Intelligence and Victory in Battle PDF

Intelligence and Victory in Battle
Intelligence is a vital component in all military operations, and gaining an information advantage over the enemy can assist commanders conduct successful operations. Intelligence is not, however, sufficient to guarantee
success because battles arent decided until the infantry have finished fighting. As one commentator has noted; intelligence in war works only through force. It can focus and economize efforts, it can offer an advantage, but in the end, force is necessary for victory.1 This essay discusses the effect of intelligence on the outcome of three battles; the Battles of Crete in May 1941 and Medenine in March 1943, and the invasion Normandy in June 1944. The Allied forces in each of these battles held a major intelligence advantage over the Germans, which had a significant influence on the conduct of the three battles. Despite this similarity, the course and outcome of each battle was quite different.
The Commonwealth forces which defended Crete in May 1941 largely consisted of poorly equipped evacuees from the Greek debacle.2 Balancing that, and providing some confidence in the attempted defence, was detailed intelligence obtained courtesy of the emerging ability of the Government Code and Cypher School at Bletchley Park to decrypt German radio traffic. In sum,
Kahn, David. The Rise of Intelligence Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. - Oct., 2006), pp.125-6. Kippenberger, H. Infantry brigadier. London: Oxford University Press, 1949, p.46-9.
this intelligence provided Freyberg with the date, locations, strengths, and methods by which the Germans would invade.3 By contrast the Germans only had very sketchy intelligence available, much of which seems to have been based on wishful thinking rather than rigorous analysis. Allied strength on the island was severely underestimated, and in a spectacular display of naivet it was anticipated that the civilian population would be friendly to the invaders.4 Freyberg used the intelligence available to him to develop a solid appreciation of the situation, and from it a sound concept of operations and defence plan. In outline, Freyberg recognised that holding the few airfields on Crete would cause the whole plan [to] fail, and commanders were enjoined to hold out on them. A threat of sea borne invasion was noted, but clearly identified as being of secondary importance. Forces were positioned and plans prepared for prompt counterattacks to recapture any key terrain lost at the airfields.5 Freybergs simple plan of holding the airfields worked well, and by the end of the first day the German airborne invasion had suffered severe casualties and was in deep trouble.6 Greek forces had destroyed the German detachment landed at Kastelli in the far west.7 In the central and eastern sectors the
Hinsley, F.H., Thomas, E.E., et al., British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, vol 1. London: H.M.S.O., 1981, p.415-18. anon, OL-series messages sent to Freyberg, Crete, Apr-May 1941, DEFE 3/894, The National Archives, OL 2154 (30 Apr 41) OL 14/375 (19 May 41), in particular message OL 2/302.
4
Murray, W., & Millett, A. A war to be won: fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000, p.106. Playfair, I.S.O., Molony, C.C., et al. The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II, The Germans come to the Help of their Ally (1941). London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1956, p.130.
Stewart, K.L., BGS Appreciation German Plan for Attack on Crete, Force Headquarters, 12 May 1941, Freyberg Papers, BGS File March-May 1941, WAII 8/16, Archives New Zealand
6 7
Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II, p.133-4
Hellenic Army General Staff. The battle of Crete, May 1941. Athens: Army History Directorate, 2000, p.58-9. 2 of 15
British, Greek and Australian forces had bottled up the German paratroopers away from the airfields at both Rethymno and Heraklion.8 The German plan at Maleme was also floundering. Landings around Galatas and Suda had been contained, and the airfield itself remained under fire from New Zealand troops in dominating positions on Hill 107.9 All that was required to complete the German defeat was for the anticipated counter attacks by the New Zealand brigade under Brigadier Hargest to occur. Inexplicably Hargest failed to grip up his command, the counter attacks were repeatedly postponed. Eventually Lieutenant Colonel Andrews voluntarily abandoned Hill 109, thus gifting use of the airfield to the Germans.10 It was an opportunity that General Student seized with both hands, literally crashing his only operational reserve onto the airfield at Maleme. Student subsequently leveraged this slight advantage into a cascading success that ten days later saw the Royal Navy conducting the third emergency evacuation of the Army in less than a year.11 Superior intelligence had allowed Freyberg to prepare a workable defensive plan, but the forces under his command werent capable of carrying it out. In this battle the Germans had the strength to off-set bad intelligence, [whereas]
8 9
Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II, p.133.
Davin, D.M., Crete. Wellington, N.Z.: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1953, p.172-3.
10 11
Davin, Crete, p.164-71.
Hellenic Army General Staff. The battle of Crete, p.82-3. Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II, p.142-6. 3 of 15
the British were not in a position to make better use of an intelligence service that was getting into its stride.12
When Field Marshall Rommel moved east after his partial victory over the Americans at Kasserine Pass in February 1943, thought he would be able to catch General Montgomery off-balance and to defeat the forward elements of Eighth Army at Medenine.13 However, in a repeat of the Crete operation, German intentions were betrayed by Ultra decrypts of radio communications and photo reconnaissance (PR) showing the panzer divisions heading east.14 With this advance warning Montgomery had the time he needed to rush additional forces, including the 2nd New Zealand Division, forward from Tripoli and set up a carefully prepared ambush.15 The resulting battle on March 6th saw the largest commitment of German armour in any North African battle, yet the outcome was a rapid and decisive German defeat. Rommel lost over one-third of his engaged tanks in just a few hours, while inflicting only minor casualties on the British and New Zealanders. The outcome was so one-sided that the Germans suspected a leak. This suspicion was noted by the British and resulted in the flow of special
12 13
Hinsley, British intelligence, vol 1, p.421.
Behrendt, H. Rommels intelligence in the Desert Campaign. London: William Kimber & Co., 1985, p.218. Liddell Hart, B.H. (ed.). The Rommel papers. London: Collins, 1953, p.412-13. Stevens, W. Bardia to Enfidaville. Wellington, N.Z.: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1962, p.131-2. Hamilton, N., Monty: master of the battlefield, 1942-1944. Sevenoaks: Coronet, 1985, p.152-3. Hinsley, F.H., Thomas, E.E., et al., British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, vol 2. London: H.M.S.O., 1981, p.593.
14
Kippenberger, Infantry brigadier, p.270-272. Stevens, Bardia to Enfidaville, p.136-45. Pemberton, A.L., The development of artillery tactics and equipment. London: British War Office, 1951, p.151. Intelligence and Victory in Battle 4 of 15
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intelligence from England to Montgomery being restricted for the remainder of the North African campaign.16 The Battle of Medenine appears to be a clear case of decisive intelligence advantage translating into decisive victory. However it should be remembered that it was less than a year since Rommel had run roughshod over a thoroughly demoralised British army from Gazala, through Tobruk, and all the way up to El Alamein, in the summer of 1942.17 Intelligence certainly helped Montgomery prepare his forces at Medenine, but crucially the British had learned how to beat the Germans in battle and had gained the confidence to do so. An Eighth Army report on the battle noted that This action proved conclusively that if infantry are well dug in with their anti-tank guns properly concealed, and if they are well supported by artillery fire, they have nothing to fear from a tank attack18 Lt. General Leese, commander of XXX Corps, remarked that the Battle of Medenine was a magnificent story ... [which] indicate[d] the will to win that was so evident everywhere in the Eighth Army. Without the skill and will to win the outcome would likely have been much less favourable to Montgomerys forces, despite the intelligence advantage.19
Operation Overlord formed the centrepiece of Western Allied strategy for 1944. A successful invasion of France would see the British and American armies
Kippenberger, Infantry brigadier, p.274. Stevens, Bardia to Enfidaville, p.153. Liddell Hart, Rommel papers, p.415-16. Hinsley, British intelligence vol 2, p.595.
17 18 19 16
Latimer, J. Alamein. London: John Murray, 2003, p.43-72. Pemberton, Artillery tactics and equipment, p.152. Hamilton, Monty, p.170. 5 of 15
grappling with a major part of the German army for the first time, and was expected to lead to the liberation of Western Europe and ultimately to the defeat of Nazi Germany.20 In order to ensure that the invasion would be a success a great deal of effort went in to ensuring that the invaders were well informed about all aspects of their impending task. The collection of this information depended on the Signals traffic analysis
employment of a variety of intelligence resources.
determined locations and command hierarchies, while decrypts of radio messages revealed strengths and intentions. Hundreds of PR flights revealed tanks, artillery, fortifications, obstacles, and supply dumps in the coastal regions. These missions were repeated at regular intervals so that trends could be discerned. The French resistance collected intelligence which
required close observation, such as whether coastal fortifications contained real guns.21 Small commando raids captured prisoners to identify units and try and understand their morale. This effort revealed the locations, identities,
strengths, quality, the nature of any fortifications, and the intentions of practically all German army, naval, and air forces in Western Europe.22
Ellis, L. (1993). Victory in the West. Vol.1. The battle of Normandy. London: H.M.S.O., 1962, p.9-10.
21
20
Hinsley, F.H. and Thomas, E.E, British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, vol 3, part 2. London: H.M.S.O., 1990, p.778. Jones,R.V., Most Secret War, London: Penguin, 2009, p.361
, Hinsley, British Intelligence, vol. 3, pt 2, p.69-87. Williams, Bill, Enemy reaction to Overlord: Allied intelligence assessment, 6 May 1944, WO 219/1837, Operation Overlord: disposition of enemy forces, appreciations of possible reactions etc. The National Archives. Holmes, R., The D-Day experience. London: Carlton, 2004, facsimile dossier of German beach defence works. Fenris, J., Intelligence and OVERLORD; a snapshot from 6 June 1944, in J. Buckley (ed.), The Normandy campaign 1944: sixty years on. London; New York: Routledge, 2006, p.188-94, 195-6. Hargest, James, The Anticipated Scale of German Air Force Effort Against OVERLORD in Notes from Normandy, WAII 1 DA 491.5/3, Archives New Zealand. Intelligence and Victory in Battle 6 of 15
22
This massive effort ensured there would be few surprises for the invaders, and meant that assault forces could be prepared for the tasks they would face. Inevitably there were omissions. The two most significant were the
unexpected presence of elements of the 352nd Infantry Division on Omaha Beach, and the 21st Panzer Division around Caen. While these two divisions were able to slow the tempo of the initial assault, they couldnt unhinge the invasion.23 Amphibious invasions are risky operations, primarily because their success ultimately depends on the so-called race to the foreshore, with success going to the side which can get the most force to the invasion site first. The
Germans held a major initial advantage since they already had over fifty divisions in France and the Low Countries, while the Allies starting from zero had to transport everything across the English Channel. Operation Bodyguard was the overarching Allied counter intelligence and security effort that sought to negate that advantage by concealing the location and strength of the actual invasion, and deflecting German interest onto locations well away from Normandy.24 Bodyguard consisted of 16 main deception operations of vary complexity and importance, coordinated by the London Controlling Section. The two main elements were Fortitude North and Fortitude South.25
23 24
Fenris, Intelligence and OVERLORD, p.196-7.
Kershaw, R., D-Day; piercing the Atlantic Wall. Surrey: Ian Allan 2010, p.409. Barbier, M.K., Deceptions and the planning of D-Day, in J. Buckley (ed.), The Normandy campaign 1944: sixty years on. London; New York: Routledge, 2006, p.170-1. Hughes-Wilson, John, Military Intelligence blunders. London: Robinson, 1999, p.19, 25. Barbier, Deceptions and the planning of D-Day, p.170. 7 of 15
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Fortitude North sought to convince the Germans that Norway was under imminent threat of invasion. The aim was to draw additional German forces to that peripheral location, and ensure the ones already there remained. It is not clear that the Germans ever accepted Fortitude North as a genuine threat. Even so, Fortitude North still served a purpose. German intelligence expected the Allies would attempt to deceive them and penetrating the deception around Fortitude North supported their belief that Fortitude South was genuine.26 Fortitude South portrayed an invasion of France along the Pas de Calais by the fictional First US Army Group (FUSAG), from the south-east of England. This deception relied on a number of interrelated factors to be convincing. This part of the English Channel is the narrowest and therefore required the least time at sea, enabled aircraft operating from England to provide the maximum cover, and provided the shortest route to the Third Reichs industrial heartland in the Ruhr. The Pas de Calais was also the launching point for the planned V-weapon campaign against England. Taken together, this made it seem to be the obvious place to mount an invasion. Commanding FUSAG was General Patton, who the Germans held in high regard and it was assumed he would be at the forefront of the invasion. A theatrical flourish was added when Patton hosted a sick officer being repatriated to Germany to dinner. Every stage-managed thing General Cramer
Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence blunders. p.24. Hastings, Max, Overlord: D-Day and the battle for Normandy, 1944. London: Pan Books Ltd., 1985, p.75. Latimer, J. Deception in war. New York: Overlook Press, 2001, p.214, 222. Intelligence and Victory in Battle 8 of 15
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observed was duly reported when he arrived in Berlin, all of it designed to reinforce existing German fears and preconceptions.27 The Allies knew that German intelligence collection capabilities in England were limited to PR, signals intelligence, and secret agent reports. Poor
procedures, coupled with Allied air supremacy, ensured that German PR coverage of England was poor to non-existent.28 This was exploited by
denying any opportunity to observe the locations Overlord was actually being mounted from, whilst allowing some limited coverage of the FUSAG area and its concentrations of dummy tanks, installations, and landing craft.29 Supporting this visual deception were fictitious radio transmissions between non-existent headquarters. This gave German radio intelligence an active
target to operate against, leading them to believe their own skill and cunning was revealing Allied capabilities and intentions.30 Shortly after the outbreak of World War II the British had imprisoned all German spies based in the United Kingdom, and a combination of good luck and good counter-intelligence captured every spy sent later. Most of these spies were convicted and executed or imprisoned, but a select few were turned to work as double-cross agents for the British. Controlled by the XX Committee, these men were used to feed scripted information to the Germans. This consisted of false information to deceive the Germans, mixed with true but unimportant and easily obtainable information build the agents credibility.
27 28 29
Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence blunders. p.31-2. Jones, Most secret war, p.422-3.
Reit, S. The hidden war: the amazing camouflage deceptions of World War II. London: Corgi, 1980, p.20-1, 22-3, 31-2, 37.
30
Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence blunders. p.25. Latimer, Deception in war, p.224-5. 9 of 15
Bodyguard made use of this group to feed corroborating information about Fortitudes North and South directly into heart of German intelligence, adding a third layer of apparently independent evidence to the overall picture.31 As the overall commander, General Eisenhower wasnt prepared to rely on only passive counter-intelligence measures to hold German forces away from Normandy. Allied strategic and tactical bombers were actively used to isolate Normandy by ruining the railway infrastructure in northern France. However, even this authentic effort was integrated into Fortitude South. By happy
coincidence, rail lines that fed Normandy also ran through the Pas de Calais so attacks that seemed to be isolating the latter were actually isolating the former. Additionally, any missions that were necessary to fully isolate
Normandy were masked in intelligence noise created by a policy of conducting at least two bombing missions in the Channel area for each one conducted in Normandy.32 In these ways the Allies completely subverted German intelligence collection to tell a coherent but false story. Since the Germans believed their various
sources to be independent, and since all were telling the same story, they deduced that the true Allied plan involved a main invasion along the Pas de Calais, led by Pattons FUSAG. As icing on their deceptive cake, the British used Ultra to monitor how the various components of their deception plans were succeeding. This insight
Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence blunders. p.24. Hinsley, F.H., Simkins C., et al, British intelligence in the Second World War: security and counter intelligence, vol 4. London: H.M.S.O., 1990, p.237-43. Latimer, Deception in war, p.227-9.
32
31
Ellis, Victory in the West, vol I, p.103 10 of 15
allowed them to fine tune their efforts by leaking additional information when necessary.33 The success of this grand deception effort can be seen in a German operational map dated 3 July 1944, almost a month after the D-Day landings. This map identifies Allied forces in Normandy with reasonable accuracy. However, it still shows the fictitious Fortitude North and South forces located in England, and documents the retention of over seventeen German divisions in the Pas de Calais area defending against a non-existent threat.34 On the eve of D-Day Allied intelligence had produced an excellent picture of the strength of German forces in Normandy, while Allied counter-intelligence had blinded the Germans tactically and operationally. This dual advantage provided the confidence to carry out the invasion. Despite this, grave concerns remained about the invasion. Alan Brooke
confessed to his diary the day before the invasion that he was very uneasy about the whole operation, and feared that it may turn into the most ghastly disaster of the whole war, which says a lot given some of the disasters Brooke had presided over earlier in the war.35 On the same day General Eisenhower prepared a dispatch, which was fortunately never used, to inform the public that Our landings in the Cherbourg-Havre area have failed to gain a satisfactory foothold and I have withdrawn the troops. My decision to attack at this time and place was based on the best information
33 34
Hughes-Wilson, Military Intelligence blunders. p.23.
Holmes, The D-Day experience, facsimile of map Lage West, 3.7.44, OKH Gen St d H, Op.Abt/IIIb
35
Danchev, A., & Todman, D. War diaries, 1939-1945: the diaries of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001. p.554. 11 of 15
available. The troops, the air and the Navy did all that bravery and devotion to duty could do. If any blame or fault attaches to the attempt it is mine alone.36 That Eisenhower and Brooke both retained grave doubts about the success of their great endeavour - despite knowing exactly how well the intelligence and counter-intelligence efforts had prepared the battlefield - indicates the limits of intelligence in winning battles. Even though the German high command was thoroughly deceived, none of the Allies geographical objectives on D-Day were achieved.37 But despite this, heavy fighting got the well prepared Allied forces ashore and kept them there, ensuring that the worst fears of Brooke and Eisenhower were not realised.
Before the Battle of Crete intelligence allowed Freyberg to develop a viable plan to counter a novel form of warfare, but failures by subordinate commanders wasted the advantage, and this superior intelligence failed to avert defeat. At Medenine intelligence provided the information which allowed Montgomery to balance himself, but defensive positions on the ground still had to be developed, and the men had to fight well to avoid defeat. At
Normandy a vast array of intelligence provided Allied commanders with unrivalled insight, while a complex counter-intelligence effort blinded the Germans. Intelligence provided the opportunity for success, but a hard fighting was required to secure it.
Eisenhower, Dwight D. "In case of failure" message drafted before D-Day. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Pre-Presidential Papers, Principal File: Butcher Diary 1942-1945. Eisenhower explicitly recognises the importance of intelligence in this message.
37
36
Hastings, Overlord, map on p.96-97 showing Allied objectives and advances on D-Day 12 of 15
These examples demonstrate that intelligence can enable success in battle, but only effective force can realise it. The relationship between intelligence and success has been summarised by noting that [I]nformation cannot win wars by itself. Information helps commanders make their operations more effective and efficient. It magnifies physical resources by enabling troops and guns to be better used in combat. It improves will and morale by reducing anxiety and steadying command. But ultimately its effect is secondary: it works only as a multiplier and guider of force and determination.38 As the Battles of Crete, Medenine, and Normandy show, it is superior use of force that wins battles, not simply superior intelligence.
38
Kahn, The Rise of Intelligence p.134. 13 of 15
Bibliography
Unpublished Sources anon, OL-series messages sent to Freyberg, Crete, Apr-May 1941, DEFE 3/894, The National Archives. Eisenhower, Dwight D. "In case of failure" message drafted before D-Day. Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Pre-Presidential Papers, Principal File: Butcher Diary 1942-1945. Hargest, James, Notes from Normandy, WAII 1 DA 491.5/3, Archives New Zealand. Stewart, K.L., BGS Appreciation German Plan for Attack on Crete, Force Headquarters, 12 May 1941, Freyberg Papers, BGS File March-May 1941, WAII 8/16, Archives New Zealand Williams, Bill, Enemy reaction to Overlord: Allied intelligence assessment, 6 May 1944, WO 219/1837, Operation Overlord: disposition of enemy forces, appreciations of possible reactions etc. The National Archives. Books Behrendt, H. Rommels intelligence in the Desert Campaign. London: William Kimber & Co., 1985. Buckley, J.(ed.). The Normandy campaign 1944: sixty years on. London; New York: Routledge, 2006. Davin, D.M., Crete. Wellington, N.Z.: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1953. Danchev, A., & Todman, D. War diaries, 1939-1945: the diaries of Field Marshal Lord Alanbrooke. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2001. Ellis, L. (1993). Victory in the West. Vol.1. The battle of Normandy. London: H.M.S.O., 1962. Hamilton, N., Monty: master of the battlefield, 1942-1944. Sevenoaks: Coronet, 1985. Hastings, Max, Overlord: D-Day and the battle for Normandy, 1944. London: Pan Books Ltd., 1985. Hellenic Army General Staff. The battle of Crete, May 1941. Athens: Army History Directorate, 2000 Hinsley, F.H., Thomas, E.E.. et al., British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, vol 1. London: H.M.S.O., 1979 __, British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, vol 2. London: H.M.S.O., 1981 __, British intelligence in the Second World War: its influence on strategy and operations, vol 3, part 2. London: H.M.S.O., 1990
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Hinsley, F.H., Simkins C., et al, British intelligence in the Second World War: security and counter intelligence, vol 4. London: H.M.S.O., 1990 Holmes, R., The D-Day experience. London: Carlton, 2004 Hughes-Wilson, John, Military Intelligence blunders. London: Robinson, 1999 Jones, R.V., Most secret war. London: Penguin, 2009 Kershaw, R., D-Day; piercing the Atlantic Wall. Surrey: Ian Allan 2010 Kippenberger, H. Infantry brigadier. London: Oxford University Press, 1949 Latimer, J. Deception in war. New York: Overlook Press, 2001. ___, Alamein. London: John Murray, 2003 Liddell Hart, B.H. (ed.). The Rommel papers. London: Collins, 1953 Murray, W., & Millett, A. A war to be won: fighting the Second World War. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2000. Pemberton, A.L., The development of artillery tactics and equipment. London: British War Office, 1951 Playfair, I.S.O., Molony, C.C., et al. The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II, The Germans come to the Help of their Ally (1941). London: H. M. Stationery Office, 1956. Reit, S. The hidden war: the amazing camouflage deceptions of World War II. London: Corgi, 1980. Stevens, W. Bardia to Enfidaville. Wellington, N.Z.: War History Branch, Department of Internal Affairs, 1962. Journal Articles Kahn, David. The rise of intelligence Foreign Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 5 (Sep. Oct., 2006), pp.125-134.
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Playfair, The Mediterranean and Middle East, vol II, p.133-4