reform and president of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa, former Governor of Iowa, lexis Which leaves us with the question of health coverage. All the recent public opinion polls I've seen show the overwhelming majority of Americans -- across political parties -- believe this country should assure universal access to health care. How well would a tax credit serve this purpose? To answer that question, let's look at the issues involved in designing what is called a refundable tax credit. Here's how it would work: For those who buy health insurance directly, instead of receiving it as an employee benefit or under a government program, the cost -- up to a specified limit -- could be offset against federal income tax liability. A taxpayer whose tax liability was less than the credit would receive a government check for the difference. The first dilemma a tax credit plan faces has to do with the size of the credit. If the credit is large relative to the cost of health insurance, it will induce more people without coverage to obtain it -- but also cost the Treasury more. A credit of, for example, $ 1,000 per person would cost $ 34 billion if every one of the uninsured -- and nobody else -- were to take advantage of it. But even a credit this large would not guarantee access to health coverage. Millions of low-income Americans would not be in a position to pay the cost of health insurance up-front -- a fact of their lives that would not be altered by the availability of a refundable tax credit the following year. And even if we could somehow get past that problem, many would still find the residual cost of insurance too high; it is not unusual for individual coverage to run more than $ 1,800 a year. Moreover, reliance on a tax credit to assure coverage assumes that cost is the only impediment. It is not. Some Americans have trouble obtaining coverage because of pre-existing medical conditions, high-risk employment or other factors that make my colleagues in the insurance industry leery -- barriers that would remain absent changes in insurance rules. A smaller tax credit would be cheaper but fall still shorter of assuring universal coverage. Recent academic studies indicate that refundable tax credits of about $ 500 to $ 600 for an individual and $ 1,200 to $ 1,400 for a family might reduce the number of uninsured Americans from 34 million to 29 million -- only a modest step.
Double-bind: either a tax credit plan targets everyone, losing revenue, or targets a limited group, terminating insurance. Employer-based strategy key to solve. Washington Post, January 26, 1992, Health Tax Credits? A Sickly Idea; Here's a Plan That Won't Do Anything to Make
the System Work, Robert Ray is co-chairman of the National Leadership Coalition for Health Care Reform and president of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Iowa, former Governor of Iowa, lexis The second dilemma for a tax credit plan has to do with targeting. If a tax credit is available to all taxpayers (or at least to those with incomes below a ceiling), much of the revenue lost because of the credit will go to people who already pay for part or all of their own insurance. On the other hand, if a credit is limited to those who do not have health coverage, some employers will be induced to terminate their employees' coverage and keep the savings. This would obviously drive up the cost of the tax credit. What's more, it could have the perverse effect of actually reducing insurance coverage if the credit were too modest to allow many people to buy adequate insurance. Any plan that offers a government-subsidized alternative to direct employer insurance creates some incentive for companies to opt out of providing coverage, but with a tax credit, companies could save all their current costs. It has recently been suggested that an employer-based strategy -- such as the one included in the reforms proposed by the National Leadership Coalition for Health Care Reform, which I co-chair -- would also displace workers from private insurance. That is a misconception. Employers would either purchase insurance directly for workers or help finance coverage indirectly -by enrolling employees in private insurance under public sponsorship and paying a payroll tax. Either way, employees and their families would be privately insured -- and all would have coverage.
128
SENIORS 2009
Aff Health Care CP Links to Politics

Counterplan costs massive political capital Clinton health plan proves Nina Owcharenko is a Senior Policy Analyst for health care at The Heritage Foundation's Center for Health Policy Studies, Health Care Tax Credits: Designing an Alternative to Employer-Based Coverage, Heritage Foundation, November 8, 2005
Recommendation. Ideally, a universal tax credit such as The Heritage Foundation has proposed would revolutionize the U.S. health care system by establishing a patient-centered system grounded in consumer choice and competition. However, as concluded during the debate over the Clinton health plan, a radical departure from the current health care system may be too politically difficult.
129
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Urban Homesteader CP

Squatting doesnt work dangerous for squatters and drives down property values, means it links to coercion Slate.com March 25, 2009, Homesteaders in the Hood, http://www.slate.com/id/2214544/pagenum/2
But these ad-hoc reactions aren't really the answer. Squatting can be dangerous for squatters and can, depending on the circumstances, harm neighboring property owners by driving down property values, as neighbors of the Sacramento tent city have complained. At the same time, some of the danger and harm of squatting results from ill-advised efforts to keep them out, and squatters who take over boarded-up housing might actually improve neighborhood conditions and increase property values. Cities should therefore resist the temptation to respond to an increase in squatting by simply ratcheting up enforcement. Instead, governments should attack the problem on both the supply and the demand side.
130
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Postal Service CP

Privitization of the post office is a coercive measure with disastrous consequences to business and the economy
Concerned United States Postal Employees, Citizens Against Privatizing the US Postal Service, December 12, 2002 We feel that protection of the United States mail should be guaranteed under Federal law and should not be degraded through the privatization of this nations mail processing and delivery services currently afforded by the United States Postal Service for this nations citizens. It is our belief that no private company or companies, individual or individuals, should be able to purchase, bid upon, or accept appointment of any part or portion of the United States Postal Service or its obligations to process and delivery this nations mail without the prior approval of the citizens of the United States of America. Further, no company or companies, appointed commission, individual or individuals, elected or appointed official(s), government or quasigovernment entity should have the lawful right to influence or cause the privatization of this nations United States Postal Service. Only the citizens of this nation should be afforded the right, as voters, to make such a decision that would clearly affect each and every person and business in this nation and may hold consequences around the world. We contend that neither the current Postmaster General/CEO of the United States Postal Service, his directors or assignees, commission or commissions representing the United States Postal Service, nor any other government, quasi-government, or unionized entity or organization has any such authority as to privatize or cause the privatization of the United States Postal Service as it exists today. We fully agree to the possibility that laws or regulations may need to be changed or enacted that will allow the United States Postal Service to adjust product and service pricing in a manner that will allow our nations postal service to operate in a more efficient manner and under a more cost effective environment, but we do not agree that any said changes of law or operation should include, in any form or fashion, the privatization of The United States Postal Service.
131
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Microfinancing

Microfinancing can not be the sole instrument for poverty reduction not everyone is an entrepreneur Bangladesh proves Emerging Markets Datafile, THE INDEPENDENT, January 15, 1999, Microcredit alone wont reduce poverty
Microcredit programs should not be the sole instrument for poverty reducton in Bangladeish though they can raise living standards, particularly of women and their households here, said a recent study of the World Bank. The new study "Fighting Poverty with Microcredit : Experience in Bangladesh" assesses for the first time the cost-effectiveness of microcredit programs as instrumental for poverty reduction based on the experience of the Grameen Bank which pioneered microfinance and two other major microcredit programs - the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Rural Development Project (BRDB) 12 (RD-12). "Microcredit has tremendous potential as an instrument for poverty reduction. But complementary efforts such as literacy promotion and training are necessary to help those who lack the skills to make credit work for them," said Shahidur Rahman Khandker, Senior Economist in the World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network and main author of the Study, at a press briefing at World Bank country office in the city yesterday. He said that microcredit opened windows to self-employment and was effective only for those poor people who had entrepreneurship. To reach the poorest of the poor, other targeted programs, such as wage employment schemes, were needed for those who could not make productive use of microcredit, Shahidur Rahman added. Based on an extensive household survey and program-level data, the study found that microcredit programs were more cost-effective than formal finance in providing financial services to poor rural clients and were also more cost-effective than some other types of anti-poverty programs.
Turn Microfinancing reduces cash flow to the very poor and only works for those above the poverty line The Discomfort Zone, Microfinance Misses its Mark, August 23, 2007, http://www.planetd.org/2007/08/23/microfinance-misses-its-mark/
The Reality of Microfinance The problems Karnani cites are well known, and were pointed out years ago by Thomas Dichter, among others. People take microfinances poverty alleviating characteristics as fact - so much so that nobody has really studied the phenomenon. Those that have, says Karnani, find the impact on poverty is not as unambiguous - and he quotes several studies: One of the most comprehensive studies reaches a surprising conclusion: Microloans are more beneficial to borrowers living above the poverty line than to borrowers living below the poverty line. This is because clients with more income are willing to take the risks, such as investing in new technologies, that will most likely increase income flows. Poor borrowers, on the other hand, tend to take out conservative loans that protect their subsistence, and rarely invest in new technology, fixed capital, or the hiring of labor. Microloans sometimes even reduce cash flow to the poorest of the poor, observes Vijay Mahajan, the chief executive of Basix, an Indian rural finance institution. He concludes that microcredit seems to do more harm than good to the poorest. The failure of microfinance to bring people out of poverty should not be surprising, except to those deafened by its hoopla. People below the poverty line simply do not have the skills, vision, creativity, and persistence to be entrepreneurial. Even in developed countries with high levels of education and access to financial services, about 90 percent of the labor force is employees, not entrepreneurs. Indeed, Thomas Dichter made a similar point, pointing out: The microcredit paradox is that the poorest people can do little productive with the credit, and the ones who can do the most with it are those who dont really need microcredit, but larger amounts with different (often longer) credit terms.
132
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Pro Bono Tax Credits

Pro bono tax credits cant solve wont reach all lawyers and links to politics Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
Unfortunately, a pro bono tax credit has its drawbacks as well. A primary concern regarding a pro bono tax credit is its inability to collectively reach all lawyers engaged in the practice of law. Inevitably, a portion of the legal profession would be unable or unwilling to garner the tax benefit available with this tax [*382] credit. n234 Moreover, under the proposed model, there would be little incentive for lawyers to render more than fifty hours of pro bono service, regardless of the need, since the $ 5,000 limitation would limit the tax benefit they could realize at fifty hours. On a broader spectrum, an additional concern involves the impact a pro bono tax credit would engender on tax revenues throughout the nation. Arguably, if every lawyer took advantage of the $ 5,000 tax credit, the resulting impact on tax revenues could be quite substantial. n235 Moreover, there also remains our society's enduring propensity to denounce tax proposals designed for the benefit of society's more affluent members. n236
Pro bono tax credits wont solve wont close gap between ALL legal needs, just the actual defense Jason M. Thiemann, Candidate for Juris Doctor, Hamline University School of Law, Hamline Journal of Public Law & Policy, Spring, 2005, 26 Hamline J. Pub. L. & Pol'y 331
Finally, the ultimate effect a pro bono tax credit would have on closing the gap between pro bono services rendered and the remaining unmet legal needs of the poor is also a concern. If a large portion of the population continued to have legal needs that go unmet, then has the implementation of a pro bono tax credit positively enhanced pro bono participation or has it simply established a ceiling on the amount of pro bono service that the legal profession will render? In determining the effectiveness of a pro bono tax credit, the ultimate question should concern the impact the pro bono tax credit engendered on lawyers' participation in pro bono activities; has the pro bono tax credit enhanced pro bono participation?
133
SENIORS 2009
Aff - AT: Education Tax Credits

History proves that government spending prevents successful education reformstax credits that incorporate government regulation will be ineffective Coulson, 4 director of Catos Center for Educational Freedom.
(Andrew, Vouchers vs. Tax-Credits: Legal and Political Comparison of Optimal Programs, April 30, 2004. The Mackinac Center for Public Policy, < http://www.mackinac.org/article.aspx?ID=6540> ) Regulatory Encroachment: Once a voucher or tax credit policy has been enacted and the inevitable spate of legal attacks overcome, it faces its most difficult challenge: resisting the gradual build-up of market-suffocating regulations that can destroy its effectiveness. When first introduced, both the Maine and Vermont programs allowed the participation of religious schools, and were subsequently amended to exclude them. The Dutch system suffered comparatively little regulation when first established in the 1920s, but has since succumbed to a dramatic regulatory expansion including government curriculum and testing, extensive personnel regulations, rising barriers to the creation of new schools, forced consolidation of small schools, etc. Maines program has also begun to accumulate a curriculum and testing burden. In Chile, significant parts of the education labor force deregulation ushered in by the voucher program during the 1980s were reversed in the 1990s.It is true that there are exceptions. The Milwaukee program originally forbade the participation of religious schools and was subsequently amended to include them, and Chilean voucher-redeeming schools gained the right to charge co-payments in 1993, but these are exceptions to the overall trend. Historically, every time a government has begun to fund private schools, it has eventually assumed control over what is taught and who can teach in them. The cases of Holland and Chile actually seem rosy when compared to the system in India. India has both government-funded private schools and parent-funded private schools. Though parent-funded schools have preserved most of their autonomy, government-funded private schools are all but indistinguishable from their government-run counterparts. In some Indian states, government-funded private schools cannot even hire their own teachers, being forced to accept whichever individuals are assigned to them by the education authorities. The freewheeling educational market of the early medieval Islamic empire was similarly stifled by encroaching state control that followed the rise of official state funding. An account of this historical pattern spanning the entire 2,500 year history of formal education can be found in my 1999 book Market Education: The Unknown History.Some school voucher proponents have argued that voucher and tax credits will suffer equally from this threat to their long-term success. John Humphreys, a research economist with Australias Centre for International Economics, writes that Using either a direct expenditure (education voucher) or a tax expenditure (education tax credit), the government will still provide financial assistance to parents who fulfill the necessary requirements. This will necessitate a degree of government regulation as to what institutions or arrangements are appropriate for educational purposes. It seems unlikely that there would be any stricter standards under a voucher system than a tax credit system[81]
134
SENIORS 2009
Aff: AT Microfinancing
Microfinancing can not be the sole instrument for poverty reduction not everyone is an entrepreneur Bangladesh proves Emerging Markets Datafile, THE INDEPENDENT, January 15, 1999, Microcredit alone wont reduce poverty
Microcredit programs should not be the sole instrument for poverty reducton in Bangladeish though they can raise living standards, particularly of women and their households here, said a recent study of the World Bank. The new study "Fighting Poverty with Microcredit : Experience in Bangladesh" assesses for the first time the cost-effectiveness of microcredit programs as instrumental for poverty reduction based on the experience of the Grameen Bank which pioneered microfinance and two other major microcredit programs - the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee (BRAC) and the Rural Development Project (BRDB) 12 (RD-12). "Microcredit has tremendous potential as an instrument for poverty reduction. But complementary efforts such as literacy promotion and training are necessary to help those who lack the skills to make credit work for them," said Shahidur Rahman Khandker, Senior Economist in the World Bank's Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Network and main author of the Study, at a press briefing at World Bank country office in the city yesterday. He said that microcredit opened windows to self-employment and was effective only for those poor people who had entrepreneurship. To reach the poorest of the poor, other targeted programs, such as wage employment schemes, were needed for those who could not make productive use of microcredit, Shahidur Rahman added. Based on an extensive household survey and program-level data, the study found that microcredit programs were more cost-effective than formal finance in providing financial services to poor rural clients and were also more cost-effective than some other types of anti-poverty programs.
Turn Microfinancing reduces cash flow to the very poor and only works for those above the poverty line The Discomfort Zone, Microfinance Misses its Mark, August 23, 2007, http://www.planetd.org/2007/08/23/microfinance-misses-its-mark/
The Reality of Microfinance The problems Karnani cites are well known, and were pointed out years ago by Thomas Dichter, among others. People take microfinances poverty alleviating characteristics as fact - so much so that nobody has really studied the phenomenon. Those that have, says Karnani, find the impact on poverty is not as unambiguous - and he quotes several studies: One of the most comprehensive studies reaches a surprising conclusion: Microloans are more beneficial to borrowers living above the poverty line than to borrowers living below the poverty line. This is because clients with more income are willing to take the risks, such as investing in new technologies, that will most likely increase income flows. Poor borrowers, on the other hand, tend to take out conservative loans that protect their subsistence, and rarely invest in new technology, fixed capital, or the hiring of labor. Microloans sometimes even reduce cash flow to the poorest of the poor, observes Vijay Mahajan, the chief executive of Basix, an Indian rural finance institution. He concludes that microcredit seems to do more harm than good to the poorest. The failure of microfinance to bring people out of poverty should not be surprising, except to those deafened by its hoopla. People below the poverty line simply do not have the skills, vision, creativity, and persistence to be entrepreneurial. Even in developed countries with high levels of education and access to financial services, about 90 percent of the labor force is employees, not entrepreneurs. Indeed, Thomas Dichter made a similar point, pointing out: The microcredit paradox is that the poorest people can do little productive with the credit, and the ones who can do the most with it are those who dont really need microcredit, but larger amounts with different (often longer) credit terms.
135
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Maximus [1/3]

Maximus is comparatively worse than the government and its programs are in disarray
Owitz 01 [Bill, contributor @ the Applied Research Center, PR O S P E C T I N G AM O N G T H E PO O R: WELFARE P R I VATIZ AT I O N, May,
http://www.arc.org/pdf/296bpdf.pdf]
Maximus went public in 1997. In the following year the company came under fire in Connecticut for a $12.8 million contract that was supposed to put a shine on a state program that pays for child care for working welfare recipients. But within months Maximus found its operations in the kind of disarray it usually takes government years to achieve, says the Leader. More than half of the 17,000 bills submitted by childcare providers were over 30 days late in being paid. Daycare centers were confronted with decisions about turning away children, and parents trying to contact the company encountered telephone-system collapse. Under pressure to perform, the company shifted into crisis mode, adding more staff as founder Mastran was forced to take the reins and provide on-site crisis control. 25 In terms of service here, theyve been abysmal, says Rick Melita, a spokesperson for the Connecticut State Employees Association. They underbid, overpromised and they didnt deliver.26
Companies like Maximus are inefficient, waste money, corrupted, and limit out successful government involvement- this makes it impossible to solve
American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees no date [public service union, Sample Speech Against
Privatization, http://www.afscme.org/issues/1519.cfm]
Another cost and quality disaster for a jurisdiction contracting with Lockheed Martin came in Florida, where the company and another firm, Maximus, were granted contracts to streamline child support data and make collections. The two firms were paid $4.5 million for their services, while they only managed to collect $207,000. Most of the payments to the firms came from variable fees, ranging from $50 to $300, for closing
cases, which frequently meant simply correcting files or deciding that many "deadbeat parents" could not pay for whatever reason. While the states real interest was actual support collections, the firms had insisted on case closing fees, arguably to cover their operating costs. When great difficulties in making collections became apparent, the firms focused even more on the closing fees. Moreover, the
firms tried to use the states own databases to close cases en masse, then billed at the maximum level. Even with these fees, which one state staffer called "freebies," both firms terminated their contracts early, saying they couldnt make profit on the project their real concern from the start. Another problem with contracting out government services is the potential for conflicts of interest, influence-peddling, and outright corruption. In Washington, D.C., for example, the FBI began investigating allegations that former high-level city employees who had gone to work for Lockheed
Martin IMS had structured the citys parking-meter contract so that Lockheed would have an advantage. An unsuccessful bidder filed a complaint, after which Lockheed forged a partnership with that bidder to get the contract. The allegations of impropriety went unresolved. There have also been conflict-of-interest problems in Los Angeles, where another parking-meter contract was controversial because of contributions the company made to officials, in New York City, where the company was barred from parking contracts because of alleged bribes and kickbacks, and in Texas, where a number of former state officials went to work for Lockheed, prompting some to wonder if the Texas welfare reform privatization project wasnt "wired for Lockheed Martin." The
"revolving door" phenomenon puts the fairness of privatization in doubt. Even in the best of all possible worlds, if everyone involved is honest and above board, it is impossible for companies like Lockheed Martin to ignore the profit motive literally putting the interests of shareholders before those of the public. Also, even in so-called "good" contracts, government entities lose much of their capacity to perform work and serve citizens. If there are problems with a contract, and citizens seek some kind of redress, the government is reduced to being essentially a middleman, going to the vendor and hoping the vendor will fix the problem.
There are literally dozens of other examples of Lockheed Martin IMSs problems with social services contracts, as well as problems with the parent companys defense-related lines of business. (IMS is a subsidiary of Lockheed Martin.) Many of these cases are summarized in a report AFSCME has produced, covering the miscues and failures of Lockheed and other vendors. I believe these
cases are really sounding warning alarms about the problems overall with contracting out government services, particularly complex and vitally important functions like social services . As Ive indicated in my brief comments, privatization has frequently failed to show improvements in costs or quality; in fact, it has often proven to be costly, ineffective, or downright corrupt. Companies like Lockheed Martin are better at, and more concerned with, producing profits and looking out for their own interests than in helping society achieve its goals.
Maximus wastes hundreds of thousands of dollars on useless items

An audit of Wisconsin's welfare program, called "W-2," was conducted in April 2001. They found that two of these companies, Goodwill and Maximus ,
admitted to "improperly spending" a half million dollars each in projects in other states, parties, promotional schemes, meals and concerts.
"Neither corporation was prosecuted for felony welfare fraud. Nor did Tommy Thompson, then governor of Wisconsin, terminate their lucrative W2 contracts."45
136
SENIORS 2009

Maximus is horribly inefficient with money and is corrupt
Milwaukee Journal Sentinel columnist
Eugene Kane wonders how a large sophisticated company like Maximus with welfare reform contracts in more than two dozen states could have made so many glaring mistakes. Maximus was one of five agencies hired to help create a welfare reform system here that ended up being so confusing and poorly run that in little more than three years, loads of frustrated poor people opted out of the system. Cutting poor families off the dole proved so successful, W-2
enjoyed a huge surplus of funds, mainly because the program was drastically over-budgeted in the first place. Kane recognizes that Wisconsin has a welfare reform system that operates just like a business a poorly run business.29 While the Wisconsin situation was unfolding, Maximus was also under siege in New York. In March 2000, according to the Mason City Iowa Globe-Gazette, New
York City comptroller Alan Hevesi refused to certify $104 million in welfare-towork contracts with Maximus, charging that the award by Mayor Rudolph Giulianis administration raised the appearance of corruption, favoritism and cronyism. Hevesi concluded that the company was given an unfair head start in preparing its bid.30 In April, a New York State Supreme Court justice blocked the contract because of compelling evidence that the contracting process has been corrupted . In late October, a state appellate court overturned the decision blocking the contract. A
beleaguered Maximus spokesperson termed this victory a vindication.31
Low accountability and discriminatory practices hamper solutions from Maximus

The Milwaukee Business Journal reports that, on
top of the companys financial shenanigans, 16 formal gender or racial discrimination complaints have been filed with the Milwaukee office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, against Maximus or one of its subsidiaries. In additionas many as a dozen internal grievances were filed with the companys human resources office related to unfair promotion practices.34 Linda Garcia is an organizer with 9to5, a national nonprofit grassroots organization working to empower women through securing economic justice. Garcia has observed the activities of Maximus first-hand from the front lines in Milwaukee. The public has not been served well by privatization, she says. The standards of accountability and monitoring have been practically non-existent. Were not seeing decent services provided to the community or a decrease in poverty or homelessness . Garcia, who has been working on behalf of the women involved in the discrimination suit against Maximus, believes discriminatory practices may be widespread at Maximus MaxStaff entity, which seems to be funneling women to low-paying jobs in order to quickly receive the bonus staff gets for placements.35
Maximus rarely pleases its clients and doesnt even get around to helping a majority
Catherine Brown-Swain is a volunteer with the Association for Children for Enforcement of Support (ACES) in Colorado Springs, Colorado. A former caseworker with the District Attorneys office, Brown-Swain recently served on a fiveperson committee evaluating proposals to manage child support services for the county. For the past five years Maximus has held the contract. Now, however, despite its re-bid, as of the contracts end on December 31, 2000, Maximus is no longer a player in El Paso County. In the three years that ACES has been around, weve
fielded over 3,000 complaints from people dependent on Maximus services, Brown-Swain says. That comes out to about one complaint for every seven clients. Most of these complaints concern clients being treated with disrespect when they try to access services. Equally important, many clients just do not have their cases worked. 21
137
SENIORS 2009

Maximus fails- no management, long timeframe for service distribution, and empirics prove DeParle 04 [Jason, former Washington Monthly editor and current reporter for the New York Times, Dream Deferred, September,
http://www.washingtonmonthly.com/features/2004/0409.deparle.html#byline]
But behind
the scenes, the Maximus program was soon in disarray. W-2 was built on the theory of "full engagement ": 40 hours of many clients waited months for assignments. Others ignored their assignments and got paid anyway. Six months after the program's start, Steve Perales, the second in charge, warned that "virtually no referrals are being made to the CSJ unit," the one that assigns community service jobs. While 1,100 clients were supposed to have assignments, just 507 had gotten them, and "only about 88 are actually participating." That is, in the country's most famous work program, only 8 percent of the clients were working. "What they were doing, I don't know," George Leutermann, the head of the program, later told
weekly activity, of which 30 would involve actual work. Yet me. "They were doing nothing." One reason was the shortage of caseworkers. Under state rules, each "Financial and Employment Planner," or Fep, was supposed to manage no more than 55 clients. Some Maximus Feps had more than twice as many. Ten months after the program's launch, the state took its first quantitative look at the agencies' performance. The audit, called a 740RC report, was of interest not only as a mid-term report card, but also because it hinted at the criteria the state would use for contract renewal the following year. With Maximus using the Milwaukee program as a national exhibit, a failure to keep the contract would wreck the business plan. All
the Milwaukee agencies performed poorly on the report, but Maximus did especially badly: 67 percent of its clients had no work assignments. Railing about "our dismal performance," Leutermann wrote a memo blaming subordinates for "a major setback" that "portends continued problems." But after months of
refusing, he also agreed to hire more caseworkers.
Reject their counterplan- studies and past experiences show that Maximus explicitly refuses to help the poor and engage in discriminatory, morally repugnant activities Casa Maria Worker 05 [catholic organization, news comment based on recent interactions with W-2 companies, An Opening Letter to Governor
Doyle, January, http://www.geocities.com/casa_maria_worker/jan_05news.html]
Instead of slashing W-2 funds, we need to be holding W-2 agencies like Maximus, UMOS and OIC accountable to a higher standard than what is currently in place. Recently, Casa Maria and the Welfare Warriors met with the CEOs of Maximus and UMOS, two of Milwaukees W-2 agencies. What we came face to face with was their lack of concern for the poor. Maximus representatives even went so far as to refuse to answer questions or post anything in their agency regarding the rights of people on W-2.
Another Milwaukee W-2 agency, OIC, has been dragging its feet on having a meeting with us. Not surprisingly, OIC is Milwaukees worst W-2 agency.
According to a study by the University of Chicago and the University of Wisconsin-Madison, all of Milwaukees W-2 agencies, OIC, Maximus and UMOS, are failing in their mission to help people out of poverty and into jobs. Compared to all other W-2 agencies in
Milwaukee County, people who receive W-2 at OIC earn the least amount of money while on W-2 and after they leave. This report also revealed that Blacks, Latin@s are dealt with in a harsher manner than white clients in the same situations in Milwaukees W-2 agencies. Your cuts in W-2 will directly harm people of color, the poor, and the homeless. Proverbs 29:7 reads, The righteous care about justice for the poor, but the wicked have no such concern. God does not condone the thievery of funds from people facing homelessness by politicians searching for votes and W-2 agencies greedy for tax dollars. People facing homelessness in Milwaukee need real support and education, not cutbacks and corruption. Community If you see the poor oppressed in a district, and justice and rights denied, do not be surprised at such things; for one official is eyed by a higher one, and over them both are others higher still. Ecclesiastes 5:8 The people of the land practice extortion and commit robbery; they oppress the poor and needy and mistreat the alien, denying them justice. Ezekiel 22:29 Interesting Facts about Milwaukees W-2 agencies OIC 1 OIC gave $500,000 to recalled Senator Gary George shortly before Senator George pushed for them to obtain a larger W-2 caseload. OICs former President, Carl Gee, could get up to 5 years in prison for the scandal. 1 On September 22nd, the Division of Workforce Solutions told OIC they have 10 days to fix problems ranging from refusing payment to subcontractors to denying literacy, job training and GED classes to clients in their program. They did not comply and their caseload was partially cut. The Casa Maria Catholic Worker
1 Five of OICs top administrators make over $100,000 a year while poor families continue to get services cut through their W2 program. William Clay, the CEO of OIC, has had his salary double in the past 8 years.
Maximus 1 Maximus 1 Maximus
illegally spent million of your tax dollars to secure contracts in other states . has been sued for race and sex discrimination by at least 20 of their own workers . 1While protesting outside of Maximus, we have experienced many discriminatory comments by Maximus caseworkers, such as being called lesbians.
1 National Director, Stephen Goldsmith, used to be Vice President of Lockheed Martin, a top weapons manufacturer for unjust wars.
138
SENIORS 2009
Aff AT: Contracts

Contracts are the antithesis of privatization and the reason why poverty is increasing now- experts and extensive studies conclude Butler 90 [Stuart, PhD and senior fellow @ Heritage Foundation, Avoiding the Pitfalls of Privatizing Social Services, June 1,
http://www.heritage.org/research/regulation/hl261.cfm]
Problems with Contracting Most of today's largest social service programs delivered by contractors were established in the 1960s, under the so-called Great Society programs created under the presidency of Lyndon Johnson. Ile basic mechanism of the Great Society was to raise finance at the federal (i.e., national) and state (i.e., provincial) levels and use this money to fund services delivered by private professional organizations at the local level. The
regulations for determining the services to be provided, and the obligation for monitoring the providers, rested with bureaucracies at each level of the government - federal, state, and local. The same basic structure continues today. In recent years there has been rising concern among privatization experts in the U.S. regarding the dynamics associated with contracting for social services. The general point is made that although spending on services has risen dramatically, the U.S.
poverty rate has changed little during the last 25 years - with variations seemingly dependent far more on the ebb and flow of the national economy than on the expansion or contraction of social service programs. It is also noted that the U.S. currently spends about $150 billion on anti-poverty programs for about 30 million poor Americans, or $20,000 per year in income support and services for each family of four below the poverty line. If the money had simply been given to each family, rather than fannelled through the social service system, the income of that family of four would be more than $5,OW above the poverty line. Yet
poverty persists. The reason this spending on services has not substantially improved the condition of the poor is that the growth of contracting since the 1960s has led to the development of a huge professional social service industry. 11is, industry "crowds out" less costly alternatives, distorts the traditional mission of America's nonprofit organizations, and uses political pressure to expand programs that enrich the industry itself rather than serve the best interests of the poor. Government Requirements. 11is, happened, paradoxically, because the government sought to
use the contracting process to assure the highest quality, professional services for the poor. To achieve this worthy goal, the government generally made the allocation of grants dependent on an organization indicating a real need for services and showing that it had a qualified staff to provide the services. But such
apparently reasonable conditions have had a profound effect on the delivery of social services in the U.S. Most important, once-independent and community-based social service organizations have become creatures of the government . By 1980, according to Lester Salamon and Alan
Abramson of the Urban Insti- tute in Washington, D.C., some 58 percent of the revenues of America's nonprofit social service organizations was coming from the governinent.1 Salamon and Abramson note, as have other scholars, that this close relationship with government has caused most groups to alter their activities to comply with the funding requirements of government programs. In addition, the Urban Institute scholars explain, the
regulations accompanying contracts has led nonprofit organizations to professionalize their staff, shedding many "un- credentialled" volunteers and replacing them with paid and "credentialled" professional service providers. Thus the net effect in many instances is that the government now pays for services that were once provided by volunteers or by organizations funded by voluntary contributions - the antithesis of privatization. Were this professionalization of social services to have produced better services it might be said to be good value for money expended. But there are many reasons to conclude that services may have, on the whole, fallen in quality while rising rapidly in cost. Erecting Barriers. One reason is that. the professional private social service providers are not passive in the process of drawing up regulations to determine who
is qualified to provide services. Like most professions and guilds, social service providers have a financial interest in convincing the public that they alone are capable of delivering a service, and that lower cost, "unqualified" alternatives are unsuitable. To reduce even the possibility that nonprofessionals might be selected, professional organizations press the government at all levels to erect licensing barriers against their competitors. As sociologists Peter Berger and Richard Neuhaus expl Through organizations and lobbies,
The end result is that the trend toward professional monopoly operates in tandem with the trend toward professional monopoly over social services. Ile connection between such monopoly control and the actual quality of services delivered is doubtful indeed . 2 Moreover, this pattern has a disturbing effect on the population supposedly being served. For one thing, community institutions that once bound low-income neighborhoods together become pushed aside by professional groups with few real links to the community. This weakens the fabric of the neighborhood, making it more likely that poverty and blight will spread. For another, the financial incentive of the professionals is to
professionals increasingly persuade the state to legislate standards and certifications that hit voluntary organizations hard, especially those given to employing volunteers. convince people that they need services and that these cannot be provided from within the community itsel@ and then to lobby the government for more money for professional groups to deliver these "essential" services. The
result is that low-income people are persuaded that they are unable to function independently and are persuaded instead to become increasingly dependent on government-funded services for their daily existence. Worse still, the professional social service industry and its academic offshoots have become the primary source of research to indicate the alleged need for services and by which to evaluate the services provided . The political process relies heavily on this
research to design programs. The thrust of this industry-generated research is predictably monotonous: there are always more problems that need to be solved than were ever imagined; if programs have failed it is because more money is needed; and the only way to solve a problem is to contract with a professional organization.
139
SENIORS 2009
Aff Contracts/Maximus Link to Politics

Giving contracts to Maximus costs political capital- years of battles across the country prove and union propaganda only intensifies it
LA Times 2K [Political Struggle Centers on Welfare-to-Work Contractor, June 20, http://articles.latimes.com/2000/jun/20/local/me-42806?pg=1] Los Angeles County today becomes ground zero in a growing battle over privatizing social services, as the Board of Supervisors prepares to sign a $23-million welfare-to-work deal with a corporation whose tactics in acquiring government contracts have come under scrutiny. The scheduled awarding of the contract to Maximus Inc. of McLean, Va., comes after a year of battle between county unions and a majority of the Board of Supervisors over whether the task of helping San Fernando Valley and north
Los Angeles County welfare recipients find work should be done by private or public employees. And while Maximus has come under fire elsewhere in the country for the way it wins public contracts--a New York judge barred the company from receiving $100 million in city contracts there after ruling that the procurement process was "corrupted"--Los Angeles County unions and staff have been accused of rigging bids here to prevent the company from winning a contract.
Beneath the battles over the arcana of public contracting and placement rates lies a deep, divisive question: Should private, forprofit corporations continue to have a role in welfare reform? "This is the kind of work that should never be contracted out," said Tanya Akel, an analyst with the Service Employees International Union, Local 660, which represents many county workers. "This money that is meant to make people self-sufficient should not be going to stockholders." Maximus officials disagree. They point to what they say is a proven record in many states of helping more than 100,000 people find jobs after years on the welfare rolls
and of running other government programs ranging from child support to enlisting people in Medicaid. County documents predict that the contract with Maximus would save the county $4 million annually. "Maximus has built its history around helping these populations and working directly with them and changing lives," said company spokeswoman Rachael Rowland. "We're really proud we've changed the lives of more than 2 million people because of work we're doing."
Both sides--the unions and Maximus--are distributing press kits with newspaper clippings either praising or criticizing the rapidly growing company, which a former federal official founded in his basement in 1975 and which now has more than 4,000 employees.
Maximus' literature highlights the government experience of its employees--not just founder and Chief Executive David Mastran but also the local contract manager in Los Angeles, a former manager in the county welfare office.
The board is believed to be split over awarding the contract. Democratic Supervisors Yvonne Brathwaite Burke and Gloria Molina have previously
expressed opposition to the idea. Supervisors Mike Antonovich and Don Knabe, both Republicans, have backed it, as has Democrat Zev Yaroslavsky, who represents most of the Valley. In defending his position, Antonovich took aim at the unions' stand: "The unions would rather keep people on welfare so they have people to watch over, and I believe we ought to empower people on welfare with training and skills."
Unions and activists have for months been pushing Yaroslavsky, normally a friend of organized labor, to kill the deal. In an
interview last week, Yaroslavsky would not reveal how he plans to vote today, saying the specifics of the deal will determine his decision. "Everybody's
got an ax to grind and we need to strip that away," Yaroslavsky said. "It's not so much a philosophical question as a management question."
Maximus is under the most scrutiny and is in the core of a political firestorm
Answers.com 09 [no specific date given, http://www.answers.com/topic/maximus-inc] The company's Milwaukee operation led to even more bad press in New York City in 2000 when the city comptroller, Alan Hevesi, questioned a $104 million welfare-to-work contract, renewable for an additional $104 million, that MAXIMUS had been awarded without going through the formal bidding process. Because New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani championed the contracts and was running for the U.S. Senate, a situation further complicated by Hevesi's own apparent ambition to seek the mayoralty, MAXIMUS suddenly found itself in the middle of a political imbroglio and under the microscope of the national media. What the press revealed about MAXIMUS, on almost a daily basis, was nothing less than a public relations nightmare.
140

Charity Tax Credit 7 Week Seniors 09

Încărcat de

Informații document

Drepturi de autor

Formate disponibile

Partajați acest document

Partajați sau inserați document

Opțiuni de partajare

Vi se pare util acest document?

Este necorespunzător acest conținut?

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

Charity Tax Credit 7 Week Seniors 09

Încărcat de

Drepturi de autor:

Formate disponibile

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

TAX CREDIT CPs / CHARITY TRADEOFF

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Government Services Fail General [1/2]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Government Services Fail General [2/2]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Government Services Fail - Mistrust

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [1/3]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [2/3]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Tax Credit CP 1NC [3/3]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [1/3]

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [2/3]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Tradeoff Link / AT: Perm 2NC [3/3]

doing an effective job.

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Key to Civil Society 2NC [1/3]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Key to Civil Society 2NC [2/3]

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Key to Civil Society 2NC [3/3]

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Civic Engagement Good Racism

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Civic Engagement Good Tyranny

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Civic Engagement Good Democracy

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Civic Engagement Good Environment

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY

Charity Good AIDS

Misael, Kevin, Matthew, Jack, Anna, Kurt, Grace, Nadia, Nick

MICHIGAN 7 WEEKS CHARITY