'Suunyavaada: A Reinterprertation HARSH NARAIN Philosophy East and West 13, no.

4, January, 1964 (c) by The University Press of Hawaii p.311-338 P.311 PARADOXICALLY ENOUGH, the Maadhyamikas, who were undoubtedly a most clear-headed group of Indian philosophers, happen to be the most misunderstood of them today. A careful scrutiny of original texts of the the Maadhyamikas, as also of those of their rivals, confirms the opinion that the Maadhyamika philosophy, 'Suunyavaada, is absolute nihilism rather than a form of Absolutism or Absolutistic monism, as commonly believed today. The burden of this paper is to reveal and demonstrate the modern mistake of regarding the 'Suunyavaada as a form of Absolutism and to throw into relief its real, nihilistic character.* I In the early days of Buddhist studies, scholars were unanimously of the opinion that 'Suunyavaada was rank nihilism or negativism, that it countenanced a view of reality as pure void. Thus, according to H. Kern, 'Suunyavaada is "complete and pure nihilism, " and, according to M. Walleser, "negativism which ralically empties existence up to the last consequences of negation." H. Jacobi takes it that on the Maadhyamika view "all our ideas are based upon a nonentity or upon the Void." A. B. Keith holds that t he Maadhyamikas' reality _____________________________________________________

Abbreviations used to refer to frequently cited texts are as follows: BCA 'Saantideva, Bodhicaryaavataava, Louis de La Vallee-Poussin, ed., with BCAP, BI (Vol. 983, New Series, 1901). BCAP Praj~naakaramati, Bodhicaryaavataara-pa~njikaa (BCA ed.). BI Bibliotheca Indica (Calcutta: Asiatic Society of Bengal, Baptist Mission Press, various dates). CS The Catu.h-'sataka of AAryadeva, Sanskrit and Tibetan Texts with copious Extracts from the Commentary of Candrakiirti (CSV). Reconstructed and edited by Vidhushekhara Bhattacharya. [Santiniketan: Kishorimohan Santra, Visva-Bharati, 1931], Vol. XXXIV, p. 308. CSV Candrakiirti, Cantu.h-'sataka-v.rtti(CS ed.). CSt Naagaarjuna, Catu.h-stava, Prabhubhai Patel, ed., Indian Historical Quarterly, VIII, No. 2 (June, 1932), 316-331; No. 4 (December, 1932), 689-705. MK Naagaarjuna, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa (Maadhyamika-suutra), Louis de La VallPoussin, ed., with MKV, Bibliotheca Buddhica, Vol. IV (St. Petersbourgh: The Imperial Academy of Sciences, 1913). MKV Candrakiirti, Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa-v.rtti (MK ed.). VV Naagaarjuna, Vigrahavyaavarttani, K. P. Jayaswal and Raahula Saa^nk.rtyaayana, eds., JBORS, XXIII (1937),Part IV (n.d.), first appendix, pp. 1-31. p.312 is "absolute nothingness." I. Wach characterizes them as the most radical nihilists that ever existed.(1) But, exceptions apart, later scholars, viz., those

from Th. Stcherbatsky down to T. R. V. Murti, find in 'Suunyavaada an Absolutism more or less akin to that of the Vedaanta. Stcherbatsky translates the term "'suunyataa," used by the Maadhyamika, as relative or contingent.(2) He hastens to add, however, that it "means not something void, but something 'devoid' of independent reality (svabhaava-'suunya'), with the implication that nothing short of the whole possesses independent reality, and with the further implication that the whole forbids every formulation by concept or speech (ni.sprapa~nca) since they can only bifurcate (viikalpa) reality and never directly seize it...."(3) He sums up the Maadhyamika position thus: "The universe viewed as a whole is the Absolute, viewed as a process it is the Phenomenal."(4) Murti has it that the terms "'suunya" and "'suunyataa" are applied to phenomena as well as to the Absolute: to phenomena because, being dependent on and relative to each other, they are devoid of essence; to the Absolute because it is devoid of conceptual distinctions.(5) According to him, the Maadhyamika denies, not the real, but doctrines about the real(6) Indeed, he regards 'Suunyavaada as "a very consistent form of absolutism."(7) Earlier orientalists find ample support from the Indian tradition, the verdict of which is that 'Suunyavaada is pure nihilism.(8) The consensus of Hindu opinion is in farer of regarding it as nothing but nihilism.s The Hindus also find in it an outright repudiation of all the four conceivable categories of reality-viz., is, is-not, both, and neither--and hold it to be thesisless through and _____________________________________________________ (1) All these references are taken from Th. Stcherbatsky, The Coception of Buddhist Nirvaa.na

(Leningrad: The Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1927), p. 37. (2) Ibid., p. 42. All documentation and hyphenation follow the author's preferred style. (3) Ibid., p. 43. (4) Ibid., p. 48. (5) T. R. V. Murti, The Central PhiloJophy of Buddhism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1955), p. 142, n. 1. (6) Ibid., p. 218. (7) Ibid., p. 234. (8) See, for example, Gautama, Nyaaya-suutra, Ganga Nath Jha, ed. (Poona: Oriental book Agency, 1939), 4.1.37-41, and commentaries, glosses, and scholia thereon; Kumaarila, mimaa^msaa'sloka-vaartika (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1898), 1.1.5. Niraalambanavaada, stanza (14); 'Sa^nkara, 'Saariiraka-bhaa.sya, Mahaadeva 'Saastrii Bakre, ed., and Waasudeva Laxman 'Saastrii Pa.na'siikar,, rev. (3rd ed., Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press, 1934), 2.2.31, pp. 478-479; 'Sa^nkara, B.rhadaara.nyaka-upani.sad-bhaa.sya (2nd impression, Gorakhpur: Gita Press, 1355), 4.3.7, p. 905 Raamaanuja, 'Sri-bhaa.sya Vaasudeva 'Saastrii Abhya^nkara, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series Vol. LXVIII (Bombay: Nit.naya-Saagar Press, 1914), 2.2.30, pp. 495-496; Saa^mkhyapravacana-suutra. AA'subodha Vidyaabhuu.sa.na and Nityabodha Vidyaaratna, eds.

(3rd ed., Calutta: Vaacaspatya Press, 1936), 1.44-47, and Vij~naanabhik.su, Saa^mkhyapravacana-bhaa.sya, ad loc. (in the same publication); Maadhava, Sarvadar'sama-sa^mgraha, Vaasudeva 'Saastrii Abhya^nkara, ed. (2nd ed., Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1951),p. 29. p.313 though.(9) It will be shown in the sequel that 'Suunyavaada in this respect is nothing but nihilism in its extremest form. The authors of the Maa,n.duukyakaarikaa (AAgama-'saastra) and the Yogavaasi.s.ttha, however, seem to view 'Suunyavaada as a form of Vedaantism, inasmuch as they tend to identify "'suunya" with Brabman;(10) but they are exceptions which only prove the rule. Besides, they seem to have been actuated by the ambition to effect a synthesis between Buddhism and the Vedaanta rather than to interpr et the Maadhyamika system objectively. Jaina writers endorse the nihilistic view of 'Suunyavaada taken by the Hindu tradition.(11) A much more significant fact is that even the Yogaacaara school of Buddhism shares this view of 'Suunyavaada. The Sarvasiddhaanta-sa^mgraha, ascribed to 'Sa^mkara, quotes the Yogaacaara as criticizing 'Suunyavaada on the score of its being total nihilism.(12) Such stalwarts of the Yogaacaara school as Asa^nga, Vasubandhu, and Sthiramati regard it as a doctrine of absolute nothingness.(13) By far the most significant point, however, is the fact that the Maadhyamikas themselves refer to Yogaacaaras and others as interpreting them nihilistically, without taking the least excepti on to this interpretation. This point will be enlarged

upon in the sequel.(14) In the face of such an almost unanimous verdict of tradition, it is difficult to see how the nihilistic interpretation of 'Suunyavaada can be rejected as totally false. II Franke and Kern note that in early Buddhism there is already a tendency to idealistic nihilism and that, according to it, to quote Kern in the words of _____________________________________________________ (9) See, for example, Udayana, Nyaayavaartikataatparya-pari'suddhi, Vindhye'svariiprasaada Dvivedin and Lak.sma.na 'Saastrii Dravi.da, eds., BI, Work No. 209 (1924), 1.1.1, p. 291. (10) See Tbe AAgama-'saastra of Gau.dapaada, Vidhu'sekhara Bha.t.taacaarya, ed. and trans. (Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1943), 4.83-84; Yogavaasi.s.tha, Vaasudeva Lak.sma.na 'Saastrii Pa.na'siikara and Naaraaya.na Raama AAcaarya, eds. (3rd ed., Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press, 1937), 3.5.7, p. 140. (11) See, for example, Prabhaacandra, Prameyakamalamaarta.n.da, Mahendra Kumaara 'Saastri (2nd ed, Bombay: Nir.naya-Saagar Press, 1941), pp. 39-98; Hemacandra, Anyayogavyavacchedadvaatri^m'sikaa, st, 17, and Malli.se.na, Syaadvaada-ma~njari, the eon, A. B. Dhruva, ed., Bombay Sanskrit and Prakrit Series, Vol. LXXXIII (Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1933), pp. 115-122.

(12) See Sarvasiddhaanta-sa^mgraha, M. Ra^ngaacaarya, ed. (Madras: Government Press, 1909), p. 12. (13) Asa^nga, Bodhisattvabhuumi, Unrai Wogihara, ed. (Tokyo: n.p., 1930) p. 44; Sthiramati, Madhyaantavibhaagasuutrabhaa.sya.tika, Vidhu'sekhara Bha.t.taacaarya and Giuseppe Tucci, eds. (London Luzac & Co., 1932), p. 9; Yuan Chwang, Vij~naptimaatrataasiddhi-'saastra, restored into Sanskrit by Raahula Saa^nk.rityaayana with the help of Wong Mow Lam, JBORS, XIX, Part IV (December, 1933), Appendix, p. 4. (14) See section IV (infra). p.314 Keith, "There is nothing internal nor external for him with true discernment, and a realization of non-existence is the means to secure a safe crossing of the tumult of life."(15) The order of planes of existence on which the Buddha dwelt, as set out in the Cuulasu~n~nata-sutta of the Majjhima-nikaaya,(16) lends support to this view. The planes are: [1] Consciousness of humanity (manussa-sa~n~naa) [2] Consciousness of forest (ara~n~na-sa~n~naa) [3] Consciousness of the earth [4] Consciousness of the infinity of space [5] Consciousness of the infinity of ideation [6] Consciousness of nothingness (aaki~nca~n~naayatana-sa~n~naa) [7] Consciousness of neither-consciousness-nor-unconsciousness [8] Objectless cessation of consciousness [9] The supreme, ultimate void (paramaanuttaraa-su~n~nataa)

As will be developed in the sequel, thesislessness, or repudiation of all views, of all metaphysics, which is so zealously advocated by the Maadhyamika, is nihilism carried to its logical extreme. And it is significant that the Buddha himself preaches such thesislessness to an ascetic, Diighanakha, in no equivocal terms.(17) There are a good many such suggestions in the Suttanipaata, too.(18) That the Buddha analyzed the whole of reality into a fivefold scheme of momentary reals railed dharmas is common knowledge; that he occasionally preached their ultimate unreality, so as to prompt Naagaarjuna, and also Gau.dapaada, to claim that he preached no dharmas at all,(19) is unknown to many. Of the five dharmas, he likens sensum (ruupa) to dots of foam, feeling (vedanaa) to bubbles, perception (sa~n~naa) to a mirage, impression (sa^nkhaara) to a banana tree, and awareness (vi~n~naana) to illusion ( maayaa).(20) A more clearly nihilistic teaching is: "Depending on the oil and the wick does the light of the lamp burn; it is neither in the one nor in the other, nor is it anything in itself; phenomena are, likewise, nothing in themselves. All things are unreal; _____________________________________________________ (15) See A. B. Keith, Buddhist Philosophy in India and Ceylon (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1923),p. 47. Quotations from Franke and Kern are taken from this reference. (16) See Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka III entitled Upari-pa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. III, Raahula Saa^nk.rtyaayana, ed. (Naalandaa: Paali Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1958), sutta 21 (121 of the whole treatise) entitled

"Cuulasu~n~nata-sutta," pp. 169-173. Cf. Udaana, Paul Steinthal, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1948),VIII. 1, p. 80. (17) See ibid., Pa.n.naasaka II entitled Majjhima-pa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. II, sutta 24 (74 of the whole treatise) entitled "Diighanakha-sutta,'' pp. 193-197. (18) See, for example, Sutta nipaata, Lord Chalmers, ed., Harvard Oriental Series, Vol. 37 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932), stanzas 794, 800, 803, 811, 824-834, 839, and 877-914. (19) MK, 25.24; CSt., 1.4; AAgama-'saastra, 4.99. (20) See Murti, op. cit., p. 50, n. 2. p.315 they are deceptions; nibbaana is the only truth.(21) His rejection of both the existence view and the non-existence view of reality,(22) too, serves to align him with the 'Suunyavaadin, broadly speaking. The Maadhyamika seeks to reconcile the Buddha's realistic, dharma-positing, with nihilistic, dharma-denying, sermons by declaring the former as of a secondary or empirical import and the latter as of primary or absolute import.(23) Indeed, there are suggestions in the Buddha himself that the latter is a highter teaching than the former.(24) III The Maadhyamika philosophy is a development of

the amorphous ideas of 'suunyataa contained in the canonical Mahaayaana Suutras, especially the Praj~naapaaramitaa texts, which were systematized and skillfully developed by Naagaarjuna into a full-fledged doctrine of 'suunyataa.(25) Let us, therefore, scrutinize these text to determine what light they can throw on the notion of 'suunyataa. One of the texts has it that all dharmas, as well as the soul, are non-existent.(26) Elsewhere, all dharmas are described as illusory and dreamlike. Indeed, the text goes to the length of declaring: "Even the All-Enlightened One (Samyak-sambuddha) is illusory and dreamlike; even All-Enlightened-Onehood is illusory and dreamlike.(27) This interesting statement, which has been put in the mouth of Subhuuti, who is shown as addressing the sons of gods, takes the latter aback, and they ask Subhuuti if he really means what he says. Let us quote their own words: Well, Revered Subhuuti, do you say that even the All-Enlightened One is illusory and dreamlike? Do you say that even All-Enlightened-One-hood is illusory and dreamlike?(28) _____________________________________________________ (21) Majjhima-nikaaya, III, 40, p. 330. Cp. Sutta-nipaata, sts. 757-758; MK, 13.2. (22) Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka I entitled Muulapa.n.naasaka and constituting Vol. I, P. V. Bapat, ed. (Naalandaa: Paali Publication Board, Bihar Government, 1958), sutta 11 entitled "Cuulasiihadanaada-sutta, " p. 92. Also see Udaana, vagga 3, sutta 10, p. 33; Itivuttaka, Ernst Windisch, ed. (London: Oxford University Press, 1948:), nipaata 2, vagga 2, sutta 12, p.

43; Samaadhiraajasuutra, Nalinaksha Dutt and Shiv Nath Sharma, eds., Gilgit Manuscripts, Vol. II (Calcutta: Calcutta Oriental Press, 1941),9.27; MK 15.7. (23) See MKV, 1.1, pp. 40-44; 15.11, p. 276; colophon (p. 594). (24) See Majjhima-nikaaya, Pa.n.naasaka I, sutta 22 entitled "Alagadduupama-sutta, " pp. 179-180, where dharmas are likened to a raft to be left off after crossing the stream. Cp. "My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. (He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.) He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly." Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (4th impression, London: Rouledge and Kegan Paul, 1949),6.54. (25) See MKV, p. 3. (26) A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, Rajendralala Mitra, ed., BI ( 1888), p. 29. (27) Ibid. (28) Ibid., p. 40. p.316 Subhuuti, undeterred by the question, replies: Sons of gods, even nirvaa.na I declare illusory and dreamlike, let alone the question of any other

dharma.(29) [The sons of gods are further confused. But Subhuuti goes on:] "If there were any other, more peculiar dharma than nirvaa.n, I would declare it illusory and dreamlike."(30) These simple, straightforward statements hardly leave any doubt about the fact that, according to the texts under consideration, all is pure void. That the Maadhyamika's is not only a no-doctrine attitude about reality but literally a no-reality doctrine is further confirmed by such statements as the following, contained in other Mahaayaana Suutras: This all is mere name, subsisting by name alone. The named as different from the name does not exist. Those dharmas which are designated by the various names are simply not there. Such is the dharma-ness of the dharmas. Nameness is devoid of name. nor does name subsist by name. All dharmas are nameless though revealed by name. These dharmas are non-existent and are brought forth by ideation.(31) All dharmas are false...illusory... dreamlike... water-moon-like...(32) It is wrong to suppose that the Maadhyamika characterrizes as void only dharmas and not the ineffable Absolute. Buddhism, the Maadhyamika system not excepted, analyzes the whole of reality into dharmas, which are of two kinds--conditioned (sa^msk.rta) and unconditioned (asa^msk.rta)--and the Absolute or the ineffable must, if at all, take its place somewhere in the list of the dharmas. To the Buddhist, to whatever school he belongs, there is nothing higher than nirvaa.na, which is a dharma. Besides, there are clear indications in the Praj~naapaaramitaa texts that 'sunyataa is not beyond but identical with dharmas. Lest someone, like

those who read Absolutism into them, should construe 'suunyataa to mean something over and above the dharmas, these texts are never tired of repeatedly reminding the reader that 'suunyataa is non-different from the dharmas. Take, for example, the following: Sensum is void ('suunya) of sensum. What is voidness ('suunyataa) of sensum is not sensum, nor is voidness other than sensum. Sensum itself is voidness; voidness itself is sensum. Feeling is void of feeling. What is voidness of feeling is not feeling, nor is voidness other than feeling. Feeling itself is voidness; voidness itself is feeling.(33) _____________________________________________________ (29) Ibid. It is significant that even the Buddha and Buddhahood are accounted dharmas here. (30) Ibid. (31) Bhavasa^mkraanti-suutra, restored with Naagaarjuna's Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra in three recensions, along with the commentary of Maitreyanaatha, from the Tibetan and Chinese versions into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami 'Saastrii (Adyat: Adyar Library, 1938), pp. 5-6. (32) Ratnakuu.ta-suutra, quoted in MKV, 1.1, pp. 52-53. (33) 'Satasaaharikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, prataapacandra Gho.sa, ed., BI (1902), Part I, p. 554. p.317

The same remarks have been made in the text as regards the remaining three complexes (skandhas), viz., perception (sa^mj~naa), impression (sa^mskaara), and awareness (vij~naana). We shall see in due course that this view is fully shared by Naagaarjuna. Murti is of the opinion that "Praj~naapaaramitaa as non-dual intuition is the Absolute."(34) The difficulty in determining the meaning of the term "Absolute" apart, the statement is misleading. The definitions of "praj~naapaaramitaa"--literally,highest wisdom--available in the texts under consideration lend full support to the nihilistic interpretation of the Maadhyamika system. Says one of these texts: "What is non-apprehension of all dharmas is called Praj~naapaaramitaa. When there is no feeling, ego-consciousness, experience, practice, then there is Praj~naapaaramitaa--so is it said."(35) A more emphatic assertion of the non-difference of 'suunyataa from the phenomenal world and, consequently, a repudiation of the non-Absolutistic character of praj~naapaaramitaa, is contained in the same text a bit earlier, as follows: Praj~naapaaramitaa should not be taken to be over and above the complexes, seats (aayatasus and bases (dhaatus). What is the reason for it? Because, Subhuuti, the complexes, seats, and bases themselves are void ('suunya), abstract (vivikta), and quiescent ('suunta) is praaj~naaparamitaa.(36) Here the significance of the emphasis represented by the expression "themselves" (eva) cannot go unnoticed. Elsewhere, All-Enlightenment is defined as "where nothing is cognized.(37) In elucidation of this remark of his, Subhuuti says to the Buddha without being refuted:

On account, Lord, of the nihility ('suunyatva) of all dharmas, there is no dharma which could be cognized. That is to say, Lord, all dharmas are 'suunya. Those dharmas, Lord, for the cessation of which righteousness is preached are non-existent; likewise, he who experiences the ultimate All-Enlightenment, that which is to be experienced, he who knows, that which is to be known--all these dharmas are 'suunya.(38) These texts list many kinds of 'suunyataa, among which are included 'suunyataa of the conditioned, 'suunyataa of the unconditioned, transcendental 'suunyataa, absolute 'suunyataa, and 'suunyataa of 'suunyataa,(39) which leave no doubt that there is _____________________________________________________ (34) Murti, op. cit., p. 228. (35) A.s.tasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, p. 177. (36) Loc. cit. (37) Ibid., p. 313. (38) Ibid., pp. 313-314. (39) See, for example, 'Satasaahasrikaa-praj~naapaaramitaa, part I, pp. 191-192. The concept of 'suunyataa-'suunyataa is explained in the sequel. p.318 absolutely no room for the postulation of an Absolute

in the Maadhyamika system. To sum up: According to the early formative texts of the Mahaayaana discussed above, all dharmas without exception are 'suunya. 'Suunyataa is nothing over acid above the dharmas, so that one cannot install it as the Absolute over against the dharmas. The highest wisdom consists in the non-apprehension of any dharmas, of anything whatsoever. Since there is nothing to apprehend, non-apprehension of anything can alone be the highest wisdom. Were there something like the Absolute, the apprehension of it would be said to be the highest wisdom. Hence, the question of there being an Absolute simply does not arise. Accordingly, the philosophy taught by these texts is pure and simple nihilism. IV Now we come to the Maadhyamika philosophical literature proper. Earlier(40) we noted that the Maadhyamikas themselves refer to the nihilistic interpretations of their philosophy without a word to indicate that they should be interpreted on Absolutistic lines. Let us enlarge upon this proposition by producing negative evidence for the thesis that the Maadhyamika philosophy is nihilist par excellence. The whole of Naagaarjuna's Vigrahavyaavartanii seems to accord tacit approval to the critics' ascription of nihilism to him. The imaginary critic in the work proceeds on the assumption that 'Suunyavaada is absolute nihilism and raises the objection that, if all is void, the Maadhyamika's proposition that all is void is itself void and hence devoid of validity.(41) This argument of the imaginary critic is developed by Naagaarjuna in 20 stanzas of the 72-stanza work. It is strange that this work, small in size but great in merit, has

received little consideration by those favoring an Absolutistic interpretation of 'Suunyavaada. Even Murti, who is probably the most serious student of the Maadhyamika system today, makes almost negligible use of it. Naagaarjuna nowhere in this work repudiates the ascription of nihilism to him. On the other hand, his reply, that he does not find any reality whatever to postulate Or deny,(42) serves to confirm the truth of the ascription. _____________________________________________________ (40) See section II (supra). (41) VV, st. 1. The discussion of this issue contained in this small work will be found interesting reading by those having an idea of the examples of systematic ambiguity cited and discussed by Bertrand Russell in connection with his theory of logical types developed in his Logic and Knowledge, Charles Marsh, ed. (London: George Alien & Unwin, 1956), pp. 59-102. Russell's thesis is ably discussed in F. Waismann, "Language Strata, " in Logic and Language, Second Series, Antony Flew, ed. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1953), pp. 16-18. (42) VV st. 30. p.319 Such implicit confirmations of the ascription of nihilism to the Maadhyamika way of thinking are not lacking in the later Maadhyamika works as well. Bhaavaviveka's reference to the Yogaacaaras ascribing nihilism to the Maadhyamika without the least concern on his part to correct them is a case in point.(43)

He also raises the question, as raised in the Vigrahavyaavartanii, that, if all is void, the very proposition that all is void is itself void and hence devoid of sense.(44) Chapter X of AAryadeva's 'Sata-'saastra(45) is devoted entirely to this problem. In his Catu.h-'sataka, too, the problem is raised at one place.(46) The La^nkaavataara-suutra contains the remark: "The essence of all entities is unreal, and this proposition, too, is unreal."(47) 'Saantideva discusses the question of universal nihility vis-?vis the question of the validity of the means of knowledge (pramaa.na) thus: "If the means of knowledge is false then what is known by it is false, and hence the essential non-being of entities fails to be established."(48) He purports to say that on the Maadhyamika view the means of knowledge, being 'suunya (false), no longer remain true means of knowledge, and, in the absence of any valid means of knowledge, the knowledge that all is 'suunya, or false, is itself false. His reply to this objection is not much to the point, an d so we ignore it here. We have adverted to this question, first, to bring home to the reader the significant fact that, in whatever context the imaginary objector raises objections to the doctrine of 'suunyataa, he proceeds on the assumption that 'suunyataa is nothing but pure void, and, second, to note that the Maadhyamika nowhere takes exception to such an assumption. The Maadhyamika invokes his thesis of thesislessness to answer such arguments.(49) That, however, this thesislessness springs from the consciousness of absolute void or, what is the same thing, the non-apprehension of anything whatsoever, is made abundantly clear by Naagaarjuna, AAryadeva, and Candrakiirti.(50) Indeed, the Maadhyamika thesis of thesislessness is nothing but absolute nihilism in disguise.

_____________________________________________________ (43) See, for example, Bhaavaviveka, karatalaratna, restored from Huen Tsang's Chinese version into Sanskrit by N. Aiyaswami 'Saastrii (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949),p. 57. (44) Ibid., pp. 45-63, passim. (45) AAryadeva, 'Sata-'saastra, English rendering from the Chinese version by G. Tucci, Pre-Diisnaaga Buddhist Texts on Logic from Chinese Sources, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol. XLIX (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1929), pp. 26-89. (46) See CS, 8.9 and CSV thereon. (47) La^nkaavataara-suutra, Bunyiu Nanjio, ed., Bibliotheca Otaniensis, Vol. I (Kyoto: Otani University Press, 1923), gaathaa 265, p. 300. Advayavajra, Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, Haraprasaad Saastrii, ed., Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol. XL (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1927), p. 26. (48) BCA, 9.139. (49) VV, st. 29. (50) See note 42 (supra); CS, 16.25; MKV, 1.1 pp. 44, 55-58. The following words of Candrakiirti are especially noteworthy: "Sages find nothing which could be false or true." (Naiva tvaaryaa.h ki~ncid upalahante yan m.r.saa am.r.saa vaa syaad iti.) MKC, 1.1, p. 44.

p.320 V Now about positive evidence of Maadhyamika philosophical literature proper. Naagaarjuna unequivocally expresses the view that objects, being essenceless, do not exist.(51) He openly declares, "Essencelessness of objects is proved by the phenomenon of change. And there can be no object without essence. Hence the 'suunyataa of objects.(52) According to him, the fact of change presents an insoluble problem, a veritable dilemma, to the realist. If there be no essence, what would undergo change? If [,again,] there be an essence, what would undergo change? The same object cannot undergo change (viz., cannot become another object), nor can another object do so; for the youth does not age nor does the aged one age. If the same object becomes another, milk itself would become curd. [If you say that something else becomes curd,] what other than milk can become curd?(53) The Maadhyamikas are never tired of describing the world as pure illusion, but in so doing they never suggest that they see anything non-illusory behind it.(54) Naagaarjuna's method is to consider the various modes of being countenanced by common sense as well as by philosophies in general and to repudiate all of them by showing that they lack law, lack logic, and hence are a chaos rather than a cosmos. This is a chaotic or irrationalistic conception of reality, as it were, Hegel, who is in a way the most thorough going rationalist ever born and whose cosmic or rationalistic conception of reality can perhaps

never be surpassed, declares that the real is rational and that the rationalist real. The Maadhyamika is prepared to grant this proposition, that only the rational can be real; but his finding is that there is nothing rational is which premise he concludes that there is nothing real. In sum: Hegel takes it that the real is rational; the Maadhyamika that the apparently real is the irrational, and hence at bottom unreal. So, the only conclusion that can be drawn from the Maadhyamika's method is that he endeavors to drive at the thought that all is pure void. The modes of being examined by him are: causality, motion, matter, space, existence, _____________________________________________________ (51) MK, 1.10. (52) Ibid., 13.3. (53) Ibid., 13.4-6. (54) See ibid.,, 7.34; 23.8; CSt. 1.14; 2.4. 18, 34; 3.5, 17, 31; Bhavasa^mkraanti (first recension of Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), st. 6; Cittavi'suddhi-prakara.na, Prabhubhai Patel, ed. (Santiniketan: Visva-Bharati, 1949), st. 19. Such statements abound in the Praj~naapaaramitaa and other Maadhyamika Suutras as well. Cp. Udaana, VIII. 1, p. 80. p.321 non-existence, qualificans and qualificand, light and darkness, soul, substance, relativity, time, change, relation, essence, value or morals, etc. What he

seems to be concerned to drive at through his examination of such modes or categories of being is to demonstrate that the universe is a chaos and not a cosmos, that nothing can be said to be in any of the states conceivable by man, and that, this being so, nothing whatever exists. As noted above, according to Buddhism, reality is divisible into the conditioned and the unconditioned. Naagaarjuna argues: "There being no proof of emergence, endurance, and extinction, the conditioned does not exist; and, in default of the establishment of the conditioned, how can there be the unconditioned?"(55) The logical corollary from this proposition is that, there being neither the conditioned nor the unconditioned, there is no reality whatever. Naagaarjuna takes enormous pains to demonstrate that nothing possesses absolute being, that all is relative. Reality is characterized by interdependence. Nothing exists in its own right, independently of other things. The existence of each object is borrowed from its relationship to other objects. This is the doctrine of what may be called universal relativity. It rejects all thought of an Absolute as the ground of the realm of relativity. According to it, all is relative (pratiitya-samutpanna). "No Absolute (apratiitya-samutpanna) real whatever existx."(56) '"There is no non-relative subsistence of anything anywhere at any time."(57) Naagaarjuna remarks in two of his works that, since this world is non-existent, the other world is non-existent also.(58) This will also be found significant in this connection. What we wish to drive at vis-?vis the position of the Maadhyamika is best illustrated by the very interesting discussion of the relativity of dharmas with reference to fire and fuel given in the

Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa Naagaarjuna writes:

(Maadbyamika-kaarikaa).

If the fire is relative to the fuel, or the fuel is relative to the fire, which of the two came first, to which the fire [or] the fuel is relative? If an entity becomes possible in and through its relation to that entity which itself owes its existence to its relationship so the former, which entity can exist on account of which? The entity which owes its existence to anoter is non-existent; how, then, can it need the latter? If, on the other hand, it so needs when it is existent, the question of needing simply does not arise.(59) _____________________________________________________ (55) MK, 7.33. (56) Ibid., 24.19. (57) CS, 9.2, with CSV. (58) Bhavabheda-'saastra (third recension of Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), p. 21; Bhavasa^mkraanti, 4. Cp. Udaana, VIII. 1, p. 80. (59) MK, 10.8, 10-11. p.322 Naagaarjuna's suggestion(60) that his denial of the world should not be take to imply belief in another order of reality like the Absolute, immanent in or transcendent to phenomena, is quite in conformity with the spirit of the Praj~naapaaramitaa texts, which refuse to set 'suunyataa over against

the dharmas and to acknowledge the positive knowledge of any such reality in the highest wisdom conceived by them. As already shown, the Maadhyamika holds that 'suunyataa is non-different from the dharmas and that there is total non-apprehension of any reality whatsoever in the highest wisdom. This is the tone of the whole gamut of Maadhyamika literature. Naagaarjuna goes to the extent the Tathaagata and nirvaa.na, thereby making it indisputably clear that there is nothing like the Absolute over and above the relative. He says, "Where there is no superimposition of nirvaa.na, nor elimination of sa^msaara (phenomena), what can there be conceived like sa^msaara and nirvaa.na?"(61) Candrakiirti comments that such superimposition and elimination are ruled out on account of the non-being of both nirvaa.na and sa^msaara.(62) Naagaarjuna establishes complete equipollency between sa^msaara and nirvaa.na thus: This world is of the same essence as the Tathaagata, and, since the Tathaagata is essenceless, this world, too, is essenceless.(63) Sa^msaara has nothing to distinguish itself from nirvaa.na. Nirvaa.na has nothing to distinguish itself from sa^msaara. Sa^msaara belongs to the same category as nirvaa.na. There is not the minutest difference between the two.(64) That which constitutes this process of births and deaths due to causes and conditions constitutes nirvaa.na without causes and conditions.(65) Elsewhere Naagaarjuna expresses the view that 'suunyataa is nothing other than existents, nor is there any existent without 'suunyataa.(66) These words occur in the Advayavajra-sa^mgraha as well.(67)

Praj~naakaramati has expressed himself categorically against the attempt to install 'suunyataa over against the realm of being. His words are: "'Suunyataa is not different from being, for being itself is of the nature of that; otherwise, in the event of 'suunyataa's being different from being, there would be no essencelessness of dharmas."(68) _____________________________________________________ (60) See notes 55-58 (supra) and 64-66 (infra). (61) MK,, 16.10. Cp. CSt, 1.5. (62) MKV, 16.10, p. 299. (63) MK, 22.16. (64) Ibid., 25.19--20. Cp. CSt, Cittavi'suddhi-prakara.na, st. 24. (65) MK, 25.9. (66) CSt, 3.41. (67) Advayavajra-Sa^mgraha, p.24. (68) BCAP, 9.34, p. 416. p.323 The doctrine of universal relativity (pratiitya-samutpaada) is the stepping stone to the doctrine of 'suunyataa. The knowledge of the former at once leads to the knowledge of the latter. Their relation is so intimate that Naagaarjuna does not hesitate in identifying the two. He says, "What is 1.5;

relativity we call 'suuyataa. It ('suunyataa) is relative being (upaadaaya-praj~napti). It is the middle path."(69) This proposition is pregnant with implications. The Maadhyamika turned pratiitya-samutpaada (relativity or, literally, dependent origination) into pratiitya-samutpaada (dependent or relative being).(70) In this sense, he expressed pratiitya-samutpaada otherwise as upaadaaya-praj~napti (relative being). In fact, his pratiitya-samutpaada is tantamount to a denial of causation altogether. Indeed, in another work, Naagaarjuna has remarked that what has come into being through causes and conditions has, in fact, nor come into being at all. And, since it has not come into being, it is 'suunya, or void, pure and simple.(71) It is significant that Candrakiirti interprets pratiitya-samutpaada to mean "non-origination by nature" (svabhaavenaanutpaada.h).(72) The Maadhyamika system is an extension of the Buddha's theses of soullessness, universal evanescence, and the quietude of nirvaa.na.(73) His doctrine of soullessness and denial of substance or abiding reality led to the denial of a reality subjacent to phenomena. From the position that the changing phenomena have no underlying, changeless reality, it was only a short step to the position that phenomena have no underlying reality at all. The former position made short work of the latter. The Naiyaayikas, Puurva Miimaa^msakas, Lokaayatas, and Buddhist realists like the Sarvaastivaadins and Vaibhaa.sikas hold that appearances are real. The Advaita Vedaanta and the Vij~naanavaada hold that appearances are unreal, and posit a reality underlying them. Early Buddhism dismissed substance, including the soul (pudgala-nairaatmya or pudgala'suunyataa), but postulated two orders of reals called dharmas, personal and non-personal,

which come out of nothing, endure for just a moment, and then rela pse into nothing, thanks to the law of discontinuous continuity (pratiitya-samutpaada). The Satyasiddhi and Maadhyamika schools went a step further and dismissed the dharmas (dharma-nairaatmya or sarva-dharma_____________________________________________________ (69) MK, 24.18. Also see CSt, 2.20; 3.38. (70) We remember having read it somewhere. (71) CSt, 3.3. Also, Naagaarjuna, Yuktii.sa.s.tikaa, referred to in Murti, op. cit., p. 89, n. 2. Also, Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 25. (72) MKV, 24.18, p. 503 ? La^nkaavataara-suutra (gaathaa 582, p. 337), however, says: "All this is uncreated. But it is not that things do not exist. Things do exist, but they do so without sufficient reason, like fata morgana, dream, and illusion." (73) These are said to be seals in Naagaarjuna, Mahaapraj~naapaaramitaa-'saastra, cited in Junjiro Takakusu, The Essentials of Buddhist Philosophy, Wing-tsit Chan and Charles A. Moore, eds. (1st Indian ed., Bombay, etc.: Asia Publishing House, 1956), p. 140. p.324 'suunyataa), too. The Maadhyamika, in effect, calls appearances unreal without positing a reality behind them. Dasgupta is right when he says:

The Maadhyamika view has no thesis of its own which it seeks to establish, for it does not believe in the reality or unreality of anything or in the combination of reality or unreality. Thus there is no ultimate thesis in Naagaarjuna. It is, therefore, neither idealism nor realism nor absolutism, but blank phenomenalism which only accepts the phenomenal world as it is but which would not, for a moment, tolerate any kind of essence, ground or reality behind it.(74) It is in this vein of blank phenomenalism that Naagaaarjuna says: '"This all is groundless, and groundless has it been called."(75) '"This all is supportless, and supportless has it been called."(76) Murti is of a different opinion. He observes, The Tattva, however, is accepted by the Maadhyamika as the Reality of all things (dharmaa.naa^m dharmataa) , their essential nature (prak.rtir dharmaa.naam). It is uniform and universal, neither decreasing, nor increasing, neither originating nor decaying. The Absolute alone is in itself (ak.rtrima svabhaava). The Absolute is that intrinsic form in which things would appear to the clear vision of an AArya (realized saint) free from ignorance.(77) Murti seems to have the following statements of the Muulamadhyamaka-kaarikaa and Candrakiirti's comments thereon in mind: "self-being is inartificial and nonrelative to other [being]."(78) "Not realizable through other, calm, inexpressible through words, exempt from conceptualization, of not many meanings--this is the definition of tattva."(79) There is reason to believe that Murti is wrong in taking it for granted that these statements of Naagaarjuna make him an Absolutist. It is true that Naagaarjuna appears to argue as if he believed in so

many laws of thought and being, so many truths. He wields logic as skillfully as others, as though he were demonstrating that at least logic contained the whole truth and that it was an exception to the theory of absolute nihility propounded by him. At first sight, it appears that for him the law assumed in his argument is unquestionably real and that it is not a non-entity, not an illusion. But the actual position is that he employs popular notions to refute poppular theses, thereby trying to demonstrate that our notions of things are self-contradictory. It is not that he really believes, for example, that what is self-subsistent alone can cause another. He simply means to say that on the realist's own logic what does _____________________________________________________ (74) S. N. Dasgupta, Indian Idealism (Cambridge: University Press, 1933), p. 79. (75) Bhavasa^mkraanti, st. 10. (76) Bhavasa^mkraanti-parikathaa (2nd recension of Bhavasa^mkraanti-'saastra), st. 8. (77) Murti, op. cit., p. 235. (78) MK, 15.2 Cp. CSt, 3.35-39,42. (79) MK, 18.9. p.325 not exist cannot make others exist. So, when he defines tattva or svabhaava, he does not mean to suggest that there is a reality conforming to his definition.

What he does mean to suggest is that it follows from the realist's own way of thinking that reality, if there were a reality, should be such. Candrakiirti has made a categorical statement in this direction which should settle the matter once and for all. He states a possible objection against the Maadhyamika's thesis thus: If the Maadhyamika has no thesis of his own, he is far from justified in propounding the thesis that things are caused not by themselves, nor by other things, nor by both, nor by neither. To this, Candrakiirti's reply is that the thesis in question is, as a matter of fact, not a thesis of the Maadhyamika at all and that the Maadhyamika's method is to meet the realist on the latter's own ground by facing him with the difficulties arising out of the latter's own logic.(80) Moreover, it can also be shown that Naagaarjuna's definitions of tattva and svabhaava are fully applicable to his void ('suunya). Murti remarks: "Tattva as Dharmataa or Bhuutako.ti is accepted by the Maadhyamika as the underlying ground of phenomena."(81) But the question is, What is there to warrant the assumption that tattva, dharmata, and bhuutako.ti cannot be identified with the void? Naagaarjuna says, "On cessation of the object of consciousness, the object of speech ceases to exist. For dharmataa is, like nirvaa.na, uncaused and imperishable."(82) Candrakiirti's explanation is: "Dharmataa is the essence of dharma, the nature of dharma, which neither originates nor perishes, like nirvaa.na."(83) Giving an alternative explanation, he writes that in this verse Naagaarjuna explains the proposition, made in an earlier verse,(84) that all speech (prapa~nca) ceases in 'suunyataa: "... how then can speech cease to exist in 'suunyataa? The reply is, on cessation of the object of speech, etc...."(85)

In another connexion, Candrakiirti tries to give a third, clearer definition of dharmataa in these words: What is this dharmataa of the dharmas? The character (svabhaava) of dharma. What is this character? Nature (prak.rti). What is this nature? It is what is this 'suunyataa. What is this 'suunyataa? Essencelessness (ni.hsvabhaavya). What is this essencelessness? Suchness (tathataa). What is this suchness, So-being (tathaa-bhaava), changelessness, everlastingness." (86) Lest someone should be misled by the word "everlastingness," Candrakiirti _____________________________________________________ (80) MKV, 1.1, p. 57; MK, 24.10; VV, st. 28. (81) Murti, op. cit., P. 237. (82) MK, 18.7. (83) MKV, 18.7, p. 364. (84) MK, 18.5. (85) MKV, 18.7, p. 365. (86) Ibid., 15.2, pp. 264-265. p.326 adds that, being non-relative and inartificial, only the non-origination of things is called their nature.(87) He also suggests that this

non-origination is identical with non-being.(88) It is significant that, in explanation of the verse quoted as footnote 84, Candrakiirti makes it perfectly clear that "'suunyataa itself is called nirvaa.na on account of its being characterized by the cessation of all speech."(89) Besides, in another work, Naagaarjuna has made the significant remark that dharmataa is 'suunya, like space.(90) In fact, according to him, all essence is like space.(91) As a matter of fact, as indicated in the Advayavajra-sa^mgraha,(92) dharmataa is nothing other than dharmas, which are at bottom 'suunya, nothing. The Absolutist interpreter of 'Suunyavaada sets much store by its concept of dharmataa, as well as tathataa. We have seen that dharmataa is nothing mysterious like an Absolute and that it is but another name for 'suunyataa, or void; We have now to examine the concept of tathataa. We have seen how Candrakiirti uses "dharmataa" and "tathataa" interchangeably. Bhaavaviveka's observations on the nature of tathataa will, however, be found decisive. He writes: If it be contended that the Tathataa, although it is foreign to words (abhilaapa, vyavahaara-vivikta) (sic) is nevertheless a reality (tattva): in that case, the expression Tathataa refers only to the AAtman of the Tiirthikas under another name. Just as the Tathataa, although it is a reality, is nevertheless from the point of view of exact truth, beyond the concepts of being and not-being, it is the same with AAtman. The Tiirthikas think that the AAtman, which is real, omnipresent, eternal, agent, enjoyer, is nevertheless foreign to every concept (beyond the pale of conceptions). As it transcends the domain of words, and as it is not the object of the dealing-with-ideas intellect (vikalpa-buddhi), it

is said to be foreign to concepts. The doctrines of the Tiirthikas say: "The words do not go there; the thought does not realize it, therefore it is named AAtman." The AAtman being such, is it reasonable to assert that "the knowledge (j~naana) which takes the Tathataa as its object leads to deliverance, while the knowledge which takes the AAtman as its object does not'-? (sic) But what is the difference between the Tathataa and the AAtman, since both are ineffable and real? It is only by esprit de parti (pak.sa-graha.na) that it is so said.(93) This emphatic repudiation of identity between tathataa and the Absolute should set at rest all speculation about the meaning of tathataa. Tathataa, _____________________________________________________ (87) Ibid., 15.2, p. 265. (88) Ibid., Cp., however, note 72 (supra). (89) MKV, 18.5, p.351. (90) Bhavasa^mkraanti, st. 2. (91) Ibid., st. 3. Cp. BCA, 9.155. (92) Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 44. (93) See Louis de La Vall-Poussin, "The Maadhyamika and the Tathataa," Indian Historical Quarterly, IX, No. 1 (March, 1933), 30-31. Bhaavaviveka's work quoted from is mentioned by La Vall-Poussin as Jewel in Hand or Gem in Hand. p.327

dharmataa, nirvaa.na, and 'suunyataa are more or less synonymous terms, used to designate the void in various ways. It is difficult--rather, impossible--to convey the true idea of the void. But some name or other has to be given to it to make discourse about it possible. This exigency of discourse is responsible for the invention or employment of the aforesaid terms, be they ever so imperfect. Candrakiirti remarks that, though the fire is essenceless, it has to be spoken of as an entity, and some essence has to be superimposed upon it just to guard against the auditors" being frightened.(94) Dharmataa, etc., are born of such superimposition.(95) Bhaavaviveka's position is clearly summed up by Louis de La Vall-Poussin as follows: "Buddhism is alien to every metaphysical interest, being merely a path leading to final rest by an unconscious and objectless contemplation.(96) Thus, Absolutism is quite foreign to the Maadhyamika way of thinking. VI So far we have tried to show how the Maadhyamika is a repudiator of being. We Shall see presently that he is concerned as much with repudiating non-being as with repudiating being. His repudiation of non-being has been a source of much distortion of his standpoint. In Naagaarjuna, the negation of the world is so complete that it ceases to be mere negation and becomes the sole substitute for reality, so to speak. All naming is determination, and, when there is negation, pure and simple, with no existence besides it--that is to say, when there is absolute or indeterminate negation--even calling it negation is

not justified, since it will become determinate in the process of being named. Naming is intended to mark something out of its context, the group of its co-existents, and, when there is negation alone, the question of marking it out by naming is entirely ruled out. Naagaarjuna observes: "The negation of being and non-being is called nirvaa.na."(97) '"They who see the being and non-being of things do not see the quiescent good worth seeing."(98) "Being and non-being are both phenomenal (conditioned or sa^msk.rta)."(99) Against the concept of non-being, Naagaarjuna argues like this: When there is no being, how can its non-being be thought of?(100) If being is not proved, _____________________________________________________ (94) MKV, 15.2, p. 264. (95) See ibid. (96) La Vallee-Poussin, "The Maadhyamika and the Tathataa," p. 30. (97) Naagaarjuna, Ratnaavali, G. Tucci, ed., JRAS, 1934, p. 316, chap. 1, st. 42. (98) MK, 5.8. (99) Ibid., 25.13. (100) Ibid., 5.6. p.328 non-being is not proved, either; for what people call non-being is but the opposite of being.(101) The

Buddha himself repudiated both being and non-being in the Kaatyaayana dialogue. If existence is there by nature, its negation cannot be; for there can be no change in nature.(102) If there is no being, there can be no non-being, since without one there can be no many.(103) Praj~naa-karamati argues against non-being in the same vein. According to him, nonbeing is something subjective and unreal. When there is nothing to deserve the name of being, it is simply foolish to talk of non-being as the negation of being.(104) 'Saantideva says: When there is no being which would be negated, non-being becomes supportless, and hence there can be no presentation of it. When neither being nor non-being is presented to consciousness, there being no other alternative, the intellect ceases to operate.(105) Without positing being, a figment of imagination, its non-being cannot be grasped. Therefore, the non-being of being, which is false, is, evidently, false itself.(106) Thus, non-being is doubly unreal. Candrakiirti remarks in the same vein: "The son of a barren woman" is nothing but words. No objective counterpart of the expression is found of which positivity or negativity could be predicated. Therefore, how is it possible to think of "no-object" in terms of being and non-being?(107) If something existed, its repudiation would lead to negativism and hence to a false view. When we find nothing whatever, what can be stolen (lost) there? Non-being is nothing whatsoever....(108)

The position is that being and non-being are correlatives, so that the one cannot be thought of save in relation to the other. If, therefore, there is no object, how can there be a non-object or non-being? From the foregoing account it is evident that the Maadhyamika's denial of non-being is a semantical rather than an ontological proposition. He does not deny that all is reducible to non-being or that all is non-being; he simply demurs to calling the negation of being by the name of non-being. It will thus be appreciated that, shorn of verbal formulation, there is in effect hardly any real difference between the Maadhyamika and the Satyasiddhi school founded by Harivarman. Takakusu has sought, however, to make a fine distinction between the two thus: Analyzing those five objects the school [the Satyasiddhi school] reduces them to molecules, and further reduces them to even finer atoms, and by thus repeating the _____________________________________________________ (101) Ibid., 15.5. (102) Ibid., 15.7-8. (103) Ratnaavalii, 1.71. (104) BCAP, 9.2, p. 358. (105) BCA, 9.34-35. (106) Ibid., 9. 140. (107) MKV, 25.8, p. 528.

(108) Ibid., 13.2 p. 239. p.329 process the school finally attains the finest element which has an entirely different nature from the first objects. Going one step further, the school attains the Void. Thus the nihilism of this school is a "destructed" or abstracted Void. In other words, the non-entity asserted in this school is simply an abstraction from entity, or merely an antithetic Void as against existence. And this is not the synthetic Void or transcendental Void advanced by the Sanron [Maadhyamika] School.(109) Takakusu's distinction does not really hold good. The process by which he says the Satyasiddhi school reaches its void is nothing peculiar to that school. It is shared by the Maadhyamikas as well. 'Saantideva has urged it as an argument against the reality of dharmas.(110) In the Catuh-'sataka, AAryadeva employs a similar argument in refutation of the atom.(111) His Hastavaala-prakara.na is wholly devoted to a similar argument.(112) According to Advayavajra, such an argument is to be met with in "western" Vaibhaa.sikas as we11.(113) It is suggested in the La^nkaavataara-suutra, too.(114) Besides, the recurrent recourse in Maadhyamika literature to likening reality to a banana tree, which, when all its skins are peeled off, has nothing left as its kernel, indicates a similar frame of reference.(115) Hence, while Buddhism in general and the Satyasiddhi school in particular tend to make approximations to 'Suunyavaada by means of the foregoing argumentation, it is the Maadhyamika alone who enjoys the credit of presenting 'Suunyavada as a

systematic philosophy. The Buddha preached that all comes out of nothing and relapses into nothing; Harivarman contends that, if all comes out of nothing and relapses into nothing, all is nothing; the Maadhyamika argues that, if things are not there, nothing is not there also, because the absence of one member of the pair of opposites is bound to mean the absence of the other member as well. When, however, the Maadhyamika expresses his disapproval of the tendency to identify his 'suunyataa with non-being, he means to say only that "nothing" is meaningless without the duality of being and non-being, and that, since being is not there, nothing is not there also. So, between Harivarman and the Maadhyamika the issue is merely a semantic one rather than ontological. The burden of the Maadhyamika dialectic is to show that all is void, nothing. The Maadhyamika, however, is not satisfied with the words "void" and "nothing." "Void" presupposes a filler thereof. Likewise, "nothing" _____________________________________________________ (109) Takakusu, op. cit., p. 78. (110) BCA, 9.86-87. (111) See CS, 13.5-6, with CSV. (112) AAryadeva, Hastavaala-prakara.na, F. W. Thomas and H. Ui, eds., JRAS, 1918, pp. 277 and 281, sts. 1 and 3. (113) See Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 15. (114) La^nkaavataara-suutra, gaathaa 583, p. 337.

(115) See, for example, Ratnaavali, 2.1; BCA, 9.151. p.330 presupposes some "thing." Hence, he finds these terms inadequate to express what he actually means. So, the Maadhyamika repudiates being and non-being, the former on ontological and the latter on semantic grounds. There is, however, a third alternative, viz., both being and nothing rolled into one (ubhaya-sa^mkiir.naatmataa), and a fourth one, viz., a category exclusive of both being and nothing (ubhaya-prati.sedha-svabhaavataa).(116) What does the Maadhyamika say about these two categories? Praj~naakaramati's reply is: Not that, in the event of both being and non-being having been negated as shown above, the mixture of both of them or negatedness of both is the real state of affairs. Since the idea of being is the ground of all ideation, after its repudiation all of these ideations stand repudiated with one stroke.(117) Out of the four categories (ko.tis) of reality that can be conceived by man, viz., being, non-being, both, and neither, the first two are basic or primary categories, while the latter two are derivative from these. And, when the Maadhyamika has his reasons to repudiate the basic or primary categories, the derivative ones stand repudiated of themselves. The Maadhyamika is also inclined to distinguish between non-being (abhaava) and 'suunyataa, (118) which, as should be manifest from the foregoing account, is quite in keeping with his basic position. VII

We have seen how Naagaarjuna rejects being and non-being. Now note that he rejects 'suunyataa, too. In Chapter XV of the Muulama-dhyamaka-kaarikaa will be found self-essence, existence, and non-existence all repudiated with the felicity characteristic of Naagaarjuna. We have shown that his rejection of non-being is semantic rather than ontological. Similarly, his rejection of 'suunyataa, too, is semantic rather than ontological. He says, "Were there something non-'suunya, there would be something, 'suunya, too. But, since there is nothing non-'suunya, where will the 'suunya be?"(119) It is obvious that here Naagaarjuna has risen to a height of imagination at which he finds inadequate even the concept of 'suunyataa, not, however, on ontological but on purely semantic grounds, as was the case with his repudiation of non-being. What is left after negating everything conceivable is characterizable neither as non-being nor as 'suunya, for the simple reason that _____________________________________________________ (116) See BCAP, 9.2, p. 358. (117) Ibid. (118) See MK, 13.2, with MKV, p.239. (119) MK, 13.7. Cp. Yogavaasi.s.tha, 3.10.14. p.331 there is nothing in opposition to which these concepts could logically observation: '"The Buddhas preach 'suunyataa as the exclusion of all [ontological] theses. We declare incurable those who

tend to erect 'suunyataa itself into a particular thesis.(120) The residue after the negation of everything whatsoever is truly ineffable. All description proceeds by relating one thing to another. Without this process, there can be no speech at all. And, when there is nothing at all in relation to which the so-called residue is to be described, it is nothing but indescribable or ineffable (prapa~ncopa'sama), where language loses all its utility and efficiency. They who erect this 'suunyataa into a particular theory, or convert it into a veritable being, as is the case with those who read Absolutism into the Maadhyamika system, are incurable. Candrakiirti says, "Those who see being even in 'suunyataa are not such as we talk with. He who, in reply to the remark, 'I shall give you no money,' says, 'Well, let me have the no-money, cannot by any means be convinced of the non-existence of money."(121) Of the Buddha, the highest being, Naagaarjuna declares: "He cannot be called 'suunya, nor can he be non-'suunya, nor both, nor neither. He is called so [viz., 'suunya, non-'suunya, both, and neither] for empirical purposes."(122) Our interpretation of Naagaarjuna's refutation of 'suunyataa is fully borne out by the following passage of Candrakiirti: If there were something like 'suunyataa [lover and above the objects], the essence of objects would depend upon it. But this is not the case. Here 'suunyataa is propounded as the generic characteristic of all reals. There is no non-'suunya real, and non-'suunyataa itself does not exist. [That is to say, all reals being 'suunya, there is no non-'suunya real; and hence 'suunyataa, in default of its opposite, simply does not exist.] And, when there are no non-'suunya objects and there is no non-'suunyataa, it follows that, in the absence of

its opposite, 'suunyataa, too, like the garland of sky-flowers, is not there.(123) As a matter of fact, there is hardly any real difference between non-being and 'suunyataa. By the former, the Maadhyamika seems to mean determinate negation, while, by the latter, indeterminate negation. Otherwise, both the terms denote one and the same fact. That is to say, when he speaks generally, he defines 'suunyataa such as in these statements: "That is called 'suunyataa which is non-existent by nature."(124) "'Suunyataa is the essencelessness of all reals, characterized by non-cognition."(125) _____________________________________________________ (120) MK, 13.8. Cp. note 137 (supra). (121) MKV, 13.8, pp. 247, 248. (122) MK, 22.11. Cp. CSt, 4.10. (123) MKV, 13.5, p. 246. Cp. Ratnaavalii, 2.4-5. (124) MKV, 20.18, p. 403. It is significant that "naasti," "abhaava," "asat," etc., used in this connection are illustrated by space, etc. (125) BCAP, 9.54, p. 447. p.332 The following words of Candrakiirti serve to sum up the Maadhyamika's position admirably well: "The wise who have attained the truth do not find anything whatsoever which could be false or otherwise."(126)

Stanza 30 of the Vigrahavyaavartanii suggests the same position. Unlike the Hegelian dialectic, which has three moments or stages--thesis, antithesis, and synthesis--the Maadhyamika dialectic tends to have five moments (ko.tis)--thesis, antithesis, synthesis, anti-synthesis, and super-synthesis. The well-known dialectical formula of Hegel is [1] being, [2] nothing, and [3] becoming; that of the Maadhyamika, [1] being (sat), [2] nothing, (asat), [3] both (ubhaya), [4] neither (anubhaya), and [5] quietude (tuu.s.nii^mbhaava), (127) non-apprehension (anupalambha), (128) the inexpressible (prapa~ncopa'sama), the essenceless (ni.hsvabhaava), or beyond-the-four-moments (catu.sko.tvinirmukta).(129) There is, however, this difference, that, while Hegel affirms the reality of all the three moments, the Maadyamika denies that of his first four moments. His reality, or, rather, his apology for one, is beyond the four moments. This beyond-the-four-moment category, suggested by the Maadhyamika, must not be construed, however, to mean a fifth moment along the lines of the fifth moment predicated of Brahman by 'Sriihar.sa and certain other Advaitists.(130) The word "'suunyataa," which is often used to denote the second moment of "nothing," is also used to denote this so-called fifth moment.(131) However, this moment is not found mentioned as such in Maadhyamika literature. This is out innovation offered here to facilitate the understanding of the Maadhyamika standpoint. That things are existent is the thesis; that they are non-existent is the anti-thesis; that they are both existent and non-existent is the synthesis; that they are neither existent nor non-existent is the anti-synthesis; and that they are none of these is the super-synthesis. The first four moments constitute what is called the expressible

(prapa~nca), while the fifth moment is the inexpressible (prapa~ncopa'sama). There are philosophers of being who maintain that the ultimate reality is of the nature of Being. There is also at least one philosophy of nothing--that of Harivarman-maintaining that the ultimate reality is of the nature of nothing. Jainism is the philosophy of being-cum-nothing, so to speak. Skeptics _____________________________________________________ (126) See note 50 (supra). (127) MKV, 1.1, p. 57. (128) See, for example, notes 35 and 42 (supra); MK, 25.24; BCAP, 9.45, p. 437; 9.54, p. 447. (129) Advayavajra-sa^mgraha, p. 19. Also, see ibid., pp. 46, 54, 57. (130) See 'Sriihar.sa, Nai.sadhiya-carita, Haragovinda 'Saastrii, ed. (Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series Office, 1954), 13.35. Cp. Appaya Diik.sta, Siddhaantale'sa-sa^mgraha, Muula'sa^mkara Vyaasa, ed (2nd ed., Varanasi: Acyuta-granthamala Office, Vikramii 2011, 4.6, pp. 516-517). Also see Murti, op. cir., p. 161, n. (131) Cp., for example, MK, 13.8. p.333 like Sa^mjaya Bela.t.thiputta and Pyttho expressed their inability to say whether the ultimate reality was being, nothing, or both. That it is neither

being, nothing, nor both would be the fourth alternative. The Maadhyamika system maintains that the real is devoid of all these four categories. 'Sriihar.sa, taking his cue from the Maadhyamika, regards his Brahman as belonging to a fifth category, as shown above. However, as pointed out earlier, the Maadhyamika posits no category of his own. He examines the categories posited by others with a view to showing up their hollowness. Candrakiirti writes, "We do not postulate the non-being of it. What then? We simply repudiate the being conceived by others. Likewise, we do not postulate its being. What then? We simply repudiate the non-being of it as conceived by others."(132) Five stages are discernible in the Maadhyamika's treatment of the ultimat truth. First, things are shown to be essentially chaotic and hence non-existent. Then, second, non-existence, too, is demonstrated to be false, together with things. That is to say, both being and non-being are rejected as false. In the first stage, 'suunyataa is presented as non-being. In the second stage, it is said to be beyond both being and non-being. Third, even 'suunyataa is rejected on the ground of there being no non-'suunya, and essencelessness (ni.hsvabhaavataa) is established. Fourth, the doctrine of non-apprehension (anupalambha or apraaptatva)(133) is Set forth. Finally, rejection of all ontology is the result. As suggested above, one is bound to arrive at the conclusion, after a scrutiny of the hybrid and seemingly conflicting utterances of the Maadhyamikas, that being and nothing are the only really fundamental positions, the rest enjoying only a derivative status. "Is" and "is-not" are the only positions that one can possibly take with regard to

ultimate reality. The other hypotheses are only semantic hypotheses. Strictly speaking, the ontological issue is between the first two hypotheses only. And the Maadhyamika adheres to the hypothesis of non-being to the last. In effect, the Maadhyamika's seeming objection to non-being is directed, not toward non-being as such, but toward styling it as non-be1ing. Non-being cannot be thought of save as opposed to being, and, he argues, if there is no being, how can there be--or, what is the same thing, how can anything be styled as--non-being? At bottom, both the Satyasiddhi and the Maadhyamika schools hold the same position: blank phenomenalism without a reality subjacent to phenomena. The Maadhyamika's method is something like this. He first seeks to show that all is relative, hence chaotic, hence essenceless, and hence void. Lest undiscerning people should erect his void into a positive reality like the _____________________________________________________ (132) MKV, 20.3, p. 393. Also see note 80 (supra). (133) See Takakusu, op. cit., p. 104. p.334 Brahman of the Vedaanta or the Absolute of the Western idealists, as has been done by those trying to see the Maadhyamika through Vedaantic or Absolutistic eyes, he later refuses to admit even the void, saying that the void can be there only when there is a non-void. This leads him to affirm the doctrine of non-apprehension, ending in the repudiation of all metaphysics. This interpretation of the Maadhyamika's method

may sound novel, but it is based on definite indications in Maadhyamika writings. For examp le, one relevant verse of Naagaarjuna suggests that in the first instance all is declared imaginary and that then imagination itself is dismissed as false.(134) Elsewhere, he contends that even the conception by which 'suunyataa is conceived is itself 'suunya(135) 'Saantideva writes in the same vein: "By contemplation on 'suunyataa, the conception of being vanishes. By contemplation on the idea that there is nothing whatsoever, that, too, vanishes afterwards."(136) In fact, the Maadhyamika literature abounds in such suggestions.(137) VIII Praj~naakaramati has discussed an interesting question as to the raison d're of the beneficent bodhisattvas involving themselves in such activities as almsgiving, etc., which are, according to the Maadhyamika, 'suunya, or false. His reply is that they do so spontaneously, involuntarily, or unpremeditatedly (avicaarata.h).(138) If he held any other view of 'suunyataa than as void, his immediate reply would be that, his 'suunyataa not being identifiable with the void, the objection was pointless. Some people are inclined to the view that the Maadhyamika's emphasis on nihilism springs from his extra concern for the attainment of renunciation, and that, otherwise, his thesis of the void need not be taken seriously on ontological grounds. There are those who tend to take even the 'Sa^mkarite's world-negating attitude in this light. A casual utterance of a Kumaarila (vis-?vis Buddhist nihilism) or a Vi.t.thale'sa (vis-?vis Advaitism) is their main support.(139) But their interpretation is

demonstrably false and far-fetched. Here we confine ourself to the clarification of the Maadhyamika's position. Now, it is not difficult to discover the true character of the Maadhyamika's emphasis on nihilism. AAryadeva has raised the issue and answered it un_____________________________________________________ (134) CSt, 3.34. (135) See Bhavasa^mkraanti-parikathaa, st. 12. (136) BCA, 9.33. (137) Also see note 105 (supra). (138) BCAP, 9.4, p. 372. (139) See N. K. Devaraia. An introduction to 'Sa^nkara's Theory of Knowledge (Varanasi: Motilal Banarsi Dass, 1962), pp. 205-206. p.335 equivocally. He says,"It is not that the non-'suunya is shown to be 'suunya simply by the desire to attain nirvaa.na; for the Buddhas do not describe nirvaa.na as attainable through false vision."(140) Candrakiirti comments: "Are these objects noh-'suunya, but shown to be 'suunya for the attainment of renunciation? Or are they demonstrated to be 'suunya by nature? It is said in reply [here he quotes the above verse of AAryadeva, and then says,]. .. entities are known to be 'suunya by nature."(141) The Maadhyamikas are serious thinkers and do not believe in make believes like the ones read into them

by the interpreters just criticized. Otherwise, they would have broken down over such a fundamental question. By the Absolutist interpreter of 'Suunyavaada much is made of Naagaarjuna's rejoinder to the objection: "If all this is 'suunya, there is neither origination nor decay, and the negation of the four Noble Truths will become chargeable against you."(142) On behalf of the objector, Naagaarjuna refers to the chain of negations which will follow of themselves in the wake of the negation of the four Noble Truths, and concludes that such a state of affairs will lead to chaos. His reply is: To this we rejoin, You do not appreciate the purpose of 'suunyataa, 'suunyataa, and the meaning of 'suunyataa; that is why you raise this objection. The Buddhas preach the dharma with reference to two truths--the empirical truth and the transcendental truth. Those who do not know the division of the two truths do not know the great essence in the Buddha's teaching. The transcendental is not preached save vis-?vis the empirical, and, without recourse to the transcendental, nirvaa.na is not attained. Wrongly apprehended, 'suunyataa destroys the unintelligent, even as a wrongly caught serpent or wrongly practiced science... If, then, you criticize 'suunyataa, it is not our fault, for the criticism does not apply to the 'suunya.(143) What Naagaarjuna seems to mean is that there are two truths, one for the higher souls and one for the lower, and that the highest doctrine, that of 'suunyataa, is not meant for the latter, who must be taught to adhere to the four Noble Truths as also to all other canons of righteousness taught by the Buddha. According to AAryadeva, the truth is preached

in three steps. In the first step, the seeker is told that there is such a thing as sin which attaches to and pollutes the self and that, therefore, one should beware of sin. In the second step, he is told that not only the sin but the self itself does not exist. In the third and final step, it is revealed to him that all is nothing, void.(144) _____________________________________________________ (140) CS, 8.7. (141) CSV, 8.7, p. 7. (142) MK, 24.1. (143) Ibid., 24.7-10, 11, 13. (144) CS, 8.15. p.336 Candrakiirti expounds the idea of Naagaarjuna thus: 'Suunyataa is preached with a view to putting an end to all speech; therefore, the purpose of 'suunyataa is cessation of all speech. You, on the other hand, who construe 'suunyataa to mean non-being (naastitva) and thereby only enlarge the net of speech do not know the purpose of 'suunyataa.... Hence, how can there be non-being in 'suunyataa, which is of the essence of cessation of all speech? So, you do not know even 'suunyataa.... What pratiitya-samutpaada means is also meant by 'suunyataa, but what non-being (abhaava) means is not what is meant by 'suunyataa.(145)

We take it that Candrakiirti purports to say that 'suunyataa is neither being, not non-being, nor both, nor neither; that it would therefore be incorrect to identify it with non-being; and that it is only this wrong identification that gives rise to the objection that it will strike at the root of ail practice, all righteousness. In this connection, Naagaarjuna makes another observation which deserves notice. He says, "All fares well with him with whom 'suunyataa fares well; nothing fares well with him with whom 'suunyataa does not so fare."(146) Candrakiirti tries to bring out the idea of this pithy remark thus: With him with whom this 'suunyataa fares well, pratiitya-samutpaada, too, fares well; with him with whom pratiitya-samutpaada fares well, the four Noble Truths fare well. How so? Because suffering is phenomenal (pratiitya-samutpanna), not non-phenomenal. And, being essenceless, it is 'suunya. Suffering being there, its origination, its cessation, and the way leading to its cessation fare well with him.(147) Thereafter, Candrakiirti goes on recounting the tenets of Buddhism the uselessness of which was apprehended by the imaginary objector to the 'suunyataa doctrine and which would be reinstated by the proper appreciation of 'suunyataa. Naagaarjuna continues: By seeking to lay your faults at our doors you have forgotten the very horse you are riding. If you regard objects as essentially existent, then, by doing so, you see objects [emerging] without causes and conditions. Thereby you fail to explain effect, cause, doer, means, action, origination, cessation,

and consequence. Pratiitya-samutpaada is called 'suunyataa by us. It is relative being, it is the Middle Path. There is no non-relative [or uncaused] dharma, and, therefore, there is non-'suunya dharma. If all this is non'suunya, there is neither origination nor decay, and denial of the four Noble Truths becomes chargeable against you. How can there be uncaused suffering? For suffering is said to be non-eternal, which would not be possible if it had essence. If it is existence by nature, then what is there to originate? Therefore, there is no origination for one _____________________________________________________ (145) MKV, 24.7, p. 491. (146) MK, 24.14. (147) MKV, 24.14. p. 500. p.337 who rejects 'suunyataa. If suffering exists, it will not cease. By upholding its essence, you speak against its cessation.(148) Thereafter Naagaarjuna recounts the theses of Buddhism, which will, in his opinion, lose their significance on the non-'suunyataa doctrine, and thus lays the same charges at the doors of the non-'suunyataa-vaadin as the latter sought to do at his. It is obvious that here Naagaarjuna purports to define 'suunyataa in its empirical aspect alone. Candrakiirti has it that "pratiitya-samutpaada" as used by Naagaarjuna in the present context means

emergence of things through causes and conditions (hetupratyayaanapek.sya praadurbhaava.h) or, conversely, non-emergence of things without causes and conditions, of themselves (svabhaavenaanutpaada.h).(149) So, the denial of 'suunyataa in its empirical aspect is tantamount to the belief in the immutability of things, which precludes all possibility of oringination or elimination of suffering, thereby rendering the doctrine of the four Noble Truths altogether meaningless. Therefore, 'suunyataa in its empirical sense alone seems to be in question here. Naagaarjuna has elsewhere, too, suggested that belief in the being of things is tantamount to belief in their eternity. He has, accordingly, characterized the realist as an eternalist in these words: "If there were being in the nature of things, it would not be non-existent; for the negation of nature cannot be established."(150) As a matter of fact, according to him, "To say [it] is' is eternalism, to say '[it] is not' is the philosophy of cessation. Therefore, the wise should not adhere either to [the doctrine of] 'it is' or to [that of] 'it is not.' For what is by nature, of that it can never be said that it is not; to say 'it is not now, it was before' means [belief in the doctrine of] cessation."(151) Indeed, as suggested above, the Maadhyamika denies not only being but also non-being--in fact, even being-cum-non-being and neither-being-nor-non-being. The last difficulty in giving credence to the nihilistic interpretation of the Maadhyamika's standpoint is the religious fervor shown by him as a Mahaayaanist. If all is void, how can this fervor be explained? The best course for a nihilist would be to be unruffled by emotions and sentiments, rather than to be so devoted to the Buddha as to erect him into a veritable Godhead. The reason, though slightly

difficult to appreciate, is not far to seek. The _____________________________________________________ (148) MK, 24. 15-23. (149) MKV, 24.18, p. 503. (150) MK, 15.8. (151) Ibid., 15.8-11. Also see CSt, 3.21. Elsewhere, however, Naagaarjuna remarks: "Isness without birth and death is simply unthinkable (prasajyetaasti bhaavo hi na jaraamara.na^m vinaa). MK, 25.4. At a third place, again, he remarks: "Being is either eternal or non-eternal" (...bhaavo hi nityo'nityo'thavaa bhavet). MK, 21.14. It is difficult ot reconcile the three statements. p.338 Maadhyamika does not present a much greater problem on this score than the Advaitin, who claims not only consubstantiality but veritable identity with the Absolute and declares the world to be illusory, but, nevertheless, does not lag behind others in his devotion to gods and goddesses. As a matter of fact, they both share the common Indian trait of dichotomizing truth into the transcendental and the empirical, in effect wholly unconnected with each other. While contemplating the transcendental truth, the Maadhyamika considers everything as illusory and void and goes to the extent of declaring the Tathaagata himself, the object of his devotion, to be nothing better than illusory. But, while contemplating the empirical truth, he distinguishes between his gods and their devotees and behaves as if

he were as much a realist as others.(152) This is the case with the Advaitin as well. Indeed, the Indians have never been able to reconcile the empirical with the transcendental, and one need not be surprised if the Maadhyamika fares no better. IX Is the Maadhyamika's thesislessness tantamount to an admission of failure on his part to fathom the mystery of the ultimate reality? His tone does not disclose any such defeatist mentality.(153) He does not seem to regret the fact that he is not in a position to talk about the real. As a matter of fact, he is not at all a skeptic. We does know, but cannot express. He believes in the void, pure and simple. But he is not in a position to explain to others what the state of affairs would be like in the absence of all that we can perceive or conceive as real. Language can operate only in the world of being. Where there is absolutely no being whatsoever, its operation is bound to come to a standstill. _____________________________________________________ (152) Cittavisuddhi-prakara.na, st. 83. (153) MKV, 1.1, p. 56.