Zulueta vs.

Court of Appeals Case Digest

ZULUETA VS. COURT OF APPEALS [GR 107383, 20 FEBRUARY 1996]
Facts: Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of Dr. Alfredo Martin. On 26 March 1982, Zulueta entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and Martins secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which Zulueta had filed against her husband. Dr. Martin brought the action for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against Zulueta, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X. After trial, the trial court rendered judgment for Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of Martins Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Zulueta filed the petition for review with the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether the injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence to be inviolable apply even to the spouse of the aggrieved party. Held: The documents and papers are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a] court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law. Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her. The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions. But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that each owes to the other.

Kyllo v. United States

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Citation. 533 U.S. 27, 121 S. Ct. 2038, 150 L. Ed. 2d 94, 8 ILRD 37 (2001) Brief Fact Summary. The police obtained evidence of a marijuana growing operation inside the defendant, Kyllos (the defendant) home, by using a thermal imaging device from outside the home. The police used the device to gather evidence to support issuance of a search warrant for the home. Synopsis of Rule of Law. The use of a device by the government, which is not generally used by the public, to obtain evidence from inside a home is a presumptively unreasonable search without a warrant under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution). Facts. Upon suspicion that the defendant was growing marijuana in his home, police used a thermal-imaging device to detect heat radiating from the defendants home. With this information, police obtained a search warrant for the home. Issue. Does the use of a device by the government to obtain evidence from a constitutionally protected area without physical intrusion constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution?

Summary of California v. Ciraolo

United States Supreme Court, 1986. Statement of the Case: The State is prosecuting marijuana-grower, Ciraolo, for growing marijuana, but obtained the proof needed for probable cause from flying a plane over his backyard to see the marijuana growing without a search warrant. Procedure: Lower courts ruled that this was an unreasonable search and seizure for the ?. Facts: Cops received an anonymous tip that ? was growing weed in his backyard. He had a 10 foot fence surrounding his yard. Cops flew a plane in public airspace over his house and photographed his weed. They also signed affidavits about what they saw. This was used to get a search warrant and found 73 weed plants. Issue: Whether a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy when he puts up a fence around his yard, but police observe, with the naked eye, that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard from a low-flying airplane. Procedural Result: Judgment reversed for State. Holding: A person does not have a reasonable expectation of privacy when he puts up a fence around his yard, but police observe, with the naked eye, that he is committing illegal acts in his backyard from a low-flying airplane. Reasoning: The 2 part test from Katz is tested in this case. 1. The ? tried to keep his actions private, but it is disputable whether this included from the sky, since his fence did not have a roof, BUT REGARDLESS,

Part 2 of the test is whether the governments intrusion infringes upon the personal and societal values protected by the 4th Amendment. 1. Area within the property of the ? is not automatically barred from police observation. 2. Even if he has taken some kind of measure to stop vision of the property, it is not off limits if it is freely visible. 3. In this case, any member of the public flying in the airspace, who glanced down, could have seen everything the officers observed BY THE NAKED EYE. 4. Therefore, his expectation of privacy is unreasonable. Dissent: The majority depends on the idea that airspace is public property, so since you can see the drugs from public property, with the naked eye, that is fair game. Curtilage has been considered part of the home itself, and thus should be considered so as to be protected more carefully than other pieces of property. The reasonable risk to privacy from a commercial or recreational aircraft is almost nonexistent, and but for the actions of police trying to observe, this observation would not have been made. Physical trespass did not occur, but it was still a search without a warrant. Additional Points: No reasonable expectation of privacy attaches to open fields. Common law distinguishes curtilage from open fields, but the line between the two is minimal. Curtilage (land considered part of the home) is defined by: 1. areas proximity to the home, 2. the existence of an enclosure around the area, 3. the nature of the use to which the area is put, 4. the precautions taken to exclude others from the area.
2.

California v. Greenwood
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Citation. 486 U.S. 35, 108 S. Ct. 1625, 100 L. Ed. 2d 30 (1988) Brief Fact Summary. The respondent, Greenwood (the respondent), was arrested for narcotics trafficking based upon evidence obtained as a result of a police search of his trash. The California Supreme Court upheld the dismissal of charges on the ground that the California Constitution declared such searches as unconstitutional. The State petitioned for review.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. An expectation of privacy does not give rise to Fourth Amendment constitutional protection unless society is prepared to accept that expectation as objectively reasonable. Facts. Police with the Laguna Beach Police Department received information that the respondent might be trafficking narcotics. The police asked the regular trash collector to gather the respondents trash and keep it separate from the other trash in the neighborhood, so that it might be examined for evidence of narcotics trafficking. Evidence was found in the garbage, and a search warrant was issued to search the respondents house based upon that evidence. Police searched the respondents house and arrested him after discovering narcotics. Respondent posted bail. The police continued to receive reports of narcotics trafficking at the respondents house. A second search of the respondents trash was conducted and again a search warrant was issued in which more narcotics were found in the house. The respondent was again arrested. The Superior Court dismissed the charges stating that warrantless searches of trash violated the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution. T he Court of Appeals affirmed, and the California Supreme Court denied the States petition for review. Certiorari was granted. Issue. Whether a person has a subjective expectation of privacy in their garbage that society accepts as objectively reasonable?
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986) F: Complainant Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint for direct assault they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Gaanan through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). ISSUE: W/N an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Sec. 1 of RA 4200 such that iuts use to overhear a private conversation would constitute an unlawful interception of communication between 2 parties using a telephone line. HELD: NO An extension tel. cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph, or other devices enumerated in Sec. 1 of the law as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line. This section refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting, or recording a tel. conversation. The tel. extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus in the case of doubt as in this case, on WON an extension tel. is included in the phrase "device or arrangement" the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension tel. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Record shows that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons suchj as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the tel. users. Consequently, the mere act of listening , in order to be punishable must stricly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature.

People vs. Aruta Case Digest

People vs. Aruta 288 SCRA 626 G.R. No. 120515 April 13, 1998

Facts: On Dec. 13, 1988, P/Lt. Abello was tipped off by his informant that a certain Aling Rosa will be arriving from Baguio City with a large volume of marijuana and assembled a team. The next day, at the Victory Liner Bus terminal they waited for the bus coming from Baguio, when the informer pointed out who Aling Rosa was, the team approached her and introduced themselves as NARCOM agents. When Abello asked aling Rosa about the contents of her bag, the latter handed it out to the police. They found dried marijuana leaves packed in a plastic bag marked cash katutak. Instead of presenting its evidence, the defense filed a demurrer to evidence alleging the illegality of the search and seizure of the items. In her testimony, the accused claimed that she had just come from Choice theatre where she watched a movie Balweg. While about to cross the road an old woman asked her for help in carrying a shoulder bag, when she was later on arrested by the police. She has no knowledge of the identity of the old woman and the woman was nowhere to be found. Also, no search warrant was presented. The trial court convicted the accused in violation of the dangerous drugs of 1972

Issue: Whether or Not the police correctly searched and seized the drugs from the accused.

Held: The following cases are specifically provided or allowed by law:

1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court 8 and by prevailing jurisprudence 2. Seizure of evidence in "plain view," the elements of which are: (a) a prior valid intrusion based on the valid warrantless arrest in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their official duties; (b) the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who had the right to be where they are; (c) the evidence must be immediately apparent, and (d) "plain view" justified mere seizure of evidence without further search; 3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly regulated by the government, the vehicle's inherent mobility reduces expectation of privacy especially when its transit in public thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion amounting to probable cause that the occupant committed a criminal activity; 4. Consented warrantless search; 5. Customs search; 6. Stop and Frisk; 7. Exigent and Emergency Circumstances.

The essential requisite of probable cause must still be satisfied before a warrantless search and seizure can be lawfully conducted.

The accused cannot be said to be committing a crime, she was merely crossing the street and was not acting suspiciously for the Narcom agents to conclude that she was committing a crime. There was no legal basis to effect a warrantless arrest of the accuseds bag, there was no probable cause and the accused was not lawfully arrested.

The police had more than 24 hours to procure a search warrant and they did not do so. The seized marijuana was illegal and inadmissible evidence.

People vs Estrada (296 SCRA 383) PEOPLE VS ESTRADA

FACTS: A petition for review was filed seeking the reversal of respondent Judge Estrada's order that granted private respondent's motion to quash search warrant 958 as well as the denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration. The pertinent facts of the present case are as follows: > Atty. Cabanlas, Chief of the Legal, Information and Compliance Division (LICD) of BFAD filed an application for the issuance of a search warrant against Aiden Lanuza (private respondent) of 516 San Jose de la Montana Street, Mabolo, Cebu City for violation of Article 40(k) of RA 7934 (The Consumer Act of the Philippines). However, the application ended with a statement that the warrant is to search the premises of another person at a different address (Belen Cabanero at New Frontier Village, Talisay, Cebu - who happened to be the subject on whom another search was applied for by the same applicant) >Respondent Judge issued search warrant 958 on June 27, 1995 which was served the next day. The present petition stated that, during the search, the team discovered that said address (516 xx) was actually a 5,000-meter compound containing at least 15 structures. The policemen proceeded to search the residence of private respondent Lanuza at Lot 41 of said address. Failure to find any drug products prompted the policemen to proceed to search a nearby warehouse at Lot 38 which yielded 52 cartons of assorted drug products. > On August 22, 1995, private respondent Lanuza filed a motion to quash the search warrant on the ground that the search warrant is illegal and null and void. Respondent judge granted Lanyzas motion to quash the search warrant and denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. Hence, the present petition.

ISSUE: WON respondent judge erred in granting Lanuzas motion to quash Search Warrant 958.

Held: There are, however, two (2) serious grounds to quash the search warrant. Firstly, we cannot fault the respondent Judge for nullifying the search warrant as she was not convinced that there was probable cause for its issuance due to the failure of the applicant to present documentary proof indicating that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs. We hold that to establish the existence of probable cause sufficient to justify the issuance of a search warrant, the applicant must show "facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. The facts and circumstances that would show probable cause must be the best evidence that could be obtained under the circumstances. The introduction of such evidence is necessary especially in cases where the issue is the existence or the negative ingredient of the offense charged for instance, the absence of a license required by law, as in the present case and such evidence is within the knowledge and control of the applicant who could easily produce the same. But if the best evidence could not be secured at the time of application, the applicant must show a justifiable reason therefor during the examination by the judge. The necessity of requiring stringent procedural safeguards before a search warrant can be issued is to give meaning to the constitutional right of a person to the privacy of his home and personalities. In the case at bar, the best evidence procurable under the circumstances to prove that private respondent Aiden Lanuza had no license to sell drugs is the certification to that effect from the Department of Health. SPO4 Manuel Cabiles could have easily procured such certification when he went to the BFAD to verify from the registry of licensed persons or entity. No justifiable reason was introduced why such certification could not be secured. Mere allegation as to the non-existence of a license by private respondent is not sufficient to establish probable cause for a search warrant. Secondly, the place sought to be searched had not been described with sufficient particularity in the questioned search warrant, considering that private respondent Aiden Lanuza's residence is actually located at Lot No. 41, 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City, while the drugs sought to be seized were found in a warehouse at Lot No. 38 within the same compound. The said warehouse is

owned by a different person. This Court has held that the applicant should particularly describe the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized, wherever and whenever it is feasible. 28 In the present case, it must be noted that the application for search warrant was accompanied by a sketch 29 of the compound at 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. The sketch indicated the 2-storey residential house of private respondent with a large "X" enclosed in a square. Within the same compound are residences of other people, workshops, offices, factories and warehouse. With this sketch as the guide, it could have been very easy to describe the residential house of private respondent with sufficient particularity so as to segregate it from the other buildings or structures inside the same compound. But the search warrant merely indicated the address of the compound which is 516 San Jose de la Montana St., Mabolo, Cebu City. This description of the place to be searched is too general and does not pinpoint the specific house of private respondent. Thus, the inadequacy of the description of the residence of private respondent sought to be searched has characterized the questioned search warrant as a general warrant, which is violative of the constitutional requirement.

Illinois v. Gates
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Citation. 462 U.S. 213, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) Brief Fact Summary. The police received an anonymous letter outlining specific details about the Defendants, Gates and others (the defendants), plans to traffic drugs from Florida to Illinois. When the details were corroborated by the defendants actions, police obtained a search warrant and found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants home and automobile. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where an anonymous tip is corroborated with actual police findings, a totality of the circumstances approach is an appropriate way of determining probable cause instead of using the twopronged test of veracity/reliability and basis of knowledge from Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969). The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution (Constitution) requires no more than a finding by an issuing magistrate that there is a substantial basis that a search will uncover evidence of wrongdoing. Facts. The police received a highly detailed anonymous tip that the defendants were trafficking drugs. The police, following up on the tip, observed the defendants conducting specific activities which were outlined in the tip. On the basis of the tip and the defendants corroborating activities, the police obtained a search warrant. Upon execution of the warrant, the police found drugs, weapons and other contraband in the defendants automobile and home. Issue. May a magistrate issue a valid warrant on the basis of an anonymous tip where there is no indicia of the informers basis of knowledge if the information contained in the tip is corroborated with police findings?

Held. When a court decides whether or not to issue a search warrant, the elements of the informants credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge are to be used as guides when considering the totality of the circumstances and are not to be exclusive requirements applied in every case. Dissent. Aguilar and the elaboration in Spinelli sets forth the analysis magistrates should follow on determinations of probable cause. To sufficiently uphold Fourth Amendment rights, magistrates must look at both the credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge of the informant. Basis of knowledge cannot fully be supported solely on the basis that some factual assertions corroborate with actual police findings. Since some of the anonymous tips were not corroborated and actually proved false, the informants credibility/reliability was undermined and therefore the warrant should not have been issued. Police cannot use findings of an illegal search to substantiate a previously issued warrant. Concurrence. Even if the factual findings by police were only corroborated by innocuous behavior, a valid warrant could still have been issued because the defendants actions were suspicious. The main focus should be whether there is an inference, based upon the suspects actions, that the informant is credible and the information was obtained in a reliable manner. Discussion.Credibility/reliability and basis of knowledge of an informant are very relevant in determining the value of a tip. These elements alone do not form the entire basis of inquiry in deciding whether probable cause exists. So long as the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing, the Fourth Amendment is not violated.

BACHE & CO. VS. RUIZ (GR 32409, FEB. 27, 1971) Digest
FACTS: - Commissioner of Internal Revenue Vera wrote a letter addressed to Judge Vivencio M. Ruiz requesting the issuance of a search warrant against Bache& Co. (Phil.), Inc. and Frederick E. Seggerman for violation of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) and authorizing Revenue Examiner Rodolfo de Leon to make and file the application for search warrant which was attached to the letter. -In the afternoon of the following day, De Leon and his witness, Arturo Logronio, went to the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Rizal. They brought with them the following papers: Veras letter -request; an application for search warrant already filled up but still unsigned by De Leon; an affidavit of Logronio subscribed before De Leon; a deposition in printed form of Logronio already accomplished and signed by him but not yet subscribed; and a search warrant already accomplished but still unsigned by Judge Ruiz. - At that time Judge Ruiz was hearing a certain case; so, by means of a note, he instructed his Deputy Clerk of Court to take the depositions of De Leon and Logronio. After the session had adjourned, Judge Ruiz was informed that the depositions had already been taken. The stenographer read to him her stenographic notes; and thereafter, Judge Ruiz asked respondent Logronio to take the oath and warned him that if his deposition was found to be false and without legal basis, he could be charged for perjury. -The Judge signed de Leons application for search warrant and Logronios deposition. Search Warrant was then signed by the judge and accordingly issued. 3 days later (a Saturday), the BIR agents served the search warrant to the corporation and Seggerman at the offices of the corporation. ISSUE: WON the search warrant is valid. HELD:

Search warrant is invalid. RATIO: There was no personal examination conducted by the Judge of the complainant (De Leon) and his witness (Logronio). The judge did not ask either of the two any question the answer to which could possibly be the basis for determining whether or not there was probable cause against Bache & Co. and Seggerman. The participation of the judge in the proceedings which led to the issuance of the search was thus limited to listening to the stenographers readings of her notes, to a few words of warning against the commission of perjury, and to administering the oath to the complainant and his witness. This cannot be considered a personal examination. Personal examination by the judge of the complainant and his witnesses is necessary to enable him to determine the existence or non-existence of a probable cause. Next, the search warrant was issued for more than one specific offense. The search warrant was issued for at least 4 distinct offenses under the Tax Code. As ruled in Stonehill Such is the seriousness of the irregularities committed in connection with the disputed search warrants, that this Court deemed it fit to amend Section 3 of Rule 122 of the former Rules of Court that a search warrant shall not issue but upon probable cause in connection with one specific of fense. Not satisfied with this qualification, the Court added thereto a paragraph, directing that no search warrant shall issue for more than one specific offense. Lastly, the search warrant does not particularly describe the things to be searched
Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986) F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought. It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesess Esmael Morada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND

MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver as guaran

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 172607 April 16, 2009 FACTS: The instant case involved a charge of rape. The accused Rufino Umanito was found by the RTC guiltybeyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape.The alleged 1989 rape of the private complainant, AAA, had resulted in her pregnancy and the birth of a childhereinafter identified as "BBB." In view of that fact, as well as the defense of alibi raised by Umanito, the Courtdeemed uncovering whether or not Umanito is the father of BBB.With the advance in genetics and the availability of new technology, it can now be determined with reasonablecertainty whether appellant is the father of AAA's child. The DNA test result shall be simultaneously disclosed tothe parties in Court. The [NBI] is, therefore, enjoined not to disclose to the parties in advance the DNA testresults.The [NBI] is further enjoined to observe the confidentiality of the DNA profiles and all results or other informationobtained from DNA testing and is hereby ordered to preserve the evidence until such time as the accused hasbeen acquitted or served his sentence.The DNA analysis on the Buccal Swabs and Blood stained on FTA paper taken from [AAA], [BBB], and Umanito, todetermine whether or not Umanito is the biological father of [BBB], showed that there is a Complete Match in allof the 15 loci tested between the alleles of Umanito and [BBB]; That based on the above findings, there is a99.9999% probability of paternity that Umanito is the biological father of BBB. The defense admitted that if thevalue of the Probability of Paternity is 99.9% or higher, there shall be a disputable presumption of paternity. ISSUE: Whether Umanito is the biological father of [BBB]. RULING: Court resolved, for the very first time, to apply the then recently promulgated New Rules on DNAEvidence (DNA Rules). The DNA testing has evinced a contrary conclusion, and that as testified to by AAA,Umanito had fathered the child she gave birth to on 5 April 1990, nine months after the day she said she wasraped by Umanito. Disputable presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted but may be contradicted andovercome by other evidence (Rule 131, Section 3).The disputable presumption that was established as a result of the DNA testing was not contradicted and overcome by other evidence considering that the accused did notobject to the admission of the results of the DNA testing (Exhibits "A" and "B" inclusive of sub-markings) norpresented evidence to rebut the same.By filing Motion to Withdraw Appeal, Umanito is deemed to have acceded to the rulings of the RTC and the Courtof Appeals finding him guilty of the crime of rape, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetuaand the indemnification of the private complainant in the sum of P50,000.00.Given that the results of the Court-ordered DNA testing conforms with the conclusions of the lower courts, andthat no cause is presented for us to deviate from the penalties imposed below, the Court sees no reason to denyUmanito s Motion to Withdraw Appeal.The instant case is now CLOSED and TERMINATED

CASE DIGEST ON PADILLA v. COURT OF APPEALS [269 SCRA 402 (1997)]

November 10, 2010 Nature: Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of the CA. Facts: Padilla figured in a hit and run accident in Oct 26, 1992. He was later on apprehended with the help pf a civilian witness. Upon arrest following high powered firearms were found in his possession: 1. .357 caliber revolver with 6 live ammunition 2. M-16 Baby Armalite magazine with ammo 3. .380 pietro beretta with 8 ammo 4. 6 live double action ammo of .38 caliber revolver Padilla claimed papers of guns were at home. His arrest for hit and run incident modified to include grounds of Illegal Possession of firearms. He had no papers. On Dec. 3, 1994, Padilla was found guilty of Illegal Possession of Firearms under PD 1866 by the RTC of Angeles City. He was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty from 17 years. 4 months, 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum to 21 years of reclusion perpetua as maximum. The Court of Appeals confirmed decision and cancelled bailbond. RTC of Angeles City was directed to issue order of arrest. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals. Padilla filed lots of other petitions and all of a sudden, the Solicitor General made a complete turnaround and filed Manifestation in Lieu of Comment praying for acquittal (nabayaran siguro). Issues: 1. WARRANTLESS ARREST: WON his was illegal and consequently, the firearms and ammunitions taken in the course thereof are inadmissible in evidence under the exclusionary rule No. Anent the first defense, petitioner questions the legality of his arrest. There is no dispute that no warrant was issued for the arrest of petitioner, but that per se did not make his apprehension at the Abacan Bridge illegal. Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person (a) when in his presence the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. When caught in flagrante delicto with possession of an unlicensed firearm and ammo, petitioners warrantless arrest was proper since he was actually committing another offence in the presence of all those officers. There was no supervening event or a considerable lapse of time between the hit and run and the actual apprehension. Because arrest was legal, the pieces of evidence are admissible. Instances when warrantless search and seizure of property is valid: ? Seizure of evidence in plain view, elements of which are (a) prior valid intrusion based on valid warrantless arrest in which police are legally present in pursuit of official duties, (b) evidence inadvertedly discovered by police who had the right to be there, (c) evidence immediately apparent, and (d) plain view justified mere seizure of evidence without further search (People v. Evaristo: objects whose possession are prohibited by law inadvertedly found in plain view are subject to seizure even without a warrant) ? Search of moving vehicle ? Warrantless search incidental to lawful arrest recognized under section 12, Rule 126 of Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence where the test of incidental search (not excluded by exclusionary rule) is that item to be searched must be within arrestees custody or area of immediate control and search contemporaneous with arrest. Petitioner would nonetheless insist on the illegality of his arrest by arguing that the policemen who actually arrested him were not at the scene of the hit and run. The court begs to disagree. It is a reality that curbing lawlessness gains more success when law enforcers function in collaboration with private citizens. Furthermore, in accordance with settled jurisprudence, any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea. 2. LICENSE TO CARRY: WON the petitioner is authorized, under a Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to carry the subject firearms No. In crimes involving illegal possession of firearm, two requisites must be established, viz.: (1) the existence of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that the accused who owned or possessed the firearm does not have the

corresponding license or permit to possess. The first element is beyond dispute as the subject firearms and ammunitions were seized from petitioners possession via a valid warrantless search, identified and offered in evidence during trial. As to the second element, the same was convincingly proven by the prosecution. Indeed, petitioners purported Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the face of the more formidable evidence for the prosecution as our meticulous review of the records reveals that the Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt were mere afterthoughts contrived and issued under suspicious circumstances. On this score, we lift from respondent courts incisive observation. Furthermore, the Memorandum Receipt is also unsupported b y a certification as required by the March 5, 1988 Memorandum of the Secretary of Defense. Petitioner is not in the Plantilla of Non-Uniform personnel or in list of Civilian Agents of Employees of the PNP, which would justify issuance of mission order (as stated in PD 1866). Lastly, the M-16 and any short firearms higher than 0.38 caliber cannot be licensed to a civilian. 3. PENALTY: WON penalty for simple illegal possession constitutes excessive and cruel punishment proscribed by the 1987 Constitution Anent his third defense, petitioner faults respondent court in applying P.D. 1866 in a democratic ambience (sic) and a non-subversive context and adds that respondent court should have applied instead the previous laws on illegal possession of firearms since the reason for the penalty imposed under P.D. 1866 no longer exists. He stresses that the penalty of 17 years and 4 months to 21 years for simple illegal possession of firearm is cruel and excessive in contravention of the Constitution. The contentions do not merit serious consideration. The trial court and the respondent court are bound to apply the governing law at the time of appellants commission of the offense for it is a rule that laws are repealed only by subsequent ones. Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to respect and apply the law as it stands. And until its repeal, respondent court can not be faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which abrogated the previous statutes adverted to by petitioner. Equally lacking in merit is appellants allegation that the penalty for simple illegal possession is unconstitutional. The penalty for simple possession of firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion perpetua contrary to appellants erroneous averment. The severity of a penalty does not ipso facto make the same cruel and excessive. Moreover, every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The burden of proving the invalidity of the statute in question lies with the appellant which burden, we note, was not convincingly discharged. To justify nullification of the law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication, as in this case. In fact, the constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been upheld twice by this Court. Just recently, the Court declared that the pertinent laws on illegal possession of firearms [are not] contrary to any provision of the Constitution Appellants grievances on the wisdom of the prescribed penalty should not be addressed to us. Courts are not concerned with the wisdom, efficacy or morality of laws. That question falls exclusively within the province of Congress which enacts them and the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes them. The only function of the courts, we reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws Held: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the CA sustaining petitioners conviction by the lower court of the crime of simple illegal possession of firearms & ammunitions is AFFIRMED EXCEPT t hat petitioners indeterminate penalty is MODIFIED to 10 yrs & 1 day, as min. to 18 yrs, 8 months & 1 day, as maximum. People v. Simon Doctrine: Although PD 1866 is a special law, the penalties therein were taken from the RPC, hence the rules in said code for graduating by degrees of determining the proper period should be applied.

Case Digest Nolasco vs Pano

By maechmedina Cynthia P. Nolasco vs Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano

FACTS: Aquilar-Roque and Nolasco were arrested by a Constabulary Security Group (CSG) at the intersection of Mayon Street, Quezon City On the same day, a searched was conducted. Ct. Col. Virgilio Saldajeno; applied for search warrant from the respondent Hon. Ernani Cruz Pano, after a month of round the clock surveillance of the premises as a suspected underground house of the CPP/NPA, particularly connected to MV Karagatan / Pena Andrea cases. The searching party seized 428 documents and written materials, and additionally a portable typewriter and 2 wooden boxes. The City Fiscal information for violation of PD No. 33, Illegal Possession of Subversive Documents Petitioners contend that the Search Warrant is void because it is a general warrant since it does not sufficiently describe with particularly the things subject of the search and seizure and that probable cause had not been properly established for lack of searching questions propounded to the applicants witness. Disputed Search Warrant: Documents, papers and other records of the communist party of the Philippines / New Peoples Army and or the National Democratic Front, such as Minutes of the Party Philippines..

ISSUE: Whether or not the search warrant issued was of general warrant and illegal?

HELD: The search warrant is of General, thus, it was hereby annulled by set aside.

RATIONALE: The Search Warrant does not specify what the subversive books and instructions are; what are the manuals not otherwise available to the public certain to make them subversive or to enable them to be used for the crime of rebellion. There is absent a definite guideline to the searching team as to what items might be lawfully seized thus giving the officers of the law discretion regarding what articles they should seize as, in fact, taken also were a portable typewriter. Mere generalization will not suffice and odes not satisfy the requirements of probable cause upon which a warrant may issue.

G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011BRICCIO "Ricky" A. POLLO, Petitioner,vs.CHAIRPERSON KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID, DIRECTOR IV RACQUEL DE GUZMAN BUENSALIDA, DIRECTOR IVLYDIA A. CASTILLO, DIRECTOR III ENGELBERT ANTHONY D. UNITE AND THE CIVIL SERVICECOMMISSION, Respondents.

FactsThis case involves a search of office computer assigned to a government employee who was charged administratively and eventually dismissed from the service. The employees personal files stored in the computer were used by the government employer as evidence of misconduct.Most of the foregoing files are drafts of legal pleadings or documents that are related to or connected with administrativecases that may broadly be lumped as pending either in the CSCRO No. IV, the CSC-NCR, the CSC-Central Office or othertribunals. It is also of note that most of these draft pleadings are for and on behalves of parties, who are facing charges asrespondents in administrative cases. This gives rise to the inference that the one who prepared them was knowingly,deliberately and willfully aiding and advancing interests adverse and inimical to the interest of the CSC as the centralpersonnel agency of the government tasked to discipline misfeasance and malfeasance in the government service. Thenumber of pleadings so prepared further demonstrates that such person is not merely engaged in an isolated practice but pursues it with seeming regularity. It would also be the height of naivete or credulity, and certainly against commonhuman experience, to believe that the person concerned had engaged in this customary practice without any

consideration, and in fact, one of the retrieved files (item 13 above) appears to insinuate the collection of fees. That thesedraft pleadings were obtained from the computer assigned to Pollo invariably raises the presumption that he was the oneresponsible or had a hand in their drafting or preparation since the computer of origin was within his direct control anddisposition.Issuelegality of the search conducted on his office computer and the copying of his personal files without his knowledge andconsent, alleged as a transgression on his constitutional right to privacy.RulingThe right to privacy has been accorded recognition in this jurisdiction as a facet of the right protected by the guaranteeagainst unreasonable search and seizure under Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, 27 which provides:Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shallissue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the personsor things to be seized.The constitutional guarantee is not a prohibition of all searches and seizures but only of "unreasonable" searches andseizures. 28

But to fully understand this concept and application for the purpose of resolving the issue at hand, it isessential that we examine the doctrine in the light of pronouncements in another jurisdiction. As the Court declared inPeople v. Mart i 29 :Our present constitutional provision on the guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure had its origin in the 1935Charter which, worded as follows:"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against unreasonable searches andseizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge afterexamination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describingthe place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." (Sec. 1[3], Article III) In this inquiry, the relevant surrounding circumstances to consider include "(1) the employees relationship to the item seized; (2) whether the item was in the immediate control of the employee when it was seized; and (3) whether theemployee took actions to maintain his privacy in the item." These factors are relevant to both the subjective and objectiveprongs of the reasonableness inquiry, and we consider the two questions together. 44 Thus, where the employee used apassword on his computer, did not share his office with co-workers and kept the same locked, he had a legitimateexpectation of privacy and any search of that space and items located therein must comply with the Fourth Amendment . 45 We answer the first in the negative. Petitioner failed to prove that he had an actual (subjective) expectation of privacyeither in his office or government-issued computer which contained his personal files. Petitioner did not allege that hehad a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was always locked and not open toother employees or visitors. Neither did he allege that he used passwords or adopted any means to prevent otheremployees from accessing his computer files. On the contrary, he submits that being in the public assistance office of theCSC-ROIV, he normally would have visitors in his office like friends, associates and even unknown people, whom he evenallowed to use his computer which to him seemed a trivial request. He described his office as "full of people, his friends,unknown people" and that in the past 22 years he had been discharging his functions at the PALD, he is "personallyassisting incoming clients, receiving documents, drafting cases on appeals, in charge of accomplishment report,Mamamayan Muna Program, Public Sector Unionism, Correction of name, accreditation of service, and hardly had anytimefor himself alone, that in fact he stays in the office as a paying customer." 46

Under this scenario, it can hardly be deducedthat petitioner had such expectation of privacy that society would recognize as reasonable.

In fine, no error or grave abuse of discretion was committed by the CA in affirming the CSCs ruling that petitioner is guilt yof grave misconduct, dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, and violation of R.A. No. 6713. Thegravity of these offenses justified the imposition on petitioner of the ultimate penalty of dismissal with all its accessorypenalties, pursuant to existing rules and regulations. Caballes vs. Court of Appeals [GR 136292, 15 January 2002] First Division, Puno (J): 4 concur Facts: About 9:15 p.m. of 28 June 1989, Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex de Castro, whileon a routine patrol in Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan, Laguna, spotted a passenger jeepunusually covered with kakawati leaves. Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with smuggledgoods, the two police officers flagged down the vehicle. The jeep was driven by Rudy Caballes yTaio. When asked what was loaded on the jeep, he did not answer, but he appeared pale andnervous. With Caballes consent, the police officers checked the cargo and they discovered bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized conductor wires exclusively owned by NationalPower Corporation (NAOCOR). The conductor wires weighed 700 kilos and valued atP55,244.45. Noceja asked Caballes where the wires came from and Caballes answered that theycame from Cavinti, a town approximately 8 kilometers away from Sampalucan. Thereafter,Caballes and the vehicle with the high-voltage wires were brought to the Pagsanjan PoliceStation. Danilo Cabale took pictures of Caballes and the jeep loaded with the wires which wereturned over to the Police Station Commander of Pagsanjan, Laguna. Caballes was incarceratedfor 7 days in the Municipal jail. Caballes was charged with the crime of theft in an informationdated 16 October 1989. During the arraignment, Caballes pleaded not guilty and hence, trial onthe merits ensued. On 27 April 1993, Regional Trial Court of Santa Cruz, Laguna rendered judgment, finding Caballes, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of theft. In a resolutiondated 9 November 1998, the trial court denied Caballes motion for reconsideration. The Courtof Appeals affirmed the trial court decision on 15 September 1998. Caballes appealed thedecision by certiorari. Issue: Whether Caballes passive submission to the statement of Sgt. Noceja that the latter willlook at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive be considered as waiver onCaballes part on warrantless search and seizure.

Held: Enshrined in our Constitution is the inviolable right of the people to be secure in their persons and properties against unreasonable searches and seizures, as defined under Section 2,Article III thereof. The exclusionary rule under Section 3(2), Article III of the Constitution barsthe admission of evidence obtained in violation of such right. The constitutional proscriptionagainst warrantless searches and seizures is not absolute but admits of certain exceptions,namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of evidence in plain view;(3) search of moving vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search; (5) customs search; (6) stop andfrisk situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent and emergency circumstances. In cases wherewarrant is necessary, the steps prescribed by the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules of Courtmust be complied with. In the exceptional events where warrant is not necessary to effect a validsearch or seizure, or when the latter cannot be performed except without a warrant, whatconstitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure is purely a judicial question,determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of thesearch or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search andseizure was made, the place or thing searched and the character of the articles procured. It is notcontroverted that the search and seizure conducted by the police officers was not authorized by asearch warrant. The mere mobility of these vehicles, however, does not give the police officersunlimited discretion to conduct indiscriminate searches without warrants if made within theinterior of the territory and in the absence of probable cause. Herein, the police officers did notmerely conduct a visual search or visual inspection of Caballes vehicle. They had to reach insidethe vehicle, lift the kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks before they were able to see thecable wires. It thus cannot be considered a simple routine check. Also, Caballes vehicle wasflagged down because the police officers who were on routine patrol became suspicious whenthey saw that the back of the vehicle was covered with kakawati leaves which, according tothem, was unusual and uncommon. The fact that the vehicle looked suspicious simply because itis not common for such to be covered with kakawati leaves does not constitute probable causeas would justify the conduct of a search without a warrant. In addition, the police authorities donot claim to have received any confidential report or tipped information that petitioner wascarrying stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could otherwise have sustained their suspicion.Philippine jurisprudence is replete with cases where tipped information has become a sufficient probable cause to effect a warrantless search and seizure. Unfortunately, none exists in the present case. Further, the evidence is lacking that Caballes intentionally surrendered his rightagainst unreasonable searches. The manner by which the two police officers allegedly obtainedthe consent of Caballes for them to conduct the search leaves much to be desired. WhenCaballes vehicle was flagged down, Sgt. Noceja approached Caballes and told him I will look at the contents of his vehicle and he answered in the positive. By uttering those words, it cannot be said the police officers were asking or requesting for permission that they be allowed tosearch the vehicle of Caballes. For all intents and purposes, they were informing, nay, imposingupon Caballes that they will search his vehicle. The consent given under intimidating or coercive circumstances is no consent within the purview of

the constitutional guaranty. Inaddition, in cases where the Court upheld the validity of consented search, it will be noted thatthe police authorities expressly asked, in no uncertain terms, for the consent of the accused to besearched. And the consent of the accused was established by clear and positive proof. Neither can Caballes passive submission be construed as an implied acquiescence to the warrantlesssearch. Casting aside the cable wires as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are

insufficient to sustain Caballes conviction. His guilt can only be established without violatingthe constitutional right of the accused against unreasonable search and seizure