Third World Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 4, pp.

677687, 2004

Designing a secure Iraq: a US policy prescription

JULIAN SCHOFIELD & MICAH ZENKO
ABSTRACT The third Western attempt at regime construction in Iraq is now underway. Western plans to rebuild the Iraqi state will fail again if they ignore the real roots of Iraqi insecurity: its geopolitical weakness. The preoccupation with designing a new constitution ignores the historical evidence of the 1930s and 1950s that it is bound to fail. Surrounded by far larger powers such as Turkey and Iran, Iraq desperately needs long-term commitments of arms and allies. While de-garrisoning is a vital part of the regional peace puzzle, an insecure Iraq destabilises politics in Baghdad and fuels arms competitions. Thus the USA and UK must intercede on Iraqs behalf and help to resolve the long-standing disputes over the unfair division of the Shatt al-Arab with Iran, and access to sea arrangements with Kuwait. If Iraq is permitted to drift away a decade after reconstruction, its regime will again fall. Creating the conditions for the Iraqis to freely select a constitution and government for themselves is a vital part of the overall goal of bringing stability and prosperity to the Persian Gulf.1 British use of minorities in Iraq to govern on their behalf, rst the Assyrians in the 1920s and then the Sunni, has entrenched divisions in society that will pose challenges for national reintegration. The philosophical underpinning of current US strategy is Straussian reconstruction: the belief that Iraq can be made secure by changing its regime. The announcement by the Bush administration on the eve of the war that the Quartets roadmap would be reintroduced would compel Iraqis to pay greater attention to their treatment of the Kurds. What remains unclear is precisely what kind of Iraq the USA will leave when it eventually withdraws.2 We recognise that, while regime change is a vital component of bringing security and therefore stability to Iraq and its neighbours, it is not sufcient. Proposals for a post-occupation Iraq are incomplete without consideration of its security within the context of the regional balance of power and dormant disputes with its neighbours.3 If the USA is to achieve its goal of establishing a stable Iraq, it must internalise historical Iraqi concerns. While this discussion is not about outlining a blueprint for the creation of a USA ally, we believe there is a coincidence of interest between the USA and Iraq that makes consideration of the impact of the region on Iraqs security worthwhile.
Julian Schoeld is in the Department of Political Science, Concordia University, Montreal, Canada. Micah Zenko is a doctoral candidate at Brandeis University, USA. He can be contacted at 79 JFK Street, Littauer P-12, Cambridge, MA 01238, USA. Email: micah zenko@harvard.edu. ISSN 0143-6597 print/ISSN 1360-2241 online/04/040677-11 2004 Third World Quarterly DOI: 10.1080/01436590410001678924

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Our argument is that, rst, Iraq cannot be made politically stable by an exclusive reliance on institution building, social engineering and re-education, because a major driving force of its behaviour is its insecurity.4 There is thus no substitute for addressing Iraqi geopolitical concerns. Democracy will not take root if Iraq remains insecure.5 Second, therefore, the USA will have to assume some security responsibilities and deter Iraqs most dangerous neighbours for long enough to permit its democratic institutions to consolidate control over the military. This means that the USA will have to take a close interest in brokering durable bilateral security agreements between Iraq and Iran, Turkey, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria. Third, Iraq needs to be de-garrisoned, but not disarmed. The Iraqi military must be provided with the weapons it needs to feel secure or nationalists among them will intervene in civilian politics. Insecurity and the garrison state Political scientists have long recognised the role international factors play in forming regime types, particularly how the threat of war stimulates garrison states and authoritarian politics. Democracies fare poorly in dangerous regions. Regimes must therefore be recognised as part of a reciprocal interaction with their neighbours.6 Iraqs internal state of affairs cannot be separated from the war-prone environment within which it is found. Carved out of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, suffering from disputes and threats of invasion from nearly all its neighbours, many of which are substantially larger, Iraq has struggled to maintain its sovereignty. Iran, the USA, the USSR and Israel have all sponsored insurgency in Kurdistan. Iran and the USA have induced revolt among the Shia. Already before 1990 Iraq had fought wars and clashed at borders with Iran, Syria, Kuwait, Jordan and Israel. While it may certainly be true that Saddam Hussein was responsible for precipitating the 1980 invasion of Iran and the 1990 conquest of Kuwait, all his foreign adventures had their origins in policies rst espoused by Iraqs monarchy in the 1920s and 1930s. Saddam accentuated Iraqs insecurities over Iran and access to the Persian Gulf, and acted on them because of a faultily over-centralised decision-making process, but he did not invent them. Iraq, like many states under chronic external and internal threat, had evolved into a garrison state by the eve of the US invasion in March 2003.7 Garrison states are characterised by authoritarian governance, high levels of militarised decision making, large and expensive armed forces, and domestic restrictions on the sort of rights that make liberal democracies work.8 Whatever the initial cause of the garrisoning, this structure of government and society is self-reinforcing because it independently magnies the perception of external danger, and may provoke disputes with neighbours.9 An important step in mitigating a regional security dilemma is the dismantlement and replacement of these garrison states with liberal institutional ones; however, this is extremely challenging. Although the programme of democratising a Middle Eastern state is both interesting and complex, it is important that Iraq be reformed within the context of its region.10 Iraq has neighbours and customers, with oil and ideas, which may disturb the countrys domestic stability. The USA must therefore recognise that domestic political reform, by establishing democracy, is insufcient for stability, 678

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anti-proliferation or reduced nationalism. It may impair Iraqs ability to make nuclear weapons, but it will do little to diminish Iraqs poor relationships with Iran, Kuwait, Syria, Saudi Arabia or Israel, and may well lead in the long term to a return to nuclear-seeking policies. Where the USA will nd social reconstruction more difcult will be in Iraqs political culture. Although Iraq has had experience of legislative politics in the past century, it was always under the aegis of either the earlier authoritarian regimes or Saddam Hussein.11 Since 1980, for example, Iraqis have elected deputies on four-year terms to a unicameral National Assembly through universal suffrage. The problem is that all Iraqi leaders, including politician-general Nuri al-Said, have argued that power is reliant on the support of the military, and that Iraq could therefore only be governed by a strongman.12 Iraq has evolved beyond that stark requirement. But without at least a strong institutional centre, the Iraqi state, incorporating all the diverse popular and elite interests of the Sunni, Shia, Kurdish, Turkomen and Assyrian populations, will be unmanageable.13 An appreciation of the challenges facing Iraqi security and their role in previous regime changes is important for the design of the current constitution. The rst regime failure1941 The British installed the Hashemite monarchy in Iraq on August of 1921, and granted formal independence in 1932.14 The British retained links through treaty relations guaranteeing two airbases, military passage and access to oilelds that produced 2.5 million tons annually. The British designed the military to resist disintegration in a multi-ethnic state by building it around a single ruling Sunni urban class located mostly north of Baghdad, incorporating a practice of purges as political behaviour, and forging a reliance on kinship ties for selection and promotion. Despite some early weeding out of Ottoman inuence, the armys cohesion and loyalty were enhanced by setting it around the ofcers that had served in the Turkish Empire, including Nuri al-Said.15 In part this was also a concession to nationalists who resented the Assyrian levies used by the British to dominate Iraq. Consequently, a major role of the army was to serve as a domestic security force, and it was consequently deployed against a Shia uprising in 193536 and nearly continuously against the Kurds. The militarys involvement in domestic politics was indirect: retired middle class ofcers, including Nuri al-Said, frequently entered Baghdad politics and thereby contributed to its stability: between 1920 and 1936, 21 of 59 cabinet posts in Iraq were held by persons with military backgrounds.16 The British had set up Iraq with a cabinet-strong legislature. As outlined in the Organic Law, this consisted of elected deputies and eight-year-term appointed senators. This, and a strong bureaucracy, ensured relative stability among the Sunni and Shia. Nuri, operating from a position of relative strength, established security agreements with all Iraqs neighbours, particularly Turkey and Iran.17 What ultimately led to the direct involvement of Iraqs military in politics was Britains failure to provide regional security and sufcient arms to enhance that security. The dependence of Iraqs monarchy on the British, and the British reluctance to become regionally involved, held back agreements on settling territorial disputes with neighbours.18 For the Hashemites to remain ascendant 679

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they had to provide a continuous ow of nances to the militaryever concerned about Iraqs neighbourssomething the British were reluctant or unable to do in the 1920s and 1930s. As the Iraqis had an exclusivity agreement with the British, there was nowhere else they could obtain arms. Consequently, the shock of Italys invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 divided Iraq. Some sought security arrangements with Turkey and Iran, while others sought to appease Italy. The fact that the British had become reluctant to come to the aid of Iraq consequently weakened the government in Baghdad.19 The rst military coup took place on 28 October 1936, in the absence of the Chief of the General Staff who had departed for a visit to Turkey. General Bakr Sidqi redirected a military force on exercise in the Diyala district into Baghdad. He was aided by the air force, the local division commanders, and the leader of the political opposition in the legislature, Hikmat Sulaiman. Although the coups gradually wore away the legitimacy of the civil subordination of the army, military juntas continued to rule through the mechanisms of the legislature and civilian ministries. Successful counter-coups followed on 11 August 1937, and 24 December 1938, putting in place the rule of the Three and the Four.20 At the outbreak of the second world war pro-British regent Emir Abdullah and Prime Minister Nuri al-Said were blocked from declaring war against Germany by pro-Axis nationalist factions, who displaced the prime minister with the lawyer and founder of the Muslim Brotherhood, Rashid Ali Al-Gaylani, in March 1940. This put the Golden Square, a pro-German faction seeking to exploit grievances against British inuence, in power. A British attempt to remove the Golden Square, consisting of four army colonels who were fearful that the British would compel Iraq to ght the Axis, provoked the seventh and nal military coup on 1 April 1941. Rashid Ali was reinstated (as the regent ed) and, after some hesitation, attacked the British stationed in Iraq at Habbaniya aireld. In May a 5800-strong British force reoccupied Baghdad and restored General Nuri al-Said as prime minister.21

The second regime failure1958 The British purged three-quarters of the Iraqi army in 194143 and constitutionally strengthened the monarchy over the cabinet (and nationalist Sunni inuence), but acceded as well to Nuri al-Saids request that the military should be preserved as a pillar of the regime.22 The consolidation of the Shah in Iran, establishment of Israel and independence of Iraqs neighbours again led the military to request renewed arms imports. A shortage of spare war material, particularly artillery, tanks and aircraft, left Iraqs army under-equipped in the 1940s. Iraq was also seeking alternate, mainly modern and thus American equipment, although through a secret agreement with Washington the British had imposed limits on US sales. Although by 1957 a Military Assistance Understanding provided Iraq with two full-strength divisions with British and US tanks and artillery, it was felt in Iraq that the military assistance was inadequate and Nuri was criticised by civilian opponents for not obtaining more.23 The USA ultimately agreed in May 1958 to provide an initial batch of four F-86F 680

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interceptors to protect Iraqs northern oilelds against MiG-17s, as part of an eventual four-squadron force.24 Once again mainstream Iraqi nationalists were frustrated with the British reluctance to provide arms. The Anglo-American and French response to the aftershocks of the 1948 ArabIsraeli War was to limit its scope, and the possibility of entry by the USSR into the region, by imposing in May 1950 a Tripartite Agreement that limited all arms sales to the Middle East. The British sought to direct Iraqs military to the immediate goals of domestic suppression (especially of the Kurds) and Soviet deterrence, and not to include defence against Iraqs immediate neighbours. Anglo-American sales to Iraq were also resisted by Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Egypt.25 On 14 July 1958 army Brigadier Abd al-Karim Qassem seized control and killed Nuri al-Said and the Hashemite family of Prince Feisal II. His goals were to counter-balance Western inuence with improved relations and arms imports from the USSR. Western reaction was swift: US marines were landed in Lebanon and deployed in the Persian Gulf, and British paratroopers ew into Amman, Jordan to cement these regimes. The British discouraged a Jordanian invasion of Iraq, and the USSR deterred a planned Turkish intervention. The Anglo-American action weakened these two countries inuence among the Arab states.26 Not surprisingly, Qassems foreign policy was not greatly different from that of his prote ge , General Nuri.27 Qassem sought unsuccessfully to resolve territorial disputes with Iran over the Shatt al-Arab and Khuzistan, and with Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Syria. He incorporated pan-Arabs into his government, as well as communists in order to obtain Soviet favour and arms. Iraqi geopolitics and security For a durably stable Iraq to emerge it must be provided security guarantees in the form of extended deterrence and arms. In the short term, while Iraq is under reconstitutive occupation, the USA should open a dialogue with Baghdads neighbours and resolve as many of its territorial disputes as possible. The negotiated arrangements should be commensurate with international law and based on principles of justice recognised within the Persian Gulf region, but should also be defensible by whatever Iraqi military that is designed and left behind when the USA withdraws. There is a precedent for productive stewardship of Iraqi interests. The British, on behalf of Iraq, had signed and resolved territorial disputes with France (for Syria), Saudi Arabia (1922 Treaty of Muhammara, and the 1925 Bahra Treaty to control tribal migrations) and Turkey (over the 1921 Mosul dispute resolved in 192526) before Iraqs independence.28 While under Ottoman control, Iraqs access to the sea had always been limited by the British protectorate of Kuwait and the Iranian tributary of Khuzistan. Iraqs frontier with Iran had been established by centuries of war and negotiations between the Iranians and the Turks, and has been formalised in a body of treaty law. The Sunni/Shia divide is a dynamic that has been changing in favour of the latter for centuries.29 The desert frontiers with Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria are arbitrary but defensible lines across sparsely populated open deserts. Only the northern border populated 681

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by Kurds overlays signicant ethnic lines and defensible geographic terrain, and was established as it was by the British to incorporate the Kurdish oil elds into Iraq. Nevertheless, Iraqs overarching security problem is that it does not possess the population, let alone the defensible terrain, to counteract Iran or Turkey. Until 1922 it had not even been independent for half a millenium. Turkey has been mollied for the past century by its and Iraqs joint co-operation over the suppression of the Kurds. In contrast, Irans power has oscillated wildly, from low points in 1941 and 1979 to high points in 1975, when it imposed the Algiers Agreement on Iraq after a costly border war (196975). We address each of these geopolitical concerns in turn. Port access and the Shatt al-Arab There were Turko-Iranian treaties governing the Shatt al-Arab divide between Mesopotamia and Iran dating from 1555 (Treaty of Amasia), 1639 (Treaty of Zuhab), 1727 (Treaty of Amir Ashraf), 1746 (Treaty of Nadir Shah), 1823 (Treaty of Erzerum I), 1843 (Treaty of Erzerum II), 1911 (Protocol of Tehran), 1913 (Protocol of Constantinople), and 1937 (Treaty of Tehran). The British compelled Iran to submit to the 1937 Treaty of Tehran where it surrendered the thalweg (centre-line) of the Shatt al-Arab waterway on its border with Iraq.30 As a general principle the treaties reect changes in control of the river that correspond to broader shifts in the power balance on the eastern and western sides of the waterway. Its long historical importance is a result of the commercial and naval access it provides from the main Iraqi port of Basra and the Iranian port at Abadan to the Persian Gulf. Starting in the 1920s the Shatt al-Arab also became the main waterway for the oil exports of both states, which were located in close proximity to either side of the river. The current Shatt al-Arab dispute broke out in the 1930s, and included a number of armed incidents and an unsuccessful reference of the dispute to the League of Nations, but was resolved with the Tehran Treaty of July 1937, thanks mainly to Turkish brokerage. Prime Minister Nuri al-Said, before the League of Nations in 1935, complained that Iran had a long coastline and that Iraq therefore required sovereignty over the Shatt al-Arab: It is highly undesirable, from Iraqs point of view, that another Power [Iran] should command this channel from one bank.31 Interruption of pipeline exports through Haifa in Israel and Homs in Syria had made Iraq reluctant to depend on other states for port access (although pipelines were put through Jordan and Turkey) and it has sought to widen its access to the Gulf.32 Since the collapse of the Ottoman Empire both Iran and Iraq have equipped themselves with the means to blockade the waterway in time of war, purchasing sea mines, anti-ship missiles, artillery and ultimately ghter-bomber aircraft procured specically for strategic warfare against their respective oil rigs, pipelines, reneries and terminals. A spill-over effect of the insecurity produced by Iraqs restricted access to the sea have been repeated threats to the security of Kuwait and of Khuzistan in Iran. Every independent government of Iraq, including those of pro-British King 682

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Ghazi and Nuri al-Said, and of Qassem and Saddam, have either proposed or demanded these changes. The Iraqi claims on Khuzistan are unrealisable. While originally a predominantly Arab province of Iran (and containing most of Irans oil), its population has been diluted by an inux of Persian workers, and attempts by Qassem in 1960 and Hussein in the early 1980s to foment revolution there largely failed. Nevertheless, the impending 1991 war led Iraq to restore the division of the waterway as it had been agreed in the 1975 Treaty of Algiers, which was strongly favourable to Iran. Iraq in effect ceded all sovereignty along the waterway to Iran, where it should customarily be shared through the thalweg along their common frontier. Neither the Tehran Treaty nor the Treaty of Algiers respected these broader international principles. A secure Iraq would therefore be aided if the USA were to reopen negotiations on a new Treaty, perhaps supervised by the United Nations, re-establishing evenly divided access and a joint commission to administer it (which was articled in the Tehran Treaty but not implemented). So that this new treaty is durable, Iraqis and Iranians must be the negotiators, and the USA, or the UN, should provide explicit guarantees.33 Iraqs two ports of Umm Qasr and al-Faw provide indefensible access to the Persian Gulf, and Iraq has consequently attempted everything from invading Kuwait to oating proposals, unsuccessfully, to lease the Warba and Bubiyan Islands.34 On 25 June 1961 Qassem claimed Kuwait, thinking wrongly that in the post-1956 environment the British would be reluctant to come to its assistance; he succeeded in furthering Iraqs international isolation when British and later Saudi Forces deployed in Kuwait to deter him. Saddam invaded Kuwait in August 1990.35 US intercession now between Iraq and Kuwait to lease the channel running between the east coast of Kuwait and the west coast of Warba and Bubiyan Islands, or to cede a portion of Warba Island for a port facility that has access to the Khawr Abd Allah channel, would contribute signicantly to Iraqi security without weakening Kuwait.

The Kurds Competition between the Arabs and Kurds has been nearly continuous, with revolts occurring in every decade between 1920 and 2000 and these wars occupying over half of Iraqs military until the mid-1970s. From Baghdads standpoint these revolts are critically dangerous because they occur in Iraqs second key oil-producing areas of Kirkuk and Irbil. This means that foreign powers, especially Iran, must be deterred from providing external support to the Kurds, including via ethnic kin organisations in Turkey. The idea of an independent Kurdistan poses a contradiction between principles of self-determination, and the value of stability. Turkey, Iran and Syria will resist US attempts to grant the Kurds autonomy sufcient to formulate an independent policy from Baghdad with respect to Kurds in neighbouring states. An independent Kurdistan would unravel multi-ethnic Iran, and deny Turkey oil elds in its eastern provinces. In some respects this is the easiest issue to resolve from an international standpoint if the USA simply upholds the status quo. Turkey and Iraq, for example, established close co-operation over the Kurdish question 683

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during the Hussein regime, and the USA should facilitate the extension of this co-operation into the future.36 Greater Syria and relations with Israel Two undercurrents the USA is unlikely to have much immediate success in changing is pan-Arabism, or, locally, the issue of Greater Syria, and relations with the state of Israel. In the area between the Mediterranean and the Zagros Mountains, pan-Arabism in the form of a vision of Greater Syria incorporating Syria, Iraq, Kuwait and Jordan (and Lebanon and Palestine) has long resonated with local politicians. Predicting which unions succeed (Yemen) or fail (United Arab Republic, KuwaitIraq) is difcult. The Fertile Crescent impinges on too many powerful states to unify, and the problems of co-ordinating such an enterprise are probably sufcient to keep the project dormant for some time. Second, Iraq, irrespective of its regime, has participated in most of the ArabIsraeli wars. An unaltered US policy on the PalestinianIsraeli dispute will make it more difcult to maintain the legitimacy of any even marginally Western-accommodating regime in Baghdad. What the USA can reasonably hope for in Iraq is a stable nationalist regime, provided nancial assistance in the same manner as Egypt, but hopefully without the same level of repression. Weapons and security The question is therefore over what type of Iraq to build. Neutralising Iraq is tempting for the USA. This would leave it with a military bereft of heavy weapons like bombers, tanks and aircraft. A military too weak even to confront its own population, let alone its neighbours. However, neutralisation will trigger nationalism and resistance to US policies, alienate local political elites, weaken the regime against non-state actors, feed challengers like Islamic fundamentalist movements, and fuel nationalists within whatever military is left behind. A strong Iraq, in contrast, will be less prone to military interventions and aggressive foreign policies. A strong Iraq would promote the status quo in the Persian Gulf, particularly the ow of (its own) oil, and counter-balance hegemonism from Iran.37 This would also deter Iranian and Syrian involvement in Iraqs delicate internal constitution. This would require an Iraqi army numbering at least four corps including a variant of the Republican Guard, and imply a commitment of US nancial aid and arms, at least until surplus oil revenues can be used for weapons procurement. Iraqs tous azimuts threats, and the size of Iran would make a smaller force lack credibility. De-garrisoning Iraqs politics will remove much of the superuous incentive for the accumulation of arms, but providing too few arms, as the British did in the 1930s and 1950s, would provoke greater insecurity that would destabilise the government. The importance given by Iraq to obtaining arms is evident in the historical diversity of its sources: it includes imports from Germany and Italy in 1937, from the USA in the 1950s and 1960s, from the Soviets beginning in 1959, the French in the 1960s, and the Chinese, North Koreans and South Africans in the 1980s.38 684

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Iraq needs a Republican Guard equivalent, because it is hard to see what other method exists to keep errant elements of the Iraqi military out of Baghdad.39 Iraqs current Republican Guard evolved out of the Hashemite Royal Guards Brigade, and through a Republican Guard brigade after the 1958 coup. Its purpose has remained largely unchanged: to counter-balance the inuence of an ofcer corps that had become accustomed to direct military involvement in politics under the Ottoman Empire and during the inter-war and cold war period. Although Saddam Husseins regime was the end-result of a long line of internal coups facilitated by weak Iraqi governments, he was most successful in using the Republican Guard to block threats of military intervention. In effect, the Iraqi military will stay out of power if civilian governments deliver the security, in the form of alliances and weapons, needed to protect the state. The extent to which the USA provides arms (as a form of a neo-Nixon doctrine) or alliances will vary in response to exogenous international and domestic events for the USA. It should therefore be prepared for a exible balance between the two. Iraq needs external security guarantees for a sufciently extended period to permit its democratic institutions to consolidate control over its praetorian guard, which are in turn required to coup-proof the regime against a military that cannot be allowed to fall below a critical lower limit.40 This means the USA will have to provide consistent assistance in the form of extended military deterrence. Conclusion An Iraq, de-garrisoned, provided with extended deterrence and arms, would achieve sufcient stability not to provoke further US intervention. Aside from providing a counter-balance to Iran in the Persian Gulf, its stability would assuage the fears of its neighbours. Nevertheless, the conquest of Iraq may have some long-term pitfalls. First, American unilateralism may impede the willingness of regional powers to negotiate with a Baghdad occupied by the USA. Second, the US invasion may set off more nuclear proliferation attempts in the Middle East and elsewhere, as states scramble to protect themselves against the USAs policy of pre-emption. While there are logistical and domestic constraints to Americas power, it possesses the projection capability and budget to provide military assistance and security guarantees to middle and small states, in regions of strategic concern, suffering from security decits. Given the sunk costs of the Anglo-American invasion, and the necessity for a durable Persian Gulf, these power guarantees are the best means to provide for the stability Iraq requires to become a de-garrisoned and democratised state.

Notes
The authors wish to thank Hassan Abdulrazak for his valuable comments. 1 O Bengio, Pitfalls of instant democracy, in M Eisenstadt & E Mathewson (eds), US Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq, Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2003, pp 1526.

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N Lehman, After Iraq: the plan to remake the Middle East, The New Yorker, 17 February 2003, p 70; and A Frachon & D Vernet, Le strate gie et le philosophe, Le Monde, 16 April 2003. I Lustick, The absence of Middle Eastern great powers, International Organization, 51 (4), 1997, pp 653684. Note that most assessments of postwar Iraq make little mention of Iraqs security position in the region. E Djerejian, F Wisner, R Bronson & A Weiss, Guiding Principles for US Post-Conict Policy in Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations, 2003; F Barton & B Crocker, A Wiser Peace: An Action Strategy For a Post-Conict Iraq, Washington, DC: Center for Security and International Strategy, 2003; P Marr, Iraq the day after: internal dynamics in post-Saddam Iraq, Naval War College Review, 56 (1), 2003, pp 1329; J Hulsman & J Phillips, Forging a Durable Post-War Political Settlement in Iraq, Heritage Foundation Backgrounder, 2003, p 1632; and A Dawisha & K Dawisha, How to build a democratic Iraq, Foreign Affairs, 82 (3), 2003, pp 3650. D Byman, Constructing a democratic Iraq, International Security, 28 (1), 2003, pp 4778, esp 6667, 7475. PA Gourevitch, Squaring the circle: the domestic sources of international cooperation, International Organization, 50 (2), 1996, pp 349373; O Hintze, Military organization and the organization of the state, in F Gilbert (ed), The Historical Essays of Otto Hintze, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975; and K Rasler & W Thompson, War making and state making: governmental expenditures, tax revenues, and global wars, American Political Science Review, 79 (2), 1985, pp 491507. R Aron, Remarks on Lassells The Garrison State , Armed Forces & Society, 5, 1979, pp 347359. A Ross, Dimensions of militarization in the Third World, Armed Forces & Society, 13, 1987, pp 562564. J Stanley, Introduction: an invitation to revisit Lasswells Garrison State in Jay Stanley (ed), Essays on the Garrison State, New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997, pp 1741. A Rathmell, T Karasik & D Gompert, A New Persian Gulf Security System, Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003. D Pipes, A border adrift: origins of the conict, in S Tahir-Kheli & S Ayubi (eds), The Iran-Iraq War: New Weapons, Old Conicts, New York: Praeger, 1983, pp 325. U Dann, Iraq Under Qassem: A Political History, 19581963, Tel Aviv: Praeger, 1969, p 8. G Harris, Iraq: Its People, Its Society, Its Culture, New Haven, CT: Hraf Press, 1958, p 147. Kings Faisal I (192133), Ghazi (193339) and Faisal II (193958). M Heller, Iraqs army: military weakness, political utility, in A Baram & B Rubin (eds), Iraqs Road to War, New York: St Martins Press, 1993, pp 3750; M Heller, Politics and the military in Iraq and Jordan, 19201958, Armed Forces & Society, 4 (1), 1977, pp 7599; and P Hemphill, The formation of the Iraqi army, 192133, in A Kelidar (ed), The Integration of Modern Iraq, London: Croom Helm, 1979, pp 88110. C Tripp, Iraqambitions checked, Survival, 28 (6), 1986, pp 495509; and P Sluglett, The British legacy, in Eisenstadt & Mathewson, US Policy in Post-Saddam Iraq, pp 314. M Khadduri, Republican Iraq: A Study in Iraqi Politics Since the Revolution of 1958, London: Oxford University Press, 1969, p 181. Harris, Iraq, p 151. ME Ahrari, Arms races in the Persian Gulf: the post-cold war dynamics, in ME Ahrari & J Noyes (eds), The Persian Gulf after the Cold War, Westport, WA: Praeger, 1993, pp 172196. G De Gaury, Three Kings in Baghdad: 19211958, London: Hutchinson, 1961, p 99, 107; S McKnight, Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi army, in J Pimlott & S Badsey (eds), The Gulf War Assessed, London: Arms and Armour, 1992, pp 1334; A. Abbas, The Iraqi armed forces, past and present, in CARDRI (Committee Against Repression and for Democratic Rights in Iraq) (eds), Saddams Iraq: Revolution or Reaction?, London: Zed Books, 1986, 203236; U Dann, The Iraqi ofcer corps as a factor for stabilityan unorthodox approach, in H Schiffrin (ed), Military and State in Modern Asia, Jerusalem: Academic Press, 1976, pp 259268. I Al-Araif, Iraq Reborn: A Firsthand Account of the July 1958 Revolution and After, New York: Vantage Press, 1982, p 7; and C Trench, The Indian Army and the Kings Enemies, 190047, London: Thames and Hudson, 1988, p 158. M Elliott, Independent Iraq: The Monarchy and British Inuence 194158, London: Tauris Academic Studies, 1996, p 15. D Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East: A Case Study of Iraq, 19411950, New York: St Martins Press, 1994, pp 97, 101, 103105, 107, 173, 180, 186; Ministry of Defence Brief, 11 March 1954 (FO 371/110821 V1193/42), and Minutes of Meeting with US Survey Teams, 18 March 1954 (FO 371/110821 V1193/43), cited in F Axelgard, US policy toward Iraq, 19461958, PhD dissertation, Fletcher School, Tufts University, 1988, pp 145, 195196, 201, 207. Memorandum of a Meeting in the State Department, 14 July 1958 (DDRS 1975, Department of State 628H), cited in Axelgard, US policy toward Iraq, p 210. M Ibrahim Al-Windawi, Anglo-Iraqi relations 19451958, PhD dissertation, Reading University, p 211; Silverfarb, The Twilight of British Ascendancy in the Middle East, pp 184, 209; Axelgard, US policy toward Iraq, p135.

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34 35 36

37 38 39 40

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