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Humanistic Psychology as "The Other": The Marginalization of Dissident Voices within Academic Institutions1 Scott D. Churchill, Ph.D.

University of Dallas Abstract Situated within the framework of a "sociology of knowledge," this paper will explore both the place and displacement of humanistic psychology within institutional contexts ranging from private liberal arts colleges to professional organizations like the American Psychological Association. First, from the perspective of social constructionism, we present the function and marginalization of humanistic psychologists (including existential, phenomenological, human science, transpersonal, and "postmodern" schools of thought) within American academic psychology. Next we consider, from the perspective of Alfred Schutz's social phenomenology, humanistic psychology's place within academic psychology as "the stranger," both in terms of the fundamental incongruence of "traditional" versus "humanistic" psychological relevance systems and the resulting breakdown of the "interchangeability of standpoints" that normally allows for contemporaries to communicate. The specific nature of these conflicts is then elaborated with reference to Heidegger's analysis of the concept of time.
I. INSTITUTIONALIZATION

Berger and Luckmann (1966) begin their now classic text The Social Construction of Reality: A Treatise on the Sociology of Knowledge, with the observation: An earlier version of this paper was presented in K.R. Malone (Chair), Postmodernism raises the question of "the other": Does psychology reply? Symposium presented at the Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association, August 11,1995, New York City.
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The man in the street inhabits a world that is "real" to him, albeit in different degrees, and he "knows," with different degrees of confidence, that this world possesses such and such characteristics. The philosopher, of course, will raise questions about the ultimate status of both this "reality" and this "knowledge." What is real? How is one to know? These are among the most ancient questions not only of philosophical inquiry proper, but of human thought as such. (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 1) The psychologist today is both philosopher and man in the street. Equipped with various preconceptions regarding "what is real" and "how is one to know," psychologists attempt to understand and intervene in the world of behavior. The institutional settings within which psychologists find themselves can serve either to legitimate or to marginalize their work, according to what extent that work is itself an expression of the ideologies served by the institutions. Indeed, academic institutions are able to exist and function as institutions insofar as they participate in the production and promulgation of knowledge systems that ultimately justify on the one hand their own existence and on the other hand the ethical acts of their constituents. The scientific and theoretical knowledge systems produced by university researchers (and publicized by the APA) are examples of what Berger & Luckmann (1966) call "conceptual machineries of universe-maintenance" (p. 104). Those who individually or collectively refuse to adopt or adapt to the symbolic universe in question, or who stand in subversive defiance to it, are pushed to the margin of the institution; they are permitted to exist only insofar as their minority status disempowers their otherwise potent message. The inspiration for this paper came when I returned to Dallas from a meeting in Washington of the APA Science Directorate (in late November 1994), the purpose of which was to decide upon the invited speakers as well as the program for the 1995 Science Weekend at the Annual Convention. Representing Divisions 24 and 32,1 found myself on the margin of what was taking place, even as I actively petitioned to add philosophical and humanistic psychologists to the list of names being considered. Returning to the University of Dallas, a small Catholic institution that takes its mission statement quite seriously, I realized that I was also on the margin of what was taking place on my own turf, especially when I received a memo announcing that my university would be hosting the 1995 annual conference of the Institute of Personalist Psychology. The latter is a very conservative group of philosophers and philosophical psychologists whose central interest (in developing a psychology consistent with Catholic Philosophy) is indeed congruent with our university mission statement. I was dismayed that members of the Psychology department were to be among the last to

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know that a psychology conference would be hosted by our university. It demonstrated the university's ultimate power as well as our status as "fringe-dwellers," while also making it clear to us what kind of psychology gets financial support at a Catholic university. Some ideas grounded in the literature of phenomenology and social constructionism have helped me to understand the nature of the institutional order within which subgroups like a departments of psychology or divisions within the APA (such as Division 24 and 32) find themselves situated. I will begin by presenting the notion of "finite provinces of meaning." This expression derives from Alfred Schutz's (1973) essay "On Multiple Realities," in which he draws upon William James' analysis2 of our sense of reality to observe that "there are several, probably an infinite number of various orders of realities, each with its own special and separate style of existence. James calls them 'sub-universes' and mentions as examples . . . the world of science, . . . [and] the various supernatural worlds of mythology and religion" (Schutz, 1973, p. 207). Schutz prefers to speak of "finite provinces of meaning,"3 since no social group exists apart from the meanings ascribed to it by its constituents. We "bestow the accent of reality" upon the group of which we are a part. For Schutz, "we call a certain set of our experiences a finite province of meaning if all of them show a specific cognitive style and are with respect to this style not only consistent in themselves but also compatible with one another" (p. 207). Berger & Luckmann (1966) write: "Compared to the reality of everyday life, other realities appear as finite provinces of meaning, enclaves within the paramount reality marked by circumscribe^! meanings and modes of experience.... A L L FINITE PROVINCES OF MEANING powerful statement, especially when considered in relation to the field of psychology, or even in relation to the academy as a whole: In what sense is the field of psychology a turning away from everyday life? In what sense is the life of the university a turning away from the reality of everyday life? Psychology is certainly devoted to understanding and healing the psyche's of everyday people. So its "turning away" is of a different nature than a simple lack of interest in the everyday. We might say As a reference, Schutz cites Chapter XXI of Volume II of James' Principles of Psychology. 3 Schutz does not like the expression "sub-universes of reality" because, phenomenologically speaking, "it is the meaning of our experiences and not the ontological structure of the objects which constitutes reality" (Schutz, 1973, p. 230).
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ARE CHARACTERIZED BY A TURNING AWAY OF ATTENTION FROM THE REALITY OF EVERYDAY LIFE" (p. 25, emphasis added). This is a very

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that the field of psychology can be characterized as a turning away from the common sense definition of psychological reality that is, from an understanding that we are self-evidently moved by our own souls, (e.g., that we wave to a friend because we are happy to see her, and not because our genetic make-up and past environmental contingencies of reinforcement make it pleasurable for us to do so!). Psychology is thus a turning away from the way that common folk view the flow of experience in time. This turning away, stated positively, is a turning towards a finite province of meaning in which psychological processes are reifiedas parts of the natural universe that produce us, rather than the other way around.4 A special kind of reification occurs in the relationship of psychology to its subject matter. Forgetful of its own role in the production of understanding about the psyche, psychology5 takes its understanding of psychological life for granted as part of the natural order of things,6 and then proceeds to impart this objectivated knowledge to initiates within the field, who then go on to invent interventions in the consult"Typically," write Berger & Luckmann, "the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer of a world, is apprehended as its product, and human activity as an epiphenomenon of non-human processes. Human meanings are no longer understood as world-producing but as being, in their turn, products of the 'nature of things.' Even while apprehending the world in reified terms, man continues to produce it. . . Complex theoretical systems can be described as reifications, though presumably they have their roots in pretheoretical reifications established in this or that social situation" (1966, p. 89-90). 5 Here and throughout the paper I will break with APA format and refer to "psychology" rather than "psychologists," both to underline the reification of this subuniverse of individuals, and to point to the institutional nature of the "world of psychology." 6 "Considered as a cognitive construction, the symbolic universe is theoretical" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p.104) Originating in processes of subjective reflection, the constructions are themselves eventually objectivated, at which point the theoretical character of the particular symbolic universe whether that of a Catholic University or of a Science Directorate becomes "indubitable, no matter how . . . [questionable] such a universe may seem to an 'unsympathetic' outsider . . . . [and] everybody may 'inhabit' that universe in a takenfor-granted attitude: (p. 104). Here is the key idea borrowed from social constructionism: "If the institutional order is to be taken for granted in its totality as a meaningful whole, it must be legitimated by 'placement' in a symbolic universe" (p. 104).
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ing room as well as the work place that derive from psychology's understanding of "the truth" of human nature. Berger & Luckmann (1966) write that "reification is the apprehension of the products of human activity as if they were something else than human productssuch as facts of nature, results of cosmic laws, or manifestations of divine will. Reification implies that man is capable of forgetting his own authorship of the human world . . . "(p. 89).7 They also assert that "the reified world is, by definition, a dehumanized world" (p. 89). If it is precisely the psyche that is reined by psychologists, then this means that the psyche becomes dehumanized by psychology. This is indeed what Sartre (1943/1956) warned in Being and Nothingness when he said that the psyche as understood by psychologists "is made-to-be what it is not, and . . . it is not what it is madeto-be" (p. 167). (Already by 1943, Sartre was able to see both the productive nature of the scientific enterprise, and its dehumanizing consequences as well.) In the reification of its subject matter, there is a "detachment of [psychological] knowledge from its existential origins" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 87), which is precisely how psychology as a field turns its attention away from the reality of everyday life. The existential origin of psychological investigation is of course the world of everyday life, and it is precisely the function of humanistic and philosophically-minded psychologists within APA to turn our attention back to this lifeworld. As Merleau-Ponty (1945/1962) writes in his preface to the Phenomenology of Perception, The whole universe of science is built upon the world as directly experienced, and if we want to subject science itself to rigorous scrutiny and arrive at a precise assessment of its meaning and scope, we must begin by reawakening the basic experience of the world of which science is the second-order expression, (p. viii) To return to things themselves is to return to that world which precedes knowledge, of which knowledge always speaks, and in relation to which every scientific schematization is an abstract and derivative sign-language, as is geography in relation to the countryside in which we have learnt beforehand what a forest, a prairie or a river is. (p. ix) So, for psychology to return to its existential origins would mean to engage in a project of de-reification. (This is essentially what Edmund It appears that psychologists are willing to recognize and name and thereby reify all psychological processes except this self-forgetful process known to sociologists and philosophers as "reification"!
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Husserl (1913/1982) meant by the phenomenological epoche: the taking out of play of all preconceptions originating from the naturalistic prejudice, in order to allow consciousness to engage its world in a direct and unadulterated intuition.) Berger & Luckmann extend the scope of what is considered reification from the realm of scientific theory to the realm of religion. They write that "Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms" (p. 89).8 Furthermore, they assert that "the analysis of reification is important because it serves as a standing corrective to the reifying propensities of theoretical thought" (p. 91) The complex theoretical systems that become reified over time, whether those belonging to science or religion, have the function of "legitimating" the institutional order that produced the theoretical system in the first place. "Legitimation 'explains' the institutional order by ascribing cognitive validity to its objectivated meanings." (p. 93) As a social process, legitimation accomplishes this by inventing a philosophy that serves to justify a system of values already operative within the institution. Then, the institution pretends that this system of "knowledge" preceded the value system, so that the value system can be shown to rest on knowledge about the way things are. "In other words, 'knowledge' precedes 'values' in the legitimation of institutions" (p. 94). When, in fact, it is value systems that always already dictate the production of "knowledge." Knowledge systems thus function as conceptual machinery for the maintenance of symbolic universes. And in the institutional order, the inventors as well as the maintainers of legitimating knowledge systems hold a very important place within a given group. In my own work over the last dozen years, I realize that I have been limited by the institutional contexts within which I belong to subgroups When man is seen, for example, as the creation of God, then an understanding of human nature will be drawn from the same theoretical and pre-theoretical understanding of God that pronounces human nature as the makings of a god. Here, as is typical in the social world, "the real relationship between man and his world is reversed in consciousness. Man, the producer of a world [in the case at hand, a Christian world], is apprehended as its product, and human activity [is apprehended] as an epiphenomenon of non-human processes. Human meanings are no longer understood as world-producing, but as being, in their turn, products of the 'nature of things.'" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p.89) Hence, "complex theoretical systems [such as Catholic philosophy] can be described as reifications, though presumably they have their roots in pretheoretical reifications" (p. 89) that, far from being the "mental constructions of intellectuals," originate from the consciousness of the man in the street.
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that function not as maintainers, but essentially as dissidents within the institutional order, and thus always remain on the margin. Interestingly, the two primary social institutions within which I work the University of Dallas and the APA are each involved in their own enterprise of legitimating a particular reification of human reality: As a Catholic university, my immediate work place illuminates the human world from the perspective of its own particular supra-human interests; while the APA is on the other hand caught up for the most part in illuminating the human person in terms of the non-human and subhuman, (i.e., environmental and biological forces). Indeed, at the APA's November 1994 planning session for its 1995 Science Weekend, a physicalistic interpretation of human reality was so taken-for-granted that there was talk of inviting as honored speakers not only the physiological psychologists studying the brain by means of functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging (fMRI) technology, but also the physicists themselves who were the developers of this technology.9 In other words, physicists, who have themselves effectively become maintainers of the legitimating apparatus of modern psychology, are given more consideration than philosophically-minded psychologists, who are adversaries of the physicalistic paradigm of science, when it comes to showcasing psychological research at Science Weekend.10 What happens when one finds oneself as having a different opinion from the majority within a symbolic universe? One becomes, essentially, "The Other." Simultaneously, from our perspective, "traditional psychology" becomes "The Other" something to be kept at bay, critiqued, and passed over. One's Otherness is in fact a prerequisite of the legitimating apparatus, insofar as knowledge systems, we know, are first invented to justify institutional orders (belief systems and codes of conduct) to those individuals to whom the institution's ways are not self-evidently 'correct.' These Others would include, for example, the Thus if the praxis of physicists has contributed to maintenance of the physicalism that has become psychology's theoretical substructure (namely, the study of the psyche as just another "thing of nature"), then physicists get to be honored as psychologists (which in turn means that the logos of psyche has been equivocated with the imaging of the brain). 10 Of the several names we managed to get onto the ballot Giorgi, Polkinghorne, DeRivera, Pribram, and Rychlak Rychlak did make it to the final list. Giorgi would have, but at the last minute, someone raised the question of whether minorities were being fairly represented. And so Amedeo Giorgi, a white male with radical views, was dropped from the final list in favor of someone who might have been a minority (demographically speaking), but who most certainly was a Maintainer of the majority view within the APA.
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heretics for whom the Church invented apologetics to justify herself. "Legitimation justifies the institutional order by giving a normative dignity to its practical imperatives. . . . [it] is not just a matter of 'values.' It always implies 'knowledge' as well." (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 93) "Heretical groups [like humanistic and postmodern psychologists within the APA, or even non-Catholics within a Catholic university] posit not only a theoretical threat to the symbolic universe, but a practical one to the institutional order legitimated by the symbolic universe in question" (p. 107). n (Indeed, the 1995 APA Convention Program [p. 258] lists a paper entitled "Post-Modernists Threaten the Science and Application of Psychology.") Berger and Luckmann describe a process of "nihilation" (pp. 114 ff) whereby "the threat to the social definitions of reality is neutralized by assigning an inferior ontological status, and thereby a not-to-be-takenseriously cognitive structure, to all definitions existing outside the symbolic universe" (p. 115). (The "Letters to the Editor" section of the APA Monitor, for example, has given space in recent years to mainstream psychologists such as Hans Eysenck, who is allowed to present tirades against psychoanalysis.) Nihilation can also take the form of "incorporat[ing] the deviant conceptions within one's own universe, and thereby liquidating] them" (Berger & Luckmann, 1966, p. 115): "In this manner, the negation of one's universe is subtly changed into an affirmation of it" (ibid.). Thus we observe the practice of psychology textbook writers, who pay lip service to humanistic psychology by continuing to talk about the "phenomenology" of Carl Rogers and presenting handsome graphic representations of Abraham Maslow's 1940s hierarchy of motives thereby acknowledging humanistic psychology while reducing it to its earliest formulations, and thus "incor-

As long as we remain mere dissidents within our institution, we are still less of a threat (Psychologically speaking ) to individuals maintaining that institution than would be the existence of "an alternative symbolic universe with an 'official' tradition whose taken-for-granted objectivity is equal to one's own. It is much less shocking to the reality status of one's own universe to have to deal with minority groups of deviants, whose contrariness is ipso facto defined as folly or wickedness, than to confront another society that views one's own definitions of reality as ignorant. . . .(Berger & Luckmann, 1966, pp. 107-8). "The appearance of an alternative symbolic universe poses a threat because its very existence demonstrates empirically that one's own universe is less than inevitable" (p. 108). In a small ivory tower, however, it becomes easy to pretend that other worldviews do not exist: you simply create a power structure within which the threat of an alternative symbolic universe cannot survive economically.

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porating" its vision as nothing more than a footnote in the history of psychology (see Churchill, 1988). An alternative to nihilation is therapy, in which the "Other" is offered the chance of assimilating oneself into the institutional order. In my own case, for example, upon my return from the 1995 APA Convention, I was invited to participate in our faculty week seminar in which we will read Herburgh's (1994) The Challenge and Promise of a Catholic University. The apparent aim was that all those who attend will be edified in their allegiance to the Catholic mission of the university. In his essay on "The Stranger" Alfred Schutz (1971) writes that: the reproach of doubtful loyalty originates in the astonishment of the members of the in-group that the stranger does not accept the total of its cultural pattern as the natural and appropriate way of life and as the best of all possible solutions of any problem. The stranger is called ungrateful, since he refuses to acknowledge that the cultural pattern offered to him grants him shelter and protection. But these people do not understand that the stranger in the state of transition does not consider this pattern as a protecting shelter at all but as a labyrinth in which he has lost all sense of his bearings, (pp. 104-105.)
II. THE INCONGRUENCE OF SYSTEMS OF RELEVANCE WITHIN PSYCHOLOGY

In his essay on "Common-Sense and Scientific Interpretation of Human Action," Schutz (1973) writes that "common-sense thinking overcomes the differences in individual perspectives" by means of (a) the interchangeability of standpoints (namely, that our ability to step into each other's shoes makes possible the resolution of perceptual differences); and (b) the congruency of relevance systems (namely, that our frames of interpretive reference are for all intents and purposes equivalent): "What is supposed to be known in common by everyone who shares our system of relevances is the way of life considered to be the natural, the good, the right one by the members of the 'in-group'" (p. 13). How is it, then, that we can experience ourselves as "strangers, as the "Other," in the context of our institutional life? Schutz emphasized that there is a cognitive style peculiar to each finite province of meaning, and that furthermore, all experiences within a finite province of meaning are "compatible with one another" only relative to this specific cognitive style (1973, p. 230). Schutz elaborates this concept by stating that such a style consists of, among other things, a specific epoche, namely, a suspension of doubt; a specific form of experiencing one's self; a specific form of sociality; and a specific time-perspective (pp. 230-232). Furthermore, he asserts that what is seen as consistent

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and compatible within one province of meaning will not necessarily be seen as such within another province of meaning; hence, the talk of finite provinces of meaning. "The passing from one to the other can only be performed by a 'leap,' as Kierkegaard calls it, which manifests itself in the subjective experience of a shock." (p. 232) What, indeed, is so shocking about stepping out of one province and into another? Here we consult Heidegger (1925/1985), who in his Prolegomena to the History of the Concept of Time points to the understanding of time as the ultimate basis for differentiating all conceptions of reality, and therefore all finite provinces of meaning. Naturalism itself is a thesis developed into a system of knowledge (known as "modern science") that is the correlative of a specific cognitive style that Husserl called the "naturalistic prejudice" a bias in which the natural world can only be seen according to a way of seeing that posits only "facts." Heidegger states: "Positivism is to be understood not only as a maxim of concrete research but in general as a theory of knowledge and culture" (p. 15). With regard to the marginalization of humanistic psychology, this prompts us to ask: what lies at the root of the difference between the cognitive styles of (a) traditional empirical psychologists, (b) humanistic psychologists, and (c) even Catholic philosophers?12 It appears that this does in fact have something to do with our conceptions of time. In terms of theory, traditional psychology eschews teleological thinking. One consequence is that there is no room for an agent whose behavior is purposefully directed toward self-projected ends. B.F. Skinner (1971), for example, wrote in Beyond Freedom and Dignity that "nothing is . . . left for which autonomous man can take credit" (p. 58). In the final analysis, he claimed "that what we call the behavior of the human organism is not more free than its digestion, gestation, immunization, or any other physiological process" (1975, p. 47). According to this view, any intentions we project as goals are merely self-flattering and ultimately self-deceptive phantoms that have "no explanatory force" insofar as they are really only "collateral products" of the biological chain of events that is behavior (1975, p. 43). Skinner serves as a good example here because in his radical behaviorism the "At first sight, this seems to be a strange sort of an approach, or in any case a detour. But it loses its strangeness as soon as we recall, even quite superficially, that both historical reality and natural reality are continuities that run their course in time and are traditionally understood as such . . . . To the totality of temporal reality we tend to juxtapose the extratemporal constituents which, for example, are the topic of research on mathematics. In addition . . . we are familiar with supratemporal constituents in metaphysics or theology, understood as eternity." (Heidegger, 1925/1985, p. 5)
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epiphenomenalism of consciousness comes across more clearly than in cognitive psychology, which nonetheless finds its own ways of avoiding a teleological view of consciousness. Giorgi (1987) wondered aloud several years ago why cognitive psychology, which came about historically at approximately the same time as humanistic psychology, has flourished so well while humanistic psychology can hardly even be considered a viable "force" in academic psychology. He looked to practical reasons, such as the large number of humanistic psychologists who go into private practice rather than university teaching or research positions. The deeper reasons may be, however, more ideological than practical: cognitive psychology managed to put the psyche back into psychology while maintaining a temporal perspective of linear determinism. For humanistic psychologists, phenomenologists, and transpersonal psychologists, the psyche always transcends the physical order, and can neither be reduced to neither physiological mechanisms nor to heuristic algorithms. The latter can be measured in clock time; the psyche's temporality cannot. This means that two fundamentally different cognitive styles, corresponding to two different time perspectives, are at work in traditional versus humanistic psychologies.13 Moreover, the difference in time perspective extends from theory into practice, insofar as psychology adheres to a mechanistic conception of time, which is rooted in (even while helping to maintain) the model of technological efficiency seen first in industry and its assembly-line fashioning of man to machine. Such a psychology both motivates and grounds itself in an ethics of efficiency, the most recent appearance of which is the development of a "managed-care" system of therapeutics. Contemporary psychotherapy is yielding itself to a worldview wherein the person and his or her existential dilemmas are being managed by MBA's whose job it is to fit one's psychopathology to the time frame deemed nomothetically most cost-effective. Finally, what about the precarious position of humanistic psychology at religious institutions? In the South, the term "humanism" always smacks of something evil, Godless, and self-aggrandizing. Although phenomenological psychology has tended to be supported at Catholic institutions throughout the Western world, this has generally been the case where the institution is characterized by an openness in its search for truth, as opposed to a dogmatic commitment to a doctrine of "The Truth" in which all teleology must point toward the one and only God (as conceived by the Catholic Church) in order to be consistent with the university mission. Thus, even phenomenological psychologists arguing for a teleological conception of the human person can none"See Sartre (1943/1956, Part Two: "Original Temporality and Psychic Temporality: Reflection") and Churchill (1991) for elaborations of this theme."
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theless be held in contempt if theirs is not the proper teleological conception, one that has its beginning and end in eternity. Again, we see that it is a difference in time perspective that results in the marginalization of humanistic psychology. Once one has aligned oneself with one of these fundamentally opposed worldviews (each of which is the function of a difference cognitive style, according to which the province of meaning specific to it is experienced as consistent and the experiences within this province are seen as compatible), one cannot help but to see someone subscribing to the alternative view as fundamentally "Other." Sartre (1943/1956) put it very simply when he stated that "the essence of the relations between consciousnesses is not the Mitsein; it is conflict" (p. 429). Thus writes Simone de Beauvoir (1949/1952) that: no group ever sets itself up as the One without at once setting up the Other over against itself. . . . following Hegel, we find in consciousness itself a fundamental hostility toward every other consciousness; the subject can be posed only in being opposed he sets himself up as the essential, as opposed to the other, the inessential, the object, (p. xxix) It is not the Other who, in defining himself as the Other, establishes the One. The Other is posed as such by the One in defining himself as the One. But if the Other is not to regain the status of being the One, he must be submissive enough to accept this alien point of view." (p. xxx) Are we being submissive (if not downright separatist) in accepting our "divisional" status within the APA (which delineates in advance the field of our influence)? Recent discussions of a new "subdiscipline" of theoretical psychology (Slife & Williams, 1997) aim in an integrative direction; but, the existing bias toward naturalism with in psychology as a whole might simply respond the way it already has with humanistic psychology: by not listening. I close then with a question rather than a solution. If it is ultimately a difference in the conception of time that constitutes us as "the Other" within mainstream psychology, if we are separated by cognitive styles that are fundamentally incongruent, if we are too small of a group of dissidents to ultimately change the style and direction of thinking in contemporary psychology, then what are we to do? Is it our destiny to remain but a footnote in the history textbooks of psychology? REFERENCES Beauvoir, S. de (1952). The second sex (H.M. Parshley, Trans.). New York: Vintage Books. (Original work published 1949)

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Berger, P. & Luckmann, T. (1966). The social construction of reality: A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. New York: Doubleday. Churchill, S.D. (1988). Humanistic psychology and introductory textbooks. The Humanistic Psychologist, 16, 2, 341-357. Churchill, S.D. (1991). Reasons, causes, and motives: Psychology's illusive explanantions of behavior. Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 11, 24-34. Giorgi, A. (1987). The crisis of humanistic psychology. The Humanistic Psychologist, 15, 5-20. Giorgi, A. (1992). Whither humanistic psychology? The Humanistic Psychologist, 20, 422-438. Heidegger, M. (1985). Prolegomena to the history of the concept of time (T. Kisiel, Trans.). Bloomington: Indiana University Press. (Original work prepared in 1925 and published in 1979) Hesburgh, T.M. (Ed.) (1994). The challenge and promise of a Catholic university. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. Husserl, E. (1982). Ideas pertaining to a pure phenomenology and a phenomenological philosophy - First Book: General introduction to a pure phenomenology (F. Kersten, Trans.). Boston: Marinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1913) Sartre, J.-P. (1956). Being and nothingness (H. Barnes, Trans.). New York: Philosophical Library. (Original work published 1943) Schutz, A. (1971). The stranger. In A Schutz, Collected papers Vol. II: Studies in social theory (pp. 91-105), The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. (Original work published 1944) Schutz, A. (1973). Collected papers Vol. I: The problem of social reality. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff. Skinner, B.F. (1971). Beyond freedom and dignity. New York: Alfred Knopf. Skinner, B.F. (1975). The steep and thorny way to a science of behavior. American Psychologist, 42, 8, 780-786. Slife, B. D., & Williams, R. N. (1997). Toward a theoretical psychology: Should a subdiscipline be formally recognized? American Psychologist, 52, 111 - 129.

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