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16

OCTOBER 2009 FEED BACK NO. 2

TS TIDINGS

Project: Silk Road Sugars private limited, Kakinada, Frame 6B GT, 1 x 35 MW. Problem: Failure of the TRLY and TREG cards in Mark-6 Panel. Details of the failure: Silk Road Sugars is supplied with a Frame 6B Gas turbine and Mark-6 is used for its control and protection. The Project scope for BHEL PSSR was to commission the machine with Gas firing. Due to non availability of gas, customer has planned for liquid fuel firing first and the contract for the conversion from Gas to Liquid fuel was given to BGGTS (BHEL GE Gas Turbine Services Pvt Ltd). The machine was put on ratchet and cranked on 24/10/2009. All the protection checks for the turbine were completed and GT was made ready for firing operation. The preparatory works for starting the Gas Turbine was going on and the necessary modules were switched on and the auxiliaries were started one by one. At this time it was found that fumes were coming out of the TRLY board at 2C3 location and immediately panel power supply was switched off and isolated. On further investigations, it was found that those fumes were due to the burning of Metal Oxide Varistor (MOVs) provided across the output contacts of the relays meant for suppression of the surges as shown in the figure circled. The relay termination point at which the varistor blown out was a dry contact providing the master control for the Warren AOP hooked up by BGGTS and the control supply fuse of the warren AOP MCC was found in blown condition after this incident

TECHNICAL SERVICES / PSSR

17

OCTOBER 2009

TS TIDINGS

The power supplies for the individual Terminal boards were kept isolated in the Power Distribution Module (PDM) and power was switched on to the panel in that condition. The terminal board connectors were connected one by one checking for the input DC supply for any disturbances. While connecting to the TREG Module the input power supply swung to negative side and the positive voltage reading was +3V and the negative side voltage was -125 V. Under healthy conditions these should be +62.5V and -62.5 V respectively. The power supply was common to two TREG boards and they were isolated. During physical checking of the board it was observed that one varistor was blown in this card also which was connected to the negative leg of the DC in which trip interlock circuit was connected as shown in the figure circled. All the remaining terminal board cards were checked thoroughly and found no damage has occurred. With the above two damaged cards kept off, the panel was charged and found to be working normally. Analysis for the failure: The terminal point in the TRLY Board, which was used by BGGTS to connect the MCC command for warren AOP was Output No.1. On inspection it was found that the Fuses FU1 and FU7 was in position leading a path for the negative DC Supply to come till the end of the Varistor. To the other end of the Varistor lies the 230V AC signal from the MCC and the Varistor was put to stress by applying AC signal at one end and negative DC at the other end which eventually broken down the Varistor. In that course it created a short circuit which mixed AC and DC supplies and the negative leg of the DC supply was mixed to the AC supply which resulted in the failure of one more Varistor connected in the negative leg of the DC supply as shown in the TREG Board drawing. Further damage was averted due to the blowing of control supply fuse in the Warren AOP MCC module
TECHNICAL SERVICES / PSSR

18

OCTOBER 2009

TS TIDINGS

Precautions to be taken for avoiding such failures Relay Nos 1 to 6 need not be assigned for MCC Commands as far as possible, instead relay nos 7 to 11 can be assigned for this purpose which can be used for dry contacts only where as the former can be used as wet contacts with the jumper JP1 and the Fuses in position. The warren AOP command signal was reassigned to dry contact type channel. Some more MCC contacts (like Vent fans and fire alarm signals) were also found to be assigned in relay number 1 to 6 and these were removed and reassigned at different spare locations to prevent such failures. If in any case if the first 6 relays had to be used, the corresponding fuses have to be removed and kept. In this case it is FU1 and FU7. The fuses and Jumpers has to be inserted only in the case where the output is assigned for wet contact applications like solenoids, MOVs etc.

TECHNICAL SERVICES / PSSR

19

OCTOBER 2009

TS TIDINGS

TECHNICAL SERVICES / PSSR

20

OCTOBER 2009

TS TIDINGS

TECHNICAL SERVICES / PSSR

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