GODOFREDO DIZON, petitioner, vs. THE COMMANDING GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINE RYUKUS COMMAND, UNITED STATES ARMY, respondent.

Digest by: Kirby Hipolito Doctrine: By virtue of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international law have been adopted as part of the law of the Nation. In like manner, there would be not be an unconstitutional derogation of the jurisdiction of the local courts if we are recognized the immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers. Facts: 1. March 14, 1947 Agreement: -between the Philippines and the United States of America -US is authorized to occupy and use certain portions of the Philippine territory as military bases -Article VIII of the Agreement grants the United States of America a general right to exercise jurisdiction over offenses committed by any person within any military base, permanent or temporary, with two exceptions: (1)Where the offender and offended party are both Filipinos; and (2)where the offense is against the security of the Philippines. 2. Godofredo Dizon was prosecuted in and convicted for an offense allegedly committed at the main storage area, Philrycom Engineer Depot, United States Army, at Quezon City by a General Court Martial appointed by the Commanding General of the Philippine-Ryukus Command of the United States Army and accordingly sentenced, on March 4, 1948, to confinement at hard labor for five years. 3. Dizon filed a petition for habeas corpus in the Supreme Court -contends that the General Court Martial had no jurisdiction over the alleged offense which was committed in a place not a base of the United States Army within the meaning of the Agreement concerning military bases of March 14, 1947 -even assuming that the offense was committed in a base, said Agreement is unconstitutional because it deprives the Philippine courts of the jurisdiction over all offenses exclusively vested in them by Article VIII, section 1, of the Constitution, and violates section 1 of Article III of the Constitution guaranteeing to every person in the Philippines due process and equal protection of the law 4. US: -the site in question is included within any of the bases specific in the Agreement -undoubtedly falls under the classification of temporary installations provided for in Article XXI of the Agreement -Even so, as said temporary installation is not located within the limits of the City of Manila, the terms of the Agreement pertaining to bases are applicable thereto by virtue of the provision of paragraph 3 of

Article XXI already above quoted -the offense is within the jurisdiction of US Issue: WON the judicial extraterritoriality provided in the Agreement of March 14, 1947, on American military bases in the Philippines is violative of the provisions of section 1 and 2, Article VIII of the Constitution(one conferring jurisdiction to the SC)? NO

1. Raquiza vs. Bradford; and Tubb vs. Griess: well-settled principles of International Law that a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign, is exempt from the civil and criminal jurisdiction of the place. 2. By virtue of section 3 of Article II of the Constitution, the generally accepted principles of international law have been adopted as part of the law of the Nation. In like manner, there would be not be an unconstitutional derogation of the jurisdiction of the local courts if we are recognized the immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers. 3. Even in the absence of an express declaration in the Constitution that the generally accepted principles of international law are made a part of the law of the Nation, we are bound to uphold the immunities above referred to. And this should be true as long as the civilized world or majority of the independent countries composing it still abide by the rules of the international law, and as long as the Philippines continues, as it must continue, to have an intercourse with such countries. 4. Agreement of March 14, 1947: the United States was given express permission to establish military bases on certain portions of the Philippine territory and to exercise jurisdiction over certain offenses. The rights thus granted are no less than those conceded by the rule of international law to "a foreign army allowed to march through a friendly country or to be stationed in it, by permission of its government or sovereign." 5. The jurisdiction granted to the United States under the Agreement may be wider than what is recognized by international law, but the facts remains that the lesser right is fundamentally as much a diminution of the jurisdiction of the Philippine courts as the greater right. 6. Philippine Independence Act, approved by the United States Congress on March 24, 1934, reserves to the United States the right to have and acquire naval reservations and fueling stations in the Philippines. In the Joint Resolution approved by the United States Congress on June 29, 1944, it was provided (section 2) that "after negotiation with the President of Commonwealth of the Philippines, or the President of the Philippine Republic, the President of the United States is hereby authorized by such means as he finds appropriate to withhold or to acquire and to retain such bases, necessary appurtenances to such bases, and the rights incident thereto, in addition to any provided for by the Act of March 24, 1934. CONCLUSION: If bases may be validly granted to the United States under the Constitution, there is no plausible reason while the lesser attribute of the jurisdiction cannot be waived.

Dispositive: Petition denied

Perfecto, Dissenting: 1. The jurisdiction granted is judicial in nature. As such, it constitutes the essential function of one of the elemental powers and attributes of sovereignty, the judicial power. 2. The Filipino people, in the exercise of the sovereignty (section 1, Article II of the Constitution), decided to vest the judicial power in one Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law. The popular constitutional mandate as couched in section 1 of Article VIII excludes from the exercise of the power other entities and persons. Being an attribute of their sovereignty, the people may exercise it directly or delegate it. When they delegated it to one Supreme Court and to such inferior courts as may be established by law, the delegation cannot be enlarged or extended without contravening the will of the people. 3. When the Supreme Court is deprived of appellate jurisdiction, Many of such cases may present themselves in the trial of offenses jurisdiction over which is granted by the Agreement to the United States of America. No one with some knowledge of law may gainsay the fact that in the trial of said offenses the constitutionality or validity of a treaty, law, ordinance, or executive regulation may be raised; the jurisdiction of the trial military court may be in issue; the accused may be sentenced to death or life imprisonment; or errors or question of law may be involved. When said situation should arise in the exercise by the United States of America of the judicial extraterritoriality granted to it in the Agreement, the Supreme Court may not exercise the appellant and revisory jurisdiction guaranteed to it by the Constitution, because the Agreement has transferred it to the United States of America. 4. It appears paradoxical that in a constitutional democracy like ours official pronouncements should be made recognizing immunities of foreign sovereigns and ministers in violation of the Constitution. The Filipino people have never given recognition to such immunities. On the contrary, they have embodied in the Constitution the purpose to establish a government under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy, where any discrimination even in favor of the most powerful foreign power should not take place