CONTENTS Articles Mario Mignucci Aristotle on the Existential Import of Propositions ........................................................

121 Robert Heinaman Actuality, Potentiality and De Anima II.5 ............... 139 Michael Papazian The Ontological Argument of Diogenes of Babylon .............................................................. 188 Book Notes Dorothea Frede Socrates and Plato .................................................. 210 Ben Morison Aristotle, Almost Entirely ....................................... 239

phronesis vol. lii no. 2 2007

vol. lii no. 2 2007

ISSN 0031-8868 (print version) ISSN 1568-5284 (online version)

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PHRONESIS A Journal for Ancient Philosophy Aims & Scope Founded in 1955, Phronesis has become the most authoritative scholarly journal for the study of ancient philosophy. It covers the whole range of Greek and Roman thought, including logic, physics, ethics, political philosophy, psychology, metaphysics, epistemology and the philosophy of science and medicine, from its origins down to the end of the sixth century A.D. Phronesis is edited by leading specialists and features contributions from top scholars in Europe and North America. Editors Professor Verity Harte (Yale) and Professor Christopher Gill (Exeter). Papers for submission and all other correspondence should be sent to the Managing Editor, Professor Verity Harte, Department of Philosophy, Yale University, P.O. Box 208306, New Haven, CT 06520-8306, USA. All books for Book Notes should be sent to Professor C.J. Gill, Department of Classics and Ancient History, School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Rennes Drive, Exeter, Devon, EX4 4RJ, UK. Advisory Committee Professors K. Algra (Utrecht), J. Barnes (Geneva), J. Brunschwig (Paris), D.J. Furley (Princeton), J. Mansfeld (Utrecht), C. Rowe (Durham), M. Schoeld (Cambridge), R.W. Sharples (London). Notes for Contributors Please refer to the fourth page of the Volume prelims or visit Phronesis web site at www.brill.nl/phro. Abstracting & Indexing Phronesis is abstracted/indexed in Arts & Humanities Citation Index; Current Contents; Dietrichs Index Philosophicus; Internationale Bibliographie der Rezensionen Wissenschaftlicher Literatur/International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature; Internationale Bibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur aus Allen Gebieten des Wissens/International Bibliography of Periodicals from All Fields of Knowledge; Linguistic Bibliography/Bibliographie Linguistique; Periodicals Contents Index; Philosophers Index; Russian Academy of Sciences Bibliographies. Phronesis (print ISSN 0031-8868, online ISSN 1568-5284) is published 4 times a year by Brill, Plantijnstraat 2, 2321 JC Leiden, The Netherlands, tel +31 (0)71 5353500, fax +31 (0)71 5317532.

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www.brill.nl/phro

Aristotle on the Existential Import of Propositions

Mario Mignucci

Editorial Preface The Editors are pleased to be able to publish the following paper by Professor Mario Mignucci, which is published posthumously. Before his death in January 2004, Professor Mignucci, who was a member of the Advisory Board of this journal, was a Research Fellow of the Philosophy Department, Kings College London, visiting annually to give three seminars on Ancient Logic. The present paper was prepared for presentation at a seminar at Kings scheduled to take place in February 2001, but which, because of his illness, could not take place. Professor Mignucci did not have the opportunity to revise the paper for publication thereafter. We are grateful to Professor Richard Sorabji for making the paper available to us for publication in its present form; Professor Mignucci had sent him a copy of the paper in anticipation of a renewed opportunity to present the paper at Kings, which, sadly, never became possible. We are grateful also to Professor Mignuccis widow, Mrs Fiorenza Mignucci, for permission to publish the paper here. The paper is in its original form, aside from some light editing in respect of minor matters of language. The Editors are grateful to Professor Sorabji for his advice and assistance in this regard.

I Let us start with some well-known facts. Aristotle put the basis for what was later called the square of opposition, which can be described as follows. Consider a universal armative proposition, for instance every man is white, and call it Pa. By changing its quantity or quality you get three more propositions, namely some man is white, a particular armative proposition, Pi, no man is white, a universal negative proposition, Pe, some man is not white, a particular negative proposition,
)

Deceased.
DOI: 10.1163/156852807X180054

Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2007

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Po. Aristotle rightly considered Po equivalent to the negation of Pa and Pi equivalent to the negation of Pe. He called these propositions contradictories, and he correctly stated that (I) Two contradictory propositions can neither be true nor be false together.1 On the other hand, he stated that Pa and Pe are contraries and dier from the contradictories because (II) Two contraries propositions cannot be true together but they can be both false.2 There is less evidence that Aristotle envisaged the relation there is between Pi and Po, two sub-contrary propositions. However, this relation can easily be derived from (I) and (II), and it is (III) Two sub-contrary propositions cannot be false together, while they can be both true.3 Finally, the tradition has completed the square by stating that Pi is the subalternate of Pa and Po of Pe and claiming that: (IV) The truth of a subalternans proposition implies the truth of its subalternate but not vice versa.4 It is easy to see that, by assuming (I), (II)-(IV) are inter-derivable, so that they stand or fall together. The doctrine of the square of opposition constituted the starting point of logical teaching for centuries and one can easily imagine the
Int. 7, 17b16-20. Int. 7, 17b20-26. 3) Int. 7, 17b24-26. Properly speaking, Aristotle asserts that Pi and Po can be true together and he does not explicitly say that they cannot be false together. 4) In a passage of the Topics (Top. II 1, 109al-6) Aristotle states that having proved Pa implies having proved Pi, which is not the same as, but very near to, one of the subalternation laws.
2) 1)

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discomfort of people born in this tradition when, at the beginning of this century, it became clear that (II)-(IV) does not represent a consistent set of propositions, if (I) is admitted.5 To have a counter-example to the doctrine we need two assumptions. The rst is that in our language empty general terms are accepted. We call a general F empty if F is truly predicated of nothing, or, if you prefer, nothing satises F, i.e. xF(x). A term such as centaur or witch can be taken as an example of an empty term. The second assumption consists in taking particular propositions, Pi and Po, as existential propositions, i.e. propositions which are supposed to assert, or imply, that there is at least an instance of the particulars of some of which the predicates are asserted. In other words, it is claimed that e.g. some man is white is true only if there is at least one man, one particular man, who is white. As one can immediately see, if these two assumptions are made the square of opposition is destroyed. Every particular proposition whose subject is an empty term is false. Therefore, (III) must be abandoned. But if Pi and Po can be both false their contradictories Pa and Pe can in some case be true together and this gives a counter-example to (II). Similarly, if every particular proposition whose subject is an empty term is false, every corresponding universal proposition is true. Therefore, the implication from Pa to Pi and from Pe to Po admits of exceptions
As far as I know, the diculty was rst pointed out by K. Ajdukiewicz, Zalozenia logiki tradycyjeney, Warszawa: 1927 and by F.S.C. Northrop, An Internal Inconsistency in Aristotelian Logic, The Monist 38 (1928), 193-210. See also L. Kattso, Concerning the Validity of Aristotelian Logic, Philosophy of Science 1 (1934), 149162; P. Henle, A Note on the Validity of Aristotelian Logic, Philosophy of Science 2 (1935), 111-113 (against Kattso); R.H. Popkin, An Examination of Two Inconsistencies in Aristotelian Logic, The Philosophical Review 56 (1947), 670-681; P.F. Strawson, Introduction to Logical Theory (London: Methuen 1952), 152-179; M. Thompson, On Aristotles Square of Opposition, The Philosophical Review 62 (1953), 251-265; J.O. Nelson, In Defence of the Traditional Interpretation of the Square, The Philosophical Review, 63 (1954), 401-413; M. Thompson, Reply to Mr. Nelson, The Philosophical Review 63 (1954), 414-419; J.J. Morrison, The Existential Import of a Proposition in Aristotelian Logic, Philosophy and Phenomenological Researh 15 (19541955), 386-393; E. Roxon, A Note on Some Misunderstandings of Aristotelian Logic, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 33 (1955), 107-111; W. Kneale-M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19787), 54-61.
5)

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and, consequently, (IV) does not hold in general. The doctrine of the square is destroyed. From the fact that the traditional presentation of the square of opposition is inconsistent some authors have inferred that Aristotles position is inconsistent as well. Prima facie, their claim seems to be easy to support, since there is evidence to assert that Aristotle shared the two assumptions from which the inconsistency follows. He surely admitted the possibility of empty terms. His favorite example is , goat-stag, which , signies something, without referring to anything existent.6 Elsewhere, the denotata of words like are ranged among , things which do not exist.7 That is enough for the rst assumption. As far as the second assumption is concerned, things are slightly more complicated. However, take the denition of to be predicated of every one at the beginning of the Prior Analytics. Aristotle says:
(A) We say that one thing is predicated of every one of another when nothing [of the subject] can be taken of which the other is not said; equally for being predicated of none.8

The Greek is not sure and Ross is probably right in deleting at 24b29 on the basis of Alexanders commentary on the passage,9 although the expression is present in most MSS.10 However, even if we decide to follow him in omitting these words, the sense clearly requires to be tacitly understood. Therefore, the meaning of the denition seems to be that A is truly predicated of every B if there is nothing of B of which A is not said. The obvious interpretation of this statement is that A is truly predicated of B if there is no individual B of which A is not said, and one may be tempted to rephrase it in the usual terms of rst order logic by stating

Int. 1, 16a16-18. APr. I 38, 49a23-24. 8) APr. I l, 24b26-30. 9) Alex, in APr. 24.27-30. 10) See Aristotle, Prior and Posterior Analytics, A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, ed. W.D. Ross (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1949), 292.
7)

6)

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(1)

AaB =df x(B(x) ^ A(x))

where AaB stands for an Aristotelian universal armative proposition. If (1) really represents a denition of Aristotles universal armative predication, the counter-examples to the square of oppositions cannot be avoided. Suppose that nothing is B; then, one should concede that there is no individual which is B and is not A. Therefore, it does not hold in general that Pa and Pe cannot be true together (i.e. II) or that Pi and Po cannot be both false (i.e. III), nor can one maintain the subalternation laws (i.e. (IV)). One can try to resist this conclusion in several ways. I will consider here two possible ways out. The rst of them is rather elaborate and, on reection, rather dubious from the point of view of the evidence at our disposal. The second has in my opinion a more solid textual basis but casts a negative shadow on the value of Aristotles logic. Let us start by considering the rst possibility. It mainly consists in challenging the idea that a particular proposition necessarily carries an existential import, which would be denied by the corresponding universal propositions. There is a rather famous passage of the De interpretatione, which concerns singular propositions. Aristotle is discussing the legitimacy of deriving from a proposition asserting that a composite predicate is true of an individual subject a new proposition stating that the same individual subject has a part of the composite predicate. From the fact that it is true that a is a dead man it does not follow that a is man. But also in the case in which there is no inconsistency between the parts taken separately of the predicate one is not always allowed to separate the parts of the predicate. Aristotles case is the following:
(B) For example, Homer is something (say, a poet). Does it follow that he is? No, for the is is predicated accidentally of Homer; for it is because he is a poet, not in its own right, that the is is predicated of Homer.11

11) Int. 11, 21a25-28: , , ; , , .

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The passage is far from being transparent. However, it clearly states that we are not allowed to infer that Homer is from the fact that Homer is a poet. I think that the illegitimacy of this inference depends on the fact that Homer is a poet is considered a true proposition, while Homer is or perhaps better Homer exists, is false. If this rather natural interpretation is accepted one might claim that in this text Aristotle states that there are singular propositions which have no existential import. By adopting the usual machinery of rst order logic one might claim that (2) F(a) xF(x)

i.e. the so-called Law of Existential Introduction, does not hold in general according to Aristotle. But if (2) does not hold how can one maintain that a particular proposition in general has always an existential import? Take for instance some poet is a poet and suppose that the only poet is Homer. If Homer is a poet, then it is true that some poet is a poet but it is not true that there is somebody who is a poet. One might admit that this interpretation of text (B) is correct but challenge its importance for the general problem of the existential import of particular propositions by observing that Aristotles position concerning the existential import of singular propositions is not consistent. This view is shared by some authors and is based on the comparison between text (B) and a passage of the Categories. As in the De interpretatione, Aristotle discusses here the illegitimacy of deriving that a has an attribute from the fact that a has the contrary attribute. Here is the passage:
(C) It might, indeed, very well seem that the same sort of thing does occur in the case of contraries said with combination, Socrates is well being contrary to Socrates is sick. Yet not even with these is it necessary always for one to be true and the other false. For if Socrates exists one will be true and one false, but if he does not both will be false; neither Socrates is sick nor Socrates is well will be true if Socrates himself does not exist at all.12

Cat. 10, 13b12-19: , ,

12)

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The point is clear. If Socrates is ill then he is not healthy. However, we cannot infer that Socrates is healthy from the fact that he is not ill. One might interpret this view as a claim that a necessary condition for the truth of a singular proposition is that its subject exists. Taken in this way Aristotles statement would be in support of the Law of Existential Introduction and, therefore, in direct conict with what he says in the De interpretatione. But this cannot be the meaning of his position. It is sucient to read what comes after text (C) to get convinced. Aristotle says
(D) But with an armation and negation one will always be false and the other true whether he exists or not. For take Socrates is sick and Socrates is not sick; if he exists it is clear that one or the other of them will be true or false, and equally if he does not; for if he does not exist he is sick is false but he is not sick true.13

What is said here is that if Socrates does not exist, then Socrates is ill (is healthy) is false. But if Socrates is ill (is healthy) is false when Socrates does not exist, then Socrates is not ill (is not healthy) must be true. If Socrates is not, he is not ill as well. Therefore, there are singular propositions which are true without having an existential import. Some authors have tried to account for Aristotles view in the Categories by supposing that here he assumes not that every singular proposition has an existential import, but only armative singular propositions. This view is rather odd. How should a proposition such as Socrates is dead be considered? If it is treated as an armative proposition it should be always false, while Socrates is not alive is true now. Moreover, the view that singular armative propositions do have an existential import cannot easily be reconciled with the point made about Homer in the De interpretatione (see text (B)), since in this case we have to do with a singular armative proposition whose existential import is denied.14
, . 13) Cat. 10,13b27-33: , , , , , .

Both William Jacobs (Aristotle and Nonreferring Subjects, Phronesis 24 (1979), 282-300) and Michael Wedin (Negation and Quantication in Aristotle, History and

14)

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I do not think that we should attribute such a strange view to Aristotle. It is sucient to observe the context in which the examples he considers both in the Categories and the De interpretatione are. In both cases the examples are intended to show a counterexample to an alleged inference. In the case of the De interpretatione it is the legitimacy of the inference from a predicate composite to its parts. In the case of the Categories what is challenged is the derivation of attributing a property to an individual from denying the contrary property to him. If this is the situation there is no reason to think that Aristotles examples should be generalized to every singular proposition or to every armative singular proposition. From the fact that it is true that Socrates is ill it does follow that Socrates is, while from stating that Homer is a poet we are not able to infer that Homer exists. The point is simply that Socrates exists follows from Socrates is ill ratione materiae and not ratione formae, i.e. on the basis of a general logical law or rule. The conclusion is that there is no inconsistency in Aristotles view about the existential import of singular propositions, and therefore we can take seriously what is stated in the De interpretatione and the Categories. The defendant of the view that Aristotle escaped the diculties of the square of opposition by rejecting that particular propositions have existential import would rejoice at this result, and take it as a proof

Philosophy of Logic 11 (1990), 131-150) with dierent and sometimes contrasting arguments have claimed that in text (B) no denial of an existential commitment for singular armative propositions is implied. This is very hard to believe. Jacobs for instance thinks that our passage merely notes that because being a poet is an accident of Homer, Homer is a poet may be true or false (p. 289). It is dicult to see in what sense this alleged Aristotelian claim is relevant to the discussion of counter-examples to the derivation of simple from complex predications. According to Wedin, if I understand his point, Aristotle would simply observe that in the proposition Homer is a poet is has no bearing on Homers existence (p. 186). But if one claims that Aristotle would have maintained (2) at least for armative singular propositions, as Wedin does, the is of Homer is a poet does have a bearing on Homers existence, being a part of the true proposition Homer is a poet from which Homer exists follows. The is in . . . is a F has not the same meaning as exists but it implies existence because of (2). This is what is denied by Aristotle when he claims that Homer exists does not follow from Homer is a poet, since Homer is a poet is true and Homer exists is false. Therefore, we do have a counterexample to (2).

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that according to Aristotle singular propositions (and a fortiori particular) have no existential import. I have two diculties with this view. The rst one is of a philosophical, or rather logical, nature if you prefer. Consider for instance the proposition some man is white. It is dicult for me to believe that the truth conditions for it could be something dierent from stating that there is at least one individual man who is white. On the other hand, it is not at all clear that we are allowed to assign the truth value True e.g. to some centaur is a teacher if we agree that there are no such entities as individual centaurs. One could easily be tempted to develop the same sort of reasoning as we nd in text (D). In this passage Aristotle claims that, if Socrates does not exist, Socrates is not sick is true, on the basis that if Socrates is not at all, he cannot be sick. In the same vein we could claim that if there is no centaur, there is not a centaur who is a teacher. Therefore, some centaur is a teacher is false. But one could dismiss this approach by recalling the position of many authors who prefer a more or less Meinongian ontology to the standard Russellian paucity. There is however a more robust objection, which is based on textual evidence. Let us return to texts (B) and (C) and the Aristotelian examples. When Aristotle says for instance that Homer is does not follow from Homer is a poet or states that Socrates is is a consequence of Socrates is ill, are we sure that we are entitled to interpret Homer is or Socrates is as there is something which is the same as Homer or there is something which is the same as Socrates? This move is absolutely necessary if we want texts (B) and (C) to say something about the existential import of singular propositions but, to my mind, it is far from having a solid textual ground. Homer in Homer is a poet surely refers to the author of the Iliad, i.e. a person who lived in the past and is no longer among us. Therefore, it seems more natural to take Homer is, the alleged consequence of stating that Homer is a poet, as meaning Homer is now, or Homer exists now. Similarly, in the Categories examples the dierence seems to be drawn between the situation of Socrates when he is alive and the situation depending on the fact that he is no longer in existence. Now, the kind of existence which matters for the existential import of propositions is not necessarily linked to the distinction between existing now and having existed in the past. It has

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more to do with logical existence, i.e. with the fact of being in the domain of individuals over which the quantiers are supposed to range. Of course, one might stipulate that this domain coincides with the class of things existing now, but this idea is not obvious and it needs to be made explicit. There is a clear dierence between Bertrand Russell and Chiron considered now. They are both non-existent now; however the rst but not the second has existed. For this reason one is tempted to put Bertrand Russell among the logically existent and Chiron among the logically non-existent things. Especially for this reason I am not condent that we can use the passages from the Categories and De interpretatione in the discussion of the question of the existential import of propositions. The attempt at taking them as evidence for attributing the view to Aristotle that particular propositions do not have an existential import looks very dubious and too risky to be pursued. II After this long discussion, shall we give up and conclude with the interpreters of the beginning of the last century that Aristotle was inconsistent in his theory of the square of oppositions? Before admitting this conclusion it may be worth considering a dierent possible way out. As we have seen, the inconsistency in the square arises if two assumptions are made, namely that there are empty terms and Aristotelian quantied propositions behave as their modern counterparts. The rst assumption was surely shared by Aristotle. For the second one we have brought in text (A) as evidence for (1), i.e. for the idea that an Aristotelian universal proposition has more or less the same meaning as a universally quantied modern proposition. It is exactly the legitimacy of (1) that I would like to challenge in the rest of this paper. Let us return to text (A) and consider once more Aristotles denition of universal predication. A preliminary observation is in order. When Aristotle states that there is nothing, obviously of the subject, of which the predicated is not said what does he mean? That is the same as asking what , nothing (of the subject) refers to. The answer is in my view clear. Nothing refers to individuals, and the general meaning of Aristotles denition is: there is no individual of which the subject is truly predicated which is not an individual of which the predicate is

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truly said. A denition of being predicated of every conrms the point. Here is the text:
(E) I say that something holds of every case if it does not hold of some cases and not of others, nor at some times and not at others. E.g. if animal holds of every man, then if it is true to call this a man, it is true to call him an animal too; and if he is now the former, he is the latter too.15

This denition has some oddities well known to Aristotles commentators.16 However, the example of man makes it clear that the cases which are mentioned in the general formulation of the denition are meant to be particular cases. In other words, (E) implies that a universal proposition is true if no particular of which the subject is true is such that the predicate does not hold of it. Therefore, we are allowed to suppose that also in denition (A) the same happens: nothing means no individual, and A holds of every B if no particular B is such that A does not hold of it. The legitimacy of (1) seems to nd a conrmation. Shall we stay with it? Well, there is a point which bothers me. Consider a universal armative proposition and translate it in the way in which we normally do in rst order predicate calculus. It is obvious that such a proposition is trivially true if its subject is constituted by an empty term. If there are no sirens the proposition every siren is pretty is true, because there is no siren who is not pretty. My point is that the denition of being predicated of every does not necessarily guarantee that we can say the same of an Aristotelian universal proposition. One could take the denition in (A) as stating that A is predicated of every B if, and only if, none of the individuals of which B is truly said is such that A is not truly said of it, and as implying that it does not include the case in which B is truly said of no individual. In this perspective, the denition would give a sort of guideline to discriminate true from false universal armative predications only in the case in which B (and of course A) are not empty terms. Consider a universal armative proposition, e.g. A is predicated of every B. This proposition is true if the individuals
APo. I 4, 73a28-31 (trans. J. Barnes, Aristotle Posterior Analytics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19932), ad loc.). 16) See e.g. the discussion of it in Barnes, op. cit., pp. 111-112.
15)

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of which B is truly predicated are individuals of which A is also truly predicated. What happens if B is an empty term, i.e. is truly predicated of nothing? Our denition does not say anything about this situation, which remains undened. It is pretty clear that if we accept this interpretation of text (A) we cannot take it as evidence for (1). I do not claim that I have proved my point. I only assert that text (A) does not rule out this possible interpretation. There are other passages which can be called in to justify this position. In my view the strongest is the denition of and in the De interpretatione. Aristotle says:
(F) Now of things some are universal, others particular. I call universal that which is by its nature predicated of a number of things, and singular that which is not; man, for instance, is a universal, Callias a particular.17

Here the distinction is introduced between what is universal and what is individual. Jan Lukasiewicz was the rst to point out an odd feature of this distinction since it is taken as a distinction between , things. In his eort to be rigorous, Lukasiewicz blamed Aristotle, saying that it is a term and not a thing which can be taken as universal or individual.18 This is surely true but I do not think that Lukasiewicz understood what Aristotle meant here. Aristotle was well aware that no existing thing can be properly said to be universal, and this claim was part of his criticism of Platos position. I think that by limiting the distinction between and to Aristotle meant not to say that the distinction is an ontological distinction but only that it applies to existing things or, to take care of Lukasiewiczs concern, to terms for existing things. To conrm this view one has to consider a parallel passage in the Prior Analytics where the distinction between what cannot be predicated of anything else (except accidentally) and what is truly predicated

Int. 7,17a38-b1: , , , .
17) 18)

J. Lukasiewicz, Aristotles Syllogistic from the Standpoint of Modern Formal Logic (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19572), 6.

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of something is viewed as a distinction between , things which exist. Aristotle says:

(G) Of all things which are, some are such that they are not predicated of anything else truly and universally (as for instance Cleon and Callias, i.e. the particular and sensible), but other things are predicated of them (for each of them is both man and animal); some things are themselves predicated of others, but nothing prior is predicated of them; some things are predicated of others, and yet others of them, e.g. man of Callias and animal of man. It is clear that some things are by their nature said of nothing; normally, each sensible thing is such that it is by its nature predicated of nothing, save incidentally; for we say that that white object is Socrates and that that which approaches is Callias.19

The passage is obscure in more than one detail. However, it clearly draws a distinction between individuals, intermediate universals, and pure universals (of which nothing can be essentially predicated), and these items are taken as partitions among , things which exist. What are in Aristotles view? To answer this question it is sucient to remember that Aristotle repeats many times that it is only of things which exist that we are allowed to consider essences and proper denitions, since of items such as , the standard example for a , no other denition than a nominal one can be given.20 Therefore, are existing things with reference to which it makes sense to speak of essence and apply the categorical divisions. On what is a , as for instance , we can say that its name signies something ( ) and explain what its meaning is, but we are not allowed to apply to this the ontological machinery by which we analyze .
19)

APr. I 27, 43a25-36: ( ), ( ) ,

, . , , (translation: Aristotle, The Complete

Works, modied). 20) See e.g. APo. II 7, 92b5-8.

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Suppose then that, in Aristotles view, the distinction between universal and singular terms can be drawn only with reference to , things which exist. It is immediately clear that terms such as or centaur cannot properly be qualied as universal and taken as dierent from Chiron or Sherlock Holmes, since there is no way to consider the latter as names for individuals. All these items are simply , non-existing things. Therefore, the denitions of and simply do not apply to them. If this is the situation, and we are allowed to think that Aristotle was faithful to this view, we must take the denition of being predicated of every in the same way, and suppose that it applies only to those predications in which no empty terms are involved. For Aristotle universal quantication takes place only with respect to universal terms. If a term can be qualied as universal provided that it is non-empty, a proposition can be taken as universal only if it is constituted by non-empty terms. The same applies to particular propositions because these are formed by universal terms as well. If our analysis is correct we are compelled to reject (1), i.e. the claim that an Aristotelian universal armative proposition means the same as a universally quantied proposition of rst order logic. By rejecting (1) and maintaining that an Aristotelian quantied proposition is dened only with respect to propositions in which no empty term occurs we can rescue his doctrine of the square of opposition from inconsistency. His way of considering quantication is perfectly in line with the relations he establishes between quantied propositions. If A and B in A belongs to every B are not empty terms it is obvious that there is no way to disprove the claim that AaB implies AiB. The same holds for the other relations of the square. If somebody is interested in a formal modern counterpart of Aristotles theory, the best one has been oered by Timothy Smiley some time ago, and it is based on the idea of adopting a many-sorted logic to interpret Aristotelian propositions. I do not think that it is interesting here to examine the details of this proposal.21

T. Smiley, Syllogism and Quantication, Journal of Symbolic Logic 27 (1962), 58-72.

21)

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III There are two obvious objections to this interpretation. The rst one concerns the role and value of Arisotles logic if we suppose that it is restricted to non-empty terms in quantied propositions. Not to allow empty terms in a logical system may look without cost if we think that we get rid of tragelaphoi, centaurs, winged horses and other mythological monsters. Logic has to do mostly with science and science does not care about daydreams. But it is easy to see that empty terms play a role also in science. When chemists a long time ago established that phlogiston does not exist, they declared that phlogiston is an empty term and through that important scientic progress was achieved. Before trying to evaluate this point let us consider the second objection, which is more strictly related to the textual evidence. According to our proposal, Aristotelian quantied propositions should not exhibit empty terms as predicates or subjects. But Aristotle does not seem too worried about using propositions with empty terms in deductions. In a rather obscure passage about reduplication he clearly says that we are allowed to build up a syllogism whose conclusion is that the goat-stag is knowable qua non-existent:
(H) Something extra duplicated in the premises should be put with the rst extreme, not with the middle. I mean, for instance, if there should be a syllogism that there is knowledge of justice insofar as it is a good, then insofar as it is a good or qua good should be put with the rst extreme. [. . .] The same happens if it should be proved that the healthful is knowable qua good or the goat-stag is knowable qua nonexistent, or that the man is perishable qua perceptible. For in all these cases of extra predication, the extra duplication should be put with the rst extreme.22

22)

APr. I 38, 49a11-26:

, . , . [ , , . . . . , ,

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Therefore, empty terms can at least occur as subjects in those propositions which form the premisses and the conclusions of Aristotelian syllogisms. In this way it becomes hard to assign a status to empty term propositions which is dierent from the status attributed to normal propositions. Both, one might claim, can be part of a syllogism. Therefore, both admit of quantication, against our interpretation. I am not sure that text (H) goes so far to represent real counterevidence to our view. One could take the proposition the goat-stag is knowable qua nonexistent ( < > ) not as a quantied proposition, but simply as a singular one. If this hypothesis is admitted, then (H) is not really inconsistent with our interpretation. Well, one might react against this proposal by pointing out that Aristotelian syllogisms do not contain singular propositions. This view was inuentially proposed by Jan Lukasiewicz many years ago and it is based on the matter-of-fact observation that in his ocial presentation of the syllogisms Aristotle never considers singular propositions.23 However, Aristotle in the Prior Analytics does not seem to be worried by the omission of singular propositions if he sometimes proposes singular inferences as examples of syllogisms.24 Therefore, the mere fact that our proposition appears as the conclusion of a syllogism is not a sucient reason to believe that it has to be interpreted as a universally quantied statement. But, one might insist, to treat the goat-stag is knowable qua nonexistent as a singular proposition implies that goat-stag must be taken as a singular term and, as we have seen, in Aristotles view the distinction between and can be drawn only if we have to do with non-empty terms. That is true, but that simply means that we have to rephrase our point by stating that the goat-stag is knowable qua non-existent function as a singular proposition, in the
.] , , .
23) 24)

APr. I 1-7 and Lukasiewicz, op. cit. pp. 1-7. E.g. APr. I 33, 47b18 .; II 21, 67a33 .

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sense that its logical behaviour is similar to the behaviour of a singular proposition in an inference. Although we are in a position, I believe, to answer the second objection, the rst one remains, at least to a certain extent. Ruling out empty terms from logic and science implies a limitation in the range of application of logic to everyday and scientic arguments. One might try to defend Aristotle by saying that, for instance, goatstags do not exist is a statement not about an empty term, but about animals, being equivalent to no animal is a goatstag. However plausible this claim may be, I do not see how this line of defence can be useful for Aristotles position. Suppose for the sake of the argument that goatstags do not exist can be translated into no animal is a goatstag, and that we can manouvre in this way in all cases in which an empty term occurs as a subject in a proposition. The new proposition we obtain contains the empty term in the predicative position, and this fact seems to be ruled out by the very notion of universal which Aristotle defends. Therefore, in his view, an empty general term can appear neither as a subject nor as a predicate in a quantied proposition. Moreover, it should be pointed out that, from a technical point of view, to justify Aristotles logic in general we need to avoid empty terms not only in a subjective but also in a predicative position. It is true that to avoid the counterexamples to the square of opposition it is sucient to impose the requirement that the subjects of the propositions be not empty terms. But is also true that Aristotle accepted also conversion of propositions. In particular he maintained that a universal armative proposition, e.g. AaB, converts into a particular one, i.e. BiA and a universal negative, AeB, into a universal negative, BeA. To accept these views one must concede that not only subjects but also predicates must be non-empty terms. If Aristotles logic works only by rejecting empty terms as predicates and subjects of quantied propositions, its limit is clear. In no way is it able to deal with propositions containing empty terms. The conclusion is that his logic is not inconsistent but has clear-cut boundaries in its capacity to account for arguments and propositions both of the everyday and scientic language. The only relaxation to this strong limit comes from the interpretation of text (H) suggested. In this passage

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Aristotle seems to consider propositions whose subject is constituted by an empty term as behaving in a way similar to singular propositions. Therefore, there is a way to deal at least with some of the propositions concerning . Of course, not every proposition containing empty terms can be reduced to the case of a is F where a stands for a non-existent individual, nor does Aristotle explain in so many words what the truth-conditions for these propositions are. It is not even clear whether Aristotle was aware of the limits of his position. What he says about does not allow us to make further attempts to solve the problems his position poses; therefore it is better to leave our analysis here.

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