Nitro Focus NO3 Sytropin Cis9-T11 UAV Tech DARPA prototype sensor fusion system to navigate without gps

Tactical High Energy Laser Humvee-like truck to defend against UAVs, Rockets, cr uise missiles, artillery shells, mortars, etc. +other threats difficult to pick up on radar. 10kW. 25kW lasers (2500 pounds, fire at full power for 2 minutes, 20 min recharg e to 80% full capacity) Eventually 50 kW laser weapon on humvee truck While the Army HEL-TD program seeks to mount a 10-kilowatt laser weapon on a 10ton eight-wheel truck to engage targets from a distance, the G-BAD initiative se eks to mount a short-range air-defense laser at least as strong as 25 kilowatts on a four-wheel The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV), which the Army, Marines , and Special Operations forces are developing to replace the Humvee. Navy researchers are looking at a G-BAD laser weapon that can fire at full power for as long as two minutes, followed by a 20-minute recharge to 80 percent of t otal capacity. The laser weapon should not weigh more than 2,500 pounds, and nee ds to fit in the JLTV's cargo area. Marine Corps officials say current low-altitude air-defense systems have weaknes ses against UAVs, which are becoming armed threats, and say they need something like the G-BAD concept as a new expeditionary mobile air-defense weapon. The G-B AD concept will be developed from the ground up to prevent reconnaissance, surve illance, targeting, and engagement of expeditionary forces by UAVs. The G-BAD system will consist of three subsystems a volume-surveillance radar, c ommand and control (C2), and a high-energy laser weapon. Navy researchers envisi on the G-BAD laser weapon ultimately for the JLTV, but the first demonstrations most likely will be on a M1152A1 humvee. For now, the G-BAD program aims to identify, develop, and mature novel key compo nents and subsystems that not only improve Marine Corps air-defense capability, but also offer reductions in size, weight, and power consumption, and that can o perate effectively on-the-move. Navy researchers primarily are interested in high-energy laser sources of at lea st 25 kilowatts that are small, rugged, high-efficiency, and with good beam qual ity. Eventually researchers want a JLTV-mounted 50-kilowatt laser weapon. Other laser weapon technological areas of interest include a rugged, lightweight beam director; improved beam control; adaptive optics; an atmospheric character ization and tactical decision aid; thermal storage and management; power generat ion, storage, and conditioning; weapon station controls and displays; and long r ange optics. Other G-BAD technologies to be developed include light tactical vehicle-mounted command, control and communications including high-quality stills and video imag ery, as well as fire-control that can acquire a target with its own sensors. The system also will need a light tactical vehicle-mounted volume surveillance rada

r able to detect and track potential threats. For now, Navy researchers are not trying to procure a high-energy laser weapon. Instead, they are focusing on developing technologies and components for such a future system. Companies interested in participating in the G-BAD program should respond with w hite papers no later than 26 April 2013, and with full proposals no later than 7 June 2013. ONR scientists say they plan to award several contracts worth as much as $400,00 0 each for this solicitation, although they will consider proposals outside of t his cost range. Projects may last for as long as four years.

STEALTH=REDUCE HEAT EMISSIONS, REDUCE TURBULENCE AROUND ARMOR

A missile lock implies the continuous attention of the fire control radar of the pursuing aircraft. If your aircraft has a radar warning reciever, it will detec t the constant high intensity radar energy and *assume* a lock. If the pursuit r adar is not locked on to you, the incident radar energy is transient, meaning hi gh energy only when his antenna is facing you. For a short range infrared missile launch, this is not really required, so you might not get a missile warning from your RWR. However for command guided or act ive/semi-active radar guided missiles, you will get a radar lock warning if you are illuminated by the mother ship or the missiles radar seeker. There was some talk about knowing when a missile is in air. No one had mentione d MAWS and PMAWS, that is Missile Approach Warning System which is an active rad ar that detects missile sized targets and the Passive MAWS which is is an electr o-optic detector which senses the UV emissions of the missiles exhaust plume. ------------- ------------- ------------ ---------------- ---------------- ---------------Edit for Jim: Does using a system make a person an authority on it? Warbird pil ot had made a huge blunder in saying that "MANPADS is the only way to detect an IR missle.." but AFAIK a MANPADS (Man-portable air-defense systems) is a handhel d missile launcher. How on the sweet earth can you "detect" a radar lock-on with a Stinger launcher? No offense, but reading the right stuff maybe just as good... Radar Homing and Warning (RHAW. Pronounced "raw") gear consists of antennas, rec eivers and analysis circuitry. Depending on its sophistication, it can be as lit tle as your Radar Detector in your car, up to classifying and prioritizing multi ple threats. When a fire control system gains a "lock-on" it means the Pulse Repetitive Freq uency (or Interval for you EEs) has changed to improve fidelity of the range, re lative angular velocity, and target velocity of the painted target. This change in PRF can be, and is, detectable. Since this is preparatory to firing a missile , the RHAW will let the crew know someone's about to fire. Detecting an actual launch is the above, also visually, and POSSIBLY via the IR

plume-though this has been problematic frankly. Missiles throw out a huge trail upon launch-if you have a VID on the bandit(s) you can see this. (SAMS/MANPADS have a similar launch signature.) Whether the detected launch is a Heater or Radar missile, the countermeasures a re the same: change one's angular velocity (in both horizontal and vertical plan es) to bleed off the missile's energy, chaff/flares, and ECM. Source(s): Retired F4 WSO

oh my. IR missiles - no lock warning, until the missile trails its white exhaust gasse s towards you. radar homing missiles - the detection is based on enemy radar detecion - the en emy has to detect you first, which in case you have proper equipment /radar emmi sion detector/ may warn you. then, most systems switch from surveillance to TRAC K mode, in which your aircraft is constantly illluminated by the radar waves. He re, you are in a serious trouble. If the enemy is using any radar augmented distance measuring gunnery solution, you can be basically even warned about the gun/cannon attack. Here again the ene my illuminates you using his radar waves to measure the distance. when you see t he flashlight in the night, you KNOW you are stalked, don't you? there are means of detection of the IR shoulder launched missiles /MANPADS/ bas ed on the constant electronic scanning of the surface for the typical IR light f requences produced by the burning rocket engine, however these systems are mostl y sensitive information, restricted to its operators. there are systems es, working on the n, the senzors are /or maneuver might Source(s): passive homing - homing onto IR image of the plane, or onto its own radar emmisi on - is virtually undetectable. it is like if someone is spying you. active homing uses some sort of own designator waves, typically radar ones. thi s is detectable and possible to jamm. semi active homing uses third party designator, such as the Hellfire laserguide d missiles, or vietnam era Sparrow missile. these missiles use the sensors of th eir carrier plane to designate/illuminate the target, and home on the refracted waves. detecting the laser designation, dedicated for armored vehicl same principle as the radar homing described above. Once agai activated by the enemy laser, so that the countermeasures and be performed

An air-to-air missile (AAM) is a missile fired from an aircraft for the purpose of destroying another aircraft. AAMs are typically powered by one or more rocket motors, usually solid fuelled but sometimes liquid fuelled. Ramjet engines, as used on the MBDA Meteor (currently in development), are emerging as propulsion t hat will enable future medium-range missiles to maintain higher average speed ac ross their engagement envelope.

Air-to-air missiles are broadly put in two groups. Those designed to engage oppo sing aircraft at ranges of less than 30km are known as short-range or within visu al range missiles (SRAAMs or WVRAAMs) and are sometimes called dogfight missiles be cause they emphasize agility rather than range. Most use infrared guidance and a re called heat-seeking missiles. In contrast, medium- or long-range missiles (MR AAMs or LRAAMs), which both fall under the category of beyond visual range missi les (BVRAAMs), tend to rely upon radar guidance, of which there are many forms. Some modern ones use inertial guidance and/or "mid-course updates" to get the mi ssile close enough to use an active homing sensor. The air-to-air missile grew out of the unguided air-to-air rockets used during t he First World War. Le Prieur rockets were sometimes attached to the struts of b iplanes and fired electrically, usually against observation balloons, by such ea rly pilots as Albert Ball and A. M. Walters.[1] Facing the Allied air superiorit y, Germany in World War II invested considerable effort into missile research, u sing the R4M unguided rocket first and later the first guided rockets like the R uhrstahl X-4. Post-war research led the Royal Air Force to introduce Fairey Fireflash into ser vice in 1955 but their results were unsuccessful. The US Navy and US Air Force b egan equipping guided missiles in 1956, deploying the USAF's AIM-4 Falcon and th e USN's AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder. The Soviet Air Force introduced its Kaliningrad K-5 into service in 1957. As missile systems have continued to advan ce, modern air warfare consists almost entirely of missile firing. The faith in Beyond Visual Range combat became so pervasive in the US that early F-4 variants were armed only with missiles in the 1960s. High casualty rates during the Viet nam War caused the US to reintroduce autocannons and traditional dogfighting tac tics but the missile remains the primary weapon in air combat. In the Falklands War British Harriers, using AIM-9L missiles provided by the Uni ted States, were able to defeat faster Argentinian opponents.[2] Since the late 20th century all-aspect heat-seeking designs can lock-on to a target from variou s angles, not just from behind, where the heat signature from the engines is str ongest. Other types rely on radar guidance (either on-board or "painted" by the launching aircraft). A conventional explosive blast warhead, fragmentation warhead, or continuous rod warhead (or a combination of any of those three warhead types) is typically use d in the attempt to disable or destroy the target aircraft. Warheads are typical ly detonated by a proximity fuze or by an impact fuze if it scores a direct hit. Less commonly, nuclear warheads have been mounted on a small number of air-to-a ir missile types (such as the AIM-26 Falcon) although these are not known to hav e ever been used in combat. Lockheed Martin is working on a hit to kill missile for air to air combat. By re moving the warhead they could enable the carriage of more missiles in the size c onstrained weapons bays of Fifth-generation jet fighters.[3] See also: Missile guidance Guided missiles operate by detecting their target (usually by either radar or in frared methods, although rarely others such as laser guidance or optical trackin g), and then homing in on the target on a collision course. Although the missile may use radar or infra-red guidance to home on the target, the launching aircraft may detect and track the target before launch by other me

ans. Infra-red guided missiles can be slaved to an attack radar in order to find t he target and radar-guided missiles can be launched at targets detected visually or via an infra-red search and track (IRST) system, although they may require t he attack radar to illuminate the target during part or all of the missile inter ception itself. [edit] Radar guidance Radar guidance is normally used for medium or long range missiles, where the inf ra-red signature of the target would be too faint for an infra-red detector to t rack. There are three major types of radar-guided missile - active, semi-active, and passive. Radar guided missiles can be countered by rapid maneuvering (which may result in them breaking lock, or may cause them to overshoot), deploying chaff or using ele ctronic counter-measures. [edit] Active radar homing Main article: Active radar homing Active radar (AR)-guided missiles carry their own radar system to detect and tra ck their target. However, the size of the radar antenna is limited by the small diameter of missiles, limiting its range which typically means such missiles are launched at a predicted future location of the target, often relying on separat e guidance systems such as Global Positioning System, inertial guidance, or a mi d-course update from either the launching aircraft or other system that can comm unicate with the missile to get the missile close to the target. At a predetermi ned point (frequently based on time since launch or arrival near the predicted t arget location) the missile's radar system is activated (the missile is said to "go active") and the missile then homes in on the target. If the range from the attacking aircraft to the target is within the range of th e missile's radar system the missile can "go active" immediately upon launch. The great advantage of an Active Radar Homing system is that it enables a "Fireand-forget" mode of attack, where the attacking aircraft is free to pursue other targets or escape the area after launching the missile. [edit] Semi-active radar homing Main article: Semi-active radar homing Semi-active radar homing (SARH) guided missiles are simpler and more common. The y function by detecting radar energy reflected from the target. The radar energy is emitted from the launching aircraft's own radar system. However, this means that the launch aircraft has to maintain a lock on the target (keep illuminating the target aircraft with its own radar) until the missile mak es the interception. This limits the attacking aircraft's ability to maneuver, w hich may be necessary should threats to the attacking aircraft appear. An advantage of SARH guided missiles is that they are homing on the reflected ra dar signal so accuracy actually increases as the missile gets closer because the reflection comes from a "point source": the target. Against this, if there are multiple targets, each will be reflecting the same radar signal and the missile may become confused as to which target is its intended victim. The missile may w ell be unable to pick a specific target and fly through a formation without pass ing within lethal range of any specific aircraft. Newer missiles have logic circ uits in their guidance systems to help prevent this problem.

At the same time, jamming the missile lock-on is easier because the launching ai rcraft is further from the target than the missile, so the radar signal has to t ravel further and is greatly attenuated over the distance. This means that the m issile may be jammed or "spoofed" by countermeasures whose signals grow stronger as the missile gets closer. One counter to this is a "home on jam" capability i n the missile that allows it to home in on the jamming signal. [edit] Beam riding Main article: Beam riding An early form of radar guidance was beam-riding (BR). In this method the attacking aircraft directed a narrow beam of radar energy at the target. The air-to-air m issile was launched into the beam where sensors on the aft of the missile contro lled the missile, keeping it within the beam. So long as the beam was kept on th e target aircraft, the missile would ride the beam until making the interception . While simple in concept, the difficulty of simultaneously keeping the beam solid ly on the target (which couldn't be relied upon to cooperate by flying straight and level), continuing to fly one's own aircraft, all the while keeping an eye o ut for enemy countermeasures, can be readily appreciated. An added complication was that the beam will spread out into a cone shape as the distance from the attacking aircraft increases. This will result in less accura cy for the missile because the beam may actually be larger than the target aircr aft when the missile arrives. The missile could be securely within the beam but still not be close enough to destroy the target. [edit] Infrared guidance Main article: Infrared homing Infrared guided (IR) missiles home on the heat produced by an aircraft. Early in fra-red detectors had poor sensitivity, so could only track the hot exhaust pipe s of an aircraft. This meant an attacking aircraft had to maneuver to a position behind its target before it could fire an infra-red guided missile. This also l imited the range of the missile as the infra-red signature soon become too small to detect with increasing distance and after launch the missile was playing catc h-up with its target. Early infrared seekers were unusable in clouds or rain (whi ch is still a limitation to some degree) and could be distracted by the sun, a r eflection of the sun off of a cloud or ground object, or any other "hot" object within its view. More modern infra-red guided missiles can detect the heat of an aircraft's skin, warmed by the friction of airflow, in addition to the fainter heat signature of the engine when the aircraft is seen from the side or head-on. This, combined w ith greater maneuverability, gives them an all-aspect capability, and an attacking aircraft no longer had to be behind its target to fire. Although launching from behind the target increases the probability of a hit, the launching aircraft us ually has to be closer to the target in such a tail-chase engagement. An aircraft can defend against infra-red missiles by dropping flares that are ho tter than the aircraft, so the missile homes in on the brighter, hotter target. In turn, IR missiles may employ filters to enable it to ignore targets whose tem perature is not within a specified range. Towed decoys which closely mimic engine heat and infra-red jammers can also be u sed. Some large aircraft and many combat helicopters make use of so-called "hot

brick" infra-red jammers, typically mounted near the engines. Current research i s developing laser devices which can spoof or destroy the guidance systems of in fra-red guided missiles. See Infrared countermeasure. Start of the 21st century missiles such as the ASRAAM use an imaging infrared" se eker which sees the target (much like a digital video camera), and can distinguish between an aircraft and a point heat source such as a flare. They also feature a very wide detection angle, so the attacking aircraft does not have to be point ing straight at the target for the missile to lock on. The pilot can use a helme t mounted sight (HMS) and target another aircraft by looking at it, and then fir ing. This is called off-boresight launch. For example, the Russian Su-27 is equipp ed with an infra-red search and track (IRST) system with laser rangefinder for i ts HMS-aimed missiles. In order to maneuver sufficiently from a poor launch angle at short ranges to hi t its target, missiles are now employing gas-dynamic flight control methods such as vectored thrust, which allow the missile to start turning off the rail, before its motor has accelerated it up to high enough speeds for its small aerodynamic surfaces to be useful. [edit] Electro-optical A recent advancement in missile guidance is electro-optical imaging. The Israeli Python-5 has an electro-optical seeker that scans designated area for targets v ia optical imaging. Once a target is acquired, the missile will lock-on to it fo r the kill. Electro-optical seekers can be programmed to target vital area of an aircraft, such as the cockpit. Since it does not depend on the target aircraft' s heat signature, it can be used against low-heat targets such as UAVs and cruis e missiles. However clouds can get in the way of electro-optical sensors.[4] [edit] Passive Anti-radiation Main article: Anti-radiation missile Evolving missile guidance designs are converting the anti-radiation missile (ARM ) design, pioneered during Vietnam and used to home in against emitting surfaceto-air missile (SAM) sites, to an air intercept weapon. Current air-to-air passi ve anti-radiation missile development is thought to be a countermeasure to airbo rne early warning and control (AEW&C - also known as AEW or AWACS) aircraft whic h typically mount powerful search radars. Due to their dependence on target aircraft radar emissions, when used against fi ghter aircraft passive anti-radiation missiles are primarily limited to forwardaspect intercept geometry.[5] For examples, see Vympel R-27, Brazo, and AIM-97 S eekbat. Another aspect of passive anti-radiation homing is the "home on jam" mode which, when installed, allows a radar-guided missile to home in on the jammer of the t arget aircraft if the primary seeker is jammed by the electronic countermeasures of the target aircraft Design Air-to-air missiles are typically long, thin cylinders in order to reduce their cross section and thus minimize drag at the high speeds at which they travel. Mi ssiles are divided into five primary systems (moving forward to aft): 1) Seeker 2) Guidance 3) Warhead 4) Rocket Motor 5) Control Actuation

At the front is the seeker, either a radar system, radar homer, or infra-red det ector. Behind that lies the avionics which control the missile. Typically after that, in the centre of the missile, is the warhead, usually several kilograms of high explosive surrounded by metal that fragments on detonation (or in some cas es, pre-fragmented metal). The rear part of the missile contains the propulsion system, usually a rocket of some type and the control actuation system or CAS. Dual-thrust solid-fuel rocke ts are common, but some longer-range missiles use liquid-fuel motors that can thr ottle to extend their range and preserve fuel for energy-intensive final maneuver ing. Some solid-fuelled missiles mimic this technique with a second rocket motor which burns during the terminal homing phase. There are missiles in development , such as the MBDA Meteor, that breathe air (using a ramjet, similar to a jet engi ne) in order to extend their range. Modern missiles use low-smoke motors early missiles produced thick smoke trails, w hich were easily seen by the crew of the target aircraft alerting them to the at tack and helping them determine how to evade it. The CAS is typically an electro-mechanical, servo control acuation system, which takes input from the guidance system and manipulates the airfoils or fins at th e rear of the missile that guide or steers the weapon to target. [edit] Missile range Missiles are often cited with their maximum engagement range, which is very misl eading. A missile's effective range is dependent on factors such as altitude, sp eed, position, and direction of the target aircraft as well as those of the atta cking aircraft. For example the Vympel R-77 has stated range of 100 km. That is only true for a head-on, non-evading target at high altitude. At low altitude, t he effective range is reduced by as much as 75%80% to 2025 km. If the target is ta king evasive action, or in stern-chase position, the effective range is further reduced. See Air-to-Air missile non-comparison table for more information. The e ffective range of an air-to-air missile is known as the no-escape zone, noting the range at which the target can not evade the missile once launched. Poorly-trained pilots are known to fire their missiles at maximum-range engageme nt with poor results. In the 19982000 Eritrean-Ethiopian War, fighters from both sides shot over a dozen medium-range R-27 (AA-10 Alamo) missiles at distance wit h little effect. But when better-trained Ethiopian Su-27 pilots gave chase and a ttacked with short-range R-73 (AA-11 Archer) missiles, the results were often de adly to the Eritrean aircraft. [1] [edit] Performance A number of terms frequently crop up in discussions of air to air missile perfor mance. Launch success zoneThe Launch Success Zone is the range within which there is a high (defined) kill probability against a target that remains unaware of its eng agement until the final moment. When alerted visually or by a warning system the target attempts a last-ditch-manoeuvre sequence.F-PoleA closely related term is the A-Pole. This is the slant range between the launch aircraft and target, at the time of interception. The greater the F-Pole, the greater the confidence tha t the launch aircraft will achieve air superiority with that missile.No-Escape Z oneThe No-Escape Zone is the zone within which there is a high (defined) kill pr obability against a target even if it has been alerted. This zone is defined as a conical shape with the tip at the missile launch. The cone's length and width are determined by the missile and seeker performance. A missile's speed, range a nd seeker sensitivity will mostly determine the length of this imaginary cone, w

hile its agility (turn rate) and seeker complexity (speed of detection and abili ty to detect off axis targets) will determine the width of the cone. [edit] Dogfight Short-range air-to-air missiles used in dogfighting are usually classified into fi ve generations according to the historical technological advances. Most of these a dvances were in infrared seeker technology (later combined with digital signal p rocessing). [edit] First generation Early short-range missiles such as the early Sidewinders and Vympel K-13 (AA-2 A toll) had infrared seekers with a narrow (30 degree) field of view and required the attacker to position himself behind the target (rear aspect engagement). Thi s meant that the target aircraft only had to perform a slight turn to move outsi de the missile seeker's field of view and cause the missile to lose track of the target ("break lock").[6] [edit] Second generation Second generation missiles utilized more effective seekers that improved the fie ld of view to 45 degrees. [edit] Third generation This generation introduced all aspect missiles, because more sensitive seekers all owed the attacker to fire at a target which was side-on to itself, i.e. from all aspects not just the rear. This meant that while the field-of-view was still re stricted to a fairly narrow cone, the attack at least did not have to be behind the target.[6] [edit] Fourth generation The Vympel R-73 (AA-11 Archer) entered service in 1985 and marked a new generati on of dogfight missile. These missiles employed more advanced seeker technologie s such as focal plane arrays that improved resistance to infrared countermeasure s (IRCM) such as flares and increased off-bore sight capability to in excess of 60 degrees, i.e. a 120 degree field of view. To take advantage of the increased field-of-view that now exceeded the capabilit ies of most aircraft radars also meant that helmet mounted sights gained popular ity.[7] Many newer missiles include what is known as look-down-shoot-down capabili ty, as they could be fired onto low flying planes that would formerly be lost in ground clutter. These missiles are also much more agile, some by employing thrust vectoring (typ ically gimballed thrust). [edit] Fifth generation The latest generation of short-range missiles again defined by advances in seeke r technologies, this time electro-optical imaging infrared (IIR) seekers that al low the missiles to see images rather than single points of infrared radiation (heat ). The sensors combined with more powerful digital signal processing provide the following benefits:[2] greater infrared counter countermeasures (IRCCM) ability, by being able to disti nguish aircraft from infrared countermeasures (IRCM) such as flares. greater sensitivity means greater range and ability to identify smaller low flyi ng targets such as UAVs. more detailed target image allows targeting of more vulnerable parts of aircraft

instead of just homing in on the brightest infrared source (exhaust). Examples of fifth generation missiles include: IRIS-T German lead consortium (2005) Vympel R-73 M2 ("AA-11 Archer") Russia (2000's) Vympel R-77 M2 ("AA-12 Adder") Russia (2000's) MBDA MICA France (1996) AIM-132 ASRAAM Britain (1998) AIM-9X Sidewinder USA (2003) Python 5 Israeli A-Darter (under development) South Africa and Brazil PL-12, PL-10 China AAM-5 Japan ASTRA (Under development) - India Behind the scenes The Iron Man MK2 and MK3 costumes are actually composed of three layers with mult iple pieces. First, the actor had to wear a skin tight black jumpsuit (seen in-f ilm, on the Mk3's first deployment) followed by detail pieces (the silver machin e parts, most noticeable below the neck). Before the armor could be attached, th e body, the helmet, and both the arms and legs, were all seperate pieces, and ca me together in a "Megazord" like fashion. Downey commented that like most bulky costumes, it got incredibly hot in the Iron Man armor suit, and would not be very practical as a costume as it took three p eople to help him get in it. Trivia In the comics, before switching his armor to its more recognizable appearance, th e Mark I armor was painted gold to avoid scaring people due to its scary appeara nce. Iron Man's Mark II armor resembles the Recovery Armor in the comics. Iron Man's Mark III armor is similar to his New Avenger armor in the comics. Iron Man's Mark V armor resembles the Silver Centurion armor's colour scheme in t he comics. Iron Man's Mark VI armor resembles the Extremis armor in the comics due the trian gler chest piece. Iron Man's Mark VII armor resembles the Bleeding Edge armor in the comics due to its abilities (according to the action figure), but it is similar in appearance to the Ultimates version of the armor. Missile guidance refers to a variety of methods of guiding a missile or a guided bomb to its intended target. The missile's target accuracy is a critical factor for its effectiveness. Guidance systems improve missile accuracy by improving i ts "Single Shot Kill Probability" (SSKP), which is part of combat survivability calculations associated with salvo combat model.[1][2] These guidance technologies can generally be divided up into a number of categor ies, with the broadest categories being "active," "passive" and "preset" guidanc e. Missiles and guided bombs generally use similar types of guidance system, the difference between the two being that missiles are powered by an onboard engine , whereas guided bombs rely on the speed and height of the launch aircraft for p ropulsion. History The concept of missile guidance originated at least as early as World War I, wit h the idea of remotely guiding an airplane bomb onto a target. In World War II g uided missiles were first developed, as part of the German V-weapons program.[3]

Project Pigeon was American behaviorist B.F. Skinner's attempt to develop a pig eon-guided missile. [edit] Categories of guidance systems Guidance systems are divided into different categories according to what type of target they are designed for - either fixed targets or moving targets. The weap ons can be divided into two broad categories, Go-Onto-Target (GOT) and Go-Onto-L ocation-in-Space (GOLIS) guidance systems.[4] A GOT missile can target either a moving or fixed target, whereas a GOLIS weapon is limited to a stationary or nea r-stationary target. The trajectory that a missile takes while attacking a movin g target is dependent upon the movement of the target. Also, a moving target can be an immediate threat to the sender of the missile. The target needs to be eli minated in a timely fashion in order to preserve the integrity of the sender. In GOLIS systems the problem is simpler because the target is not moving. [edit] GOT systems In every Go-Onto-Target system there are three subsystems: Target tracker Missile tracker Guidance computer The way these three subsystems are distributed between the missile and the launc her result in two different categories: Remote Control Guidance: The guidance computer is on the launcher. The target tr acker is also placed on the launching platform. Homing Guidance: The guidance computers are in the missile and in the target tra cker. [edit] Remote control guidance These guidance systems usually need the use of radars and a radio or wired link between the control point and the missile; in other words, the trajectory is con trolled with the information transmitted via radio or wire. System include Command Guidance - The missile tracker is on the launching platform. These missi les are totally controlled by the launching platform that sends all control orde rs to the missile. The 2 variants are Command to Line-Of-Sight (CLOS) Command Off Line-Of-Sight (COLOS) Line-Of-Sight Beam Riding Guidance (LOSBR) - The target tracker is on board the missile. The missile already has some orientation capability meant for flying in side the beam that the launching platform is using to illuminate the target. It can be manual or automatic.[5] [edit] Command to Line-Of-Sight (CLOS) The CLOS system uses only the angular coordinates between the missile and the ta rget to ensure the collision. The missile is made to be in the line of sight bet ween the launcher and the target (LOS), and any deviation of the missile from th is line is corrected. Since so many types of missile use this guidance system, t hey are usually subdivided into four groups: [edit] Manual Command to Line-Of-Sight (MCLOS) Both target tracking and missile tracking and control are performed manually. Th e operator watches the missile flight, and uses a signaling system to command th e missile back into the straight line between operator and target (the "line of

sight"). This is typically useful only for slower targets, where significant "le ad" is not required. MCLOS is a subtype of command guided systems. In the case o f glide bombs or missiles against ships or the supersonic Wasserfall against slo w-moving B-17 Flying Fortress bombers this system worked, but as speeds increase d MCLOS was quickly rendered useless for most roles. [edit] Semi-Manual Command to Line-Of-Sight (SMCLOS) Target tracking is automatic, while missile tracking and control is manual. [edit] Semi-Automatic Command to Line-Of-Sight (SACLOS) Target tracking is manual, but missile tracking and control is automatic. Is sim ilar to MCLOS but some automatic system positions the missile in the line of sig ht while the operator simply tracks the target. *SACLOS has the advantage of all owing the missile to start in a position invisible to the user, as well as gener ally being considerably easier to operate. SACLOS is the most common form of gui dance against ground targets such as tanks and bunkers. [edit] Automatic Command to Line-Of-Sight (ACLOS) Target tracking, missile tracking and control are automatic. [edit] Command Off Line-Of-Sight (COLOS) This guidance system was one of the first to be used and still is in service, ma inly in anti-aircraft missiles. In this system, the target tracker and the missi le tracker can be oriented in different directions. The guidance system ensures the interception of the target by the missile by locating both in space. This me ans that they will not rely on the angular coordinates like in CLOS systems. The y will need another coordinate which is distance. To make it possible, both targ et and missile trackers have to be active. They are always automatic and the rad ar has been used as the only sensor in these systems. The SM-2MR Standard is ine rtially guided during its mid-course phase, but it is assisted by a COLOS system via radar link provided by the AN/SPY-1 radar installed in the launching platfo rm. [edit] Line-Of-Sight Beam Riding Guidance (LOSBR) LOSBR uses a "beam" of some sort, typically radio, radar or laser, which is poin ted at the target and detectors on the rear of the missile keep it centered in t he beam. Beam riding systems are often SACLOS, but do not have to be; in other s ystems the beam is part of an automated radar tracking system. A case in point i s later versions of the RIM-8 Talos missile as used in Vietnam - the radar beam was used to take the missile on a high arcing flight and then gradually brought down in the vertical plane of the target aircraft, the more accurate SARH homing being used at the last moment for the actual strike. This gave the enemy pilot the least possible warning that his aircraft was being illuminated by missile gu idance radar, as opposed to search radar. This is an important distinction, as t he nature of the signal differs, and is used as a cue for evasive action. LOSBR suffers from the inherent weakness of inaccuracy with increasing range as the beam spreads out. Laser beam riders are more accurate in this regards, but a re all short-range, and even the laser can be degraded by bad weather. On the ot her hand, SARH becomes more accurate with decreasing distance to the target, so the two systems are complementary.[5] [edit] Homing guidance [edit] Active homing

Active homing uses a radar system on the missile to provide a guidance signal. T ypically electronics in the missile keep the radar pointed directly at the targe t, and the missile then looks at this "angle" of its own centerline to guide its elf. Radar resolution is based on the size of the antenna, so in a smaller missi le these systems are useful for attacking only large targets, ships or large bom bers for instance. Active radar systems remain in widespread use in anti-shippin g missiles, and in "fire-and-forget" air-to-air missile systems such as AMRAAM a nd R-77 [edit] Semi-active Homing Main article: Semi-active radar homing Semi-active homing systems combine a passive radar receiver on the missile with a separate targeting radar that "illuminates" the target. Since the missile is t ypically being launched after the target was detected using a powerful radar sys tem, it makes sense to use that same radar system to track the target, thereby a voiding problems with resolution or power, and reducing the weight of the missil e. Semi-active radar homing (SARH) is by far the most common "all weather" guida nce solution for anti-aircraft systems, both ground- and air-launched.[2] It has the disadvantage for air-launched systems that the launch aircraft must k eep moving towards the target in order to maintain radar and guidance lock. This has the potential to bring it within range of shorter-ranged IR-guided missile systems. It is an important consideration now that "all aspect" IR missiles are capable of "kills" from head on, something which did not prevail in the early da ys of guided missiles. For ships and mobile or fixed ground-based systems, this is irrelevant as the speed (and often size) of the launch platform precludes "ru nning away" from the target or opening the range so as to make the enemy attack fail. SALH is similar to SARH but uses a laser as a signal. Another difference is that most laser-guided weapons employ a turret-mounted laser designator which increa ses the launching aircraft's ability to maneuver after launch. How much maneuver ing can be done by the guiding aircraft, will depend on the turret field of view and the systems ability to maintain a lock-on while maneuvering. As most air-la unched, laser-guided munitions are employed against surface targets the designat or providing the guidance to the missile need not be the launching aircraft; des ignation can be provided by another aircraft or by a completely separate source (frequently troops on the ground equipped with the appropriate laser designator) . [edit] Passive homing Infrared homing is a passive system in which heat generated by the target is det ected and homed on. Typically used in the anti-aircraft role to track the heat o f jet engines, it has also been used in the anti-vehicle role with some success. This means of guidance is sometimes also referred to as "heat seeking".[2] Contrast seekers use a television camera, typically black and white, to image a field of view in front of the missile, which is presented to the operator. When launched, the electronics in the missile look for the spot on the image where th e contrast changes the fastest, both vertically and horizontally, and then attem pts to keep that spot at a constant location in its view. Contrast seekers have been used for air-to-ground missiles, including the AGM-65 Maverick, because mos t ground targets can be distinguished only by visual means. However they rely on there being strong contrast changes to track, and even traditional camouflage c an render them unable to "lock on".

[edit] Retransmission homing Main article: Track-via-missile Retransmission homing, also called Track Via Missile(TVM), is a hybrid between c ommand guidance, semi-active radar homing and active radar homing. The missile p icks up radiation broadcast by the tracking radar which bounces off the target a nd relays it to the tracking station, which relays commands back to the missile. [edit] GOLIS systems Whatever the Go-Onto-Location-in-Space guidance system, it must contain preset i nformation about the target. These systems' main characteristic is the lack of a target tracker. The guidance computer and the missile tracker are located in th e missile. The lack of target tracking in GOLIS necessarily implies Navigational Guidance.[2] Navigational guidance is any type of guidance executed by a system without a tar get tracker. The other two units are on board the missile. These systems are als o known as self-contained guidance systems; however, they are not always entirel y autonomous due to the missile trackers used. They are subdivided by their miss ile tracker's function as follows: Entirely autonomous - Systems where the missile tracker does not depend on any e xternal navigation source, and can be divided into: Inertial Guidance With gyro-stabilized platform With strapdown platform Preset Guidance Dependent on natural sources - Navigational guidance systems where the missile t racker depends on a natural external source: Celestial Guidance Terrestrial Guidance Topographic Reconnaissance (Ex: TERCOM) Photographic Reconnaissance (Ex: DSMAC) Magnetic Guidance Dependent on artificial sources - Navigational guidance systems where the missil e tracker depends on an artificial external source: Satellite Navigation Global Positioning System (GPS) GLObal NAvigation Satellite System (GLONASS) Hyperbolic Navigation DECCA LORAN C [edit] Inertial guidance Main article: inertial guidance Inertial Guidance uses sensitive measurement devices to calculate the location o f the missile due to the acceleration put on it after leaving a known position. Early mechanical systems were not very accurate, and required some sort of exter nal adjustment to allow them to hit targets even the size of a city. Modern syst ems use solid state ring laser gyros that are accurate to within metres over ran ges of 10,000 km, and no longer require additional inputs. Gyroscope development has culminated in the AIRS found on the MX missile, allowing for an accuracy of less than 100m at intercontinental ranges. Many civilian aircraft use inertial guidance using the ring laser gyroscope, which is less accurate than the mechani cal systems found in ICBMs, but which provide an inexpensive means of attaining a fairly accurate fix on location (when most airliners such as Boeing's 707 and 747 were designed, GPS was not the widely commercially available means of tracki

ng that it is today). Today guided weapons can use a combination of INS, GPS and radar terrain mapping to achieve extremely high levels of accuracy such as that found in modern cruise missiles.[4] Inertial guidance is most favored for the initial guidance and reentry vehicles of strategic missiles, because it has no external signal and cannot be jammed.[3 ] Additionally, the relatively low precision of this guidance method is less of an issue for large nuclear warheads. Preset guidance Preset guidance is the simplest type of missile guidance. From the distance and direction of the target, the trajectory of the flight path is determined. Before firing, this information is programmed into the missile's guidance system, whic h, during flight, maneuvers the missile to follow that path. All the guidance co mponents (including sensors such as accelerometers or gyroscopes) are contained within the missile, and no outside information (such as radio instructions) is u sed. An example of a missile using Preset Guidance is the V-2 rocket.[6] [edit] Celestial guidance Celestial guidance was first used in the American Snark missile (Nortronics stel lar-inertial guidance) first flown on 06/08/1953. It uses star positioning to fi ne-tune the accuracy of the inertial guidance system after launch. As the accura cy of a missile is dependent upon the guidance system knowing the exact position of the missile at any given moment during its flight, the fact that stars are a fixed reference point from which to calculate that position makes this a potent ially very effective means of improving accuracy. In the Trident system this was achieved by a single camera that was trained to spot just one star in its expec ted position (it is believed that the missiles from Soviet submarines would trac k two separate stars to achieve this), if it was not quite aligned to where it s hould be then this would indicate that the inertial system was not precisely on target and a correction would be made. [edit] Terrestrial guidance TERCOM, for "terrain contour matching", uses altitude maps of the strip of land from the launch site to the target, and compares them with information from a ra dar altimeter on board. More sophisticated TERCOM systems allow the missile to f ly a complex route over a full 3D map, instead of flying directly to the target. TERCOM is the typical system for cruise missile guidance, but is being supplant ed by GPS systems and by DSMAC, Digital Scene-Matching Area Correlator, which em ploys a camera to view an area of land, digitizes the view, and compares it to s tored scenes in an onboard computer to guide the missile to its target. DSMAC is reputed to be so lacking in robustness that destruction of prominent bu ildings marked in the system's internal map (such as by a preceding cruise missi le) upsets its navigation.[4] A guided bomb (also known as a smart bomb, guided bomb unit, or GBU) is a precis ion-guided munition intended to precisely hit a specific target, and to minimize damage to things other than the target.[1] Because the damage effects of explosive weapons fall off with distance according to a power law, even modest improvements in accuracy (and hence reduction in mi ss distance) enable a target to be effectively attacked with fewer or smaller bo mbs. Thus, even if some bombs miss, fewer air crews are put at risk and the harm to civilians and the amount of collateral damage may be somewhat reduced. The creation of precision-guided munitions resulted in the retroactive renaming

of older bombs as unguided bombs or "dumb bombs". Design [edit] Payload A guided bomb must carry fewer explosives to accommodate the guidance mechanisms . [edit] Guidance

A laser-guided GBU-24 (BLU-109 warhead variant) strikes its target. Guided bombs carry a guidance system which is usually monitored and controlled f rom an external device. [edit] Radio The Germans were first to introduce PGMs in combat, using the 1,400-kg (3,100 lb ) Fritz X to successfully attack the Italian battleship Roma in 1943. The closes t Allied equivalents were the 1000-lb (454 kg) AZON (AZimuth ONly), used in both Europe and the Pacific, and the US Navy's Bat, primarily used in the Pacific Th eater of World War II. In addition, the U.S. tested the rocket-propelled Gargoyl e; it never entered service.[2] No Japanese remotely-guided PGMs ever saw servic e in World War II. The United States Army Air Forces used similar techniques with Operation Aphrodi te, but had few successes; the German Mistel (Mistletoe) "parasite aircraft" was no more effective. The U.S. programs restarted in the Korean War. In the 1960s, the electro-optical bomb (or camera bomb) was reintroduced. They were equipped with television came ras and flare sights, by which the bomb would be steered until the flare superim posed the target. The camera bombs transmitted a "bomb's eye view" of the target back to a controlling aircraft. An operator in this aircraft then transmitted c ontrol signals to steerable fins fitted to the bomb. Such weapons were used incr easingly by the USAF in the last few years of the Vietnam War because the politi cal climate was increasingly intolerant of civilian casualties, and because it w as possible to strike difficult targets (such as bridges) effectively with a sin gle mission; the Thanh Hoa Bridge, for instance, was attacked repeatedly with gr avity bombs, to no effect, only to be dropped in one mission with PGMs. Although not as popular as the newer JDAM and JSOW weapons, or even the older la ser-guided bomb systems, weapons like the AGM-62 Walleye TV-guided bomb are stil l being used, in conjunction with the AAW-144 Data Link Pod, on US Navy F/A-18 H ornets. [edit] Infrared In World War II, the U.S. National Defense Research Committee developed the VB-6 Felix, which used infrared to home on ships. While it entered production in 194 5, it was never employed operationally.[3] [edit] Laser In 1962, the US Army began research into laser guidance systems and by 1967 the USAF had conducted a competitive evaluation leading to full development of the w

orld's first laser-guided bomb, the BOLT-117, in 1968. All such bombs work in mu ch the same way, relying on the target being illuminated, or "painted," by a las er target designator on the ground or on an aircraft. They have the significant disadvantage of not being usable in poor weather where the target illumination c annot be seen, or where it is not possible to get a target designator near the t arget. The laser designator sends its beam in a series of encrypted pulses so th e bomb cannot be confused by an ordinary laser, and also so multiple designators can operate in reasonable proximity. Laser-guided weapons did not become commonplace until the advent of the microchi p. They made their practical debut in Vietnam, where on 13 May 1972 when they we re used in the second successful attack on the Thanh Hoa Bridge ("Dragon's Jaw") . This structure had previously been the target of 800 American sorties[4] (usin g unguided weapons) and was partially destroyed in each of two successful attack s, the other being on 27 April 1972 using Walleyes. That first mission also had laser-guided weapons, but bad weather prevented their use. They were used, thoug h not on a large scale, by the British forces during the 1982 Falklands War.[5] The first large-scale use of smart weapons came in 1991 during Operation Desert Storm when they were used by coalition forces against Iraq. Even so, most of the air-dropped ordnance used in that war was "dumb," although the percentages are biased by the large use of various (unguided) cluster bombs. Laser-guided weapon s were used in large numbers during the 1999 Kosovo War, but their effectiveness was often reduced by the poor weather conditions prevalent in the southern Balk ans. There are two basic families of laser-guided bombs in American (and American-sph ere) service: the Paveway II and the Paveway III. The Paveway III guidance syste m is more aerodynamically efficient and so has a longer range, however it is mor e expensive. Paveway II 500-pound LGBs (such as GBU-12) are a cheaper lightweigh t PGM suitable for use against vehicles and other small targets, while a Paveway III 2000-pound penetrator (such as GBU-24) is a more expensive weapon suitable for use against high-value targets. GBU-12s were used to great effect in the fir st Gulf War, dropped from F-111F aircraft to destroy Iraqi armored vehicles in a process referred to as "tank plinking." [edit] Satellite Lessons learned during the first Gulf War showed the value of precision munition s, yet they also highlighted the difficulties in employing them specifically whe n visibility of the ground or target from the air was degraded.[6] The problem o f poor visibility does not affect satellite-guided weapons such as Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM) and Joint Stand-Off Weapon (JSOW), which make use of the United States' GPS system for guidance. This weapon can be employed in all weath er conditions, without any need for ground support. Because it is possible to ja m GPS, the guidance package reverts to inertial navigation in the event of GPS s ignal loss. Inertial navigation is significantly less accurate; the JDAM achieve s a published Circular Error Probable (CEP) of 13 m under GPS guidance, but typi cally only 30m under inertial guidance (with free fall times of 100 seconds or l ess).[7][8] The precision of these weapons is dependent both on the precision of the measure ment system used for location determination and the precision in setting the coo rdinates of the target. The latter critically depends on intelligence informatio n, not all of which is accurate. According to a CIA report, the accidental bombi ng of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade during Operation Allied Force by NATO airc raft was attributed to faulty target information.[9] However, if the targeting i nformation is accurate, satellite-guided weapons are significantly more likely t o achieve a successful strike in any given weather conditions than any other typ e of precision-guided munition.

A countermeasure is a measure or action taken to counter or offset another one. As a general concept it implies precision, and is any technological or tactical solution or system (often for a military application) designed to prevent an und esirable outcome in the process. The first known use of the term is in 1923.[1] Countermeasures can refer to the following disciplinary spectrum: defense medicine materials engineering electro-magnetic engineering policing Information technology Law Diplomatic security Pollution prevention Defense countermeasures are often subdivided into "active" and "passive" counter measures. Active "Active" countermeasures alter the electromagnetic, acoustic or other signature( s) of a target thereby altering the tracking and sensing behavior of an incoming threat (e.g., guided missile) are designated softkill measures. Measures that p hysically counterattack an incoming threat thereby destroying/altering its paylo ad/warhead in such a way that the intended effect on the target is majorly imped ed are designated hardkill measures. Both are further described in active protec tion systems. [edit] Passive "Passive" countermeasures include: Armor Camouflage Fortification Self-sealing fuel tank See also Electronic countermeasures Infrared countermeasures Flare (countermeasure) Anti-aircraft Anti-ballistic missile National Missile Defense Strategic Defense Initiative Mine countermeasures In aviation, self-sealing fuel tank is a fuel tank or fuel bladder technology in wide use since World War II that prevents fuel tanks (primarily on aircraft) fr om leaking fuel and igniting after being damaged by enemy fire. Self-sealing tanks have multiple layers of rubber and reinforcing fabric, one of vulcanized rubber and one of untreated natural rubber that can absorb oil and e xpand when wet. When a fuel tank is punctured, the fuel will seep into the layer s, causing the swelling of the untreated layer, thus sealing the puncture. World War I George J. Murdock applied for the patent "War Aeroplane Fuel Tanks" on February 7, 1917 but was temporarily blocked by an order of the Federal Trade Commission,

on February 6, 1918, to keep any discussion or publication of the invention sec ret. The order was rescinded by the United States Patent Office on September 26, 1918 and Murdock was eventually granted United States Patent 1,386,791 "Self-Pu ncture Sealing Covering for Fuel-Containers" on August 9, 1921. Military aircraf t built by the Glenn L. Martin Company used this self-sealing fuel tank. [edit] World War II In the newer generations of pre-war and early-war aircraft, self-sealing tanks w ere tanks used to minimize the damage from leaking or burning fuel. A convention al fuel tank, when hit by gunfire, could leak fuel rapidly. This would not only reduce the aircraft's effective range, but was also a significant fire hazard. D amaged fuel tanks could also rupture, destroying the airframe or critically affe cting flight characteristics. It was realized that, because of weight limitations, it was not practical to sim ply add armor plate to aircraft fuel tanks; a method of stopping fuel leaking fr om damaged tanks was necessary. Early attempts at protecting fuel tanks consisted of using metal tanks, covered inside or outside by a material that expanded after being pierced. Research reve aled that the exit of the projectile, rather than the entry, was the greater pro blem, as it often tumbled, thus creating a large exit hole. Among the earliest v ersions of these types of tanks were those manufactured in the UK at Portsmouth airport by Fireproof Tanks Ltd. These tanks were first installed in the Fairey B attle light bomber with other versions installed in Supermarine Spitfire and Haw ker Hurricane fighters and larger aircraft such as the Avro Lancaster heavy bomb er. The Henderson Safety Tank company provided crash-proof self-sealing tanks fo r the Miles Master trainer.[1] The Germans were using layers of rubber laid over leather hide with a treated fi bre inner surface for the self-sealing tanks on their Junkers Ju 88 bombers earl y in the war.[2] In the US, Ernst Eger of United States Rubber Company (later Uniroyal) patented[ 3] a self-sealing fuel tank design in 1941; one of many companies involved in de veloping this technology during the war. Goodyear chemist James Merrill was awar ded a patent in 1941 for refining and successfully testing his method for manufa cturing self-sealing tanks using a two-layer system of rubber compounds encased in a metal outer shell or the wing lining of the aircraft.[4] In 1942, he receiv ed a War Production Board citation from President Roosevelt and the Goodyear tan ks were subsequently placed in service in Goodyear-produced Corsair fighters, as well as other aircraft. By 1942 Fireproof Tanks had developed the first flexibl e fuel bladders as range extender tanks for the MkIX Spitfire. These tanks were flexible containers, made of a laminated self-sealing material like vulcanized r ubber and with as few seams as possible to minimize leak paths. As early tests showed that impact could overpressurize a fuel tank, the self-sea ling fuel cell is suspended, allowing it to absorb shocks without rupture. U.S. Navy fuel tanks during the war were able to withstand Caliber .50 in (12.7 mm) b ullets and, on occasion, 20 mm (0.79 in) cannon shells. Not all fighters were fitted with the relatively new invention. Self-sealing tan ks tended to be heavier with lower capacity than non-sealed tanks. Nonetheless, aircraft that were fitted with self-sealing tanks regularly took more punishment than those without, and were able to return to base. Combat experience in the P acific war showed that the heavily protected American aircraft could sustain far more damage than the lightly armored Japanese designs without self-sealing fuel tanks (for instance, the Mitsubishi A6M Zero).

The same principles were applied to give self-sealing fuel lines in aircraft (MI L-PRF-7061C). [edit] Modern use Most jet fighters and all US military rotary wing aircraft have some type of sel f-sealing tanks. Military rotary wing fuel tanks have the additional feature of being crashworthy.[5] High altitudes require the tanks to be pressurized, making self-sealing difficult. Newer technologies have brought advances like inert foa m-filled tanks to prevent detonation. This foam is an open cell foam that effect ively divides the gas space above the remaining fuel into thousands of small spa ces, none of which contain sufficient vapour to support combustion. This foam al so serves to reduce fuel slosh. Major manufacturers of this technology include A mfuel (Zodiac) (formerly Firestone), Meggitt (formerly Goodyear), GKN USA and FP T Industries. FPT is now part of GKN.[6] For military use, tanks are qualified t o MIL-DTL-27422 (includes crashworthiness requirements) or MIL-DTL-5578 (non-cra shworthy). An aircraft fuel tank sometimes consists of several interconnected fu el cells. The interconnecting hoses are typically also self-sealing.[7] In additions to fighter aircraft some military patrol vehicles and armoured VIP limousines feature self-sealing fuel tanks. Self-sealing fuel tanks using military technology are also required in some moto rsport categories.

COUNTERSHADING/ADAPTING TO SHADOWS BY SHADING/DARKENING NON-SHADOWED PORTION OF ARMOR TO MATCH SHADED PORTION's COLOR/DARKNESS In 2005 an Israeli company, ApNano, developed a material that was always rigid. It was announced that this nanocomposite based on tungsten disulfide nanotubes w as able to withstand shocks generated by a steel projectile traveling at velocit ies of up to 1.5 km/s.[62] The material was also reportedly able to withstand sh ock pressures generated by other impacts of up to 250 metric tons-force per squa re centimeter (24.5 gigapascals; 3,550,000 psi). During the tests, the material proved to be so strong that after the impact the samples remained essentially un marred. Additionally, a recent study in France tested the material under isostat ic pressure and found it to be stable up to at least 350 tf/cm (34 GPa; 5,000,000 psi). As of mid-2008, spider silk bulletproof vests and nano-based armors are being de veloped for potential market release[citation needed]. Both the British and Amer ican militaries have expressed interest in a carbon fiber woven from carbon nano tubes that was developed at University of Cambridge and has the potential to be used as body armor.[63] In 2008, large format carbon nanotube sheets began being produced at Nanocomp. Engineers of powered exoskeletons face a number of large technological challenge s to build a suit that is capable of quick and agile movements, yet is also safe to operate without extensive training. [edit] Power supply One of the largest problems facing designers of powered exoskeletons is the powe r supply.[23] There are currently few power sources of sufficient energy density to sustain a full-body powered exoskeleton for more than a few hours.

Non-rechargeable primary cells tend to have more energy density and store it lon ger than rechargeable secondary cells, but then replacement cells must be transp orted into the field for use when the primary cells are depleted, of which may b e a special and uncommon type. Rechargeable cells can be reused but may require transporting a charging system into the field, which either must recharge rapidl y or the depleted cells need to be able to be swapped out in the field, to be re placed with cells that have been slowly charging.[24] Internal combustion engine power supplies offer high energy output, but they als o typically idle, or continue to operate at a low power level sufficient to keep the engine running, when not actively in use which continuously consumes fuel. Battery based power sources are better at providing instantaneous and modulated power; stored chemical energy is conserved when load requirements cease. Engines which do not idle are possible, but require energy storage for a starting syste m capable of rapidly accelerating the engine to full operating speed, and the en gine must be extremely reliable and never fail to begin running immediately. Engines which are small and lightweight typically must operate at high speed to extract sufficient energy from a small engine cylinder volume, which both can be difficult to silence and induces vibrations into the overall system. Internal c ombustion engines can also get extremely hot, which may require additional weigh t from cooling systems or heat shielding. Electrochemical fuel cells such as solid oxide fuel cells (SOFC) are also being considered as a power source since they can produce instantaneous energy like ba tteries and conserve the fuel source when not needed. They can also easily be re fueled in the field with liquid fuels such as methanol. However they require hig h temperatures to function; 600 C is considered a low operating temperature for S OFCs. Most research designs are tethered to a much larger separate power source. For a powered exoskeleton that will not need to be used in completely standalone situ ations such as a battlefield soldier, this limitation may be acceptable, and the suit may be designed to be used with a permanent power umbilical. [edit] Strong but lightweight skeleton (Section reference [25]) Initial exoskeleton experiments are commonly done using inexpensive and easy to mold materials such as steel and aluminum. However steel is heavy and the powere d exoskeleton must work harder to overcome its own weight in order to assist the wearer, reducing efficiency. The aluminium alloys used are lightweight, but fai l through fatigue quickly; it would be unacceptable for the exoskeleton to fail catastrophically in a high-load condition by "folding up" on itself and injuring the wearer. As the design moves past the initial exploratory steps, the engineers move to pr ogressively more expensive and strong but lightweight materials such as titanium , and use more complex component construction methods, such as molded carbon-fib er plates. [edit] Strong but lightweight actuators The powerful but lightweight design issues are also true of the joint actuators. Standard hydraulic cylinders are powerful and capable of being precise, but the y are also heavy due to the fluid-filled hoses and actuator cylinders, and the f luid has the potential to leak onto the user. Pneumatics are generally too unpre dictable for precise movement since the compressed gas is springy, and the lengt

h of travel will vary with the gas compression and the reactive forces pushing a gainst the actuator. Generally electronic servomotors are more efficient and power-dense, utilizing h igh-gauss permanent magnets and step-down gearing to provide high torque and res ponsive movement in a small package. Geared servomotors can also utilize electro nic braking to hold in a steady position while consuming minimal power. [edit] Joint flexibility Flexibility is another design issue, and which also affects the design of unpowe red hard shell space suits. Several human joints such as the hips and shoulders are ball and socket joints, with the center of rotation inside the body. It is d ifficult for an exoskeleton to exactly match the motions of this ball joint usin g a series of external single-axis hinge points, limiting flexibility of the wea rer. A separate exterior ball joint can be used alongside the shoulder or hip, but th is then forms a series of parallel rods in combination with the wearer's bones. As the external ball joint is rotated through its range of motion, the positiona l length of the knee/elbow joint will lengthen and shorten, causing joint misali gnment with the wearer's body. This slip in suit alignment with the wearer can b e permitted, or the suit limbs can be designed to lengthen and shorten under pow er assist as the wearer moves, to keep the knee/elbow joints in alignment. A partial solution for more accurate free-axis movement is a hollow spherical ba ll joint that encloses the human joint, with the human joint as the center of ro tation for the hollow sphere. Rotation around this joint may still be limited un less the spherical joint is composed of several plates that can either fan out o r stack up onto themselves as the human ball joint moves through its full range of motion. Spinal flexibility is another challenge since the spine is effectively a stack o f limited-motion ball joints. There is no simple combination of external singleaxis hinges that can easily match the full range of motion of the human spine. A chain of external ball joints behind the spine can perform a close approximatio n, though it is again the parallel-bar length problem. Leaning forward from the waist, the suit shoulder joints would press down into the wearer's body. Leaning back from the waist, the suit shoulder joints would lift off the wearer's body. Again, this alignment slop with the wearer's body can be permitted, or the suit can be designed to rapidly lengthen or shorten the exoskeleton spine under powe r assist as the wearer moves. [edit] NASA AX-5 hard shell space suit The NASA Ames research center experimental AX-5 hard-shell space suit (1988), ha d a flexibility rating of 95%, compared to what movements are possible while not wearing the suit. It is composed of gasketed hard shell sections joined with fr ee-rotating mechanical bearings that spin around as the person moves. However, the free-rotating hard sections have no limit on rotation and can poten tially move outside the bounds of joint limits. It requires high precision manuf acturing of the bearing surfaces to prevent binding, and the bearings may jam if exposed to lunar dust.[26] [edit] Power control and modulation Control and modulation of excessive and unwanted movement is a third large probl em. It is not enough to build a simple single-speed assist motor, with forward/h old/reverse position controls and no on-board computer control. Such a mechanism

can be too fast for the user's desired motion, with the assisted motion oversho oting the desired position. If the wearer's body is enclosed with simple contact surfaces that trigger suit motion, the overshoot can result the wearer's body l agging behind the suit limb position, resulting in contact with a position senso r to move the exoskeleton in the opposite direction. This lagging of the wearer' s body can lead to an uncontrolled high-speed oscillatory motion, and a powerful assist mechanism can batter or injure the operator unless shut down remotely. ( An underdamped servo typically exhibits oscillations like this.)[27] A single-speed assist mechanism which is slowed down to prevent oscillation is t hen restrictive on the agility of the wearer. Sudden unexpected movements such a s tripping or being pushed over requires fast precise movements to recover and p revent falling over, but a slow assist mechanism may simply collapse and injure the user inside. (This is known as an overdamped servo.)[27] Fast and accurate assistive positioning is typically done using a range of speed s controlled using computer position sensing of both the exoskeleton and the wea rer, so that the assistive motion only moves as fast or as far as the motion of the wearer and does not overshoot or undershoot. (This is called a critically da mped servo.)[27] This may involve rapidly accelerating and decelerating the moti on of the suit to match the wearer, so that their limbs slightly press against t he interior of the suit and then it moves out of the way to match the wearer's m otion. The computer control also needs to be able to detect unwanted oscillatory motions and shut down in a safe manner if damage to the overall system occurs. [edit] Detection of unsafe/invalid motions A fourth issue is detection and prevention of invalid or unsafe motions, which i s managed by an on-board realtime computational Self-Collision Detection System. [28] It would be unacceptable for an exoskeleton to be able to move in a manner that exceeds the range of motion of the human body and tear muscle ligaments. This pr oblem can be partially solved using designed limits on hinge motion, such as not allowing the knee or elbow joints to flex backwards onto themselves. However, the wearer of a powered exoskeleton can additionally damage themselves or the suit by moving the hinge joints through a series of combined and otherwis e valid movements which together cause the suit to collide with itself or the we arer. A powered exoskeleton would need to be able to computationally track limb positi ons and limit movement so that the wearer does not casually injure themselves th rough unintended assistive motions, such as when coughing, sneezing, when startl ed, or if experiencing a sudden uncontrolled seizure or muscle spasm. [edit] Pinching and joint fouling An exoskeleton is typically constructed of very strong and hard materials, while the human body is much softer than the alloys and hard plastics used in the exo skeleton. An exoskeleton typically cannot be worn directly in contact with bare skin due to the potential for skin pinching where the exoskeleton plates and ser vos slide across each other. Instead the wearer may be enclosed in a heavy fabri c suit to protect them from joint pinch hazards. The exoskeleton joints themselves are also prone to environmental fouling from s and and grit, and may need protection from the elements to keep operating effect ively. A traditional way of handling this is with seals and gaskets around rotat ing parts, but can also be accomplished by enclosing the exoskeleton mechanics i n a tough fabric suit separate from the user, which functions as a protective "s

kin" for the exoskeleton. This enclosing suit around the exoskeleton can also pr otect the wearer from pinch hazards. [edit] Adaptation to user size variations Most exoskeletons pictured in this article typically show a fixed length distanc e between joints. But humans exhibit a wide range of physical size differences a nd skeletal bone lengths, so a one-size-fits all fixed-size exoskeleton would no t work. Although military use would generally use only larger adult sizes, civil ian use may extend across all human size ranges, including physically disabled b abies and small children. There are several possible solutions to this problem: A wide range of fixed-sized exoskeletons can be constructed, stored, and issued to each differently sized user. This is materially expensive due to the wide var iety of different sizes of users, but may be feasible where only one person is e ver expected to use the exoskeleton, such as when one is issued to a physically disabled person for their personal mobility. Exoskeletons in a wartime service w ould be custom sized to the user and not sharable, making it difficult to supply the wide range of repair parts needed for the many different possible model siz es. The users can be required to be of a specific physical size in order to be issue d an exoskeleton. Physical body size restrictions already occur in the military for jobs such as aircraft pilots, due to the problems of fitting seats and contr ols to very large and very small people. [29] Adjustable-length exoskeleton limbs and frames can be constructed, allowing size flexibility across a range of users. Due to the large variety of potential user bone lengths, it may still be necessary to have several adjustable exoskeleton models each covering certain size ranges, such as one model only for people that are 5' - 7' tall. A further difficulty is that not only is there variation in bone lengths, but al so limb girth due to bone density, muscle build, fat, and any user clothing laye ring such as insulation for extreme cold or hot environments. An exoskeleton wil l generally need to fit the user's limb girth snugly so that their arms and legs are not loose inside and flopping around an oversized exoskeleton cavity, or so tight that the user's skin is lesioned from abrasion from a too-small exoskelet on cavity. Again, this can be handled in a military environment by requiring certain degree s of muscle density and body fitness of the potential users, so that exoskeleton s designed for a particular limb girth will fit the majority of soldiers. Many p eople would be excluded due to incompatibly thin or thick bodies, even if they a re within the correct height range. A rigid shell exoskeleton may be able to use an adjustable suspension harness wi thin the shell. The rigid outer shell still imposes a maximum girth but may be a ble to accommodate many smaller girths inside. A fully enclosing flexible armored exoskeleton using small overlapping sectioned sliding plates could dynamically expand and contract the overlap distance of it s many outer plates, both to adapt to the wearer's limb length and girth, and as the plates move in coordination with the wearer's body in general use. Another example is the Nanosuit worn by Prophet and Alcatraz in the Crysis serie s, which augments the wearer's speed, strength and stealth, but does not look li ke traditional powered armor and is powered by advanced nanotechnology, instead forming a bullet proof, tight fitting artificial muscle suit An electronic countermeasure (ECM) is an electrical or electronic device designe d to trick or deceive radar, sonar or other detection systems, like infrared (IR

) or lasers. It may be used both offensively and defensively to deny targeting i nformation to an enemy. The system may make many separate targets appear to the enemy, or make the real target appear to disappear or move about randomly. It is used effectively to protect aircraft from guided missiles. Most air forces use ECM to protect their aircraft from attack. It has also been deployed by military ships and recently on some advanced tanks to fool laser/IR guided missiles. It is frequently coupled with stealth advances so that the ECM systems have an easi er job. Offensive ECM often takes the form of jamming. Defensive ECM includes us ing blip enhancement and jamming of missile terminal homers. Radar ECM Basic radar ECM strategies are (1) radar interference, (2) target modifications, and (3) changing the electrical properties of air.[1] Interference techniques i nclude jamming and deception. Jamming is accomplished by a friendly platform tra nsmitting signals on the radar frequency to produce a noise level sufficient to hide echos.[1] The jammer's continuous transmissions will provide a clear direct ion to the enemy radar, but no range information.[1] Deception may use a transpo nder to mimic the radar echo with a delay to indicate incorrect range.[1] Transp onders may alternatively increase return echo strength to make a small decoy app ear to be a larger target.[1] Target modifications include radar absorbing coati ngs and modifications of the surface shape to either "stealth" a high-value targ et or enhance reflections from a decoy.[1] Dispersal of small aluminum strips ca lled chaff is a common method of changing the electromagnetic properties of air to provide confusing radar echos.[1] Further information: Radar jamming and deception [edit] Aircraft ECM ECM is practiced by nearly all modern military unitsland, sea or air. Aircraft, h owever, are the primary weapons in the ECM battle because they can "see" a large r patch of earth than a sea or land-based unit. When employed effectively, ECM c an keep aircraft from being tracked by search radars, or targeted by surface-toair missiles or air-to-air missiles. On aircraft ECM can take the form of an att achable underwing pod or could be embedded in the airframe. Fighter planes using a conventional electronically scanned antenna mount dedicated jamming pods inst ead or, in the case of the US, German, and Italian air forces, may rely on elect ronic warfare aircraft to carry them. [edit] Future Airborne Jammers The Next Generation Jammer is being developed to replace the current AN/ALQ-99 c arried on the E/A-18G and EA-6B electronic warfare planes. Planned for adoption around 2020, it will use a small AESA antenna divided into quadrants[2] for all around coverage and retain the capability of highly directional jamming. DARPA's Precision Electronic Warfare (PREW) project aims to develop a low-cost s ystem capable of synchronizing several simple airborne jamming pods with enough precision to replicate the directionality of an electronically scanned antenna, avoiding collateral jamming of non-targeted receivers.[3] [edit] Dedicated ECM aircraft EC-130H Compass Call EA-6B Prowler equipped with ALQ-92 communications jammer, ALQ-100 multi-band tra ck breaking system, and five ALQ-99 tactical jammer pods.[4] EA-18G Growler EF-111A Raven Tornado ECR Su-24MP

Yak-28PP Mi-8PP [edit] Shipboard ECM The ULQ-6 deception transmitter was one of the earlier shipboard ECM installatio ns.[4] The Raytheon SLQ-32 shipboard ECM package came in three versions providin g warning, identification and bearing information about radar-guided cruise miss iles.[4] The SLQ-32 V3 included quick reaction electronic countermeasures for cr uisers and large amphibious ships and auxiliaries in addition to the RBOC (Rapid Blooming Off-board Chaff) launchers found on most surface ships.[4] The BLR-14 Submarine Acoustic Warfare System (or SAWS) provides an integrated receiver, pro cessor, display, and countermeasures launch system for submarines.[4] [edit] Infrared and acoustic analogies Infrared homing systems can be decoyed with flares[1] and other infrared counter measures. Acoustic homing and detection systems used for ships are also suscepti ble to countermeasures. United States warships use Masker and PRAIRIE (PRopellor AIR Ingestion and Emission) systems to create small air bubbles around a ship's hull and wake to reduce sound transmission.[1] Surface ships tow noisemakers li ke the AN/SLQ-25 Nixie to decoy homing torpedoes.[1] Submarines can deploy simil ar acoustic device countermeasures (or ADCs) from a 3-inch (75-mm) signal launch ing tube.[1] United States ballistic missile submarines could deploy the Mark 70 MOSS (MObile Submarine Simulator) decoy from torpedo tubes to simulate a full s ize submarine.[1] Most navies additionally equip surface ships with decoy launch ers.[5] Electronic counter-countermeasures (ECCM) is a part of electronic warfare which includes a variety of practices which attempt to reduce or eliminate the effect of electronic countermeasures (ECM) on electronic sensors aboard vehicles, ships and aircraft and weapons such as missiles. ECCM is also known as electronic pro tective measures (EPM), chiefly in Europe. In practice, EPM often means resistan ce to jamming. Specific ECCM techniques The following are some examples of EPM (other than simply increasing the fidelit y of sensors through techniques such as increasing power or improving discrimina tion): [edit] ECM detection Sensor logic may be programmed to be able to recognize attempts at spoofing (e.g ., aircraft dropping chaff during terminal homing phase) and ignore them. Even m ore sophisticated applications of ECCM might be to recognize the type of ECM bei ng used, and be able to cancel out the signal. [edit] Pulse compression by "chirping", or linear frequency modulation One of the effects of the pulse compression technique, is boosting the apparent signal strength as perceived by the radar receiver. The outgoing radar pulses ar e chirped, that is, the frequency of the carrier is varied within the pulse, muc h like the sound of a cricket chirping. When the pulse reflects off a target and returns to the receiver, the signal is processed to add a delay as a function o f the frequency. This has the effect of 'stacking' the pulse so it seems stronge r, but shorter in duration, to further processors. The effect can increase the r eceived signal strength to above that of noise jamming. Similarly, jamming pulse s (used in deception jamming) will not typically have the same chirp, so will no

t benefit from the increase in signal strength. [edit] Frequency hopping Frequency agility ('frequency hopping') may be used to rapidly switch the freque ncy of the transmitted energy, and receiving only that frequency during the rece iving time window. This foils jammers which cannot detect this frequency switch quickly enough nor predict the next hop frequency, and switch their own jamming frequency accordingly during the receiving time window. This method is also useful against barrage jamming, in that it forces the jammer to spread its jamming power across multiple frequencies in the jammed system's frequency range, reducing its power in the actual frequency used by the equipmen t at any one time. The use of spread-spectrum techniques allow signals to be spr ead over a wide enough spectrum to make jamming of such a wideband signal diffic ult. The famous World War 2 Movie actress, Ms. Heddy Lamar was granted US Patent 2,29 2,387 issued on August 11, 1942, for an early version of frequency hopping. The technique used a piano roll to change between 88 carrier frequencies and was int ended to make radio-guided torpedoes harder to detect or jam. The patent was iss ued to composer George Antheil and "Hedy Kiesler Markey", Ms. Heddy Lamarr's mar ried name at the time. [edit] Sidelobe blanking Radar jamming can be effective from directions other than the direction the rada r antenna is currently aimed. When jamming is strong enough, the radar receiver can detect it from a relatively low gain sidelobe. The radar, however, will proc ess signals as if they were received in the main lobe. Therefore, jamming can be seen in directions other than where the jammer is located. To combat this, an o mnidirectional antenna is used for a comparison signal. By comparing the signal strength as received by both the omnidirectional and the (directional) main ante nna, signals can be identified that are not from the direction of interest. Thes e signals are then ignored. [edit] Polarization Polarization can be used to filter out unwanted signals, such as jamming. If a j ammer and receiver do not have the same polarization, the jamming signal will in cur a loss that reduces its effectiveness. The four basic polarizations are line ar horizontal, linear vertical, right-hand circular, and left-hand circular. The signal loss inherent in a cross polarized (transmitter different from receiver) pair is 3 dB for dissimilar types, and 17 dB for opposites. Aside from power loss to the jammer, radar receivers can also two or more antennas of differing polarization and comparing ed on each. This effect can effectively eliminate all jamming ization, although enough jamming may still obscure the actual [edit] Radiation homing The other main aspect of ECCM, is to program sensors or seekers to detect attemp ts at ECM and possible even to take advantage of it. For example, some modern fi re-and-forget missiles like the Vympel R-77 and the AMRAAM are able to home in d irectly on sources of radar jamming if the jamming is too powerful to allow them to find and track the target normally. This mode, called 'home-on-jam', actuall y makes the missile's job easier. Some missile seekers actually target the enemy 's radiation sources, and are therefore called "anti-radiation missiles" (ARM). The jamming in this case effectively becomes a beacon announcing the presence an benefit from using the signals receiv of the wrong polar signal.

d location of the transmitter. This makes the use of such ECM a difficult decisi on; it may serve to obscure an exact location from a non-ARM missile, but in doi ng so it must put the jamming vehicle at risk of being targeted and hit by ARMs. Radio jamming is the (usually deliberate) transmission of radio signals that dis rupt communications by decreasing the signal to noise ratio.[1] Unintentional ja mming occurs when an operator transmits on a busy frequency without first checki ng whether it is in use, or without being able to hear stations using the freque ncy. Another form of unintentional jamming occurs when equipment accidentally ra diates a signal, such as a cable TV plant that accidentally emits on an aircraft emergency frequency. The concept can be used in wireless data networks to disru pt information flow.[2] It is a common form of censorship in totalitarian countr ies, in order to prevent foreign radio stations in border areas from reaching th e country.[1] Distinction between "jamming" and "interference" Originally the terms were used interchangeably but nowadays most radio users use the term "jamming" to describe the deliberate use of radio noise or signals in an attempt to disrupt communications (or prevent listening to broadcasts) wherea s the term "interference" is used to describe unintentional forms of disruption (which are far more common). However the distinction is still not universally ap plied. For inadvertent disruptions, see electromagnetic compatibility. [edit] Method Intentional communications jamming is usually aimed at radio signals to disrupt control of a battle. A transmitter, tuned to the same frequency as the opponents ' receiving equipment and with the same type of modulation, can, with enough pow er, override any signal at the receiver. Digital wireless jamming for signals su ch as Bluetooth and WiFi is possible with very low power. The most common types of this form of signal jamming are random noise, random pu lse, stepped tones, warbler, random keyed modulated CW, tone, rotary, pulse, spa rk, recorded sounds, gulls, and sweep-through. These can be divided into two gro ups obvious and subtle. Obvious jamming is easy to detect because it can be heard on the receiving equip ment. It usually is some type of noise such as stepped tones (bagpipes), randomkeyed code, pulses, music (often distorted), erratically warbling tones, highly distorted speech, random noise (hiss) and recorded sounds. Various combinations of these methods may be used often accompanied by regular morse identification s ignal to enable individual transmitters to be identified in order to assess thei r effectiveness. For example, China, which used jamming extensively and still do es, plays a loop of traditional Chinese music while it is jamming channels (c.f. Attempted jamming of number stations). The purpose of this type of jamming is to block reception of transmitted signals and to cause a nuisance to the receiving operator. One early Soviet attempt at jamming western broadcasters used the noise from the diesel generator that was p owering the jamming transmitter. Subtle jamming is jamming during which no sound is heard on the receiving equipm ent. The radio does not receive incoming signals yet everything seems superficia lly normal to the operator. These are often technical attacks on modern equipmen t, such as "squelch capture". Thanks to the FM capture effect, frequency modulat ed broadcasts may be jammed, unnoticed, by a simple unmodulated carrier. The rec eiver locks onto the larger carrier signal and hence will ignore the FM signal w ith information.

Digital signals use complex modulation techniques such as QPRS. These signals ar e very robust in the presence of interfering signals. However the signal relies on hand shaking between the transmitter and receiver to identify and determine s ecurity settings and method of high level transmission. If the jamming device se nds initiation data packets the receiver will begin its state machine to establi sh two way data transmission. A jammer will never complete the hand shaking sequ ence but loop back to the beginning. This method jamms the receiver in an infini te loop of always waiting to initiate a connection and never completing it which effectively all legitimate communication. Bluetooth and other consumer radio protocols have built in detectors so that the y only transmit when the channel is free. Simple continuous transmission on a gi ven channel will continuously stop a transmitter transmitting, hence jamming the receiver from ever hearing from its intended transmitter. Wireless signal jammers are devices used to disrupt radio signals. The low cost of manufacture of wireless signal jammers and their damaging effects have added to their popularity and frequent use. A mobile phone jammer is an instrument used to prevent cellular phones from rece iving signals from base stations. When used, the jammer effectively disables cel lular phones. These devices can be used in practically any location, but are fou nd primarily in places where a phone call would be particularly disruptive becau se silence is expected. Operation As with other radio jamming, cell phone jammers block cell phone use by sending out radio waves along the same frequencies that cellular phones use. This causes enough interference with the communication between cell phones and towers to re nder the phones unusable. On most retail phones, the network would simply appear out of range. Most cell phones use different bands to send and receive communic ations from towers (called frequency division duplexing, FDD). Jammers can work by either disrupting phone to tower frequencies or tower to phone frequencies. S maller handheld models block all bands from 800 MHz to 1900 MHz within a 30-foot range (9 meters). Small devices tend to use the former method, while larger mor e expensive models may interfere directly with the tower. The radius of cell pho ne jammers can range from a dozen feet for pocket models to kilometers for more dedicated units. The TRJ-89 jammer can block cellular communications for a 5-mil e (8 km) radius.[1] Less energy is required to disrupt signal from tower to mobile phone, than the s ignal from mobile phone to the tower (also called base station), because the bas e station is located at larger distance from the jammer than the mobile phone an d that is why the signal from the tower is not as strong.[2] Older jammers sometimes were limited to working on phones using only analog or o lder digital mobile phone standards. Newer models such as the double and triple band jammers can block all widely used systems (CDMA, iDEN, GSM, et al.) and are even very effective against newer phones which hop to different frequencies and systems when interfered with. As the dominant network technology and frequencie s used for mobile phones vary worldwide, some work only in specific regions such as Europe or North America. Some Cell Phone Jammers have been introduced to som e State Prisons in the United States. Cell phones that have been sneaked into pr ison pose a security risk for guards and property owners living near by. Components of a jammer include: [edit] Antenna

Every jamming device has an antenna to send the signal. Some are contained withi n an electrical cabinet. On stronger devices, antennas are external to provide l onger range and may be tuned for individual frequencies. Some devices can store the frequencies that they have jammed to prevent later tuning necessary in repea ted use of that frequency. [edit] Circuitry The main electronic components of a jammer are: Voltage-controlled oscillator Generates the radio signal that will interfere wit h the cell phone signal Tuning circuit Controls the frequency at which the jammer broadcasts its signal by sending a particular voltage to the oscillator Noise generator Produces random electronic output in a specified frequency range to jam the cell-phone network signal (part of the tuning circuit) RF amplification (gain stage) Boosts the power of the radio frequency output to high enough levels to jam a signal [edit] Power supply Smaller jamming devices are battery operated. Some look like cellphones and use cellphone batteries. Stronger devices can be plugged into a standard outlet or w ired into a vehicle's electrical system. The jammer's effect can vary widely based on factors such as proximity to towers , indoor & outdoor settings, presence of buildings and landscape, even temperatu re and humidity play a role. There are concerns that crudely designed jammers may disrupt the functioning of medical devices such as pacemakers.[citation needed]However, like cellphones, mo st of the devices in common use operate at low enough power output (<1W) to avoi d causing any problems.[citation needed] An infrared countermeasure (IRCM) is a device designed to protect aircraft from infrared homing ("heat seeking") missiles by confusing the missiles' infrared gu idance system so that they will miss their target. First deployed during the Vietnam War, they have been enhanced over the years to be lighter, more portable, and more reliable, but the basic principle is the sa me.[citation needed] [edit] Infrared missile seeker technology See also: Infrared homing Infrared missile seekers of the first generation typically used a spinning retic le with a pattern on it that modulates infrared energy before it falls on a dete ctor (A mode of operation called Spin scan). The patterns used differ from seeke r to seeker, but the principle is the same. By modulating the signal, the steeri ng logic can tell where the infrared source of energy is relative to the missile direction of flight. In more recent designs the missile optics will rotate and the rotating image is projected on a stationary reticle (a mode called Conical s can) or stationary set of detectors which generates a pulsed signal which is pro cessed by the tracking logic. Most shoulder launched (MANPADS) systems use this type of seeker, as do many air defense systems and air to air missiles (for exam ple the AIM-9L). [edit] IRCM principles

A ALQ-144 modulated IRCM jammer. Infrared seekers are designed to track a strong source of infrared radiation (us ually a jet engine in modern military aircraft). IRCM systems are based on modul ated source of infrared radiation with a higher intensity than the target. When this modulated radiation is seen by a missile seeker, it overwhelms the modulate d signal from the aircraft and provides incorrect steering cues to the missile. The missile will begin to deviate (wobble) from the target, rapidly breaking loc k. Once an infrared seeker breaks lock (they typically have a field of view of 1 - 2 degrees), they rarely reacquire the target. By using flares, the target can cause the confused seeker to lock onto a new infrared source that is rapidly mo ving away from the true target. The modulated radiation from the IRCM generates a false tracking command in the seeker tracking logic. The effectiveness of the IRCM is determined by the ratio of jamming intensity to the target (or signal) intensity. this ratio is usually called the J/S ratio. Another important factor is the modulation frequencies whi ch should be close to the actual missile frequencies. For spin scan missiles the required J/S is quite low but for newer missiles the required J/S is quite high requiring a directional source of radiation (DIRCM).[1] [edit] Drawbacks of IRCM One of the drawbacks of standard IRCM systems is that they broadcast a bright so urce of infrared. If the modulation of the signal is not effective against a par ticular seeker system, the IRCM will enhance the ability of the missile to track the aircraft. The aircrews typically brief about potential threats and choose a n IRCM modulation that will be effective against likely threats.[citation needed ] [edit] Directional IRCM DIRCM, or Directional Infrared Countermeasures, avoid this potential drawback by mounting the energy source on a movable turret (much like a FLIR turret). They only operate when cued by a missile warning system of a missile launch, and use the missile plume to accurately aim at the missile seeker. The modulated signal can then be directed at the seeker, and the modulation scheme can be cycled to t ry to defeat a variety of seekers. Countermeasure success depend on threat's tra cking techniques and requires threats' analysis capabilities.[2] Defeating advan ced tracking systems requires a higher level of DIRCM power. Issues of Laser Saf ety are also taken into account. Israel has announced a program to develop a system called Multi Spectral Infrare d Countermeasure (MUSIC) that will similarly use active lasers instead of flares to protect civilian aircraft against MANPADs.[3] The US Army is deploying a sim ilar system to protect its helicopters.[4] Department of the Navy Large Aircraft Countermeasures (DoN LAIRCM) by Northrop G rumman provides infrared threat protection for U.S. Marine Corps CH-53E, CH-46E and CH-53D platforms.[5] BAE Systems' AN/ALQ-212 advanced threat infrared countermeasures (ATIRCM) - part of a directable infrared countermeasures suite - is fielded on U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopters. The suite provides protection against an array of threats, including all infrared threat bands. The AN/ALQ-212 incorporates one or more inf rared jam heads to counter multiple missile attacks.

[edit] CIRCM (Common Infrared Countermeasures) See also: CIRCM CIRCM will be a laser based IR countermeasure against current and future IR thre at systems for the US Army rotorcraft and fixed wing platforms and US Navy and U S Air Force rotorcraft platforms. Currently, systems by BAE Systems, ITT Defense and Information Solutions, Northrop Grumman and Raytheon are under consideratio n. [6] [edit] Flares Flares create infrared targets with a much stronger signature than the aircraft' s engines. The flares provide false targets that cause the missile to make incor rect steering decisions. The missile will rapidly break off a target lock-on. [edit] Fielded examples Typical IRCM systems are the: AN/AAQ-24 by Northrop Grumman - DIRCM. AN/ALQ-132 by Sanders/BAE Systems. Used in the 1960s in Vietnam, and was a fuel fired flashlamp system. AN/ALQ-144 by BAE Systems, used for helicopter defense. AN/ALQ-157 by BAE Systems, used for larger helicopters and aircraft. AN/ALQ-212 by BAE Systems, currently fielded on U.S. Army CH-47 Chinook helicopt ers. CAMPS by Saab Avitronics, used for civilian and VIP aircraft. CIRCM by Northrop Grumman Flight Guard by Israel Aerospace Industries, used in military and civilian aircr aft (gain the nickname of "Live Saver" due to history of success in saving air v ehicles during battles at several countries), but banned at several European air ports. According to defense sources in Israel, the European ban is "odd and base d mostly on a misunderstanding[7] ITT's CIRCM System "Sukhogruz" - Russian DIRCM (used on Su-25T) [edit] See also Infrared signature Countermeasure Flare (countermeasure) Chaff (radar countermeasure) Electronic countermeasures Anti-aircraft Anti-ballistic missile A (decoy) flare is an aerial infrared countermeasure to counter an infrared homi ng ("heat seeking") surface-to-air missile or air-to-air missile. Flares are com monly composed of a pyrotechnic composition based on magnesium or another hot-bu rning metal, with burning temperature equal to or hotter than engine exhaust. Th e aim is to make the infrared-guided missile seek out the heat signature from th e flare rather than the aircraft's engines. In contrast to radar-guided missiles, IR-guided missiles are very difficult to f ind as they approach aircraft. They do not emit detectable radar, and they are g enerally fired from a rear visual-aspect, directly toward the engines. In most c ases, pilots have to rely on their wingmen to spot the missile's smoke trail and alert them. Since IR-guided missiles are inherently far shorter-legged in dista nce and altitude range than their radar-guided counterparts, good situational aw areness of altitude and potential threats continues to be an effective defense. More advanced electro-optical systems can detect missile launches automatically

from the distinct thermal emissions of a missile's rocket motor. Once the presence of a "live" IR missile is indicated, flares are released by th e aircraft in an attempt to decoy the missile; some systems are automatic, while others require manual jettisoning of the flares. The aircraft would then pull away at a sharp angle from the flare (and the termi nal trajectory of the missile) and reduce engine power in attempt to cool the th ermal signature. Optimally, the missile's seeker head is then confused by this c hange in temperature and flurry of new signatures, and therefore follows the fla re(s) rather than the aircraft. The most modern IR-guided missiles have sophisti cated on-board electronics that help discriminate between flares and targets, re ducing the effectiveness of countermeasures. Usage Apart from military use, some civilian aircraft are also equipped with counterme asure flares, against terrorism: the Israeli airline El-Al, having been the targ et of the failed 2002 airliner attack, in which shoulder-launched surface-to-air missiles were fired at an airliner while taking off, began equipping its fleet with radar-based, automated flare release countermeasures from June 2004.[1][2] This caused concerns in some European countries, which proceeded to ban such air craft from landing at their airports.[3] [edit] Process A flare goes through three main stages: ignition, deployment, and decoying. [edit] Ignition Most flares, like the MJU-27A/B flares, must be kept in an airtight storage comp artment before deployment. These flares, known as pyrophoric flares, are made of special materials that ignite when they come in contact with the air. This is a safety and convenience factor, since attempting to ignite a flare inside the fu selage and then deploying it is risky. However pyrotechnic flares (such as the M JU-32) also exist, and offer their own safety benefit; requiring an external ign ition method, an accidental leak or puncture in the storage compartment would no t result in a catastrophic fire on board the aircraft as with a pyrophoric flare . [edit] Deployment Flares are most commonly gravity-fed from a dispenser inside the aircraft's fuse lage. These dispensers can be programmed by the pilot or ground crew to dispense flares in short intervals, one at a time, long intervals, or in clusters. Most currently used flares are of the pyrophoric variety, and thus the dispensers do not have to ignite and deploy the flare at the same time. With pyrotechnic flare s, a lanyard automatically pulls off a friction cap covering the exposed end of the flare as it falls from the dispenser. A friction surface inside the cap rubs against the exposed end of the flare (similar to a match-head and striking surf ace) and ignites the flare. [edit] Decoying Flares burn at thousands of degrees, which is much hotter than the exhaust of a jet engine. IR missiles seek out the hotter flame, believing it to be an aircraf t in afterburner or the beginning of the engine's exhaust source. As the more modern infrared seekers tend to have spectral sensitivity tailored t o more closely match the emissions of airplanes and reject other sources (the so

-called CCM, or counter-countermeasures), the modernized decoy flares have their emission spectrum optimized to also match the radiation of the airplane (mainly its engines and engine exhaust). In addition to spectral discrimination, the CC Ms can include trajectory discrimination and detection of size of the radiation source. The newest generation of the FIM-92 Stinger uses a dual IR and UV seeker head, w hich allows for a redundant tracking solution, effectively negating the impact o f modern decoy flares (according to the U.S. Department of Defense). While resea rch and development in flare technology has produced an IR signature on the same wavelength as hot engine exhaust, modern flares still produce a notably (and im mutably) different UV signature than an aircraft engine burning kerosene jet-fue l. [edit] Materials used For the infrared generating charge, two approaches are possible: pyrotechnic and pyrophoric. As stored, chemical-energy-source IR-decoy flares contain pyrotechnic compositio ns, liquid or solid pyrophoric substances, and/or liquid or solid highly flammab le substances.[4] Upon ignition of the decoy flare, a strongly exothermal reaction is started, rel easing infrared energy and visible smoke and flame, emission being dependent on the chemical nature of the payload used. There is a wide variety of calibres and shapes available for aerial decoy flares . Due to volume storage restrictions on board platforms, many aircraft of Americ an origin use square decoy flare cartridges. Nevertheless, cylindrical cartridge s are also available on board American aircraft, such as MJU 23/B on the B-1 Lan cer or MJU-8A/B on the F/A-18 Hornet; however, these are used mainly on board Fr ench aircraft and those of Russian origin, e.g. PPI-26 IW on the MiG 29.

Schematic view of a MJU-7A/B decoy flare cartridge : anodised aluminium cartrid ge (1); an electrical impulse cartridge (2), providing both expulsion and, in so me cases, direct ignition of the payload; a pusher plate acting as a safe&arm de vice (3); the payload (4) with first fire layer (5); the wrapping self-adhesive polyester reinforced aluminum foil (6); and a front washer (7). Square calibres and typical decoy flares: 1x1x8 Inch . e.g. M-206, MJU-61, (Magnesium/Teflon/Viton (MTV) based) M-211, M-2 12 (spectral flares) 2x1x8 Inch . e.g. MJU-7A/B (MTV based), MJU-59/B (spectral flare) 2x2,5x8 Inch e.g. MJU-10/B (MTV based) Cylindrical calibres and typical decoy flares: 2,5 Inch e.g. MJU-23/B (MTV based) 1,5 Inch e.e. MJU 8 A/B (MTV based) 1 Inch e.g. PPI 26 IW [edit] Pyrotechnic flares Pyrotechnic flares use a slow-burning fuel-oxidizer mixture that generates inten se heat. Thermite-like mixtures, e.g. Magnesium/Teflon/Viton (MTV), are common. Other combinations include ammonium perchlorate/anthracene/magnesium, or can be based on red phosphorus.

To adjust the emission characteristics to match closer the spectrum of jet engin es, charges on the base of double base propellants. These compositions can avoid the metal content and achieve cleaner burning without the prominent smoke trail . [edit] Blackbody Payloads Certain pyrotechnic compositions, for example MTV, give a great flame emission u pon combustion and yield a temperature-dependent signature and can be understood as gray bodies of high emissivity (e~0.95). Such payloads are called blackbody payloads. Other payloads, like iron/potassium perchlorate pellets, only yield a low flame emission but also show temperature-dependent signature.[5] Nevertheles s, the lower combustion temperature as compared to MTV results in a lower amount of energy released in the short-wavelength IR range. Other blackbody payloads i nclude ammonium perchlorate/anthracene/magnesium and hydroxyl-terminated polybut adiene (HTPB) binder.[6] [edit] Spectrally balanced payloads

A sectional of the typical LLU-2B ground illumination flare. Now other payloads provide large amounts of hot carbon dioxide upon combustion a nd thus provide a temperature-independent selective emission in the wavelength r ange between 3 and 5 m. Typical pyrotechnic payloads of this type resemble whistl ing compositions and are often made up from potassium perchlorate and hydrogen l ean organic fuels.[7] Other spectrally balanced payloads are made up similarly a s double base propellants and contain nitrocellulose (NC), and other esters of n itric acid [8] or nitro compounds as oxidizers such as e.g. hexanitroethane and nitro compounds and nitramines as high energy fuels.[9] The main advantage of th e latter payloads is their low visibility due to the absence of metals such as s odium and potassium that may be either easily thermally excited and give promine nt emissions or give condensed reaction products (such as carbonates and chlorid es), which would cause a distinct smoke trail. [edit] Pyrophoric flares Pyrophoric flares work on the principle of ejecting a special pyrophoric materia l out of an airtight cartridge, usually using a gas generator, e.g. a small pyro technic charge or pressurized gas. The material then self-ignites in contact wit h air. The materials can be solid, e.g. iron platelets coated with ultrafine alu minium, or liquid, often organometallic compounds; e.g. alkyl aluminium compound s, e.g. triethylaluminium. Pyrophoric flares may have reduced effectivity at hig h altitudes, due to lower air temperature and lower availability of oxygen; howe ver oxygen can be coejected with the pyrophoric fuel. The advantage of alkyl aluminium and similar compounds is the high content of ca rbon and hydrogen, resulting in bright emission lines similar to spectral signat ure of burning jet fuel. Controlled content of solid combustion products, genera ting continuous black body radiation, allows further matching of emission charac teristics to the net infrared emissions of fuel exhaust and hot engine component s. The flames of pyrophoric fuels can also reach the size of several metres, in com parison with about less than one metre flame of MTV flares. The trajectory can b e also influenced by tailoring the aerodynamic properties of the ejected contain ers.[10]

To be merged: As with the pyrotechnic payloads these will also give either graybody radiation or selective emissions. In contrast to pyrotechnic payloads, pyrophoric substanc es use the oxygen from the environment for oxidation. Hence specific energy dens ity of pyrophorics is always higher as compared to any pyrotechnic; however, pyr ophorics suffer from low oxygen partial pressure at greater heights. A typical l iquid pyrophoric fuel is triethylaluminium. Upon combustion of triethylaluminium , a selective IR spectrum is obtained, which is mainly determined from carbon di oxide and water vapour. Any transient or permanent combustion product of alumini um are not IR-active in this region of the electromagnetic spectrum.[11] Solid pyrophoric payloads are based on iron platelets coated with a porous alumi nium layer. Based on the very high specific surface area of aluminium those plat elets instantaneously oxidize upon contact with air. In contrast to triethylalum inium combustion, those platelets yield a temperature-dependent signature. [edit] Highly flammable payloads These payloads contain red phosphorus as an energetic filler. The red phosphorus is mixed with organic binders to give brushable pastes that can be coated on th in polyimide platelets. The combustion of those platelets yields a temperature-d ependent signature. Endergonic additives such as highly dispersed silica or alka li halides may further lower the combustion temperature.[12] Chaff, originally called Window[1] by the British, and Dppel by the Second World War era German Luftwaffe (from the Berlin suburb where it was first developed), is a radar countermeasure in which aircraft or other targets spread a cloud of s mall, thin pieces of aluminium, metallized glass fibre or plastic, which either appears as a cluster of secondary targets on radar screens or swamps the screen with multiple returns. Modern armed forces use chaff (in naval applications, for instance, using shortrange SRBOC rockets) to distract radar-guided missiles from their targets. Most military aircraft and warships have chaff dispensing systems for self-defence. A n intercontinental ballistic missile may release in its midcourse phase several independent warheads, a large number of decoys, and chaff. Chaff can also be used to signal distress by an aircraft when communications are not functional. This has the same effect as an SOS, and can be picked up on rad ar. It is done by dropping chaff every 2 minutes. An anti-ballistic missile (ABM) is a missile designed to counter ballistic missi les (a missile for missile defense). A ballistic missile is used to deliver nucl ear, chemical, biological or conventional warheads in a ballistic flight traject ory. The term "anti-ballistic missile" describes any antimissile system designed to counter ballistic missiles. However the term is used more commonly for syste ms designed to counter intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Radar cross-section (RCS) reductions Main article: Radar cross section Almost since the invention of radar, various methods have been tried to minimize detection. Rapid development of radar during WWII led to equally rapid developm ent of numerous counter radar measures during the period; a notable example of t his was the use of chaff. The term "stealth" in reference to reduced radar signature aircraft became popul

ar during the late eighties when the Lockheed Martin F-117 stealth fighter becam e widely known. The first large scale (and public) use of the F-117 was during t he Gulf War in 1991. However, F-117A stealth fighters were used for the first ti me in combat during Operation Just Cause, the United States invasion of Panama i n 1989.[20] Increased awareness of stealth vehicles and the technologies behind them is prompting the development of means to detect stealth vehicles, such as p assive radar arrays and low-frequency radars. Many countries nevertheless contin ue to develop low-RCS vehicles because they offer advantages in detection range reduction and amplify the effectiveness of on-board systems against active radar guidance threats.[citation needed] [edit] Vehicle shape The possibility of designing aircraft in such a manner as to reduce their radar cross-section was recognized in the late 1930s, when the first radar tracking sy stems were employed, and it has been known since at least the 1960s that aircraf t shape makes a significant difference in detectability. The Avro Vulcan, a Brit ish bomber of the 1960s, had a remarkably small appearance on radar despite its large size, and occasionally disappeared from radar screens entirely. It is now known that it had a fortuitously stealthy shape apart from the vertical element of the tail. In contrast, the Tupolev 95 Russian long range bomber (NATO reporti ng name 'Bear') appeared especially well on radar. It is now known that propelle rs and jet turbine blades produce a bright radar image[citation needed]; the Bea r had four pairs of large (5.6 meter diameter) contra-rotating propellers. Another important factor is internal construction. Some stealth aircraft have sk in that is radar transparent or absorbing, behind which are structures termed re -entrant triangles. Radar waves penetrating the skin get trapped in these struct ures, reflecting off the internal faces and losing energy. This method was first used on the Blackbird series (A-12 / YF-12A / SR-71). The most efficient way to reflect radar waves back to the emitting radar is with orthogonal metal plates, forming a corner reflector consisting of either a dihe dral (two plates) or a trihedral (three orthogonal plates). This configuration o ccurs in the tail of a conventional aircraft, where the vertical and horizontal components of the tail are set at right angles. Stealth aircraft such as the F-1 17 use a different arrangement, tilting the tail surfaces to reduce corner refle ctions formed between them. A more radical method is to eliminate the tail compl etely, as in the B-2 Spirit. In addition to altering the tail, stealth design must bury the engines within th e wing or fuselage, or in some cases where stealth is applied to an extant aircr aft, install baffles in the air intakes, so that the compressor blades are not v isible to radar. A stealthy shape must be devoid of complex bumps or protrusions of any kind; meaning that weapons, fuel tanks, and other stores must not be car ried externally. Any stealthy vehicle becomes un-stealthy when a door or hatch o pens. Planform alignment is also often used in stealth designs. Planform alignment inv olves using a small number of surface orientations in the shape of the structure . For example, on the F-22A Raptor, the leading edges of the wing and the tail s urfaces are set at the same angle. Careful inspection shows that many small stru ctures, such as the air intake bypass doors and the air refueling aperture, also use the same angles. The effect of planform alignment is to return a radar sign al in a very specific direction away from the radar emitter rather than returnin g a diffuse signal detectable at many angles. Stealth airframes sometimes display distinctive serrations on some exposed edges , such as the engine ports. The YF-23 has such serrations on the exhaust ports. This is another example in the use of re-entrant triangles and planform alignmen

t, this time on the external airframe. Shaping requirements have strong negative influence on the aircraft's aerodynami c properties. The F-117 has poor aerodynamics, is inherently unstable, and canno t be flown without a fly-by-wire control system. Ships have also adopted similar methods. The Skjold class patrol boat was the fi rst stealth ship to enter service, though the earlier Arleigh Burke class destro yer incorporated some signature-reduction features.[21][22] Other examples are t he French La Fayette class frigate, the German Sachsen class frigates, the Swedi sh Visby class corvette, the USS San Antonio amphibious transport dock, and most modern warship designs. Similarly, coating the cockpit canopy with a thin film transparent conductor (va por-deposited gold or indium tin oxide) helps to reduce the aircraft's radar pro file, because radar waves would normally enter the cockpit, reflect off objects (the inside of a cockpit has a complex shape, with a pilot helmet alone forming a sizeable return), and possibly return to the radar, but the conductive coating creates a controlled shape that deflects the incoming radar waves away from the radar. The coating is thin enough that it has no adverse effect on pilot vision . [edit] Non-metallic airframe Dielectric composites are more transparent to radar, whereas electrically conduc tive materials such as metals and carbon fibers reflect electromagnetic energy i ncident on the material's surface. Composites may also contain ferrites to optim ize the dielectric and magnetic properties of a material for its application. [edit] Radar-absorbing material Main article: Radar-absorbent material Radar-absorbent material (RAM), often as paints, are used especially on the edge s of metal surfaces. While the material and thickness of RAM coatings can vary, the way they work is the same: absorb radiated energy from a ground or air based radar station into the coating and convert it to heat rather than reflect it ba ck. [edit] Radar stealth countermeasures and limits [edit] Low-frequency radar Shaping offers far fewer stealth advantages against low-frequency radar. If the radar wavelength is roughly twice the size of the target, a half-wave resonance effect can still generate a significant return. However, low-frequency radar is limited by lack of available frequencies-many are heavily used by other systems, by lack of accuracy of the diffraction-limited systems given their long wavelen gths, and by the radar's size, making it difficult to transport. A long-wave rad ar may detect a target and roughly locate it, but not provide enough information to identify it, target it with weapons, or even to guide a fighter to it.[23] N oise poses another problem, but that can be efficiently addressed using modern c omputer technology; Chinese "Nantsin" radar and many older Soviet-made long-rang e radars were modified this way. It has been said that "there's nothing invisibl e in the radar frequency range below 2 GHz".[24] [edit] Multiple emitters Much of the stealth comes from reflecting radar emissions in directions differen t than a direct return. Thus, detection can be better achieved if emitters are s

eparate from receivers. One emitter separate from one receiver is termed bistati c radar; one or more emitters separate from more than one receiver is termed mul tistatic radar. Proposals exist to use reflections from emitters such as civilia n radio transmitters, including cellular telephone radio towers.[25] [edit] Moore's law By Moore's law the processing power behind radar systems is rising over time. Th is will erode the ability of physical stealth to hide vehicles.[26][27] [edit] Ship's wakes and spray Synthetic Aperture sidescan radars can be used to detect the location and headin g of ships from their wake patterns.[28] These may be detectable from orbit. Whe n a ship moves through a seaway it throws up a cloud of spray which can be detec ted by radar. [edit] Quantum interference Principles from quantum interference have been proposed for the detection of ste alth aircraft.[29] The overall approach relies upon devising a gravimetric radar system for detecting moving massive objects based on the time variation that th ese objects produce in the local gravitational field measured by several detecto rs. [edit] Acoustics See also: Aircraft noise and Helicopter noise reduction Acoustic stealth plays a primary role in submarine stealth as well as for ground vehicles. Submarines use extensive rubber mountings to isolate and avoid mechan ical noises that could reveal locations to underwater passive sonar arrays. Early stealth observation aircraft used slow-turning propellers to avoid being h eard by enemy troops below. Stealth aircraft that stay subsonic can avoid being tracked by sonic boom. The presence of supersonic and jet-powered stealth aircra ft such as the SR-71 Blackbird indicates that acoustic signature is not always a major driver in aircraft design, although the Blackbird relied more on its extr emely high speed and altitude. One possible technique for reducing helicopter rotor noise is 'modulated blade s pacing'.[30] Standard rotor blades are evenly spaced, and produce greater noise at a particular frequency and its' harmonics. Using varying degrees of spacing b etween the blades spreads the noise or acoustic signature of the rotor over a gr eater range of frequencies.[31] [edit] Visibility Further information: Camouflage and Military camouflage The simplest stealth technology is simply camouflage; the use of paint or other materials to color and break up the lines of the vehicle or person. Most stealth aircraft use matte paint and dark colors, and operate only at night . Lately, interest in daylight Stealth (especially by the USAF) has emphasized t he use of gray paint in disruptive schemes, and it is assumed that Yehudi lights could be used in the future to mask shadows in the airframe (in daylight, again st the clear background of the sky, dark tones are easier to detect than light o nes) or as a sort of active camouflage. The original B-2 design had wing tanks f or a contrail-inhibiting chemical, alleged by some to be chlorofluorosulfonic ac

id,[32] but this was replaced in the final design with a contrail sensor from Op hir that alerts the pilot when he should change altitude[33] and mission plannin g also considers altitudes where the probability of their formation is minimized . [edit] Infrared An exhaust plume contributes a significant infrared signature. One means to redu ce IR signature is to have a non-circular tail pipe (a slit shape) to minimize t he exhaust cross-sectional volume and maximize the mixing of hot exhaust with co ol ambient air. Often, cool air is deliberately injected into the exhaust flow t o boost this process. Sometimes, the jet exhaust is vented above the wing surfac e to shield it from observers below, as in the B-2 Spirit, and the unstealthy A10 Thunderbolt II. To achieve infrared stealth, the exhaust gas is cooled to the temperatures where the brightest wavelengths it radiates are absorbed by atmosp heric carbon dioxide and water vapor, dramatically reducing the infrared visibil ity of the exhaust plume.[34] Another way to reduce the exhaust temperature is t o circulate coolant fluids such as fuel inside the exhaust pipe, where the fuel tanks serve as heat sinks cooled by the flow of air along the wings.[citation ne eded] Ground combat includes the use of both active and passive infrared sensors and s o the USMC ground combat uniform requirements document specifies infrared reflec tive quality standards.[35] [edit] Reducing radio frequency (RF) emissions In addition to reducing infrared and acoustic emissions, a stealth vehicle must avoid radiating any other detectable energy, such as from onboard radars, commun ications systems, or RF leakage from electronics enclosures. The F-117 uses pass ive infrared and low light level television sensor systems to aim its weapons an d the F-22 Raptor has an advanced LPI radar which can illuminate enemy aircraft without triggering a radar warning receiver response. [edit] Measuring The size of a target's image on radar is measured by the radar cross section or RCS, often represented by the symbol and expressed in square meters. This does n ot equal geometric area. A perfectly conducting sphere of projected cross sectio nal area 1 m2 (i.e. a diameter of 1.13 m) will have an RCS of 1 m2. Note that fo r radar wavelengths much less than the diameter of the sphere, RCS is independen t of frequency. Conversely, a square flat plate of area 1 m2 will have an RCS of = 4 A2 / 2 (where A=area, =waveength), or 13,982 m2 at 10 GHz if the radar is per pendicular to the flat surface.[36] At off-normal incident angles, energy is ref lected away from the receiver, reducing the RCS. Modern stealth aircraft are sai d to have an RCS comparable with small birds or large insects,[37] though this v aries widely depending on aircraft and radar. If the RCS was directly related to the target's cross-sectional area, the only w ay to reduce it would be to make the physical profile smaller. Rather, by reflec ting much of the radiation away or by absorbing it, the target achieves a smalle r radar cross section.[38] [edit] Tactics Stealthy strike aircraft such as the F-117, designed by Lockheed Martin's famous Skunk Works, are usually used against heavily defended enemy sites such as Comm and and Control centers or surface-to-air missile (SAM) batteries. Enemy radar w ill cover the airspace around these sites with overlapping coverage, making unde tected entry by conventional aircraft nearly impossible. Stealthy aircraft can a

lso be detected, but only at short ranges around the radars, so that for a steal thy aircraft there are substantial gaps in the radar coverage. Thus a stealthy a ircraft flying an appropriate route can remain undetected by radar. Many groundbased radars exploit Doppler filter to improve sensitivity to objects having a r adial velocity component with respect to the radar. Mission planners use their k nowledge of enemy radar locations and the RCS pattern of the aircraft to design a flight path that minimizes radial speed while presenting the lowest-RCS aspect s of the aircraft to the threat radar. To be able to fly these "safe" routes, it is necessary to understand an enemy's radar coverage (see Electronic Intelligen ce). Airborne or mobile radar systems such as AWACS can complicate tactical stra tegy for stealth operation. [edit] Research Negative index metamaterials are artificial structures for which refractive inde x has a negative value for some frequency range, such as in microwave, infrared, or possibly optical.[39] These offer another way to reduce detectability, and m ay provide electromagnetic near-invisibility in designed wavelengths. Plasma stealth is a phenomenon proposed to use ionized gas (plasma) to reduce RC S of vehicles. Interactions between electromagnetic radiation and ionized gas ha ve been studied extensively for many purposes, including concealing vehicles fro m radar. Various methods might form a layer or cloud of plasma around a vehicle to deflect or absorb radar, from simpler electrostatic to RF more complex laser discharges, but these may be difficult in practice.[40] Several technology research and development efforts exist to integrate the funct ions of aircraft flight control systems such as ailerons, elevators, elevons, fl aps, and flaperons into wings to perform the aerodynamic purpose with the advant ages of lower RCS for stealth via simpler geometries and lower complexity (mecha nically simpler, fewer or no moving parts or surfaces, less maintenance), and lo wer mass, cost (up to 50% less), drag (up to 15% less during use) and, inertia ( for faster, stronger control response to change vehicle orientation to reduce de tection). Two promising approaches are flexible wings, and fluidics. In flexible wings, much or all of a wing surface can change shape in flight to d eflect air flow. Adaptive compliant wings are a military and commercial effort.[ 41][42][43] The X-53 Active Aeroelastic Wing was a US Air Force, Boeing, and NAS A effort. In fluidics, fluid injection is being researched for use in aircraft to control direction, in two ways: circulation control and thrust vectoring. In both, large r more complex mechanical parts are replaced by smaller, simpler fluidic systems , in which larger forces in fluids are diverted by smaller jets or flows of flui d intermittently, to change the direction of vehicles. In circulation control, near the trailing edges of wings, aircraft flight contro l systems are replaced by slots which emit fluid flows.[44][45][46] In thrust vectoring, in jet engine nozzles, swiveling parts are replaced by slot s which inject fluid flows into jets to divert thrust.[47] Tests show that air f orced into a jet engine exhaust stream can deflect thrust up to 15 degrees. The U.S. FAA has conducted a study about civilizing 3D military thrust vectoring to help jetliners avoid crashes. According to this study, 65% of all air crashes ca n be prevented by deploying thrust vectoring means.[48][49]

Trophy (also known as ASPRO-A. Israel Defense Forces designation , lit. ("Windbreaker ) is a military active protection system (APS) for vehicles. It intercepts and d estroys incoming missiles and rockets with a shotgun-like blast. Trophy is the p roduct of a ten-year collaborative development project between the Rafael Advanc

ed Defense Systems and Israel Aircraft Industries' Elta Group. Its principal pur pose is to supplement the armor of light and heavy armored fighting vehicles. MUltifunctional Self protection System (MUSS, German: Multifunktionales Selbstsc hutz-System) is a softkill active protection system developed to protect militar y vehicles against guided anti-tank missiles.[1] MUSS consists of three main elements: the sensors, consisting of laser warner an d a missile warner using ultraviolet sensors, the computer, and the electronic o r pyrotechnic countermeasures.[2] When the sensors detect an incoming missile or a laser beam aimed at the vehicle, the computer activates the countermeasures. MUSS offers 360 protection with elevation up to 70 and can handle up to four threa ts at once.[2] The whole system has a weight of 65 to 160 kg.[3] The Arena (Russian: ) is an active protection system (APS) developed at Russia's Kolo mna-based Engineering Design Bureau for the purpose of protecting armoured fight ing vehicles from destruction by light anti-tank weapons, anti-tank guided missi les (ATGM), and missiles with top attack warheads. It uses a Doppler radar to de tect incoming warheads. Upon detection, a defensive rocket is fired that detonat es near the inbound threat, destroying it before it hits the vehicle. Shtora (Russian: , "curtain") is an electro-optical active protection system or suite for tanks, designed to disrupt the laser target designation and rangefinders of incoming anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs). The system is mounted on the Russia n T-80 and T-90 series tanks, the Ukrainian T-84 and the Serbian M-84AS. Shtora-1[2] is an electro-optical jammer that disrupts semiautomatic command to line of sight (SACLOS) antitank guided missiles, laser rangefinders and target d esignators. Shtora-1 is a soft-kill, or passive-countermeasure system. The syste m was shown fitted to a Russian main battle tank during the International Defens e Exposition, held in Abu Dhabi in 1995. The first known application of the syst em is the Russian T-90 main battle tank, which entered service in the Russian Ar my in 1993. It is also available on the BMP-3M infantry fighting vehicle. According to Steven Zaloga and Tankomaster:[1] Laser illumination sensors Quantity: 2x TShU-1-11 precision sensors and 2x TShU-1 rough sensors Field of view (each): -5 .. +25 elevation and 90 azimuth Field of view (total): 360 azimuth EO interference emitters Quantity: 2, OTShU-1-7 Operating band: 0.7 .. 2.7 mkm Protected sector: 4 elevation and 20 azimuth Energy consumption: 1 kW Light intensity: 20 mcad Anti-FLIR smoke grenades Quantity: 12, 81mm 3D17 Obscured band: 0.4 .. 14 mkm Bloom time: 3 sec Cloud persistence: 20 sec The Shtora-1 has four key components: Two electro-optical/infrared (IR) "dazzlers" interface station one each mounted to the left and right of the main gun, which includes an infrared jammer, modula tor, and control panel. 1.A bank of forward firing grenade launchers or dischargers mounted on either si

de of the turret, which can fire grenades dispensing an aerosol smoke screen opa que to infrared light. 2.A laser warning system with precision and coarse heads. 3.A control system comprising control panel, microprocessor, and manual screen-l aying panel. This processes the information from the sensors and activates the a erosol screen-laying system. 4.Two infrared lights, one on each side of the main gun, continuously emit coded pulsed-infrared jamming when an incoming ATGM has been detected. Shtora-1 has a field of view of 360 degrees horizontally and 5 to +25 degrees in elevation. It contains twelve aerosol screen launchers and weighs 400 kg. The sc reening aerosol takes less than three seconds to form and lasts about twenty sec onds. The screen-laying range is from 50 to 70 meters. According to Defense Update, the Shtora system can also locate the area within 3 .55 degrees where the laser originated from and automatically slew the main gun t o it, so that the tank crew can return fire and so that the stronger frontal tur ret armour is facing it.[2] Shtora-1 can operate in fully automatic or semi-automatic modes, continuously fo r six hours against anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) attack Iron Curtain is an active protection system (APS) designed by Artis, LLC, an Ame rican technology development and manufacturing firm located in Herndon, Virginia . The system is designed to protect military vehicles and other assets by interc epting threats such as rocket propelled grenades and rendering them inert. Iron Curtain uses two independent sensors, radar and optical, high-speed computi ng, and tightly controlled explosively formed penetrators to minimize the false alarm rate and increase system reliability and accuracy. The system, which began as a DARPA program, is able to defeat threats even if fired from an extremely c lose range.[1][2] The system radar was developed by Mustang Technology Group in Plano, Texas. BAE Systems integrated the system onto a combat vehicle as a system demonstrator for government testing. Iron Fist is a hard-kill active protection system (APS) designed by Israel Milit ary Industries (IMI), with a modular design allowing adaptation to a range of pl atforms ranging from light utility vehicles to heavy armoured fighting vehicles. The concept was revealed by IMI in 2006 and was expected to enter Israel Defens e Forces tests by mid 2007. The system has already been successfully tested agai nst a wide variety of threats including rocket-propelled grenades, anti-tank gui ded missiles and tank-fired HEAT ammunition and kinetic energy penetrators. It senses incoming threats via a fixed radar sensor developed by RADA Electronic Industries and an optional passive infrared detector developed by Elbit's Elisr a. When a threat is imminent, an explosive projectile interceptor is launched to wards it. The interceptor explodes very near the threat, destroying or deflectin g and destabilizing it without detonating its warhead. For this, only the blast effect of the explosive is used. The interceptor casing is made of combustible m aterials so no fragmentation is formed in the explosion, helping minimize collat eral damage. Acquisition of the Iron Fist active protection system was approved in June 2009. The system will be installed on the Namer armoured personnel carrier.[1] On November 2010, The Israeli ministry of defense announced stop of funding of t he system development.[2][3]

On May 2011 the system intercepted Kinetic energy penetrators and Metis anti tan k missiles during a test in the U.S.[4] Quick Kill is an active protection system (APS) designed to destroy incoming ant i-tank missiles, rockets, and grenades. The Quick Kill system is designed and pr oduced by Raytheon for the U.S. Army. The Quick Kill system was part of the Unit ed States Army's Future Combat Systems. Quick Kill detects incoming RPGs and anti-tank missiles with an active electroni cally scanned array radar. Once its speed, trajectory, and intercept point are c omputed, Quick Kill vertically launches a small countermeasure missile. This kin d of system is similar to the one that the Israeli Army uses for its ground forc es. The system features two types of missiles: a smaller one for defense against close range weapons such as RPGs, and another, larger one to intercept longer r ange, faster anti-tank missiles or shells.[1] The countermeasure missile interce ptes the incoming threat and destroys it with a focused blast warhead. The Quick Kill missile has 360-degree capability and a reload capability, with each launc her typically containing 8 to 16 missiles. It can be used stationary or on the m ove with a wide range of vehicles from armored personnel carriers to airborne he licopters. The system's vertical launch countermeasure is unique in its ability to engage threats fired from any angle or elevation, providing all weather, full 360-degree hemispherical vehicle and crew protection with each countermeasure. The system has demonstrated its ability to defeat multiple threat types by defea ting two simultaneous threats.[2] It was reported that the Humvee or JLTV would not be suitable for the Quick Kill APS, due to the blast pressures generated when the incoming warhead detonates, which was likely to buckle lightly armored vehicles.[3] AMAP-ADS (active defence system) is a hard-kill active protection system (APS), developed by the German company ADS Gesellschaft fr aktive Schutzsysteme, a daugh ter company of IBD Deisenroth Engineering, as part of their Advanced Modular Arm or Protection protection concept. The system is also known under the name AAC in Sweden and as Shark in France. Due to its modular design it can be adapted to a broad range of vehicles. Especially light vehicles can be protected against lar ge caliber weapons which would otherwise be impossible because they can only be equipped with light armor. The system has a modular design that can be adapted to almost every vehicle; it weighs 140 kg for light vehicles and up to 500 kg for heavy vehicles. The main e lements are the sensor-countermeasure modules arranged all around the vehicle. A processor determines the type and the trajectory of the approaching target. Sub sequently a countermeasure module close to the calculated impact point is activa ted. This countermeasure ejects "directed energy", destroying or disrupting the approaching threat so that it cannot penetrate the vehicle. The arrangement of sensors and countermeasures provides a hemispherical protecti on. The overlapping sectors of the sensor-countermeasure modules enable the syst em to defeat multi-attacks. Due to the short reaction time of approximately 560 microseconds, threats can be eliminated at ranges of approximately 10 m, not dep ending on the speed of the threat.[1] AMAP-ADS is one of the fastest active prot ection systems, faster than Quick Kill, Iron Fist or Trophy.[1] Since the counte rmeasures create a non-fragmenting strong directed energy beam, collateral damag e to nearby troops or civilians is minimized. These are important aspects in urb an environment. In comparison to other hard-kill systems, there are no moving pa rts. This makes ADS light and reduces power requirements. Therefore it can be in stalled on lightweight vehicles. According to sources,[who?] the system can defeat shaped charges used in RPGs an

d anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs) as well as kinetic energy penetrator threats and explosively formed penetrators (EFPs). The system is not intended to completely substitute passive base armor. Larger c aliber projectiles will only be fragmented and not entirely deflected. Therefore , a minimum of passive armor is still required to absorb the residual energy of the fragments. Applications Prototypes have already been tested on several vehicles including Marder,[2] SEP , CV90120, AMV 8x8 and LMV. An Asian nation[which?] has decided to use AMAP-ADS as active protection system on their vehicles, while a number of European armies are considering buying it.[ 3] [edit] Successful demonstrations AMAP-ADS has been tested on several platforms. As part of the AAC (Active Armor Concept) it was installed on the SEP designed by BAE Systems Hgglunds. On the 17t h of April it was tested in Sweden under urban combat conditions. Threat rejecti on and multi-hit capability were proven, when 7.62 mm rounds and RPG-7s were fir ed from a short distance of some 50 m, a range typical for urban missions. [edit] US testings A Textron ASV vehicle has been modified and equipped with the AMAP-ADS hardkillsystem. Then it was tested 6 weeks extensively at Redstone Arsenal in Huntsville , Alabama.[4] These tests were overlooked by the Office of the Secretary of Defe nse. Different types of RPGs and ATGMs were launched at various spots like the s ides or the roof from close range (15 metres (49 ft), including mulit-hit attack s, in which multiple threats were used in a short period of time.[4] AMAP-ADS me t or even exceeded all US requirements during the tests.[4] The operationability in hot climates was also proven. Drozd ("thrush" in Russian) is an active protection system developed in the Sovi et Union, designed for increasing tanks' protection against anti-tank missiles a nd RPGs. It is considered the world's first operational active protection system ,[1] created in 197778 by A. Shipunov's KBP design bureau as Kompleks 1030M-01. Drozd uses 24.5 GHz Doppler radar to detect incoming rounds travelling between 7 0 and 700 m/s (to avoid engaging small arms or other faster projectiles). Its co mputer determines when to fire a 107 mm projectile. When the incoming round is a t 7 m range the Drozd fragmentation warhead detonates, spreading 3-gram slugs to destroy the incoming round. The Drozd system was relatively complex, requiring a radar array and two launch tubes on each side of the tank turret, and a large electronics package on turret rear. One of Drozd's shortcomings was that it was only able to protect a 60 degree arc around the forward part of the turret. Each unit cost around $30,000, was 80-pe rcent successful against incoming RPGs in Afghanistan, but proved to provide too high of a collateral damage issue to surrounding troops that were dismounted fr om their armored vehicles. The project was abandoned by the Army, but completed by the Soviet Naval Infantr y to increase protection for about 250 older T-55 tanks in 198182 (newer T-72s we re problematic on landing craft, due to size and weight, and $170 million Drozd

development was much cheaper than a new tank design). Tanks were upgraded to T-5 5M standard and equipped with Drozd at the tank rebuilding plant in Lviv, Ukrain e, and kept in war stores for secrecy. The rebuilt tanks were designated T-55AD, or T-55AD1 if they had the newer V-46 engine. Drozd APS was later replaced by t he simpler Kontakt-5 explosive reactive armour. Drozd was exported in small numbers to China and to an undisclosed Middle-Easter n client. It was subsequently discontinued. The Drozd-2 system was developed to give a 120-degree protection arc with more projectile launchers. It was intended to be installed on the T-80U main battle tank. A more sophisticated all-round a ctive protection system is the Arena Active Protection System. LEDS-150 Land Electronic Defence System is an active protection system, develope d by Saab Avitronics, a South African subsidiary of the Swedish aerospace and de fence company, Saab.[1][2] The system is able to counter most known threats against armoured vehicles with soft and hard kill methods.[3] LEDS-150 consists of laser warning sensors, an ADC-150 Active Defence Controller , a number of MCTS Munition Confirmation and Tracking Sensors, and High Speed Di rected Launchers, HSDL, which allows the combination of soft- and hard-kill coun termeasure deployment capability to the platform, optional displays, and interco nnecting harnesses. This system uses the Denel Dynamics Mongoose-1 missile to destroy the incoming t hreat in 5 to 15 meters distance from the protected vehicle.[4] LEDS-150 covers all 360 degrees azimuth; its elevation coverage is from -15 to +65 degrees. The system has been integrated on the MOWAG Piranha armoured personnel carrier.[ 5][6] The South African Army has funded much of the development of this system.[7]