ExcerptfromtheIntroduction ForthepasttwodecadesIhavesoughttounderstandtheattitudesofordinaryArabsandtomakea casethattheseattitudesfueledpoliticsintheregioninboththeshortandthelongterm.WhenIstarted thiswork,in1990,mostpoliticalscientistsandforeignpolicyanalystsdiscountedtheimportanceof publicopinionbecausethecountriesoftheregionweredominatedbyauthoritarianrulers.Thenthe 2010Arabuprisingsarrived,seeminglyfromnowhere,andsuddenlytheattitudesofordinaryArabs wereinarguablythedrivingforceacrossalargeswathoftheMiddleEast,notonlyshapingeventsas theyhappenedbutalsolayingthefoundationforpoliticsintheyearsahead. InawayIfeltvindicated.Mostly,though,Iwonderedandstilldowhetherandwhenthisawakened giantwillfinditsbearings.Inmyview,thekeytounderstandingtheregionstillliesinlookingcloselyat thestronglyheldvaluesandbeliefsofpeopleintheregionandhowtheydefinethemselves.Ofcourse, thesebeliefsandnotionsofidentitydidnotemergefromwholeclothin2010;theyevolvedovertime. Andwenowarebetterabletostudytheirevolution,usingtheaccumulatedpublicopinionresearchof thepastdecade.Thatisthepurposeofthisbook.

k. *** MyjourneyintounderstandingArabheartsandmindsbeganasthecoldwarendedandjustasIraqs SaddamHusseinwasemergingastheperceivedwinnerofthedevastatingIraqIranwarthatdominated the1980s.Tobeexact,itstartedwithatriptotheregionthattookmetoBaghdadinearlyJune1990, justtwomonthsbeforeIraqsarmyinvadedKuwait.Ihadtakenaleavefromteachingpoliticalscienceat OhioStateUniversitytoserve,throughaCouncilonForeignRelationsInternationalAffairsFellowship, asadvisortoCongressmanLeeHamilton,thenchairoftheHouseSubcommitteeonEuropeandthe MiddleEast.IwouldtourtheregionthatspringandsummertoresearchareportforHamiltononthe implicationsofdevelopmentsintheregionfortheglobalbalanceofpower.TheArabgovernmentsand peopleImetandinterviewedonthattripwereclearlyapprehensiveaboutanimpendingeraof Americandominance,withoutthecounterweightoftheSovietUnion.Totheirminds,Americanow wouldbefreetointensifyitssupportforIsrael,leavingArabsstillmorevulnerable.Eversincethe1967 ArabIsraeliwar,theUnitedStateshadbeentheprincipalsupplierofcuttingedgeweaponstoIsrael,a substantialproviderofeconomicaid,andIsraelsprotectorattheUnitedNations.Indeed,themajority ofcasesinwhichtheUnitedStatesemployeditsvetopowerattheUNSecurityCouncilduringthecold warhadrelatedtoIsrael.TheprevailingsentimentwasthatAmericansupportforIsraelstoodintheway ofcompellingIsraeltowithdrawfromtheArabterritoriesitoccupiedin1967andthatinthepostcold warera,thiswouldbeevenmorethecase. NoArableader,however,hadexpressedtheseconcernspubliclymoreoftenandmoreforcefully,andin somewaysmoresurprisingly,thanIraqsruler,SaddamHussein.Althoughitseemsalmostimpossibleto believenow,SaddamhadbeenonAmericasgoodsidethroughouthiseightyearwarwithIran,which hefoughtwithsignificantU.S.militaryandintelligencesupport.Bythestartofthenewdecade,though, thebloomwasoffthatrose.Inaspeechin

AmmaninFebruary1990,SaddamexpressedwhatIdiscoveredtobeacommonfeelingamongArabs: GiventherelativeerosionoftheroleoftheSovietUnionasthekeychampionoftheArabsinthe contextoftheArabZionistconflictandglobally,andgiventhattheinfluenceoftheZionistlobbyonU.S. policiesisaspowerfulasever,theArabsmusttakeintoaccountthatthereisarealpossibilitythatIsrael mightembarkonnewstupiditieswithinthefiveyearspanIhavementioned.Thismighttakeplaceasa resultofdirectortacitU.S.encouragement.[1] Bythatsummer,angerwithAmericanpolicywasmorewidespread.DrivingimmediateArabsentiment werefivefactors:theperceptionthattheArabIsraelipeaceprocesswasdead,thetilttotherightin Israelipolitics,aU.S.vetoofaUNSecurityCouncilresolutiononprotectingPalestinians,aresolutionby theU.S.CongressdeclaringJerusalemtobetheunitedcapitalofIsrael,andtheimmigrationofSoviet JewstoIsrael.TheprevailingviewwasconciselysummarizedbyaformerEgyptianambassadortothe UnitedStateswhohadwidelybeenconsideredproAmerican:Arabsaresickoftheirgovernments patheticallybeggingtheU.S.topleadwithIsraeltopleaseletthemhavepeace.[2]Theofficial spokesmanoftheIslamicdeputiesintheJordanianHouseofRepresentativesechoedthefeeling:The U.S.hostilityandarrogancemustmotivateourArabandIslamicnationtoputanendtothecourseof beggingandcapitulationthatitisimmersedin.[3]SaddamHusseinsoughttoexploitthissentimentby hostinganArabsummitinBaghdadattheendofMay,ostensiblytoaddressthePalestinianquestion butalsotocelebratehisownemergenceastheArableadermosttobereckonedwithbytheWest. *** MytripthatspringandsummerwouldtakemetoSyria,Jordan,Egypt,Iraq,thePalestinianterritories, andIsrael.Imetwithmanygovernmentofficials.Ialsometwithandinterviewedjournalists,academics, andbusinesspeopletalkingtostudentsandfacultyatacademicinstitutions,chattingincafes,and visitingpeopleintheirhomesandImadeaparticularefforttoengagepeopleinformally,alwaysin Arabic,andtofindoutwhetherSaddamsconcernswerewidelyshared.EvenaflightfromBaghdadto Cairowashelpful.FlyingineconomyonEgyptAir,IfoundmyselfinthemiddleofaplanefullofEgyptian workersreturninghomefromIraq.DuringtheIraqIranwar,BaghdadhadreliedheavilyonEgyptian labortoreplaceIraqiswhoweredoingthefighting.Thestoriestheseworkerstoldwentbeyondforeign policy.AlthoughtheyexpressedadmirationforSaddamHusseinforstandinguptoIsraelandtheUnited States,theytoldstoriesofmixedtreatmentinIraqanddistinctculturaldifferences,eventhoughthey wereArabslikeIraqis. Mytrip,startinginSyria,hadbeentimedtocoincidewithasummitofmostoftheArabheadsofstate, whocametoBaghdadattheendofMaytoaddressthePalestinianquestion,whichformostofthe previousdecadehadbeenovershadowedbythebloodyIranIraqwar.Butinrecentyearsithadagain cometothefore,firstduetothePalestinianuprising(whatwouldcometobecalledthefirstintifada)in 1987andthenfollowingtheendoftheIranIraqwar,whichmostaroundtheworldinterpretedasan Iraqivictory.SaddamHusseinreignedsupreme. InBaghdadmyviewsonArabpublicopinionwerebothenrichedandchallenged.Iarrivedthereshortly afterthesummitended.U.S.ambassadorAprilGlaspie,myhostinBaghdad,invitedmetoaccompany

hertoadinneratthehouseoftheItalianambassador.ShetoldmeonthewaythatPalestineLiberation OrganizationchairmanYasserArafatwasstillinBaghdadasthe guestofSaddamHussein.Atthetime,theUnitedStateshadfrozenitsdialoguewiththePLO,and neithershenorlowerlevelAmericanofficialscouldmeetwithhimorhissubordinates.GlaspieaskedifI wouldbepreparedtomeetwithhimiftheopportunityaroseduringmybriefvisit.Herreasoningwas thatIwasnotsubjecttothesamerestrictionsthatAmericanofficialsfacedandthatArafatmightbe happytogetasenseofhowtheAmericanCongressviewedthePalestinianIsraeliconflictandthathe,in turn,mightwanttosharehisviewswithWashington.ShealsoreasonedthatArafatmightfeelmore comfortablecommunicatinginArabic.Onmyside,Isawthisasanextraordinaryopportunitytomeet andevaluateacentralPalestinianfigureIhadonlyreadandwrittenaboutbutneverbeforemet. AtdinnerthateveningAmbassadorGlaspieaskedtheEgyptianambassadortoarrangeameeting. KnowingthatIwasscheduledtoleavetoCairothenextday,theEgyptianenvoysomehowmanagedto arrangeitforearlymorning.IwasmetattheSheratonhotelbyArafatsdriver,whowhiskedmeto Arafatsguesthousealowkey,modestvilla,oneofmanytheIraqishadbuilttohostvisiting dignitaries. Arafatmovedfrombehindhisdesktogreetmebutotherwisesaidlittle,atleastinitially.Instead,he quietlytookmymeasureasIspokeatlength,summarizingtheattitudesthatHamiltonandother membersofCongressheldtowardthePLOandthePalestinianissue.Soon,though,hewaskeento expresshisowntakeonevents,andourinitialconversation,thougharrangedatthelastmoment,lasted morethananhourandahalf,broughttoaclosebyArafatsappointmentwithaSovietdiplomat.AsI preparedtoleave,Arafatseemedanxioustoextendourconversation.Hismeetingwiththevisitor wouldbequick,hesaid,andhesuggestedIstayformoreconversationandalsoforlunch.Thus,Igotto experienceArafatscharmatthelunchtable,whenhetookmyplateanddebonedthefishbefore servingmeassomeofhisaidesandavisitorfromMauritanialookedon. AsArafatandIworkedourwayintotheconversation,wemovedbeyondthespecificissuesofthe AmericanArabrelationship.ReadingwhathefeltwasahighlyantiAmericanArabpublicsentiment, ArafatvoicedhisstrongbeliefthatproAmericanArableaderswouldsoonfaceamomentofreckoning. SaddamHusseinandtheIraqipeopleweretrueArabnationalistswhogenuinelycaredaboutthe Palestinianpeople,hesaid,andbothweregainingwidespreadArabpublicadmiration.[4]Thepro AmericanArableaders,especiallyKingFahdofSaudiArabia,lookedweakandvulnerableincomparison. Therehadalreadybeenanincident,Arafatnoted,inwhichapublicdemonstrationhadpreventedthe motorcadeofthekingofSaudiArabia,withallhismajesty,fromenteringthecityofMedina. AsIwasleaving,ArafatimpliedthatSaddamHusseinwouldbeabletousehispopularitytoinfluence foreignpoliciesthroughouttheArabworld,andindeedinthewakeofthesummit,rulersintheregion didincreasetheirfinancialcommitmentstothePalestinians.Thatsametimeframealsobroughtpublic airingsofcriticismofU.S.foreignpolicybysomeofAmericasclosestalliesintheregion.Bytheendof June1990,evenKuwaitinewspaperswerecallingonArabstoadoptseriousandobjectivestands againsttheU.S.,whichpersistsinapositionhostiletoArabcauses.[5]EgyptianpresidentHosni

MubarakalsowarnedthatthebiasedU.S.positionswillcertainlyreturntheregiontodependenceon themilitaryoption.[6] ForSaddamHussein,theArabsummitwasalsothepublicrelationscouphehadlongedfor.Widely televisedacrosstheregioninwhatwasararemomentformostlygovernmentcontrolledmediathe meetingshelpedportrayhimastheemergingleaderoftheArabworld,oneabletodealwiththe consequencesofthisnew,singlesuperpowerglobe.[7]Hispersonalpopularitysoaredaswell, particularlyafterhewasseentohavewonthewarwithIranandboastedofweaponsthatcouldreach Israel. *** IwasbackintheStatesasSaddambaskedintheafterglowofhissummit.ThereportIsubmittedto CongressmanHamiltonconcludedthatresentmentofAmericanforeignpolicyovertheArabIsraeliissue wasperhapsatthehighestlevelsincethelate1950s,followingtheSuezcrisis.SimultaneouslyIwas preparingtomovetotheU.S.MissionattheUnitedNationsasadvisorunawarethattheUNSecurity Councilwouldalmostimmediatelybedealingwiththebiggestcrisisofthepostcoldwarera:theIraqi invasionofKuwaitonAugust2. Inretrospect,SaddamsdecisiontosendforcesinKuwaitseemslikeahugemiscalculation,butby midsummerhehadseencloseupthepotentialpowerofincitingArabopinionagainsttheWestto neutralizetheregionsautocrats.Hebelievedthatregionalrulers,especiallytheSaudis,wouldnotrisk theangeroftheirpeoplebyinvitingAmericantroopsontoArabsoil,andwithoutthedeploymentof groundforcesAmericaseffortstoreversehisoccupationofKuwaitwouldfail.Whathefailedtorealize butquicklylearnedwasthat,facedwithacrisis,Arabrulerswouldchoosewhattheyperceivedtobethe lesseroftwoevils.Forananalystwitharealistsunderstandingofthecalculationsofstatesandrulers,it wasnotparticularlysurprisingthatthekingofSaudiArabiaandthepresidentofEgyptwouldseein SaddamHusseinsambitionsagreaterthreattothemthanthethreatofanangrypublicevenaspublic opinionvisiblyinfluencedtheirdecisions. Nonetheless,twoimmediatequestionsarose:IntheabsenceofArabpublicopinionpolls,wasI misreadingthegeneralpublicsentiments,basedmerelyonmeetingswithalimitednumberofpeople andthemedia?Andinwhatwayispublicopinionafactorinthedecisionsandbehaviorofrulers,ifitis afactoratall?Ithusbeganajourneyofwhatisnowmorethantwentyyearsofresearch. ________________________ [1]S.Husayn,IraqsSuddamHusayn.SpeechpresentedatArabCooperationCouncil,Amman,Jordan, February27,1990(FBISNES90039). [2]AshrafGhurbalinterviewwithauthor,Cairo,Egypt,June1990. [3]StatementbyofficialspokesmanoftheIslamicdeputiesintheJordanianHouseofRepresentatives, FBISDailyReport,May10,1990(FBISNES90). [4]SaddamHusseinactuallyprojectedthesebeliefsinprivateconversationswithhisclosestaides.In tapesanddocumentsthatfellintoAmericanhandsafterthe2003Iraqwar,hoursofconversations

datingfromtheearly1980sintothetimeofthe2003war,itappearsthatmostofHusseinspublicly expressedattitudesabouttheUnitedStates,Israel,Arabnationalism,andPalestinewereconsistent withhisprivateviews.Forsomedocumentation,seeKevinM.Woodsetal.,eds.,TheSaddamTapes: TheInnerWorkingsofaTyrantsRegime,19782001(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2010). [5]ReportsinKuwaitinewspapers,FBISDailyReports,June25,1990(FBISNES90122). [6]StatementbyHosniMubarak,FBISDailyReport,June5,1990(FBISNES90108).Forfurther background,pleaseseeShibleyTelhami,ArabPublicOpinionandtheGulfWar,PoliticalScience Quarterly8,no.3(Fall1993). [7]OnJune2,1990,whileIwasinBaghdad,theEconomistquotedanIraqipasserbyassaying,Nasser madepromises,butcouldnotdeliver.ButwhenSaddamspeaks,heacts.ManyArabs,including millionsbeyondIraq,seemedinclinedtoagree.OnMay19,1990,theEconomistventured,Bymeeting inBaghdad,Iraqscapital,theArabshopetoshowtheworldthattheystandfullybehindtheirnewest hero,withhismysteriousnewmonstergunandhispromisetodestroyhalfofIsraelifIsraeldaresto attackhim.ThispicturecorrespondedwelltomyownconclusionsduringmyvisittotheregioninMay andJuneof1990.(OriginallycitedinmyArabPublicOpinionandtheGulfWar.)