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AI includes management of assets (asset definition: engineered piece of equipment) for the
entire life cycle (concept-material selection-design-operation-maintenance-de-
commissioning). Maintenance is just a part of AI, which is a much broader term. AI also
includes technical safety assurance by way of technical and quantified assessments such as
fire / explosion consequence modeling, dispersion assessment, etc.
The logical steps involved in the AIPM process are given below:
3. How do one decide for which SCE/HSECES you need to populate the Reliability and
Survivability tables in the SCE/HSECES performance standards?
The Reliability and Survivability performance standards will have to developed for all
mitigation/protection/emergency response HSECES/SCEs. In other words, the reliability
and survivability performance standards for all the SCEs/HSECES that are located on
the left side of the bow need not be done since the MAH (Major Accident Hazard)
depicted / occurs only at the centre of the MAH bow tie. So logically, the performance
standards for all SCE/HSECES located on the right side of the bow will require to be
develop in terms of reliability and survivability..
4. Development of performance standards for the SCEs/ HSECESs seems to be one of the
critical activities in the whole AIPM process. Can you please explain this in simple
terms?
5. Bow Tie Assessment seems to be the logical starting point of AIPM process. Is it so?
Yes. Once the HAZID (Hazard Identification) workshop is carried out, the high and
medium risks (and based on SCE/HSECES definition of applicable standards/guidelines
such as UK HSE/ADNOC COP, etc.) are identified as MAH events. Once the barriers are
identified, then specific bow ties could be developed for each of the
SCEs/HSECES/barriers. Bow Tie method is universally used to demonstrate that MAH
events are controlled/mitigated using appropriate barriers/SCEs/HSECES.
6. Can there be a logical co-relation formed between Bow Tie Assessment and Swiss-
Cheese safety assessment techniques? Does this co-relation help in understanding AIPM?
Both Bow Tie and Swiss Cheese methods can be used to demonstrate that all MAHs are
controlled/mitigated using barriers/SCE/HSECES. Once the AI verification is carried out
using UK HSE traffic light system, ideally the bow ties should have all green (SCEs
performing as intended) barriers. Some major Oil & Gas operators consider ALARP (As
Low As Reasonably Practicable) condition for the asset if all SCEs/barriers are ‘Green’
and ‘Green Bow Tie’ is kept as the ultimate AIPM goal.
7. Since the SCEs/HSECES are basically hardware barriers, defining their performance
standards seem to be a complex process. Can you explain how this is done?
8. Achieving AIPM does seem to require synergy between HSE, Maintenance, Technical
/Engineering services & Asset Integrity (AI) departments as an integral pre-requisite. In
Yes, in order to achieve effective AIPM, all these departments should work together since
all of them have a role to play in achieving AIPM. Corporate Asset Management team
should understand the requirement for this synergy and co-ordinate the AIPM activities
accordingly.
9. Logically the left side of the bow tie should be given importance/ weightage considering
their role in preventing MAHs. But practically more SCE/HSECES are available on the
right side (mitigation/emergency response) of the bow with a typical 40 (left side):60
(right side) configuration. Does this bow tie requires some re-align/balancing to achieve a
60 (left): 40 (right) configuration? If so how is this achieved?
However one tries to balance the bow tie, technically, this 40 (left): 60 (right)
configuration will ultimately prevail. While correcting gaps /verification corrections/
while defining risk-based inspections, the Control/Prevention SCEs/HSECES should be
given priority and more weightage.
10. Once the performance standards for all SCEs/HSECES are defined, the next logical step
is to monitor their performance by way of performance indicators. How is this critical
step achieved?
11. The ‘Survivability’ table in the Performance Standard seems to be a bit confusing. Are all
emergency systems or SCEs designed to survive MAH events?
Not all SCEs are designed to survive MAH events. Please refer R 6 for details.
12. How do we co-relate functions of AI, HSE, Maintenance and Technical /Engineering
Services in achieving AIPM?
The performance assurance tasks for SCE/HSECES/barriers are achieved by all these
departments. A few performance assurance tasks and the roles of all these departments
are given below as examples.
13. How does Risk-Based Inspections play a role in the whole AIPM process?
Refer to FAQ 8.
Yes. Many Oil and Gas operating companies (Shell, UKOOA, Premier Oil, etc.) has
defined asset operations based on SCE/HSECES/barrier failure or degraded conditions.
Refer to point l of FAQ 2.
15. Logically, for an operating asset, the individual risk levels should be calculated based on
HSECES/barrier performance. How is this done?
The base case Individual Risk Per Annum (IRPA) levels are calculated in the QRA report
(part of COMAH report) by considering published barrier availability conditions based
on past failure data (ORDEA, E&P Forum, PARLOC, etc.). As part of the AI verification,
if the barrier performance is found to have failed or degraded, then the IRPA levels will
increase.
16. Ideally, who is suited as an ‘Asset Integrity Coordinator’ for an Oil & Gas asset?
17. Is there a comprehensive checklist that could be used by Asset Integrity managers to
ensure that nothing is left out to achieve effective AIPM?
Yes. OGP has developed a ‘Question Set’ (R 11) containing 34 questions that will help
AI managers to develop an effective AIPM.
References:
Compiled by:
Pillai Sreejith
E mail: pillai_sreejith@hotmail.com