Aristotle - Fragments On Ethical Subjects (George Grote)

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FRAGMENTS
ON ETHICAL SUBJECTS.
BY THE LATE
GEOEGE GEOTE,
BEING
F.E.S.
A SELECTION
FROM HIS POSTHUMOUS

PAPERS.
LONDON: JOHN MUKEAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

1876.
right of Translation
Tlie
is reserved.
MR. GROTE'S WORKS.
A HISTORY OF GEEECE. From

to the close of the
Generation coiitpmjiorary with
the Earliest Period Alexandkr the Great.

10 vols.
8vo.
120s.
Library Edition.
With
Portrait,
Maps, and Plans.
Cabinet Edition.
Post 8vo.
*,*
6.
With
Portrait
and Plans.
be
12 vols.
each.
Any volume of this
Edition
may
had
separately.
PLATO AND OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKEATES.

3 vols.
8V0.
45s.
ARISTOTLE.
2 vols.
8vo.
32s.
THE MINOR WORKS OF GEORGE GROTE.

Critical
With
By
Remarks on
his Intellectual Character, Writings,
and Speeches.
AiEX. Bain, LL.D.
With
Portrait.
8vo.
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PERSONAL LIFE OF GEORGE GROTE.
Compiled from
to
Family Documents, Private Memoranda, and Original Letters Various Friends. By Mrs, Gbote. With Portrait. 8vo. 12s.
and from
LOKDOK
PRIXTBD BY WILLIAU CLOWES AND SONS, STAMFORD STREET AND CHARING CRCSS.
INTIIOUUCTION.
When
to be
Mr. Grote's vast collection of MSS. came

thoroughly examined, there were discovered
Essays in Ethics, which
several
appeared
to be
to
be
sufficiently consecutive
and complete
given to
the world.
The work on Plato
afforded
him
opportunities
;
for discussing various points of Ethical theory
and
but
he turned these opportunities to good account

in
none of
his
published writings had he treated
systematically of the questions relating to Morals,

in the
tises
form that they usually assume in the
trea-
of modern writers.
Ethical Philosophy formed, all

of his chief lines of study.
through
life,
one
its
He had
preceptive
followed
development, both as to
its
theoretical foundations
details,
and as
to
its
practical
or
in
ancient and in modern times.

possibly
His own views
may
have
been
;
shaped
by
his
early
contact
with James Mill
but they were matured by his
IV
INTRODUCTION.
meditations.
;
own independent
Mr. Grote belonged

in the statement of
to the Utilitarian school
and
in
the doctrines, as well as

there
is
the arguments
to all its
used,
much
that
is
common
disciples
yet his superior erudition, together with his great
powers both as a reasoner and as a writer, impart

a welcome freshness to his handling of the subject
in these papers.
The
Ethical
first
On Sentiment
Essay
right
the Origin and Nature of
raises
the
Psychological ques-
tion of Ethics, the mental foundations of the sen-
timent
of
and
wrong.
After
giving
the
elements that enter into the sentiment, he defines

it
generally as a sentiment of regulated social recias
procity,
between
lives.
the
agent and
is
the
society
it
wherein
he
This
the
Form^ which
presents in every grade of
its
development.
There
are also in the Matter, some points of caj)ital uniformity,

to be
which he enumerates; but account has
also
taken of the original and inherent diversities one
between
urges
age
or
country and another.

of
this fact
He
and
strongly the
of
bearing
on the
;
theory
an
Instinctive
Moral
Sentiment
meets the objection, urged against the derivation

theory, that
it
tends to weaken
the
authority of
the ethical motive.
INTKODUCTION.
V of Morals
Tbe second Essay

a
short
discussion
Philosophy
the
is
of
Moral Standard.
The
author takes his ground upon the juridical view

of Morality, brought into prominence
by Bentham
force.
and Austin, and

enquires into
illustrates it
with great
He
the
meaning of the
it,
" supremacy of
all
its
conscience," and connects
under
disguises,
with a reference
urges
right,
to
external
reciprocity
authority.
He
re-
the
essential
criticises
of
obligation
and
and
Kant's
theory
of the
moral
feelings.
The
third
Essay
Ancient
Systems
of Moral
Philosophy
goes
no farther than
to advert to the
defectiveness of the ancient systems in

starting-point the
making
their
summum
The
bonum, or the happiness
of the individual.
real
end of morality being,
not to
make
the individual happy, but to protect
one
man from
another man, the theory of the sumto be stretched
mum
honum had
and interpreted
to
contain a reference to the welfare of others.
The
author shews that the adherence to this startingpoint was the cause of
much
of the perplexity
find
and
confusion
moralists
;
of
ideas
that
we
in
the
ancient
not even excepting Aristotle himself.
The fourth Essay
Idea
of Ethical
Philosophy
is
the fullest in
its
handling of the several topics

vi
INTRODUCTION.
brought forward.
The author
repeats the
social
bearings of Obh'gation, viewing society as the im-
mediate source of the ethical sanction

cates that there
is
but indidoes
?
a farther enquiry
on what
how
Society
itself
proceed in
framing
its
enactments
and
this conducts to the question of

is
far utility
or happiness
the ultimate end.
The second part
of the
Essay
is
occupied with
tracing at some length the growth of ethical ideas

in the child
;
while, in the third
part,
the author
goes fully into the nature and meanings of Moral
Approbation and Moral Disapprobation.
The two concluding
Essays, had
they been
dis-
covered in time, would have been included in the

'
Aristotle.'
They
are
the
fruit
of long
and
la-
borious study, and, so far as they extend, eml)ody

the writer's matured views upon the Ethics and the
Politics
:
the two treatises whose omission from his
published exposition of the Aristotelian philosophy has been most regretted.
The
falls
fifth
Essay On
the Ethics of Aristotle

:
naturally into two divisions
the
first
treats
to
of Happiness;
Aristotle,
j.s_..
the second of what,

ingredient
according
of
the chief
Happiness,
namely^ Virtu e.
On
Aristotle's
own
conception of
INTRODUCTION.
'
V"
turn-
Happiness, Mr. Grote dwells very minutely

ing
it
over on
all
sides,
and looking
fully
full
at
it
from
every point of view.

its
While
acknowledging
measure of
its
merits,
he gives also the

criticisms
defects.
His
on
this
head are in the

less
author's
best style, and are

discussion
no
important as
regards Ethical
than as a commentary
on
Aristotle.
His handling of Aristotle's doctrine of Virtue

equally subtle and instructive.
is
Particularly striking
are the remarks on the Voluntary and the Involuntary,
and
on
vrpoatjoecrt?,
or
deliberate
is,
preference.
The treatment of the Virtues

more fragmentary
;
in detail
unhappily,
but what he does say regard-
ing Justice and Equity has a permanent interest.
The concluding Essay
The
Politics of Aristotle
must
be studied in connection with the preceding.

brief sketch,
it it
Although but a
is
remarkable
for
the insight which
affords us into the
most con-
summate
political Ideal of the ancient world.
A. B.
CONTENTS.
ESSAY
SENTIMENT
I.
FAQB
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATUEE OF ETHICAL

1
ESSAY
PHILOSOPHY OF MOEALS
IL
29
ESSAY
in.
..
VANCIENT systems of MOEAL PHILOSOPHY
49
ESSAY
IV.
65
/IDEA OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY
ESSAY
^THE ETHICS OF AEISTOTLE
V.
127
ESSAY
5
VI.
213
THE POLITICS OF AEISTOTLE
ESSAY
I.
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT.
'/
ON THE OEIGIN AND NATUKE OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT.
Of
all
the remaining productions of the

is
ancient
world, there
nothing which
is
more
characteristic
and admirable
than
the
writings
of
the
Greek
ethical
and Roman philosophers on the subject of

and
first
political science.
By them
these sciences were

particular facili-
created, not only without
any
ties
for the attempt, but in spite of a
very narrow
range of experience and observation

entire
in
sjDite
of
want of intercourse with
all
nations
not
Hellenic
and,
what
is
of
still
greater
moment,
without any pre-existing specimens of philosophical enquiry on that or any other subject to serve them
either as
model or incentive.
clearly
To understand
ledge,
1.
what the Greek and Roman
writers achieved in this department of
human know-
two preliminary explanations are necessary.

a general view of that which consti-
To give
tutes ethical sentiment,

it
and the sources from whence
derives
2.
its
origin.
To
present an account of the state of ethical
B 2
ON THE ORIGIN AND NATURE

it
[Essay
I.
sentiment as
stood in the Hellenic world prior to
Socrates, with
whom
the
day-star of philosophical
enquiries
on ethical subjects
may
be considered to
have
arisen.
What
is
Ethical Sentiment
The explanations given by

miany and various
different writers of the
nature and origin of ethical sentiment have been

;
but every one
who
has ever
either spoken or written
upon the subject has agreed
in considering this sentiment as absolutely indispen-
sable to the very existence of society.

diffusion of a certain
Without the
measure of
this feeling through-
out
all
the
members
would
of the social union, the caprice,
the desires, and the

dividual
passions
of each
separate
in-
render
the
maintenance of any
Positive
established
rality,
communion
impossible.
mo-
under some form or another, has existed in
every society of
experience.
which the world has ever had
But
if
we compare one age with
another, and one
part of the globe with another, the differences in

respect to ethical sentiment will appear both vastly
numerous and prodigiously important.
Some few
leading points of similarity will be found to prevail
always and everywhere

will be found to
but the points of difference

in regard
outnumber greatly those
Essay
I.]
OF ETHICAL SENTIMENT.
to
which an uniformity of sentiment reigns throughall
out
the various communities of the world.
Any
theory which professes to explain the origin and

nature of ethical sentiment must render an account,
not merely of the points of resemblance, but also of
the
many and
great divergences between one society
and another.
No
theory can satisfy this condition which repre-
sents ethical sentiment as consisting of inexplicable

instincts, or
mental determinations originally arising
without any regard to consequences.
Those who
adopt this view of the case produce the supposed

instincts for the
fications
purpose of explaining those modi-
of ethical sentiment which are the most

universal
common and
instincts
they do not imagine

Yet
if
special
in this or that age or nation to
explain
what
is
separate and peculiar.
the theory of
instinct be
applied to the former, consistency imit
periously requires that

latter
;
shall be applied
to
the
the
more
so as the latter includes all that is
really or intrinsically difficult of explanation.
For
the former, or the universal and essential tendencies
of the moral sense, admit of being most satisfactorily
deduced from other elementary principles of our

nature.
Ethical sentiment
sentiment,
feelings,
is,
in fact, a
very complicated
presupposing
many
trains of ideas
distinct,
and
and deduced from several
and even

;
[Essay
1.
opposing elements of our nature
yet so combined
affect
together by habitual association, as to
the
mind with the
rapidity and instantaneousness of a
simple feeling, no separate consciousness of the constituent items remaining.
The elementary tendencies

ethical sentiment presupposes,
of the
mind which
it is
and out of which

:
more or
1.
less
deduced, are as follows
Our
self-regarding tendencies.
The whole of every man's comfort and

and the
happiness,
for-
from the cradle to the tomb, depends upon the

bearance, the
others; and
protection,
positive help of
all
these consequences,
again, depend
entertain
to-
upon the
dispositions
which
others
is
wards him.
plete
This dependence
great and com;
throughout the whole of

felt
life
but
is
most
urgently
during the utter helplessness of child-
hood, at the time

formed.
2.
when
the
first
associations
are
Our sympathetic
tendencies.
Generally speaking, and leaving out of sight particular cases of exception, the pains of others are
an
original
cause
of pain to
ourselves.
Several ex-
ceptions
might be enumerated
to this rule,
;
such as
the " Suave
mari magno," of Lucretius
but the
rule in general holds good.
The
pleasures of others are frequently a cause of
pleasure to ourselves, but
by no means
universally.
Essay
I.]
in this case
The exceptions
numerous.
are very frequent
and
But the sympathy of

or with our
others, either
with our pains
pleasures, is always agreeable to us

others,
want of sympathy on the part of

always painful and disagreeable.
3.
or
the
manifestation of a feeling the opposite of sympathy,

is
Otcr betievolent affections.
We
love those
who
confer happiness upon us, or

:
protect us from suffering
we
also love those
whose
presence
is
associated with our enjoyments, or with
our consciousness of protection.

4.
Our malevolent
hate those
affections.
We
us, or
who
are the causes of suffering to
who
;
deprive us of happiness either present or

also
expected
those
whose presence
enjoyment.
is
associated
with suffering or
5.
loss of
Sympathising with other persons who
feel pain,
we
are disposed to hate those
who
are the causes of

as
that pain, though not with the
same intensity
we
are
hate those
who
are the causes of pain to ourselves.

feel pleasure,
Sympathising with others who

disposed to love those
pleasure.
we
who
are the causes of that
Amongst
constant,
all
these
different
affections,
the
self-
regarding affections are both the strongest, the most
and the most
lasting.
The sympathetic
becoming
and the benevolent
affections are capable of
ON THE OKIGIN AND NATURE
[Essay
I.
frequent and powerful causes of action under a good

training, as the malevolent affections often do under
an opposite system.
It
seems to be by virtue of the
benevolent and sympathetic affections acting conjointly with
the
self-regarding
affections, that
we
to
become capable of conceiving intense attachment

a
common good
that
is,
to the idea of the safety
and happiness of others
in conjunction
with our
own
and apprehensions equally intense

common
peril or suffering.
is
at the idea of a
Every individual person
placed in a double posi-
tion in respect to his conduct
and sentiments.
In
the
first
place,
he
is
an
agent,
seeking to satisfy
various wants, and to gratify various affections in

the easiest
manner open
and
to him.
In this character,
his interests
his feelings stand apart
from those
of other persons, not unfrequently at variance with
them.
In the second place, he
is
a patient, in com-
mon
duals
are
with others, from the action of different indivi:
in this character his interests and his feelings

in
commonly
unison
with
he
is
those
of
others.
Throughout the whole of

in both of these
life
constantly placed
two
positions,
and he accordingly
acquires the constant habit of viewing and judging
of the circumstances around
him both from
the one
is
point of view and from the other.

to
When
he
about
become an agent, he unconsciously passes from the
point of view belonging to this character to place
Essay
I.]
himself by imagination in that of the spectator or

patient
;
when he
to
is
witness to the agency of others,

to the position of the agent,
state
his fancy transfers
him
and presents
him a conception of the

if
of
mind which would animate him

placed.
he himself were so
The habit of thus changing our point of
view, and conceiving what

in a position different
we
is
should feel
is
if
placed
from our own,

it
necessarily
it
an acquired habit
so
but
acquired so early,
is
constantly
called
into
all
exercise,
and
is
so
in-
dispensably necessary at
times to our comfort and

last
even our
safety, that
it
becomes at
all
one of the
most rapid and familiar of
the mental processes.
We
come
to
perform
it
not only without any distinct
or special consciousness, but also in cases
where
it
causes us extreme pain, and where

desire to escape
it.
we would
greatly
The
idea of the
judgment which
others will form becomes constantly and indissolubly

associated with the idea of action in the
mind of
every agent
this idea being, in fact, the
same (with
some
differences
which
shall
be touched upon pre-
sently) as the idea of that

self
judgment which he him-
would form
if
placed in the position of others.
It
is,
in fact, the idea of the
judgment of
others,
concurrently with his
own
as a spectator or patient.
This idea of the judgment of others upon our
conduct and feelings as agents, or the idea of our
own judgment
as
spectators
in
concurrence with
10
others,
[Essay
I.
upon our own conduct
as agents,
is
the main
basis of
what
is
properly called ethical sentiment;
which
is
essentially a social sentiment, conceivable
only by a number of
men
living in
some
sort of
communion more
or less intimate
is
and extensive.
identical either
Ethical sentiment
by no means
with sympathy or with

although
it is
the benevolent affection,
a compound which presupposes both
the one and the other.
A man
may
feel
both sym-
pathy and benevolence in the most acute degree

towards a being
sentiment
who cannot be an
iufant,
object of ethical
towards an
an
idiot, or
an animal
senti-
he
may
be powerfully restrained by ethical
ment
in his dealings with a person towards

little
indulges
or no benevolence, or
whom he whom he even

is
regards as a personal enemy.
Ethical sentiment
an aggregate of the opinions entertained by each

given community, and associated in their minds with
very strong feelings

which
entitles
as
to
the line
of
conduct
any individual agent
to their protec-
tion, their
esteem, or their admiration on the one
hand
their
or which exposes
displeasure,
him on the other hand

contempt,
or
their
to
their
indif-
ference.
It consists of
an association in
my mind
of
of a certain line
of conduct, on the part both
myself and of any other individual agent, with a

certain sentiment resulting
from such conduct, and
excited
by
it,
in
the
minds of the general public
Essay
I.]
us.
11
around
It
is
sentiment of regulated social

tlie
reciprocity,
as
between
agent and the society
amongst
whom
he lives
such
and such behaviour and such sentiments

theirs. It
is
to be rendered
on
his part, such
to be manifested as requital
on
the
opinion which he entertains, and which has been
deeply impressed upon his mind by
its
connection
with his most anxious hopes and

ditions
fears,
on the confirst
prescribed to
him
for
obtaining,
the
protection,
next the esteem, and lastly the admi-
ration of the society
and for
escaping the distress
and misery consequent upon
his becoming, or
even
upon
his conceiving himself to be, the object of their
anger, or scorn, or displeasure.
All ethical senti-
ment, of what kind soever

imperfect,
it
be,
whether perfect or
uniformly contains
idea of a certain
well
or
ill
directed,
:
these three ingredients
1.
The
conduct or disposition on the part of each individual

agent.
2.
The idea of a
by
certain
disposition
or
conduct on the part of other persons towards such

agent, determined
it
his conduct
and disposition as
may have been
manifested, or as there
it.
may
be
reason to understand
These two
ideas, intimately
combined and blended together by

ceived (3), as bound together
association, con-
by
common
sanction,
and
as reciprocating
is
one with the other, seem to

universal, essential,
constitute all that
and
it
indis-
pensable to ethical sentiment, taken as
exists in
12
ON THE OKIGIN AND NATURE

lowest and most perverted, as well as in
correct, varieties.
its
[Essav
I.
its
purest
and most
The
reciprocity
between
that
the agent
and the
society
consists
in
this,
although he does not expect to receive the protection or favour of society, except
upon condition of
on his part,
certain conduct
failing which,
and certain
dispositions
he anticipates from them the contrary
treatment
yet,
on the other hand,
if
he has duly
performed these conditions, he conceives himself to
have earned their protection or favour as a matter

of right, and thinks that they would do
if
him wrong
they withheld
it.
I say, moreover, these two ideas conceived as

together hy
hound
a common sanction.
To
a certain extent
is
the sanction thus implied in our moral sentiment

actually exhibited in the positive interference
and in
the manifestation of sentiment on the part of society.
In most
cases,
the
various acts and forbearances

to constitute the
which a man supposes
sum
of his
duty, especially in a rude stage of civilization, are

acts
and forbearances towards other individuals
and here, the body of the society forms the positive

sanction on which a
protection,
man
relies for interference
and
when he
feels that
he has performed the

it.
conditions M^hich give
him
a title to claim
If
dis-
the social organization be so imperfect as
to
if
appoint his hopes of

persons against
such
protection
or
the
whom
he requires protection should
Essay
I.j
13
themselves chance to be the most powerful portion

of society
the agent
thus disappointed looks to the
Gods
as a
supplementary sanction.
The
idea of a
sanction, or of a superior force
competent to interfere
a guarantee for the
and prepared
to interfere
as
maintenance of the connection between the two ideas

above alluded
sentiment
to,
forms a constant adjunct of ethical

imperfectly
the
reality
however
ill
may
con-
correspond to this imagination.

nection established in the
The intimate
mind by
its
association be-
tween good or
desert
and
consequences, drives
us to conceive an ideal vinculum between
them,
under
the
form
of
superintending
and ever-
watchful Providence, competent to punish, to compensate,
and
to reward.
These, then, are the constituent elements of ethical

sentiment, which
it
includes universally
acts
and under
all
circumstances
the idea of certain
and forbearon the part
ances, manifesting particular dispositions,
of any given agent, considered as the exciting cause of those dispositions
on the part of others upon
which the safety and happiness of the agent most

vitally
depend
of their protection or
the
ill-usage, their
admiration or scorn, their esteem or neglect. Association knits together
two intimately and
indis-
solubly in the
mind of the agent
the
idea of the
act or disposition
on his own part with that of the
corresponding disposition on the part of others
in

14
[Essay
I.
such manner that the one cannot be thought of without the other, and a compound sentiment
is
formed,
the items of which cannot become subjects of distinct

consciousness.
As
a cement and guarantee to the
constancy of this union, the idea of an extraneous

sanction
called the
is
superadded, and completes what
may
be
Form
of Ethical Sentiment, as distinguished
from the Matter.
In regard to the Matter of Ethical Sentiment, there

is
in
some few
capital points a great uniformity
but
there
are also,
upon almost
all
other points, the

dif-
widest divergencies^ between different ages and

ferent
nations.
First,
Ethical
Sentiment always
dispositions of
places
some
limit
upon the malevolent
mankind, and upon the indefinite power which each
man
originally possesses of
hurting or tormenting
his neighbours.
In the very rudest communities,

is
some limitation of this kind

sentiment
;
imposed by the general
without
it,
indeed, no
exist.
community what-
ever could even continue to
The
association
is
everywhere more or
less
formed, in the
mind
of
each individual agent, between acts of intentional

hurt or spoliation of others, and the displeasure or
enmity of
feels this
society.
Every member of the

less force
it.
:
society
sentiment with greater or

feels his
every
one finds and
own
protection in
There
are great differences between one society and another

in respect to the faintness or potency of the feeling
Essay
I.]
its
15
the constancy or unsteadiness of
operation
the
upon
all
degree to which
all
it
bears equally or unequally
the various members, and operates alike for the

all
protection of
and the
restraint of
all.
But
societies agree, so far as the existence of the feeling

is
concerned, in this portion of the matter of ethical

it
sentiment, and
forms the indispensable link which
enables them to subsist and

solution.
move on without
dis-
The coincidence
of interest, or indeed of
is
necessity,
between one society and another,
in this
particular so evidently and urgently impressed, that

it
would be astonishing
if
the effects produced were
not uniform.
Again, ethical sentiment tends universally, under

all its
forms and
varieties, to
develop and encourage

It
the benevolent impulses of our nature.

this effect in
produces
some communities
to a greater degree,
:
in other communities to a less degree
but in
all,
without exception,
tion.
to,
it
produces an
effect in this direc-
In the
it
first place,
the restraint, before alluded
which
imposes upon the malevolent and rais
pacious propensities of our nature,
indispensably
necessary to
make room
for
any considerable growth
and development of the benevolent impulses.
man who
of others
is
perpetually in fear of evil at the hands
is
hardly susceptible of a decided or con-
stant feeling of benevolence towards
them
it is
only
when he
ceases to be beset with the former feeling
16

any
[Essay
I.
that the latter association acquires
forcible hold
of his mind.
indirect
In the next place, over and above the
encouragement, thus afforded by clearing
the ground from obstructive and antagonizing feelings, ethical
sentiment affords further positive en-
couragement to the benevolent impulses.

of society
is
The voice
everywhere more or
in
less favourable to
them, even
history.
the least civilized tribes recorded in
Thirdly, ethical sentiment

rator
is
also the great gene-
and supporter of
all
the virtues included under
the
general term of self-command, including prucourage,

continence,
repression
dence, temperance,
of anger, &c.
The constant
to
habit in the agent, of
making present
public, is the
selfish
himself the judgment

effectual curb
of
the
his
grand and
by which
and impetuous appetites are kept in reasonable
subjection.
Ethical sentiment, therefore,

reference not to
its
when viewed with

times
Form, but
to its Matter, exhibits

all
a certain general similarity of direction in
and
places.
It tends
uniformly and everywhere, in
a greater or less degree, to place some limit on indi-
vidual malevolence and cupidity; to foster the bene-
volent impulses of
our nature
to
encourage the
to implant the
habit of individual self-command
and
notion of a certain recognised standard of action, for
the adjustment of each man's behaviour.
Essay
1.]
this nniformity of
17
But when
general direction has

truth carry the
once been stated,
we cannot with
analogy any farther.
In no two countries and in no
two ages
is this
general effect produced, either to the

If
same degree or in the same manner.

a
list
we make
of the various actions reputed guilty, disgrace-
ful, wrong, or unbecoming, or conversely, of actions

virtuous, honourable, right, or becoming, in
any given
age or country,
we
shall find that our list will be

if
altogether inapplicable
we
try
it
with reference
to
any
distant region or anterior stage of society.
The
virtuous
man
or
the vicious man, of our
own age
or country, will no longer receive the same denominations if transferred to a remote climate or a different people.
Though
it
the same terms of praise and

will be found that in one
blame are employed_,
society they are directed towards one class of actions,

in another society towards another. If
we compare
American
the positive morality of Japan^ of
Hindostan, of
Turkey^ of England^
of Brazil, of the
Indians, of the ancient Greeks,
Eomans, and Ger-
mans,
we
shall perceive
that amongst
any one of
these nations a
man might
be exposed to the abhor-
rence of society for actions which amongst the rest

of them would be perfectly innocent.
There
exist
amongst each of them, peculiar

antipathies,
errors, suj)erstitions,
and caprices, handed down and cherished
as an integral portion of the national ethical sentic

18
ON
tup: UltiaiN
and nature
[Essay
I.
ment, quite as
much reverenced
much more
as that other portion

others,
which the nation holds in common with
in
many cases, we consider

its
indeed,
reverenced.
When
ethical sentiment with reference, not to

to its Matter,
Form, but
we
cannot but discern
that the uniformity and similarity, as between various

societies,
does not
extend beyond
few capital
points, of obvious
and pressing
necessity,
and in addirection.
dition to this, a general analogy of
aim and
:
The
rest
is
all peculiarity
and diversity
on which
its
each age and each nation clings to tenets of
own,
without recognising any basis of reference

to itself with others.
common
And
it
is
obvious that such peculiarities would

all
naturally arise, amongst different societies
rude
and ignorant, in those early processes of association

out of which ethical sentiment
is
first
constituted.
To
love the causes of their security and happiness

perils
to hate the causes of their
and misery
are
its
universal
currents of the jorinciple

societies
of association,
which each of these rude
would obey on
own ground
the signs and concomitants of either of

In so
far,
these important results would also share in the feel-
ing more specially belonging to the cause.

then, as the causes of happiness or misery
were ob-
vious, immediate, not to be overlooked or mistaken,
these communities
would
all
form the
like
judgments
in such a
and attach the
like ethical sentiments.
But
Essay
I,]
19
rude condition of the
human
intellect,
mistakes as to
the real causes of happiness and misery would be
innumerable, and each society would
make
a different
mistake
moreover,
among
the different signs and
concomitants, accident would turn the attention
of
each society upon some in preference to the
rest.
Differences would hence arise, in the original constitution of ethical
sentiment,
as
conceived by each
community
ceived
of
and such
peculiarities,
when once
general
con-
and
incorporated
with
be
the
body
ethical
sentiment, would
to
transmitted from
generation
generation,
by the omnipotence of
early habit and training
they would be inseparable

yet recorded.
and
incorrigible,
except by some greater improve-
ment than
would be
history has ever

as
There
much
caprice and peculiarity, in the

is
various divergences of ethical sentiment, as there

in the choice of particular
phenomena
as
omens and
signs of the future.
In treating of the
origin
and authority of our

have paid more
moral
sentiment,
many
writers
attention to the Matter of this sentiment than to the
Form, and have considered the
latter as if
it
were
something subordinate to and dependent upon the

former.
The
idea or the sight of certain actions
(they say), without any regard to their consequences,

excites in our
minds a certain simple and inexplicable
feeling, called ethical ajDprobation or disapprobation.
c 2
20
[Essay
I.
We pursue
this
the one, and avoid the other, hy virtue of

self-arising determination,
inward and
and quite
independent of any regard to the feeUngs or opinions

of others.
This latter (they say)
may
indeed appear
as an auxiliary
and a modifying
influence, but it is
:
not the primary ground of the determination
man
would
find himself
even from the beginning thus
impelled and deterred, although there were no other
being at hand to contemplate or
criticise
him.
This method of proceeding with regard to ethical

sentiment appears to
phical
:
me
erroneous and unphilosoit
Erroneous, because
altogether misconceives
:
the actual genesis of the sentiment
Unphilosophical,
because
it
diverts the attention from that
which
is
common
and
sities
to ethical sentiment universally, in all times
places, to that in
which
it
presents endless diverdiversities exist in
and anomalies.
That such
respect to the various actions condemned, tolerated,
and applauded,
in different countries
:
and
ages, is a
matter of incontestable notoriety
and he who pro-
ceeds to render a general account of ethical senti-
ment, taking for his basis of explanation the actions
comprised under
it,
will find himself compelled to
admit original and inherent diversities between the
man
of one age or country and the
man
of another.
If this
mode of explanation be
applied only to those
actions which are objects of moral approbation or of
moral disapprobation, in
all
ages and countries,
it

Essay
I.]
21
will leave the largest portion of ethical sentiment not
accounted
for.
If the same
mode be extended
to all
to the peculiar divergences of ethical sentiment as
well as to the points of analogy, a thousand different

characteristic instincts
must be supposed discoverable
some in one
society
and some in another.
No
phifor
losopher, so far as I
know, has yet contended
the supposition of all these multiplied

instincts
:
and separate
though
it is
a necessary and logical conse-
quence of adopting the idea of the actions approved

as the
starting point of
an explanatory theory
ethical sentiment
and thus rendering the F'orm of
secondary and subordinate to the Matter.

I believe
that those
who have
represented
our
moral sentiments as an aggregate of original and

unaccountable instincts, have clung to this theory
mainly from a fear that the ethical motive would be

degraded and enfeebled,
if
the
tq
sentiment
out
of
which
it
arises
were admitted
be derivative and
generated by association.
The authority of the

would not be
belief could
moral sentiments
adequately
(they
imagined)
the
sustained,
unless
be
established that they were natural

instincts
and ready-made
directly
impressed
to
upon
the
mind
by
Nature
herself, or
by the Divine Author of Nature
original revelations, or direct
commands and
to
impulses,
from the Divinity

the idea of those
man.
Such seems
insisted
have been
who have
upon the doctrine
22

instincts
[Essay
I.
of original and inexplicable
in
:
morality.
But the idea

is
itself is altogether fallacious
nothing
gained in the
way
of authority
by
setting forth
the ethical impulse as arising ready-made out of the
hands of nature.
They have
and
this in
common with
is
many
other impulses
which carry with them no
authority
whatever,
which
it
frequently
all
necessary to disregard.
All our appetites, and
our desires of relief from bodily uneasiness, are an

inseparable
part
of
our natural
constitution
yet
there
is
not one of these which
we
are justified in
so re-
implicitly following: each of
them must be
strained
and modified as
If
it
to fall into
harmony with
by nature,
they ought
our duty.
were
true,
then, that our moral
sentiments were implanted ready-made

it
would not be legitimate
to infer that
implicitly to be obeyed:
like
since
nature implants in
it
manner numerous other impulses which

resist.
is
indispensable often to
in the
Nothing
is
acquired,
way
of authority, to the moral sentiments,

:
by
representing them as instinctive
on the contrary,
much
is lost
for
by
this supposition, all the separate
divergences of the feeling are placed upon one com-
mon
level,
without the possibility of any standard
for distinguishing fallacy
from rectitude.
Are we
to
admit then that the moral sentiments

f
are factitious
tive,
Quite the reverse.
They
are deriva-
and generated by association from other simpler
Essay
1.]
:
23
and more elementary principles of our nature

the process of association
is
but
by which they are formed
universal and uniform, so far as regards the
Form
it is
of ethical sentiment: in regard to the Matter,

to a
high degree irregular and anomalous, but these
anomalies are for the most part not factitious
they
do not present the appearance of any separate premeditation or design.
No
instance has ever been
presented to the actual observation of the historian,

of families, previously destitute of
all social
first
training,
coalescing with each other for the
time,
and
thus passing into a state of society.
But
it
must have
been during this period that
all
the languages
now
:
spoken on the globe must have taken their origin
and when we consider how complicated the meclianism

is,
both organical and mental, of the very
simplest of these languages,
we
shall not
be astonvast
ished
that
men who
could
overcome so
difficulty for the
purposes of mutual communication,
should be capable of conceiving in their minds the

benefit
of
reciprocal
help
and the necessity of

If
reciprocal
socialized
abstinence
from injury.
the
semi-
man were
capable of going through, and
disposed to go through, those perplexing intellectual
combinations on which the
first
construction of a
fortiori
language must have depended, a
he must
to
have been competent
to conceive,
and disposed
conceive, those simpler moral combinations which go
24

:
[Essay
1.
to constitute ethical sentiment
more
especially
when
we
recollect that the latter
process, after all, has
been rudely and defectively performed, leaving out
much,
in regard to the Matter,
which ought
perhaps,
to
have
been taken in
and
taking
in,
still
more
which ought
to
have been
left out.
The
arises
real difficulty in explaining ethical sentiment
from these very irregularities in which the
sentiment differs in one society and in another.

those
But
who
adopt the theory of instinct are so far

irregularities, that
from explaining such
they leave
them altogether unnoticed, and are not very willing

to
admit them in their
full
extent.
It is
quite
impossible to account for
them by any general theory.

special cause, in the early
Each of them has had

history of the people
its
amongst
whom
it is
found
but
that cause has not been transmitted in history, and
can very rarely be divined.
Again, account must be
taken of the connection of the early morality with

religion, the
Gods being looked upon

for
as the great
its
supplementary sanction
observances.
the enforcement of
Acts pleasing or displeasing to the

to
Gods come thus
be enrolled among the commands

:
and prohibitions of morality

acts,
and
this
class
of
depending entirely upon the temjDer and
tastes
which
differ
may happen
materially
:
to
be ascribed to
pass
the Gods,
when we
from
one people
to
another
they are not determined by human
Essay
I.]
25
interests,
and therefore there
is
no operative cause
of uniformity.
With regard
was
rude
first
to the
way
in
which
ethical sentiment
generated, on the original coalescence of

into a
men
permanent
social
communion, we
must
have no direct observation to consult, and
therefore content ourselves with assigning some un-
exceptionable theory.
in
But with regard
to the
way
which
ethical sentiment is sustained
and trans-
mitted, in a society once established,
we have ample
experience and opportunity for observing, before our

eyes.
We
know
perfectly that children are not born

:
with any ethical sentiment

course
of early education,
they acquire
it
in the
and we can trace the

its earliest
various stages of the process from
rudi-
ments
to its complete maturity.
It will
be impossible however to comprehend with

either the real character or the true
any exactness
mode
have
of generation, of ethical sentiment, unless
we
the
previously
familiarised
its
ourselves
with
principle of association in
great and fundamental
modes of working.
Two
general truths are indis-
putably established and universally manifested in our

various associative processes
:
First, that sensations
and ideas which have been frequently experienced

in conjunction,
more
especially if
any one amongst

to
them be vivid and
interesting,
have a tendency
run together into clusters or compounds, of which the
26
[Essay
I.
separate parts are not subjects of distinct conscious-
ness
insomuch that unless we can retain a clear
recollection of
some period of our

to us,
lives
when
this
compound was unknown

it
we
are apt to suppose
a simple, original, and
spontaneous, production
of the
mind
Secondly, that sensations or ideas ori-
ginally indifferent,
familiarly
when they have been long and
known
as the causes, precursors, or con-
comitants of pleasure or pain, become at last pleasurable or painful in themselves

:
and that the idea
of what was at
jBrst
only looked upon as the means
to pleasure or the precursor of pain, will
very often
thus come to be more attractive or more terrible than

the original end.
tions of ideas,
Many
ideas,
and many combinaaffected us
which originally
by
a bor-
rowed and secondary
influence, acquire the
power
of acting upon us directly and without any sensible

intermediation.
They become magnetised
(if
one
may
be allowed the metaphor) by frequent friction

self-acting
and contact with the original and
magnet
is
and the new magnetic force thus created
often
greatly superior to the primary source from which

it
is
derived.
is
Any
act,
or
any
state of existence,
which
profoundly impressed upon our minds as
the producing cause of an indefinite train of pleasures

or of pains, will become far
far
more highly esteemed, or

definite lot of
more intensely dreaded, than any

it
the pleasures or pains to which
conducts.
Essay L]
27
These are the laws followed by the principle of

association, in the generation of all that multiplicity
of complex
sentiments, opinions,
and
dispositions,
which
constitute the mental consciousness,
and de-
termine the actions, of every adult man.

these complexities ethical sentiment
too,
is
Amongst
one
and
one
among
the most complex of
all
representing
comparison
the result of
many and
various trains of emotion,

intellectual
and repeated processes of

superadded.
ESSAY
II.
PHILOSOPHY OF MOEALS.
PHILOSOPHY OF MOKALS.
There
are two enquiries which
may
be pursued with
respect to systems of positive moraHty.

First,
we may examine
morahty with
a
the
various
to
systems of
positive
view
ascertain
what
the
points
they
have
in
common, and what
are
characteristic or distinctive points of each
wherein
thus
de-
they resemble and wherein they differ

tecting
those
principles
to
and
distinctions
which
positive
ill
belong
essentially
every
system
of
morality, whether rude or refined, well or

structed.
con-
Or, secondly,
we may endeavour
all
to determine the
standard to which
systems of positive morality
ought to conform, and according to which, in so far

as they conform
more or
less to
it,
they are better
or worse systems.
These are two distinct lines of enquiry, which
may
be pursued separately, and which ought not to

;
be confounded
in such
a.
though they often are confounded

that enquirers pass unconsciously
manner
from the one to the other.

32
PHILOSOPHY OP MOPALS.
[Essay
II.
Thus the question
What
constitutes
morality/ ?
may
be
so
understood and treated as to

first
belong
sometimes to the
the second.
of these enquiries, sometimes to

either consider
it
You may
Or
as asking
What
we
are the points

?
common
as
to all systems of actual

test are
f
positive morality
asking By what
line of
to distinguish right mo7âlity
from wrong morality
But whether we pursue the one

the other, there
forgotten
is
enquiry or
is
one distinction which

it
often
and which
is
of great importance to
keep in mind.
Morality always implies two things
:
First,
an
individual agent supposed to act or to be capable of
acting morally
tators, or
Secondly, a public composed of spec-
of parties interested in the tenor of his
proceedings
by whose
verdict, either really delivered
or apprehended as possible,
a rule of conduct
is
imposed upon the individual, or an

tion held out to determine him.
artificial invita-
There are thus two
distinct points of
view from
which morality must be looked

individual agent, and as
it
at
as
it
concerns the
concerns the observing
and judging
public.
Society requires
its
from each
individual person
among
members a
upon him,
certain series
if
of observances, and
inflicts
he should
offices
omit them, censure, and refusal of good
and
sympathy,
perhaps
positive
ill-treatment.
:
Each
individual occupies a double position
as a separate
Essay
II.]
PBILOSOPHY OF MORALS.
lie
33
to
agent,
is
himself under obligation

:
perform
of
these duties to society

society,
as a constituent
member
at
he
is
engaged in enforcing the performance

individuals.
of
them upon other
Looking
_,
mora-
lity
from the point of view of society
it
consists
of an aggregate of duties
commanded and enforced

it
upon each individual
looking at
it
from the point
of view of the individual,

of duties
consists of to perform,
an aggregate
whether per-
which he
is
bound
formance be
aii'reeable to
him
or not.
Positive morality, like positive law, always com-
prehends the three correlative notions, command,

duty,
and
sanction.
Society
is
the superior
by whom
commands
are issued, duties imposed, and sanctions

:
threatened or executed
inferior,
the individual person

are
is
the
by
whom commands
or
infringed,
received, duties
performed
and sanctions endured or
anticipated to be endured.
Positive morality, like positive law, must therefore be looked
upon from two

it
distinct points of
view
issues
according
or to reason
as
concerns the superior
who
It
orders, or the inferior
who
obeys them.
is
im-
possible to resolve these
two points of view into one,

as if they
upon them
were the same.

in
:
Society
is
the principal and the
commanding party
regard both to positive law and to positive morality

the individual
is
the subordinate and subject party.
The ancient
moralists seem to have
more or
D
less
34
PHILOSOPHY OF MORALS.
[Essay IL
committed the mistake of looking at morality exclusively from the point of
view of the individual, and
not from the point of view of society.

bonuin,
The summum
determine, and
which they endeavoured
to
which some of them determined in one manner, some

in
another,
had
reference
to
individual
agency.
They
tried to instruct each individual agent as to

life.
the object which he ought to aim at in
They
estimated
different
objects as
fit
to
be sought or
rejected in proportion to their value as affecting the

individual.
They
did
not distinguish what was

:
imperative from what was optional
they addressed
themselves to the reason of each individual man, and

tried to prove to
him
that 'his
own
feelings
and the
exigencies of his nature
would be
best satisfied
by
a certain course of
life
such as they suggested.
This
is
undoubtedly one branch, and an important
branch, of every sufficient theory respecting morality.
But
it
is
not the real and genuine view in

to be presented.
society, in
which the theory of morality ought

It suppresses the interests
and feelings of
order to
give predominance to the
interests
it is
and
feelings of the individual agent.
Now
of great of
moment
that
the
interests
and feelings
each
individual agent should be brought to coincide as
much
any
useful.
as possible with the exigencies of society,
and
line of
argument which tends

still
to this result is
But
this is not the
proper and genuine
Essay
II.]
of any system of positive
35
morality.
representation
Every system of
positive morality involves the idea
of subjection on the part of the individual to the

interests
and feelings of
society
society.
It
supposes that
the
majority of
concur in opinion as to
indi-
certain duties
vidually,
to
incumbent upon each member

constitute
and thus
an authority competent
impose and enforce those

lies
duties.
The foundation
opinions of the
of morality
in
the
collective
larger portion of society, not in the separate ojDinion
of each individual
agent with regard to his
own
good
^just
as the foundation of law lies in the com-
mand
of the legislator
who
disposes of the force of
society, not in
the opinion of each individual as to

it
the line of conduct which

pursue.
is
may
suit his
views to
Positive morality, as well as positive law,
conceived as superseding individual discretion.

of obligation or duty implies both a com-
The idea
mand and
interior
entitled
a sanction /r(?7?z without, against which the

inclination are not
movements of individual
to
contend.
This idea of
an extraneous
force, overriding the inclinations of the individual,
constitutes
science,
what
is
called
the
supremacy of conto control the
or
the right of conscience
passions
so
and
is
inclinations of the individual, of

said
which
much
by Bishop Butler and
Sir
James
Mackintosh.
authority
of
The
law,
authority of conscience, like the

is
conceived as residing
in
D 2
36
[Essay IL
superior without
in the former case, as proceeding
from the puhlic

lator.
in
the latter case, from the legis-
The
idea of this authority, emanating from
the
public
and
extrinsic
to the individual, is
:
the
paramount element
individual
is
of morality
the part
of the
that of subordination or obedience to
this authority.
If then, in
any theory of morality, we omit the
ideas of extrinsic authority,
and obedience
to such
authority on the part of the individual, and explain

it
as only a well-directed choice
and discretion on the
part of the individual,
we
shall fall into a funda-
mental mistake.
And
this is the
mistake committed
by
so
many
of the ancient moralists,
when they
laid
the main stress on the ascertaining of the
summum
at.
bonum, or of that which they would recommend to each individual as the primary object to aim
It
may be contended perhaps that the supremacy which we ascribe to conscience cannot be considered
as the idea of authority
emanating from the public
without, inasmuch as there are cases in which the

conscience of the individual differs from the judg-
ment of the
with
it
public without, perhaps even conflicts
pointedly.
occa-
But although individual conscience does thus

sionally conflict with the public judgment,
it
is
not
it
the less true that the authority which

is
we
ascribe to
originally
borrowed from the idea of approbation
Essay
II.]
37
or disapprobation acting
science
is
upon us from without. Con-
the idea of moral approbation and disappro-
bation applied to our
own actions or intentions
it
com-
prehends the varieties of self-reproach, self-esteem,
and
self-admiration.
Now
we
this idea is based
upon
the actual fact that
find ourselves the objects of
approbation and disapprobation on the part of others,
and that we observe other individuals
to be so also.
is
The disapprobation
of those around us
productive
of painful consequences of the severest kind, and the

idea of such a sentiment being entertained towards
ourselves becomes painful in the
besides that
highest degree
we
naturally
come
to partake,
by means
of sympathy, in the feelings which
we
see manifested
It
by the persons among

is to
whom we
in their
are brought up.
be remarked that the feelings of approbation

nature essentially
are not confined
and disapprobation are

social,
not personal feelings.
They
to our
own bosoms
they essentially imply the con-
current sentiment of the public:
and even
if
the
actual public around us dissent from our views,
we
say that they ought to concur with us, and

in our
we
carry
minds the idea of a wiser and more enlightened
who would concur with us. In the large majority of cases, a man agrees in his particular acts
public
of approbation and disapprobation with the public to
which he belongs
if it
were not
so,
there would be
no public verdict on moral
subjects.
In this wav.
38
[Essay
If.
the idea of approbation and disapprobation becomes
inseparably associated witli that of a collective judg-
ment pronounced by
others as well as
by
ourselves.
And
if
by virtue of any
train of reasoning, or of
any
special authority,
we come
to dissent
from the general
public,
and
to attach the idea of approbation or dis-
approbation to certain acts with which the general

public does not connect them, those ideas pass over
with
all their associated
conjuncts and appendages,

as
and present themselves as the voice of the public

it
would be
in this
if
the public were properly instructed.

idea of the public voice as
it
And
ought
manner the
to he, will
often prevail over the idea of the
public voice as
it is.
The
feeling of self-reproach, or of self-esteem,
is,
in other words, the feeling that
we
deserve or are
likely to incur the reproach of others
that we
felt
de-
serve, or are likely to obtain, the esteem of others.
Both the reproach and the esteem, though

the man's
within
own mind,
are imagined
as
proceeding
from others.
There
is
also involved in the
moral sentiment a
feeling of implied reciprocity.

feels it his
The
individual
who
duty to obey the
command
of the public
without, feels himself entitled as one of the public to
exact from every other
individual the
is
same obser-
vance as that to which he
himself submitting.
Under the same circumstances
as those in
which he
is
Essay
II.]
89
placed, another
man would
is
be bound to perform the
same duty now exacted from him.

the individual obeys
The order which
an order of equal and uni-
versal application to every one, given the like cir-
cumstances and position.
If as
an individual he
is
is
obliged to obey, as one of the public he

enforce
entitled to
upon other
individuals.
title
This feeling of reciprocity between the
to
command
obey as
as one of the public,

is
and the
obligation to
an individual,
an
essential element of the
moral sentiment.
You may
look at
it
from either of
the two points of view
either
from that of the
public or from that of the individual

as
and according
it
you look
at
it
from the one or the other,
assumes,
a different aspect.
But any theory which does not

points of view,
is
embrace
botlt
the
necessarily in-
complete and erroneous.
In positive law, the mandate
is
issued
by a
deteris
minate superior
obey.
the duty of the individual
to
The
superior
may perhaps
be, but is
not
indi-
necessarily, a
many-headed body, including the
vidual himself as a member.
As an
individual, he
obeys laws which he has concurred in making and

issuing.
In positive morality, the mandate
is
conceived as
emanating from an indeterminate superior, a manyheaded body called

himself
is
the 2ûblic, of
which the individual

member.
necessarily
and
essentially a
He
40
[Essay
II.
obeys a mandate which as a
member
of this public he
would concur in enforcing upon
others.
The
idea of
dicta-
an external public concurring in judgment and

tion with himself,
is
essential
if
the actual public
around him should not partake in his convictions, he

impeaches their verdict, he supposes that they would
agree with him
if
they thoroughly meditated the
circumstances of the case, and he imagines a better

public concurrent with himself
thority.
and constituting au-
This imaginary public he supposes to be as

all
well acquainted with
the circumstances of his case
and position
as
he
is
himself,
in
fact
much
better
acquainted than any real public can ever be

it is
and
and
to their verdict, thus perfectly instructed
enlightened, that he conforms his conduct.

If then
points
we enquire what are common to all systems of

to consist in obedience
the
fundamental
positive morality,
apart from the goodness or badness of any

find
we
shall
them
on the part of an
emanating
individual to
commands from
without,
from an indeterminate superior called the public, real

or supposed, whereof the individual himself
ber.
is
is
mem-
The
feeling of obligation thus arising
strictly
moral obligation: the
command executed
by which
it is
is
a moral
is
command
the sanction
enforced
the
moral sanction, consisting in the idea of approval or
condemnation by a public without, concurring with

the individual himself.
Essay
II.]
is
41
Kant
objective
right in calling the

subjective.
maxim
is,
of moral agency a man,
and not
That
who
acts
nnder a sense of moral obligation, believes that any

other individual nnder the same circumstances would
be under obligation to do the

tion
is
like.
The
obliga-
equally and universally binding, whatever
be the personal or peculiar inclinations of the individual.
Kant
{i. e.
says that " Pure Reason
is
by
itself
alone
of
without the necessity of any conjunction

or passion, fUr sich allein) practical,
feeling
and
call
is
gives to
mankind an universal law which we

(Prakt. Yern., p. 143.)
is
the Moral Law."
This
only true in so far as reason
concerned in sug-
gesting to a community of persons what actions they

will
It is
is
forbid
and what actions they
will
encourage.
it
not reason which issues or gives the law,
the
community which gives the law, and which
punishes neglect of the law by condemnation and

disgrace.
Kant
This
in
says farther, that in moral agency the Beobjective,
stimmungsgrilnde of the will are

is
not
subjective.
true in a certain sense, but hardly in the sense

it.
which he means
When
a man, under strong
temptation to act immorally,
resists
is,
and obeys the
moral law, the matter of fact
that the pain con-
nected in his mind with the idea of disobeying the
moral law
is
greater than the pain of resisting temp-

42
[Essay iL
tation,
and thus determines

is
his behaviour.
But
this
sentiment
that
is,
in every case a subjective sentiment

it
each individual experiences

to himself.
in a degree
is
and manner peculiar
There
indeed a
general similarity between the sentiment in one
man
and in another man, which warrants us
in calling
them by the same name,

between hunger and
viduals
:
just as there
is
a similarity
feai'
and
/iO/je
in different indiis
but nevertheless each of these
in every
particular case a subjective affection.
Kant seems
to think that the pains
and pleasures
of the moral sentiments are not to be reckoned as

pains and pleasures
:
for this is
what he means when

it
he says that morality carries with
no "
subjective
Bestimmungsgrundey
He
thinks that in the case of
the moral law, pure reason influences our will separately
and by
itself,
without any admixture of
feel-
ings of pleasure or pain
in
a manner inexjjlicable,
anomalous, and without parallel in our mental constitution.
But Kant seems
to
confound two things which

distinct.
ought to be kept completely
He
confounds
the general painful idea associated in our minds with
an act of our own in violation of moral law
with
:
the anticipation of subsequent positive pains likely

to
come upon us
in consequence of such violation
viz.,
the anticipation of punishment, loss of service,
loss of
advancement, &c.
It is
very true that the
Essay
II.]
first
43
general painful idea,
mentioned,
is
derived by
way
of association from actual experience or obser-
vation of the positive pains last-mentioned as con-
sequent
on violations of duty.
:
But
still
it is
feeling altogether distinct

is
it is
an association which
:
formed in some minds and not formed in others
it is
an association which when formed and when so

as
to
firmly established
stitutes the truly
govern the conduct, con-
moral man.
A man in whose mind
this association has not
been formed, and who performs
a moral obligation because he anticipates some positive loss or suffering in the event of his infringing
it,
cannot be said (as Kant observes) to act in the

:
proper sense morally

but not aus PJiicht.
his
behaviour
is
pjiichtmdssig,
But when we say
that a
man
takes trouble or incurs risk or imposes

privations because he feels called upon
upon himself by
his sense
of duty
feeling,
what
we
really
in
is
mean
is,
that the painful

idea of
associated
his
mind with the
violating his duty,
of greater force with

is
him than
the idea of the pain which he
to encounter in per-
forming
it.
The
ideas
of self-reproach
of subsebeing able
quent mental remorse
of the
loss of his title to the
esteem and confidence of others

to hold
of not
up
his
head in the company of others, be-
cause he has done what renders

respect
him unworthy of their
all
these are highly painful.
On
the other
hand, the ideas of self-esteem
of subsequent mental
44
[Essay
IT.
approbation
of having
acquired increased
title to
the esteem and confidence of others, and holding up

his
head higher than ever in their presence, because
he has performed his duty under the most trying

circumstances and the strongest temptation to evade
it
all
these are ideas highly gratifying,
and at the
It is
very
least
consolatory under
suffering.
not
meant
to say that the performance
of duty under
these supposed
circumstances will be anything but

is
painful
the
is
man
to
placed in a position in which
nothing
open
him except the choice between

painful.
two modes of conduct both of which are
He
to
does not do right because
it is
agreeable to
him
is
do so
but because the idea of doing

to
wrong
more painful
him than the idea of the
sufferings
consequent upon his doing right.
Moral action
is
not to be at
all
considered as an
exception to the general rules of
human
conduct.
The man who
acts morally acts just as
much under
the influence of ideas of pleasure and pain, as the
man who
science
acts
immorally
only his pleasures and
pains are different.

are
The
pleasures and pains of con-
portant of
among the most remarkable and imAny philosophical all human emotions.
must of necessity be very
often
defective.
system which takes no account, of them or denies

their existence,
We
" Si extasy
know
that they
amount
to
torture or
recludantur tyrannorum mentes, posse

Essay
II.]
45
aspici laniatiis et ictus."
"
Mens
sibi conscia facti,
Prsemetuens, adhibet stimulos, torretque

" Yirtus,
si
flagellis."
videri posset, mirabiles amores sui ipsius
concitaret."
Many
other similar metaphors might
be
cited,
which
illustrate the extent of gratification
as well as of suffering arising out of the conscience.
When
man
acts morally, the idea of these pleasures
and pains constitutes the Bestimmungsgrund of

behaviour
his
what Kant
calls
Achtung fur das Gesetz
a
own
regard for den Werth seiner Person as contra-
distinguished from den Werth seines Zustandes.

sense
His
of self-esteem
is
inseparably connected
with his observance of the moral law.

sense of self-esteem is only another
But a man's
to express
word
the feeling which he has of that esteem which he
ought
to
receive
from others
which
the
public
would award
to him, if they
were perfectly rightall
minded and
thoroughly acquainted with
the
circumstances of the case.
Kant, in speaking of morality, considers

single
it
as a
and anomalous case of what he
calls the
Auto-
nomy
of the will, in contradistinction to the Heterin every other case of action of the
onomy which
will is observable.
this
In the sense in which he intends

it is
remark, I think
not correct.
He means by
Autonomy,
that there are in this case no conside-
rations of pleasure or pain influencing the will

this case alone.
in
It
I do not agree in this opinion.
46
[Essay H.
appears to
me
that the will
is
in this case as in all

asso-
others, determined
by the pleasures or pains
ciated with our ideas of obeying or disobeying the
moral law
science.
called usually the sense of
duty or Con-
But there
is
undoubtedly a sense in which the
observation of
Kant
is
partly true.
Under
is
the in-
fluence of a sense of duty,
my
will
determined to
object.
aim
ploy
at the
accomplishment of a given
em-
my
most strenuous
efforts
do every thing
which can possibly be expected of me

pose of
for the
failure is
skill,
pur-
accomplishing
failure,
it
but I
fail.
Notwith-
standing the
the
exigencies
of the moral
sentiment are
satisfied.
Provided the
not
owing
to
any want of prudence, or

energy,
or perfinds
severing
an enlightened conscience
nothing to disapprove.
the outset
Though
the sense of duty at

to
commands and determines me

Sincere,
do
my
and
best, it is after all satisfied
without the realization of

hearty,
is
the
end originally sought.
energetic
is
obedience to the moral law

:
all
which
ex-
required
what Kant
calls ein
reiner Wille,
it,
plained in the
expression
is
way
that he defines
one.
though the
a very misleading
My
will, or
is
my
desire,
:
is
unsatisfied, because the
object
not
attained
but the sense of duty in which

is
my
desire
originated,
nevertheless
satisfied, if
every thing
within the limits of possibility has been
done
to
Essay
II.]
47
attain
it.
The
pleasures and pains of self-esteem are
associated, not with the attainment of the object, but
with the doing, or omitting to do, every thing which

skill
and
zeal
can suggest for such a purpose.

in this respect that the term
Now
it is
Autonomy
of the Will, as contradistinguished from Heteronomy,
has a certain application.
Our
pleasures and pains
generally are derived from the attainment of various

objects foreign to ourselves
:
we
desire these objects
and try
to attain
them
our gratification depends
upon
sense,
success.
The
pleasures and pains of the moral
on the other hand, are not derived from the

attainment of any object foreign to our-
positive
selves
:
they are derived from reflection on our

it.
own
conduct in the pursuit of
The
satisfaction of the
moral sentiment
it is
is
independent of the actual result

:
not contingent upon success or failure

it.
no exwill is
ternal impediments can disappoint
The
determined, not by the idea of a certain object necessary to be obtained, but
by the
idea of a certain line
of conduct necessary to be pursued

is
by ourselves
it
therefore in a certain sense autonomous, not heter-
onomous.
In another sense,
also, the
expression autonomous
is
may man
in
be used.
in
The moral law
command which a
conjunction with the public imposes upon
himself.
He
acts in obedience to his
own
is,
sentiment
harmony with what
either actually
or
what he
: :
48
[Essay IL
thinks ought to be, the sentiment of the pubKc.
If
he obeys the
command
of the j)ublic simply, his

it,
own
sentiment not concurring with
this is not properly
moral acting
it is
it is
pjiichtmdssig but not aus PJiicht

,
heteronomy and
is
not
autonomy.
Properly
speaking moral acting

the
both the one and the other
man
himself, concurring with a public, real or
ideal.
ESSAY
III.
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL

PHILOSOPHY.
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY.
The
ancient systems of Ethics took for their start-
ing point mainly, and primarily, the happiness or
summum bonum
of the individual.
It
was assumed,
and admitted by each of the dissenting schools

of philosophy, that every individual would pursue
his
own happiness
as
different
or
his
own summum bonum

entertained
but
individuals
different
views respecting the
summum bonum,
the problem
for philosophers was, to determine
wherein the real
summum bonum
Ends which it was
taken to aim
at,
consisted
what
if
?
was that End of
best for every individual separately
and which
he attained, he was to
be pronounced perfectly happy

It is
undoubtedly true that the ancients did not
adopt this point of view exclusively.
They
con-
sidered the sentiments and actions of each individual

to a
certain extent as
affecting others as well as
himself; as imparting to others enjoyment or misery,
and creating
still
in
them gratitude
or resentment.
But
in the main, the
primary point of view, the

E 2
52
[Essay
TII.
ethical Standpunkt of the ancients,
was the
position
and condition of the agent

as to the
himself.
To
advise
him
means
requisite for
becoming happy, was
the grand ethical problem.
Nothing can more
clearly evince the preponderance
of this point of view than the tenacity with whicli
even the Stoics adhered to
it,
though
it
involved
their
them
in the greatest perplexities
and enabled
opponents to taunt them with glaring contradictions.

It
was absolutely indispensable,
in their opinion, to
prove that virtue and nothing

life
else
produced a happy
to
the individual: if this could not be shewn,
they admitted that their whole system was worthless.
" Nam
esse,
Cato
is
made
to say (in Cicero id
de
Fiiiib.
iii.
3)
si
hoc non obtineatur,

sit
;
solum bonum
probari possit,
si
quod honestum
nullo
:
modo
quod
:
beatam vitam virtute

opera philosophice
aliquis
sit
effici
ita
sit,
cur
danda, nescio
nse ego
si
enim sapiens
miser esse
possit,
istam gloriosam
memorabilemque virtutem non magni Eestimandam

putem."
But though the ancient
moralists thus selected the
condition of the individual agent as the apx^ of their
various ethical systems, they explained
it
in such a
way
as to alter
very materially those conclusions

to flow
which might naturally be expected

a principle.
from such
The end which each
individual both
did pursue and ought to pursue was admitted to be

Essay III]
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MOKAL PHILOSOPHY. 53

:
happiness
but different persons took different views
as to the constituent elements of happiness.
Now
man
in
the ancient philosophers did not admit that each
was the proper judge and measure of happiness

his
own
individual case.
They maintained
that there
was a right and a wrong choice upon

that one
;
this point
man might and
did
choose better than
another,
and
to be
that the wise and virtuous
man was
man
that pro-
the only legitimate referee.
That man alone was

the wise
understood to be happy,
whom
nounced
happy, and whose condition he would

to adopt as his
have been willing

alone
own
man
was understood
to be
unhappy,
whom
the wise
man
and
declared to be unhappy, and whose character

position he
was disposed
to
repudiate.
The
the
Summum Bonum,
ought
to
or grand end
which every man

to
aim
at,
was happiness according

the wise
it
scheme
laid
down by
man
the
Sunimum
âlum,
wise
or that which
was proper
for every
man
to avoid,
was Unhappiness
defined
it.
in the sense in
which the
man
According
fit
to the
schemes of the ancient moralists,

be happy or unhappy,
to be so.
seems that a
man might
felt
though he neither
nor believed himself
At
j
least
the man's
own
sentiments and belief were
not regarded as the proper measure and evidence

of happiness.
satisfied
He might
himself be perfectly well

to his condition
:
and even strongly attached
54
[Essay
III.
yet the wise
man might
not recognise him as happy.
Or he might be
in a state
from which he was very
anxious to escape, and yet the wise

refuse to pronounce
(Epist. IX.)
man might
this,
him unhappy.
and the Stoics
se
Seneca indeed
seems to say the contrary of
and
to cite both Epicurus "
as authorities
Non
est
beatus,
esse
qui
non putat
"
then he eludes the difficulty

sapienti sua
tidio sui."
by contending " Nisi

stultitia laborat fas-
and
non placent
omnis
In appreciating the moral systems of the ancients,
however,
it is
of great
moment
to
keep in view the
way
The
in
which they understood and defined Happiness.
ethical
ap^
But
from which they started was, the

to pursue his
injunction
upon every individual

this, if
own
happiness.
allowed to be interpreted by
the individual himself, would have led to endless

errors
and deviations, accordiug

taste.
to
every man's
different
^
*
Accordingly they laid down the

state of
scheme of one particular
mind and circumof individual
stances, as constituting the
maximum
happiness, or the only thing which they were willing

to call happiness.
Each of the philosophical

of
sects
did this, though
all
them did not

happiness,
lay
down
the
same scheme.
To pursue
was
to follow
the scheme of happiness prescribed by the wise
man
tastes
to
whoever did not follow

or inclinations
this,
whatever
his
own
might
be,
was not allowed
be
Essay
III.]
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY. 55

liis
obeying the natural dictate of pursuing

happiness.
It is easy to see that
own
when
the definition of hap-
piness
was
so
restricted as to
embrace only that

the main
which the wise man would
call happiness,
observances of morality would be quite sure to be
comprehended in
it.
The wise and virtuous man
would not esteem any other man happy who was

not wise and virtuous.
He might
perhaps
not
account another
alone,
man happy
with wisdom and virtue

dis-
though accompanied by great external

:
advantages
qualities
but the presence of these lofty mental
he would deem absolutely indispensable.

moralists considered the happiness of
:
The ancient
the individual agent as the sole and exclusive end
bat they also considered that virtuous conduct was

the sole and exclusive
means
to that end.
In
this
manner the
interests
and happiness of persons other
than the individual came to be inseparably inter-
mingled in their theories with the interests and happiness of the individual himself, although the latter
alone formed the original point of departure.
In studying their moral

will often be found both
treatises, this confusion
very prevalent and very

it is
perplexing.
When
they speak of good,
some-
times good with reference to the interests and liappiness of the individual agent
sometimes good^ with
reference to the interests and happiness of society.
56
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY,
[Essay
III.
The ancient philosophers pass from the one
to the
other without any preliminary warning, and seem-
ingly without consciousness of any transition what
soever.
If a
man
both
has achieved some great
and
glorious
deed,
deserving and obtaining the
admiration of the society to which he belongs, they

consider
him
as
having attained a considerable good

himself
in
as
j
i
having
plojced
situation
to
be
macarised by the wise and virtuous
without taking
account of the personal sacrifices which he
undergone in the performance,
may have and which may have

indi-
been so intolerably painful as to make the result a

matter of no happiness at
I
all,
judging by his
vidual sentiments.
I
Whatever the sentiments of the
individual might be, the moralist ventured to speak

for
him, according to
general
rule
determined
beforehand, and to vest the decision in the wise and

virtuous man.
An
indisputable good has been done,
looking at the case from the point of view of the

society
self ,to
:
the wise and virtuous
man
takes upon him-
pronounce, without farther enquiry, that the
agent has acquired a portion of good, and that he

deserves to be considered happy.
I
is
do not mean to say that
this confusion of ideas
universally obvious throughout the works of the
ancient moralists.
it,
At
times they seem to get clear of

:
especially Aristotle
there are occasions on

is
which
they admit that what
good
for
the
individual
Essay
III.]
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. 57

not always be good for others besides
agent
may
is
him, and
vice versa.
But
still
their ordinary
mode of
reasoning
to
confound the two, and to employ the

]iap2?iness as if
words good and
they neither had nor
could have more than one standard of reference.
Both Plato and the

I
Stoics
must be considered
to
have neglected the sentiments of the individual agent,

j
when they
that
the
down in man who acted

laid it
so unqualified a
manner
never
virtuously could
I
'
be miserable, and that the

could not be happy.
man who
least
acted viciously
At
they presupposed a
very peculiar and a very efficacious training, carried

(so far as almost to efface from the mind the ordinary
measure of self-regarding sentiment.

quires a certain measure of training
Aristotle re-
and acquired
habits, as a necessary preliminary to the appreciation
of ethical motives
but not to the same extent which
would be
requisite to fulfil the theories of Plato

:
and
for
the Stoics
who, although professing to adopt
their ap^y] or starting point the happiness of the indi1
vidual agent himself, ended in taking no account at

all
of his feelings, except in so far as they coincided
with those of the virtuous and right-minded spectator,

It is altogether impossible to reason correctly
upon
and
ethical subjects, unless
you admit two

1.
distinct
independent apâl of reasoning.

_of persons other than the
The happiness
2.
agent himself.
The
happiness of the agent individually.
58

These two ends of
action^
[Essay IIL
or beginnings of ethical
reasoning, are sometimes found in conflict, but
more
frequently in
coincidence
but they are
by no
means
co-ordinate, or of equal
weight and dignity in

both cannot be
the eyes of the moralist.

attained,
When
the
happiness of the individual must be
postponed, as a general rule, to that of the

nity to which he belongs.
commu-
A
]
These are the two
sole
apâX of ethical science.

or blameworthy,
is
Every
action
it
which
is
wrong
so
|j
because
tends to impair either the happiness of the
'I
individual himself or that of others, perhaps of both

once.
is
jat
Every action which

so because
:
is
right
or praise-
worthy,
'
it
tends to promote one or both
of these ends
an action indeed
may have
it
such ten:
dency, without being necessarily praiseworthy
but
no action can be praiseworthy, unless

vthe condition here described.
Strictly speaking,
it is
conform to
doubtful whether any action

subject
either
it
whatever
blame.
is
a proper
of praise or
is
The agent who performs

the action itself
the proper
subject of praise or blame, according to his intention
and knowledge
but
is
it
is
useful or hurtful,
:
cannot be said either to be right or wrong
it
an action such as a virtuous man would do, or such
as only a vicious
man would
do, but it is not in itself
either virtuous or vicious.
The
moralist, or ethical philosopher,
who
takes

Essay HI.]
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. 59

to explain
upon bim
and
criticise
the different tem-
pers, dispositions,
and capacities which discriminated
one individual from another, must be assumed to

address himself to the whole society, and not to any
special individual
exclusively.
His business
is
to
consider the conduct and dispositions of each separate

individual, in so far as that conduct
positions bear
and those
dis-
upon the happiness both of the
indi-
vidual himself and of others.
He
is
therefore called
upon
to consider
every separate man, on the one
hand, as an agent in himself, under the influence of

certain disjoositions which provoke to action or deter
from action
on the other hand, as a person affected

actions, either singly or in conjunction
by
his
own
with other members of the community.

separately
Each person
the
and indiscriminately comes before two
ethical philosopher in these
different points of
view.
This therefore suggests naturally the double
classification of actions
1.
above alluded to
Actions which tend to impair, or to promote,
the happiness of the public
meaning by the public

not even
any
fraction, large or small, of the society,
excluding the agent himself as one of the number.

2.
Actions which tend to impair, or to promote,

happiness of the agent himself separately
:
the
mean permanently and

guished from tbe
impulse.
in the long run, as distin-
gratification
of
his
immediate
60

These are the two
classifications of
[Essay HI.
actions
and
of dispositions which
in ethical philosophy.
form the canon of criticism
The two systems of arrangement may

/cide
either coin-
or clash, in
any particular
case.
In the long
'run,
and with reference and
to the greater
number of
:
actions
dispositions, they
do coincide
for it is
'obvious that
what tends
to
promote the happiness
of the public must tend to promote the happiness of
the greater number of individuals

separately
among
the public,
of these
and indiscriminately taken.

is
One
two propositions
included in the other.

coincident, the
But though generally
two systems
of arrangement are always liable to clash in particular
cases
and with regard
to
any
particular
individual.
An
action which tends to promote the

:
happiness of the agent may'not\ impair that of others
an action which greatly impairs the happiness of the

agent
may
be necessary to prevent that of the society

still
from being impaired in a
greater degree.
it
When
the two systems of classification clash,
is
necessary for the ethical
philosopher to determine
:
which of the two he
will prefer
whether he will
rather encourage that which tends to the happiness
of the agent or that which tends to the happiness of

the society
whether he
is
will discourage that
which
latter.
impairs the former or that which impairs the
When
the case
thus nakedly stated, there cannot
Essay
III.]

is
be the smallest hesitation which of the two ends be preferred.

It is possible
to
indeed by means of a
cloud of unmeaning words to perplex the question
and
but
to disguise the real nature of the alternative
when
properly understood, the two things to be

just
compared are the same which have and the choice

the alternative
the
is
been
stated,
therefore simple and easy.
When
lies
between suffering experienced by

side
community on the one
and
the
either suffering
experienced, or the foregoing of happiness,

particular agent on the other
latter
by any
must be
submitted to in order to escape the former.
Hence
is
derived the authority of what
is
called
the moral sense
the force of moral

name
of the
obligation.
The
he
ethical philosopher addresses
himself to each indi-
vidual
in
the
community, and
therefore speaks to each in a tone of
command and
the
society
left
supremacy.
requires
When
the
happiness of
shall
that a certain act
be done or
undone, he does not leave with the individual agent

the option of performance or omission.
ests of
The
inter-
the community are paramount, and the ethical
philosopher, as representing that community, exacts
obedience on the part of the agent, whether such obedience be easy or painful.
the moral imperative
entire
:
This
is
the source of
it
is
a voice representing the

to
community, and addressed

its
an agent who
is
one of
members.
The
right of
tlie
community
to

C2
ANCIENT SYSTEMS OF MORAL PrilLOSOPHY.

obedience
[Essay
ITT.
exact
from each of
its
its
own
individual
members, in cases where

concerned,
is
serious
interests are
a matter which the ethical philosopher

:
assumes from the beginning

demonstrate
it.
he never attempts
to
Without
:
this right in fact society-
could not subsist
positive law is
one of the forms in

is
which
If
it is
exercised, positive morality
another.
we
take the greater
number of individual agents

cases
in the greater
number of
saving
always par-
ticular exceptions
it
both of individuals and of cases
may
be said generally that the agent himself feels
in his
to a
own bosom the obligation to render obedience command so issued in the name and for the
community.
interests of the
He
is
himself one of
in
that community, and
he has been accustomed
other cases to concur in imposing the like obligation
upon
others.
He
cannot
fail
to
apply to himself
more or
less the
same remarks which he would have

placed in similar circumso or not, the obliga-
made upon another agent

stances.
But whether he does
tion does not the less exist, in the
view of the ethicn
philosopher
it
does not
depend upon feeling or
absence of feeling on the part of the agent.
The moral
imperative,
and the
legal imperative,
have same
their origin in the

necessity.
same
relations
is
and
in the
In each case control
exercised
by or
its
on behalf of the entire community over one of
members
in each case the relation of
supremacy of
J:ssay III.]
the whole over
any part
is
implied
in each case the

to the
necessity of ensuring protection
and happiness
commnuity, even
at the cost (if such be unavoidable)

is
of the happiness of any individual,

self-evident.
assumed as
In
fact,
prior to the establishment of written laws

is
and fixed judges, the whole of what
now
is
positive
posi-
law was in the condition of that which

tive morality.
now
The commencement of writing was

from
not farther removed from the days of Aristotle and

Plato,
than that of printing
is
us.
ESSAY
lY.
IDEA OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY.
I.
Ethics, in the most extended sense,
is
the science of
actions, in
human
dispositions, emotions, desires,
and
so far as they affect, or are regarded
by
society as af-
fecting, either the happiness of the individual himself,
or the happiness
and sentiments of
others.
All these
common
characteristics of our nature are manifested
in a different degree
and manner and

one
arise out of in another.
different circumstances, in
man and
Besides these individual differences, there are also

local
and national
differences
:
which distinguish one
society
from another
the
members of the same
society are found to resemble each other in the turn
of their feelings, and to differ in the same respect
from the members of other

certain
societies
in so
much
that
general
propositions
may
be
affirmed
or
denied of each
To explain
feelings
the nature and origin of these different
to trace them both to their causes and their consequences to shew by what circumstances they
are encouraged, repressed, or modified
to
F 2
explain
68
that
[Essay IV.
which
all
ethical systems
have in common, as
well as the distinguishing features of each as com-
pared with another, and to assign as far as

the producing causes of such diversity
may
be
to
classify
and denominate conveniently

emotional phenomena
all
these complicated
this is the scope
and business
of the ethical philosopher.
It is plain that this is a
subject of vast extent, co-extensive with the

field
whole
of
human
action
and even of human
feeling.
For the
ethical criticisms actually current in a

liable to
com-
munity are
embrace every part of a man's

other
conduct and dispositions, not merely where
persons are concerned, but even where he himself

alone
is
directly concerned.
And
none of these
ethical criticisms
can properly be omitted in a com-
plete system of ethical philosophy.
But there
is
also another part of the province of
the ethical philosopher which, while intimately con-
nected with the preceding,

able from
positor
:
is
yet perfectly distinguish-
it.
He
is
is
not simply an observer and ex-
he
also a critic.
He
is
to explain
how far
and of
to be
each disposition and emotion tends to the happiness

or misery both of the person experiencing
others,
it
and how
far therefore each deserves
fostered or counteracted.
for stifling, as far as
He
is
to suggest
means
may
be, the noxious liabilities

all its
of our nature, and for improving

tendencies.
beneficent
exist, inde-
These tendencies do indeed
Essay IV.]

:
69
pendently of his choice or observation
but
they
better,
admit of being greatly modified, either for the

or for the worse,
trol.
by circumstances within our confunction of the ethical philosopher
The
critical
consists in bringing out clearly this letter,
and worse,
be, to re-
and in accustoming
cognise and aim at
others, as far as
may
it.
The
are
expository function,
and the
critical function,
decidedly distinct,
but
they are nevertheless

critical
intimately connected.
The
both
it
assists
assists,
and
presupposes the
expository.
First,
by
teaching what phenomena are to be observed.
The
dis-
sum
total of effects
is
produced by any passiou or
position,
infinitely large,
and the man who would
observe to any purpose must
know how
to separate
the important effects from the unimportant.
Now
is
the importance or non-importance of the effects
measured by their influence upon the happiness or

{misery of the agent himself or of others.
Unless
/therefore the ethical philosopher, considered as

/
an
observer, be accustomed to conduct his observations
with reference to this canon, he will not be able to

distinguish
what
is
important or unimportant for the
purposes even of exposition.
Next, the
sitory.
critical function
presupposes the expo-
You
cannot
criticise
any
disposition
it
or
emotion, unless you
know
previously what
is
and
what are
its effects.
You cannot
point out the means
70

it,
[Essay IV.
of encouraging or repressing
circumstances under which
unless
you know the
it is
usually generated.
Both these
critical
functions
essential
the
expository
and the
Both
are
to ethical philosophy.
fact,
have always been attempted, in point of
more
or less perfectly, even in the rudest essays of ethical
philosophy, and in the most ancient times.

scarcely possible for
It
is
any adult person, be he
philo-
sopher or not, to speak of

out feeling some
human
dispositions with-
sentiment and
intimating some
judgment of
his
own
respecting them.
is
But though
neither of the two functions

often
altogether omitted, they

:
become inconveniently confounded
man
explains the historical origin of certain dispositions
and sentiments, and thinks that by

justified
so
doing he has
them
critically
or he expatiates
upon the
value of certain dispositions and sentiments as admirable portions of our nature, and thinks that
by
so
doing he
or
is
dispensed from the necessity of studying

their
origin.
expounding
In
this
manner,
although a writer unites the two functions of criticism
and exposition, yet he
is
never conscious to himself

;
where the one begins or where the other ends
nor
does he even seem aware that the very attempt to

criticise necessarily implies
an assumed standard of
Thus, for example, the
judgment selected by himself.

most serious confusion
arises
between criticism and
exposition in respect to the use of the term nature
Essay IV.]
IDEA OP ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY.
71
and
that
natural.
it is it is
To say of any sentiment

is
or disposition,
natural,
thought to be the same as saying
that
justifiable
and becoming
though the most

are no
mischievous sentiments in the

less natural
human mind
than the most beneficent.

often been asked,
The question has

answers have
question
is
Upon what
is
moral ohligation founded ?
To
this question different
been
returned.
But
in
think
the
somewhat ambiguous,
put.
the terms in
which
it is
The
root from which the sentiment
of obligation springs, in the

person,
is,
mind
of each individual
the absolute necessity of avoiding the dis-
pleasure of those around
him and of
conciliating a
certain measure of their esteem
and kindness.
man
and
feels
himself under obligation to do such actions
to manifest such dispositions, as are necessary to
accomplish this end.
In time the feeling with which
he originally regarded the end, comes to be transferred to the

action,
means
he
feels
obliged to perform the
without any distinct or separate consciousness

first
of the ulterior purpose which the action was
intended to serve.
Such
it
is
the original source of the
feeling of obligation, as
exists in the
bosom of each
individual
it is
a feeling not arising out of the in-
herent and intrinsic attributes of the action, but out

of the effect
is
which the performance of the action

produce upon
the sentiments of
calculated to
others.
72
[^ssay IV.
But
if
the
same question be put

is ethical
to the ethical
philosopher
Ujyon what
obligation founded 1
the answer which he will

To the
unanimous,
is
return will be different.
individual agent, the pronounced sentiment
of the society to which he belongs,

final
when
intense and
:
and without appeal

it,
he cannot
escape from the necessity of obeying

the character of
its
whatever be
ethical
injunctions.
But the
philosopher will feel both inclined and authorized to
push his enquiries
farther.
He
will
examine upon
what foundation those commands and prohibitions of

the society
which constitute
irresistible authority for
the
individual agent, are

is
founded.
In his view,
there
no legitimate foundation
for these
commands
and
prohibitions, except their tendency to promote
the safety, happiness, and enjoyment of the society.
This
is
the answer he will

is
make
to the question
?
Upon what
founded ethical obligation

it
He
will
consider ethical obligation as
would be
:
if
mankind
were perfectly wise and right-minded

that a society composed
he will find
of
men
in such a stage of
improvement, would enforce no prohibitions or com-
mands, except such as tended to promote their

their
safety,
happiness,
and their enjoyment
that
they
would hate and condemn only such agents as were

likely to counteract these ends
:
and that they would
esteem and favour different agents in proportion as

they tended to
assist these
same ultimate purposes.

Essay IV.]

conceiving the idea
73
of a
The
ethical philosopher,
society wiser
is
and better than any actually
existing,
able to detect one single and assignable foundation

all
:
for
viz.
the various ordinances of ethical sanction
the safety and happiness of the society.

as they are
to
fit
:
Taking
men
be
now, no such single foundation can
made
we must
acquiesce in the existing
sentiment of the community, as the ultimate basis of

ethical obligation
:
we can
only say that the greater
part
of the
ethical
sanctions
have a converging
tendency towards the happiness of society as their

end, not that all of
them
distinctly point to
it
and
acknowledge
it
as
paramount.
Nor
is
it
to be expected, indeed, that in the existall
ing condition of humanity,

sanction
the separate forces of
should actually be
aimed with exclusive

all
reference to this end,
any more than that

it
the
separate forces of legislative sanction as

are directed towards
it
:
now
exists
although in the eye of the

the
philosopher, happiness
is
only legitimate
end
towards which the sanctions legislative as well as

ethical ought to be directed.
When
to
a philosopher
for
lays
it
down, that the only proper end

sanction ought
which the
is
legislative
be employed
the
happiness of the society
it is
no
sufficient
reply to
this position to point out, that legislation as it
now
this
stands
end.
is
not in fact directed exclusively towards this

will
The philosopher
admit the truth of
74

fact,
it
[Essay IV.
answer as a matter of
as a refutation.
but he will deny
its
force
it
If
be not so (he will say)
ought to be
improved.
so,
and
it
will be so
when men become
The
like reply
to ethical sanction, which,

is
may be made with respect as men are now constituted,

That
this is true
is
certainly not directed exclusively towards the prosocial
motion of the
happiness.
now, and always has been
true, as a
matter of fact
no ground of opposition
tends that
Besides,
it
to the philosopher
who
con-
ought to be so.
it is
admitted on
all
is
hands that the obserabsolutely indispen-
vance of ethical obligations

sable to ensure the safety
and happiness of society
without such observance these ends could not possibly be attained.

It
may
be said that these are not
the only ends which ethical observances answer
it
may
further be said that they are ends attained not

deliberate foregoing consciousness, but
by any
by
the
hap-hazard.
safety
But
still it
is
not the
less true that
and happiness of
society are the actual result
of the establishment of ethical relations
among
its
members, and that every adult person has a conviction that they are so.
Moreover, this grand end
is
common
to
all
the
separate exhibitions of ethical sentiment, in
all
times
and
places.
The
positive morality of one age agrees
in this respect with the positive morality of another.
But
in respect to other accessory ends, not connected
Essay IV.]
75
with the safety and happiness of society, the morality

of one age differs very widely from that of another.
There are endless divergences in matters of peculiar

fancy and sentiment.
As
positive morality has existed
up
to the present
time^ there are such accessory ends in every society,
sometimes occupying as
end.
either
it
much
attention as the
main
If
we
collect the list of all actions
which are
approved or disapproved, esteemed or abhorred,
will not be found that all in the former list are
actions
which tend
to the safety or happiness of the

it
society
list
still less
will
be found that
all
the latter
are actions which tend to the peril or misery or
discomfort of the society.
Such predicates
will be
true with regard to a certain
number of the
certainly
actions
comprised in
regard to
all.
each
list
but
not with
That men have a tendency

those beings
to
love
and esteem
who
are causes of happiness to them,
and
to hate
is
and dread those who occasion them

unquestionable.
all
suffering,
This
is
a tendency
in every
common
to
mankind and observable

In so far as
different society.
men
feel
and judge
under the influence of

morality of
this tendency,
the positive
all societies is cast
nearly upon the same
mould, and assumes similar features.
But there are two
points to be considered in addi-
tion to this general statement.
76
First,
[Essay IV.
men do
not always rightly apprehend the

happiness or
misery.
causes of their
They fancy
certain things and persons to be causes of these results,
which in
it
reality are not so

is
and
vice versa.
Secondly,
not merely the causes of happiness
which have a tendency to become objects of our love
and esteem, but
all
those accessories which have

as concomitant
become associated in our minds

happiness.
It is not
with
merely the causes of misery

to
which have a tendency

hatred and
fear,
become objects of our
but
all
those accessories which have
become associated
as concomitant with misery.
These two last-mentioned circumstances greatly

modify the course and direction of ethical sentiment,
and occasion wide divergences between

societies.
different
acci-
One
society has
been led by some
dental and forgotten reason, to fix
upon one
:
acces-
sory as the object of esteem or abhorrence

society
another
upon
another.
The
mistakes
causes
made by
real
different societies,
in overlooking
and
assigning causes supposed, are not always the same.
Hence
tlie
positive morality of one age or one society
comes to vary in
of another.
many material respects from that And when once any special ethical
it
antipathy has become rooted in a society,

itself
transmits
from generation
to generation,
with scarcely
any chance of being ever
eradicated.
ethical sentiment
is
Although therefore the
one
Essay IV.]
IDEA OF ETHICAL PHILOSOPHi'.

association,
77
formed by
we
are not to expect, even

it
according to the laws of association, that
should be
framed accurately and exclusively upon the basis of

utility,
except in a society which has

of mental
is
reached the
highest pitch
improvement.
just as
The
erro-
neous ethical sentiment

process
much formed by
of association as the
sound ethical
senti-
ment
only that the former results from associations

capricious,
latter
accidental,
fact
and
involving
mistakes
of
the
force
results
from
associations
general,
common
in in
to
all
mankind, capable of being arranged

system,
an
harmonious
and sure
to
increase
and authority as society becomes more
instructed.
To
collect
and compare
together
the
positive
morality of different societies, has a tendency to

enlarge and purify the character of ethical sentiment,
and
to
disengage those great principles which are

to all ages
common
and nations from the capricious
adjuncts which are peculiar to this or that portion
of the globe.
The grand features of morality acquire
increased and peculiar dignity in our minds, in con-
sequence of our finding them everywhere reproduced
and everywhere more or
less
venerated
we become
gradually familiarised with the idea of a standard of

morality, different from that actually prevalent any-
where, by which the positive morality of each particular nation is to be tried.
We
are thus brought
78

stages nearer, to say the least of
[Essay IV.
many
If
as
it
it,
to
the
principle of utility.
we
take the law of nature, or ethical sentiment

all
pervades
little
mankind,
it
may
be stated with
is
very
exception, that this universal morality
founded upon the same universal cause the absolute

necessity of
its
rules for the protection of the safety

society.
and happiness of
timent as
assign
rests.
it
But
if
we
take ethical sen-
exists in
any given
society,
we
cannot
it
any determinate foundation upon which
The sentiment
;
exists,
apparently without any
foundation
that
is,
manifestations to
we cannot trace all its different any one common principle.
Ethical sentiment
may
be traced partly to the
self-
regarding tendencies of our nature

antipathetic tendencies.
1.
partly
to the
To
the self-regarding
tendencies, in so far as the favour
and esteem of
others, to a certain extent, is absolutely essential to
our preservation and comfort.

thetic tendencies, in so far as
2.
To
the sympaconceive
we thereby
and partake the
feelings of others
in so far as
we
thereby conceive and become attached to a

interest
common
far
between ourselves and them
and in so
as
we
love the causes of safety and happiness to

3.
others as well as to ourselves.

tendencies, in so far as
To the
antipathetic
we
hate the causes of pain to

(if
ourselves
and
by
sympathetic antipathy
one
may
say so), the cause of pain to others.
Essay IV.]
79
What is called the moral faculty (and indeed the word

faculty generally)
it is
is
a very ambiguous expression
generally understood to indicate something ready
made, not gradually formed
something
If
it
implanted
be meant,
by
nature, not gradually acquired.
by saying that man has a moral

afSrm that he
is
faculty, simply to
so
organized, and placed in such
circumstances, as that he will assuredly in the course
of a certain time form ethical associations, I admit this

perfectly
:
I also
admit that these ethical associations
form a
class
by themselves, distinguishable from
every other modification of our consciousness, so that

it
is
proper and necessary to bestow upon them a
separate denomination.
that ethical sentiment
is
But
it
is
not the
less
true
a highly complex association,
composed of many
different ideas
and many
different
feelings united together intimately
and indissolubly,
undergoing successive modifications according as our

experience
to
is
enlarged and according as

It
we apply
it
new
cases.
involves both a group of feelings

;
and a process of reason

of dealing with
for the constant necessity
new new
cases renders
some exercise of
reason inevitable.
propriety in any
In order to conduct himself with

case,
man
is
forced to put
his
together in his
mind the various analogies which
former experience has presented to him, and to apply

the result to the case before him.
This cannot be
done without an
intellectual process
more or
less
80
[Essay IV.
perfectly performed
performed
too
by the
aid of
general terms, whicli presuppose a classification of

actions
and
dispositions, reposing
is
upon some
fixed
principle.
There
both a process of feeling and a
process of reason superadded
the
latter capable of
being stated in general terms.
11.
We
society,
have records of certain observed

existing
at
states
of
various
times and
in
various
places, in
which there have been no written law and

In such cases a
no established or permanent judges.

large portion of
lation
what
left
is
now
the province of legis-
would be
as a portion of the wide field of

Tf under
positive morality.
such
circumstances a
man
abstained from theft, this would arise not from
the fear of legal punishment, but either from repug-
nance in his own mind, or from fear of resentment
on the part of the
sufferer, or
from a dread of the
unfavourable sentiments of the society around him.
Theft would then be an immoral act

position to thieve,
and the
dis-
an immoral
disposition.
When
law
is
made prohibiting
are
theft, or
when judges
are
named who
empowered
to
punish every act of

illegal,
theft, the act of theft
becomes
;
but without
to
ceasing to be immoral
the
disposition
thieve
Essay IV.]

it
81
continues to be immoral as
was before
it
cannot
be calledillegal, for neither legislators nor judges can
meddle with dispositions except in

manifested and reduced into action.
so far as they are
In the outset of legislation,

or no acts would be
it is
probable that few

punished, except
made
illegal or
such acts as were previously deemed immoral by the

feelings of the society.
But in process of time and

found convenient to establish
as society proceeds,
it is
a fixed rule in cases where doubt and uncertainty
produce
confusion,
although the rule selected
is
perhaps not in
itself better
than
many
other rules
equally applicable.
As
the authority of legislators
and judges became
established,
many
acts
and many
omissions were in this
manner declared
to be illegal
and punished, although previously they were in no
way
or
immoral.
Being however once declared
illegal
by competent authority, they became immoral more

less.
This
characteristic
coincides
with
that
which Aristotle applies
to vofxiKou St/catov (conven-
tional justice) as opposed to ^vctikov Si/catov (natural

justice),
aXX,co9,
e^ ^PXV'^ H'^^
ovOev hia<êpei, ovrcu?

v. 7).
17
orav Se Ooivrai, hiaîpei (Ethic. Nic.

portion of the domain occupied
One
is
by
legislation
thus formed of matter which previously belonged

:
to the field of Ethics
another portion
is
formed of
field
matter which did not previously belong to the

of Ethics, but which
comes afterwards
to
belong to
82
it

in consequence
[Essay IV.
of having been determined
by
legislative precept.
The
positive morality of
any given age or nation
consists of the
opinions and feelings then current

is
respecting
what
right or
wrongblameable,
unbecoming
in-
different or
praiseworthy
respectable
or contemp-
tible or ridiculous
becoming or
suit-
able or unsuitable to
any given character or

which
position
is
and
ful
to a certain extent also, of that
grace-
and elegant, or unpleasing and repulsive.
Each
individual has sentiments of this sort, according to
which he judges both his own conduct and

tion
disposi-
and that of
others.
The sentiments with which

one of
we regard what we
spectable,
think right, praiseworthy, resuitable,
becoming,
&c.,
is
satis-
faction as applied to ourselves, of favour as applied

to others
is
:
that with which
we regard
the contrary,
a sentiment of discomfort, sometimes even of the

to ourselves
most acute pain, as applied
of aversion
The
or perhaps intense hatred as applied to others.
desire to acquire this favour, and the fear of incur-
ring this repulsion, are
motives to action
the
actual
feeling
us,
among the most powerful known to human nature. Both

as
applied
to a case or
agent
as
really
before
and the idea of that feeling

yet unrealized
applied to
either
others,
case
and contingent
upon our own determination or upon that of

is
called
by the name moral sentiment.
And

Essay IV.]
83
the idea of the pleasurable or painful feeling, constitutes
the
desire,
or
aversion,
which serves as a
motive to and from action.

Tlie ethical feeling properly so called
is
essentially
a social sentiment, capable of being felt
by every one
man
in the
community towards every other man, and

which may prevail
is
not implying any special community or fraternity
between the two.
The
affection
between two brothers or two friends
not,
in
the proper sense of the word, an ethical sentiment,
any more than the

happen
to
special
antipathy which
personal
may
subsist
between two
enemies.
specta-
The judgment or sentiment with which the

tors around,
who
are not personally concerned, reor antipathy
gard
this
affection
and
the sort of
self-judgment with which the parties concerned re-
gard themselves in consequence of their knowledge

of what other people are feeling in respect to
this is properly the ethical or
them
moral
sentiment.
The
ethical or
moral sentiment
is
one in which every
individual around, or even the whole world, might
be conceived as capable of sharing.
The very
is
basis
and primary element of
ethical sentiment
expected
and assured reciprocity of conduct and

I
disposition.
know
that I desire to receive certain benefits, and to
be the object of certain affections and dispositions, on

the part of others
:
know
that I hate to experience
harm
or to be the object of certain other dispositions
G 2
84

affections
[Essay IV.
and
on their
part.
I believe
that others
to
desire the
same conduct and sentiments, and wish
avert the
same conduct and sentiments, from me

I also believe that
towards them.
every individual
amongst the persons around
me
has the same desires

to other persons,
and the same aversions with respect
me
included.
That
should manifest towards others
that conduct and disposition

ceive from
which they wish
to re-
me
and that
I should receive
from them
that conduct and those dispositions which I desire
from
them the two phenomena
being indissolubly
linked together under the sanction of a superintend-
ing and extraneous force

ethical sentiment.
this
it is
which
constitutes
It is a feeling of certain obligations
under which I
stand,
and of certain
rights
which
I enjoy, each con-
ditionally
upon the other and mutually implying the
other ,and both guaranteed by a

sanction.
common
conjointly
enforcing
Ethical
sentiment
ail
includes
and
in-
separably
these
I
three ideas
right,
obligation,
and
sanction.
am
under certain
is,
obligations
with
to
for-
regard to others
exact from
that
it
others have a
right
me
certain fulfilments
and certain
to suit
bearances, whether
may happen
my
incli-
nation, or not, to practise them.

I
am
possessed of certain rights in regard to others
^that is, others are
obliged to practise certain
fulfil-
Essay IV.]

it
85
ments and forbearances towards me, whether

be agreeable to them or not.
others,
I
may
am
obliged
towards
towards
and they are in

have certain
like
manner
obliged
me.
rights in
regard to others, and
they on their parts have certain rights in regard to
me.
There
is
an indissoluble reciprocity of right

that too assured
it
and obligation
sanction.
free-will
and
by a common
I feel that
does not depend upon
my
whether
I will
perform or decline
my
obli-
gations
towards others, nor upon the free-will of
others whether they perform or decline their obligations towards me.

I feel as if
both they and I were
subject to a
common
superintending force, command-
ing both and restraining both, and capable of being
invoked by
either, in case of neglect or violation
by
In
the other, for purposes of compulsion or redress. point of

fully
fact,
there
is
no
real extraneous force
which
and completely corresponds
to the idea of this
ethical quasi-sanction,
though there are some

it,
real
forces
which go a certain way towards
and sug-
gest the lineaments of that idea which
the fancy
afterwards
fills
up.
But
it is
not the less true that

is
the idea of this quasi-sanction
an element in the
common form
of ethical sentiment, partly real, partly
strengthened by our imagination for the purpose of
guaranteeing the reciprocity of right and obligation
as a fancied vinculum between them. If
we suppose
either the feeling of right without
86
[Essay IV.
that of obligation, or the feeling of obligation with-
out that of right, in

will be
racter.
eitlier case
the ethical sentiment

its specific
broken np and deprived of
chais
The
feeling of right without obligation,

:
simple mastery or superiority
that
of obligation
without right,
is
*
is
simple subjection.
Either of these
radically distinct
it
from
all
ethical sentiment.
In fact
the latter has in

contract
the elements of a supposed
or
covenant if there
had
been a real
contract or covenant, the feeling would not have
been at
that he
all different.
is
Every separate individual
feels
bound
to certain observances
and certain
forbearances towards others and for the benefit of

others
:
but every one at the same time feels that
others are bound to certain observances
and certain
forbearances towards him, and that the same sanction
which ensures the performance of
this qudsi-covenant,
from him to others, also ensures the from others to him.

a
like
performance
On
the one hand, each
man
is
member
of the society, entitled to exact from every
other
member
various performances and abstinences.

is
On
and
the other hand, he
an individual agent acting

perform certain obligations
towards others.
for himself, but
bound
to
to exhibit certain dispositions

fact the
:
These are in
two
different phases of the

is
same
ethical sentiment
whoever
not impressed with
both of them, cannot be said to be ethically minded.

Moralists seem often to speak of the sentiment of
Essay IV.]

it
87
ethical obligation as if
stood alone and unconnected
with any sentiment of right.
Looking
at the
matter
with reference to practice, one can easily understand
why
is
they have done this
for every
to set quite sufficient value
on his
man is certain own rights, but he
not equally certain to be sufficiently attentive to
his obligations.
But
it
is
nevertheless an error to
:
suppose that the sense of obligation stands alone

for the sense of right is indissolubly
it
connected with
and forms an equally

If I
essential part of the ethical
man.
others
duly perform
my
obligations
is
towards
still
more
I
if I
perform what
beyond
my
obligations
acquire
thereby a right to certain
favourable sentiments and to conduct betokening such
sentiments at the hands of others.
If others do not
me such favourable sentiments, or do not requite me by the corresponding tenor of action, they are in the wrong they do me wrong and they
accord to
are wanting in the obligations incumbent
upon
them.
By
a certain line of conduct on

is
my
part, the esteem
of others
acquired to
it
me
me.
as of right,
and they are

of an
obliged to accord
to
Now
this feeling,
is
acquired right to the esteem of others,
inseparably
interwoven with the sentiment of obligation, or with

the idea of right doing on
my
part
just as the
feel-
ing, of a supervening liability to the disesteem of

others,
is
interwoven with the idea of wrong doing
or the violation of obligation.
The consciousness of
88

is
[Essay IV.
right to the esteem of others,
called self-esteem
the consciousness of liability to the

others,
is
disesteem
of
called
self-reproach.
When we
speak of
the esteem of others, or of the disesteem of others,
we
mean
of course such conduct on their part as betokens

:
these sentiments
it
is
only by some overt manifes-
tation that their sentiments can
become known
to us.
The
desire of acquiring a right to the esteem of
others and
of avoiding
the
liability
to their dis-
esteem,
assisted
is
the genuine
ethical motive
which,
when
is
by the
requisite
knowledge and power,
quite sure to lead to right action.
It is true that
when
the
performance of obligation has become
habitual, the virtuous
man
feels
himself impelled by
a rapid and vehement sentiment of which he does not stop to render any account.
But
it
may
be
shewn incontrovertibly that the
desire of obtaining
the esteem of others, and the feeling of an acquired

right to such esteem,
make
a part of the sentiment.

fails
For
if it
so
happens that he
grief
to
obtain
that
esteem, he
suffers
and
disappointment, and
labours under an indignant consciousness of having
been wronged by others.
man, who has been

if
for
years undeviatingly
honest or veracious,
he finds himself mistrusted

be acutely pained
or suspected of dishonesty, will
and
will feel himself grievously
wronged.
He
will
be conscious that he has deserved esteem aiid con-
Essay IV.]
89
fidence,
and that he
is
entitled to complain of others
for treating
him otherwise.
Now
the existence of
such feelings proves that both the desire to enjoy esteem and the consciousness of his eventual right
to
it,
formed a main element at
least in that habitual
sentiment which impelled him to the observance of
honesty and veracity.
The genuine
and
ethical motive
is,
the
desire at all
events of acquiring a right to the esteem of others,

if possible
consistently with this, the desire of

it
actually enjoying
liability
the desire of escaping conscious

To
a perfectly virtuous man, the
to the
disesteem of others, and if possible
consistently with this, the desire of escaping their
actual disesteem.
consciousness that he deserves esteem will be
more
more
gratifying than the
actual
enjoyment of
it
the
consciousness of deserving disesteem will be

painful than the actual suffering of it
to choose
if
he
is
reduced
between the two.
The consciousness of a
and admiration of
it
;
perfect title to the esteem
others,
is
and the actual possession of

the
ethical
at the
same time,
summum honum
the consciousness
of
unequivocal liability to the disesteem and abhorrence

of others, and the actual incurring of
time,
is
it
at the
same
the ethical
summum malum
and avoid the
and the
desire
to obtain the one
other,
constitutes
the
ethical motive.
Regard
to
it
the
is
esteem and reit
proach of others, either as
dispensed, or as
90

to be dispensed if others
[Essay IV.
ought
is
were right-minded,
If Ihe actual public
the basis of virtuous action.
refuse to a virtuous
serves, he feels
man
the esteem which he de-
that they do
him wrong, and withto
hold from him what he has a right

himself that the time will come
he
persuades
will do
when they
him
justice
and
the
idea of the imaginary public

in
who
his
coincide with
him
judgment, outweighs in
mind the
actual public
who
are opposed to him.
The
ethical sentiment, in all its forms
and
varieties,
presents the idea of a public (meaning thereby persons other than the agent himself)
it
presents
is
them
not merely as persons to
whom
the agent
bound,
but as persons
a certain
DemeritReward Punishment Eight contempt

or respect
Liability to aversion or
who common
are not less

sanction.
bound
to him,
under
The
ideas
of Merit
to
esteem
all
have
reference to this public and to
its
anticipated judg-
ment.
Wrong
is
that which deserves condemnation
or punishment.
When
relative
I say that obligation
and right are

I
cor-
and mutually imply each other,

every
specific
do not
mean
that
act
which we perform
under a sense of obligation must necessarily correspond to a

specific right vested in
some other
deterobli-
minate persons.
gatory
is
In performing any particular
act,
the sentiment
by which we
are impelled
not one peculiar to that act alone, but
common
to

Essay IV.]
91
that act along with a great

is
many
others
and
it
that general sentiment of ethical obligation
which
correlates
and
is
indissolubly
conjoined with the

;
general sentiment of
together,
ethical right
making up both
when
joined by the idea] vinculum, called

is
a sanction, what
properly called ethical sentiment.
Ethical sentiment, then, consists of a cluster of ideas
and
feelings indissolubly united together
by
associa-
tion, in
such manner that the occurrence of phenoreal

life,
mena
in
in
way
conformable to this
association, occasions to us a feeling of satisfaction
the occurrence of
to
it,
phenomena
in a
manner contrary
creates a feeling of displeasure or indignation.

to,
Restraints are to be submitted
and
services to be
as the indis-
performed,
pensable
certain
by each individual agent,

condition,
but at the
same time as the

restraints
and constant cause, of similar

and (what
is still
and
services,
more) of the continuance
of favourable dispositions and esteem on the part of

others.
It is
upon these
dispositions that the volun:
tary and ready performance of acts depends
and
the desire of favourable disposition on the part of

others, as the
permanent cause of continued

to us, forms a
benefit
and protection
much more important

In
feature in the ethical associations than the anticipation of
any
special
and
definite services.
is
fact,
ethically speaking,
an act
regarded more in reit
spect to the evidence which
affords of the settled
92
[Essay IV.
disposition of the agent, than with a

specific consequences.
view
to its
own
This forms one remarkable
ground of discrepancy between the point of view of

Ethics and the point of view of Law.
The feeUng
above described
is
formed by associations begun at
a very early age and continually repeated under

circumstances of
happiness.
the
greatest
importance to our
it
The elements of which

intimately blended,
is
composed
rapid and
become
so
and
so
vehement in their action upon our

cannot
passing.
present,
is
feelings, that
we
of
detect
them separately
all
at the
moment
But that
these
elements are really

senti-
shewn most incontestably when the

to be deliberately unrolled. If I
ment comes
strate
remon-
with another person respecting some wrong
which he has done
if
I
if
console
him
for
wrong
which he has
dispute with
third party
suffered
I discuss
with him or
him respecting wrong done by some

I hearten
if
him up
to the discharge
of some very painful duty
if I arbitrate or
give sen-
tence in any dispute
in
all
these cases the ethical
sentiment has to be taken to pieces and the separate

elements of
it
distinctly
brought out and appealed

insisted on,
to.
The
topics
and arguments then
affect
a man's reason because they revive what had previously passed in his mind, because he
is
conscious
ethical
that they are embodied as elements in his
sentiment and because he
is
also
aware that the

Essay IV.]
IDEA OF ETHICAL THILOSOPHY.

has
already
93
latter
sentiment
undergone
various
modifications
during his transition from infancy to

still
manhood and may perhaps undergo

the future.
If the sentiment
more
in
were simple, uncom-
j)Ounded and instinctive, the topics which are
now
found more or
less operative
could have no bearing
upon
it.
You may
call it
a natural sentiment if you will

is
meaning thereby a sentiment which

association, but
formed by
which
is
quite certain to be formed
more
or less in every variety of
human
society.
The
foundations of the sentiment are doubtless laid in
human
nature
but the sentiment
itself is
comjDOsed
of ideas and feelings gradually, and at last indissolubly, united together

;
the causes which determine
such ideas and feelings to become associated together,
being quite universal in their operation, and acting
upon every individual (with

and
varieties)
certain modifications
who
is
brought up in anything like

social relations.
an established form of
sentiment
is
The
ethical
:
natural, in the sense of universal
inas-
much
or to
cular
as the formation of it
depends upon causes of
universal occurrence, not peculiar to any one age,
any one form of
society, or to
any one
parti-
mode
of training.
But
it is
not natural in the

instinctive.
sense of simple,
uncompounded and
and rudest form
itself,
is
The
earliest
in
which the
ethical
sentiment presents
when
a child conceives
94
[Essay IV.
the kindness or unkindness of others towards
him
to
be conditioned on a certain mode of behaviour on

his part
is
towards them.
:
Orders are issued which he
required to obey
if
he does not obey, painful

if
consequences follow
on the other hand,
he does
obey, he finds by experience that kindness and good
treatment on the part of others
is
the consequence,
and he learns
which
to expect this with the full assurance
ultimately
ripens
into
feeling
of right.to
Obligation
to obey,
as the necessary
condition
obtaining the kindness and good treatment of those
around
assurance of receiving that kindness,
in
the event of obedience
this is the nascent state of
the ethical feeling, in the mind of a child.

If
we
consider the perfect
and absolute
helpless-
ness of a child,
we
shall see that the aid
of those
around
is
essential to
every instant of his waking
existence
that
reliance
upon
their
aid
all
must
in-
evitably become the most familiar of
his ideas,
and the most constant of

he
to
feels a
all his
necessities.
is
When
want, his only resource
to cry, in order
bring some one to his assistance.

is
The mere
it,
thought, in so far as he
capable of conceiving
all
of being deprived of that aid, must be of
senti-
ments the most intolerably painful.
That the desire
of the constant aid and protection of others should
become the most intense of
all desires,
and the fear
of their negation of aid the most insupportable of
Essay IV.]
95
all fears, is
a natural consequence of the long help-
lessness of childhood.
As
upon
a child
grows
older,
he perceives
that the
granting or refusing of such aid by others depends

their dispositions towards
him
and that these

his
dispositions
on the part of others depend upon
conduct towards them.

of others,
The favourable
dispositions
and the symptoms and evidences of such
dispositions, become,
by the common
process of asso-
ciation, the object of his earnest attachment, as
being
the ascertained and exclusive causes of everything
which
is
essential to his existence
but such disposi-
tions are not to be obtained unless
he obeys certain
orders given
by those around
unless he refrains
from actions which they

positions agreeable to
dislike,
and manifests
dis-
them
while,
on the other
hand,
if
he does obey the orders, refrain from the

actions,
forbidden
desired
and manifest
the
dispositions
from him, the favourable dispositions
of
others will most certainly be assured to him.

then,
is
Here,
the
first genesis
of the ethical sentiment
the
idea and confident expectation of favourable dispositions
on the part of
others, as the assured conse-
quence of one
part
set of actions
and dispositions on his
the idea and confident expectation of unfavouron the part of others,

set of actions
able dispositions
as the assured
consequence of one
his part
and
dispositions
on
the
idea and confident expectation of un-

96
[Essay IV.
favourable dispositions on the part of others, as the
assured consequence of another set of actions and

dispositions
on
his part.
Grood or bad dispositions
from others, conditional upon his

disposition
own
conduct or
towards others
is
the constant type
the main and essential element of ethical feelings.
Having formed
child easily
rule in
this association in his
own
case, a
makes the next
step of applying a similar
judging of the relations of one person towards

GrOod or bad dispositions on the part of
another.
others towards A, conditional

disposition
upon the conduct or
of
towards
others
this
is
rule
which he
will readily follow out
and apply
to
every
individual successively.
And
this is the idea of obli-
gation and right.
The
persons towards
whom
child first learns to conceive this sentiment of obliga-
tion are adult persons, in the first place immeasur-
ably superior to himself in power, in the next place

generally full of active
fondness and affection toof inferiority and
wards him.
feebleness
is
The
consciousness
all
blended with
the
sentiments of
infancy
a child feels that he has not the slenderest

fears of others, but he
power of acting upon the

feels at the
same time that he has great power of
acting upon their love

looks
and fondness.
Hence he
upon the goodwill and
affection of persons
to
around him as consequences which he expects

ensue from certain conduct on his
own
part, but
Essay IV.]
97
which
at the
if
same time he has not the means of

withheld,
enforcing,
however the
negation of
them may
his
displease him.
But
in process of time his growth,
own
sense of
power increases with
and he
also sees instances of the exercise of
power
com-
by one man over another,
so as to appreciate
parative superiority and inferiority in the individuals
around him.
From
these circumstances arise
the
rudiments of the idea called sanction, or of a certain
compulsory force which

for
may
he employed to procure
as be-
him those advantages which he conceives
longing to his
their
own good
freely
conduct, in the event of
not being
conceded.
Advantages
so
capable of being secured are conceived as rights, in

the fullest sense
realized
expectations of
benefit
which
if
not
by the
free-will of the party at
whose hands
they are expected, are supposed to be enforceable
by authority or superior power of some kind.

It
would seem, therefore, that
in the
mind of a
than
child, the idea of ethical obligation arises earlier
that of ethical right
meaning
by
ethical obligation
the
idea
of beneficent
dispositions
and
conduct
from others in consequence exclusively of certain

conduct of his own.
disappointed
if
Though he would be
consequences which
it
painfully
the
he thus
expects were withheld, yet
can hardly be said that

to
he fancied himself to have a right
them, until he
conceived the idea of some possible means of en-
98

is
[Essay IV.
forcing them. This in fact
the sentiment entertained
of obligation towards some very great and at the
same time very much venerated power

power, or
still
the paternal
To
the eye
:
more the divine power.
of a child, the power of his father seems omnipotence
he learns to
feel ethical obligation

first
towards his father,
but he has at
no sense of ethical right over him.

in its purest
Filial obligation
and
earliest
form
is
ethical
right.
obligation
without
any sense
of
ethical
But when the
child has so far
grown up
as to feel
a certain force of his own, and so far enlarged his
experience as to be cognizant of the various powers
around him, he acquires the idea of a

to enforce obligations
common
as
sanction
and prevent wrong,
as well
on
the part of others towards him,
on his part
is
towards others.
This
common
first state
sanction
usually
the authority of the
head of the family over the

of things of which
members.
This
is
the
a child acquires experience
various
members of a
family living under the
common
authority of the
head or
father.
To
that authority he pays obedience

protection.
It
and from that authority he receives

is
employed
to
compel him to behave in a certain
way towards
them.
others,
and
to refrain
from hurting
The
ideas of obedience
and protection thus
come
to be conceived as
depending upon a common
sanction and to be indissolubly associated together
Essay IV.
99
wliich
in
his mind.
The extraneous authority on

upon condition of
alone he has to rely for protection, will not be exerted

in his defence unless
certain acts
:
and abstinences and dispositions on

vice versa, if
his part
and
confor
he performs these
acts,
&c. he
may
fidently rely
his security.
upon such authority being exerted
This confident, but conditional, reliance,

of ethical right
is
:
constitutes the feeling
the disapof
pointment of that feeling

wror.ged.
the
sense
being
Negation of favour
censure or punishto himself, in the
ment from the common authority
event of his doing forbidden acts or neglecting to do

enjoined acts
sure
:
similar negation of favour
similar cen-
similar punishment from the same authority,

their
towards others, in the event of

acts, or
doing forbidden
neglecting to do enjoined acts, towards him.
III.
Having
to
traced
the sources
of ethical of our
sentiment
nature,
it
the self-regarding tendencies
now remains
ciple
to trace also the operation of the prinfirst
of
sympathy on the
conception of the
interest
to
notion and the feeling of a
common
;
and com-
mon
liabilities
with others
and
shew how the
pleasures and pains of others, conceived conjointly
with our
own and
conceived as arising from the same
H 2

100
IDEA OF ETHICAL PFTILOSOPHY.
[Essay TV.
causes witli our own,

forcibly
come
to affect our
minds
so
and vividly.
Those persons, who are the
causes of
harm and
those
suffering to ourselves conjointly
with others, become thus the objects of our terror and

aversion
;
who
are the causes of protection and
benefit to ourselves in conjunction with others, be-
come the Each of

is
objects of our attachment
and gratitude.
others,
is
these feelings,
by being shared with

and prolonged
:
greatly intensified
its
each
also
is
modified in
nature by being divested of what

:
exclusive and personal to ourselves

in consequence of being shared
to be based
each appears,
all
by
around
us,
on a foundation of reason and extraneous
authority independent of
^TJfjLT)
any individual impulse
0eos
Tt9 /cat avTrj.
When
this
feeling
of a
common
interest
with
others has once acquired a footing in our minds,
together with the sentiments emanating from

joint attachment to
it,
of
aversion to the
common benefactor joint common enemy it farther becomes

the
an idea highly painful
to
every one to imagine
himself the object of this joint aversion, and an idea
highly pleasurable to imagine himself the object of

this joint attachment.
We
are thus brought
by a second and a
different
road to the same end

favourable
that
of
of strongly desiring the
sentiment
those
around
us
and
shrinking with apprehension from their unfavour-
Essay IV.]
101
able sentiment.
The absolute
necessity in
which we
are placed, even for our
own
protection
and comfort,
latter,
of conciliating the former,

is
and avoiding the
one road
the
sympathy which we
and
the
feel in their
pains and
arising of a
pleasures^
conception
thence
common
render
interest with them, is another

to the
road
each conducting
to
same conclusion
each
of
tending
others
the
favourable
sentiments
among
the objects of our most anxious desires,
and the unfavourable sentiments of others a source

to us of the liveliest fear
and
suffering.
We
also
arrive
by means of sympathy, and by
means of
sympathy
that feeling of a
common
interest
which
inspires, at the sentiment of approbation
and disapprobation
sentiments
which
are
always
a
conceived as belonging to us in
common with
number of
others.
arrive,
But we do not
by means of sympathy
alone,
at the feeling of right or obligation, or the idea of a
sanction binding
tion are founded
them
together.
Right and obliga-
upon the self-regarding tendencies,
not upon the sympathetic tendencies, of our nature
they assume a pre-existing antithesis between each

man and his fellows, each having a separate his own individual happiness, to take care of
are
object,
They
this
introduced for the purpose of regulating
discrepancy
in
of
reconciling the
discrepant
parties
an ascertained common medium
of limiting
the
102
IDEA OK ETHICAL PHILOSOPHY.
[Essay IV.
extent to which, and the means by which, each
man
may
pursue his
own
separate happiness, and of de-
fining the terms on which
he
may make
sure of
obtaining the forbearance and co-operation of every

other man.
When
it is
said that I
am
under obligation to act in

is
a certain manner, a constraining force

acting upon
trolled
impKed
as
me
it
is
assumed, that
my own
uncon-
inclinations
might lead me otherwise

is
the
when
necessity of constraint
founded upon
my
having
self-regarding tendencies.
I affirm that I
is
On
the other hand,
have a
certain right, a constraining force
implied as acting upon others
it
is
assumed that
others have self-regarding tendencies, which might
induce them to withhold or to resist the benefit to
which
my
right relates.
Both right and obligation
are founded
upon the supposition that each man has

of his
separate and divergent inclinations

sort
own
and
be
of centrifugal
tendency
they
regulate
modify these inclinations, in order that they
may
brought into a certain degree of harmony in the
members of the
society generally.
Though
the notion and the feehngs of right and
obligation are originally based
upon the
self-regard-
ing tendencies of our nature, yet

loped fully in
when
once devesocial
the mind, they become
and
are
comprehensive in the highest degree.

recognised and venerated
as the
They
grand source of
Essay IV.]
103
security not merely to ourselves, but also to every
other uieniber of the society.
They
are in fact
more
extensively social even than the principle of sym-
pathy
for
sympathy cannot reach very powerfully
beyond a limited number of persons, whereas a deep

felt
sense of right and obligation
may pervade
the
whole of a very large community.
From
vidual,
the self-regarding tendencies of each indibelief, in each,
and from the
of the like
self-
regarding tendencies
in
others,
are
derived
the
notions and the feelings of right and wrong, obligatory

or
forbidden
and
our
distinction
between
various agents according as they are disposed to act

rightly or wrongly, in a ino.nner ohligatoiy or foi^bidden,
&c.
From
the sympathetic tendencies of each indi-
vidual and from his belief of the like sympathetic
tendencies in others,
feelings of
we
derive the notions and the

relief
what
is
good and bad (the cause of
and comfort, or of pain and uneasiness) not

selves singly
to our-
and exclusively, but
to ourselves in confor all, or
junction with others
good
and
and bad
good
and bad absolutely
also our distinction of agents

is
according as they do what
good or what
is
bad.
These two feelings, though derived from different

sources and each modifying the other
are generally found in
flict.
more or
less,
harmony, occasionally in conis
Generally speaking, what

is
bad, is regarded as
wrong, though what
wrong
is
not always regarded

104

[Essay IV.
as
bad
i.e. it
does not always painfully affect our
benevolent sympathies.
man who,
in order to
accomplish a particular work of benevolence, departs
from the
strict obligation
of justice, will be generally
considered as having acted wrongly
but he
will not
be treated by most persons as having done a bad act
still less
as being himself a
bad agent.
act with a benevolent
man who
little
does a
wrong
view is looked upon, by ordinary persons, as deserving

of very
gence.
censure,
and very considerable indul-
It
most frequently occurs, however, that

done with a benevolent view
wrong
acts are not

is
the wrong act
generally a bad act
the
benevolent
impulses do in the greater
number
of cases coincide
with dictates of justice.
The words good and bad

agents
that
are
by no means conand malevolent
stantly used to signify benevolent

:
but I think they most commonly tend to
meaning
a kindly or an unkindly disposition.

is
Benevolence
in point of fact, in
itself,
an un-
distinguishing imjmlse, which requires to be governed
and regulated,
like our other impulses
and
affections,
of the self-regarding kind.

desire of
Anger,
fear, gratitude,
money, desire of power, appetites of every
kind, all require a certain restraining and guiding
authority
sists
all
are to be indulged only so far as con-
with some definite and approved end.

is
It
the
ethical
sentiment
which furnishes
this

Essay IV.]

all
105
of them,
restraining and guiding authority for
lu
its
rudest state, as
it
is felt
in the
mind of an unis
taught and unreflecting man, this sentiment
only
an obedience
to the actual
judgment of those around
him, such as he knows by experience that they are

likely to pronounce,
and such as he would himself

to
concur in
agent.
pronouncing with regard
any other
In the rationalized state of

a
ethical sentiment,
where
man
has by reflection formed to himself the idea of
a standard
more exalted than that of the persons

to their
it
around him, he often appeals

ought
to
judgment
is
as
it
be, rather
than as
if
actually
^^to
their
judgment
as
it
would be
they were raised to his
level of instruction.
In every person above the age of absolute
child-
hood, ethical sentiment involves more or less of a
judgment of reason, the

reflection
result of comparison
and
upon the phenomena which have passed
within our experience.
child has found himself
punished or rewarded
frowned upon or caressed

many
expressions
under circumstances in which he did not anticipate

it
:
he has been witness to
of
opinion and
many
instances of retributory behaviour
on the part of
others,
which have greatly astonished
him
he has heard disputes and contradiction beto
tween the persons around him, in regard

right or
what
is
wrong
all
these
phenomena make impres"
106
sions
[Essay IV.
upon him, sometimes very strong impressions

to
they stimulate his reasoning powers,

bring what
like
is
endeavour to
confused and disorderly into something

:
system and regularity
he has to follow out a

strike a balance
to
number of
different analogies, to
conflict
between such as
with each other, and
extract out of the whole an intelligible rule for his
own
guidance.
He
finds
himself
prompted
and reduced
by
to
different impulses in particular cases,
the necessity of choosing between them
he
finds
himself in doubt as to the various rules or orders
which have been issued

respects
to
him by
those
whom
he
and which are not always
in
harmony with
each other, so that he cannot at the same time obey

all
of
them
and he
his
is
thus reduced
to
the necessity
of employing
intellectual
powers, in order to
rescue himself from a state of painful embarrassment.
Though
the general ethical sentiment
is
early im-
planted by association in the mind, yet the applications of this sentiment to particular cases are con-
stantly liable to involve a process of reason
nor can
the sentiment be brought to bear
upon our conduct
without this process.

so called
is
Ethical
sentiment properly
not feeling alone, like benevolence, comfilial
passion, paternal or
fear,
love, sexual impulse, anger,
&c.
it is
a rationalized sentiment
process of
feeling
and reason combined.

into the
Every young person on coming
world
Essay
IV.]

ethical
107
finds
the
sentiments of the society ready
formed and in active operations.
He
embraces, by a
process of association which passes almost unconsciously to himself, those sentiments
which he
;
finds
entertained by the persons around him
he begins by
the com-
obeying directions given by those
who have
mand
fest
first
of his happiness and comforts, and
who manidoes not at
tender affections towards him.

perceive any
tlie
He
meaning
:
or recognise
any advan-
tage in
orders given
he obeys them because

the causes
in need as
they are issued by those

of
all his
pleasure,
and
whom he loves as of whom he stands

it is rlgJit
his sole protectors against all his pains
and wants.
His
first
ideas of
what
or wrong to do, are
derived from the orders and

superiors
it is
:
prohibitions of these
the former word and the actions to which

associated with the affectionate dis-
apphed are
positions
and willing aid of those upon
whom
he
it
depends, the latter word and the actions on which

is
bestowed, with the contrary sentiment
and
they
thus carry with

veneration, and
them the
feelings belonging to love,
sense of entire
dependence.
He
same
learns to view circumstances, and to estimate indi-
vidual
characters
as those
and
pretensions,
in
the
manner
by
whom
he
is
surrounded.
This
is
indeed a gradual process, including multiplied repetitions of separate acts of feeling
and judgment, the

tlie
general result of which remains in
mind
as a
108

disposition, but
[Essay IV.
permanent sentiment or
which are
themselves individually forgotten and can never be

recalled.
(vol.
i.
Mr. Edgworth in his Practical Education

very justly
:
ch. ix. p. 205, 3rd edit.) observes
"
The words
right or wrong, and permitted or forbidfirst
den, are synonymous at

children
:
in the apprehensions of
and obedience and disobedience are
their
only ideas of virtue and vice.

to be done, or rather
sure,
Whatever we command
whatever we prohibit,
it
whatever we associate with plea:
they imagine to be right
provided
we have uniformly
extends,
associated
with pain,
they believe to be icrongy

instruction
As
their experience
and
they gradually acquire
more
first
enlarged notions of right and wrong, but the
form of the sentiment
is
of that which
is
enjoined,
permitted or forbidden, by the authority on which he

depends.
The
earliest
form of moral sentiment thus
includes the triple element of right, obligation, and
sanction
common
presiding power
which
restrain
will
restrain others fix)m hurting
him and
him
from hurting others.
The persons with whom a

members of
self strong
child first lives, are the
his
own
family, between
whom
and him-
sympathies and mutual affection prevail.
These feelings are mingled with his sentiments of

right,
wrong, and obligation, as regards the members
of his
own
family
so
that
the
latter
sentiments,
to present
during that early age, can scarcely be said
Essay IV.]
109
themselves distinctly and in a separate state

are at any rate greatly modified.
they
But
upon
as a child
grows up, he
persons with
pathies,
finds himself called
to deal with
whom
he has no pre-established sym-
and who have no pre-established sympathies
with him.
At
the same time his feeling of his

is
own
power, as compared with others,
greatly increased.
He
has less to hope from the pre-existing affection of
those with
to expect
whom
he
is
now
placed
but he has more

his
from the sentiment with which

inspire
fears,
own
to-
conduct
hopes,
may
them
from
the gratitude, the
and the
which they may entertain
wards him. The treatment which he meets with from

the persons with
whom
he never
did
lives,
depends more
lived with
on
his
his
own behaviour than it own family. There is no
when he
tenderness to excuse or
disguise his faults
there
is
no inclination on the
part of others to forestall his wants

ciation of fondness
there
is
no
asso-
on his part with the person in
whom
to be
authority resides.
The sentiment of obligation

and
with
:
performed by him towards others and by others

him,
towards
now
presents
itself
less
distinctly
nakedly
or
at
least
much
connected
affection
and sympathy than when he was a child
for the feeling of
sympathy with
others,
and
still
more the feeling of a common

sympathy,
is
interest arising out of
always existing and always producing
a certain effect, although an effect
much
less
than
it
110
[Essay IV.
did produce during the period of cliildhood.
When
is
the child grows up to be a man, he becomes what

called a responsible
agent
the conduct
of others
his
towards him
is
for the
most part determined by

:
conduct towards them
he
is
admitted to share in
the general sympathy and in the general feeling of a
common
interest
entertained
is
by every individual
around him, but he
not allowed to calculate upon
any peculiar indulgence or favour.

calculate
The
less
he can
upon the
established
it
affection
of those
to
around him, the more important

acquire
their
becomes
him
to
esteem
indeed without
certain
measure of good feeling and esteem from those with
whom
he
lives, life
would become positively insup-
portable.
Such fulfilments and forbearances as are
necessary to purchase this
minimum
be
of esteem, must
be
performed,
let
the
sacrifice
what
it
may.
The
this
painful associations connected with the loss of
minimum
of good feeling on the part of others^

effective
are
more intense and more
than the pain
of almost any degree of self-denial in other respects.
What sort of conduct on his of a man in order to purchase

feeling from others
])art will
be required
that degree of good
which
is
essential to his comfort
will
be determined in a great degree by
the
station
which he
occujîes in
society.
If he be a
person of rank and wealth,
less will
be required from
will
him
in
the
way
of obligation,
and more
be
Essay IV.]
Ill
granted to him in the
way
if
of right:
if
he be a
person poor and of low degree, these proportions

will be reversed.
And
he happens to be a slave,
is
the absolute property of one individual master, he

altogether out of the pale of ethical sentiment
society neither ensure to
:
the
him any
;
rights,
nor exact
from him any obligations

gation to
a
he
is
in a state of obli-
master,
is
whom
he
may
love
or
hate,
is
according as he
the
treated, but in
neither
case
sentiment which animates him
of an
ethical
character.
The ancient
poets have various striking passages
expressive of the incapacity of a slave for ethical

feeling
''H/xtcru
yap r
apery]^ airo dtVvrat, &c.
'Tytes
Ke(f)aXr)
ovSeu
evOeia
i//v^>J?
hovkrjs
(Plato).
shew
OviroTe SovXeir)
TTe<f)VKev
(Theognis).
to
This fact
would be
senti-
singly
sufficient
is
that the ethical
ment
the offspring of those relations in which a
man
is
placed to the society round
him
that
it is
not natural in the sense of ready-made, original, or

instinctive-
but
that
it
is
a complex
feeling,
the
arise
gradual result of
except where a
associations
is
which do not
man
placed in certain relations
towards his fellows.
The esteem
in
which a man
is
held by his fellows
does not depend wholly and exclusively upon what
they
may
believe respecting his disposition,

ethical measure.
which
is
strictly
and properly the
very
112
[Essay IV.
poor and weak man, although his disposition

the best possible, will obtain
little
may
be
esteem, and will
be the object of hardly any sentiment except indifference

disposition
or
perhaps compassion.
be, his
Whatever
his
may
too
power of doing good or

to
harm
is
insignificant
excite
any marked
feeling.
The esteem
on his
in
which a man
is
held depends partly
dispositions, but partly also
upon
his
power
and resources of every kind, natural as well as

acquired
partly
person.
desires
too
upon the accidental circum-
stances in which he has been placed, or particular

associations
which have become connected with
his
name and
man
to
have
full
credit
among
his
fellows for all the powers and resources

possesses, as well as for the
which he
good mental
dispositions
which belong
to him.
To rob a man of the

is
credit
due to him from the former source,

the same sort as to deprive
an insult of
credit due
him of the
from the
latter.
To be reproached with weakness, impotence, unfitness for the duties
incumbent upon a man, igno-
rance of those accomplishments which are
common
with
men
of good condition, want of virile power,
bastardy, ugliness, infamy of one's family, &c.
is
an
imputation quite as terrible and cutting as that of
any
ethical
fault,
such
as
dishonesty,
mendacity.

Essay IV.]
113
hiave^
injustice, cruelty, or ingratitude.

rascal, villain, &c., originally
The words
meant persons of low
and mean condition
they have gradually come to
mean persons
of bad moral character.
The reproach
is
of Euryalus to Ulysses (Odyss. YIII.) that he

adXrjTrj<s,
no
is
but nothing better than a ship-master,

resented
more
warmly
than
almost
any
other
reproach in the poem.

consequence, &c.,
is
The
loss of station,
power,
painful in the
same manner and

merit
from the same causes as the
loss of ethical
both the one and the other deprive us of what

feel to
we
be a
title
to the
esteem of the
community
to a
around.
For a man who has been accustomed
high and commanding

in a
station, it is intolerable to live

dis-
low condition, even though there be no

it.
comfort or positive suffering attending
The conhim
per-
ception of the altered esteem of others towards

is
always present
to his
mind, though he
may
all
haps experience no actual manifestations of such

alteration.
The most
acutely painful of
us, is that
senti-
ments from others towards

let it
of contempt
be even an indulgent contempt.
If
we
take
the case of GEdipus, there
is
no
moral guilt
(at least
according to the ancient ideas)
which he has incurred.
But he has involuntarily

acts
and unconsciously committed

of horror to
all
which are
objects
around him, and he knows that
he has thus become odious to every one.
The conI

114
IDEA
OB^
ETHICAL PHILOSOrHY.
life
[Kssay IV.
sciousness of this feeling renders

to him.
insupportable
The
or
idea of that which other persons are thinking
feeling
with respect to his character, position,

behaviour
station,
and
is
constantly
present
to
every man's mind.
He
desires intensely that others

all
should think highly of him in
these respects
that they should regard with esteem and favour his
personal dispositions, his power, his station, and his

pursuits.
He
dreads with equal intensity that others

ill
should think
of
him
in these respects
that
they
should regard with odium or contempt his personal

character,
his power, his
station,
or
his
pursuits.
Those
acts of his
own which
will procure for
him
the
former class of sentiments from others, he comes to

contemplate with satisfaction and delight as respects
the past and with desire of repetition as respects the
future.
Those acts of his own which will draw upon

latter
class of sentiments,
him the
he comes to con-
template with aversion as respects the past and with

resolution to avoid as respects the future.
The
acts
themselves become ultimately by the process of association, the
object of a sentiment of their
own, and
are shunned or coveted for their
own
be
sake, the end,

so,
to.
which originally caused tliem
to
being no
longer distinctly thought of or attended
That
this is the real genesis of ethical sentiment
in every individual
mind,
may
be shewn by the
Essay TV.]

ethical.
115
analogy of other sentiments not

in every society acts
There are
as degradstations,
which are regarded
ing and unsuitable to
men
all
in
particular
though perhaps not at

persons
discreditable
to other
at any rate
not involving any moral guilt,

to be
and therefore such as cannot be pretended

the
object of the
supposed moral instinct.
Now
these
degrading and unbecoming acts come to be

aversion and shunned, in the same
as
regarded with
manner and from the same cause

shunned.
immoral
acts are
is
A man
what
shrinks from doing what
de-
grading and unbecoming, just as he shrinks from the

idea of doing
is
immoral: he
is
no more conscious
of a distinct reference to the opinion of others in the
one case than in the other

deters
the sentiment which
him from
the one, appears just as immediate,

identified with the act
as rapid,
itself,
and as completely
in the former as in the latter.
The sentiment
is
called honour in the
mind of a gentleman
indisputis felt
ably acquired by position and education, and

only by those
peculiarly
acts
who have been

:
peculiarly placed and
educated
to
it
enjoins
him
to
do certain
it
and
refrain
from
others,
and
does so
without any special or conscious allusion to those

feelings on the part of others in
which
it
originally
took
its rise.
The
is
honour assumes
I
"
first
form which the sentiment of
must do
this, for if I
;
do not,
shall
be thought dishonourable
must refrain
I
116

that, for if I
[Essay IV.
from doing
do
it,
I shall
be thought
dis-
honourable."
But the subsequent and mature form

is
of the sentiment
different,
after the
association
between the act and the idea of those feelings with
which others regard the

and instantaneous.
" Such an act
is
act,
has become habitual
The
sentiment
then
runs
it
an honourable
is
act, therefore
must
act,
be done
therefore
such another act

it
a dishonourable
must not be done,"

it is
By
the universal
law of
association,
certain that this change in
the nature and character of the sentiment will take

place
that
come
elements of thought and feeling which

distinctly impressed
were originally
will
upon the mind,
to be effaced
from our consciousness as have often
subjects of separate attention, after they
passed through our

conjunction.
minds
in habitual
and rapid
Now the
case
is
the same with the ethical sentiment
as with the sentiment of
honour
both are originally
founded 'on our regard to the feelings which others
may
entertain towards us
both become in process
of time and by the natural tendency of association,

divested to a great degree of
to those feelings.
all
conscious reference
The
difference
no doubt
is,
that
the sentiment of honour belongs

to a select class in the
more
especially
ethical
community, whereas
sentiment
is
founded on relations and necessity per-
vading
all society,
and
is
absolutely essential to bind
Essay IV.]

all
117
together
those
who
live in
any
sort of
communion.
But
as to the
mode
of generation, and the gradual

association,
change which the feeling undergoes by

the analogy between the two
If
is
perfect.
we were even
is
to admit, as
Dugald Stewart con-
tends, that there
a moral instinct which leads us
directly to consider certain acts as right,
and certain
other acts as wrong, without any reference to what

others think or feel about
them it would
still
be
impossible to ascribe any necessary correctness or authority to this supposed instinct.
For no one can

be, but constantly
deny that the

is,
instinct not only

:
may
depraved and perverted

is
and
if this
be the case,
it
on the same footing with other appetites and
inclinations, requiring to be kept right
by the super-
vision
and control of reason.

been above stated that a child
first
It has
derives
his ethical sentiment

feelings of others,
from his experience of the
and from the absolute necessity
whicli keeps the feelings of others constantly present

to his
mind
as causes of all his comforts
and most of were always
his sufferings.
If the feelings of others

it is
uniform and consistent,
probable that the ethical
sentiment which a child would contract would be
never combined with any operations of reason.
But
is
the feelings and opinions of others as to what

right and
wrong
:
are not always either harmonious

of
or consistent
differences
opinion
arise
among
118
[Essay IV.
individuals as to
what
is
right or wrong, nor
is
the
in
same individual always consistent with himself

his
judgments on the matter

in
actions are considered
wrong
one
another.
man when they are not wrong in young person who grows up under such
is
appearances,
perplexed by the dissentient judgdifferent individuals,
ments which he hears from

is
and
forced to employ his reason in order to reconcile
them.
By
successive comparisons
is
and
reflections,
he
forms what
or
called a standard of his own^ of right

is
of what position of what

wrong
It
becoming or degrading
in
in his
taste.
is
good
taste or in
bad
commonly happens,
that he prefers the
judgment
of one section of those around
him
to that of the rest
from
whicb
reverence for their authority, or personal
affection, or
any other
in
his
cause.
But
this
is
judgment
called a
arises
mind and which

it is
standard of his own, as
deduced from his own

reflections
it
observation, comparisons,
and
on what
has when
the opinions of others actually are, so
formed an essential and constant reference to the

opinions of others as they ought
to he
;
or as he thinks
they would be,
if
others were wise and right-minded.
The
idea of this imaginary public, wise and rightis
minded,
present to his
mind
as approving of the
standard which he has adopted.

tion
is
His own approba-
only another expression for the approbation

better
of this
and superior
public.
In
common
Essay IV.]
119
parlance,
we
often speak of a man's
own
standard as
:
opposed to that of the persons around him
but
if
we
analyse the sentiment described by the

it
first
form
of words,
will
appear to point distinctly at the
idea which the agent entertains of the feelings of
supposed persons other than himself.

to his
By
acting up
own
standard of right and wrong, he feels

:
that he acquires a title to the esteem of others
if
they withhold
are in
desert,
it
from him,
:
it is
their fault,
and they
the
wrong
he has the sentiment of good

it.
though others may not acknowledge
He
loves to do,
and does
do, that
which he thinks praisethat

it
worthy, although he
may foreknow
do, that
will not
be actually praised by those around him

to do,
he hates
and does. not

it
which he thinks blame-
worthy, although
may
of
not be actually blamed by

It is
those
in a
whom
certain
he sees or hears.
undeniable that
number
and
minds
the attachment to
what they
\\\\Tik.
;
praiseivorthy overpowers their desire
of actual praise
their
repugnance
to
what they
think blameworthy, surpasses their aversion to actual

1)1
ame.
But the attachment
to that
which
is
praise-
worthy presupposes the attachment
to actual praise
a man would never

which
is
learn to esteem or value that

if
praiseworthy
he had not previously deIn like manner
lighted in and desired actual praise.
the aversion to what
is
blameworthy presupposes the

:
aversion to actual blame
no man would ever come
120
[Essay IV.
to dread or to
shun that which
is
blameworthy,
if
he had not previously endured acute pangs from the

bearing of actual blame.
The
idea of
what
is
praise-
worthy
tion
is
derived by a secondary process of associais
from that which
actually praised
the idea of
the blameworthy, in like manner, from that which

is
actually blamed.
is
The fundamental
idea of the
whole,
that of the kindness
and good feeling and
esteem of others as an acquisition of primary necessity,
indispensable to our comfort
that
of the
unkindness, hatred and disesteem of others, as the

cause of pain,
loss,
and suffering of the most
terrible
amount.
its
From
this association all virtue,
even in
its
greatest refinement
and improvement, deduces
origin.
The judgment of
actually sees or hears
others,
it
such as an individual
pronounced upon himself or
upon
his
own conduct, very often differs seriously from

it.
the judgment of others as he conceives

individual himself
else
First, the
knows much more than any one
can possibly know, respecting his

disposition.
is
own conduct
called his
and motives and
What
is
own
judgment of himself,
the idea which he forms of the

it
judgment of others
as
would be
if
they possessed
the same fulness of knowledge, and contemplated the
matter with the same intensity of interest, as he does

himself.
realized
:
But
this
is
a supposition never actually
others never
know
so
much about
his con-
Essay IV.]
121
duct and intentions as he himself does, nor do they

feel sufficient
anxiety respecting
it
to take
any great
pains about enlightening themselves.
Their senti-
ments may often be intense and
violent, but it is
seldom combined with any earnest research into the

less
obvious parts of the case, and never founded
upon complete knowledge or accurate appreciation of

all
the influential
circumstances.
But the
ideal
is
spectator without, as the agent conceives him,
person supposed to possess entire knowledge of
all
the circumstances, and a judgment intent and con-
centrated upon the case
he
is
a critic such as the

if
persons without actually would be,

follow
to last
all
;
they could
first
the workings of the agent's

is
mind from
he
on a par with the actual public, and

far as concerns his
differing
from the agent, in so
impartiality
he
is
on a par with the agent himself,
and
differing
from the actual public, only so far as
respects the completeness of his knowledge. In every
young man's mind,
this notion
of ideal spectators
spectators, or of the
if
more enlightened than the actual

actual spectators as they
would be
they were more
enlightened,
exercise
is
quite certain to be formed and to

less of influence, because
more or
no
man
own
can altogether banish the supposition that others
know
may
that which
is
familiar to himself
and
to his
thoughts.
The judgment of
these ideal spectators
often be altogether at variance with that of the

122
[Essay IV.
actual spectators by
whom
the agent
is
surrounded
the
supposed favourable
judgment of the former
may
be more gratifying to him, and their supposed
unfavourable judgment
more
afflicting,
than the
actual criticism, favourable or unfavourable, which
he hears pronounced by the
latter.
This appeal to the ideal spectators, thoroughly

well informed and enlightened,
the sense of good or
ill desert,
is
what
constitutes
or merit and demerit.
That estimation which
I suppose
I
myself
to deserve
and that estimation which
suppose that a rightto
minded and well-informed spectator would accord
me
to
are
me
only two modes of expressing the same

If the actual spectators around do not accord
thing.
this estimation, I
regard them either as not
right-minded or as not well-informed
constitute
myself
mine.
their censor, instead of recognising
them
as
There are two grounds on which an individual

agent
may
appeal from the judgment of the actual Either he
spectators around him.
may say
that they
:
do not
know
all
the circumstances of the case
or he
may
say that they do not judge and feel rightly
that they
condemn or approve behaviour which a
perfectly wise
man would
not condemn or approve.
He may
I
appeal either on grounds of fact or on
grounds of law.
have already remarked that every agent un-
Essay IV.]
123
avoidably comes to form the conception of some spectators better informed as to matters of fact than the
actual spectators are.
He
transfers his
own know-
ledge of fact to the bosoms of the spectators.
By
similar process, he arrives at the conception of a public
judging upon different principles (better or worse,
as the case
is
may
be) from the real public by
whom
he
surrounded.
He
invests
them
to a certain extent
not only with his

his
own knowledge
of fact, but with
own mode
of view
not
brought out ready made

instinct, but
by any original and inexplicable
formed
by gradual process of reasoning or comparison out of what he has seen and heard and experienced.
differences
The
of
sentiment amongst different people

to
round him with respect
what
is
right or wrong,
proper or improper, suitable or unsuitable

it
render
necessary for him to take one side or the other in
such disputes.
He
is
sure to find himself at variance
with one portion or other of the community around
him upon
this subject,
and he thus learns
to consider
himself in the light of a person having ethical views

of his own.
Each successive
ethical
judgment, which
feel,
he has heard, or seen, or been made to

earliest recollection,
from his
produces a certain impression
upon
it
his
mind
him
the state of his ethical sentiment as

at
exists in
any given moment
is
the result of
all
these previous impressions

or
more
or less
com-
pared, combined,
contrasted,
according to the
124
IDEA OF P:THICAL philosophy.

intellect.
[Essay IV.
measure of his
In the general cast of
ethical sentiment, all the
members of the same com:
munity come near
to
agreement
in the applications
of detail, there are wide differences, and each indi-
vidual acquires a certain independent view of his
own.
In one man's mind, acts and dispositions of
one kind will come to be associated with the idea of

the esteem and disesteem of others
;
in another man's
mind, acts and dispositions of another kind.
From
this
general harmony,
disturbed
by
par-
ticular differences, in the ethical sentiment of various
individuals, there arises in the
mind of each man
an indistinct conception of a standard of morality
common
ascertain
to all of them,
and some
is.
sort of desire to
what that standard
The arguments by
which any dispute with respect

in a particular case
is
to the right or
wrong
conducted, imply a persuasion

is
in the disputants that there
some common principle
which ought
of them.
to serve as a basis of reasoning to both
It is true that this

is it
conception of a
:
common
re-
standard
persons,
search,
faint
and undeveloped
with ordinary
is
never distinctly made a subject of

is
and therefore
:
very unlikely
to
be dis-
covered
moreover the prosecution of the enquiry

intellectual
efforts
demands
and patient attention
such as very few persons can give.
But
still
it,
the
as
it
rudiments of such an idea
the divination of
:
were
are
in
every one's mind
arguments which
Essay IV.]

it
125
allude to
and suppose
its
existence are urged
by
every one and admitted by every one.
Every man knows that there

in the ethical
is
a better and a worse

:
sentiments of different individuals
every
man
is
conscious that he has himself underthis respect,
gone improvement in
ethical sentiment has
and that
his
own
changed for the better as com-
pared with what
it
once was, nor will he hesitate to
admit that there
is
room
for
still
farther improve-
ment, and that there are persons around him
who
already stand higher in this respect than himself.
This belief and aspiration after a

not yet distinctly ascertained
is
common
standard
one of the
many
separate elements constituting ethical sentiment.
Ethical obligation means subjection to the sanction
of society, and the manifestation of such conduct as

that sanction enjoins.
Ethical right
is
a reliance
on that same sanction, to be employed in our favour,
and on a certain behaviour towards us on the part

of other individuals, conformable to
its
injunctions.
ESSAY
V.
THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.
THE ETHICS OF AEISTOTLE.
The
Ethics of Aristotle presuppose certain conditions
in the persons to
whom
they are addressed, without

profit.
which they cannot be read with
They
pre-
suppose a certain training, both moral and

lectual, in the pupil.
intel-
First, the reason of the pupil
must be
so far deve-
loped, as that he shall be capable of conceiving the
idea of a scheme of uhis

to
life
and
action,
and of regulating
momentary impulses more or

this
less
by a reference
mo-
standard.
He must
not live by passion,
obeying without
reflection the appetite of the
ment, and thinking only of grasping at this immediate satisfaction.
The
habit must have been formed
of referring each separate desire to some rational
measure, and of acting or refraining to act according

as such a comparison
'
may
dictate.
Next, a certain experience must have been acquired concerning

actions of
human
affairs,
and concerning the
men
with their causes and consequences.
Upon
these topics all the reasonings
and
all
the illus-
trations contained in every theory of Ethics
must
130

:
[Ersat V.
necessarily turn
so that a person tlioroughly inex-
perienced would be incompetent to understand them.
For both these two reasons, no youthful person,

nor any person of mature years whose mind
is still
tainted with the defects of youth, can be a competent
learner of Ethics or Politics (Eth. Nic.
i.
7.
Com-
pare
vii.
8).
Such a pupil
will neither appreciate

(i.
the reasonings, nor obey the precepts
3).
Again,
a person cannot receive
instruction
in
Ethics with advantage unless he has been subjected

to a
good
practical discipline, so as to
have acquired
to
habits of virtuous action,

feel
and
to
have been taught
pleasure and pain on becoming occasions and in
reference to becoming objects.

stances
Unless the circum-
by which he has been surrounded and the

him a
certain vein of sentiment
treatment which he has received, have been such as

to implant in
and
to
give a certain direction to his factitious pleasures and

pains
unless
obedience to.xight precej)ts has to a
certain degree been
made
habitual with
to
him
he will
to,
i.
not be able to imbibe,
still less
become attached
even the jmncijna of ethical reasoning (Eth. Nic.

^
4.
7).
The
well-trained
man, who
has
already
acquired virtuous habits, has within himself the oLp^,

or beginning, from which happiness
proceeds
he
may do very
these habits
to
well,
even though the reason on which
were formed should never become known
him
but he will at least readily apprehend and
Essay v.]

it
131
understand the reason when

dp)(al
is
announced.
The
or beginnings
to
which
ethical
philosophy
it
points and from

is
whence the conduct which
enjoins
derived, are obtained only
hj habituation, not by
induction nor by perception, like other apâi: and
we ought
in all our investigations to look after the
ap^r) in the
way which
and
the special nature of the
subject requires,
to be
very careful to define
it
well
(i.
4,
i.
7).
In considering Aristotle's doctrine respecting the

apôX of ethical and political science, and the
way
in
which they are
to be discovered
and made
available,
we
should keep in mind that he announces the end

to be, not
and object of these sciences
merely the
enlargement of human knowledge, but the determination of
human conduct towards

:
certain objects
not theory, but^ practice

is,
not to teach us what virtue

it
but to induce us to practise

is
" Since then the
present science
like the others,
not concerned with speculation,
^g^njisre
we
enquire, not in order

is,
that
we may know what
virtue
but in order that
Bz^jnay^-become good, otherwise there would be no

j3rofitin^the- enquiry "
(ii. 2.
See also
i.
2,
i.
5, vi. 5).
The remarks which

ferent
Aristotle
makes about the
dif-
ways of finding out and arriving
at apxal,
are curious.
tained,
Some
principles or beginnings are objjerception
by induction
habituation in
others by a certain way others
others by
K 2
again in other
132
[Essay V.
ways.
Other modes of arriving at dpxcd are noticed

places.
by the philosopher himself in other
For
example, the dpxcLL of demonstrative science are said

to be discovered
is
by
intellect (vovs)
vi. 8 in
vi.
6-7.
There
to
a passage however in
dp-)(al
which he seems
{cr6(f)os)
say that the

natural
of the wise
man
and the
man
{(j)vcnKo<;)
are derived from experience
which
I find it difficult to reconcile

calls
with the pre-
ceding chapters, where he

of intellect and science
wisdom a compound
and where he
{eTno-TrjfjLrj),
gives Thales and Anaxagoras as specimens of wise
men.
By
vi. 6
it
seems that wisdom has reference

:
to matters of demonstrative science
how
then can
it
be true that a youth
may be
a mathematician without
being a wise
man
Moreover, Aristotle takes much pains, at the com-
mencement of
his treatise
on Ethics, to
set forth the
inherent intricacy and obscurity of the subject, and

to induce the reader to be satisfied with conclusions
\
not absolutely demonstrative.

servation several
He
repeats this ob-
times a
sufficient
proof that the
evidence for his

self
ii.
own
opinions did not appear to him(Eth.

Nic.
i.
altogether
2).
satisfactory
3,
i.
7,
The completeness
mind
of the proof (he

:
says)
must be determined by the subject-matter

cultivated
man
of
will not ask for better proof

:
than
the nature of the case admits
and human
action, to
which
all
ethical theory relates, is essentially flue-
Essay v.]

its
133
tuating and uncertain in
consequences, so that
every general proposition which can be affirmed or

denied concerning
exception.
it,
is
subject to
more or
less
of
If this degree of uncertainty attaches

subjects, the
still
even to general reasonings on ethical
particular applications of these reasonings are
more open
mine
to mistake
the agent must always deter-
for himself at the
moment, according
to the
circumstances of the case, without the possibility of

sheltering himself under technical rules of universal
application
:
just as
the
physician
or the pilot
"
is
obliged to do in the course of his profession.
Now
the actions and the interests of
men
exhibit no fixed
rule, just like the conditions of health.

is
And
acts
if this
the case with the universal theory,
still
more does
present
the
theory that refers to
particular
;
nothing that can be accurately fixed
for it falls not
under any art or any system, but the actors themselves

just as
must always consider what
suits the occasion,

pilot's art.
happens in the physician's and the

this is the case
try to give
it
But though
sent, ice
with the theory at pre-
must
some assistance " {jreipaTeov
/307^6'eri/). Eth.
Nic.
2.
The
to
last
words cited are remarkable.

the
They seem
successful
indicate, that Aristotle regarded

all
prosecution of ethical enquiries as
He had
previously said
(i.
3)
"There
but desperate.
is
so
much
difference of opinion
and
so
much
error respecting
34
THE ETHICS OF ARTSTOTLE.

is
[Essay V.
what
honourable and
just, of
which pohtical science
treats, that these properties
of
human
same
action
seem
to
exist
merely by positive legal appointment, and not
by nature.
respecting
And
there
is
the
sort of error
what things are

sustained
good,
because
many
some
persons
have
injury
from them,
having already been brought

their wealth, others
to destruction
through
through their courage."

entirely this
is
One cannot but remark how

or
at
variance with the notion of a moral sense or instinct,
an intuitive knowledge of what

Aristotle
is
right and
that
wrong.
most
truly
observes
the
details of our daily
behaviour are subject to such an
infinite variety of modifications, that
no pre-estab:
lished rules can be delivered
to
guide them
we
must
act
with reference to the occasion and the
circumstances.
Some few
rules
may
indeed be laid
:
down, admitting of very few exceptions
but the
vast majority of our proceedings cannot be subjected

to
any rule whatever, except

rule, if
to the
grand and
all-
comprehensive
we
are indeed so to call
it,
of
conforming to the ultimate standard of morality.
Supposing the conditions above indicated

realized
in
to
be
supposing
affairs,
a certain degree of experience
human
of rational self-goveriiment, and of
habitual
obedience to good rules of action, to be
already established in the pupil's mind, the theory of

ethics
may
tlien
be
imfolded to him with
great
Essay V.]

(i.
135
advantage
that a
fection
3).
It
is
not meant to be implied
man must have

of practical
previously acquired the per-
reason
and virtue
theory
;
before
he
he
acquaints
himself
with
ethical
but
must have proceeded a certain way towards the

acquisition.
Ethics, as Aristotle conceives them, are a science

closely analogous to if not a subordinate branch of
Politics.
(I do not
however think that he employs
the word ^ROlkt} in the same distinct and substantive
meaning
as TroXtrtK-^ {iTnaTyjfjLr)), although he several

to, tjOikcl
times mentions
science
is
and
tjOlkoI Xoyoi.)
Ethical
is
for
the individual
(i-
what
political science
'
^-^
for the
community
2).
C^Mii^
action, in each separate
In every variety of
art
human
and
science, the agents, individual or collective,
propose to themselves the attainment of some good as

the end and object of their proceedings.
multifarious,
Ends
:
are
and good things are multifarious

is
but
good, under one shape or another,

[thing desired
'cause of
always the
by every
one,
and the determining
human
action (ov irdvTa i^leTaC)

itself,
i.
1.
Sometimes the action

powers implied in the
or the exercise of the

is
action,
the end sought,

is
without anything beyond.

ulterior
Sometimes there
an
end, or substantive business, to be accom-
plished by
means of the
action and lying
beyond
is
it.
In this latter class of cases, the ulterior end
the
136
real

good
:
[Essay V.
better than the course of action used to

it
accomplish
{jTej)VKe)
" the
:
external results are naturally
better than the course
of action"
it
(i.
1).
Taking
this as a general position,
is
subject to
many
case,
exceptions
but the word

is
Trecf)VKe
seems to
signify only that such
naturally and ordinarily the
not that the reverse never occurs.
Again some ends are

preme
;
comprehensive
and
su-
others,
partial
and subordinate.
The
sub-
ordinate ends are considered
with reference to the
supreme, and pursued as means to their accomplish-
ment.
Thus the end of the bridle-maker
is
sub-
servient to that of the horseman, and the various
operations of
war
to
the general
scheme of the
commander.
The supreme, or
architectonic, ends, are
superior in eligibility to the subordinate, or ministerial,
which, indeed, are pursued only for the sake
of the fprmer.
One end
included
in
(or one good), as
subordinate,
is
thus
another
end
(or
another
good) as
supreme.
The same end may be supreme with

end
different
to
regard to one
ordinate
from
itself,
and subof
with
is
regard
another.
The end
to
the
general
supreme
or the
with
reference
that
of the
soldier
maker of arms, subordinate

In this
is
with reference to that of the statesman.

scale
of comprehensiveness
limit
:
of
ends there
no
definite
we may suppose ends more and
Essay V.]

as
137
more comprehensive
we
please,
and we come from
thence to form the _ideaô one most comprehensive^

QBd_spverfiign.jeii.d^.which includes under
it
every
all
other without exception
with reference
to
which
other ends stand in the relation either of parts or of
means
and
which
is
itself
never in any case pur-
sued for the sake of any other or independent end.
The end
thus
conceived
is
man, or The
Good The Summum Bonum TayaOov

pcoTTivov
the Sovereign Good of
To apiaTovTavd
To comprehend,
for realizing
ayaOov
(i.
2).
to define,
and
to prescribe
is
means
the Sovereign Good,
the object of
architecall
Political Science, the
paramount and most
tonic Science of
all,
with regard to which
other
Sciences are
simply ministerial.
It is the business
of the political ruler to regulate the application of

all
other Sciences with reference to the production
of this his
End to determine how

what manner each
enforce
or
it
far each shall be

shall
learnt and in
into practice
be brought
to
forbid
any system of
human
reign
rical,
action according as
tends to promote the
accomplishment of his supreme purpose
the
Sove-
Good of
the Community.
all
Strategical, rhetoto be applied so

:
economical, science, are
far as they
conduce to this purpose and no farther

simply ministerial
;
they are
all
political science is
2).
supreme and self-determining
(i.
What Political Science is for the community,
Ethical
138
Science
THP] ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.
[Eshay
V.
is
for the individual citizen.

is
By
this it is
not meant that the individual
to be abstracted
from society or considered as living apart

society
:
from
but simply that
human
action
and human
feeling
is to
be looked at from the point of view of
the individual, mainly and primarily
and from
is
the
point of view of the society, only in a secondary
manner
case
while in political science, the reverse
the
our point of society; next, and

The
view
is,
first
as
regards the
subordinate to that, as regards

vii. 8).
is,
the individual citizen (See Eth. Nic.

object of the Ethical Science
the Supreme
all
Good
of the individual citizen
the End of
for
Ends,
with reference to his desires, his actions, and his

feelings
the
end
which he seeks
itself
and
without any ulterior aim
the
end which compre-
hends
all his
other ends as merely partial or instru-
mental and determines their comparative value in

his estimation
(i. 2, i.
4).
It is evident that this conception of
an
End
of
all
Ends
is
what Kant would

conformable to
it,
call
an Idea
nothing
so trained
precisely
in its full extent, can
ever exist in reality.
No
individual has ever been
found, or ever will be found, with a

as to
mind
make every
separate and particular desire sub-
servient to some general preconceived
End however
is
comprehensive.
But
it
is
equally certain that this
subordination of Ends one to another
a process
Essay Y.]

less
139
performed to a greater or
degree in every one's
mind, even in that of the rudest savage.

can
blindly
No man
it
and undistinguisliingly follow every

:
immediate impulse
the impulse,
whatever
be,
when
This
it arises,
must be considered more or
less as it
bears upon other pursuits and other objects of desire.

is
an indispensable condition even of the most form

of
social
imperfect
society,
existence.
In
civilized
we
find the process carried
very far indeed
in the
minds of the greater number of individuals.

in his
Every man has
view certain leading Ends,
such as the maintenance of his proper position in

society, the acquisition
of professional
success, the
making of
his fortune, the prosecution of his studies,
&c., each of
which
is
essentially
paramount and
ar-
chitectonic,
and with reference
to
which a thousand
other ends are simply subordinate and ministerial.
Suppose
this process to be
pushed farther, and you

still
arrive at the idea of an

sive,
End
more comprehen-
embracing every other end which the indivito,
dual can aspire
and forming the central point of

life.
an all-comprehensive scheme of
Such a maxi-
,mum, never actually
attainable, but constantly ap-
proachable, in reality, forms the Object of Ethical

Science.
Quorsum victim gignimur ?

is
QT'^x^
all
What
the Supreme
Good
the End of
it
Ends ?
How
are
we
to determine
it
wherein
consists, or
by
what means
is
to
be attained
at
least, as
nearly
140
THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE;
[Essav V.
attained as the limitations of
human
condition per-
mit
Ethical Science professes to point out what
the end ought to he

tions for
Ethical
closest
:
precepts are suggesit
making the
approaches to
which
are practicable.
is, is
Even
to understand
what the end
a considerable acquisition
at,
since
if
the precise point to aim

(i. 2).
even
we thus know we cannot hit it
The approaches which

wards forming
this idea, of
differ
different
men make
to-
an End of Ends or of a
:
Supreme Good,
most
essentially
although there
seems a verbal agreement between them.
_Every_
man
well^
speaks o^ Hapjîness as his

i.
End
of End&j(6i/o/i,aTt
oyioKoyeiTai,
4)
he wishes to live welLfir_ta_do

to be the
which he considers
same
as being
hajDpy.
But
men
disagree
exceedingly
in
:
their
opinions as to that _which constitiites happiness

the same
nay
man sometimes
places
it
in one thing,
riches, accord-
sometimes in another
in health or in
ing as he happens to be sick or poor.
There are however three grand
divisions, in
one
or other of which the opinions of the great majority of
mankind may be
distributed.
life
Some think
that
(ySto?
happiness consists in a
aTToXavcTTtKo?)
:
of bodily pleasure
others, in a life of successful political

:
action or ambition (yStog TroXtrticds)

in a
life
others again,
of speculative study and the acquisition of

(ySto? OccoprjTLKOi).
knowledge
He
will not consent
Essay V.]

life
141
to
number the
of the
(;)(pr7jaaTtcrTi^g)
money-maker
end at the
among them
inclinations
because he attains
his
expense of other people and by a force upon their

(this
at
least
seems the sense of the

îai6<^
words
6 yap
)(prj[jLaTL(TTr)s
tU
ecrrt),
and beit is
cause wealth can never be the good, seeing that
merely useful for the sake of ulterior
objects.
(The reason which Aristotle gives

from his catalogue the
life
for discarding
of the money-seeker, while
he admits that of the pleasure-seeker and the honourseeker,
appears a very inconclusive one.
He
believed
real
them
to be all equally mistaken in reference to

:
happiness
the two last just as
much
as the first
and
certainl}", if
we
look to prevalence in the world

first is at
and number of adherents, the creed of the

least equal to that of the
two
is
last.)
The
first
of the three
the opinion of the mass,

sucli as
countenanced by
palus
many
Sovereigns
Sardana-
it is
more
suitable to animals than to

(i.
men, in
the judgment of Aristotle
5).
Honour and glory

tion,
the reward of
it
political
ambiis
cannot be the sovereign good, because
it
possession
which the person honoured can never be

:
sure of retaining
for
is
depends more upon the
persons by
whom
to
he
honoured than upon himself,

of the sovereign good
while the ideas which
we form
suppose
us and
it
be something intimately belonging to

to
liard
be
withdrawn
(i.
5).
Moreover
142
THE
E'J'HICS
OF ARISTOTLE.
it
[Essay V.
those
its
who aspire own account
to honour, desire
not so
much on
as in
order
virtue
:
tliat
they
it
may have
seems even
confidence in their
own
so that
in their estimation as
if
virtue were the higher

itself
aim
of the two.
But even virtue
(meaning thereby
the simple possession of virtue as distinguished from
the active habitual exercise of
it)
cannot be the
sovereign good
life
for the virtuous
in
sleep
or in inaction
or
man may pass his he may encounter

(i.
intolerable suffering
and calamity
5).
it, is
Besides, Happiness as
perfect, final,
we
conceive
an End
comprehensive and
its
all-sufficient
an
end which we always seek on

never with a view to anything
own
account and
ulterior.
But neither
honour, nor pleasure, nor intelligence, nor virtue,

deserves these epithets
insufficient,
:
each
is
an end
special,
and not
final
for each is sought pai'tly
indeed on
of
its
its
own
account, but partly also on account
tendency to promote what we suppose to he

(i.
our happiness
7).
The
latter
itself
is
:
the only end
always sought exclusively for
including as
it
always does and must do, the happiness of a man's

relatives, his children
and
his
countrymen, or of
;
all
with
it
whom
he has sympathies
life
so that if attained,
would render his
desirable
and wanting
tov
/3lov,
for
/cat
notliing
ixovovêvov^
(i.
alperou
irotet
jxrjSevo^ eVSea
7).
The remark which
Aristotle here
makes
in respect
Essay V.]
143
lo
the final aim or happiness of an individual

it
viz.,
that
includes the happiness of his family
and
his
countrymen and of those with

thies
whom
It
he has sympa-
deserves
careful attention.
shews
at once
the largeness and the benevolence of his conceptions.
We
but
arrive thus at the
same end
as that proposed
by
political science
the
happiness of the community

different road, starting
we
reach
it
by a
from
the point of view of the individual citizen.
Having shewn
being's
special
that this Happiness, which
is
" our
end and aim," does

acquisition
not
consist
in
any
or
such as pleasure, or glory,
intelligence, or virtue,
Aristotle adopts a different

it
^ [^
method
artist
to
shew wherein
does consist.
Every
i.
and every professional man (he says
7),
the
painter, the musician, &c., has his peculiar business

to do,
and the Good of each
artist consists in
doing *^
his business well
and appropriately.
Each separate
foot,
portion of man, the eye, the

its
hand and the
has
peculiar function
and in analogy with both
these,
man
as such has his business
and function, in the
complete performance of which
human Good consists.
What is the business and peculiar function of Man, as Man ? Not simply Life, for that he has in common
with the entire vegetable and animal world
:
nor a
mere
all
sensitive Life, for that he has in

:
common with
has,
viz.,
Animals
it
must be something which he
apart both from plants and animals
an active
144
in
THE
E'l'HICS
OF ARISTOTLE.
{TrpaKTiK-rj
[Essay V.
life
conformity with reason

;
tl<;
tov
\6yov exovTos)
or
the
exercise
of
Reason as a
directing and superintending force,
and the exercise
of the appetites, passions, and capacities, in a manner
conformable to
peculiar
Reason.
of
This
:
is
the
special
and
business
man
ill
it
is
what every man

virtue of a
it
performs either well or

is
and the
man
well.
that
whereby he
is
enabled to perform
.
Tlie
Supremeas
it
Good
of hurnanity, therefore,
con-
sisting
does in the due performance of this
special business of
man,
is
to be
found in the
vir-
tuous activity of our rational and appetitive soul:
assuming always a
life
of
the
ordinary length,
without which no degree of mental perfection would

suffice to attain
then stand
of a
soul
thus " Happiness,
the object.
Tlie full position will
or the highest
good
human
and
being, consists in the working of the
in a course of action, pursuant to reason

to virtue,
and conformable
tinuance of
life."
throughout the
full
con-
(The argument respecting a man's proper business

(epyov)
and viitue
(aperrj)
i.
seems
to
be borrowed from
;
Plato Republic,
Compare
also
c.
23, p.
352
c.
24,
iv. 2.
p.
353.
Xenophon
is
Memorabilia,
delivered
14.)
This explanation
by Aristotle
as a
mere
outline,
easily
which he seems
to think that
any one
may
fill
up
(i.
7).
And
he warns us not to
require a greater degree of precision than the subject
Essay V.]

:
145
admits of
since
we ought to
be content with a rough
approximation to the truth, and with conckisions
which are not universally
true, but only true in the
majority of instances, such being the nature of the
premises with which
we
deal
(i.
3).
Having determined
piness or the
in this
manner what Hapconsists

in_,
Supreme Good
Aristotle
it
next shews that the explanation which he gives of
conforms in a great degree

delivered
all
to the opinions previously

fulfils
by eminent philosophers, and
at least
the requisite conditions which
have ever been

8).
supposed to belong to Happiness
(i.
All philo-
sophers have from very early times agreed in distributing

Corporeal,
classes is
tially
good things into three
classes
Mental^
of these
and External.
Now
the
first
incomparably the highest and most essen:
good of the three
and the explanation which

it
Aristotle
class.
gives of happiness ranks
in
the
first
Again, various definitions of happiness have been

delivered
by eminent
authorities
more or
laid
less
ancient
{ttoWoI koX TTokaioi).
Eudoxus
down
:
the prin-
ciple that happiness consists in pleasure
others have
maintained the opinion that

both of pleasure and pain
good, and the latter no evil
it is
entirely independent
that
(i.
the former
is
no
12, vii. 11-13, x. 1. 2).
Some have placed happiness

prudence
:
in virtue
others in
(cro(^ta
others in a certain sort of
wisdom
L
146

:
[Essay V.
Tt?)
others have added to the definition this con-
dition, that pleasure or external prosperity should
be
8).
coupled with the
above-mentioned objects
(i.
The moral
doctrines propounded
by Zeno and Epi:
curus were therefore in no

reasonings by which
way new
how
far the
these philosophers
sustained
them were new we cannot judge

loss of the treatises of
accurately, from the

to
Eudoxus and others
which
Aristotle
makes
reference.
is
Now,
tion of
in so far as virtue
introduced, the explana-
Happiness given by Aristotle coincides with
these philosophers and improves upon
them by
subiji
stituting the active exercise of virtuo us habits
place
of the mere possession of virtue
And
in
regard to pleasure, the
man who
has once acquire d
habits of vir tuous agency stands in no need of pleas ure fro
m witho u
t,
as a foreign accessory
fo r
he
finds
pleasure in his ow;n behaviQur, and he would not be
denominated virtuous unless he did so

says) their
life
"
Now
(he
stands in no need of pleasure, like an
extraneous appendage, but has pleasure in itself"

(ii.
8).
Again,
is
ii.
3,
he says that "the symptom of a
perfect habit
the pleasure or pain which ensues

acts in
upon the performance of the

consists
:
which
tlie
habit
for the
man who
doing
abstains from bodily pleaso, is
sures
and
does
the
rejoices in
it
temperate, while he
is
who
reluctantly
and
painfully,
intemperate.
And
man who
sustains dangers with pleasure, or
Essay V.]

without pain,
is
147
at least
is
courageous
if
with pain, he
a coward.
For
ethical virtue has reference to our

:
pleasures and pains
it is
on account of pleasure that
we commit
vicious acts,
and on account of pain that

Wherefore,
once from
feel
we
shrink from virtuous performances.
as Plato directs,
we ought
to be trained at
our infancy by some means or other so as to

pleasure and pain from the proper sources
is
:
for that
the right education."
Moreover, the
man who
is
in the active exercise of
virtue derives his pleasure from the performance of

that
which
is
the appropriate business of humanity,
so that all his pleasures are conformahle to the pleasures
natural
to
man and
therefore consistent with each
other
whereas the pleasures of most people are con-
tradictory and inconsistent with each other, because
they are not conformable to our nature

It is
stotle
(i.
8).
not easy to understand perfectly what Arito
means by saying that the things agreeable
the majority of
mankind
are not things agreeable
by nature.
The
construction above put
upon
this
expression seems the only plausible one
that those
of the
pleasures which inhere in the performance
appropriate business of man, are to be considered as
our natural pleasures
those which do not so inhere,

:
as not natural pleasures
inasmuch as they
arise out
of circumstances foreign to the performance of our
appropriate business.
L 2
148
[Essay V.
This however hardly consists with the explanation
which Aristotle gives of to ^vaei

and with
reference
(i.
in another place
to
another
subject.
In
the
dis-
Magna
and
Moralia
34, pp.
1194-1195 Bek.), in
tinguishing between natural justice (ro SiKatov

conventional justice (ro SUaLov
is
vojico),
<^vcret)
he
tells
us
that the naturally just
that which most
commonly
1217
remains
Bek.)
just,
(Similarly Ethic.
exists
Eudem.
iv. 14, p.
That which
by nature (he says) may

;
be changed by art and practice
the
left
hand may
by
these
means be rendered
as strong as the right in
particular cases, but if in the greater
number of
cases
and
left
for the longer portion of time the left
remains
and the right remains
right, this is to be con-
sidered as existing
If
by nature.
we are to consider that arrangement as natural which we find to prevail in the greatest number of
cases
and
for the greatest length of time, then un-
doubtedly the pleasures arising out of virtuous active

behaviour must be regarded as
less
natural
than
those other pleasures which Aristotle admits to form
the enjoyment of the majority of mankind.
But again there

nature and
natural
is
a third passage, respecting
arrangements, which
appears
scarcely reconcilable with either of the

just noticed.
is
two opinions
In Eth. Nicom.
ii.
" Ethical virtue
a result of habit,
whence
it is
evident that not one
of the ethical virtues exists in us by nature.
For
Essay
V.]

exist
149
altered
none of those things which
by nature
is
by
habit.
For example, the stone which naturally

to
moves downwards cannot be habituated

upwards, not even
habituate
it
move
if
man
it
should endeavour so to
by throwing
like
upwards ten thousand
times
nor in
manner
fire
downwards
nor can
any other of the things formed by nature in one way

be changed by habit to any other than that natural
way.
Virtues therefore
are
not generated in us
;
either hy nature, or contrary to nature
but
we
are
formed by nature
them, and
so as to be capable of receiving
we
are perfected in
them through the

one
influence of habit."
If it be true that nothing
which
exists
in
manner by nature can be changed by

exist in another
habit so as to
manner,
do not see
how
the asser-
tion contained in the passage above cited out of the
Magna
we
Moralia can be reconciled with
are told
it,
where
"
For even things which
exist by nature
jMrtake of change.
Thus
left
throwing with the

dextrous
the right
:
we all should practise hand, we should become ambiif
but
still it is
the
left
hand by nature, and
hand
is
not the less better by nature than
the
left
left,
although
we
should do everything with the

the right."
as
we do with
(Mag. Mor.
i.
34,
at sup.)
In the one case he illustrates the meaning
of natural properties by the comparative aptitudes of

the right and
left
hand
in the other
by the down-

150

of the stone.
[Essay V.
ward tendency
different in the
The
idea
is
plainly
one case and in the other.

seems to be not
less
On
the other hand, there
variance between the one passage quoted out of the
Nicomacheian Ethics and the other.

passage last quoted,
For
in the
we
are told that none of the
ethical virtues is generated in us
by nature
:
neither
by nature, nor contrary

fit
to nature
nature makes us
to
receive
them,
habit
introduces
and creates
them But
an
observation perfectly true
and accurate.
if this
was the sentiment of
Aristotle,
how
could
he also believe that the pleasures arising out of the

active manifestation of ethical virtue
tural pleasures of
were the na-
man
If ethical virtue does not

it
come by
nature, the pleasures belonging to

either.
cannot
come by nature
On
the
whole,
I
these
three
passages
to
present a
in
variance which
am
unable
reconcile
to the
the
meaning which Aristotle annexes

vocal
very equi-
word
nature.
tells
Although Aristotle
us that the active exercise
of the functions of the soul according to virtue confers happiness, yet
he admits that a certain measure
of external comfort and advantages must be super-
added as an indispensable auxiliary and instrument.

Disgusting ugliness, bad health, -low birth, loss of
friends
and
relatives
or vicious conduct of friends
and
relatives, together
with
many
other misfortunes,,

Essay V.]
151
are sufficient to sully the blessed condition of the
most virtuous
for
man
{pviraivovcri to jxaKoipLov
i.
8)
which reason
it is
that
some persons have ranked
both virtue and good fortune as co-ordinate ingredients
equally essential
it
to
happiness
and
have
doubted also whether
can ever be acquired either
by teaching, or by training, or by any other method

except chance or Divine inspiration.
so magnificent a
To suppose
that
boon
it is
is
conferred by chance, would
be an absurdity
a boon not unworthy indeed of

still
the Divine nature to confer; but
the magnifi-
cence of
it
will appear equally great
and equally
undeniable, if
we
suppose
it
to
be acquired by teachis
ing or training.
And
this
really
the proper
is
it,
account to give of the

acquired
:
way
in
which Happiness
for the
grand and primary element in

soul,,
:
.^s^-the^yirtuous
agency of the
which
is
un-
doubtedly
acquired
by training
while
external
advantages, though indispensable up to a certain

limit, are
acquired only as secondary helps and in-
struments.
The
and
creation of these virtuous

is
habits
poli-
among
the citizens
one of the chief objects of

:
tical science
legislation
when once
acquired, they
all
are the most lasting and ineffaceable of

sessions
:
human
pos-
and as they are created by

be imparted
to
special training,
they
may
every
man
not disqualified
by some natural
defect of organization,
and may thus

(i.
be widely diffused throughout the community
9).
152

is
[Essay V.
This
an important property.
If happiness be
supposed to be derived from the possession of wealth

or honour or power,
small
it
can only be possessed by a
number of persons.
For these three considered

compara-
as objects of
tive.
human
desire, are essentially
A man does not think himself rich, or honoured,
or powerful, unless he becomes so to a degree above

the multitude of his companions and neighbours.
Aristotle insists
most earnestly that the only way
of acquiring the character proper for happiness is
by
-^ course of early and incessant training in yirtugus,

_
action.
Moral teaching, he
it
says,
will do little or
nothing, unless
with,
be preceded by, or at least coupled
moral training.
Motives
must be applied
,
sufficient to
ensure performance of what

is
is _vixtuQiis
.andabstinence from what

course
vicious, until such a
of conduct becomes habitual,
and
until
It is
disposition is created to persevere in them.
the
business of the politician and the legislator to

their
employ
for the
means of working upon the
citizens
It is
purpose of enforcing this training.

virtue (he says) as
it is
not with
with those faculties which
we
receive ready-made from nature, as for example,
the external senses.
We
:
do not acquire the faculty
of sight by often seeing, but
we have
it
from nature
to virtue,
and then exercise

;
it
whereas with regard
we
obtain our virtues by means of a previous course
of virtuous action, just as
we
learn other arts.
For
Essay V.]
153
those things which learn
we must
learn in order to do,
we
by actually doing:
builders,
thus
by building
we
:
become
and by harping we become harpers
by doing
just
and temperate and courageous

just
try,
actions,
we become
and
temperate and
in a better
courageous.
All legislators
some
and others in a
create habits
worse manner, to
ethise (e^tôi/re?)
to
among
good.
the
citizens for the purpose of
making them by repeated
" In one
word
habits are created
action, wherefore our actions
must be determined in
differ, so will
a suitable way, for according as they
our
habits
differ.
Nor
is
the
difference
small
whether we are
ethised in
:
one
the
way
or in another,
is
from our youth upwards

great, or rather
it
difference
(ii.
very
is
everything''
1).
Neither an ox, nor a horse, can acquire such

habits,
and therefore neither of them can be
called
happy: even a child cannot be
called so, except

will
from the hope and anticipation of what he
become
It
in future years.
may
appear somewhat singular that Aristotle
characterises a child as incapable of happiness, since

in
common language
is
a child
as
when healthy and

happy.
well
treated
described
peculiarly
But
happiness, as Aristotle understands
it, is
something
measured more by the estimate of the judicious

spectator than
by the sentiment of the man
in
whose
bosom
it
resides.
No
person
is
entitled to be called
154
[Essay V.
happy^
whom
the intelligent and reflective observer
does not macarise (or endcemonise), or whose condition
he would not desire more or
less to
make
his
own.
with
Now
all
the
life
of a child, even though replete

is
the enjoyments belonging to childhood,
not such as any person in the state of mind of a
mature citizen could bring himself

X. 3),
to accept
(i.
10,
The
test to
which Aristotle appeals, either
tacitly or openly,
seems always to be the judgment

(i.
of the serious
man
8, x. 5).
It is
no
sufficient
feels it is
proof of happiness that the person
who
completely satisfied with his condition and does not

desire
anything beyond.
is
Such
self-satisfaction
:
is it
indeed necessary, but
not by itself sufficient
must
be
farther
confirmed by the
judgment of
persons without
to
not of the multitude, who are apt judge by a wrong standard nor of princes, who
of pure and
liberal pleasures (x, 6)
are equally incompetent, and ivho have never tasted

the relish
but of
beings
the virtuous and worthy,
who have
arrived at the
most perfect condition attainable by

(x. 5, X. 6, X. 8).
human
The
different standard adopted
by the many and
by the more discerning few,

happiness,
It
is is
in estimating
human
vii. 1.
again touched upon in Politica,

respects
in
some
treated
more
clearly
and
simply in this passage than in the Ethics.
Both the
Many and
the
Few
(he says) agree that in order to
Essay V.]
155
constitute Happiness, there
must be a coincidence of
things
the three distinct kinds of
Good
The Mental
to
The Corporeal The

to the proportions in
External.
But with respect

be
which the three ought
intermingled, a difference of opinion arises.
Most
persons are satisfied with a very moderate portion

of mental excellence, while they are immoderate in
their desire for wealth
and power
("
For of virtue
they think that they have a sufficiency, whatever be

the quantity they have
;
but of wealth and possessions
they seek the excess without bound."
Pol.
vii. 1).
On
the other hand, the opinion sanctioned by the
few of a higher order of mind, and adopted by

Aristotle, was,
that Happiness
was possessed
in a"|
higher degree by those
who were
richly set forth
with moral and intellectual
excellence and
only
moderately provided with external advantages, than
by
those
in regard to
(ib.).
whom
the proportion was

of estimate,
reversed
The same
difference
is
between the few and the many,

Polit.
vii.
touched upon
13,
where he says that men in general

haj)-
esteem external advantages to be the causes of

piness
:
which
is
just as if they
were
to say that the
cause
why
a musician played well was his lyre, and

art.
not his proficiency in the
In this chapter of
the
Politica
(vii.
13),
he
refers to the Ethica in a singular
manner.
Having
delerr
stated that, the point of first importance
is, Jio.
156

consists,
[Essay V.
mine wherein happiness

"
he procee.d8tg_say
any
We
it
have said
also in the Ethics, if there he
good in
that
that treatise (et rt to)v X6ya)v eKeivo)v ocjyeXosi),
(happiness)
is
the active exertion and per-
fected habit of virtue."
sion "
This
is
a singular expresthe
if
there
be
any good
in
Ethics "
it
seems rather to
fall in
with the several passages in
that treatise in which he insists upon the inherent
confusion and darkness of the subject-matter.
/The
definition of
what happiness
really
is
seems to
In
be one of the weak points of Aristotle's treatise.

a work addressed to the public,
it
is
impossible to
avoid making the public judges of the pleasure and

pain, the happiness
and unhappiness of
individuals.
TA
1
certain measure of self-esteem on the part of the
individual,
and a certain measure of esteem towards

to
him on the part of persons without, come thus

regarded as absolutely essential to existence.
out these,
life
be
Withspec-
would appear
intolerable to
any
tator without,
though the individual himself might

it.
<
be degraded enough to cling to
But these are
secured by the ordinary morality of the age and of

the locality.
virtue
The question
arises as to degrees of
:
beyond the ordinary
level
Are we
sure that
such higher excellence contributes to the happiness

of the individual
it
who
possesses
it ?
Assuming
that
does so contribute, are

of
we
certain that the accesis
sion
happiness
which he thereby acquires
Essay V.]
157
greater than he would have acquired by an increase

of his wealth and power, his virtue remaining
at
still
the ordinary level
These are points which
Aristotle does
not establish satisfactorily, although

:
he professes to have done so
nor do
think that
they are capable of being established.
The only
aspirais,
ground on which a moralist can inculcate

tions after
the higher
degrees of virtue,
to
the
of
gain which thereby accrues
the happiness
others, not to that of the individual himself.
Aristotle appeals to Grod as a proof of the superiority of
an internal source of happiness
to
an ex-
ternal source
is
vii. 1, " using
God
as a witness
who
happy and
blessed, yet not
through any external
good, but through Himself and from His
own
nature."
Again,
vii. 3,
" For at leisure
and the whole universe
God would be happy, (/cocr/xos), who have no

of a
life
external actions except such as are proper to them-
selves"
in
proof of the superiority

life
of
study and speculation to a

jx)litical
of ambition and
is
activity.
The same argument

x. 8. It is to
insisted
upon in Eth. Nic.

the Koo-jLtog
be observed that
as well as
God
is
here cited as expe-
riencing happiness.
The analogy
undoubtedly
to
to
which Aristotle appeals here

certain extent
is
a just one.
The
most perfect happiness which we can conceive
our
Idea, to use Kant's phrase, of perfect happiness
is
158
[Essay V.
that of a being
nature,
who
is
happy
whose
in
and
aid
for his
own
with the
least
possible
from external
or
habits
circumstances
dispose
being
nature
him only
to acts, the simple performance of
which confers
hapjîness.
But
is
this true
of the
perfectly virtuous
nature
and habits?
Does the
simple performance of the acts to which they dispose

us,
always confer happiness
Is not the existence of
a XGy_Jiigli standard of virtuous exigency in
man's mind, a constant source of
self-dissatisfaction,
from the
difficulty of
acting up to his
?
own
ideas of
what
is
becoming and commendable
That the most virtuous nature

essentially the
is
in itself
and
most happy nature,

of
it
is
:
a point highly
questionable
to say the least

we must
pleasures
at the
and even
if
we
it
admit the
fact,
same time add that
cannot appear to be so to ordinary persons without.
The
internal
of a
highly virtuous
man
cannot be properly appreciated by any person not of

similar character.
So that unless a person be himit,
self disposed to believe
you could
find
no means
vir-
of proving
tuous,
it
to him.
To a man not already

this
you cannot bring

for the
argument persuasively
so.
home
purpose of inducing him to become
In regard to prudence and temperance, indeed,

qualities in the first instance beneficial to himself, it
is
clear that the
more
perfectly he possesses them,
the greater and more assured will be his happiness.
Essay V.]
THE ETHICS OP ARISTOTLE.
159
But in regard
first
to virtuous qualities, beneficial in the
instance to others
and not
to himself,
it
can by
no means be asserted that the person who possesses

these qualities in the highest degree
is
happier than
one
who
possesses
them
in
a more moderate and
ordinary degree.
Aristotle indeed says that the being just necessarily
includes ^he having pleasure in such behaviour: for
we do
But
not
call
man
not
just or liberal unless he has

i.
a pleasure in justice or liberality (Eth. Nic.

this
8).
does
refute
the
supposition,
that
another man,
less
just
or liberal
than he,
may
enjoy greater happiness arising out of other tastes and
other conduct.
In order to sustain
respecting the
superior
the conclusion of Aristotle
happiness of the virtuous
man,
it
is
necessary to assume that the pleasures of
self-esteem
and self-admiration are generically

other pleasures
dis-
tinguished from
and
entitled to a
preference in the eyes of every right judging person.
And
this
Aristotle
does
seem
to
3
nature.
He
?
says
x.
" Or
assume something of
that pleasures
differ in
kind
For the pleasures arising from the
honourable are different from those arising from the

base
;
and
it
is
not the case that the unjust
man
is
experiences the pleasure of the just, or he that
unmusical that of
difference
the
musician."
is
The inherent
again touched
between various pleasures
160
N
X.

5
[Essay V.
upon
" And
them
since
the
functions
differ
in
goodness and badness

desire, others of
some of them being

to
it
objects of
be eschewed, and others of

:
them neither
so is
likewise with the pleasures
for each function has its
own
pleasures.
The
pleais
sure then that
is
proj)er to the function of

is
good
good, and that which
proper to the function of
bad
is
bad
for the desires of things honourable are
praiseworthy, those of things base are to be blamed.
And
the pleasures
attaching
to
them
are
more
proper to the functions than are the appetencies

themselves."
able
In the next chapter, in that remark-
passage where he touches upon the predilec-
tions of
men
in
power
for the society of jesters
and
to
amusing companions (" The many have recourse
the amusements of those that are accounted happy ")
" For
tions of
it
is
not in kingly power that you find
either virtue or intellect,
on which the higher funcif
man
depend.
the
relish
Nay, not
princes who have
never
tasted
of pure and liberal pleasure,
have recourse to the pleasures of the body, on which

account these must be thought the more desirable.
For children consider those things

are held in honour
to be best that
among
themselves."
distinction
Here we have a marked
drawn between
being cha-
the different classes of pleasures

racterised as good,
some
some bad, some
indifferent.
The
best of all are those which the virtuous
man
enjoys.
"
Essay V.]

he considers the best
:
161
and which
the pleasures insepa-
rably annexed to virtuous agency.
These pleasures
are thus assumed to be of a purer and

character,
more exalted
and
to deserve a decided preference over
every other class of pleasures.
And
if
this
be
assumed, the superior happiness of the virtuous

follows as a matter of course.
I
man
should observe that Aristotle considers happiness
to consist in the exercise of the faculties agreeably to
virtue (Jvipyeia
is
/car'
aperrfv)
the
pleasure (rjSovrf)
something different from the exercise {evipyeia)

it,
inseparably attending
indeed, yet not the same
" conjoined with the functions (eVepyetat?), and the
two are
so inseparable as to raise a question

is
whether
the function
(x. 5).
not identical with

x.
And
he says,
the
pleasure
"
We
think that pleasure
should be mixed up (wapaiJLeixLxOai) with happiness."

It
seems to be in the sense of self-esteem, which
constitutes the distinctive
mark of virtuous agency,

:
that Aristotle
supposes happiness to consist
the
pleasure he supposes to be an inseparable concomitant,
but yet not the same.
The
self-esteem
is
is
doubt-
less often felt in cases
where a man
performing a
accom-
painful duty where the sum
total of feelings
is
panying the performance of the act

reverse of pleasurable.
the very
But
still
the self-esteem, or
is pei^ se
testimony of an approving conscience,

pleasurable,
always
and
is
in
fact
the
essential
pleasure

162

I
[Essay V.
inherent in virtuous behaviour.
do not see the
propriety of the distinction here taken
by
Aristotle.
vii.
He
puts
it
somewhat
differently,
Polit.
" Living happily consists either in joy or in virtue to
men, or in both."
piness
is
And
Polit.
viii.
^"
For hap-
compound of both these (honour and

So
Polit, viii. 3.
pleasure)."
Happiness (again he says

p.
Polit. vii. 13, p.
440 E.
286) consists in the perfect employment and active

:
exercise of virtue
and that
absolutely (or
under the
most favourable
external
conditions)
not
under
limitation (e^ vvoOecreo}^) or subject to very trying
and
difficult
circumstances.
For a man of virtue may
be so uncomfortably placed that he has no course
open
to
him except
a choice of evils,
and can do
Such a
nothing but make the best of a bad position.
man
will conduct himself
under the pressure of want

:
or misfortune as well as his case admits

piness
:
but hapi.
is
out of his reach.

it
(Compare Eth. Nic.
10.)
so
To be happy,
is
necessary that he should be
placed as to be capable of aspiring to the accom-
plishment of positive good and advantage

i
he
must
be admitted to contend for the great prizes, and to
undertake actions which lead to

to
new honours and

:
benefits
previously
unenjoyed
he
must
be
relieved
\
from the necessity of struggling against

calamities.
overwhelming
Aristotle tells us in the beginning of the Ethics
Essay V.]

i.
163
difference
(Eth. Nic.
3)
"
But there
is
so
much
of opinion
and
so
just,
much
error respecting
what
is
honourable and
of which political science treats,
that these properties of
human
action
seem
to exist
merely by positive legal appointment, and not by

nature.
And
there
is
the same sort of error reIf there be this
specting what things are good."
widespread error and
dissension
among mankind
is
with respect to the determining of what

just,
good and
what standard has
Aristotle established for the

I
purpose of correcting
established
it ?
do not find that he has
any standard, nor even that he has

necessary to
thought
it
make
the attempt.
There
are indeed a great
number of
observations,
and many
on the
most admirable observations in
his Treatise,
:
various branches of Virtue and Vice
many which
tend to conduct the mind of the reader unconsciously

to the proper standard
:
but no distinct announcement
of any general principle, whereby a dispute between
two dissentient moralists may be
settled.
When
he
places virtue in a certain mediocrity between excess
on one side and defect on the other,

is
this
middle point
:
not in any
way marked
or discoverable
it
is
point not fixed, but variable according to the position

of the individual agent, and
is
to be determinable in
every case by right reason and according to the
judgment of the prudent man

reference
to
"
in the
mean
with
ourselves, as
it
has
been
determined hy
164
reason,

and as
it""
[Essay V.
the 2yrudent
man
ii.
(6
(f)p6viixo<;)
would
determine
decision
tion
is
(Etb.
Nic.
6).
But thougli the
is
thus vested in
of the
tlie
prudent man, no men-
made
principle
which the appointed
arbiter
would follow in delivering his judgment,

to arise.
II.,
assuming a dispute
In a previous part of Chapter
he defines " the
mean with
reference to ourselves " to be " that

falls
which
neither exceeds, nor

priety (jov SeovTo<;).
short
of, the
rule of pro-
But
this is not one,
nor
is
it
the same to
all."
To render
this definition sufficient
and
satisfactory,
Aristotle ought to have pointed out to us
how we
are to find out that ride of propriety {to Seov) which
marks and
and
constitutes the
medium
point, of actions
affections, in relation to ourselves
this
medium
by the
point being in his opinion virtue.

is
To explain what
only a change
meant by a medium
Seo?/, the
in relation to ourselves,
words TO
rule of propriety, is
of language, without any additional information.
Thus the
capital
problem of moral philosophy
still
remains unsolved.
It is
remarkable that Aristotle in some parts of his
treatise states
very distinctly what this problem

essential to its solution
:
is
and what are the points

speaks as
if
he
he were fully aware of that which was
wanting
paring
to
to his
own
treatise,
:
and
but
as if he
still
were preis
supply the defect
the promise
Essay V.]

Take
Nic.
for
165
never
realized.
Etli.
it
example the beginning of
Book VI.
" Since
has been already laid down, that
we
is
ought
to choose the
middle point and not either the
excess or the defect and since the middle point

that which right reason
determines
all
let
us distin-
guish what that
is.
For in
the mental habits

in all others
which have been described, as well as

also,
there
is
a certain aim, by a reference to which
the
rational
being
:
is
guided
is
either
in
relaxing
definite
or in restricting
and there
a certain
boundary of those medial

to
exist
points,
which we afiSrm
determinable
between excess
and
defect,
according to right reason.

is
To speak
it
thus, however,
indeed correct enough, but

(Ta(f)e<s)
:
gives no distinct
information (pvOev Se
for in all other
modes
of proceeding which are governed

ciples it is quite just to say that
by
scientific prin-
you ought neither

sufficient
to
work nor
to rest
more than
is
nor
less
than
is sufficient,
but to a degree midway between
the two and agreeably to right reason.
But a man
who
has only this information would be no wiser

it,
than he was before
any more than he would know

to apply to his body,
what things he ought

and
by being
simply told that he must apply such things as medical science
as the medical practitioner directed.
Wherefore, with respect also to the habits of the soul
we must
not be content with merely giving a general
166
THE ETHICS OF
AlllSTOTLE.
[Essay V.
statement in correct language, but

discriminate
definition."
we must
farther
is
what right reason
is,
and what
its
This
is
a very clear
and candid statement of the

in Aristotle's theory
is
grand and fundamental defect

of Ethics.
He
says very truly that " there

(o-zcotto?),
certain end and aim
to
which a rational
restricts
being has reference when

relaxes
he
It
either
or
any
disposition."
was incumbent
was
;
on
Aristotle* to explain
what
this o-kotto?
but this
he never does, though he seems so clearly to have

felt
the
want of
meaning
it.
We
might have supposed that
after
he had pointed out what was required to impart

to correct but
specific
vague
fill
generalities,
he
would have proceeded
at once to
:
up the acknowthis,
ledged chasm in his theory
but instead of
he
enters into an analysis of the intellect, speculative
and
practical,
and explains the varieties of
intellec-
tual, as contradistinguished
from moral, excellence.
This part of his work

tive
:
is
highly valuable and instruc-
but
cannot find that he ever again touches
upon the
o-kottos,
which had been admitted

In a certain sense,
it
to be as
yet undetermined.
is
indeed
true that he endeavours " to discriminate
what right
he
classifies
reason
is,
and what
is its
definition :" for
the intellectual functions into intellect (vovg), science

{eTna-TTJfMr]),
wisdom
(cro<^ta),
art
(rexvrj),
prudence
of"
((jypovrjais)
he states the general nature of each

Essay V.]

and the range of
subjects to
167
these attributes,
which
it
appHes.
He
tells
us that intellect and prudence have

is
reference to
human conduct that prudence
" con-
cerned with things just and honourable and good for
man
"
"
(vii.
12) "with
the things of man, and those
things regarding which
we
deliberate"
(vii;
7)
prudence must needs be a true habit according to
reason, concerned with the
good of
is,
man"
tells
(vii.
5).
it
In explaining what prudence

is
he
us that
is
according
to
reason
us that
m
it is
explaining what
according
to
right
reason,
he
tells
jDrudence.
He
he,
thus seems to
make
use of each as a part of the
definition of the other.
But however
fulfils
this
may
certain
it is
that he never
the expectation held
out in the beginning of the Sixth Book, nor ever

clears
up the ovSev
is
cra(ês
there acknowledged.
vi.
There
one sentence at the beginning of

if it
5,
which looks as
conveyed additional information
upon the
difficulty in question
" Now
it
seems to
belong to the prudent
man
in
to be able to deliberate
aright concerning the things that are good and profitable
to
himself
not
part, as concerning the
things that have a reference to health or strength
but concerning the things that refer to the whole

of living well " (Trpog to eu t^v). of
fact
But
living
this in point
explains nothing.
happiness
soul
:
For
is
:
well
is
the
same
of
the
as
happiness
to
the active
exercise
according
virtue
therefore
virtue
168
[Essay V.
must be known, before we can know what

well
I
is.
living
think that this
q-zcotto?
or end, which Aristotle
alludes to in the beginning of the Sixth
Book
as not
disit is
having been yet made

tinctly
clear,
appears to be more
brought out in a previous passage than

after the
6,
in
any portion of the Treatise
beginning of
the Sixth Book.
In Book lY.
Aristotle treats of
the virtues and defects connected with behaviour in

social intercourse
:
the obsequious at one extreme, the

:
peevish or quarrelsome at the other
and the becoming

name, which lay
medium, though
between them.
this
it
had no
special
Speaking of the person who adopts
becoming medium, he says
"
We
have said
generally, then, that he will associate with people as
he ought
and having, moreover, a constant

is
refer-
ence to what
honourable and what
is
expedient,
he will aim at not giving pain or at contributing

pleasure."
Again
states the
in
regard
to
Temperance
iii.
q-zcotto?
of the temperate
man
" What
11
he
things have a reference to health or vigour, and are

agreeable,
these he desires in
measure and as he
ought
as well as the other agreeable things that are
not opposed to these, either as being contrary to
what
is
honourable or as being beyond his fortune.
For he that desires things agreeable, which yet

are contrary to
what
is
honourable or beyond his
Essay V.]

pleasures
169
fortune, loves these
more than they are

man,
worth.
But not
so with the temperate
who
lives
according to right reason."
These passages are not very

nation of the proper
ct/cottos
:
distinct, as
an expla-
but I cannot find any
passages after the beginning of the Sixth
Book
which
are
more
distinct
than they
or perhaps,
equally distinct.
In one passage of the Seventh Book, Aristotle

refers,
though somewhat obscurely,
to the
average
degree of virtue exhibited by the mass of mankind as

the
standard to be consulted
defect (vii. 7).
in
when we pronounce
passages
to
upon excess or
Aristotle
seems
some
indicate
pleasure and pain as the end with reference to which

actions or dispositions are denominated good
He
for
says
vii.
11 "To theorise respecting pleasure
and
evil.
and pain,
he
is
is
the business of the political philosopher
the architect of that end with reference to

call
which we
absolutely
institute
each matter either absolutely good or
evil.
Moreover,
it
is
indispensable
:
to
an enquiry respecting them

ethical
for
we have
exj^lained
virtue and
:
vice
as
referring to
affirm happi-
pleasures
and pains
and most people

:
ness to be coupled with pleasure
for
which reason
they have
named
rh ixaKapiov diro tov âipeiv'^

o-kotto? is
In Book yill. 9-10, the

very
clearly,
indeed stated
but not as such
not
as if Aristotle
170
[Essay V.
intended to
make
it
serve as such, or thought that
it
ought
to
is
form the basis upon which our estimate of

In
what
viii.
the proper middle point should be found.

tells
7}
9-10, he
us that
(^tXta)
all justice
is
and benevolence
{to
SiKaiov Kol
a consequence and an
incident
of established
communion among human

the
all
beings (kolvcovlo)
all,
that
grand communion of
is
which comprehends
the rest,
the Political
Political
Communion
that the end and object of the

it
Communion, as well that for which

created as that for which
the
it
was originally
is
subsists
and continues,
common and
all
lasting
advantage (to Koivy avfjiipepov)
that
other communions, of relations, friends,
fellow-soldiers, neighbours, &c., are portions of the
all-comprehensive political communion, and aim at

realizing
some
partial
advantage
to the constituent
members.
These chapters are very clear and very

plainly
important, and they announce
enough
the
common and
lasting interest
as the foundation
and
measure of justice as well as of benevolence.
But
they do not apply the same measure, to the qualities
which had been enumerated

the Sixth, as
in the
Books prior
to
a means of ascertaining where the
middle point
is to
be found which
is
alleged to contells
stitute virtue.
is
Nevertheless, Aristotle
us that
it
in the highest degree difficult to find-the middle

(ii.
point which constitutes virtue

!
9).
It
might seem at
first
sight not easy for Aristotle,

Essay V.]
171
consistently with the plan of his treatise, to point
out any such standard or measure.
For none can be
mentioned, with any tolerable pretensions to admissibility,
except that of tendency
to
promote happiness
as
the happiness both of the individual agent and of the

society to
which he belongs.
But
as
he had begun
by introducing the ideas of reason and virtue

media
for
explaining
what happiness
was,
there
would have been
at least
an apparent incongruity in
reverting back to the latter as a means of clearing
up what was obscure
in the former.
I say
at least
an apparent incongruity
gruity
is
because
after all the incon-
more apparent than
real.
If
we
carefully
preserve the distinction between the happiness of the

individual agent and the happiness of the Society to
which he belongs,
it
will appear that Aristotle
might
without any inconsistency have specified the latter

as being the object to
which reason has regard, in
regulating and controlling the various affections of
each individual.
Wherein
consists the happiness of
an individual
man ?
In a course of active exertion of the soul

:
conformably to virtue
virtue
being understood to
consist in a certain mediocrity of our various affec-
tions as determined
by
right reason.
When we
may
without
next enquire, to what standard does
right reason look in
making
this determination
it
inconsistency
be
answered
Right
172
THE ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE.
[Essay V.
reason determines the proper point of mediocrity by
a reference to happiness generally
that
is,
to
the
happiness of society at large, including that of the

individual agent in question
in other words, to the
common and
scribes as the
lasting advantage,
which Aristotle deThere
grand object of the statesman.
-y
is
no inconsistency
in reverting to happiness, thus
explained, as the
standard by which right reason
judges in controlling our different affections.
In
all
moral enquiries,
in
it
is
of the greatest im-
portance to keep
individual,
as
view the happiness of the

at large,
and the happiness of the society
two
distinct
and separate
ttoXv, in
objects
which coincide but
indeed ws eVl to
the majority of instances
and with regard
to the majority of individuals
which do not coincide necessarily and universally,

nor with regard to every individual.
particular
man may
be placed in such a position, or animated
with such feelings, that his happiness
may
be pro-
moted by doing what

the society.
is
contrary to the happiness of
He
will
under these circumstances do

:
what
is
good for himself but bad for others

is
he will
do what
morally wrong, and will incur the blame
of society.
In speaking of good and
evil it is
is
always
necessary to keep in mind, that what

individual
good for an
:
may be bad
for the
society
mean,
understanding the words good for an individual in

the most comprehensiv^-êiise, as including
all
that
Essay v.]

suffer
173
he has to
society.
from the unfavourable sentiments of

confusion has arisen from morahsts
Much
speaking of good and evil absolutely, without specifying whether they meant good for the individual
or
for
the
society
more particularly
in
the
writings of the ancient philosophers.
From
his
the
manner
of
in
which Aristotle arrives

constitutes
at
definition
what
happiness,
we
might almost suppose that he would have been led

to the indication of the happiness of society at large
as the standard for right reason to appeal to.
For
in examining
in general, he
what
is
the proper business of
man
has recourse to the analogy of the
various particular arts and professions
the
piper,
the statuary, the carpenter, the carrier, &c.
Each
has his particular business and walk of action, and

in
the
performance of that business consists

the well
is
the
good and
in
his
case
(i.
7).
So in
like
manner there
a special business for
man
in general,
in the performance of
which we are
to seek
human
good.
Now
sional
this
analogy of particular
artists
and profes-
men might have
conducted Aristotle to the
idea of the general happiness of society as a standard.
For the business of every
artist or artisan
consists in
conducing to the comfort, the protection,
or the gratification of the public, each in his particular
walk
professional excellence for
them
consists
174

perfectly.
[Essay V.
in accomplishing this object
For every
special profession therefore the happiness of society

at large,
under one form or another,
is
introduced as
to be
the standard
by which good and excellence are
measured.
Apply
this
analogy to
man
in general, taken apart
from any particular
craft
or
profession.
If each
man, considered simply

business, in the
as such, has his appropriate
good performance of which happistandard of excellence in

is
ness for
him
consists, the
respect to such performance
to be found in its
It
conduciveness to the happiness of society at large.
can be found nowhere
else, if
we
are to judge accord-
ing to the analogy of special arts and professions.

Until
supplied,
this
it is
want of a standard or measure
is
clear that the treatise of Aristotle is
defective in a most essential point

is
defect
which
here admitted by himself in the
first
chapter of
the Sixth Book.
Nor
is
is
there any other
way
of
to
supplying what
wanting except by reference
the general happiness of society^ the end and object

(as
he himself
tells us)
of the statesman.
Aristotle,
is
"
What
then,"
says
" prevents
our
calling
him happy who

to
in the active exercise of
his soul agreeably
perfect virtue,
and
is
suffi-
ciently well furnished with external goods, not for a
casual period but for a complete lifetime ?"
(i.
10).
He thinks himself obhged
to add,
however, that
this is

Essay V.]
175
not quite sufficient

still
for that after death a
man
will
for-
be affected with sympathy for the good or bad
tunes and conduct of his surviving relatives, affected
however
of the
faintly
and
slightly, so as not to deprive

^
him
title to
it.
be called happy
if
on other grounds he
sees the misfor-
deserves
The deceased person
tunes of his surviving friends with something of the
same kind of sympathetic

degree, as
is felt
interest,
though
less in
by a living person in following the

(i.
representation of a tragedy
11).
The
difference
life
between a misfortune, happening during a man's

or after his death,
is
much
greater than that between
scenic representation of past calamities

reality
It
(^7>.).
and actual
seems as
this
if
Aristotle
was reluctantly obliged
to
make
all
admission
that deceased
persons were at
concerned in the calamities of the living
more
more
in deference to the opinions of others than in conse-
quence of any conviction of his own.

in the
His language
it
two chapters wherein he
treats of
:
is
than usually hesitating and undecided
beginning of Chapter XI., he

interest
says " To have
and in the
no
whatever in the fortunes of their descend-
ants and friends, seems exceedingly heartless
and
then,
contrary to
what
it
we
should
expect'
he
to
farther on, states
to be a great matter of
doubt
evil
whether the dead experience either good or

but
if
anything of the kind does penetrate
them,

176

feeble
[Essay V.
it
must be
and
insignificant, so as to
make no
sensible difference to them.
IT.
Aristotle distributes good things into three classes
the adinirahle or worshipful

potential.
1.
the
praiseworthy
the
its
Good
as
an End
that which
itself
is
worthy of
being honoured and venerated in
and from
own
2.
its
nature, without regard to anything ulterior
that which comes
up
to our idea of perfection.

:
Good
as a
means
that
its
which
is
good, not on
own account nor
in
own
nature,
but on
account of certain ulterior consequences which flow
from
3.
it.
Good
as
a
:
means, but
that
not a
certain
and
constant means
which produces
generally, but
not always, ulterior conse'quences finally
good
that
which, in order to produce consequences in themselves
good, requires to
be
coupled with
certain
concomitant conditions.
1. it is
Happiness belongs to the
first
of these classes
put along with
the divine, the better, soul, intellect,
the
more
i.
ancient, the principle, the cause, &c.

2).
(Mag.
Moral,
Such objects
as these,
we contemplate
with awe and reverence.
Essay V.]
'I'HE
ETHICS OF ARISTOTLE.
177
2.
is
Virtue belongs to the second of the classes

acts to
it
good from the
which
it
gives birth, and

acts,
from the end (happiness) which those

sufficiently
3.
when
long continued, tend to produce.

(Sf'C.
Wealth, power, beauty, strength,

:
belong to the
third class
these are generally good because under

to
most circumstances they tend

but they
produce happiness
if
may
be quite otherwise,
a man's
mind
be so defectively trained as to dispose him to abuse
them.
It
is
remarkable that this classification
is
not
formally laid
down and
whereas
explained, but
familiar,
is
assumed as
already well
Ethics,
i.
known and
:
in the
Nicom.
12
it is
formally stated and exi,
plained in the
Magna
Moralia,
2.
Praise, according to Aristotle, " does not belong

to the best things, but
only to the second-best.

:"
The
Gods
the
are to be macarised, not praised
the praise of
Gods must have reference
to ourselves,
and must
be taken in comparison with ourselves and our acts
and
capacities
and
it
this
is
ridiculously degrading,
when we apply
like
to the majesty of the
Gods.
In
manner the
most
divine
and
perfect
deserve to be macarised rather than praised.
men " No
but
man
praises
happiness,
it
as
he praises
justice,
macarises (blesses)
better."
as
something more divine and
Happiness
is to
be numbered amongst the perfect
178

objects
[Essay V.
and worshipful
of which
all
it
is
the apxr) for the sake

:
of ns do everything
all
and we consider
good things
12).
to be
the principle and the cause of
something divine and venerable

Since then Happiness
is
(i.
the action of the soul

it
conformably to perfect virtue,
is
necessary to
examine what human virtue

essential
is
and
this is the
most
mark
to
which the true
politician will direct
his attention
(i.
13).
There are two parts of the soul

the irrational.
fact, like
the rational
and
Whether
these two are divisible in
the parts of the body, or whether they are
inseparable in fact, and merely susceptible of being

separately dealt
with in reasoning, like the conis
cavity and convexity of a circle,
matter not
necessary to be examined in the present treatise.

Aristotle speaks as if he considered this as really a
doubtful point.
Of the
and
to
irrational soul,
faculty,
one branch
to
is,
the nutritive
and vegetative
plants.
common
man
with animals
The
virtue of this faculty is not special
man, but common

:
to the vegetable
and animal
sleep, at
world
it
is
in fact
all
most energetic during

virtue special to
the period
when
(i.
man
is
for the
time dormant
13).
But the
the
quite
irrational soul
desires,
has also another branch,
appetites,
distinct
and passions
which are
either
resist
from reason, but
may
"
Essay V.]

it,
179
reason, or obey
as the case
may
happen.
It
may
thus in a certain sense be said to partake of reason,
which the vegetative and nutritive faculty does not

in
any way.
The
virtue of this department of the
soul consists in its
due obedience
13).
to reason, as to the
voice of a parent
(i.
Human
virtue,
then, distributes
1.
itself into
two)
grand divisions
The
virtue of the rational soul,

2.
or Intellectual Virtue.
The
virtue of the semi-
rational soul, or Ethical Virtue.
Perhaps the word Excellence more exactly corresponds to

apery],
than
Virtue.
is
Intellectual
excellence
both
generated
and
augmented by teaching and experience.

excellence
Ethical
by
practical training.
:
The
excellenceîs
not natural to us
trained,
but
we
are susceptible of being

it.
and the training creates

it
By
all
training,
according as
is
is
either
good or bad,
excellence
either created or destroyed: just
as a
man
be-
comes a good or a bad musician, according as he has

been subjected to a good or a bad mode of practice.
It is
by doing the same thing many times that we

it
acquire at last the habit of doing
"For what things
we have
(ii.
to learn to do, these
1)
according as the
we learn by doing things we are trained to

builders,
do are good or bad,

habits.
we
acquire good habits or bad
By
building
we become
by playing
indifferent,
on the harp we become harpers
good or
180
[Ebsat V.
according to the
All
legislators
way
in
which we have
to
practised. their
wish
and attempt
make
:
citizens
good,
by means of certain habits

fail
:
some
succeed in the attempt, others

difference
It
is
and
this is the
between a good and a bad government.

to
a,t
by being trained
do acts of justice and

last just
courage that
we become
and courageous
" In
sion of)
one word, habits are generated by (a succeslike operations

:
for
this reason
it
is
the
character of the
operations performed which

for
we
the
ought chiefly to attend to:
according to
difference of these will be the habits

It
is
which ensue.
therefore
not a matter of slight difference

earliest years
whether immediately from our

ethised in
we
are
one way or in another
it
makes a prodithe
gious
difference
(ii.
or
rather,
it
makes
whole
difference"
1).
Uniform perseverance
habit
:
in
is
action, then, creates a
but of what nature
the required action to
be
In every department of our nature, where any

is
good result
to be
produced,
we may
be disap:
pointed of our result by two sorts of error
either
an excess or on the side of

too much, or too
little,
defect.
To work
so
or eat
prevents the good effects of
training upon
the
health
and strength:
with
regard to temperance, courage and the other virtues
the
the
man who man who is
is
trained to fear everything and
trained to fear nothing, will alike
Essay V.]
181
fail in
acquiring the genuine habit of courage.
The
acquisition of the habit
makes the performance of

of abstinent acts,
the action easy
by a course
of
we
acquire
the
habit
temperance:
and
having
acquired this habit,
we can with
(ii.
the greater ease
perform the act of abstinence
2).
The symptom which

been perfectly acquired,
indicates that the habit has

is
the facility or satisfaction

(ii.
with which the act comes to be performed
3).
The man who
abstains from bodily pleasures,
and
who performs
the temperate
this contentedly (avr&J tovto) )(aipo)v),is
man:
the
the
man who
with
does the same
thing but reluctantly and with vexation {axdofxevoq)

is
intemperate:
like
courage.
Ethical
excellence, or ethical badness, has reference to our
pleasures
and pains
whenever we do any thing

it
mean, or shrink from any thing honourable,
is
some pleasure or some pain which determines our

conduct
:
for
which reason Plato rightly prescribes

shall
that the
earliest
young
be educated even from the
moment
so as to give a proper direction to

(ii. 3).
their pleasures
and pains
By
often pursuing
pleasure and pain under circumstances in which
we
ought not
to
do
so,
we
contract bad habits, by a law
similar to that
which under a good education would

to
have imparted
us good habits.
Ethical virtue
then consists in such a disposition of our pleasures
and
pains as leads to
performance
of
the
best

182
actions.
::
[Essay V.
Some persons have
defined
it
:
to consist in
apathy and imperturbability of mind

nition
is
but this
defi-
erroneous: the mind ought to be affected

(ii. 3).
under proper circumstances
(This seems to
be the same doctrine which was afterwards preached
by the
Stoic school.)
There are three ingredients which determine our

choice, the
honourable
the
expedient
the agreeable the base
and as many which occasion our rejection
the
inexpedient
all
the
2^<î'>^ful
or
vexatious.
In
respect to
rightly, the
these
three
the
good man judges

especially in
wicked
latter.
man wrongly, and
regard to the
to us
Pleasure and pain are familiar
from our
from
earliest childhood,
and are
inefface-
able
human
nature
all
men measure and

by pleasure
classify actions {Kavovitp^jiev ra<; Trpaêt?)
and pain
some men
to a greater degree, others to
a less degree.
political
(ii.
All ethical
turns
excellence,
and
all
the
science,
upon
pleasure
and
pain
3).
man becomes
just
and temperate by doing just

thus by degrees acquiring
is
and temperate
the habit.
for if a
actions,
(it
But how
asked) can this be true
man
performs just and temperate actions,

start
he
must already
by being
just
and
tem-
perate.
The
objection
is
not well founded.
man may
do just and temperate actions, and yet not be just
Essay V.]

If he does them,
183
and temperate.
does, intending
knowing what he
to do
is
what he
does,
and intending
the acts for their
own
sake, then indeed he
just
and temperate, but not otherwise.

of art carry their
The productions
own
merit along with them: a
work
state
of art
is
excellent or defective, whatever be the

it.
of
mind of the person who has executed

acts of a
But the
man
cannot be said to be justly or
temperately done, unless there be a certain state of
mind accompanying
they
their performance
by the doer
acts,
may
indeed be called just and temperate

that they are such as a just
do,
meaning thereby
temperate
and
does
man would
but the
man who
them
It is
does not necessarily deserve these epithets.
only by frequent doing of acts of
this class that
man
can acquire the habit of performing them
intentionally
and
for themselves, in
which
consists
the just and temperate character.
To know what
you must obey
such acts are,
is
little
or nothing:
the precepts, just as you follow the prescriptions of a

physician.
Many men
think erroneously that phi-
losophy will teach them to be virtuous, without any

course of action adopted by themselves
Aristotle classifies the
(ii.
4).
phenomena of the
three Passions
soul (the
non-rational soul) into

or FacultiesaJBfections
Capacities
occasional
States.
The
first
are the
anger,
fear,
envy, joy,
aversion
" in
short, everything that is
accompanied by pleasure or
184

(ii.
[Essay V.
pain"
5).
The second
them
are, the capacities of
being
moved by such
if
affections
the
affective
faculties,
ii.
one
may
so call
(ib.
So Eth. Eudem.
2).
The
third are, those habits according to which

ill
we
are
said to be well or
disposed towards this or that
particular affection
to be disposed to violent
anger
or violent fear,
is
a bad habit.
Virtues and vices are

habits,
neither affections,
nor faculties, but

is
either
good or bad.
This
the genus to which the virtues

Nic.
ii.
belong (rw yeVet
Eth.
5).
Yirtue
is
that
habit from the possession of which a
man
is
called
good, and by which he performs well his appropriate

function
(ii.
6).
It consists
in
certain
medium
between two extremes, the one of excess, the other

of defect
medium not
positive
to
and
absolute, but
variable
and having reference
each
particular
person and each particular case
neither
(ii.
exceeding
All ethical
nor falling short of what
is
proper
6).
virtue aims at the attainment of this middle point in
respect to our affections
and actions
to
exhibit each
on the proper
occasions, in the proper degree, towards
the proper persons, &c.
This middle point

it
is
but
\ it
one, but errors on both sides of
are numberless
must be determined by reason and by the judgment

of the prudent
man
(ii. 6).
Yirtue therefore, according

generic definition
rov TL
Tjv elpai
to
its
essence
and
(/caret [xev r-qv ovcrCav,

is
kol top \6yov
Xeyovra),
a certain mediocrity.
Essay V.]

actions
185
But there are some
and some
affections
which do not admit of mediocrity, and which imply

at once in their
names
evil
and culpability
(ii.
6)
such
defect,
as
impudence, envy,
theft, &c.
Each of these
and
names implies
in its meaning" a certain excess

:
and does not admit of mediocrity
just as
temperance and courage imply in their

idea
meaning the
of mediocrity,
and exclude both excess and
defect.
Aristotle then proceeds to apply his general doctrine
that virtue or excellence

He
again
consists in a
medium
between two extremes, both defects

ferent virtues.
difficulty of
is,
to various dif-
insists
upon the extreme
determining where this requisite medium

:
in each individual instance
either excess or defect
is
the easy and natural course.
In finding and adwell, the rare,

9).
hering to the middle point consists the

the praiseworthy, the honourable
(ii.
The
ex-
tremes, though both wrong, are not always equally
wrong
that which
is
:
the most
wrong ought
to
at
any
rate to be avoided
and we ought
be specially
on our guard against the seductions of pleasure

{ih.),
since our natural inclinations carry us in that
direction.
Aristotle so often speaks of the propriety of fol-
lowing nature, and produces nature so constantly as
an authority and an
to
find
him
saying "We
arbiter, that
it
seems surprising
must be on our guard

186
[Essay V.
with reference to the things whereto

are prone.
we
ourselves
For some of us are by nature disposed

others
towards
"
some things,
towards
others."
But we must drag ourselves away

(ii.
in the opposite
direction"
9).
There
is
a singular passage in the same chapter
with respect to our moral judgments.

forcibly insisted
After having
on the extreme
difficulty of hitting
the proper
medium
point of virtue, he says that a
man who commits
only small errors on one side or on

is
the other side of this point,
not censured, but only

it
he who greatly deviates from

"
he then proceeds
:
But
it is
not easy to define in general language at
what
23oint a
is it
man becomes
deserving of censure
nor
indeed
easy to do this with regard to any other
matter of perception.
Questions of this sort depend

particular case,
upon the circumstances of the
and
the judgment upon each resides in our perception''

(ii.
9).
first five
The
chapters, of the third
Book of the
Ethics, are
devoted to an examination of various
notions involved in our ideas of virtue and vice
Voluntary and Involuntary

Ignorance
kKovcjiov
koL olkovctlov
ayvoia Choice
or resolution, consequent
7rpoaLpeo-L<;.
upon previous deliberation
Those actions are involuntary, which are done either
by compulsion,
or through ignorance.
An
action
is
it
done by compulsion when the proximate cause of

Essay V.]
: :
THE ETHICS OF AKISTOTLE.

a-px^) is
187
(or beginning
jwill of the
something foreign to the
agent
the
agent himself neither conActions done from the
curring nor contributing.
fear of greater evils are of a
mixed character, as
where a navigator
in a storm
throws his goods over-
board to preserve the ship.

taken as a
class,
Such actions
as this,
cir-
and apart from particular
cumstances, are what no one would do voluntarily
but in the particular circumstances of the supposed

case, the action is
done voluntarily.
Every action
is
voluntary,
is,
wherein the beginning of organic motion

(iii.
the will of the agent
1).
Men
are
praised
if
under such painful circum-
stances they
make
is
a right choice
if
if
they voluntarily
for the
undergo what
painful
or dishonourable
purpose of accomplishing some great and glorious

result {ih.)
:
they are censured,
they shrink from
this course, or if
they submit to the evil without

If a
some
is
sufficient end.
man
is
induced to do what
unbecoming, by the threat of evils surpassing

endurance, he
is
human
spoken of with forbearance
though there are some crimes of such magnitude as

cannot be excused even by the greatest possible
apprehension of
evil,
such as death and torture.

it
In
such trying circumstances,

right choice, and
choice
still
is
difficult to
make a
more
difficult to
adhere to the
when
is
it is
made.
What
done tlwougk ignorance, can never be said
188
to be

done voluntarily:
if
[Essay V.
the agent shall be afterfor
wards grieved and repentant

it is
what he has done,

though he
involuntary.
If he be not repentant,
cannot be said to have done the deed voluntarily, yet

neither ought
it
to be called involuntary.
A distinction
however
is
to be taken in regard to
ignorance, considered as a
action involuntary,
ground
for calling the
and
a
for excusing the agent.
man drunk
ignorantly,
or
in
violent
passion,
:
misbehaves
is,
but not through ignorance

not the
that
igno-
rance
is
cause of his misbehaviour, but
drunkenness or rage.
In like manner, every de-
praved person
may
be ignorant of his true interest,
or the rule which he ought to follow, but this sort of
ignorance does not render his behaviour involuntary,
nor entitle him to any indulgence.
It
must be igno-
rance with regard to some particular circumstance
connected with the special action which he

mitting
is
comor the
ignorance of the
is
person with
whom,
instrument with which, or the subject matter in regard

to
which he
it
dealing.
Ignorance of this special
kind, if
be accompanied with subsequent sorrow

constitutes
and repentance,
an action involuntary,
for indulgence
is
(ii.
and forms a reasonable ground
1).
voluntary
is
action,
then,
that
of which the
par-
beginning
in the
agent
he
knowing the
is
ticular circumstances
under which he
actions,
acting.
Some
persons
have treated
performed
through
Essay V.]

:
189
passion or through desire, as involuntary

is
but this nor Be-
an
error.
If this
were
true, neither children
animals would be capable of voluntary action.

sides, it is proper,
on some occasions,
:
to follow the
dictates both of
anger and of desire
and we cannot
be said to act involuntarily in these cases
when we
sins
do exactly what we ought to do.
Moreover
from passions and sins from bad reasoning are alike

voluntary or alike involuntary
to
:
both of them ought

affections are
be avoided
and the non-rational
just as
(ii. 1).
much
a part of
human nature
as reason is
Having explained the proper meaning of voluntary and involuntary as applied to actions, Aristotle
proceeds to define
ir
poatpecr ls
(deliberate choice)
which
is
most intimately connected with excellence,

affords a better test of disposition
(ii.
and which indeed
than actions themselves can do

All
premeditated
is
2).
choice
is
voluntary,
but
all
voluntary action
not preconcerted.
Children and
animals are capable of voluntary action, but not of

preconcerted action
tary,
is
:
sudden deeds,
too,
are volun-
but not preconcerted.
Premeditated choice
passion
different
from desire
from
from
wishare
ing
and
from opinion.
Desire
and
passion
common
from
to animals,
who
are nevertheless incapable
of deliberate preference.
desire, but not
The incontinent man

:
acts
from deliberate preference
the
190
[Essay V.
continent
man
acts
from deliberate preference, but

is
not from desire.
Nor
:
premeditated choice
often
the
is
same
as wishing
for
we
wish for what
notoriously impracticable or unattainable, but
we do
choose
to be
not deliberately prefer any such
thing
moreover
we
wish
for
the
end,
but
we
deliberately
the means conducting to the end.
We
wish
happy
but
it
cannot with propriety be said that
we
deliberately choose to be happy.
Deliberate choice
in our
has reference to what
it
is
or seems
own
power
to achieve.
is
Again, deliberate choice
not to be regarded as a
simple modification of opinion.
Opinion extends to
every thing
deliberate choice belongs exclusively to
matters within our grasp.

false
:
Opinion
either
is
either true or
evil.
deliberate choice
is
good or
We
are good or bad, according to the turn which our

deliberate choice takes
:
not according to our opinions.
We
deliberately choose to seek something or to avoid

is
something, and our choice
praised
when
it
falls
upon what
an opinion
it
is
proper
the points upon which

or such a thing
we form
are,
what such
:
is,
whom
will benefit,
it
and how
and our opinion

true.
is
praised
when
that
happens to be
It often occurs, too,
men who form
the truest opinions are not the
best in their deliberate preferences.
Opinion
may
It is
precede or accompany every deliberate choice, but

still
the latter
is
something
distinct in itself.

Essay V.]
191
in
fact a
determination of the will, preceded by

counsel,
deliberate
and thus including or presup(ii.
posing the employment of reason
2).
It is
an
appetency, determined by previous counsel, of some
matter within our means, either really or seemingly,

to accomplish
It
/BovXevTiKrj ope^L^ tcov iif
r)[juv
(ii.
3).
seems from the language of Aristotle that the

of Jlpoaipeo-i'^ which he has
to be inadmissible,
various explanations
canvassed
and
shewn
by
had
all
been
advanced
various
contemporary
philo-
sophers.
Upoaipeo-L^, or
deliberate preference,
includes the
idea
of deliberation.
reasonable
man
does not
deliberate
upon
all
matters
he
does not deliberate
respecting mathematical or physical truths, or re-
specting natural events altogether out of his reach,

or
respecting
matters of
pure accident, or even

design carried on by
respecting matters of
distant
human
foreign
nations.
He
:
only deliberates re-
specting matters which are more or less within his
own agency and

deliberate
controjll
respecting matters which
are not certain, but of doubtful issue.
He
does not
about
:
the
end,
but about the means

itself
is
towards the end
the
end
commonly
as-
sumed, just as the physician assumes the necessity

of establishing good health and the orator that of
persuading his hearers.
If there be
more than one
way
of accomplishing
the
end,
he deliberates by
192
THE ETHICS OF
AIIISTOTLE.
[Essay V.
which out of these several means he can achieve

best and most easily
first to
:
it
proceeding from the end
itself
the proximate cause of that end, then to the
cause immediately preceding that cause, and so back-
wards
either
until
he arrives at the primary cause, which

his
is
an action of
own, within
his
own means,
assistance
or something requiring implements and
beyond
his
power
to procure.
This
is
a process of
analysis, similar to that
which
is
pursued by geometri:
cians in seeking the
way
of solving a problem
they
assume the figure with the required conditions to be

constructed
;
they then take
it
to pieces, following
back
it
the consequences of each separate condition which
has been assumed to possess.

proceeding they arrive at some
If
by
this
way
of
known
truth, their
problem
is
solved
if
is
they arrive at some

insoluble.
known
in the
untruth, the problem

is
That step which

the
first
last arrived at in the analysis, is

(iii.
order of production
3).
When
man
in carry-
ing back mentally this deliberative analysis arrives

at something manifestly
impracticable,
:
he desists
from farther deliberation

within
his
if
he arrives at something
he begins action
the
power
to
perform,
accordingly.
The
subject
of deliberation, and
subject of deliberate preference, are the same, but the

latter represents the process as
accomplished and the
result of deliberation decided.
We
take counsel and
deliberation (as has been
Essay V.]
193
said),
not about the end, but about the means or the
best
the
means towards the end assumed.

end
is
(jj
We
ivish
for
ôvkrjcn^ rov
riK.ov<;
ecrrt
:
iii.
4).
Our
wish
for good, real or apparent

is
whether
for the
one or the other,
a disputed question.
Speaking
generally, and without reference to peculiar idiosyncrasies,
the real good or the good
is
the object of
human
wishes
sjDeaking
it
with reference to any

his
particular
individual,
is
apparent good.
is
On
this matter,
own supposed or the virtuous man

:
the proper judge and standard of reference

is
that
which
really
good appears good

its
to him.
Each
particular disposition has
own
peculiar sentiment
is
both of what
able
(iii.
is
honourable and of what
agree-
4)
the principal excellence of the virtuous

of circumstances
;
man
to
is,
that he in every variety
perceives
what
is
truly and genuinely good
whereas
most men, pleasure proves a deception, and ap-
pears to be good, not being so in reality.
Both virtue and vice consist

ference, of
in
deliberate pre-
one or of another course of action.
Both
:
therefore are voluntary and in our
own power
refer
both
equally
so.
It is
not possible to
virtuous
conduct or vicious conduct to any other beginning

except to ourselves
actions, as
is
:
the
man
is
the cause of his
own
It
he
is
the father of his

all
own
legal
children.
upon
this
assumption that
is
reward and
punishment
founded
it is
intended for purposes
194
THE ETHICS OF ARISTOTLK.

it
[Essay V.
of encouragement and prevention, but
would be
absurd to think either of encouraging or preventing
what
and
he
is
involuntary, such as the appetite of hunger
thirst.
is
man
is
punished for ignorance, when
himself the cause of his
own
ignorance, or
when by
reasonable pains he might have acquired
the requisite
knowledge.
Every man above the

dvaicrO-qTov)
limit of absolute fatuity (Koixihrj
must
know
that
any constant repetition of

:
acts tends to
form a habit
if
then by repetition of acts he allows

it
himself to form a bad habit,
is
his
it
own
is
fault.
When
once the bad habit
is
it
formed,
:
true that
he cannot at gnce get rid of
but the formation of
such a habit originally was not the less imputable to
himself
(iii.
5).
Defects
of body also
which we
bring upon
ourselves
by our own negligence or

:
intemperance, bring upon us censure

constitutional
if
they are
for
at
and unavoidable, we are

to
pitied
them.
Some persons seem
have contended
that time, that no

sible for his
man
could justly be
:
made
respon-
bad conduct
because (they said) the
end which he proposed
to himself
was good
or bad
according to his natural disposition, not according to
any
selection of his
own.
this
Aristotle
seems to be
:
somewhat perplexed by
argument
nevertheless
he maintains, that whatever influence

to original
we may
still
allow
and uncontrollable nature,

habits
is
the forma-
tion of our
more
or less under our
own
Essay V.]

;
195
concurrent controul
and therefore the end which we

those
propose to ourselves being dependent upon

habits,
is
(iii.
also in pai't at least

5)
dependent upon our-
selves
our
virtues
and our vices are both
voluntary.
The
first five
chapters of the third
Book
(in
which
Aristotle
examines the nature of to eKovaiov, to

&c.) ought perhaps to
oLKOvo-LOU, 7TpoaLpcrL<;, fiovXrjCTL^,
constitute a
Book by themselves.
They
are
among
the most valuable parts of the Ethics.
He
has
now
established certain points with regard to our virtues

2:enerallv.
1.
They
are mediocrities
(/êcroTT^res).
2.
They
are habits, generated by particular actions
often repeated.
3.
When
generated, they have a specific influence

in
facilitating the
class.
of
their
own
are
performance
of
actions of the
4.
same
in
They
They
our
own power
originally,
and
voluntary.
5.
are under the direction of right reason.
It is to
be observed that our actions are voluntary

to the
is
from the beginning

of repeated
first.
end
the
last of
number
actions
no
are
to
less
voluntary tlian the
But our
habits
voluntary only at the
beginning
they cease
tlie
be voluntary after a certain

left
time but the permanent effect

repetition of action
is
by each separate
(iii.
inappreciable
5).
o 2
196

then proceeds to
[Essay V.
Aristotle
an analysis of the
separate virtues
Courage,
Temperance, Liberality,
Magnificence, Magnanimity, Gentleness, Frankness,

Simplicity, Elegant playfulness. Justice, Equity, &c.
He
endeavours to shew that each of these
is
it,
a certain
defect on
mediocrity
the other.
excess lying on
one side of
There are various passages of Aristotle which

appear almost identical
with the moral
doctrine
:
subsequently maintained by the
example
fear
iii.
6 " In
Stoic school
for
to
like
manner he ought not
penury, nor sickness, nor in any
way
such
things as arise not from
moral baseness nor are
dependent on himself."
The courageous man

it befits
is
afraid of things
:
such as
man
to fear,
but of no others
and even
these he will
make head
against on proper occasions,

for the sake of honour^
7).
when reason commands and

which
or too
is is
the end of virtue
(iii.
To
fear nothing,
little, is
:
rashness or insanity: to fear too much,
timidity
the courageous
fears
man
is
the
mean between
the two,
who
what he ought, when he ought,
as he ought,
(ib.).
and with the right views and purposes

(adulterer) exposes himself often
The
[jlolxo^
to great
dangers for the purpose of gratifying his

but Aristotle does not hold this to be
passion:
courage.
affront
Neither does he thus denominate
men who
thirst of
danger from passion, or from the
Essay V.]

a
197
revenge, or from
sanguine temperament
there
8).
must be deliberate preference and a proper motive,

to constitute courage
the motive of honour

(says Aristotle)
is
(iii.
The end of courage

pleasant, but
it
in itself
is
it
:
put out of sight by the circumjust as the prize for
stances around
which the
pugilist contends is in itself pleasurable, but being of
small
moment and encompassed with

appears to carry with
it
painful acces-
sories, it
no pleasure what-
ever.
Fatigue, and wounds and death are painful to
the courageous
to
man
death
life
is
is
indeed more painful

of more value
:
him, inasmuch as his
but
still
he voluntarily and knowingly affronts these
pains for the sake of honour.
This
is
painful
" but pleasure

all
is
not to be anti-
cipated in the exercise of
the different virtues,

is
except in so far as the attainment of the end
concerned"
(This
is
(iii. 9).
perfectly true
but
it
contradicts deci-
dedly the remark which Aristotle had made before

in his first
Book
(i.
8) respecting the inherent plea-
sure of virtuous agency.)
Courage and Temperance are the virtues of the

instincts (rfov oKoyoiv ixepwv
is
îii.
10).
Temperance
respect
the observance of a rational
medium with
and
sex.
to ihe pleasures of eating, drinking,

totle
Arisit
seems to be inconsistent
when he makes
to
belong to those pleasures in which animals generally

198

(iii.
[Essay V.
partake
10)
for other
:
animals do not relish
intoxicating liquors
unless
indeed these are con-
sidered
as
ranking under drink generally.
The
temperate
man
desires these pleasures as he ouglit,
when he ought, within

able,
the limits of what
is
honour-
and having a proper reference
to the
amount
of his
own pecuniary means

(iii.
just as right reason
prescribes
to pursue
11).
To pursue them more, is

There
is
excess
them
less, is defect.
however, in
estimating excess and defect, a certain tacit reference

to the average dispositions of the
many.
"
Wherefore the desires of the temperate man

;
ought to harmonize with reason

is
for the
aim of both
the honourable.
And
the temperate
man
:
desires
this
what he ought, and

too
is
as he ought,
(iii.
and when
12).
and
the order of reason "
All virtuous acts are to be on account of the honourable
thus
Aristotle says that the donations of the
aorwro? (prodigal)
are
not to
be called
for
this,
liberal
" Neither are their gifts
liberal,
they are not
honourable,
nor on account of be "

(iv.
1).
nor as they
ought
to
XoTrpevn)?
or
magnificent
will
man
is
Again
''
about the ixeya-
Now
the magni-
ficent
man
all
exjDend
such things on account

a condition
still
of the honourable; for this

in
shared
by
the
virtues
and
he will
do so
pleasantly and lavishly "

the fidvavcro<; or vulgar
(iv. 2).
On
the contrary,
man, who
differs
from the

Essay V.]
199
magnificent
said to
spend
man
"
in the
way
of virepôXi] or excess,
is
Not
for the sake of the honourable,
but for the purpose of making a disphiy of his
weahh
" (iv. 2).
With
respect to those epithets

is
which imply praise

comparison with
to
or blame, there
always a
tacit
some assumed standard.

^tXoTt/to5 (lover
Thus with regard

Aristotle
'
the
of honour),
observes
" It
is
evident that, as the term

'
lover of such and
such things
is
'
used in various senses,
we do
not
always apply
thing
;
lover of honour' to express the same

praise,
but
is
when we
we
praise that ambition
which which
more than most men's, and blame that

greater than
fifth
it
is
ought
to be " (iv. 4).
In the
Book, Aristotle proceeds to explain

Justice
wherein consist
and
Injustice.
These words are used in two senses
a larger sense
equivalent to
and a narrower
sense.
is
In the larger sense, just behaviour

the observance of law, generally
is
:
unjust behaviour
equivalent to the violation of law generally.
But
be
the law either actually does
command,
or
may
understood to command, that
we
should
to
perform
towards others the acts belonging
each separate
head of virtue
it
either actually f)rohibits, or
may
be understood to prohibit, us from performing towards

others any of the acts belonging to
each separate
head of
vice.
In this larger sense, therefore, justice

200
THE ETHICS
(1f
ARISTOTLE.
[Essay V.
is
synonymous generally with perfect virtue

with perfect wickedness
:
injusdif-
tice,
there
is
only this
ference, that just or unjust are expressions applied to
behaviour in so far as
it affects
other persons besides
the agent: whereas virtuous or wicked are expressions

applied simply to the agent without connoting any
such ulterior reference to other persons.

unjust,
is
Just or
else
:
necessarily towards
somebody
and
Vir-
this reference is implied distinctly in the term.
tuous and vicious do not in the force of the term
connote any such relations, but are employed with

reference to the agent simply
perfect virtue
;
" This justice then
is
yet not absolutely, but with reference
to one's neighbour.
In one sense we
is
call those
things
just that are productive
and preservative of happiness
and
its
parts to the political
communion
" (v. 1).
Justice in this sense,
the very fulness of virtue,

of virtuous
because
it
denotes the actual exercise

:
behaviour towards others
" there
are
behave virtuously in regard to their

affairs,
many who own jDersonal

what
but
who
are incapable of doing so in

{ib.).
regards others"
For
this reason, justice has
been called by some

Qiun
the
all
good of another and not our

the virtues, because
:
justice alone of
is
it
neces-
sarily has reference to another
the just
man
does
the
what
for the interest of
some one
(v. 1).
is
else, either
magistrate, or the
Justice
in
community
the
narrower sense,
that
mode
of
Essay V.]

his
201
behaviour whereby a man, in

others,
dealings
fair
:
witli
aims at taking to himself his
share and
no more of the common
objects of desire
and
will-
ingly consents to endure his fair share of the

hardships.
Injustice is the opposite
common
that by which
escape his
at this
man
tries to
appropriate more tlian his fair share of
the objects of desire, while

fair share of the objects
he
tries to
of aversion.
To aim
of the
unfair
distribution
of the benefits
society,
either in one's
own
favour or in favour of any one
else, is injustice in the
narrow sense
(v. 2).
is
Justice in this narrower sense
divided into two

2.
branches
Justice.
1.
Distributive
Justice.
Corrective
Distributive Justice has reference to those occasions
on which positive benefits are

the
to be distributed
among
is
members of the community, wealth and honours,

2).
&c. (v.
In this case, the share of each citizen
to be a share not absolutely of equality, but
one proit is
portional to his personal worth (ctftW)
and
in
the estimation of this personal worth that quarrels
and dissension
arise.
Corrective Justice has reference to the individual
dealings, or individual behaviour,
between
man and
man
and
either to the dealings implying
mutual consent
contract, as purchase, sale, loan, hire, suretyship,

:
deposit, &c.
sent,
or such as imply no such mutual con-
such as are on the contrary proceedings either
202

force
[Essay V.
by fraud or by
as
theft,
adultery, perjury,
poisoning, assassination, robbery, beating, mutilation,
murder, defamation, &c.
In regard to transactions of
are considered as being all
is
this nature, the citizens
upon a par
no account
:
taken of the difference between them in point of
individual worth.
titled to
Each man
is
considered as en-
an equal share of good and evil
and
if in
any dealings between man and man, one man

attempt to increase his
diminish
his
shall
own
share
of good or to
own
share of evil at the expense of
another man, corrective justice will interpose and

re 'establish the equality thus improperly disturbed.
He who
position
:
has been made to lose or to suffer unduly,

his
must be compensated and replaced in
former
he who has gained unduly, must be mulcted

to suffer, so as to be
or
made
thrown back
judge,
to the
point from which he started.

sents this corrective justice,
is
The
who
repre-
a kind of mediator, and
the point which he seeks to attain in directing redress, is the middle point between gain
and
loss
so
is
that neither shall the aggressive party be a gainer,
nor the suffering party a loser

a
" So that
justice
mean between
a sort of gain and loss in voluntary
things,
(v. 4).
loss
it is
the having the same after as before"
Aristotle admits that the
words gain and

of the trans-
are not strictly applicable to
many
actions
which come within the scope of interference

Essay V.]
203
from
corrective justice
tliat
they properly belong to

in
voluntary contracts, and are strained
order to
apply them to acts of aggression, &c.
(z6.).
The Pythagoreians held
the doctrine that justice
universally speaking consisted in simple retaliation

in rendering to another the precise dealing
which
that other
had
first
given.
This definition will not
suit either for distributive justice or corrective justice

:
the treatment so prescribed would be sometimes

less,
more, sometimes
than justice
not to mention
that acts deserve to be treated differently according

as they are intentional or unintentional.
But the
doctrine
is to
a certain extent true in regard to the
dealings between
KOLvojvLaL<;)
man and man
(eV rats 6XKaKriKai<;
if it
be applied in the
way
of general
analogy and not with any regard

it is
to exact similarity
of importance that the
man who
has been well
treated,
and the man who has been
ill-treated,
should
each show his sense of the proceeding by returning

the like usage
State
is
:
" for
by proportionate
(v.
5).
requital the
held together "
The whole business
of exchange and barter, of division of labour and
occupation,
the
co-existence of those
distinct and.
heterogeneous ingredients which are requisite to constitute the political
communion
most essential wants of the citizens
the supply of the founded

is
all
upon the continuance and the expectation of

assured requital for acts done.
this
Money
is
introduced
204
[Essay V.
as an indispensable instrument for facilitating this
constant
traffic
it
affords a
common measure
estimating the value of every service

if
" And
for
thus
there were no possibility of retaliation, there would

" (v. 5).
be no communion
Justice
is
thus a mediocrity
or consists
just
in a just
medium
between two extremes, but not in the same

The
and
to
way
as the other virtues.

to himself
man
is
one
else
who
the
awards both
every one
proper and rightful share both of benefit and burthen.

Injustice,
on the contrary, consists in the

lie
excess or defect which

this
on one
side or the other of
medium
point (v. 5).
Distributive justice is said
by Aristotle
to deal
;
with
individuals according to geometrical ratio

justice,
corrective
according to arithmetical proportion.
Justice,
strictly
and properly
so called,
is
political justice:
that reciprocity of right and obligation which prevails
between
free
and equal
citizens in a
community,
or between citizens who, if not positively equal, yet
stand in an assured and definite ratio one to the other

(v. 6).
This relation
is
defined and maintained
by
law, and law.
by judges and magistrates
to administer the
Political justice implies a state of
law
to
a com-
munity of persons
sustain the
qualified
by nature
obey and
law
and a
definite
arrangement between
the citizens in respect to the alternation of
command
said
{riv),
and
obedience " For this
is,
as
we have

Essay V.]
205
naturally
according to law, and
among
those
who can
have law
those, namely, as
we have
said (^crav),
who have an equality of ruling and being ruled." As the law arises out of the necessity of preventing
injustice, or of
hindering any individual from approhis fair share of
priating
it is
more than
that
good things,
so
felt
any person invested with sovereign

will
authority
therefore
thority,
may and
is
commit
this injustice.
Reason
understood to hold the sovereign auacts only as the guardian of
and the archon
the reciprocal rights

stitutional
and obligations
of
the concitizens
:
equality
between
subsists
the various
undertaking a troublesome duty and paid for his

trouble by honour and respect (v. 6).
The
relation
which
between master and
slave, or father
and
son, is not properly speaking that

it
of justice, though
is
somewhat analogous.
it
Both
the slave, and the non-adult son, are as

of the master and father
injustice
:
were parts
there can therefore be no
on his part towards them, since no one

Beof
deliberately intends to hurt a part of himself.
tween husband and wife there

justice
subsists
sort
household justice
is
(to oIkovo}xikov hiKaiov)

political justice (v. 6).
but this too
different
is
from
Political justice
ventional.
in part natural
is
in
part con-
That which
is
natural
is
is
everywhere the
different in dif-
same
that which
conventional
its
ferent countries, and takes
origin altogether
from
206
positive

and
special institution.
is
[Essay V.
Some
persons think
that all poHtical justice
thus conventional, and
none natural
because they see that rights and obli-
gations (ja SiKaLa) are everywhere changeable, and
nowhere exhibit that permanence and

which mark the properties of natural
is
invariability
" This
:
objects.
true to a certain extent, but not wholly true
pro-
bably
among
the
is
Gods
it is
is
not true at
all
but with
us that which
natural
:
in part variable, thougli

is
not in every case
yet there
a real distinction
is
between what
is
natural and
what
not natural.
justice,
Both natural
justice
and conventional
;
are
is
thus alike contingent and variable

clear
but there
mode
of distinguishing between the two, ap-
plicable not only to the case of justice but to other

cases in
which the
like
distinction
is
is
to be taken.
:
For by nature the right hand

nevertheless
trous men.
it
the stronger
but
may happen
in like
that there are ambidexthose rules of justice
And
manner
which are not natural, but of human establishment,

are not the same everywhere
:
nor indeed does the
same mode of government prevail everywhere, though

there
is
but one mode of government which

to nature
is
every-
where agreeable
the best of all"
(v.
7\
(The commentary of Andronicus upon

is
this passage
clearer
and more instructive than the passage of

and
it
Aristotle itself:
is
remarkable as a distinct
utilit^^
announcement of the principle of
" Since
Essay V.]
207
both
natural justice, and conventional justice, are
changeable, in the
way
The
just stated,
how
is
are
we
to
distinguish the one of these fluctuating institutions
from the other
distinction
is
plain.
Each
its
special precept of justice
to be
examined on
it
own ground,
vantage of
all
to ascertain
whether
be for the ad-
that
it
should be maintained unaltered,

it
or whether the subversion of

chief.
would occasion mis-
If this be found to be the fact, the precept in

:
question belongs to natural justice

to conventional
if it
be otherwise,
v.
c.
justice "
(Andronic. Rh.
10).
The
just,
and the
unjust, being thus defined, a
man
it
who
does, willingly
and knowingly, either the one

:
or the other, acts justly or unjustly
if he-
does
unwillingly or unknowingly, he neither acts justly
nor unjustly, except by accident
that
is,
he does
what
but
is
is
not essentially and in
its
own
nature unjust,
only so by accident (v.
8).
Injustice will thus
have been done, but no unjust act will have been

committed,
if
the act be done involuntarily.
The
though
man who
fear of
restores a deposit unwillingly
and from
danger
to himself, does not act justly,

is
he does what by accident

anxious to restore
the
just
the
man who,
by
deposit,
is
prevented
positive superior force from doing so, does not act
unjustly, although he does

just.
what by accident
it is
is
un-
When
to
man
does mischief,
either in
done
such
contrary
all
reasonable
expectation,
208

that neither
[Essay V.
manner
he
nor any one else could

mischief which
have anticipated from
his act the

it
has actually ensued from

case
it is
(TrapaXoycu?),
:
and in
this
it
a pure misfortune (aruîy/xa)
or he does
without intention or foreknowledge, yet under
cir-
cumstances in which mischief might have been foreseen,

it is
and ought
to
have been foreseen

:
in this case
a fault (d/xaprr^/xa)
or he does
it
intentionally
and with foreknowledge, yet without any previous

deliberation,
through anger, or some violent momen;
tary impulse
KTjixa),
in this case
is
it is
an unjust act
(dSi-
but the agent
not necessarily an unjust or
wicked
man
for leaving
done
it:
or he does
it
with
intention and deliberate choice, and in this case he

is
an unjust and wicked man.
The man who does a

is
just thing, or
an unjust thing,
not necessarily a just or an unjust man.

so or not,
Whether
he be
depends upon the state of his mind
and intention
Equity, to
but
tion
is
at the time (v. 8).

eVteticeg, is
not at variance wîth

justice.
It is
justice,
an improvement upon
a correc-
and supplement
to the inevitable imperfections
in the definitions of legal justice.

to
The law wishes

doing so
:
comprehend
its
all
cases,
but
fails in
the
words of
express
enactment do not fully and exactly

intentions, but
less.
its
real
either
something
more
in
or something
When
the lawgiver speaks

case
general
terms,
particular
may happen

Essay V.]

within the rule as he lays
to
it
209
which
falls
down, but
if
which he would not have wished

he had
comprehend
known how
to avoid
it.
It is
then becoming
conduct in the individual to whose advantage the
law in
this special case turns, that
he should refrain
from profiting by his position, and that he should act

as the legislator himself
tlie
would wish,
if
consulted on
special case.
The general
rules laid
down by
:
the legislator are of necessity more or less defective

in fact, the only reason
why
every thing
is
not de-
termined by law,
respecting which
(v. 10).
is,
that there are some matters

is
it
impossible
to
frame a law
Such
is
the conduct of the equitable

refrains
man
,
"the man who
from pushing his
legal
rights to the extreme, to the injury of others, but
who
foregoes the advantage of his position, although

is
the law
êlpov,
jSorjdov).
in his favour " (6

iXaTTO)TiKo<i,
fxr
aKpLôSiKato^
e)(Oiv
eTrl
ak)C
KaiTrep
rov
uofxov
A
to a
man may
man
is
hurt
himself,
but he
cannot
act
unjustly towards himself
No
injustice can be
done
is
except against his
own
consent.
:
Suicide
to
by implication forbidden by the law

suicide
commit
wrong, because a man in so doing acts

towards
the
city,
unjustly
not towards
himself,
which
is
impossible (v. 11).

unjustly
To
act
and
to be the object of unjust

:
dealing by others
are
both bad
but which
p
is
the
210

It
is
[Essay V.
worst?
the least of the two evils to be the
object of unjust dealing
by
others.
Both are bad,
because in the one case a
man
gets
more than
:
his
share, in the other less than his share
in both cases act unjustly
the just
is
medium
is
departed from.
:
To
blameable, and implies wickedness

is
to be the object
of unjust dealing by others

implies no
itself
not blameable, and

is
wickedness
the
latter
therefore in
it
the least evil, although
by accident
may
perhaps turn out to be the greater evil of the two.

In the same manner a pleurisy
evil
is
:
in itself a greater
than a trip and a stumble

turn out that the latter
if it
is
but by accident
it
may
two,
the greater evil of the

a
should occur at the
moment when
man
is
running away from the enemy, so as

being taken prisoner and
slain.
to cause his
The question here

the greater evil
of unjust
in
to
raised
by
Aristotle
to
which
is
act unjustly or be the object dealing had been before raised by Plato
Aristotle follows out his theory
it
the Gorgias.
virtue,
about
whereby he makes
consist in the
observance of a
medium
point.
The man
that acts
unjustly sins on one side of this point, the object of
unjust dealing misses
it
on the other
eats or
side
the one
is
comparable to a
man who
is
works too much

eats or
for
his health, the other to a

little.
man who
works too
hardly
The question
one which
could
arise,
according to the view taken by modern ethical

Essay A^]
211
writers of the principles of moral science.
The two
things compared are not in point of fact

surable.
commen-
Looking
at the question
from the point of
view of the
no moral
misfortune
moralist, the person injured has incurred

guilt,
but has suffered more or
less
of
the unjust agent on the contrary has suf-
fered no misfortune
perhaps he has reaped

guilt.
:
benefit
but at any rate he has incurred moral
Society
:
on the whole
is
a decided loser by the act
but the
is
wrong done
implies the suffering inflicted

it
the act
considered and called wrong because

suffering,
does
inflict
and
for
no other reason.
It
seems an
inadmissible question therefore, to ask which of the
two
is
the greater evil the

:
the
suffering
undergone by
that
A or
wrong by which B
occasioned
suffering
at least so far as society is concerned.
But the ancient

parison,
moralists, in instituting this
com-
seem
to
have looked, not at
society, but at
the two individuals

sufferer
the wrong doer

If
and the wrong
and
to
to
have looked at them too from a
point of view of their own.
we
take the feelings
of these two parties themselves as the standard by
which
judge,
the
sentence
must be obviously
:
contrary to the opinion delivered by Aristotle

sufferer,
the
off
it
according to his
:
own
feelings
is
is
worse
than he was before

is
the doer
better
off.
And
for this reason that the act forms a proper
ground
for judicial
punishment or
redress.
But the moralist

p 2
212
estimates

the
condition
[Essay V.
of
the
two
men by
standard of his own, not by the feelings which they
themselves entertain.
virtuous frame of
He
is
decides for himself that a
mind
the primary and essential
ingredient of individual happiness

of
a wicked frame
:
mind the grand source of misery

tries
and by
this test
he
the comparative happiness of every man.

manifests evidence of a guilty frame
The man who

of
mind
is
decidedly worse off than he
who
has only
suffered
an unmerited misfortune.
ESSAY
VI.
THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE.
THE POLITICS OF AKISTOTLE.

The scheme
of government proposed
by
Aristotle, in
the two last books of his Politics, as representing his
own
ideas of something like perfection,

:
is
evidently
founded upon the Republic of Plato

differs in the
from
whom
he
important circumstance of not admitting
either
community of property or community of wives
and children.
Each of these philosophers recognises one separate

class of inhabitants, relieved
all
-^,
from
all
private toil
and
money-getting employments, and constituting ex-
clusively the citizens of the
commonwealth.
small class
is
in effect the city
This J
the
commonwealth
the remaining inhabitants are not a part of the com-
monwealth, they are only appendages to

pensable indeed, but
still
it
indis-
appendages, in the same
manner
as slaves or cattle (vii. 8).
In the Republic
of Plato this narrow aristocracy are not allowed to

possess private property or separate families, but form
one
inseparable
brotherhood.
In the scheme of
distinct caste of
Aristotle, this aristocracy
form a
its
private
families
each
with
separate property.
21G
[Essay VI.
The whole
and
produce
territory of the State belongs to them,
is tilled
is
by dependent
cultivators,
by w^hom the
certain
is
made over and apportioned under
restrictions.
A
(i.e.
certain
section of the territory
understood to be the
of citizens of
it is
common
property of the body
of the aristocracy), and the produce
handed over by the cultivators into a common

supply the
jDublic tables at
stock, partly to
which
all
the citizens with their wives and families are subsisted, partly to
nities.
defray the cost of religious solemportion
The remaining
of the territory
is
possessed in separate properties by individual citizens,
who consume
to
the produce as they please

lots of
(vii.
0)
each citizen having two distinct

him, one near
tlie
land assigned
outskirts of the territory, the
other near the centre.
This latter regulation also

in the treatise de Legibus,
had been adopted by Plato
and
it is
surprising to observe that Aristotle himself

it,
had censured
in his criticisms on that treatise, as
incompatible with a judicious and careful economy

(ii.
3.
8).
The
syssitia
or public tables
are also
adopted by Plato, in conformity with the institutions

actually existing in his time in Crete
and elsewhere.
scheme,
The dependent
ought
of
cultivators, in Aristotle's
to be slaves, not united together
by any bond
(vii.
common language
or
common country
9,9):
if this
cannot be, they ought to be a race of subdued
foreigners, degraded into perioeci, deprived of all use

Essay VI.]
THE POLITICS OP ARISTOTLE.
217
of arms, and confined to the task of labouring in the

field.
Those slaves who
till
the
common
land are to
be considered as the property of the collective body

of citizens
:
the slaves on land belonging to indivi-
dual citizens, are the property of those citizens.
When we consider the habitants whom Aristotle

benefits of their
scanty proportion of in-
and Plato include in the

it
community,
will at once appear

political
is
how amazingly
simplified.
their task as
theorists
is
Their commonwealth
really
an
aristo-
cracy on a very narrow scale.

the inhabitants are
security
The great mass of
thrust out altogether from all
and good government, and are placed withat
out reserve
the disposal of the small body of
armed
citizens.
is
There
but one precaution on which Aristotle

for
and Plato rely

citizens
ensuring good treatment from the

:
towards their inferiors
and that
is,
the
finished
and elaborate education which the
citizens
are to receive.
Men
so educated, according to these
philosophers, will behave as perfectly in the relation
of superior to inferior, as in that of equal to equal of citizen to citizen.
This supposition would doubtless prove true, to a

certain extent, though far short of that extent which
would be
requisite to assure the complete comfort of
the inferior.
extent,
it
But even
far
if it
were true
to the fullest
would be
from satisfying the demands
218

For though the
[Essay
VL
of a benevolent theorist.
inferior
should meet with kindness and protection from his

superior,
still
his
mind must be kept
in a degradation
all
suitable to his position.
He must
:
be deprived of
moral and
intellectual culture
he must be prevented
:
from imbibing any ideas of his own dignity
he
must be content
to receive
whatever
is
is
awarded, to
endure whatever treatment

for
vouchsafed, without
an instant imagining that he

is
has a right to
benefits or that suffering
wrongfully inflicted upon

in-
him.
Both Plato and Aristotle acknowledge the

and moral abasement of
all
evitable depravation
(^
the
inhabitants excepting their favoured class.
Neither
to
of
them seems
it.
solicitous
either
'
to disguise or
mitigate
But
if
they are thus indifferent about the moral
condition of the mass, they are in the highest degree
exact and careful

citizens.
respecting that
their
of
their
select
object,
This
is
grand and primary
towards which the whole force of their

the
full
intellect,
and
is
fertility
of their ingenious imagination,
directed.
Their plans of education are most elabo:
rate
and comprehensive
aiming at every branch of
moral and intellectual improvement, and seeking to

raise the
whole
man
to a state of perfection, both
physical and mental.
You would imagine

so
that they
were framing a scheme of public education, not a

political
constitution
wholly are their thoughts
Essay VI.]

training
219
engrossed with the

citizens.
It
is
and culture of their
in this respect that their ideas are
truly instructive.
Viewed with reference
to the general
body of
in-
habitants in a State, nothing can be
more
defective
than the plans of both these great philosophers.
Assuming
that their objects
were completely attained,
the mass of the people would receive nothing
more
than that degree of physical comfort and mild usage
which can be made
to
consist w4th subjection
and
with the extortion of compulsory labour.

Aîewed with reference to the special class recognised as citizens, the plans of both
are to a high
is
degree admirable.
better provision
made
for
the virtue as well as for the happiness of this particular class than has ever been devised
political projector.
by any other
in
The intimate manner

is
which
all
Aristotle connects virtue with happiness,
above
remarkable.
in
the
He
in fact defines happiness to consist
active
exertion
and perfected
habit
of virtue
9.
(a./oeT-^9
ivepyeca Koi
is
)(pTJcri<;
rt? reXeto?
vi.
3.)
and
it
upon
this disposition that
he founds the
necessity of excluding the mass of inhabitants from
the citizenship.
For the purpose

is,
to be accomplished
by the
political union,
the assuring of happiness
to every individual citizen,
which
is
to be effected
citizen.
by
implanting habits of virtue in every

ever therefore
is
Who-
incapable of acquiring
habits of
220

from becoming a
[Essay VI.
virtue, is disqualified
citizen.
But
every man whose
life is S23ent
in laborious avocations,
whether of husbandry, of
trade, or
of manufacture,
becomes thereby incapable of acquiring habits of

virtue,
and cannot therefore
be admitted
to
the
citizenship.
No man
toil,
can be capable of the requisite
mental culture and

the necessity of
tuition,
who
is
not exempted from
enabled to devote his whole
time to the acquisition of virtuous habits, and subjected from his infancy to a severe
training.
and systematic
The
on the
exclusion of the bulk of the people

is
from
civil
rights
thus founded, in the
mind of
Aristotle,
lofty idea
which he forms of indivito be

sole
dual
human
perfection,
which he conceives
it
absolutely unattainable unless

object of a man's
life.
be
made the
But then he takes
especial
care that the education of his citizens shall be really
such as to compel them to acquire that virtue, on
which alone
their pre-eminence
is
built.
If he ex-
empts them from manual or money-getting labours,

he imposes upon them an endless
restraints
series of painful
and vexatious duties
for
the
purpose of
forming and maintaining their perfection of character.
He
allows no
luxury or self-indulgence, no misof

time,
appropriation
no ostentatious display of
life
wealth or station.
The
of his select citizens
would be such as
to
provoke
little
envy
Its
or jealousy,
among men
of the ordinary stamp.
hard work
Essay VI.]
THE POLITICS OF AEISTOTLE.
221
and
its strict discipline

:
would appear repulsive rather
than inviting
and the pre-eminence of strong and
able men, submitting to such continued schooling,
would appear well deserved and hardly earned.

Oligarchical reasoners in
modern times employ the
bad part of Aristotle's principle without the good.
They represent the

enjoyment of
rich
and great
as alone capable
of reaching a degree of virtue consistent with the

full
political privileges
but then they
take no precautions, as Aristotle does, that the

so
men
preferred
shall
really
answer
to
this
exalted
character.
They
leave the rich and great to their
own
self-indulgence
and indolent
propensities, withto habits
out training
them by any systematic process

So that the
of superior virtue.
select citizens
if
on
this
plan are at the least no better,
indeed they are not
worse, than the remaining community, while their
unbounded indulgences
or undue admiration,
excite
either
undue envy
among
the excluded multitude.
The
select citizens of Aristotle are
both better and

:
wiser than the rest of their community

are at the same time so
while they
hemmed
in
and circumscribed
by severe
of envy
regulations, that nothing except the per-
fection of their character can appear
worthy
therefore
either
or admiration.
Though
these
oligarchical reasoners concur with Aristotle in sacrificing the bulk of the
community
fail
to the
pre-eminence
of a narrow class, they
of accomplishing the end
222
for

which alone he pretends
[Essay VI.
to justify such a sacrifice
the
formation of a few citizens of complete and
unrivalled virtue.
The arrangements made by

government of
selves,
Aristotle for the good
his aristocratical citizens
among themof the
are
founded upon principles
most
perfect equality.
He would have them

all
is
only limited
in number, for in his opinion, personal
and familiar
acquaintance
to
among them
essentially requisite
good government
all
(vii. 4. 7).
The
principal offices
citizens
:
of the State are
to be held
by the aged
the military duties are to be fulfilled by the younger

citizens.
The
city
it,
altogether,
with the territory
appertaining to
avTdpKrjs
:
must be
large
so
enough
to
be
but
it
must not be
extensive as to the citizens.
destroy personal intimacy
among
very large body
are, in Aristotle's view, incapable of
discipline or regularity.
To produce a
reason
virtuous citizen, nature, habit, and
must
coincide.
They ought
to
be endued with
virtues qualifying
leisure
:
them both
for occupation
and
for
with courage, self-denial {Kaprepia), and

:
forti-
tude, to maintain their independence
with justice
and temperance,
to restrain
them from abusing the

for
means of enjoyment provided
them
and with
philosophy or the love of contemplative wisdom and

science,
in order to banish ennui,
and render the

(vii.
hours of leisure
agreeable to them
13.
17).
Essay VI.]
223
They
are to be taught that their hours of leisure are
of greater worth and

occupation.
dignity than their hours of

is
Occupation
to
be submitted to for the

is
sake of the quiet enjoyment of leisure, just as war
made
for the sake of
procuring peace, and useful and
necessary employments undertaken for the sake of

those which are honourable
(vii. 13. 8).
Aristotle
greatly censures (see
vii. 2.
5) (as indeed Plato
had
done before him) the

as
institutions
of Lacedsemon,
create
to
being
directed
exclusively to
excellent
rule
warriors,
and
to
enable
the
is
nation
over
foreigners.
This (he says)
not only not the right
end, but
is
an end absolutely pernicious and culpable.

a forcible sovereignty
is
To maintain
minds of the
over free and

:
equal foreigners,
unjust and immoral
and
if
the
citizens be corrupted
it is
with
this collective
ambition and love of power,

individual citizen, taught
probable that some
by the education of the

first
State to consider power as the

will find
of all earthly ends,
an opportunity to aggrandize himself by
force or fraud,
and to
establish a
(viii. 13.
tyranny over his
countrymen themselves
13).
The Lacedse-
monians conducted themselves well and flourished

under their
institutions, so
long as they were carry:
ing on war for the enlargement of their dominion
but they were incapable of tasting or profiting by
peace
they were not educated by their legislator so

to
as to be able to turn leisure
account (airto?
S'
224

ov TratSevcras hvvaaOai cr)(oXdêLV
[Essay
VL
pofJioOeTr)';,
vii. 13.
15).
The education of the

the body
:
citizen is to
commence with
is
next the irrational portion of the soul
to
be brought under discipline
that
and
is,
the will and the

passions
appetites, the concupiscent
irascible
thirdly, the rational portion of the soul is to be cul-
tivated
and developed.
The
habitual desires are to
be so moulded and tutored as to prepare them for the

sovereignty of reason,
when
the time shall arrive for

(vii. 13.
bringing reason into action
23).
They
are
to learn nothing until five years old (vii. 15. 4),

their diversions are to be carefully prepared
and pre-
sented to them, consisting generally of a mimicry of
subsequent serious occupations
(vii. 15.
15)
and
all
the fables and tales which they hear recited ai^ to be
such as to pave the

all
way
for
moral discipline
\ib.)
under the superintendence of the Psedonom.

is to
No
obscene or licentious talk

(vii.
be tolerated in the city

statue,
15.
7),
nor any indecent painting or
except in the
temples of some particular Deities.
No
youth
is
permitted to witness the recitation either
of iambics or of
comedy
(vii. 15. 0), until
he attains
the age which qualifies

tables.
him
to sit at the public
Immense
stress is laid
by the philosopher on
the turn of ideas to which the tender minds of youth
become accustomed, and on the
earliest
combinations
their senses
of sounds or of visible objects which
meet

Essay VI.]

IIpo? 7rao"a9 ovi/a/xet? koI reîâ?
225
(vii. 15. 10).
ianv a
Set TrpoiraihevecrOai koX TrpoeOiêcrdaL
npo^ ra? eKdcTTwv

ra?
rrjq
apeT'fj<;
epyacrta?, wcrre
SrjXov otl
koL
7rpo<;
TrpdêLs (viii. 1. 2).
All the citizens in Aristotle's republic are to be

educated according to one
common system
each
being regarded as belonging to the commonwealth
more than
to his
own
parents.
This was the practice

it
at Lacedasmon,
(viii. 1. 3).
and Aristotle greatly eulogizes
Aristotle does not approve of extreme
and violent
bodily training, such as would bring the body into

the
condition
the
of an
athlete
nor
does
he
even
sanction
gymnastic
system,
labours
imposed
the
by the
effect
Lacedaemonian
rendering the
which
had
of
Spartans "brutal
of soul," for
(ol
the
purpose of exalting their courage

Q-Tqpioiheif;
Aa/cwve?
direpydtôvraL
to'l<;
ttovoi?,
ct>9
tovto /xaXtcrra
first,
7r/309
dvSpeiav
is
avfKêpov).
He
remarks,
that
courage
not the single or exclusive end to be aimed

:
at in a civil education
next, that a savage
and brutal
soul
is
less
compatible with exalted courage than a
gentle soul, trained so as to be exquisitely sensible to

the feelings of shame and honour
(viii. 3.
3-5).
The
most sanguinary and unfeeling among the barbarous

tribes,
he remarks, were very far from being the
most courageous.
man
trained on the Lacedae-
monian system,
in bodily exercises alone, destitute
226
[Essay VI.
even of the most indispensable mental culture (see

below),
was a
real
^dvavao^
duties,
useful
only for one

for
branch of
political
and even
that
less
useful than if he
had been trained
in a different
manner.
Up
to
the age of 14,
Aristotle prescribes {rjîq

see vii. 15. 11) that
means 14 years of age
boys
shall be trained in gentle
and regular
exercises, withto
out any severe or forced labour.
From 14
17
they are to be instructed in various branches of
knowledge
after 17,
they are to be put to harder
bodily labour, and to be nourished with a special and

peculiar diet (di/ay/cocâytats).
is to
For how long
this
continue,
is
not stated.
But Aristotle
insists
on
the necessity of not giving them at the same time

intellectual instruction
and bodily training,
for the
one of
other
these,
he says, counteracts and frustrates the

2-3).
(viii. 4.
The Lacedaemonians made music no part

education
:
of their
Isocrat.
Panathen. Or.
'
xii.
p.
375, B.
they did not even learn
letters
'
(ypa/a/^-ara),
but
they are said to have been good judges

(viii.
of music
to
4.
it
6).
Aristotle
himself however seems
think
next to impossible that
men who have

(viii. 6. 1).
not
learned music can be good judges

Aristotle admits that music
as
may
be usefully learnt
:
an innocent pleasure
it
and
relaxation
but he
its
chiefly considers
as desirable
on account of
Essay VI.]

on the dispositions and
affections.
227
moral
effects,
A
is,
right turn of the j)leasurable
and painful emotions

:
in his opinion, essential to virtue
particular strains
and particular rhythms are naturally associated with

particular dispositions of
mind
by early teaching,
those strains and those rhythms which are associated
with temperate and laudable dispositions
may
be
made more agreeable
to a
youth than any others.

earliest,
He
will like best those
which he hears
and
which he
finds universally
commended and
relished
by those about him.
relish for the o/Aotw/xara of
virtuous dispositions will tend to increase in
him the
love of virtue itself

Aristotle
(viii. 6.
5-8).
enjoins
that
the
youth be taught
to
it
execute music instrumentally and vocally, because

is
only in this
or
way
that they can acquire a good

in
taste
judgment
music
besides which,
it
is
necessary to furnish boys with some occupation, to
absorb their restless energies, and there

suitable than music.
is
none more
Some
persons alleged that the
teaching music as a manual art was banausic and
degrading, lowering the citizen

of a hired professional singer.
objection
down
to the station
Aristotle meets this

shall be instructed
by providing that youths
in the musical art, but only with the
view of
correctfor-
ing and cultivating their taste
they are to be
bidden from making any use of their musical acquisitions, in riper
years, in actual
playing or singing
Q 2
228
(viii.

6.
[Essay VI.
o).
Aristotle observes,
that
music more
difficult
of execution
had been recently introduced

its
into
the agones, and had found
way from
the
agones into the ordinary education.

disapproves and excludes
it (viii. 6.
He decidedly He forbids 4).

instruit
both the
flute
and the harp, and every other

art to play
ment requiring much

the
flute,
upon
especially
which he considers as not
ethical,
but
orgiastical
calculated to
The
it
excite violent
and momena footing in
tary
emotions.
flute
obtained
invasion
;
Greece after the

that time
Persian
in
Athens at
:
became especially fashionable

afterwards (Plutarch
alleges,
but was
discontinued
through
the influence of Alcibiades).
The suggestions of
Aristotle for the education of
his citizen are far less copious

7 those of
.^'
and circumstantial than
Plato in his Republic.
He
delivers
no plan
of study, no arrangement of sciences to be successively
'"^communicated, no reasons for preferring or rejecting.

"^
We
totle
do not know what
it
was
'
precisely
which Aris-
comprehended
in the
term philosophy,' intended
by him
to be taught to his citizens as

leisure.
an aid
It
for the
proper employment of their
must pro-
bably have included the moral,
political,
and meta-
physical sciences, as they were then

sciences to
known
those
which
his
own voluminous works
relate.
By means
of the public table, supplied from the
produce of the public lands, Aristotle provides for
Essay VI.]
229 well
the full subsistence of every citizen.
Yet he
is
aware that the
citizens will be likely to increase in

efiScient
numbers too rapidly, and he suggests very

precautions against
imperfect in frame
it.
No
child at all deformed or
is
to be
brought up
if
children
beyond a convenient number,

posed
:
born, are to be ex-
but should the law of the State forbid such a
practice, care
must be taken
in them,
to
to
forestall conscious-
ness and
life
and
prevent their birth
by
a[Ji^X(ocrL<s (vii.
14. 10).
Aristotle establishes
two agora in
his city
one
situated near to the harbour, adapted to the buying,

selling,
and storing of goods, under the surveillance

:
of the agoranomus
the other called the free agora,
situated in the upper parts of the city, set apart for
the amusement and conversation of the citizens, and
never defiled by the introduction of any commodities

for sale.
No
artisan or
husbandman
is
ever to enter
the latter unless by special order from the authorities.
The temples of the Grods, the
residences of the various
boards of government functionaries, the gymnasia of

the older citizens, are
all to
be erected in this free

cities
agora
(vii. 11).
The Thessalian
had an agora
of this description where no

pations were permitted.
traffic
or
common
occu-
The moral tendency
of Aristotle's
reflections is
almost always useful and elevating.
The intimate
union which he formally recognises and perpetually
230

is
[Essay VI.
proclaims between happiness and virtue,
salutary
is,
and instructive
and
his ideas of
what virtue
are
perfectly just^ so far as relates to the conduct of his

citizens
towards each other

as
though
tliey are miser-
abl}^ defective
regards obligation towards non-
citizens.
He
always assigns the proper pre-eminence

virtue
:
to
wisdom and
he never overvalues the
advantages of
their
riches,
nor deems them entitled on
own
account, to
title to
any reverence or submission
he allows no
the obedience of mankind, except
that which arises from superior power and disposition to serve them.
Superior power and station, as

series of troubles
he considers them, involve a

obligations
to
some
more
of
which render them
objects of desire only
men
of virtue and beneficence.
What
all
is
rare and
more
creditable
still,
he treats
views
conquest and aggrandizement by a State as immoral
and
injurious,
even
to the
conquerors themselves.
THE END.
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Philos Sthics G881
Grote, George
Fragraents on ethical subjects

Aristotle - Fragments On Ethical Subjects (George Grote)

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Aristotle - Fragments On Ethical Subjects (George Grote)

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FROM HIS POSTHUMOUS

LONDON: JOHN MUKEAY, ALBEMARLE STREET.

MR. GROTE'S WORKS.

A HISTORY OF GEEECE. From

Generation coiitpmjiorary with

the Earliest Period Alexandkr the Great.

Maps, and Plans.

Any volume of this

PLATO AND OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOKEATES.

THE MINOR WORKS OF GEORGE GROTE.

his Intellectual Character, Writings,

AiEX. Bain, LL.D.

PERSONAL LIFE OF GEORGE GROTE.

Mr. Grote's vast collection of MSS. came

The work on Plato

for discussing various points of Ethical theory

he turned these opportunities to good account

published writings had he treated

systematically of the questions relating to Morals,

form that they usually assume in the

Ethical Philosophy formed, all

ancient and in modern times.

His own views

with James Mill

but they were matured by his

Mr. Grote belonged

to the Utilitarian school

the doctrines, as well as

yet his superior erudition, together with his great

powers both as a reasoner and as a writer, impart

the Origin and Nature of

tion of Ethics, the mental foundations of the sen-

elements that enter into the sentiment, he defines

generally as a sentiment of regulated social recias

presents in every grade of

are also in the Matter, some points of caj)ital uniformity,

which he enumerates; but account has

taken of the original and inherent diversities one

country and another.

meets the objection, urged against the derivation

the ethical motive.

Tbe second Essay

author takes his ground upon the juridical view

and Austin, and

conscience," and connects

defectiveness of the ancient systems in

bonum, or the happiness

end of morality being,

the individual happy, but to protect

another man, the theory of the sumto be stretched

contain a reference to the welfare of others.

not even excepting Aristotle himself.

The fourth Essay

handling of the several topics

bearings of Obh'gation, viewing society as the im-

mediate source of the ethical sanction

this conducts to the question of

the ultimate end.

The second part

tracing at some length the growth of ethical ideas