To appear in Epoch: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 18 (1), forthcoming, Fall 2013.

Do not quote or cite unless given explicit permission by the author.

Heidegger's Sein zum Tode as radicalization of Aristotles definition of kinsis

Joseph P. Carter University of Georgia

Abstract: There is evidence in the early Vorlesungen to suggest that in Sein und Zeit Heidegger's description of Dasein as Bewegung/Bewegtheit relies on his reading of Aristotles definition of motion, given specifically in the 1924 Die Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie. According to Heidegger, Aristotle identifies kinsis with energeia and calls it active potentiality (ttige Mglichkeit). In this essay, I show how Heidegger's interpretation of Aristotles definition of motion sheds light on the arguments concerning being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode) in Sein und Zeit. I argue that self-understanding is Dasein's active potentiality, since this is its authentic being-towards-death. In turn, I assess Heideggers philological and philosophical justifications for collapsing the distinction between energeia and kinsis in Aristotle, showing how Heidegger diverges from Aristotle's doctrines.

In the opening passages of Division II.5 of Sein und Zeit (SZ),1 where the attention shifts

from the analysis of temporality (Zeitlichkeit/Temporalitt) in Daseins everyday attitude to its role in the broader account of historicity (Geschichtlichkeit), Heidegger makes a rather curious claim pertaining to the movedness (Bewegung/Bewegtheit) of Dasein: The movedness of Existenz is not the motion of what is present-at-hand. It is determined out of the stretching of Dasein. The particular movedness of the self-stretching which is stretched out [erstreckten Sicherstreckens], we call the happenings of Dasein.2 In other words, the being of Dasein concerns a particular motion that accounts for the happenings of life (Geschehen), which occur in terms of ones own history and continue to expand and grow so long as one exists. The problem, still, is that there is no apparent account in SZ to shed light on this claim. While Heidegger claims that this spezifische Bewegtheit provides a way to understand Daseins Zeitlichkeit and Geschichtlichkeit, in what respect are we even to grasp the character of such movement when Heidegger says so little about it? What might Heidegger mean by the movedness of Existence, or what I call Daseins kineticity? What does it mean for its motion to be das erstreckte Sicherstrecken, the self-stretching which is stretched out? Furthermore, if temporality is the fundamental aspect of the being of Dasein, then why does Heidegger also remark that Dasein is constituted in terms of motion? Are these two ways at odds, or might there be something more to Daseins temporality that is not made explicit in the

For their helpful comments and criticisms on earlier drafts, I thank Elizabeth Brient, Steven Crowell, Edward Halper, Ren Jagnow, Greg Moss, Nathan Vacher, and my anonymous reviewer. 1 Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Tbingen: Max Niemeyer, 2006). All translations from SZ and the Gesamtausgabe are my own, unless noted otherwise. For SZ, I have consulted both the Macquarrie-Robinson (M&R) and Stambaugh (2010) translations, and for Die Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie (GA 18), the Metcalf-Tanzer (2009) translation. 2 SZ, pp. 374-375, emphasis mine.

text? In all, on what terms must we understand Daseins kineticity as equally ontologically constitutive as its temporality, if Heidegger makes little argument for it? To address these issues, I suggest an approach along the same lines as Heideggers strategy for articulating temporalitythrough Aristotle. If temporality is articulated by uncovering the existential-ontological assumptions hidden beneath Aristotles vuglare Zeitbegriff,3 then it makes sense also to approach the question of Daseins kineticity through Heideggers interpretation of motion in Aristotle. For one reason, in the Physics, Aristotle argues that there is neither motion without time nor time without motion, since time follows along with motion (Phy. .10, 218b13-20). In the same vein, just as there is originary time for Dasein temporalitythere should also be Daseins originary motionkineticity. Yet again, there is no direct evidence or argument for this in SZ. Instead, at our disposal are various treatments of motion in Heideggers early Vorlesungen (1921-1927) preceding the publication of SZ.4 With an eye to motions connection to Dasein, the most notable Vorlesung analyzing in detail Aristotles views on motion is the 1924 Die Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie [Grundbegriffe].

, (Phy. .11, 219b1), which Heidegger translates as Das nmlich ist die Zeit, das Gezhlte an der im Horizont des Frher und Spter begegenden Bewegung (SZ, p. 421). See also Die Grundprobleme der Phnomenologie (GA 24), pp. 331-345. At GA 18, p. 378, Heidegger also ties together the active potentiality (ttige Mglichkeit) of motion with Daseins located temporality (rtliche Zeitlichkeit)its concrete, temporal context. 4 There is a strong consensus amongst commentators that the pre-SZ Vorlesungen and Seminare significantly aided Heidegger as he planned and prepared his manuscript for the 1927 publication of SZ. Theodore Kisiel, The Genesis of Heideggers Being and Time (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1995) painstakingly details this development, with a substantial discussion on Aristotles influence (pp. 227-308). For texts where Heidegger deals with Bewegung/, both in Aristotle and in general, see the following: GA 18, pp. 269-329, 354-395 (Handschriften). Die Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie (GA 22), pp. 169-188. GA 24, pp. 325-30. Aristoteles, Metaphysik 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft (GA 33). Phnomenologische Interpretationen ausgewhlter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zur Ontologie und Logik (GA 62), pp. 101-108, 387. Vom Wesen und Begriff der Physis: Aristoteles, Physik B, 1, in Wegmarken (GA 9), pp. 239-301.
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What makes this text unique and most pertinent is that it supplies Heideggers most explicit and detailed analysis of the definition of motion given in Physics .1-3 with direct reference to its role in the constitution of Dasein: Because of this orientation [to uncovering the how of Daseins being], we need to characterize motion since we will come to know it as a determination of a being [Seienden], and indeed of the living-being, from which every additional treatment of Being is assessed. : the guiding thread for the explication of the Being of the being-there of the human being.5 Therefore, in light of the Grundbegriffe and other supporting texts, I show in 1 how and why Heidegger uses his interpretation of Aristotles definition of motion to lay the groundwork for the Daseinsanalytik in SZ.6 Following this, in 2, I show how Heideggers understanding of

GA 18, pp. 273, emphasis mine. Cf. GA 33, p. 172. That Heideggers explication of Physics 1-3 in the Grundbegriffe plays a formidable role in developing the notion of Sein zum Tode is rarely suggested, even though commentators agree that Heidegger's early interest in the Physics does help shape the Daseinanalytik. For example, while Kisiel mentions that Physics 1-3 is crucial to Heideggers development of the Daseinsanalytik, there is a significant lacuna in his treatment. Where he analyzes the Grundbegriffe, Kisiel, pp. 286-301, leaves aside the second part of the course, where Heidegger examines the definition of motion. When translating and analyzing Heideggers famous Phnomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der Hermeneutischen Situation) (GA 62), pp. 354-399, Kisiel, pp. 248-271, also ignores Heideggers remarks on both Metaphysics A 1-2 and Physics A-E, wherein Heidegger makes plain that is central to the hermeneutical project. Still, this is not to say that no commentator recognizes the general importance of Aristotle's definition of motion for Heidegger. See Jussi Backman, Divine and mortal motivation: On the movement of life in Aristotle and Heidegger, Continental Philosophy Review 38, pp. 241-261; Walter Brogan, Double Arch: Heideggers reading of Aristotles kinetic ontology, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities 2 (3), pp. 85-92; Brogan, Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being (Albany, NY: SUNY 2005); Rudolf Burnet, Die Lehre von der Bewegung bei Aristoteles, Heidegger und die Griechen, Martin-HeideggerGesellschaft, vol. 8 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2005), pp. 95-122; Francisco Gonzalez, Whose Metaphysics of Presence? Heideggers Interpretation of Energeia and Dunamis in Aristotle, The Southern Journal of Philosophy (44), pp. 533-568; Servanne Jollivet, Das Phnomen der Bewegtheit im Licht der Dekonstruktion der aristotelischen Physik, HeideggerJahrbuch 3 (2007), pp. 130-155; Thomas Sheehan, On the way to Ereignis: Heideggers
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 implicitly shapes the arguments in SZ concerning Dasein as being-towards-death (Sein zum Tode). According to Heidegger in the Grundbegriffe, Aristotle defines as an active potentiality (ttige Mglichkeit). With this in mind, I show that we should interpret the towardness (Zu-sein) of being-towards-death as indicating Daseins active potentiality. Specifically, Daseins self-understanding is its active potentiality, since this is how Dasein

interpretation of Physis, in Continental Philosophy in America, eds. H. J. Silverman, et al (Pittsburgh, PA: Duquesne University Press, 1983), pp. 131-164; and Charlotta Weigelt, The Logic of Life: Heidegger's Retrieval of Aristotle's Concept of Logos, Stockholm: Almquiest & Wiksell, 2002 and (abbreviated version of chapter 5) "Logos as Kinesis: Heidegger's Interpretation of the Physics in Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie." Epoch: A Journal for the History of Philosophy 9 (1), pp. 101-116. Nevertheless, only Bernet, Gonzalez, Jollivet, and Weigelt offer detailed analyses of the Grundbegriffe and its connection to SZ. Bernet focuses on the role of in the Grundbegriffe, although he also offers more general comments regarding the role of in Heidegger beyond SZ. While Bernet, pp. 95-97, lists the various ways he thinks the Grundbegriffe influences SZ, calling them ausdrcklicher Bezugnahme for the Daseinsanalytik, he thinks Sein zum Tode relates more to the Nicomachean Ethics. Gonzalezs treatment is highly critical of Heidegger, and at times misses the nuances of Heideggers arguments. However, his criticisms of Heideggers sharp distinction between and are helpful for understanding how Heidegger exploits some ambiguities in Aristotle. Jollivet suggests insightfully that the Grundbegriffe is a deconstructive enterprise which seeks out the existential-ontological elements hidden beneath Aristotles formulation of (p. 140). This squares with my proposal that the analysis of Dasein is as much about originary motion as originary time. She also provides a thoughtful presentation of Bewegtheit in the general philosophical milieu of Heideggers work. Weigelt, while nicely articulating the commanding role of in Heidegger's interpretation of , hardly addresses the teleological significance of death in the Grundbegriffe's discussion of . As for the others, Backman focuses more on Heideggers reading of Metaphysics 1-3 (GA 33) and the Nicomachean Ethics in Platon: Sophistes (GA 19), pp. 21-64. He references the definition of motion both in Aristotles text and in the Grundbegriffe only in passing (Backman, 251; 261, fn. 62). Brogan and Sheehan devote a great deal of time explicating Heideggers 1939 Phusis essay. Even though Heidegger addresses the definition of motion in this text (GA 9, pp. 283-287), which Brogan and Sheehan recognize, albeit briefly, no significant attempt is made by either Brogan or Sheehan to make sense of the definition in the context of the Daseinsanalytik. Strangely, while Sheehan reads his interpretation of Ereignis and back into SZ, this is with the noticeable absence of a substantial discussion of the definition of motion, even though Sheehan sees as central to Heideggers notion of Ereignis. Gonzalez, however, thinks there is a significant interpretive shift between the early readings of Aristotle and 1939 Phusis text, which is why he makes no attempt to apply it retrospectively to SZ; see Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 554. 5

authentically moves towards death. This reading of helps us also to make sense of various aspects of Daseins kinetic structure, e.g. constancy, internal stretching, and Daseins inherently incomplete being. However, in 3, I assess Heideggers justifications for collapsing the distinction between and in Aristotle. While Heideggers philological reasons for the strong identification are insufficient on Aristotles own terms, they illuminate the philosophical reasons for how and why Heidegger applies his interpretation of to Dasein.

I
The general aim of the Grundbegriffe is to elucidate the being of Dasein as Sein-in-einerWelt (In-der-Welt-sein in SZ) in light of Aristotelian concepts.7 While Heidegger is, indeed, interested in uncovering what he thinks is the originality of Aristotles concepts, the whole exercise is still executed within the framework of what will become the Daseinsanalytik in SZ.8 As is evident throughout the course, this is accomplished by presenting Daseins worldliness as if it were originarily an Aristotelian notion.9 Dasein, or das Dasein des Menschen, is defined as the practical living being who has speech ( , ein Leben, und zwar , solchen Seiendem, das die Sprache hat) since this is its living activity, .10 As Heidegger reads , it must be understood in terms of Daseins work or activity () in a world, since the world is the factual or concrete context (sachliche Zusammenhang) within which Daseins is revealed. Heidegger correlates with Daseins authentic activity (die eigentliche Verrichtung) and concern (Besorgen), since these

GA 18, pp. 36-44. Cf. Bernet, op. cit., p. 96 and Jollivet, op. cit., p. 139. Cf. Jollivet, op. cit., pp. 134, 139-143. 9 GA 18, pp. 43-44. 10 Ibid.
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have meaning only in a concrete context wherein Dasein busies itself.11 Speaking, for example, is one manner by which Dasein acts concernfully in the world. For Heidegger, therefore, is the activity which Dasein performs (verrichten) in a factual contexta world. What we need to see, however, is why and how is integral to the analysis of Daseins worldliness. To see this, let us turn to what I take to be Heideggers more explicit argument for reading as Besorgen. This will provide various clues to lead us to the definition of motion and why, ultimately, Daseins is . Our first clue is found in Heideggers translation of the opening passage of the Nicomachean Ethics (EN A.1, 1094a3), where Aristotle distinguishes activities with external ends (/Werke) from those whose ends are themselves (): Es zeigt sich, da ein gewisser Unterschied vorliegt unter den . Die einen sind , die anderen sind , neben dem Besorgen, und zwar , Werke.12 Admittedly, Heidegger still seems only to focus on without reference to . However, the way he reasons through Aristotles claim reveals that motion is an implicit, albeit central component of the interpretation, given that his examples are from motion, e.g. Spaziergang and Schusterei: These are of the sort that they give forth [abfallen] from a concern. Alongside the activity of producing [Verfertigen] the shoe, the shoe gives forth. The points out that the of concern is something which stands alone for itself. At most, this pertains to the character of expedience [Beitrglichen].13 In contrast, the activity of going for a walk [Spaziergang] is, by its , that I go for a walkcontrary to shoemaking

GA 18, p. 44. GA 18, pp. 70-71. Cf. pp. 91-92. 13 Cf., GA 18, p. 57-58. For a nice explanation of Beitrglichen and its connection to motion, see Bogdan Minca, Poiesis: Zu Martin Heideggers Interpretationen der aristotelischen Philosophie (Wrzburg: Knigshausen & Neumann, 2006), pp. 69-70.
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[Schusterei], which comes to an end in something that has in itself its authentic being [eigentliches Sein]. It is not that I go somewhere [hingehen], here and there, that I walk a definite distance, but that I am out in the air, that I have been going for a walk. The lies in the . In this way, since I linger in the concern, this doing [Besorgung, "erranding"] comes to an end, to its . The authenticity of being-finished, of 'goingfor-a-walk,' is grounded in how I go for a walk. There are two different ways of concern distinguished according to the being-character of what constitutes the .14 Essentially, there are two kinds of activities determined according to two kinds of : those whose ends lie beyond the work ( ; neben dem Besorgen) and those whose ends are the acts themselves (; Besorgen). Shoemaking (Schusterei) pertains to the former, while going for a walk (Spaziergang) belongs to the latter. For, the end of shoemaking is not the shoemaking itself, but the shoe, whereas the end of going for a walk is itself, since its end is in the activity itself, an -. The activity is its own end. While one makes a shoe in order to have a shoe, one goes out for a walk simply for the walking. Therefore, walking is an , while shoemaking is merely an , or Werk. Heideggers use of Werk illuminates Aristotles distinction. Werk, like , is typically reserved for acts of labor (Arbeit) and making (Herstellung), whose ends lie outside of the activity. While there is a kind of working performed in Spaziergang, it is not merely a Werk, because the activity is done for its own sake and not for a product. Still, the work of shoemaking is as much a Besorgen as going for a walk. They are both concerns in which Dasein finds itself in the world. What marks their difference is the nature of their ends. Keep these activities in mind when we turn to authenticity and

14

GA 18, p. 71, emphasis mine. 8

inauthenticity in SZ. I will use them to help illuminate the difference between these two modes of Dasein. The basic thrust of Heideggers interpretationthe distinction between internal and external is not the peculiar aspect here. This can be inferred from Aristotles text alone. What makes Heideggers explanation of the EN passage so striking is that his example of Spaziergangactually suggests motion. To be sure, shoemaking is a motion, since the end of motion lies beyond the activity, and the end of shoemaking is the completed shoe. But, Aristotle also classifies walking () as a motion, since it is a change of place (). It is unlikely, therefore, that Aristotle would have agreed to Heideggers use of Spaziergang to exemplify in this passage. If one were to give a more straightforward reading of Aristotle's text, then it would be better to use seeing () or thinking (; ) as an examples of , since neither are motions for Aristotle (Meta. .6, 1048b23-24). However, I think there is a specific reason why Heidegger uses Spaziergang. It comes from an exploitation of an initial ambiguity in Aristotles own formulation of in Metaphysics .3. At the end of .3, Aristotle seems to assume that is (Meta. .3, 1047a32). While Aristotle qualifies his claim later in the Metaphysics (Meta. .6, 1048b1835), it gives Heidegger just enough leverage to play the complicated relationship between and to his advantage. Spaziergang is the perfect term to exploit this. Heidegger appeals to Meta. .3, 1047a32 later in the course in order to elucidate what he thinks is the distinction between and .15 But, I believe Heidegger also assumes this implicitly in the explication of EN A.1, 1094a3 because it helps make sense of Spaziergang as an

GA 18, pp. 295-296. On Metaphysics .3, see Edward Halper, One and Many in Aristotles Metaphysics: The Central Books (Las Vegas: Parmenides Press, 2005), pp. 208-213. Cf., GA 33, pp. 51-52, 223-224 and Jollivet, op. cit., pp. 140-41.
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. Spaziergang suggests that the activity of walking must be read in terms of a motion, since the -gang (gehen) can be taken as a process (Gang) which has walking as its purpose. In other words, the activity is nothing but the motion; to go for a walk is no more than the walking itself. Even the English translation reflects a motion with an internal teleology: going for a walk. If going for a walk is inherent to the walking, then the activity of walking, the , is the motion. It is thereby no surprise that Heidegger uses Spaziergang as the example of since it exemplifies as . Nearly all of what I have drawn from the Heideggers translation of EN A 1, 1094a3 has been made explicit only by way of taking for granted what Heidegger himself holds as a direct identity between and . But, I do not think I have assumed this without good reason. As indicated above, Heidegger sees as das Leitfaden fr die Explikation des Seins des Daseins des Menschen. As I see it, the entire analysis of Daseins in the Grundbegriffe holds this identity as a guiding assumption. However, we are now at the point where this needs to be brought out more clearly. Heidegger first addresses the definition of motion where he speaks of how a worldly beingDaseinis there in the world in such a way that the world is inherently usable (verwendbar). What is usable is constituted in terms of a , a noch nicht. Thus, Dasein and its world exist in terms of an ability-to-be (Seinknnen). Because everything encountered in everydayness (lltaglichkeit) is ordinarily (durchschnittlich) usable, and since usability implies motion, or at least its possibility, Daseins everydayness is inherently kinetic. To elucidate this, Heidegger translates the definition of motion given at Physics 1, 201a10, and then gives his reasons for the translation:

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"Motion is the , the visibility of beings [Gegenwart des Daseienden], as the ability of being-there, and indeed the visibility as long as it is able to be there" [ , , ]. Motion is the visibility of the ability of being-there as such. The wood is able to be a chest, now grasped immediately and simply. This ability-to-be of the wood supposes this ability-to-be-a-chest. As long as it is there, the wood is moving. As long as the wood is there in the authentic sense as chest-ability, the motion is. When the carpenter has the wood at work [es in Arbeit hat], the wood is there in its ability-to-be. The ability-to-be is visible in the being-at-work, as long as the carpenter has the wood working in his hands [es unter der Hand hat]. Thus, Aristotle can define motion hereafter also as . as a way of being-there is nothing other than the being-at-work of something.16 Initially, Heideggers reading of Aristotle seems seriously flawed. It suggests that even when the wood (Holz) is merely lying there (da), e.g. on the table not being sculpted or attended to in anyway, the wood is still moving because it is merely capable of being-sculpted. That is to say, a thing appears in motion even when it does not show up as a motion, i.e. when it is at rest.17 However, this reading overlooks Heideggers use of Gegenwart and gegenwrtig. For Heidegger, Gegenwart does not merely mean presence. It suggests that which is recognized as present, or that which is visibly present to Dasein in everyday experience.18 For, when something is present to Dasein, it appears. It is a phenomenon. Read in this manner, we

Ibid, emphasis mine. Ibid. This is the reading that motivates Gonzalezs criticism. See Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 536 where he reads Heidegger as identifying Bedeutsamkeit with . 18 GA 18, p. 313. Prior to this, at GA 18, p. 279, Heidegger ties intellection () to discursive thinking () by way of . See also GA 18, p. 392; GA 33, p. 196. In a translators note (p. 48, fn. 2), Macquarrie & Robinson suggest the sense of bringing vividly to mind.
16 17

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can make sense of Heideggers seemingly odd reasoning to find that it is relatively consonant with Aristotle: I see the wood lying there on the table. Obviously, the wood is not noticeably moving. Yet, I can still say that it has the potency to become a chest. Why? I have learned from experience that wood is sufficient materialfor chest-making. But, while I might suppose that it has the potency to become a chest when it is at rest, such potency is not visible (gegenwrtig) until I am engaged in the work (Arbeit). This is because the motion of carpentry is the activity (das In-Arbeit-sein) which brings-out, or phenomenalizes, the Kastenseinknnen as a potency. The activity does not constitute the potency ontologically, but rather reveals it, makes it manifest to Dasein. For, when there is motion, the potency is recognized as present gegenwrtigen. When the chest is being made, I can say truly (unconcealedly, -) that the potency is there, even though it was there all along, albeit latently. This shows, phenomenologically, that we recognize latent capacities retrospectively. While I might not recognize a particular potency at this time, when some work is performed, revealing the potency, I can infer that it was able to be such-and-such all along. Potentials are revealed in the active formation, the motion, of something coming to be out of what had the potency all along, but remained hidden. Thus, if my reading of Gegenwart as visibility is correct, then Heideggers translation of the definition of motion should be read as the visibility of existing things as the beings which are able to be there, and indeed visible insofar as it is able to be there (Gegenwart des Daseienden, als des Daseinsknnenden, und zwar die Gegenwart, sofern es da sein kann).19 In other words, the truth (-) of motion is the uncoveredness (Entdecktheit) of potentiality, since motion is the visibility of what is able to be there for as long as such ability shows up in the activity of becoming-there. Heideggers phenomenological reading of Aristotle is, to be sure,

19

GA 18, p. 313. 12

unconventional. It takes motion as the phenomenological expression of potentiality of Being, the pressing-out of potentiality into the open in order for Dasein to encounter it. Heidegger reads Aristotles definition to mean that the being of motion is the disclosure of the potentiality of Being. From this, we can begin to see Heideggers motivation for defining the how (Wie) of Daseins being as it is due to the kineticity of Dasein that Dasein discloses the being of Being as potentiality. Of course, one might raise an objection to my reading: it still seems to commit Heidegger to hold ontologically that the wood lying there latent and at rest is not able to be a chest unless it is actively being worked upon, since it is not clear how the phenomenalization of potentiality in motion is not also the causal ground for the potential. Heidegger, in the same passage, denies such implications: Wood, as a thing which is an available being, is there and at the same time is usable for a chest. Still, as wood, being-there and 'usable for' are not the same. Moreover, usability itself, as the being-character of the beings that are there, does not yet characterize these beings as being situated in motion. One could gather from this that meaningfulness, as the determination of the beings that are there, which belongs to the being of the world, is not actually appropriate here, provided that the usability is first there authentically as long as the wood is at work. But, this is a mistake.20 The wood simply lying there is not being altered in any way, but is usable at the same time (zugleich). For, even the work of chest-building itself would not be possible, if the wood alone were to lack the capacity to be the chest. Even while the wood is lying there, it is usable by virtue of the fact that its meaningfulness (Bedeutsamkeit) is found with reference to something else,

20

Ibid., emphasis mine. 13

namely the activity of chest-building, the tools, the workshop, the chest and ultimately Dasein itself. Nevertheless, being there at rest and being usable are not the same (nicht dasselbe), either ontologically or phenomenologically. For, the woods usability is not necessarily revealed to Dasein while the wood lies there motionless. True, the wood is always usable, even when at rest. But, if rest and usability were the same, then merely coming upon the wood while at rest would reveal its Kastenseinknnen. But, unless one has already learned that the wood is capable of becoming a chest, it is unlikely that the wood alone would reveal such capacity. Simply stumbling upon a stack of wood does not immediately disclose its potential to be a chest. Now, whatever is usable is meaningful, since meaningfulness pertains to referentiality, and whatever is usable refers to something else, e.g. that for which something is used. But since we know that motion is the making-visible of a potential, and because usability is a kind of potentiality, it seems at first that unless something is moving (in Arbeit), then it is not meaningful. This would entail that something is not usable until it is at work, being used. However, Heidegger finds this conclusion to be absurd (Tuschung). Because usability and meaningfulness go hand-in-hand, and yet not all meaningful things are in motion, something need not be moving in order to be usable. For, usability itself [die Verwendbarkeit selbst] does not yet characterize these [existing things] as being located in motion.21 That is, there are different modes of usabilityusable, but not yet involved in a motion and the usability that is active in a motion. Thus, meaningfulness pertains to both motion and rest, but in different modalities. The point I believe Heidegger is emphasizing, here, is that meaningfulness is not as readily apparent in rest as it is in motion.

21

Ibid., emphasis mine. Cf. Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 536-537. 14

Heideggers interpretation of Phy. .1, 201a10 reveals that there is a hierarchy of potencies in Aristotle: active and inactive.22 In his Handschriften, Heidegger clarifies what is said in the two passages cited above: : the visibility of the ability-to-be-a-chest of this wood as such (indicating [bezogen auf] the ability-to-be-a-chest). The ability-to-be as something being-there, not as thought, planned, supposed, but rather as something encountered [begegnend] in the surrounding world. As pertaining to something, the becoming-made is in the workshop. The being-moved: something in motion. It is neither the chest, the wood, nor the space for wood-storage that is there, but rather something at work; at the very moment, the carpenter has it working in hand! [] is the how of the there. This is : the how of Dasein as being-at-work. Motion, , does not destroy the potentiality, but rather it holds it precisely within [erhlt], accounting for its therethe active potentiality.23 Motion, obviously, does not pertain to what is inactive. As the visibility of the woods abilityto-be-of-the-chest (Gegenwart des Kastenseinknnens dieses Holzes), motion is the activeness of this potentiality (die ttige Mglichkeit). It is the potentiality which is busy (ttig). When there is only a chest, only the wood on the table, or merely the workspace wherein all the tools and material are housed, there is no motion, since there is no becoming-made active in each of these. Heidegger is not alone in this interpretation. Amongst contemporary Aristotelian scholars, Myles Burnyeat, De Anima II 5, Phronesis 47 (1), pp. 28-90; Edward Halper, Aristotle on the Knowledge of Nature, Review of Metaphysics 37 (4), pp. 811-835; and L.A. Kosman, Aristotles Definition of Motion, Phronesis 14 (1), pp. 40-62 all argue in one respect or another that there are levels of potentiality and actuality in Aristotle. 23 GA 18, p. 378. Cf., GA 33, p. 51: So sagt Aristoteles an einer spteren Stelle (Meta. 3, 1047a32): [] so wie Bewegung erscheint, ist sie so etwas wie ein Am-Werke-sein; der nchstallgemeine -Charakter ist . Inwiefern? Wo etwas in Bewegung ist, sagen wir ja: es ist da etwas im Gang, es ist etwas los, etwas am Werk; da ist eine Ttigkeit, emphasis mine. See also GA 33, pp. 170-171.
22

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However, because these things can turn into motion, or at least are able to be involved in it, then they must already have a potential. It is only that such is inactive, latenthidden (ruhend). Merely because something is not in motion does not mean that a potency does not exist. It simply means that, like the motion, the potential is not yet visible. As we have said, motion is the outward-exercising (Ausbung) of the potential.24 The ontological condition that there be a latent potency when there is no visible activity is preserved, if one holds that motion pertains only to the making-visible of such potency, while not being a causal ground for it.25 Now that we have in clear view Heideggers basic understanding of Aristotles definition of motion, it is appropriate to show how it lays the groundwork for Sein und Zeit, specifically in regard to Sein zum Tode. There are at least three central criteria by which Heideggers analysis of motion in the Grundbegriffe shapes the arguments for Sein zum Tode: constancy (Stetige; Stndigkeit), stretching (Spannung; Erstrecken), and incompleteness (Unfertigkeit; Grenzenlos). Because motion as does not destroy (vernichtet nicht) potentiality, but instead holds onto it, it follows that the potentiality is constant (stndig) throughout the entire activity.26 In fact, so long as there is motion, the potential must be ever more sustained so as to continue to be motion, since if the potential is exhausted, motion comes to an end. An indication of this is

GA 33, p. 191. As such, it would be incorrect to say that Heidegger commits both himself and Aristotle to Megarianismthe position that potentiality does not exist until there is some activity. For Heideggers more explicit analysis of Aristotles confrontation with the Megarians in Metaphysics .3, see GA 33, pp. 160-224 (17-22), especially pp. 182-193 (19). See also GA 9, pp. 286-287 where Heidegger affirms the priority of actuality in Aristotle. Backman, op. cit., pp. 249-250, also affirms that Heidegger interprets Aristotle as holding to latent potencies. 26 GA 18, pp. 381: ein Wie des Da, das , das , es erhlt es im Daes im Unfertigsein halten, da-sein lassen. Heidegger appeals to Themistius, In Aristotelis Physica 213, 1ff where Themistius reads the definition of motion to imply that motion is that which preserves () the potential. See also Philoponus, In Aristotelis Physicorum 350, 10. Cf. Jollivet, op. cit. 140. Bernet, op. cit., 102-103 overlooks this preservative aspect.
24 25

16

that motion holds itself together within itself (es sich in zusammenhlt)motion is continuous (Stetige; ). Heidegger makes this explicit in his translation of Physics .1, 200b15-21: Sofern wir die Bewegung auseinanderlegen, ausgrenzen bzw. durchgegrenzt haben, mu versucht werden, in derselben methodischen Haltung berzugehen zu dem, was nchstfolgend ist. [Es ist auch zu handeln von dem, was mit einem Seienden als InBewegung-Seienden mitgegeben ist: Das ist das, was das Phnomen der Bewegung in sich selbst beschliet.] Die Bewegung scheint etwas zu sein, was zu dem gehrt, das der Art ist, da es sich in zusammenhltdas Stetige; das Grenzenlose zeigt sich zuerst im Stetigen [sofern das Stetige sich als das zeigt, bei dem eine an kein Ende kommt; die positive Bestimmung des ist es gerade, da es ist.] Wo man das Stetige bestimmen will, da kommt es dazu, da man mit dazu gebraucht, mit meint den des [wenn man vom Stetigen spricht, spricht man damit an ein bestimmte Grenzenlosigkeit], gleich als ob das nichts anderes wre als das . Ferner ist es unmglich, das Bewegtseiende ohne den Ort, die Leere und die Zeit anzuprechen.27 Motion cannot exhaust a potency while it is active, seeing that the potential is infinite. Thus, the motion itself is infinite, at least potentially. As infinite, it is never at an endconstantly incomplete (stetige Grenzenlose). For, insofar as the potential is always present, and because a potential signifies what is not yet (noch nicht) completewhat is lacks a limit (Grenzenlos)the infinite is incomplete by nature. For Aristotle, completeness pertains to a limit. So, the infinite is GA 18, pp. 291-92. The brackets appear in the Gesamtausgabe text, containing Heideggers inter-translation commentary. Aristotles text is as follows (Phy. .1, 200b15-21): . , , . .
27

17

defined as that in which something more can always be taken (Phy. .4, 204a2-7), or that which does not come to an end/limit (bei dem eine an kein Ende kommt). Motion also always follows a magnitude, for magnitudes are continuous and constantly able to be divided without end. To say that motion is continuous, or is constant, is also to say that it is not constituted as a summation of discrete points. This is because points presume a continuous, unbroken line (es sich in zusammenhlt) from which the points may be marked off. Points are generated by division (), which can be performed potentially infinitely many times. From this, one might even say that the very activity of dividing the line is the way such potential is made visible to us, since we can see, in the act of dividing, how the divisions never seem to exhaust the lines potential to be divided. The line qua continuous always retains the potential to be divided even while it is being divided. In this way, division is a motion. The constancy of motion is, therefore, its continual preservation of a potential within the working-out of such potential, or insofar as the potential is itself at-work (ttig). It is the nature of motion to preserve its incompleteness (Grenzenlosigkeit). From this, we can begin to see what Heidegger means when he suggests that motion, as , stretches itself out toward the end (spannt sich aus zum Ende): [in contrast to ] , "stretches itself out towards the end"also a characteristic of being-there, but such that it determines the being in its being-there in the manner that it is not there in its being-finished; : the character of being belonging to the being-grasped in becoming-finished.28 How might we best understand what it means for motion to stretch itself out? Heidegger is not explicit here, but let me suggest this: as long as there is motion, it draws itself out by making its

28

GA 18, p. 296, emphasis mine. 18

potentiality increasingly visible. It is this increased visibility that is grasped in an activitys becoming-finished (Fertigwerden). The end is always near, always imminently not-yet, since at any moment motion is able to cease as much as it is able to continue. So, the stretching cannot pertain to any distance from the end.29 Nevertheless, the magnitude of motion, as Heidegger understands it, pertains primarily to the degree to which motion unfolds (gem) and expands (sich entbreitet).30 What might this mean? Heideggers paradigm for motion is growth. Even locomotion has a kind of growth. In going for a walk, the motion grows larger the longer there is walking. But, the magnitude need not be determined by the distanced walked. For example, during the time in which I walk in the same place, e.g. in a circle, my capacity to continue walking becomes more apparent over time. So, what is stretched out, it seems, is the potentials visibility, at least in the sense of increase. Since the activity is inherently incomplete (because it is always able to continue), the potential to walk becomes increasingly visible the more the activity is present. It is this increase with regard to the visibility of the potential that seems to be what it means for motion to stretch itself out towards the end. Still, why focus on motions being-toward-the-end, but not being at the end? Is not the aim of motion its , and is not the magnitude said with respect to this aim? Does not the , as an aim, determine the character of the motion? According to Heidegger, means neither aim (Ziel) nor purpose (Zweck), but rather a limit (Grenze; ) or end (Ende) in the

I thank my reviewer for several criticisms on this issue. GA 9, p. 254. Heidegger, GA 18, p. 368 also points to a strong sense of self-alteration (Sichverndernden). Cf. GA 18, p. 368, Maordnung. When explaining motion, Heidegger more often emphasizes growth (Gewchsen) than locomotion. In this way, he draws attention to the kind of expansion that he sees to be analogous of the life of Dasein. This is consonant with his discussion of motion at GA 24, pp. 344, where Heidegger argues that motion pertains primarily to self-elongation (Ausdehnung) and not to spatial change.
29 30

19

definite sense of being-finished.31 Heidegger justifies this by holding that is grounded in the more concrete, everyday term , termination, or the end of life.32 Heideggers reasons are not merely etymological. If motion is to preserve its being by maintaining a potential, then it cannot aim at the point where it ceases. The means that end at which there is no motion. This means that the is present in the motion only potentially. Thus, the being of motion is its incompleteness (; Unfertigkeit). As long as there is activity, the work is unfinished, which means that the product is outstanding. Once the shoe is finished, for instance, the activity of shoemaking ceases. When one has had enough of the air, so to speak, one finishes going for a walkone sits down. Simply taken as the point of cessation, however, the shoe and the sitting do not reveal the magnitude of the motion. They only show that the motion has terminated. As for Dasein, the point at which its activity, its worldly concern, disappears, it dies. Ones death, on its own, does not reveal the span of their life. I must inquire into the temporality of their motion, their history, in order to discern their span of life.

GA 18, p. 82. GA 18, p. 87. Cf. SZ, pp. 244-246; GA 9, pp. 284-287; Sheehan, Ereignis, pp. 144-145; Gonzalez, op. cit., pp. 542-546. Heideggers discussion of the nature of in Aristotles thought (GA 18, pp. 80-91 (11)) is beyond the scope of this essay. It is far too rich and nuanced to cover adequately here. It would require an examination of Heideggers reading of Metaphysics 16, where Aristotle deals with the many ways (complete"; "finished) is said. However, it is important to say a few things about Heideggers analysis since it shapes his interpretation of the role of in motion. First, in light of Meta. .16, 1021b15-17, Heidegger, p. 85, claims that pertains to that beyond which there is nothing (Worberhinaus-nichts), or that beyond which there is no more potentiality for Being (es ber das hinaus keine weitere Seinsmglichkeit fr ein Seiendes gibt). See also GA 18, pp. 92-94. Then, from Meta. .16, 1021b23-25, Heidegger, GA 18, pp. 87-88 argues further that means, fundamentally, the absence of something, its being-goneTod. The result of this reading is that the traditional understanding of as purpose or goal is relegated to a derivative, more abstract sense (pp. 82-83). The priority is given to the concrete meaning associated with Dasein, namely death.
31 32

20

The most radical and important aspect of Heideggers interpretation is revealed at this point: and are sharply distinguished.33 Because the being of activity is motion, and because activity is present only insofar as its work remains unfinished, the traditional equivalence between and does not hold for Heidegger. is defined by Heidegger as Gegenwrtigsein eines Seienden als Ende and Sichim-Fertigsein-Halten,34 while , because of its identity with motion, is im Fertigwerden Begriffensein and Im Selbst der Arbeiter seiner selbst sein.35 The former is fully complete with nothing outstanding, while the latter is fundamentally incomplete and always not-yet, always holding itself in the work. The - distinction is evident even in Heideggers formulations of Schusterei and Spaziergang. Both exist as activities only when that which designates their cessation is not yet present. In these activities, what marks them as inherently kinetic is that for the time during which there is work, their being is necessarily incomplete. However, even though the absolute always remains outstanding while motion exists, Heidegger also points out that because the work itself is the being of motion, then [i]n diesem Sinne kann man sagen, da das In-Arbeit-Halten das des ist.36 That is to say, the authentic (eigentlich) of motion is not its cessation, but motion's own incompleteness. The implication for Dasein is that while it is complete in its constant incompleteness, death is its and not , since death is that wherein it holds This is why Heidegger, GA 18, p. 321, also remarks that if Aristotle were to have been more attentive, he would have used in Physics .1 in order to define motion: Sofern Sein letztlich heit In-seinem-Ende-Sein, Sich-in-seinem-Ende-Halten in einem endgltigen Sinne, , mu Aristoteles, wenn er vorsichtig spricht, das Dasein des Seienden-in-Bewegung als bezeichnen, (emphasis mine). At Metaphyiscs K 9, 1065b15-16, where Aristotle repeats the definition, Aristotle uses instead of , although Heidegger does not recognize this. 34 GA 18, pp. 296, 380. 35 Ibid. Cf. GA 18, p. 380. See also SZ, p. 244-245. 36 GA 18, p. 321.
33

21

itself in being-done (Sich-im-Fertigsein-Halten) in the sense of being-done with acting. Death is Daseins being at the end (zu Ende sein). Therefore, the paradoxical nature of Daseins motion is this: Dasein, while active in motion, is incomplete since it holds its as a potential. But, it is precisely because of its activity that it is complete as incompleteness since it is always preserving itself in this way. Still, in death, Dasein is wholly finished at the very moment it no longer exists, for this is the moment where it no longer makes visible its potentiality-for-death. In death, what is visibly present is ones absence (; Abwesenheit), the disappearance of activity.37 The of Dasein is the presence of its absence, the moment where its being-there-no-more (Nichtmehr-Dasein) is. This clearly stands in contrast to the presence of Daseins motion, since such is not to be at the end, but rather to be towards it (Sein zum Ende).38 Thus, while it exists, Dasein is never an . It is always an : In making, being-made is a determinate way of being-thereonly if one sees it, is it possible to see what motion is: the being-there of a being that is in the midst of becoming-finished, but is not yet finished. is , but not . is a way of being-there, interpreted as .39 Herein, we can see why must be aligned with , at least as Heidegger reads Aristotle: because there must be a potency for there to be motion, and since motion is something visibly present (Gegenwart), then such potency must be present in the same way; the visibility of the potency is in fact nothing but motion. However, such visibility is found only in an activity, an , for this is the working-out of such potency. As Heidegger sees it, and

GA 18, p. 89. Cf. GA 9, pp. 296-297. Cf. GA 18, pp. 89-90, 321. 39 GA 18, p. 296. Cf. Gonzalez, pp. 553-554.
37 38

22

must be identical. This, therefore, is the being of Dasein according to the Grundbegriffe: the being whose Being is always to be actively stretching itself out towards its death by the continuous preservation and maintenance of the potentiality-for-death. In SZ, this is articulated as Sein zum Tode. From all of this, we can say with confidence that Heideggers early thoughts on Aristotles definition of motion provide the basic framework of the Daseinsanalytik in SZ. The reason we must continue to SZ is to reveal more fully what role Eigentlichkeit plays in this kinetic structure, for Dasein is authentically when it understands itself as Sein zum Tode.

II
In many ways, we have seen how Daseins Sein zum Tode is foreshadowed in Heideggers interpretation of Aristotles definition of motion: constancy, internal stretching, and incompleteness. These themes will become even more apparent as we proceed through SZ. Still, what has gone largely unaccounted for is the extent to which Heideggers interpretation of bears any significance on how authenticity (Eigentlichkeit) and inauthenticity (Uneigentlichkeit) operate in the arguments for Sein zum Tode in SZ. It is, therefore, critical also to square the analysis of with Heideggers account of authenticity in SZ. One of the clearest indications that Heidegger articulates Sein zum Tode in terms of motion is in his argument for the difference between the potentiality belonging to Dasein and that belonging to things present-at-hand (Vorhanden) or ready-to-hand (Zuhanden). Dasein is neither what is merely present nor what is equipmentally ready to be used for some purpose, since the potentiality belonging to the latter is one that is always out for actualization (Aufsein auf Verwirklichung), or something with the potentiality intending to be completely actualized: At the same time, it is necessary to identify being-towards-death as a being-towards-apossibility and indeed one that is towards a distinctive possibility of Dasein itself. Being23

towards-a-possibilitythat is to say, one that is towards a particular possibilitycan mean: being out for something possible as concern for its actualization [Verwirklichung]. In the field of things ready-to-hand and present-to-hand we encounter constantly such possibilities: the achievable, manageable, passable, and the like. The concernful being-out-for something possible has the propensity to destroy the possibility of what is possible through the obtainment of it [Verfgbarmachen].40 Anything which is out for actualization pertains to a kind of existence whose aim is to do away (vernichten) with the potential. In shoemaking, as an example of Herstellen, the potential for the leather to become a shoe is such only insofar as the activity aims at being-fulfilled. Shoemaking does not seek to preserve the potential in the leather; it is to have a completed shoe. Thus, the potential to be a shoe is one that is out for being-finished. The motion of shoemaking aims at exhausting the leathers potential to be a shoe precisely because the being of such activity is grounded in a finished product. Hence, for this kind of potentiality, the actualization of the is paramount. Here, Heidegger retains the Grundbegriffes sense of as being-finished. As we shall see, the same sense holds for Dasein's inauthentic attitude toward death. And yet, this is exactly the sort of potentiality that is wholly inconsonant with Daseins Sein zum Tode. The of Daseindeathis not one that is able to be actualized for Dasein. Heidegger insists that Dasein does notindeed, cannotbe out for actualizing its most fundamental end since that fulfillment entails Daseins termination: In no way can being-towards-death have the character of concernfully being-out-for its actualization. First of all, death as something possible is not something possible as ready-

40

SZ, p. 261. 24

to-hand or present-at-hand, but rather a possibility-of-being of Dasein. Thus, the concern for actualization of this possibility would have to signify the occasioning of ones demise. With this, however, Dasein would have already stripped itself of the ground for existing as being-towards-death.41 The being of Dasein is to be moving toward death, always to have death as its foremost potential while it exists. For, if death were a potential of the type found in something usable (zuhanden) or merely present (vorhanden), then its potentiality would be of the sort to be actualized for Dasein. However, this contradicts the very being of Dasein as being-towards-death. Dasein exists when its death is only potentially. Thus, Daseins being cannot be like that of a tool or a thing lying around. It cannot be something whose activity aims at termination. Heideggers tacit, but primary point here is that as Sein zum Tode, Dasein must be a particular kind of potential, the potential that is in some way active, but not fullyttige Mglichkeit. Dasein is not mere latent potential, like the piece of wood lying there on the table. It acts in the world, since these activities () are its worldly concerns (Besorgnisse). So, for Dasein to be out for itself as potential is for it to be an active potentialitymotion. The authentic being of Dasein is its active pursuit of itself as potentiality. Therefore, Dasein cannot be out for its actualization, precisely because what is meant by Verwirklichung is the destruction (vernichten) of the potential. Still, what might best characterize Daseins activity? What is Daseins ? Heidegger, shortly after the argument given above, suggests a kind of preservative activity which Dasein performs with reference to itselfunderstanding: If, therefore, what is meant by being-towards-death is not an actualization of death, then it cannot mean dwelling upon the end in its possibility. [] However, in being-

41

Ibid. 25

towards-death, if it has to make accessible understandingly possibility as has been characterizedthat is, possibility as suchthen the possibility of death must be understood so as not to weaken it as a possibility, but cultivated and maintained as a possibility in our comportment towards it.42 What does it mean for Daseins potentiality not to be attenuated or held back (geschwcht), but to be understood as a potentiality (als Mglichkeit verstanden), where in this understanding, the potential is cultivated (ausgebildet) and maintained (ausgehalten) as such? Obviously, understanding is an activity. But, because it retains a potential, it reveals that the being of Dasein is a motion. For, if the being of Dasein is not to be at death (zu Ende Sein), not to actualize its own cessation, but to understand itself as always being towards the end, maintaining its motion so as to keep it unfinished, then Daseins self-understanding is its authentic motion of being-towards-death. Self-understanding is the activity that does not aim at the destruction of a potential, but rather at its preservation. Just as Aristotle argues that motion preserves () its potential, at least according to Heidegger and Themistius, Dasein is to do the same by understanding its potentiality for death as something to be maintained. Authentic Dasein cultivates and maintains its potentiality through self-understanding. However, does not Heidegger interpret in Aristotle, first of all, as the visibility of potentiality? Before seeing how it preserves Daseins potentiality, how might self-understanding capture Heideggers initial characterization of motion? We can see this in how Dasein unwraps (ent-hllen) itselfmakes itself visibly presentby revealing through the anticipatory (vorlaufende) nature of self-understanding that it is inherently the potentiality-for-death:

42

Ibid. 26

Being-towards-death is the anticipation of an ability-to-be of some being whose sort of being is anticipation itself. In the anticipatory revealing of this ability-to-be, Dasein makes itself accessible for itself with respect to its utmost possibility. To project ones self, however, upon its ownmost ability-to-be means to be able to understand ones self in the being of the particular being so revealedthat is, to exist. Anticipation manifests itself as the possibility of the understanding of ones ownmost distinctive ability-to-be that is, as the possibility of authentic existence. 43 First, what does it mean for Dasein to anticipate death? When Dasein runs-ahead, it is neither seeking out death so as to actualize it nor supposing that death is distantly detached from Daseins present moment. Furthermore, to anticipate death is not to lie in wait (erwarten) for it, since this supposes that death is something actualizable for Dasein.44 Rather, anticipation entails that Dasein understands death as immanently imminent, such that Dasein grasps for itself that it is by nature always near death. In understanding itself as the potentiality-for-death, Dasein knows itself to be Sein zum Tode, since understanding is how it is authentically toward death. It is here that I think Heideggers interpretation of motionthe making-visibly-present (Gegenwart; ) of a potential as a potentialhelps us see this even more clearly. We already know that Daseins understanding is its . Since is defined as the of a potential, then understanding must somehow be the making-visible of Daseins potentiality. How so? In Vorlaufen, Dasein understands itself in such a way that it actively reveals (enthllt) this potential for death as its own potentialDaseins immanencesuch that Dasein recognizes that death is always imminent as a possibility. Dasein runs ahead towards death authentically by seeing how the termination of its existence in the world is possible at every moment of existence.
43 44

SZ, pp. 262-263, emphasis mine. SZ, p. 262. 27

In this seeing, ones possibility-to-be opens up and is given to Dasein for it to grasp. Thus, the end is not Daseins genuine concern; rather, it is the towardness to death. Anticipation lays open, so to speak, the possibility to be as a possibility. In it, Dasein discloses to itself that its being lies in the sway, the motion, of concrete existence, and not in the actualization of death, the collapse of possibilities. In this way, Dasein makes its potentiality visible in an activity of taking hold of ones self in terms of its utmost potential (uersten Mglichkeit). This is, therefore, what Heidegger means by das vorlaufenden Enthllen: the activity of making-visible the potentiality of death in anticipationself-understanding. Self-understanding is the how of authentic beingtowards-death, Daseins kineticity, since it is how Dasein properly reveals to itself that it is always tending towards death. For the most part, however, Dasein is inauthentic. Dasein often falls (verfallen) and forgets (vergessen) about its authentic way to be towards its death. But, this does not mean Dasein no longer remains in motion. Dasein is being-toward-death even while inauthentic.45 Dasein often forgets about its kinetic character, and becomes preoccupied with more everyday, factical concerns. While it is on average (durchschnittlich) in the everyday mode of life, Dasein is indeed moving through life, but moving in such a way as to be absorbed in its daily routines and taking up possibilities mostly given over to it by others. It takes up tasks whose ends are of primary concernproducts, deadlines, dates, commitments, etc. In forgetfulness, it fails to understand how its death is always imminent, and always to be maintained as such. Dasein loses sight of its true potentiality for beingdeathby forgetting that it is not something that can be actualized. Instead, it takes up externally given possibilities in such a way as to be fulfilled, not

45

SZ, p. 259. See also pp. 306 & 312. 28

as possibilities, but as possibilities that will be finished.46 Inauthenticity, therefore, is Daseins forgetfulness of its fundamental kineticity. This is because inauthentic Dasein acts in the world in order to actualize particular potentials, since the concerns in which it finds itself are determined by particular purposes. Inauthentic Dasein exists as being-out-for the exhaustion of possibilities. One is hired for a specific job on the presumption that it will be successfully completed. The shoemaker is not asked by a customer either to work indefinitely on the leather, or even to work for the sake of working, cultivating ones shoemaking ability, but rather to make successfully a particular shoe. The expediency (Beitrglichkeit) of these possibilities exemplify Daseins everyday, inauthentic concerns insofar as the focus is upon the completion of the end, and not the cultivation of the possibility itself. For the moment, let us return to the Grundbegriffe in order to accentuate further the distinction between Daseins authentic and inauthentic motions. There, Heidegger infers from Schusterei and Spaziergang two senses of Besorgen: There are two different forms of concern, which are distinguished according to the being-character of that which accounts for the .47 In what sense are there two forms of concern and how does the character of the of each differentiate them? The clue is in Heideggers use of Eigentlichkeit in the sentence prior, since it evinces one of the two senses, and implies the second: The authenticity of completeness [Die

Steven Crowell has raised the following concern for my reading here: if death corresponds to Fertigsein, then one runs the risk of reading being-towards-death as merely "being-towardsperishing," which Heidegger calls "demising" (SZ, pp. 247-248 and p. 251). I agree that there is a sense of Fertigsein with which being-towards-death means a kind of perishing. The caveat, however, is that this sense pertains only to inauthenticity. Inauthentic Dasein focuses on ends, even to the extent of fixating on death as that which one must flee, since Dasein sees the need to finish as many projects as possible before one perishes. On the other hand, for authentic Dasein, Fertigsein does not mean "termination," but instead means the completeness of always being incomplete. Thus, the orientation is not upon the end, but on being towards the end. I thank Crowell for his thoughts on this issue. 47 GA 18, p. 71.
46

29

Eigentlichkeit des Fertigseins], that of going for a walk, is grounded in this: how I go for a walk.48 Not only should we immediately recall Heideggers use of Eigentlichkeit in SZ, but also its contraryUneigentlichkeit. Spaziergang is the Besorgen that is authentically complete, since its activity is such that it holds itself together precisely by maintaining its potentiality. That is to say, Spaziergang can be taken as a whole (ganz) even if it is a motion because it is always incomplete as long as it exists. Thus, the wholeness of authentic motion is its complete incompleteness. The authenticity of Dasein is much the same. It is the motion of life defined in such a way that its genuine activity is to aim at the constancy (Bestndigkeit; Stetige) of its potentiality. Conversely, inauthentic Dasein is analogous to Schusterei, because it is the Besorgen which intends to exhaust particular possibilities. The potential simply finishes, or perishes. If Spaziergang is authentically complete because it sustains a potential, then Schusterei must be inauthentic precisely because it aims to destroy a particular potential, to actualize it (verwirklichen). What is more, the potential given to shoemaking is not self-given, but determined by something beyond itby others. The motion of shoemaking is absorbed in its activity similarly as Daseins fallenness in das Man. Shoemaking is only because of the concerns of others (i.e. needing or wanting shoes), and not by its own activity. In this motion, therefore, what is forgotten is that genuine (eigentlich) being lies in the motion itself, and neither in its cessation nor in the concerns of others. So, when Dasein engages in the world in like manner as Schusterei, it has forgotten about its motion, and neglects the preservation of the towardness in Sein zum Tode, since it presumes its wholeness pertains to finishing a variety, or even a summation, of particular projects. It might be said, from this, that in inauthenticity, Dasein

48

Ibid. 30

forgets how to live. Authentic life is never about coming upon the end, especially any particular end, but about becoming more and more incomplete, stretching out ones potentiality for arriving at the end. The completeness of this way of being is simply the constancy of incompleteness. For Dasein to be in motion inauthentically means, therefore, to be engaged in daily concerns which are grasped as issues and activities to be resolved and terminated. One of the most apparent instances of Daseins complete-incompleteness in SZ is Heideggers appeal to ripening (das Reifen) as a preliminary way to characterize the Being of Dasein as Sein zum Tode: The unripe fruit, for example, goes toward its ripeness. In the course of its ripening, the not-yet of the fruit is in no way appended to it as what is not-yet-present-at-hand. The fruit brings itself to ripeness, and such self-bringing [Sichbringen] characterizes its being as fruit. Nothing conceivable that one could procure would be able to eliminate the unripeness of the fruit, had this being not come to ripeness on its own accord. The not-yet of unripeness pertains not to something else beyond [auenstehendes] the unripeness, which, with indifference to the fruit, could be present-at-hand in and with it. It pertains to the kind of being of the fruit in itself. A full summation of what is not-yet is like what is ready-to-hand indifferently going towards the absent, un-ready-to-hand remainder. Strictly speaking, however, the not-yet can be neither beyond nor not indifferent to the ripening. Nevertheless, the ripening fruit is not only not indifferent to the unripeness [nicht nur nicht gleichgltig gegen die Unreife] as what is other than itself, but more so that while ripening, the fruit is unripeness. The not-yet is already included in the fruits

31

own being; in no way is the not-yet a random determination, but rather is something constitutive. Analogously, Dasein is always-already its not-yet, so long as it is.49 Daseins towardness is akin to ripening. This is because, as being-towards-death, Dasein is je schon sein Noch-nicht, it is always already its not-yet. But, what does it mean for Dasein to be its not-yet? For anything to be not-yet is to be the active potentiality for whatever remains outstanding. For, to say, the fruit is not yet ripe, is to say that at this point in time, the fruit is actively ripening. And, even though the fruit has not fully matured, the fact that it is maturing makes visible that it has been and continues to be on the way to maturation. Like the fruit, the being of Dasein is its Sichbringen. Thus, for the fruit to be not yet ripe also means that it is still in the processthe motionof ripening. Being-not-yet is itself something being-at-work (InArbeit-sein; ). What the noch-nicht of the fruit suggests is that thus far (noch) the fruit is actively the potential to be what remains outstanding, the mature fruit. The reason that the totality of the fruit is not indicated by the summation (die volle Summe) of all the intermediate steps the fruit takes along the way to its maturation is that what is not-yet is not something that is detached from the being of the fruit. Heidegger then ties this to Daseins motion: Instead, just as Dasein is constantly already its not-yet, so long as it is, so too it is always already its end. The end, by which we mean death, cannot mean the being-at-the-end [ZuEnde-sein] of Dasein, but rather Daseins being-toward-the-end [Sein zum Ende]. Death is a way to be, which Dasein embraces [bernimmt] as soon as it is.50 Dasein is what is not-yetthe potentiality of death. To be not-yet is a kind of incompleteness. Furthermore, Dasein is the potential of death because it is Daseins Weise zu sein, its way to be. Its towardness is not to be at its end, for this would be for Dasein to perish. But, because Dasein
49 50

SZ, pp. 243-44, emphasis mine. Cf. Phy. .1, 201a19 for , coming to maturity. SZ, p. 245. See also GA 18, pp. 97-98. 32

always (stndig) exists in this way, Dasein exists als ganzes Seinknnen, as the being-potential which is itself whole: Because anticipation makes accessible in the possibility that cannot be outstripped [i.e. death] all of the possibilities available for Dasein, what lies within anticipation is the possibility of an existentiell assurance [Vorwegnehmens] of the whole of Dasein, which is to say the possibility of existing as a whole ability-to-be.51 What is it that makes Dasein complete if it is always incomplete? It is precisely the fact that Dasein is always incomplete: Was am Dasein die Unganzheit ausmacht, das stndige Sichvorweg, ist weder ein Ausstand eines summativen Zusammen, noch gar je ein Dasein als das Seiende, das es ist, zu sein hat.52 There is, therefore, an inherent dialectic to Daseins kineticity such that its incompleteness is complete so long as Dasein exists, since it is always the whole motion at every moment of its existence. Thus, Daseins authentic wholeness is defined by always being towards its end, attentively preserving its potentiality-for-death. To bring this section to a close, let us tie everything together by returning to the issue with which this essay initially opened: is not self-stretching an integral aspect of Daseins motion in SZ? Why is Dasein defined as the motion or the movedness of Being that stretches out by stretching itself out? It is because of Daseins authentic activityself-understanding: The nearest nearness of being-towards-death, as a possibility, is as far as possible from something actualized [einem Wirklichen]. The more uncoveredly one understands this possibility, the more purely the understanding penetrates within the possibility as the possibility of the impossibility of existence in general. [] In anticipation of this possibility, the possibility becomes greater and greater, that is, it reveals itself as what
51 52

SZ, p. 264. SZ, p. 244, emphasis mine; cf. p. 308. 33

knows no measure at all, no more or less, but rather points to the possibility of the measureless impossibility of existence.53 As I said above, motion need not be measured according to how near (nahe) it is to its cessation, but according to the temporality of the motion. For, in one respect, Daseins nearest nearness (nchste Nhe) to death is simply that Dasein is always-already the potentiality-for-death. The longer Dasein exists, however, the greater and greater (immer grer) such potentiality becomes, since it prolongs death as a potential. As such, the more time it takes to understand itself, the more Dasein dwells in self-understanding, then the more Dasein stretches out by stretching itself outdas erstreckte Sicherstrecken. Here, we see how intimately kineticity and temporality are connected for Heidegger. Because the only thing that can limit such potentiality is the actualization of death, as long as Dasein exists, its motion confronts no limit, no definite amount (Ma) of time to be in motion. This is the indefiniteness (Unbestimmtheit) of Daseins finitude, such that the indefiniteness of Daseins motion is indicated by the constant towardness of its being-towards-death. Thus, the movedness of Daseins being is such that it indefinitely stretches itself out towards death by way of a self-understanding.

III
It should be quite evident by now that Heideggers interpretation of Aristotles definition of motion is one of the driving, albeit tacit, components in the Daseinsanalytik. Still, it cannot be left unsaid that Heideggers use of Aristotle comes at a cost of misreporting Aristotles text. To anyone familiar with Aristotle, Heidegger has not merely appropriated Aristotles philosophical apparatus and applied it straightforwardly to the Daseinsanalytik. To the contrary, the application actually relies on a fundamental misreading of Aristotle. Above, I suggested, without much
53

SZ, p. 262, emphasis mine. 34

argument or explanation, that Heideggers reading of Meta. .3, 1047a30-32 is the key to recognizing the collapse between and , especially in the definition of motion. In order to appreciate fully the manner in which Heidegger draws from Aristotle, it is important to place all that has been said in the context of the degree to which Heidegger manipulates Aristotles text to his advantage. It is not immediately apparent why Heidegger thinks such equivalence between and is originarily argued by Aristotle. When Heidegger first explicates the definition of motion, neither his translation nor his explanation addresses explicitly the use of in the definition. Instead, he defers to . Following this, Heidegger tersely comments that if Aristotle were to have been more attentive, he would have used instead of . The reason for this, I think, involves a kind of interpretative sleight of hand, which allows Heidegger to suggest that Aristotle himself sharply distinguishes and , where the former must be understood as and the latter as the cessation of . Prior to the initial explication of Phy. .1, 201a10, Heidegger garners textual support for this identity from Meta. .3, 1047a30-32, read through the lens of .8, 1050a20: Fr die Aufklrung der Bedeutung [von ] ist intruktiv eine Stelle aus der Metaphysik 3: , , . [Heideggers translation:]Es kam nmlich der Name dazu, bertragen zu werden auch auf das andere, was an Bestimmungen an der Bewegung entgegentritt; nmlich ist in sich bezogen . ( zu ersetzen

35

durch , vgl. , ).54 Let us first square Heideggers translation with a more traditional, straightforward one. Heidegger: It came about that the name was also carried over to the other [i.e. ], which is set down in contrast to the determinations of movement, namely that refers/moves within itself [in sich bezogen] [towards ]. Traditional: The term , which is set down with , has applied to other things [ : literally, has come upon other things] aside from mostly motion. For, it is commonly thought that [] is most of all. Heideggers translation obfuscates Aristotles claim by glossing over much of the text. Aristotle means only to say, dialectically (), that in contrast to the others who hold that actuality seems to be ontologically identical to motion, the true meaning of actuality extends further than motion, e.g. to immaterial, unmoved things. What is peculiar, however, is that Heidegger only translates 1047a30-31. At first, this might seem odd on Heideggers part, since a32 reads for it seems that is most of all. Why not translate this apparently auspicious claim that is ? I suggest that Heidegger thinks that the equivalence made at a32 is clear on its own in the Greek. Instead, he focuses more on explaining the character of this equivalence, which he sees given at 1047a30-31that is insofar as it is the activity which stretches itself out toward the end. If we look carefully at Heideggers translation, we can see that in sich bezogen gives us an important clue to why Heidegger appeals to (that which is stretched out with/toward another) as a replacement for (that which is referred with another).

54

GA 18, p. 295, emphasis mine. Cf. GA 33, p. 224. 36

While sich beziehen auf unequivocally means to refer to something linguistically, which therefore would have been a suitable translation of , Heidegger uses sich beziehen. Without auf it is not clear whether sich beziehen means to refer or to move ones self into, i.e. a change of place (). However, what is most significant about sich beziehen in this context is that, read as sich be-ziehen, it suggests to stretch ones self out, since ziehen can mean to stretch out. Clearly, connotes neither locomotion nor stretching. Like sich beziehen auf, it has only the logical sense of combining or referencing another term. So, without a significant caveat, Heideggers use of sich beziehen is unjustifiable, or at most ambiguous. But, Heideggers parenthetical remark provides a justification for sich beziehen: in a30 needs to be replaced (ersetzen) by , which is the participial equivalent of given at .8, 1050a22.55 means both that which stretches out towards (obviously Heideggers preference, since it implies ), and that which refers to another. This twofold sense is due to the root of meaning to stretch out both literally in terms of a physical elongation and metaphorically as a linguistic term which indicates how a word tends or stretches toward another in meaningthat is, to refer. This, Even though he does not explicitly cite Diels at this point, Heidegger is clearly relying on Diels Etymologica, in Zeitschrift fr vergleichende Sprachforschung 47 (1916), pp. 193-210. In his Etymologica, p. 201, Diels suggests that, in light of a manuscript discrepancy, should be read as nach 1050a23. However, W.D.Ross, Aristotles Metaphysics: A Revised Text with Introduction and Commentary, vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1958; 1924), p. 246 faults Diels for a false parallel between and , seeing that the word from which Diels derives occurs only in the active voice for Aristotle, not in the middle-passive. Ross, therefore, sees no problem with , saying that it implies that Aristotle was in the habit of connecting the words and together in his lectures (emphasis mine). Ross reading is the most reasonable. Still, it should be noted that it is Heidegger who is takes advantage of Diels suggestion, since Diels makes no argument to the effect that indicates a strong ontological correspondence between simpliciter and . In fact, commenting on 1047a30-32, Diels, p. 201, advances a more straightforward reading, inconsonant with Heideggers: Hier scheint der Terminus [], im Gegensatz zu der noch in Bewegung gedachten geradezu den Endpunkt, den Vollendungzustand zu bezeichnen (emphasis mine).
55

37

therefore, allows Heidegger to use sich beziehen, since it expresses both senses of . But, why should Heidegger retain both meanings? It allows him to interpret Aristotle as arguing that points to in meaning, precisely because, by being , is what stretches itself out towards the state of being fully finished. That is to say, the linguistic referentiality of as meaningfully (bedeutsam) pointing to is grounded in its ontological referentiality (Bedeutsamkeit; ) of being the motion towards a state of cessation. From this, Heidegger is able to conclude rather straightforwardly that in contrast to means what stretches itself out towards the end (spannt sich aus zum Ende). Therefore, Heideggers emendation of Aristotles texts is not simply to correct a manuscript error or to clarify the text. It is to reveal philosophically that meaningfulness is authentic only when Dasein understands the logical, referential structure of the world on the ground of its own motion towards death. Daseins stretching towards death is the ontological context according to which the referential structure of the world operates. Clearly, therefore, Heideggers interpretation of as what stretches itself out toward the end strongly informs the notion of das erstreckte Sicherstrecken, but only because Heidegger identifies with in Aristotelian ontology. Another telling piece of evidence suggesting that Heidegger departs from Aristotle's doctrine of actuality is his interpretation of EN K.6-7, given in the 1924-25 Sophist lectures (GA 19). For Aristotle, one of the most definitive human is the life of contemplation (). But, even as Heidegger understands this, is not a motion; its authenticity lies precisely in an actuality bereft of all potentiality, a deathless life. Contemplation is the highest activity because it is finished () at every moment. As such, is the most

38

virtuous activity; it is that activity in which human beings act most excellently. This is why, at EN K.7, 1177b19-26, it is the highest form of happiness (): The activity of thinking, which is the life of contemplation, seems both to be superior to the political life, to aim at no ends beyond itself, and to have the proper pleasure, which enlarges the activity. Also, as much as humanly possible, self-sufficiency, leisure, tirelessness, and whatever else assigned to the happy person appear to be those things pertaining to this activity. Hence, this would be the complete happiness of man, if one were to have received a complete span of life. For, nothing is incomplete concerning these things belonging to happiness.56 Because there is nothing about happiness that is , the of happiness must be complete. Thus, happiness is not a motion. Becoming happy might be some sort of motion or change, but this is not the unchanging activity that is supposed to be happiness. However, Aristotle draws the curious conclusion that the contemplative life "would be the complete happiness of man, if one were to have received a complete span of life." The syntax would have us think, at least initially, that complete happiness depends upon an unlikely "complete span of life" ( ), since for life to be fulfilled in the ways specified at b21-22 is rare and difficult, if not impossible. In fact, it is for these very reasons that complete happiness seems to be more divine than human (1177b29-24). Nevertheless, even when there is a complete span of life, it does not always follow that one has attained complete happiness. People often die never having achieved much happiness, having lead quite disparate and dissatisfied lives. In EN A.10,

, , ( ), , , , .
56

39

1101a17-19, it is precisely on this point that Aristotle disputes Solon, arguing that happiness ought not to be predicated of a human being after a complete life, but that "since the future is obscure to us, we set down that happiness, as an end, is complete in everyway and at all times [ ]." In this way, living humans are called happy (1101a20). Because it is absurd to predicate an activity to the dead, and since the future is not certainthat is, admits of changehappiness must be that complete activity which pertains to the living insofar as it is living. Why then does Aristotle draw this seemingly strange conclusion at 1177b24-25? Why talk about a complete life? It is to point us to the divine character of , its motionlessness. As Heidegger reads Aristotle in the Grundbegriffe, means beingfinished, which is the inauthentic sense of Fertigsein. In the Sophist lectures, Heidegger holds fast to this assumption. In contemplation, happiness is a pure ( schlechtinim reinsten Sinne), since contemplation "is the pure visibility of life with respect to its possibility of being which has been brought to its end" (Sie ist die reine Gegenwart des Lebenden hinsichtlich seiner zu Ende gebrachten Seinsmglichkeit).57 It is "the finished presence of life with respect to its highest possibility of being (das Fertiganwesendsein des Lebenden hinsichtlich seiner hchsten Seinsmglichkeit).58 In other words, contemplation, as the hchsten Seinsmglichkeit, ought to coincide with pure happiness when its possibility is fully actualized (zu Ende gebrachten; das Fertiganwesendsein) for the living human being, even though this is rare and difficult. Just in this way, motion is not admitted into happiness because motion is an incomplete activity by nature (Phy. .2, 202a3-12). While one strives after contemplation as a motion insofar as one becomes wise, when in contemplation, its activity is free of motion. Therefore,

57 58

GA 19, p. 173. Cf. GA 18, p. 90. See also Gonzalez, op. cit., p. 37. GA 19, p. 173. 40

there is a kind of deathlessness (EN K.7, 1177b34). This is precisely how Heidegger understands Aristotle: This mode of human Dasein is a genuine one, if it (b24): , (b24sq). It is genuine only if one has seized hold of a complete course of life, only if in fact Dasein stretches itself out over the whole duration of human existence, and therefore, only if this kind of comportment does not simply determine human existence from time to time, but is constantly sustained as its proper mode. Since what always is, which is the theme of this kind of comportment, is constantly identified beforehand, such that even the visibility of Dasein within it is constant, it is determined as sustaining. Herein lies the curious tendency of measuring the temporality of human Dasein with respect to the eternity of the world. Abiding in the eternalis not to be haphazard or occasional, but rather it is to be sustained continuously throughout the duration of life. In this, a particular possibility of (1177b33) is present for man, a kind of being for man in which he has the highest possibility of not arriving at his end. This is the consummate [uerste] position granted to the human Dasein by the Greeks.59 For Aristotle, contemplation is the genuine (eigentlich) human which is motionless, and consequently deathless. But, this is not the picture painted by Heidegger in Sein und Zeit and the Grundbegriffe. The most genuine life of Dasein is that mode of being where Dasein understands itself as cultivating its own possibility to be insofar as it is constituted by the possibility of death. This is, of course, no deathless activity. Dasein's Seinsmglichkeit is given over to Dasein

59

GA 19, pp. 177-178. 41

because of what it is: the possibility of death that is unable to be outstripped (unberholbar).60 To surpass one's possibility for death would require that death be actualizable (verwirklichbar) for Dasein, which is absurd. There is, however, a sort of outstripping in Aristotle's formulation of human contemplation. Complete happiness, in , entails that one "place aside mortality as far as possible [ ] and carry out in every way the life that is in accordance with the best things in ourselves" (EN K.7, 1177b34-35). The fullest expression of actuality for the living human being is not a motion, but a changeless life, or at least one that most resembles it. To be fully alive, for Aristotle, is not to be self-aware of being-towards-death as a life that embraces its mortality, but to be one that attempts to lay hold of divinity (1178b1924). It is, as Heidegger says, a kind of being for man in which he has the highest possibility of not arriving at his end. Not only, then, does the deathless character of set in relief Heidegger's identification of with , but so does the call to pursue it in the face of mortality, the call to overthrow ones own possibility for death. At the beginning of SZ, in the first introduction, Heidegger argues that Dasein is the being whose being is to understand Being, and to disclose it as such by way of Daseins understanding of its own being.61 If Dasein can be defined as insofar as it is , and if Dasein is to disclose Being as such through self-understanding on these terms, then when Dasein truly grasps itself as motion, it discloses Being in the same way. The actuality of Being, as such, cannot help but be motion as well. This, of course, allows Heidegger to justify that das Sein is actually das Seinknnen. This is indeed implied in the Grundbegriffe, where Heidegger interprets the definition of motion as the disclosure of das Seinknnen des Seins.

60 61

SZ, p. 307. SZ, p. 12, emphasis mine. 42

Because Dasein is the being who reveals this by way of understanding its own being in terms of potentiality, Being itself is really nothing but the ability-to-be. Thus, the true work of Being, activity itself, is disclosed in the activity of Daseins authentic self-understanding as motion. Daseins motion is the voice of Being, the how (Wie) of Beings disclosure. It makes sense, from this, for Heidegger to articulate as such in terms of motion, if Dasein is to make the actuality of Being visible as motion. This also allows Heidegger to suggest that holds priority. Being is disclosed as the ability-to-be because that through which it is made visible is the motion of one being according to which all of Being is structured. Dasein is, indeed, the forthe-sake-of-which by which the world is to be understood. Thus, unlike for Aristotle, is not merely a region of Being for Heidegger. Rather, Being is . The fundamental reason? Because Daseins nature is motion, always on-the-way-toward death, and because Being is disclosed through the being of Dasein, Being is disclosed also as always being-on-the-way (Unterwegssein)

43