CHAPTER FOREIGN

1 - THE CLIENCY POLICY

RELATIONSHIP

AND ITS ROLE IN POSTWAR

U.S.

In this that guides elaborated domestic

and the following this study in some detail

chapter,

the

theoretical concept of

framework cliency is

is laid here.

out. The

Its implications in chapter

for the client's begins the

politics

are discussed

2. This chapter which

with a rigorous patron

definition together

of cliency. and the

The motives

bring

and client

goods and services are then discussed. by

which

tranthe

spire under a cliency concept several of cliency related

relationship

Next,

is further

illustrated

contrasting with a

it with brief

concepts. of U.S.

This chapter cliency

concludes

descriptive era.

overview

relationships

in the postwar

1) DEFINITIONS

OF CLTENCY

AND THE CLIENT

STATE

THE CLIENCY

RELATIONSHIP

AND ITS MOTIVATIONS

Cliencv relationship

is

long-term,

asymmetric, and

mutually-beneficial autonomous countries

between

two independent

PAGE 5
which differ tical power. on a broad and often greatly in their size, wealth,
1S

and military

and polibased

Th~ cliQncy spectrum

relationship

security-orientQd, which

of security

concerns

are complementary The similarity of

identical

for the countries disparity

involved.

these concerns

and the great create

in the capabilities for

of the

patron and client in order to of

strong

incentives

them to cooperate This cooperation and material the secuis the it and

further a

their

mutual exchange

interests. of

consists resources

reciprocal are dissimilar

services

which

and which

help to enhance

rity interests most visible ;s the and

of the two countries. concrete of aspect

While

this exchange

of the

cliency and the defining

relationship, commitments

recognition which

mutual

interests are its

cooperation

follow

that

characteristics. means and that it are

The cooperative is fundamentally

nature

of the cliency and

relationship the patron

non-coerciVe,

client and

autonomous

in this sense.

Its non-coercive factors

character

its secufrom

rity orientation othQr asymmetric the

are the major international satellite and

distinguishing

cliency

relationships,

such as

economic Eastern other 1.2 of

dependence, Europe,

relationships imperialism.l in some

of contemporary Cliency detail and these in section

colonialism,

relationships this chapter.

will be contrasted

The cliQncy

goals which rel~tionship and global here.

bring

the

patron

and client

together

in

may vary considerably, circumstances.

depending some

on domestic, basic motives

regional,

However,

can be outlined

In entering

into

a cliency

relationship, ally in

the

patron

primarily

seeks a stable and cooperative rity which regional the can deter thr~ats

an area vital and

to its SQCUits

by rivdl powers regional

help defend may or

interests. of

The patron's its areas,

interests borders for nearby

include other and

defense

national protection

strategically-important

allies,

PAGE 6
economic nationals have client concerns such as the protection raw ma~erials. including support in of investments The patron by its may also from the

or sources

of vital

various on

secondary

goals, matters,

cooperati~n international

intelligence assistance

forums,

military

in extra-regional kinds

conflicts,

and arrangements

for military

bases and other

of facilities.

The

client

generally goods and

seeks services

a to

reliable enhance

source its

of

security-oriented stability

dom9stic countries. aid and

and its military various

capabilities kinds

vis-a-vis and

other

These may include formal or informal

of military by the patron

economic

commitments

to assist

it in the

event of threats

to its security.

The motives relationship military

of the patron

and

client

in establishing goals:

a cliency client A

thus converge

on two basic stability

a stronger

apparat~s

and greater

in the client

country.

strong client of deterring However,

is clearly hostile

essential

for the patron's

primary

goals

powers

and protecting stability experiences

its regional can be equally frequent

interests. important may be

the client's

domestic

for the patron. weakened forces.

A client which

unrest

by dissention This dissention on

in its political may make it

leadership

or its military client to

difficult

for the

act decisivelY

b~half future

of the patron's stability interests

interests.

Uncertainty problems

about the cli~nt's for the patron's

can present and force

serious it

long-term

to r~evaluate

its regional

policles.

The patron to ~n5ur~ credible

wlil generally that the client threat

seek to minimize is sufficiently and justify a

these problems stable to

by acting a

present commi~men~.

military

long-term

The client militarily military

gov~rnm~nt and

also has more

an obvious While

interest the

in becoming goals patron of and

stronger str~ngth

stable.

broad

and stability

are held

by both the

PAGE 7
the client, pursuing entail. shared by in practice goals may they may have very and different have regional may, in different of reasons what are for they not

these

conceptions ambitions fact,

The client the patron interests.

which

or which

conflict

with the with-

patron's

Buildin~~ up the client's

military

forces

out some control for the patron.

over their Of perhaps

use may then have adverse greater importance are

consequences differences stabilto a its acting the main under the

between

the patron

and client

over how to achieve

domestic

ity. While minimize client domestic against

the patron unrest and may by

may seek a measure ensure peaceful

of political changes of

consensus

government,

government position its

be more repressing Since and

interested popular client

in strengthening movements government transferred and is

opposition. of the

the

recipient cliency

services

resources

relationship, Repression can

cliency

can help

it to achieve

these

particof the

ular goals. opposition long-term enhance the

of popular

movements which

and supression

lead to conditions Consequently, stability

jeopardize by

the client's the patron to

stability. client's

attempts

may also interests.

have adverse

long-term

implications

for the patron's

ClIENCY INSTRUMENTS

The resources under this

and services will

provided be

by the patron to here

to the client as cliency i) militraining

relationship

referred

instrumGnts.

Three main categories transfers, and

can be distinguished: loans and grants, via

tary and economic for security quotas,

including

forces,

indirect terms,

transfers

loan guarantees, and covert inter-

favorable

credit

etc.;

ii) overt

ventions,

including political

intelligence actors,

aSSls~ance7

direct

manipulation actions

of domestic

and military

or paramilitary

PAGE 8

against

particular such

domestic as

or foreign pacts,

targets; and

and

iii)
less

security formal

agreements, arrangements. to enhance continued goals.

treaties,

other

These goods and services and stability and often

are provided of the client, more

by the patron to ensure its

the strength cooperation,

to achieve

specific

security

Foreign broad

aid

is an instrument of foreign policy

that

has been used to many of

achieve do

variety

goals,2

which

not

involve a cliency able importance

relationship.

It can, however, as well.

be of considermagnitude, domes-

in this context

In sufficient

economic

aid can bolster and augmenting

the client's investment to finance client

economy

by increasing

tic demand key areas. tic groups services direct

in infrastructure transfers

and other domessocial

It can be used by enabling the

to specific to allocate and

government more

and development transfers can such be

projects

selectively

fund more These unrest,

as subsidies useful and ln

and

tax concessions. popular

mechanisms particularly stability. military

quite

placating

in crisis Economic

periods,

can thus enhance used to build it with

the client's

aid can also be by providing allowing

up the client's

capabilities and by

strategically-important to be diverted can playa to the for

infrastructure military role,

other

funds

spending.

Indirect

financial

transfers

similar client economic

although

they do

not

necessarily

accrue

government aid.

and are usually

smaller

in volume

than direct

Transfers personnel domestic equipment market.

of

military

equipment enhance

and

training

for

military and

can more directly stability is, of

the military

capabilities

of the client course,

country.

Sophisticated

military arms

available can provide provide

in the

international

However,

the patron

it at no cost or on favorare more advanced about U.S.

able terms,

and can often

items which

than those available

elsewhere.

While

most discussions

PAGE 9
arms transfers have focused on major a weapons sizable systems portion for use

primarily military operations. special

in international aid has

3

engagements. gone

of U.S.

actually particular for

for domestic in this units.

counterinsurgency context both at has been

Of

importance

training

counterinsurgency military missions.

U.S. bases equipment and parammilitary in a more

and locally and special

through training

Sophisticated

can boost morale

and make military

ilitary operations posture

more efficient,

enhancing domestic

the client's stability

and enabling manner.

it to maintain

effective

Military tary

and economic and

transfers its ability be

can increase to contain

the client's domestic the

mili-

capabilities they

unrest. patron's

However, particular

may not

sufficient or maintain

to achieve

regional

goals

the client's or security

stability. agreements may be

Overt or covert providing necessary. ment by the

interventions

by the patron under certain

for intervention Actions patron

circumstances

of this sort generally to the client's relationship.

imply a stronger and

commit-

security,

thus a stronger

and more vital cliency

In its innocuous

most benign actions by

form,

intervention power

can such

involve

relatively

the intervening and technical

as the provision organmay

of subsidies, izations include which labor

advice,

assistance to its

for domestic goals.

are seen unions,

as favorable

These

political

parties,

business playa may

firms,

newspa-

pers, and political ganda,

other private role.4

organizations covert

which actions

significant include propa-

More effective assassinations, groups who are

sabotage, against

and other seen as

paramilitary a threat targeted to

activities the client of

directed

government.s the client 5ub5tantial friendly

These actions country, impact either on

are generally at home or

at nationals They can

in exile. and

have a of the

the

organization and

effectiveness affect

or hostile

groups,

can thus significantly

PAGE 10
cl1Qnt's targets, domestic vis-a-vis stability. stability. as when groups. other Covert actions country may also involve foreign for

a hostile Actions countries,

provides can

critical strengthen

support

such as these in addition

the client its domestic

to enhancing

Overt military

interventions forces

include

direct

involvement country

of the patron's

on behalf

of the

client

and the temporary borders. of

or permanent Direct

stationing

of its troops

within

the client's

military

involvement

by the patron of troops

is generally

a means

last resort.

The stationing to deter either support.

in a client

country

1s used

more frequently may be receive to the directed outs1dQ client.

hostile

aggression. groups.

Overt which

interventions may not

at domestic or at

mayor

nearby

countries

which

are hostile to promote capaas the

They may consequently stability

be used either

the client's bilities

domestic

or to enhance In many

its military cases two (such

vis-a-vis U.S.

other

countries.

large-scale

intQrvention

in Vietnam)

these

goals may be

indistinguishable.

Bilateral tions, and basis for

treaties, other

multilateral

pacts and often

securityorganizaserve as to the legal

security

arrangements In

interventions. these

addition symbolize the

legitimizing commitrole in

interventions,

arrangements

patron's

ment to the client deterring

and consequently by hostile

can play an impor~ant or domestic groups.

aggression

foreign

THE CLIENT

STATE

The main affect

thesis

of

this study of the

is

that cliency client country.

can seriously The impact of

the domestic

politics

PAGE 11
cliency concept on the client's of the client domestic politics is embodied here in the form

state.

The client

state

is a particular

of state in which altered cliency transfer

state-society of the

relations

have been fundamentally participation are affected to above instruments in a by the

as a result relationship. of

client

government's relations referred These

State-society

the goods and services to the client government's government. need

as cliency can obvisocial

instruments

ate the client

for support to

from domestic

groups and enable power of groups very little policies ety.

it more effectively

undermine groups

the political have

that oppose

it. Domestic

consequently

political

influence

in ~ client

state,

and the state's of soci-

may become

divorced

from the interests

and needs

This can have is not constrained any policies it

important

long-term

consequences. can

state which virtually

by societal

pressures

undertake

sees fit, regardless of time the to

of their

impact on society. input into state in in

Over a long period policymaking foreign domestic

~bsence

of public in

can lead and

serious

problems areas,

the economy, often resulting

relations, unrest. where

in other

policy

This unrest

may be particularly can be augmented public great

true

in underdeveloped of instieconom-

countries, tutions ic

by the absence

to channel is

and contain of

discontent importance.

and where By

planning

generally

undermining

societal lead to becomGs

influences long-term closely

on state policy instability.

cliency

can thus paradoxically if the state patron power

Furthermore,

identified groups,

with the client their anger Hence

in the

eyes of at it as

discon~ented well as at can have

social

may be directed in the

the client consequences envisioned

government. which are

long term cliency from those

quite

different

origin~lly

by the patron

and client

governments.

In order establishment

to ad~quately of a client

discuss

how

cliency

can

lead to

the

state and

to succinctly

characterize

PAGE 12 state-society relations 1n such a state it is necessary which bear on these matters. 2 will into to discuss

several other concepts

This will be

done in chapter 2. Chapter which give important a client state and

also review a number of studies the nature of policy-making long-term consequences. the concept in The of

insights its chapter it

possible further with

remainder cliency by

of this

illustrates asymmetric

comparing

other some

international

relationships

and by presenting

empirical period.

data which help to

identify U.S. clients

in the postwar

2) ClIENCY AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONSHIPS

In this section satellite

cliency

is compared exist

with in

dependency, contemporary

with the Eastern

relationships

which and

Europe, and with colonialism international two key coercion

-,

imperialism.

These five types of

1

relationship i)

are contrasted the more

in figure powerful

according

to

issues:

whether

country

must use

to maintain economic

the relationship a

and ii) whether

it is primarelationship,

rily an

relationship, of the two. to these

security-oriented

or a combination ships aspects according

A comparison issues helps useful

of these five relati6nto identify the unique how

of cliency. impact

It is also

in broadly

illustrating

the domestic relationships

of cliency may differ from that here.

1 about

of the other

discussed

-figure

here-

Figure 1 - Cliency Contrasted with Other International Relationships

Primary Orientation of Relationship

Security Coercion Required to Vaintain Relationship?

Economic

Both

yes no

satellite

colonialism dependency .!-.._~ __ . _

__L

imperialism

I cliency L-.

___JI

PAGE 13

DEPENDENCY

As is evident to dependency alism.

in figur~

I. cliency

bears

a greater

similarity or imperibut differ

and to sdtellization dependency orientation.

than to colonialism

Cliencyand

are both non-coercive, Dependency theory. at

in their primary original effect

least

in its

Latin American

tradition,6 interactions economic

is mainly as trade,

concerned capital

with the flows, and

of such economic transfer country.

technology dependent

on the

development

of the by

weaker, writers how these

This approdch

has been

extended

such as Frank, interactions ent

Cardoso,

and O'Donnell,

who have examined structures above

affect As

social is

and political from the

in the dependcliency economic hence

country.' very

clear

discussion, (although

involves aid

different financial

kinds

of interactions are capital

and other

transfers

flows and

contribute

to dependence).

Furthermore, motivated involves

cliency

is fundamentally concerns. in By

a state-to-state contrast, countries

relationship generally

by security private

dependency and

actors

both

is motivated disparities

essentially in factor

by the desire

to exploit

international

endowments.

Despite non-coercive

these differences, in

cliency

and

dependency

are

both by the and/or

the sense that neither into the relationship. in the two them

country

is forced public

other to enter private

In both cases, countries (although if

decision-makers because it

engage not

in

the

relationship their Because

affords

necessarily bGnefits. kinds

respective

societies)

mutual,

asymmetric,

they are both non-coercive cliency

and entail

very different

of interactions, very easily

and dGpendency to

are complementary be the case

and may

coexist. the

This appears states strong

in the relationin Central

ships between and South

r

United where

and several commercial

countries

America,

and security-oriented

PAGE 14 bonds evident concerns have traditionally chapters. gone hand-in-hand. dependence have, As and will become

in later arising minor

economic issues

even security played a

from economic

by contrast, relations.

relatively

role in postwar

U.S.-Iranian

THE SATELLITE

RELATIONSHIP

The satellite primarily depicted Economic quite

relationships

of

contemporary

Eastern

Europe

are

security-oriented,

but, unlike with

the cliency a high degree European

relationship of coercion. are

here. must be maintained interactions and their ties among

the Eastern are

countries

strong

economies among

in fact countries

highly

integrated. been is the

However.

economic to

these

have always and it

subordinated

political the concept

and military

concerns,s

latter to which

of satellization

generally

refers.

Coercive in several the threat

domination ways. or

in the satellite

relationship

is maintained has been a country

The most prominent use of military as

form of domination force to maintain

actual

in the satellite kia, and recently use of the Soviet satellite frequently leaders in the

system,

has occurred Closely

in Hungary,

Czechoslova-

in Poland. secret

related

to this has been the arrest

police

to spy on and occasionally a practice in later has also which was

and activists, Stalinist

used more The ability leaders in the chanby

era than

years. given

to implement

these forms

of coercion

Soviet

a large measure satellite nels. Soviet

of indirect

influence

over decision-making through from informal

countries,

generally control has

manifested resulted

More direct officers of

the occupation

high positions much of the and

in the armies military

of the satellite policy of

countries.

Similarly.

and economic through

the satellites

is controlled

coordinated

the Warsaw

PAGE 15 Treaty Organization decision-makers. and COMECON, which are dominated by Soviet

Another major form of domination has resulted from the ideological and them. satellite leaders and the in the

in the satellite similarities

relationship

between the Soviet bonds that was link

strong personal satellite

The leadership

countries

initially political

installed at forces were the Communist tations

the end of World extremely weak. It

War II, when

contending

has subsequently

emerged through orienSoviet

parties of these countries, virtually

whose ideological those of the

have been

identical to

Communist party

and whose loyalty

has been reinforced tension.

by Soviet

coercion and by postwar East-West lar world-views maintaining

of

The loyalties and simiin

the satellite

leaders have been instrumental

the cohesion

of the Soviet bloc.

Although the satellite the kinds of goods and

relationship services

also involves transfers under the

of

exchanged

cliency

relationship,

the coercive measures These coercive

it entails clearly distinguish also mean that satelliimpact on the domestic leaders emerge only policy

it from cliency.

measures

zation has a stronger and much more blatant politics of the through a options are satellite

country. Satellite selection

very circumspect

process,

and their

highly constrained.

Political

activities

outside of Censor-

the party and the state apparatuses ship and highly controlled

are rigidly repressed.

forms of socialization

and mobilization

help to further restrict activities goals and methods of the Soviet parties.

which might conflict with the Communist

Union and the satellite

PAGE 16 COLONIALISM AND IMPERIALISM

Colonialism a substantial

and imperialism coercive

differ and

from

cliency

both

in having if not been army

component

in having have

strong, generally

exclusive, established and colonial mainly by

economic by armed

motivations. conquest and

Colonies maintained levels

by an occupying of which country. were sought metals early

administration,

the upper

are staffed During mainly the to

functionaries

from the

colonizing colonies

early era of European secure exclusive

colonization

control

over sources In

of precious and

and other twentieth as capital

valuable centuries outlets,

commodities. colonies exclusive often

the nineteenth an added

took on

importance

markets

for goods light

produced

in the home country, such as textiles. structures still

and sources

of cheap

labor for on

industries

The impact of colonization of the colonized persists.9 economic societies

the political

and social and

has been severe, control

in many ways and

However.

the absolute

it entails

its strong

motives

clearly

dlstlngU1Sh

colonization

from cliency.

Imperialism discussed compared in

is the

most

ill-defined and for

of the

four relationships it is that not easily imperialism and that an and hegem-

this section.

this reason seem to agree foreign

with cliency.

All writers expansionist

refers to an aggressive. imperialistic onic, though Marxists that is relationship

policy.

is consequently the formal

5~~

exploitative control as

it does not entail non-Marxists exclusively those

of colonialism. a relationship economic Other motives

and many motivated much

imperialism

or primarily that motivated

by private colonialism.1o economic

concerns, writers.

like

however. that

deny the importance imperialism power's is based

of private on

and maintain

broader

considerations

of the imperialist

national

interests.II

PAGE 17 The economic motives attributed distinguish way. that However, is this conception to imperialism from cliency by many writers in an obvious

of it

imperialism less

also entails in

a high degree of coercion colonial and satellite

perhaps

direct than

relationships relationship.

but that nevertheless This coercion

does not appear manifested

in the cliency in the threat power a country.

is generally

or actual use of military large measure of By contrast, tion of

force.

It gives the imperialist subjugated

informal influence over the

the cliency relationship interests on the

is maintained

by the percepand client can further it entails, the

mutual and

part of

the patron

governments

by the realization Because of the a very

that cooperation coercive influence

these interests. imperialism

can have

direct

and blatant country,

impact on

domestic politics satellization.12

of the

subjugated

much like

that of

3) A BRIEF OVERVIEW

OF POSTWAR

U.S. CLIENCY

RELATIONSHIPS

Table 1 contains data on various forms of U.S. security assistance to 50 well as major third world countries in the postwar period, as with these in this

figures on This

u.s.

direct investment illustrate the

and trade

countries.

table helps

discussion

chapter by showing which countries and by helping

can be considered

U.S. clients

to identify the motives which these relationships. between

guided U.S. policyIt is also useful in

makers in establishing illustrating Iran has how

the relationship

the United

States and may bQ

compdrQd with othQr

cliQncy rQlationships

which

more familiar to the reader.

-table 1 about here-

Table 1 - Major Third Wor1d~ecipients

of U.S. Security Assistance, 1950-1980

~Col].1ron

10

11

12

j:!
'M
C/)"d

. Reg Lon

and Country
2128

p.<lJ <lJ 0 P >, ClDOO~""'" COH..-!+J~ HE-!+Jpp

(])

co;;i co

;>Ul+JOH :PU)U'-.l

Central America/ Carribean 50-80 Cuba 53-59 Haiti 50-80 D. Republic 50-80 Mexico 50-80 Guatemala 55-80 Honduras 50-80 El Salvador 50-80 Nicaragua 50-80 Costa Rica 50-80 Panama 50-80 South America Colombia Venezuela Ecuador Peru Brazil Bolivia Paraguay Chile Argentina Uruguay 50-80 50-80 50-80 50-80
5D-80 50-80

95(49) 2417 (30) 6910(15) 305(46) 4516 (19) 4504 (20) 2634 (28) 7242(14) 7363 (13) 13459 (6) 2149 3370(25) 1058(38) 2868(27) 2219 (32) 1447(35) 10052(1l) 3607 (24) 6563(17) 590 (43) 3140 (26)

151 666(28) 71(45) 459(35) 29(48) 587(30) 437(36)

223(41)

14,

o o
100 31 70 28
40

769(26)
126(43; 1045 (20) 543

69 100 78
29

10.2 5.6(33) 4.5(35) 32.0(12) .6(46) 24.2(15) 43.1 (7) 18.8(19) 96.3 (5) 13.2(26) 109.6 (4) 9.8 12.6(28) 16.7(22) 34.2 (9) 19.5(18) 2.9(37) 38.5 (8) 26.0(14) 23.6(16) 5.4(34) 32.3(11)

25864 8724 (6) 154(18) 110(19) 56(26) 52 (28) 22 (42) 25 (40) 22(43) .43(35) 10175 (5) 707
53 (27)

27
2

50 17
9

RP*

o o
o

10
1 4 2

o o

o
3
1 2 II

o
13

RP RP RP RP RP RP RP RP RP

1778 3192 8253 1950 642 o 1985 13 142 106 - 478 415 1329 4430 1965 106 149 354 1950 62 93 238 41 257 1954 19 1952 58 183 9 60 79 264 1942 348 847 324 2957 5651 10714 193 459 1213 993 2136 3488 - 416 14 145 651 795 644 882 2824 11 - 159 30 51 540 765 724 356 758 840 30 - 135

386(37) 1160(17)
829(24) 936(22)

45
36 16 13 36

50-80
5D-80

50-80 50-80 50-80

324(38) 628(29) 492(34) 1410(15) 535 (31) 1506 (14)

52 77
41 35

92(21) 44 (33) 65 (22) 174(17) 43 (34)

25(41)

o o o

a
5 1

o o o

RP RP RP RP
RF

1974 1950

65

63(23) 50 (30) 100(20)

o
1

RP RP RP RP RP

1956
1964

1956 1951

J
Column Region/Country Sub- Saharan
Af r Lca

J Table 3 4

-)

1 (continued) 5 7 8 10 12

11

Liberia Nigeria Zaire Kenya Ethiopia South Africa Middle East/ North Africa Morocco Tunisia Libya Iran Turkey Iraq Egypt Lebanon Jordan Israel Saudi Arab i.a Asia Afghanis tan Pakistan India Burma Thailand Cambodia Laos South Vietnam Malaysia Indonesia Phil ippines Taiwan South Korea

50-80 50-80 60-80 60-80 63-80 50-74 50-80

816 10640 (9) 620(42) 2077(33) 1277(36) 852(41) 0(50)

94 512 (33) 55 (46) 261(40) 291 (39) 520(32) 33(47)

8 100 12 20 40 12 5

.8 17.1 (21) .4(47)

2.1(40)
.8(44) 5.6(32) 0(50)

1117 28 (37) 10(49) 38 (36) 6(50) 1225(11) 26 (38)

0 1 0

10 0 0 6 1 1 0

EA

1951 1952 1963

299 1361 3998 82 124 168 10* 219 1835 8* - 203 83 -, - 101 140 490 1252

50-80 4790 4135(23) 57-80 56-80 11167(7) 51-70 10286(10) 1649(34) 50-79 4626(18) 50-80 50-67 481(45) 74-80 18417 (5) 50-80 4325(21) 50-80 26022 (3) 68-S0 100666 (1) 5D-80 293(48) 50-80 51-78 50-SO 50-80 50-SO 50-80 55-75* 55-75 55-75 58-80 50-80 50-80 50-80 SO-SO 2272 2446(29) 4150(22) 973(39) 296(47) 1140(37) 11091(8) 23605 (4) 29943 (2) 523(44) 862 (I}O) 2302(31) 6733(16) 9956(12)

7337 1208(16) 1014(21) 1583(12) 13351 (7} 6704(10) 687(27} 1551 (13) 1057(19) 17236 (6) 184008 (1) 52579 (3) 1741 26 (49) 814(25) 21(50) 197(42) 2308 (11) 13228 (8) 34745 (4) 56233 (2) 874(23) 119(44) 1058 (18) 17273 (5) 10270 (9)

37 22 38 1 75 72

2 23 78 93 52 . 52 0 18 3 55 89 90 90 100 37 28 86 99 97

7.6 7,3(23) 9.7(29) 14.2(24) 12.7(27) 17.4(20) 2.4(39) . 7 (45) 23.6(17) 31. 7(l3) 0(50) 7.4(30) 8.9 1.4(42) 2.4(38) .0(48) 1.0(43) 15.5(23) 593.9 (2) 706.3 (1) 124.2 (3) 3.0(36) 1.5(41) 14.2(25) 56.5 (6) 33.8(10)

16918 3328 (10) 22 (44) 3758 (9) 630 (13) 6806 (7) 25 (39) 224(16) 646 (12) 13(48) 57(25) 603(14) 241534 17(46) 485(15) 63(24) 18(45) 13025 (4) 52(29) 48(31) 129581 (1) 17(47) 45 (32) 17287 (3) 5214 (8) 66992 (2)

5 1 0 1

a a a

3 0

0 0 0
96

94 0 0 0 1 10 4 17 11 10 13 7 103 0 2 3 0 3 6 8 11 2 7 0 11 3

CE,EA 1947 CE,NA,EA 1952 CE*

1951 1977

84 2093 7533 - 158 80 - 305 138 - 314 1272 16 158 568 - 111 39 - 949 - 130 - 129 15 64 1460 - 1737 791 1308 9312 37 8 71 409 38 226 1482 18 51 427 40 14 - 316 57 710 58 106 1216 149 486 1406 58 1421 42 1588

0 1

a a a

CE,SE,EA

0 59 0 0 6 3 54

SE SE* SE* SE*

1951 1951 1951 1951

SE,MDT,EA1951 MDT 1952 MDT 1950

Table 1 - Notes and Sources Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, and 12 give averages for the variables shown over the years in column 1. Figures in parentheses in columns 2, 3, 5, and 6 give the country's rank among the 50 countries shown in the table. Columns 2 and 3 are in thousands of 1975 dollars, and column 12 is in millions of 1975 dollars, deflated with the U,S. GDP deflator, obtained from International Monetary Fund, Inten1ational Financial Statistics, Supplement on Price Statistics, 1981. Population data for per capita figures in columns 2, 3, and 5 are for 1970, from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Department of State, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978 (Hashington: U. S. Government Printing Office, 1980). Table II. Regional figures give averages or totals for all third world countries in the particular region (excluding China). The time period in column 1 for Cambodia also excludes 1965-1969, when the government in power had poor relations with the United States. Further notes and sources for specific columns are as follows: 2) Economic aid includes both loans and grants. Calculated from yearly series provided by the Agency for International Development, published in a condensed form in Agency for International Development, U.S. Department of State, U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants and Assistance from International Organizations (Bureau for Program and Policy Coordination, Washington, 1982). 3) Military transfers include both aid and sales, from U.S. Department of Defense. Fiscal Year Series, 1980 (Data Manage~ent Division, Washington,

1981).
4) Calculated from U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, U.S. Department of State, World :Hilitary Expenditures and Arms Trade, 1963-1.973 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), Table III, and World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1969-1978, Table IV. 5) Calculated from Defense Security Assistance Agency, U.S. Department of Defense, Fiscal Year Series, 1980. 6) U.S. troops include all military personnel stationed in the country. Averages exclude 1951 and 1952, for which data were unavailable. These figures were calculated from work sheets provided by the Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (DIOR), U.S. Department of Defense, Washington~ D.C. 7) Congressional Quarterly Service, Global Defense: U.S. Military Commitments Abroad (September, 1969), p. 38. 8) Military actions here include violent and non-violent responses to both domestic and international actions pertaining to the particular country. The data was obtained from Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, Political Use of the United States Armed Forces, 1946-1976 (ICPSR 7595). This riatawas the basis for Barry M. Blechman and Stephen s. Kaplan, Force Without War: U.S. Armed Forces as a Political Instrument (W'ashington: Brookings, 1978).

--Table 1 - Notes and Sources (continued) 9) Includes the Rio Pact (RP), Executive Agreements (BA), Central Treaty OrganiZation (CE)t North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA)t and Mutual Defense Treaties (MDT), from Congressional Quarterly Service, Global Defense, p. iv. Treaties are no longer in force for countries marked with an asterisk. 10) u.S. Department of Statet Treaties in Force (Washington: u.S. Government Printing Office, January 1980). Year shown is the earliest year a military mission was provided or in which the mutual Security Act was signed. 11) 1950 figures are from u.S. Office of Business Economics, Direct Private Foreign Investments of the United States (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), p. 44. 1966 figures are from u.S. Department of Commercet u.S. Direct Investment Abroad, 1966 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967)t p. 31. Missing data are due to regional aggregations given in these tablest and generally reflect low levels of investment. 12) Trade is imports plus exports, calculated from a 1978 tape based on International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade. Where necessary this data was supplemented with data from the original source.

PAGE 18
The sample third world volume target major of U.S. of used in this table was which either: chosen by selecting those

countries military U.S.

i) received aid;

a substantial ii) were the in a

transfers

or economic or

a major

intervention; with

iii) were engaged States in that

security It

agreement

the United large

the postwar all counwould be

period.

was made might

sufficiently

to ensure

tries which included. The

possibly shown

be considered in column

U.S. clients

periods had

I give the years with the United

in which States and

each country for which figured. the The

a close

relationship

yearly period allied

averages 1950-1980

in columns is

2. 3. 5. 6.

and 12 are which

used for those States in

countries

were closely period.

with the United are used a

the entire a country

postwar became

Shorter

periods

in cases where treaty

independent revolution.

after or

1950. or where change

or conflict.

or a coup. altered

other

of government

substantially States. tools

the country's

relationship

with the United policy

The data given referred States to here in the

in columns as cliency postwar capita

2-10 show how the foreign instruments Figures have been used in columns

by the United

period.

2. 3,

and 5 are given comparisons versus

on a per

basis to facilitate magnitude

cross-national of external

and to indiresources

cate the relative of a particular

domestic

type.

POSTWAR

U.S. CLIENTS

Although

the United

States

has maintained

allies

in all regions

of the third world. U.S. cliency

it is clear

from this table

that the strongest in the Middle for 21

relationships

have been These

with countries two regions

East and in Asia east of Burma. and 57 PQrcent in 1950-1980 of U.S. economic

accounted

aid to all third world 55 percent

countries

respecti~ely,

and 41 and

of U.S. military

PAGE 19 transfers stationed bases, wars), tries (both sales a large in and aid).13 The United states numerous has also

number

of troops, military

maintained actions

military two major of coun-

engaged and made in these

frequent

(including

strong regions,

formal

commitments

to the security

especially

in East Asia.

.-

In

the Middle closely

East Israel by Saudi Arabia

has and

been the recently

major

U.S.

client, Since the

followed

by Egypt.

1967 war Israel fers at world, States

has received per capita

U.S. economic rate than

aid and military country on

transin the

a higher and

any other dependent Saudi

has been

.almost exclusively military

the United was the in

for sophisticated per capita

equipment. of U.S. as

Arabia

third largest 1950-1980. military have also the region. agreements agreements

recipient emerged

military

transfers

Egypt has rapidly aid

a major

recipient three

of U.S.

and economic figured

in recent in

years.

These

countries for

prominently none

U.S. security major

arrangements formal

Although

have concluded States, with a variety

security informal

with the United has been reached

of important

each.

Large amounts

of U.S. military (under King

and/or

economic

aid

have also and Jordan. in the

been given to Libya Libya and region of Turkey

Idris),

Iran, Turkey, military

provided

the major period,

U.S.

bases

during U.S.

the postwar troops.

each hosting provided the Soviet intervention

a large

contingent important

Iran sites on

several border in

intelligence-gathering target of a major

and was Iran

the and is

covert

U.S.

1953.

Turkey

were the key members

of CENTO

in the region, troops

and Turkey

also a member Morocco

of NATO and provided can probably

for the war minor

in Vietnam.

and Lebanon

be considered of U.S.

U.S. clients. aid and

Each

received

moderately Morocco while

high levels has provided Lebanon major was

economic military

militarY

transfers. States.

a major

base for to

the

United

sufficiently

important

U.s. policymakers

to warrant

intervention

in 1958 and 1982.

PAGE 20 Of the Asian countries in table 1, only Pakistan Although located can be between considered Iran and Thailand a U.S. client shown

or even

a U.S. ally.

the figures cliency in the

shown for Pakistari in 1950-1980 relationship, they are consider1960s when of containand

do not suggest

a strong a period

-,

ably higher Pakistan ing

for

late 1950s and early

played

an important Union and Vietnam

role in the U.S. strategy China. Thailand,

the Soviet South

Laos, Cambodia,

especially

have

been quintessential of U.S. military in U.S.

U.S. clients. and economic activities aid in

Each received

very large volumes on a large

and participated Southeast Taiwan, Asia.

scale

military

Much the Korea. and

same can be Each provided a Mutual

said for major Defense

the Philippines, military Treaty bases with for it. and its

and South States

the United Taiwan

signed

and South Korea were major aid. The received Philippines, moderatly

recipients

of U.S. military threat aid. from

economic

with no immediate high levels of U.S.

neighbors, in column

As shown in on a the

8, U.S. military The United in the in the early early

forces States 1950s

have been used intervened and on in

extensively Korea in

this region. large scale Philippines late 1950s.

South

a smaller

scale Straits

1950s and

in the Formosa

in the

The America

U.S. relationships and Sub-Saharan

with countries have

in

Central

and weaker

South than in

Africa

been considerably

those with countries terms of the

in the Middle

East and East Asia, at least used in this

security-oriented
in

indicators regions

tablQ. of PQr several

NonQ of thQ COUh~r;e5 capita military werQ primarily

these

received

high levels although

transfers armed by

from the United it. While

States,

a number

of these

countries aid, secufor

received
this aid Chile. Ethiopia

fairly

hiQh per capita

levels

of U.S. economic as the primary America by Cuba,

rity concerns

can clearly

be identified

motive

only for the countries Military in these bases were only

of Central provided

and possibly Panama, and

regions,

and these

countries

were the only ones

PAGE 21
in which large numbers of U.S. troops active;n every were stationed. and;n regions U.S. miliCentral being the U.S.

tary forces America, target

were quite

the Caribbean in these

with virtually

country at

of a U.S. in

intervention South

some time and

in this century. Africa

interventions limited

America

Sub-Saharan

have been

to covert

actions

in Chile and Zaire such as Venezuela America close

and counterinsurgency Bolivia. Africa would While shown all in

assistance

in countries in South

and

of the countries the table have cult to argue can Republic the

and Sub-Saharan U.S. allies, it

been fairly that any other have had

be diffi-

than Panama

and possibly with the

the DominiStates East and

relationships of some countries

United

approaching East Asia.

levels

in the Middle

On the basis of this discussion, clients can tentatively

three

broad

categories

of U.S.

be identified:

strong Cliency RelationshiDs! Israel, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Cambodia, Laos, South Vietnam, the Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea Moderate Cliencv Jordan, Pakistan, Relationships: Libya, Iran, Turkey, Panama, Dominican Republic Egypt,

Weak Cliency Relationships: Morocco, lebanon, Honduras, Nicaragua, EI Salvador, Costa Rica, liberia, Zaire, Ethiopia.

Cuba, Guatemala, Bolivia, Chile,

These categories the concepts inclusion certainly

are provided

to give some idea of which are meant to apply

countries to. The can

developed

in this study countries

of many of these be debated.

1n a particular are best viewed for brief

category

The weak clients

as marginal periods but

cases which may have been legitimate are clearly not comparable with

clients

countries developed

in the strong and moderin this study should be

ate categories. thought

The concepts mainly

of as applying

to the strong and moderate

clients.

PAGE 22 U.S. MOTIVES IN ESTABLISHING CLIENCY RELATIONSHIPS

Columns

11

and 12

give figures

on

U.S. direct

investment shown

in

1950 and 1966 and total U.S. trade 1 with these shows direct that no 50 countries. clear

in the periods of

in column regions of

A comparison

the different between

relationship

exists

the volume policy

investment

or trade

and use of

the foreign America had

tools

shown in volumes of

this table. U.S.

South and Central and trade of

the highest regions, and,

investment

the five.

with the exception America, Sub-Saharan ment and lower than highest volumes period. among the Africa

of U.S. bases and military lowest levels of the

actions

in Central tools. investnot much the

foreign volume policy

policy of U.S. tools

had generally

the lowest foreign

trade and levels in South America. of

of the

Asia and the Middle policy tools shown

East received

levels

the foreign

but only modest postwar

of investment Furthermore,

and trade,

particularly

in the earlY was

no significant investment

correlation

found among shown

the 50 countries in columns

between

or trade and the figures

2, 3, 5, and 6.14

The establishment

of cliency

relationships with

by the United

States raw

has also not been clearly materials. The desire

associated

sources

of essential

to protect

oil deposits

and shipping motive

routes in U.S. U.S.

in the Persian policy toward

Gulf has certainly the Middle

been an important

East. However, extensive

it has not dissuaded to Israel. Africa other and

policymakers

from giving

support

sourc-

es of strategic America States.

raw materials

in Sub-Saharan

in South

have evidently The countries

not warranted of the high

such attention Middle

by the United East and East assistance raw

Mediterranean volumes

Asia which

have received

of U.S.

security

do not contain, materials.

or even border

on, major

sources

of strategic

PAGE 23
While the protection es of out on raw materials the basis of of foreign or other investment, goods markets, cannot and sourcbe ruled U.S.

certainly as an it such
IS

this brief cliency

discussion

important clearly as Magdoff

goal in establishing itself a suggested such as sufficient

relationships, Marxists in

not by have

explanation. policy

that U.S. foreign the desire combat

general

is based

on motives economic

to protect

private

U.S. and

Western

interests, national

socialism,

and maintain these many become than

an open door for multifdctors have undoubtedly they cannot in and

corporations.IS U.S. foreign

Although policy has Asia in

influenced explain the

instances, more heavily in South

why the United East and

States East

involved America

Middle

Sub-Saharan

Africa.l

Furthermore, factors

this argument such as these

does not consider to U.S. national between formulation the of

the importance security. goals of This

of economic amounts

to a

failure private

to distinguish in the

the state and the policy.17 foreign

sector

U.S. foreign tions of

It should policy,

be added

that many other

explanademocalso

U.S.

such as the desire or extend variations. spheres

to promote

racy, strengthen cannot explain

U.S. allies, regional

of influence,

these

It is clear from table cliency Soviet relationships Union and China by these

1 thdt in

the United areas along

States

has engaged

in

mainly where

the borders of

of the and two with

a serious has

threat been

expansion The

penetration exceptions countries and th~ Soviet

countri~s

perceived.

to this

pattern

have been the Middle

U.S.

relationships in Central desire to the

in th~ Mediterranean Caribbean. In in

East and the

America combat area

the latter Guatemala were in

regions 1954 and certainly Mlddle

influence Cuban

throughout

after the

revolution

major

determinants

of

East, Soviet

involvement of some

in Egypt under Nasser

r

and

in Iraq

after

1958 were clearly the massive

concern

to

U.S. policymakers. cannot be explained

However, solely

U.S. support particularly

for Israel

on this basis,

PAGE 24 since it increased influence Israel sympathy ences in in the rapidly in the late 19605 and 1970s when Soviet declining. an enigma, While U.S. support for

region was of

remains for

something

cultural and are

similarities, influ-

survivors

of the political

Holocaust, process

pro-Israeli certainly

the American factors.18

important

explanatory

Except

in the case of Israel, in the postwar to

it thus appears

that U.S. cliency primarily Union and with

relationships by a desire China. This in

period

have been motivated by the Soviet

limit or contain with

advances the strong Asia, in

is consistent East and

U.S. relationships the Northern

countries Persian Central

Southeast

Tier and and U.S.

Gulf regions America.

of the Middle also

East, and

in the Caribbean weaker

It is

consistent

with the

relationships

with countries Soviet

in South

America,

Sub-Saharan

Africa,

and South Asia, where 19605

and Chinese The

advances

in the 1950s and various in the

were considerably interests Gulf area, other has 1n

weaker. clearly Central

desire

to protect goal

economic Persian However, such as

been an America, vital

important and in the

Caribbean. policymakers goals of

interests for key

considered allies

by U.S.

protection

and certain

ideological

have undoubtedly cliency

played

an important

role in the establishment

relationships

as well.

PAGE 25 FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER 1

1) This definition is Pm"er of Nations (New elaborate discussions context are given by Clientelist Politics,"

similar to that given by Klaus Knorr, The York: Basic Books, 1975), pp. 24-26. M"Oi=e of the concept of cliency in a different John Duncan Powell, "Peasant Society and American Political Science Review, Vol. 64,

No.2.

June 1970.

PP.

411-425; Rene

Lemarchand and

Keith Legg,

"Political Clientelism and Development: A Preliminary Analysis." Comparative Politics, Vol. 4, No.2. January 1972, pp. 149-178; and James C. Scott, "Patron-Client Politics and Political Change in Southeast Asia," American Political Science Review, Vol. 66, No.1, March 1972, pp. 91-113. about the political uses of foreign aid. see Hans J. Morgenthau, "Preface to a Political Theory of Foreign Aid." in Robert A. Goldwin (ed.). Why Foreien Aid? (Chicago: Rand McNally, 19(3), pp. 70-89; Jacob J. Kaplan, The Challenae of Foreicm Aid (New York: Praeger, 19(7); and Joan M. Nelson. Aid, Influence, and Foreign Polic~ (NeL" York: MacMillan, 19(8). For an excellent empirical study that finds foreign policy goals to have outweighed humanitarian considerations in U.S. aid-giving, see R. D. McKinlay and R. Little, "A Foreign Policy Model of Bilateral Aid Allocation." World Politics, Vol. 30, No.1, October 1977. pp. 58-86. 3) Studies which focus almost exclusively on major weapons systems are Anthony Sampson, The Arms Ba?aar (Hew York: Viking, 1977) and Uri Raranan, Robert L. Pfaltzgraff, Jr., and Geoffrey Kemp (eds.), Arms Transfers to the Third World: The Military Buildup in Less Industrial Countries (Boulder: Westview Pres5, 1978). A useful exception is Michael T. Klare, Supplying Repression (NeW York: Field Foundation. 1977). 4) For an excellent study focusing particularly on actions such as these see Jan Knippers Black, United States Penetration of Brazil (UniVersity of Pennsylvania Press, 1977). This broad concept of intervention is similar to that used by Andrew M. Scott, "Nonintervention and Conditional Intervention." Journal of Tnternational Affairs Vol. 22, No.2, 1968, pp. 208-216, and by other contributors to this special issue on intervention.
l

2) For useful discussions

5) For a revealing discussion of the role of covert actions and related operations in U.S. foreign policy, see the transcript of a 1968 meeting of top U.S. intelligence officials chaired by Richard M. Bissell, Jr., reprinted as "The Bissell Philosophy," in Victor Marchetti and John D. Marks. The CIA and the Cult of Intellioence (New York: Dell, 1974). pp. 357-376. 6) For.a good review of this literature see Ronald H. Chilcote. "A Critical Synthesis of the Dependency Literature," Latin American Perspectives, Vol. 1, No.1, Spring 1974, pp. 4-29. The term rdependence' is used in a somewhat different sense by James A. Caporaso. "Dependence, Dependency, and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral Analysis," International Organization: Vol. 32, No.1. Winter 1978, pp. 13-44. 7) Andre Gunder Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America (New York: Monthly Review Press 1967); Fernando Henrique Card050 and Enzo Faletto, Dependency and Development in Latin America (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979); Guillermo A. OrDonnell, Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism:
I

PAGE Studies national

8)

26

in South American Studies, 1973).

Politics

(Berkeley:

Institute

of Inter-

Zb ig n iew K. Brzez ins k 1. -!-T.!..h!.!;e=-=-S~o-"v~i,-"e=-t~-:--,;B!-,l~o~c...!:---!U,,-,n ~tcliv~;:-a~n",d~C~o.!..1n,-,f-,l,-l,c,,-,,;t (Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 1967). pp. 125, 139. and elsewhere. The concept of the satellite used here is taken primarily from this source.

9) For a provoca~lve study dealing with this issue see Hamza Alavi, "The State in Post-Colonial Societies-Pakistan and Bangladesh," Hew Left Review 74, July-August 1972, pp. 59-81.

10) A good review of Marxist concepts of imperialism is Michael Barrett Brown. "A Critique of Marxist Theories of Imperialism." in Roger Owen and Bob Sutcliffe (eds.), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London: Longman, 1972), pp. 35-70. The classic non Marxist economic theory is J. A. Hobson, Imperialism: A Study (London: Allen and Unwin, 1938). 11) Hans Morgenthau. Politics Amona 1961). ch. 5; Benjamin J. Cohen. The York: Basic Books, 1973). Nations Question (NeW York: Knopf, of Imperialism (New

12) The actions of Great Britain and Russia in Iran in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries serve as a classic example of imperialism. See chapter 3 for a discussion of the (primarily economic) motives and consequences of these actions. 13) ThQSQ PQrcQntagQs w~rQ calculated columns 2 and 3 of table 1. 14) The 12 correlations ranged significant at better than .10.
Rev i e l.J Pre s S

from -.21

th~ to

sourCQS and York:

USQd none

for were

from

.16, (New

15)

Harry

Magdoff,
,

1 9 6 9 ),

"'!c-+r"")

The

s=-. -.!;;1'-".~2~. -'---'=.!!!-"'-""'--!-:!.=....!-='1.l!

Age of

Imperialism

Monthly

16) For a critique of theories of imperialism along these lines. see James R. Kurth. "Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism." in Steven J. Rosen and Kurth (eds.). Testing Theories of Economic Imperialism (Lexington. ~lass.: D. C. Heath. '197t;,), pp. 12-14. 17) For an excellent theoretical discussion relating international economic issues and national sQcurity SQQ Clark A. Murdock. "Economic Factors as Objects of Security: Economics. Scarcity. and Vulnerability," in Klaus Knorr and Frank N. Trager (eds.), Economic Issues and National Security (Lawrence, Kansas: Allen Press, 1977). pp. 67-98. and other contributions to this volume. On the distinction between state and private goals in U.S. foreign policy. see Stephen D. Krasner, Defendino the National Interest (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978), chs. 1, 3. 18) For a provocative study of pro-Israeli influences on policy, see Alfred M. Lilienthal. The Zionist Connection York: Dodd. Mead. 1978). U.S. (New