DETECTAREA I IZOLAREA DEFECTELOR N SISTEMELE DINAMICE FAULT DETECTION AND ISOLATION IN DYNAMIC SYSTEMS

Eugen IANCU Mihai MIRCEA

University of Craiova, Romnia RO - 1100 Craiova, str. Lapu, nr.5, Tel 0251/435724, Fax 0251/436447 E-mail: Eugen.Iancu@automation.ucv.ro, mmircea@elth.ucv.ro

Rezumat: n aceast lucrare se prezint civa algoritmi pentru detectarea analitic a evenimentelor din timpul funcionrii, a blocrii sau n cazul defectrii senzorilor pentru un sistem dinamic.

Abstract: In this paper are presented some algorithms for analytical detecting the occurrence, during the working, of the blocking actuators and/or fault sensors for dynamic system.

1. Introducere Problema detectrii i izolrii defectelor este una complex. Necesitatea obinerii unor performane bune de diagnoz fr instalarea unor echipamente redundante sau dedicate scumpe, foreaz dezvoltarea programelor de diagnoz, s adopte tehnici disponibile, informaii ascunse n procesul tehnologic. Ceea ce realitatea sistemelor industriale ofer inginerului nsrcinat cu implementarea funciilor de monitorizare, este de obicei inadecvat, modele disponibile slabe, lipsa redundanei, numr insuficient de msuri, distorsiuni n datele achiziionate perturbaii nemodelate. n conformitate cu [1], un defect se definete ca: o deviaie nepermis a unei proprieti caracteristice ce duce la inabilitatea ndeplinirii scopului propus. Pentru problema detectrii i izolrii defectelor n sistemele dinamice au fost propuse mai multe abordri incluznd utilizarea arborilor de defecte [2], filtre Kalman [3], observatori, tehnici de paritate a spaiului [3], i filtre de detecie etc. Toate metodele de detectare a defectelor utilizeaz date redundante (suplimentare) obinute fie direct cnd exist dou sau mai multe traductoare pentru msurarea unei variabile a procesului fie analitic, cnd o variabil a unui proces este determinat printr-un model matematic. Aceste relaii de redundan pot fi exploatate pentru a genera semnale reziuale. n condiii normale de funcionare aceste semnale reziduale sunt mici dar pot afia variaii distincte la apariia defectului. Procesul de diagnoz al defectului const n trei etape: a) Procesul de modelare (estimarea strii, estimarea parametrilor, teoria deciziei statistice etc). b) Generarea semnalelor reziduale. Acestea sunt independente de msurtorile reale dar, reflect efectele modelrii incerte, zgomot i defectele componentelor. n absena defectelor i erorilor mari de modelare semnalele reziduale nu prezint abateri artnd o coresponden ntre msurtori i detecia bazat pe modelare.

1. Introduction The fault detection and isolation (FDI) problem is a inherently complex one. The necessity to obtain good diagnostic performances without installing a lot of redundant and dedicated expensive equipment, forces the diagnostic tools developers the techniques available to processing all the information that are "hidden" in the technological process. In fact what the reality of industrial systems can offer to the engineer charged to implement the monitoring functions, is usually very inadequate: poor models available, lack of redundancy, insufficient number of measures, noise on the acquired data, unmodeled disturbances, etc. In accordance with [1], a fault is defined "as a non permitted deviation of a characteristic property which leads to the inability to fulfil the intended purpose". Numerous approaches have been developed addressing to the problem of detecting and isolating failures in dynamical systems, including the use of fault trees [2], Kalman filters [3], observers, parity space techniques, [3] and detection filters, etc. All failure detection methods exploit redundant data, which is obtained either directly, when two or more sensors are available for measurement of a process variable, or analytically, when a process variable is estimated using the mathematical process model. These redundancy relationships may then be exploited to generate residual signals. Under normal operating conditions these residuals are "small" in an appropriate sense and yet display distinct patterns when failures occur. The failure diagnosis process consists in three stages: a) Modeling of process (state estimation, parameter estimation, statistical decision theory,etc.). b) Residual generation. The residuals are independent of true measurements but reflect the effects of modeling uncertainty, noise and component failures. In the absence of failures and gross modeling errors the residuals are unbiased showing agreement between measurements and model-based predictions.

270

The 5 International Power Systems Conference

th

c) Analiza semnalelor reziduale. Datorit efectelor zgomotului i a modelului incert semnalele reziduale trebuie examinate cu atenie pentru a determina prezena unor defecte (detectare), determinarea componentelor care prezint defecte (izolare).

c) Residual analysis. Due to the effects of noise and model uncertainty the residuals must be carefully examined to determine the presence of failures (detection) and which system components have failed (isolation).

Fig. 1. Structura genaralizat a modelului bazat pe metodele de detectare i izolare a defectelor Fig. 1. Generalised structure of model based fault detection and isolation methods

2. Diagnoza defectelor Un defect cauzeaz o degradare n comportarea sistemului dar nu conduce neaprat la o cdere total a instalaiei. Sistemul poate continua s funcioneze la un nivel mai sczut, motiv pentru care cderea se poate produce dac defectul nu este detectat la timp. Sarcinile unui sistem de detectare a defectelor sunt [4], [5],[6]: Detectarea defectului; o indicaie binar dac defectul s-a produs sau dac acesta nu s-a produs; Izolarea defectului reprezint a doua sarcin a diagnozei defectului; aceasta nseamn detectarea traductorului sau a elementului de execuie care prezint defect; Sinteza comenzilor n condiionarea defectului care trebuie s asigure viabilitatea sistemului (posibil ntro mai mic msur).

2. Fault diagnosis A fault causes degradation in system behavior, but does not necessarily cause complete failure of plant function. The system may continue operate a lesser degree, though failure may occur if a fault is not detected in time. The tasks of a fault detection systems are [4], [5],[6]: Fault detection; a binary indication if the fault is present or the system is fault-free; Fault isolation is the second task of fault diagnosis; that means the knowledge of which sensor or actuator is failed; Synthesis of commands in fault condition, which must assure the viability of system (possibly in a slightly degraded manner).

06-07.11.2003, Timioara, Romania

271

Problema detectrii i izolrii defectului este prezentat n fig. 1. n general modelul matematic al unui proces are urmtoarea expresie: Y = f(U, N, , X) (1) unde: Y variabile de ieire msurabile; U - variabile de intrare msurabile; - parametri procesului nemsurabili; N - semnale nemsurabile de perturbaii (din proces preluate din proces i din sistemele de achiziie i control); X variabilele strii interne (parial msurabile i parial nemsurabile). 2.1. Modelarea matematic a unui traductor sau a elementului de execuie defect Figura 2 prezint sistemul generalizat cu toate posibilitile de defect. Semnificaia variabilelor este: - Uc intrarile dorite pentru control; - Ud defecte la dispozitivul de acionare; - Ur acionarea instalaiei (intrare real); - Yc ieirea actual a instalaiei; - Yd defectele senzorului; - Yr ieirea msurat a instalaiei. n acest lucrare considerm dou clase de defecte: defecte independente ale senzorilor i defecte independente ale dispozitivelor de acionare. Este posibil modelarea defectelor la dispozitivele de acionare sau la senzori ca semnale adiionale aa cum indic figura 2. Se presupune c Uc(t) este intrarea corect (dorit) a instalaiei i Ur(t) este intrarea real (actual) a instalaiei, modificat de semnalul de eroare Ud(t). Printr-o selecie corect a semnalelor Udi(t) putem reprezenta diferite defecte pentru dispozitivul de acionare i. n particular dac acesta se blocheaz n poziia iniial neproducnd nici o ieire atunci Udi(t) = -Uci(t). Dac apare o abatere bi pentru dispozitivul de acionare respectiv din diferite motive, atunci Udi(t) = bi.

The fault detection and isolation problem (FDI) is depicted in figure 1. In general a mathematical model of a process is made of the following expressions: Y = f(U, N, , X) (1) where: Y - measurable output variables; U - measurable input variables; - non-measurable process parameters; N - non-measurable disturbance signals (both from the process, the control and the acquisition systems); X - internal state variables (partially measurable and partially not). 2.1. Analytical modeling of sensor and actuator failed Figure 2 shows the generalized system with all possible faults acting. The significance of variables is: - Uc desired control input; - Ud actuator faults; - Ur actuation to plant (real input); - Yc actual plant output; - Yd sensor faults; - Yr measured plant output. In this paper we consider two classes of faults: independent sensor failures and independent actuator failures. It is possible to model the failure of actuators and sensors as additive signals as indicated in figure 2. Let Uc(t) be the correct (desired) plant input and Ur(t) be the real (actual) plant input, as modified by the actuator error signal Ud(t). By appropriate choice of the signals Udi(t), we can represent various failure modes for the ith actuator. In particular, if the ith actuator freezes at its nominal position, producing no incremental output, then Udi(t)= -Uci(t). If there is a bias bi appearing on the actuator for some reason, then Udi(t) = bi .

Fig. 2. Modelul analitic al traductoarelor i elementelor de execuie defecte Fig. 2. The analytical modeling of sensors and actuators failed

n final dac dispozitivul de acionare i este blocat la o valoare constant bi, atunci Udi(t)=bi -Uci(t). Defectele multiple pot fi modelate speficicnd c mai multe elemente ale lui Ud(t) s fie diferite de zero. Defectele senzorilor pot fi reprezentate ntr-o manier asemntoare printr-o alegere corespunztoare a semnalelor Ydi(t). Variabilele Uc(t) i Yr(t) reprezint semnalele externe disponibile pentru scolul diagnozei defectelor, iar Ur(t) i Yc(t) sunt semnale interne sau inaccesibile.

Finally, if the ith actuator is stuck at a constant value bi, then Udi(t) = bi -Uci(t). Multiple failures can be modeled by specifying several elements of Ud(t) to be nonzero. Sensor failures can be represented in a similar manner by appropriate choice of the signals Ydi(t). The variables Uc(t) and Yr(t) represent the external signals that are available for fault diagnosis purposes and Ur(t) and Yc(t) are internal or inaccessible signals.

272

The 5 International Power Systems Conference

th

3. Metode analitice pentru detecia i localizarea defectelor 3.1. Detecia i localizarea defectelor utiliznd (folosind) analiza sensibilitii inverse Din practica inginereasc, este bine tiut c un sistem dinamic nu rspunde la fel la toi stimuli exteriori (mrimi de comand sau perturbaii). Se spune c sistemul este mai sensibil la comanda ui sau la perturbaia j. n mod similar, modificarea unuia sau a mai multor parametri din structura intern, face ca starea i ieirea sistemului s se abat de la traiectoria neperturbat, sistemul fiind mai sensibil la unele modificri fa de altele. Toate aceste observaii au condus la necesitatea analizei sensibilitii sistemului care cuprinde urmtoarele aspecte: - Analiza sensibilitii directe - ASD - Analiza sensibilitii inverse - ASI n cazul ASD se urmrete determinarea influenelor pe care le au variaii ale strii iniiale, ale parametrilor i ale comenzilor, asupra evoluiei n timp a strii i ieirii sistemului. n cazul ASI se pornete de la msurarea abaterilor traiectoriilor strii i ieirii sistemului perturbat fa de traiectoriile ideale generate de un model al sistemului neperturbat i se caut determinarea cauzelor care au condus la aceste abateri, realizndu-se o diagnosticare tehnic. 3.2. Detecia i localizarea defectelor utiliznd metoda filtrelor multiple Metodele de detectare a defectelor bazate pe compararea ipotezelor multiple sunt de asemenea utilizate prin utilizarea filtrelor multiple cu funcii corespunztoare. Alocnd ipoteza H0 pentru funcionarea normal (fr defect) i Hi, i=1...n, pentru diferite moduri de defecte, prin analiza cu ajutorul calculatorului i utiliznd semnalele reziduale pentru fiecare filtru sunt generate funciile corespunztoare (probabilitile de defect) pentru Hi acestea oferind o indicaie a defectului. Uneori modul de alctuire a fiecarui filtru poate fi utilizat iar ipoteza cea mai plauzibil poate fi aleas ca mod de defect. Principalul dezavantaj al metodei const n numrul mare de modele utilizate. 3.3. Estimarea strii Pentru a realiza un estimator de stare discret, se pornete de la modelul matematic. x +1 = Ad xk + Bd uk yk = Cd xk

3. Analytical redundancy for fault detection and isolation 3.1. Fault detection using inverse sensitivity analysis From engineering practice is well known that a dynamic system does not respond in the same way to all external stimulus (command or disturbance). It is saying that the system is more sensitive to the command ui or disturbance j . Similar, altering one or more parameters from internal structure lead to a deviation from the undisturbed trajectory, and the system is more sensitive to one altering given another. All this observations lead to the necessity of the system sensitivity analysis (SSA), which involve next appearances: - Direct sensitivity analysis - DSA - Inverse sensitivity analysis - ISA In the case of DSA it is follow to determine the influences of the variations of the initial state, parameters and commands concerning the time evolution of the systems state and output. In the case of ISA it is starting from the measurement of the state trajectory and output trajectory deviation of the disturbed system from the ideal trajectories of an undisturbed model of the system and it is looking to determine the causes that generate this deviations, implementing a technical diagnosis. 3.2. Fault detection using of multiple filters Methods of fault detection based on the comparison of multiple hypotheses are also used via multiple filters and appropriate likelihood functions. By assigning the hypotheses H0 to the normal operation condition (no fault) and Hi, i=1...n, for n different failure modes and by computing and using the residuals of each filter, appropiate likelihood functions (failure probabilities) for Hi are generated that give an indication of fault. Sometimes the innovation of each filter can be utilized and the hypothesis with the maximum likelihood can be chosen as the failure mode. The main concern is usually the detection of abrupt changes in the state variable (or components of it). 3.3. State estimators To design a digital state estimator for a continuoustime plant (mobile robot), first we discredited the plant to obtain the discrete state-space model: (2) x +1 = Ad xk + Bd uk yk = Cd xk (3) Let the estimate of. We claim that the state observer is a dynamical system described by: xk be xk
xk +1 = Ad xk + Bd u k + L( y k C d xk )

(2) (3)

Fie xk vectorul de stare real, n timp ce x k reprezint vectorul strii estimate. Relaia cunoscut ce descrie dinamica estimatorului de stare este:
xk +1 = Ad xk + Bd u k + L( y k C d xk )

(4)

(4)

Alegerea matricii ctig L se face astfel nct (Ad-LCd) s fie stabil. 4. Analiza sistemelor cu elemente de executie defecte Pentru a analiza comportamentul unui sistem cnd unul sau mai multe elemente de execuie sunt blocate vom considera urmtoarele relaii :

We select the observer gain L so that (Ad - LCd ) is stable. 4. System analysis with fault actuators For analysis of behavior of the system, when one or many actuators are blocked, we consider the following relations:

ir = (1-ki) i + ki i0. i=1,2,3

(5)

ir = (1-ki) i + ki i0. i=1,2,3

(5)

06-07.11.2003, Timioara, Romania

273

n care ki=0 pentru starea n care elementul de execuie este n funciune , ki=1 in condiii de defect i elementul de execuie este blocat n poziia i0; ir are semnificaia unei comenzi reale a elementului de execuie i. Pentru cazul n care ki=1 putem simula un element de execuie care nu funcioneaz i rmne blocat i0. n concluzie, apariia unui defect este echivalent cu o modificare a structurii ecuaiei de stare pentru elementele de execuie . Vectorul de comand are expresia :
10 1 1r E r = 2 r = (I K D ) 2 + K D 20 30 3 3r

in which ki=0, for fault free actuator, ki=1, in fault conditions and the actuator blocked in i0 position; ir has the significance of the real command of the actuator i. For the case when ki = 1, we can simulate one actuator that don't work and remain in blocked position i0. In conclusion, the appearance of one fault it is equivalent with a jump modification of the state equation structure for the actuators. The vector of commands has the expression:
10 1 1r E r = 2 r = (I K D ) 2 + K D 20 30 3 3r

(6)

(6) in which:

n care:
k 1 0 0 K D = 0 k2 0 0 0 k 3

(7)

k1 0 0 K D = 0 k2 0 0 0 k 3

(7)

este numit matrice de defect . Cnd kd=0 sistemul nu are nici un defect. T Vectorul 0 = 10 20 30 reprezint poziia de

is called fault matrix. When kd=0 the system has no fault. T The vector 0 = 10 20 30 represent the blocking

[ ] [

[ ] [

blocaj a elementului de execuie. Deci, putem studia comportamentul n condiii de defect fixnd matricea de defect. Polinomul caracteristic al sistemului este (fig.3): L(s) = det (sI s ) -1 det [ I (sI s ) -1 Ad ] (8) deci, dac presupunem, firesc, ca sistemul fr defect este stabil , nu ne ramane dect s analizm condiiile n care soluiile ecuaiei sunt n semiplanul stng al planului complex: det [I (sI s ) -1 Ad] = 0 (9) 4.1. Sinteza comenzilor n cazul detectrii elementelor de execuie Dac sistemul de control este proiectat folosind un control dinamic sau static atunci putem asigura controlabilitatea n cazul defectrii unui element de execuie dac acesta nu este interferat n structura sistemului de control. Mai mult, aciunea controlerului asupra canalului defect (care caut s mpiedice apariia unei erori) perturb puternic celelalte canale pentru ca acele ieiri vor tinde repede spre valoarea minim sau maxim. Pentru a descrie simplu (matematic) un sistem defect avem urmtoarele ecuaii:
x p ( t ) = Ap x p ( t ) + B p ( I K D )K C u R ( t ) + B p K D u0 (10)
y( t ) = C p x p ( t ); u R ( t ) = f [ v( t ) y( t )]
o

position of the actuators. So, we can study the behavior in fault conditions, by fixed the fault matrix. The characteristic polinom of system is (fig. 3): L(s) = det (sI s ) -1 det [ I (sI s ) -1 Ad ] (8) so, if assume that the first system S is stable, then it have to be studied the possibility of settling of equations solutions in left half-plane of complex plane : det [I (sI s ) -1 Ad] = 0 (9)

4.1. Synthesis of the commands in case of actuators failures If the control system is projecting using the method of the decoupling in the dynamic or steady control then we can't assure the controllability in the case of fault of an actuator if it isn't interfere in the structure of the control system. More, the controller action on the fault channel (which search to cancel the appearance of the error) disturb strong the other channels because those output will tend fast on the minimum or maximum value. For the simple mathematical description of the fault system result the equations:
x p ( t ) = Ap x p ( t ) + B p ( I K D )K C u R ( t ) + B p K D u0 (10) y( t ) = C p x p ( t ); u R ( t ) = f [ v( t ) y( t )]
o

(11)

(11)

unde: KD = diag[ki] cu ki=0 pentru funcionare normal i kj =1 pentru defectarea elementului de execuie pe canalul j. Trebuie rezolvat problema determinrii coeficienilor matricii KC, astfel procesul putnd fi meninut n starea dorit. n acest caz produsul (I-KD )KC are linia j cu toate elementele zero, unde (I-KD )=diag[aii ] cu aii =1 i ajj =0, celelalte elemente aik fiind zero. Pentru c este folosit cu variabile standard, starea static prognozat va corespunde la xs=0, uRs=0, ys=0. Se folosete indicele d pentru valorile variabilelor statice n condiii de defect. n aceste condiii

where KD = diag[ki] with ki=0 for normal function and kj =1 for actuator failure on channel j. It must be solved the problem of the determination of the coefficients of KC matrix (correction device) so the process can be maintained in a neighborhood of a desired state less on an output channel. In this case the product (I-KD )KC has the line j with all elements zero, where (I-KD )=diag[aii ] with aii =1 and ajj =0, the another elements aik =0. Because it are used with normalized (standard) variable, expected steady state will correspond to xs=0, uRs=0, ys=0. Let be "d" the subscript used for the steady values of variables in

274

The 5 International Power Systems Conference

th

ecuaiile (10-11) devin:

Ap xd ( t ) + B p ( I K D )K C u Rd + B p K D u0 = 0

fault conditions. In this case, the equations (10-11) becomes: (12)

Ap xd ( t ) + B p ( I K D )K C u Rd + B p K D u0 = 0 y d = C p Ap [ B p ( I K D )K C u Rd + K D u0 ]
1

(12)

y d = C p Ap [ B p ( I K D )K C u Rd + K D u0 ]

Sinteza comenzii este considerat rezolvat dac matricea KC i/sau vectorul de comand uRd sunt determinai pentru o matrice KD i vectorul u0. Bibliografie (References)

The synthesis of the command is considered solved if the matrix KC and/or command vector uRd are determined for known matrix KD and vector u0.

1. Isermann, R.: Supervision, fault detection and fault diagnosis methods - An introduction, Control Engineering Practice, 5(5), 1997, 639-652. 2. Viswanadham, N., Taylor, J. H.,. Luce, E. C.: A Frequency-Domain Approach to Failure Detection and Isolation with Application to GE-21 Turbine Engine Control Systems, Control Theory 3. Willsky, A.S.: A Survey of Design Methods for Failure Detection in Dynamic Systems, Automatica, 12(6), 1976, 601-611. 4. Dalton, T.: Introduction to Fault Diagnosis, Intensive course for postgraduate students on Applications of Artificial Intelligence in Industrial Automation, TEMPUS M-JEP 11467/96-Companion, University of Galati, Academica Publishing, Romania, 1998. 5. Vinatoru, M., Iancu, E., Vinatoru C.: Robust control for actuator failures, Proceedings of 2nd IFAC Symposium ROCOND'97, Budapest, 1997, 537-542. 6. Vntoru, M., Iancu E., Vntoru C., Patton R.J., Chen J.; Fault Isolation Using Inverse Sensitivity Analysis, International Conference on Control'98, 1 - 4 September 1998, University of Wales, Swansea, England, vol. 2, 964-968. 7. Ivanescu, M., Vinatoru M., Stoian V., Iancu E.: Robotic Arm Control in Fault Condition, Proceedings of the IASTED International Conference Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing, 24-26.07. 2000, Banff, Canada, vol.I, 361-365.