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their properties are identical. Leibniz is fond of using leaves as an example. Two leaves often look absolutely identical. But, Leibniz argues, if two things are alike in every respect, then they are the same object, and not two things at all. So, it must be the case that no two leaves are ever exactly alike. Leibnizs support for the principles of the identity of indiscernibles primarily derives from his commitment to the principle of sufficient reason in the following way. If any objects are in every way the same, but actually distinct, then there would be no sufficient reason (that is, no possible explanation) for why the first is where (and when) it is, and the second is where (and when) it is, and not the other way around. If, then, one posits the possible existence of two identical things (things that differ in number onlythat is, one can count them, but that is all), then one also posits the existence of an absurd universe, one in which the principle of sufficient reason is not universally true. Leibniz often expresses this in terms of God: if two things were identical, there would be no sufficient reason for God to choose to put one in the first place and the other in the second place. (Note that Leibnizs argument relates to a scholastic debate centered on the notion of Buridans Ass.) Similar considerations apply to Newtonian absolute space. Leibnizs argument against the Newton-Clarke position can be understood here as two related reductio ad absurdum arguments. The first concerns the violation of the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Suppose that space is absolute. Since every region of space would be indiscernible from any other and spatial relations would be construed as extrinsic, it would be possible for two substances to be indiscernible yet distinct in virtue of being in different locations. But this is absurd, Leibniz argues, because it violates the principle of the identity of indiscernibles. Therefore, space must not be absolute (see Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Third Paper). The second reductio concerns the violation of the principle of sufficient reason. Suppose that space is absolute. Leibniz argues that there would then be no sufficient reason for from any other). Thus, absolute space is absurd, because it violates the principle of sufficient reason (see Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Fourth Paper). (Analogous problems are thought to result from a conception of absolute time.) why the whole universe was created here instead of two meters to the left (because no region of space is discernible
That is, if the leaf were located elsewhere, it would be a different leaf. A change of location is a change in the object itself, since spatial properties are intrinsic (similarly with location in time). Leibnizs view has two major implications. First, there is no absolute location in either space or time; location is always the situation of an object or event relative to other objects and events. Second, space and time are not in themselves real (that is, not substances). Space and time are, rather, ideal. Space and time are just metaphysically illegitimate ways of perceiving certain virtual relations between substances. They are phenomena or, strictly speaking, illusions (although they are illusions that are well-founded upon the internal properties of substances). Thus, illusion and science are fully compatible. For God, who can grasp all at once complete concepts, there is not only no space but also no temptation of an illusion of space. Leibniz uses the analogy of the experience of a building as opposed to its blueprint, its overall design (see, for example, Correspondence with Arnauld 12 April 1686 and Monadology 57). It is sometimes convenient to think of space and time as something out there, over and above the entities and their relations to each other, but this convenience must not be confused with reality. Space is nothing but the order of co-existent objects; time nothing but the order of successive events. This is usually called a relational theory of space and time. Space and time, according to Leibniz, are thus the hypostatizations of ideal relations, which are real insofar as they symbolize real differences in substances, but illusions to the extent that (i) space or time are taken as a thing in itself, or (ii) spatial/temporal relations are taken to be irreducibly exterior to substances, or (iii) extension or duration are taken to be a real or even fundamental property of substances. Take the analogy of a virtual reality computer program. What one sees on the screen (or in a specially designed virtual reality headset) is the illusion of space and time. Within the computers memory are just numbers (and ultimately mere binary information) linked together. These numbers describe in an essentially non-spatial and temporal way a virtual space and time, within which things can exist, move and do things. For example, in the computers memory might be stored the number seven, corresponding to a bird. This, in turn, is linked to four further numbers representing three dimensions of space and one of timethat is, the birds position. Suppose further the computer contains also the number one, corresponding to the viewer and again linked to four further numbers for the viewers position, plus another three giving the direction in which the viewers virtual eyes are looking. The bird appears in the viewers headset, then, when the fourth number associated with the bird is the same as the viewers fourth number (they are together in time), and when the first three numbers of the bird (its position in virtual space) are in a certain algebraic relation to the number representing the viewers position and point of view. Space and time are reduced to non-spatial and non-temporal numbers. For Leibniz, God in this analogy apprehends these numbers as numbers, rather than through their translation into space and time.
argue that all relational predicates are in fact reducible to internal properties of each of the three substances. This includes time, as well as relations such as the sister of or is angry at. But can all relations be so reduced, at least without radically deforming their sense? Modern logicians often see this as the major flaw in Leibnizs logic and, by extension, in his metaphysics. Furthermore, Leibniz must provide a response to the Newtonian bucket argument. Indeed, Leibniz thinks that one simply needs to provide a rule for the reduction of relations. For linear motion the virtual relation is reducible to either or both the object and the universe around it. For non-linear motion, one must posit a rule such that the relation is not symmetrically reducible to either of the subjects (bucket, or universe around it). Rather, non-linear motion is assigned only when, and precisely to the extent that, the one subject shows the effects of the motion. That is, the motion is a property of the water, if the water shows the effects (see Correspondence with Clarke, Leibnizs Fifth Paper, 53). Perhaps it seems strange that the laws of nature should be different for linear as opposed to non-linear motion. It sounds like an arbitrary new law of nature, but Leibniz might respond that it is no more arbitrary that any other law of nature; people have just become used to the illusion of space and time as extrinsic relations of entities that they are not used to thinking in these terms.