Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases (for motion): Butch Victory Liner v.

Malinias: A motion without a notice of hearing (to all parties concerned, including the date of hearing) is a mere scrap of paper that does not toll the period to appeal and upon the expiration of the 15 day period, the questioned order/decision becomes final and executory. A bus owned by Victory Liner and a truck used by Malinias collided in La Union. This resulted into damage on both vehicles. Malinias filed a complaint for sum of money (47k) and damages against Victory Liner in the MTC of Benguet. In the trial, Victory Liner did not appear and was declared to have waived its right to present evidence. In January 13, 1998, the MTC ruled in Malinias favor and awarded him 82k. Victory Liner filed a motion for reconsideration. It stated: Please submit the foregoing Motion for Reconsideration for hearing at a schedule and time convenient to this court and the parties In February 23, 1998,iIt was denied for not conforming with the mandatory requirements and was treated as a mere scrap of paper. Thus, it was deemed to have not tolled the reglementary period to appeal. The decision of the MTC was deemed to have become final and executory. Victory Liner got desperate and filed several petitions: First, a petition for relief from judgment with the MTC. Second, a petition for certiorari (rule 65) in the RTC. Third, petition for certiorari to annul judgment (rule 47) in the CA. All were denied on the ground that the decision was already final and executory. Sec of Finance, Sec of Justice, Auditor general and the Office of the President and all of these were denied. He went to the lower court (petition for mandamus) to have the resolution annulled and for him to be reinstated. The respondents (members of the board of Lanao) moved to dismiss on the ground of lack of cause of action and it was granted. The motion to dismiss was filed in Feb 1, 1961 and set for hearing on Feb 10. On Feb 8, Llanto moved to postpone (not acted upon) and he failed to appear on the hearing date. o However, on March 4, 1961, he filed his written opposition to the motion to dismiss. On May 15, 1961, the court dismissed Llantos petition, including therein his arguments and thereafter concluding that Llanto did NOT have a cause of action. o He filed a motion for reconsideration and this was thereafter denied Llanto contests the dismissal of his petition because the court granted the motion to dismiss without any hearing.

Issue: Was the dismissal void due to lack of hearing on the motion to dismiss? No. The SC here stated the rationale for requiring a hearing on a motion. The court elucidated that its purpose is to enable the parties to adduce evidence in support of their opposing claims (due process, the party opposing the motion needs to be given his day in court) In this case, however, the motion to dismiss is due to lack of cause of action. Existence of a cause of action or lack thereof is determined by the allegations in the complaint and is question of law. Llanto was able to file his written opposition and the order of dismissal took into consideration his arguments against the motion to dismiss. There was no need for hearing. Furthermore, his motion for reconsideration cured the defect of lack of hearing

Issue: Was the motion of Victory Liner valid? No. In fact, the SC held that the motion filed in the MTC was the most crucial failure of Victory Liner. It cited Sections 5 and 6 of rule 15 which stated the requirements for a valid motion namely: o A date must be set for hearing by the applicant o The notice of hearing shall be addressed to the parties concerned and shall specify the time and date of the hearing o There must be proof of service of the notice of hearing of the motion Because of this failure, the motion failed to toll the period to appeal. It was not deemed to have been filed. A motion without a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper. o The rationale behind this rule is plain: Unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion and if he objects, to hear him on his objection, since the rules themselves do not fix any period within which he may file his reply/opposition

Vlason Enterprises v. CA: shit case: Sec 4 and 5 of the RoC ideally requires a movant to address and serve on the counsel of the adverse party the notice of hearing of its motion. Service of a copy of a motion must contain a notice of the time and the place of hearing. There are, however, exceptions to the rule: o Where a rigid application will result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice, especially if a party successfully shows that the alleged defect in the questioned final and executory judgment is not apparent on its face or from the recitals contained therein o Where the interest of substantial justice will be served o Where the resolution of the motion is addressed solely to the sound and judicious discretion of the court o Where the injustice to the adverse party is not commensurate to the degree of his failure to comply with prescribed procedure In this case, Vlason was not informed of any cause of action against it. It was not validly summoned. Its vessels that it used for its salvaging business was levied upon and sold in execution to satisfy a supposed judgment against it . To allow this to happen 1

Lanto v. Dimaporo: No need for hearing on the motion IF the adverse party had sufficient opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss. The position that was previously held by Llanto was abolished due to a resolution of the provincial board of Lanao del Norte. He appealed to the CSC,

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon simply because of its failure to comply with the notice requirement would result into manifest injustice. Cases (Motion to dismiss) Boticano v. Chu: Chu was held in default. This doesnt mean that he didnt have the chance to question the courts jurisdiction over his person. He subsequently filed pleadings and even voluntarily appeared in court. Therefore, he cannot just raise the question of jurisdiction only for the first time in his appeal to the CA. Boticanos truck carrying logs was rear-ended by a truck driven by Sigua and owned by Chu. Chu agreed to pay for the damages but when he thereafter failed to comply. Summons was not duly served on Sigua but it was served on Chu, through his wife. It was served at their dwelling. Boticano filed a complaint with the RTC of Nueva Ecija. Chu was declared to have been in default for failure to file an answer, and Boticano was allowed to present his evidence ex-parte. Chu an was adjudged to be negligent and was ordered to pay actual damages, 73.7k as unrealized income and attorneys fees. Chu timely filed an appeal and was even granted an extension. Boticano filed a motion to dismiss the appeal and it was dismissed. The case went to the CA and the CA ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC because the RTC did not properly acquire jurisdiction over Chu. The CA agreed with Chus argument that summons was not validly served on him. Meanwhile, the CA case held that the only remaining balance that Petitioners had to pay was only 1.4M In response, DATICOR filed a case against PDCP and FBTC to get back the excess payment they made (CIVIL CASE 1) and the RTC ordered PDCP to give back the excess payment o PDCP appealed this order (CIVIL CASE 2) and the CA ruled that indeed, the petitioners outstanding obligatio n was 1.4M and it cannot be increased or decreased. However, the CA ruled that it was FBTC that should return the amount of (only) 965k, the amount that DATICOR prayed for. Thereafter, DATICOR filed a complaint against FEBTC to recover the excess payment (CIVIL CASE 3). FBTC denied responsibility and only wanted to pay the 965k o FBTC then filed a complaint against PDCP, alleging that it should pay the 965k and the complete overpayment o In this case (CIVIL CASE 3), the most important one, the RTC dismissed DATICORs complaint against FBTC, because it amounted to a splitting of a cause of action and because of res judicata.

Issue: Is DATICOR entitled to collect the full overpayment from FBTC? No First off, the SC ruled that Civil Case 2 had the effect of res judicata. The judgment in Civil Case 2 was a final judgment: it ruled that DATICOR overpaid by 5.3M, FBTC must only pay 965k and that PDCP had no more claim against DATICOR To allow re-litigation of the issue in that was settled in CIVIL CASE 2 that was finally settled would allow the splitting of a cause of action, which a ground for dismissal under the RoC . o This rule prevents a party from dividing a single or indivisible cause of action it into several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions based on it o Clearly then, the judgment in CIVIL CASE 2 bars further recovery Basically, DATICOR cant ask FBTC to overpay because their rights were already litigated. Its cause of action was based on the same facts because the same alleged wrongful act (refusing to return the overpayment) is the one put at issue. Res Judicata Elements: 1. Finality of Former Judgment 2. Court which rendered judgment had jurisdiction 3. Judgment must be on the merits 4. There must be between the first and second actions, identity of parties, SM and causes of action

Issue: Did the RTC validly acquire jurisdiction over Chu? Can Chu validly raise the question of jurisdiction only for the first time on appeal? YES the RTC had jurisdiction and NO, Chu cannot question jurisdiction over his person for the first time in appeal. The fact that Chu was declared in default is of no moment. He had a chance to question the RTCs jurisdiction in the subsequent pleadings he filed. Besides, he was deemed to have voluntarily s ubmitted himself to the courts jurisdiction. He did this by filing a notice of appeal, appeal bond, motion for extension to file record on appeal, opposition to plaintiffs motion to dismiss appeal. He also appeared in person in a hearing. His voluntary appearance is deemed to be equivalent to service.

Del Rosario v. Far East Bank and Trust Company: Elements of Res judicata Petitioner DATICOR and Respondent PDCP entered into an agreement whereby PDCP extended to DATICOR a foreign loan of 4.4M (dollar loan and peso loan) with various rates of interest on both Petitioners paid a total of 3M but was still left with an outstanding balance of more than 10M. Petitioners contested this loan for being usurious and this was pending in a CA case. o Meanwhile PDCP assigned its receivables to co-respondent FBTC o FBTC and DATICOR agreed that DATICOR would pay, and they did, 6.4M as full settlement

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Halimao v. Villanueva (1996 case): If ground for motion to dismiss is RJ, it does not operate as a hypothetical admission of the alleged facts. However, the general rule is that a MTD based on lack of cause of action operates as a hypothetical admission of all the facts alleged therein. Halimao wrote the chief justice and said that the respondents Attys Villanueva and Ferrer entered the Oo Kian Tiok Compound in Cainta with guns. Halimao was the caretaker of the compound. He wishes to have them disbarred for serious misconduct. The respondents argued that the complaint was a mere duplication of an already dismissed administrative case against them filed by Danilo Hernandez (a security guard of the compound) They filed a motion to dismiss. The Investigating Commissioner of the IBP held that res judicata applied, as though the parties were different, they substantially had the same interests Halimao argues that by filing a motion to dismiss, the respondents hypothetically admitted the facts alleged in the complaint. pleadings. It can look at the records, apply relevant laws and jurisprudence to adjudge whether or not there really is a cause of action. Tan Kiat, his complaint, argues that he bought 2 parcels of land from Tan Keh. The title couldnt be transferred to his name because Tan was not yet a citizen. Thereafter, Tan Keh sold the lands to the Remigio Tan with the understanding that they would only hold it in trust for Tan Kiat. To assure Tan Kiat, Tan leased the properties him. Tan died and his heirs never transferred the subject properties. In fact, his heirs transferred it to their names. Tan Kiat, as aforementioned, filed a case for recovery of property. The Tans filed a MTD alleging lack of cause of action, prescription, res judicata, waiver/extinguishment/laches. The RTC dismissed the case. The CA set aside the dismissal, stating that the complaint had a cause of action because by filing a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action, the Tans hypothetically admitted all the facts alleged therein.

Issue: Did the respondents hypothetically admit the alleged facts in light of their motion to dismiss based on res judicata? NO. A motion to dismiss is considered a hypothetical admission of the facts alleged when the ground for dismissal is the failure of the complaint to state a cause of action. When such motion is filed based on the aforesaid ground, the defendant in effects says that even assuming the facts to be as alleged by the plaintiff, he has still failed to prove that he had a right that was violated. (Fine, even if its true, but you still dont have a cause of action) This rule DOES NOT apply to a case where the defendant files a motion to dismiss based on: 1. Lack of jurisdiction over the person/SM/nature of the action 2. Improper venue 3. Lack of capacity to sue 4. Litis Pendencia 5. Res Judicata 6. Prescription 7. Unenforceability In such cases, the hypothetical admission is limited to the facts alleged in the complaint which relate to and are necessary for the resolution of these grounds as preliminary matters involving substantive or procedural laws. In this case, the investigating commissioner properly dismissed the case for res judicata, it being that the two cases were the same ( Both Hernandez and Halimao were employed at the compound) The admin case brought by Hernandez was barred for want of prima facie showing of professional misconduct. The issue was settled in the FIRST admin case.

Issue: Was the CAs order improper? YES Should the dismissal be upheld? YES There are limitations to the general rule that averments in the complaint are deemed hypothetically admitted upon the filing of a motion to dismiss based on the failure to state a cause of action . A MTD based on this does not admit: 1. The truth of mere description of fraud 2. Allegations of legal conclusions 3. An erroneous statement of law 4. Inferences from facts not stated 5. Conclusions of law 6. Allegations of fact, the falsity of which is subject to judicial notice 7. Surplusage/irrelevant matters 8. Scandalous matter 9. Legally impossible facts 10. General averments contradicted by more specific avrements A more judicious resolution of a MTD necessitates that the court should not be constrained to the consideration of facts alleged in the complaint and inferences fairly deducible therefrom. Courts may consider facts within the range of judicial notice and other relevant laws and jurisprudence. They can also examine records/documents incorporated into the complaint. The court found here the following: o Tan Kiat cannot question his landlords ownership, him being the lessee o Tan was able to mortgage the lands in question therefore he was the absolute owner o There was no trust, express or implied Clearly then, the complaint DID NOT have a cause of action. It has also prescribed, because of the lapse of the 10 year period for reconveyance and because of laches, the complaint being filed 18 years after the land was registered in the name of the Tans. 3

Tan v. CA and Tan Kiat (1998 case): Limitation on the Halimao Doctrine: The hypothetical admission of the facts in a MTD based on lack of cause of action does not mean that the court is constrained to the facts in the

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Asia Production and Wang v. Pano, Hua and Dy Hua and Dy claimed to have been owners of a building constructed on a lot leased from a certain San Andres. They ORALLY agreed to sell the building to petitioners for 170k, with the ORAL assurance that that they would also transfer their contract of lease to the petitioner. Petitioners constructed a factory on the lot and made several payments (reaching 50k) to Hua and Dy. However, the respondents did not execute a deed of sale nor an assignment of the lease. In response, petitioners went to court and filed a complaint for recovery of sum of money. Dy filed a MTD on the ground that the action is covered by the statute of frauds therefore it must be in writing. The RTC granted the MTD, agreeing with Dy that the agreement shouldve been in writing to be enforceable (lease agreement for a period longer than one year) Yes. The doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies was not complied with. This calls for resort first to the appropriate admin authorities in the resolution of a controversy falling under their jurisdiction before the same may be elevated to the courts of justice. (Go to admin bodies first and have them resolve it before going to Court) o Non-observance of this doctrine results in lack of a cause of action, which is a ground for dismissal. This deficiency is NOT jurisdictional and failure to object to this in a MTD operates as a waiver. In this case however, the petitioners timely brought up the issue in their MTD. The respondents should have gone first to DENR because DENR is empowered to rule in the first instance of any controversy relating to the violations of a TLA. This comes within their expertise so they can properly evaluate evidence to resolve factual issues coming within their competence .

Issue: Was the MTD properly granted? NO The SoF was not designed to perpetuate fraud. Furthermore, it only makes ineffective actions for specific performance of the contracts covered by it. The SoF applies only to executory contracts and in actions for their specific performance. It does NOT apply to actions which are neither for violation of a contract nor for the performance thereof. In this case, the contract was already partially performed (due to the payment) More importantly, in this case, the complaint petitioners filed was NOT for specific performance of the agreement to sell and to assign the leasehold right. They merely seek to recover their partial payment for the building. By their motion to dismiss, private respondents hypothetically admitted the truth of the allegations in the complaint (that the petitioners are seeking to recover the 50k partial payment they made) o Logically, it was just really for collection of sum of money. To reiterate, the action is not one for specific performance so the SoF does not apply and even if it was, it still wont apply since it was already partially performed.

Municipality of Binan v. CA and Garcia: a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of actions is NOT necessary The petitioner Municipality, through its mayor, filed an unlawful detainer case against Garcia in the MTC, alleging that it was not amenable to extending the lease contract that it had. Garcia, in his answer, argues that he still had a right to stay (the lease for 25 years still hasnt expired AND that he exercised his option to renew) Garcia then filed a Motion for preliminary hearing as if a motion to dismiss has been filed on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action. Petitioner opposed the motion and the MTC ordered Garcia to vacate. Garcia then filed a motion before the MTC praying that the issues raised in the motion for preliminary hearing be resolved first because it was in the nature of a motion to dismiss. His motion was not granted. Garcia appealed to the RTC and in the meantime, upon motion of the petitioner, the judge issued a writ of execution pending appeal. Garcia went to CA, arguing that he was not sent a copy of the motion (for execution pending appeal) The CA overturned the lower courts, holding that under the RoC, no motion shall be acted upon by the court w/o proof of prior notice. It also annulled the order for Garcia to vacate because the MTC did not grant the preliminary hearing.

Sunville Timber v. Abad: Non-observance of doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies can be a ground to dismiss (lack of cause of action) Sunville was granted a TLA authorizing it to cut forest land in Zamboanga for 10 years. The private respondents then filed a petition with the DENR for the cancellation of the TLA on the ground of serious violations of the TLA. They subsequently filed a complaint for injunction in the RTC of Pagadian City against the petitioner. Petitioner moved to dismiss the civil case for injunction on the ground that the court did not have jurisdiction and that the respondents have not yet exhausted the administrative remedies. This was denied. On appeal, the CA held that this case falls under one of the exceptions of the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies because of the urgency of the matter and public interest (The logging was causing flooding)

Issue: Was the CA correct in overturning the lower courts? No. The CA was wrong. The lower court did NOT commit GADLEJ in when it failed to conduct a preliminary hearing as prayed for in Garcias motion for prelim hearing as if a motion to dismiss has been filed o This is because the said motion of Garcia is anchored on the ground that the complaint allegedly states no cause of action since the original term stipulated in the contract (25 yrs) has not yet expired. 4

Issue: Should the MTD be granted?

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon This was 1993 so at this time, the rule (now Rule 16 sec 6) stated: Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule may be pleaded as an affirmative defense and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon as if a motion to dismiss had been filed This provision allows the grounds for a MTD to be set up as affirmative defenses in the answer (in case no MTD was filed) o Note: Now, the rule states At the discretion of the court x x x a preliminary hearing may be had This hearing, however, is NOT mandatory for it rests on the sound discretion of the court. Moreover, a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense for failure to state a cause of actions is NOT necessary o This is because the courts must determine the sufficiency of the allegations in the complaint itself (w/n it states a cause of action) The sufficiency of the cause of action must appear on the face of the complaint. No extraneous matter may be considered, nor facts not alleged. this was before the Tan Kiat case, which obviously is contradictory to this. However, the law expressly powers NPC to directly service all the requirements of a BOI registered enterprise, like FINE. The CA committed GADLEJ in upholding the injunction since NPC was fully within its right to directly service FINE. Meralcos petition is dismissed.

Napocor and FINE Chemicals v. CA and Meralco (Alternative remedy if motion to dismiss is denied: Rule 65 GADLEJ) FINE Chemicals filed an application for a direct power connection with NPC. NPC, acting on the same, asked Meralco if it would grant FINE a direct power connection too (Because NAPOCOR and Meralco agreed not to compete) Meralco told NPC not to grant FINEs request. Meralco stated that it is capable of serving FINEs power requirement. NPC ignored this and proceeded to supply electricity to FINE. Meralco went to the RTC of Pasig and filed a petition for prohibition and mandamus with injunction against NPC and FINE . FINE filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the allegations of the petition failed to state a cause of action. The RTC, however, denied the motion to dismiss, stating that based on the facts alleged, a cause of action exists. FINE went to the CA, filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was also DENIED by the CA.

Issue: Should Meralcos petition be dismissed? YES The ordinary procedure would have been as follows: When FINEs MTD was denied, it should have just filed an answer, gone to trial and if the decision is adverse, shouldve reiterated the issue on appeal. o However, this is subject to certain exceptions. One would be if the court, in denying the MTD commits GADLEJ. This is because it would be unfair to require the defendant to undergo the ordeal and expense of the trial under such circumstances as the remedy of appeal would not be plain and adequate. In the case at bar, Meralcos claim in its petition for prohibiton and mandamus in the RTC is based on its standing as a holder of a franchise. It asserts that it has the right to be heard on any application for direct power connection. 5

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases: (Dismissal of Actions): Sandy O.B. Jovenir Construction v. Macamir Realty, spouses Miranda Due to misrepresentation by OB Jovenir as a legitimate contractor, owners of the Macamir Realty, the spouses Miranda, sought the termination of their agreement to erect a condominium for the spouses In doing so, the spouses filed for a TRO in behalf of Macamir Realty in RTC Makati(3 feb 1997). o However, the Macamir BoD did not approve of this o Thus, the Spouses filed a motion to withdraw the complaint (13 feb 1997) Subsequently, the spouses filed another TRO for Macamir Realty, this time with approval of the BoD (17 Feb 1997) o However, at this time, the motion to withdraw the original complaint hasnt been granted yet Petitioner now assails that since the original complaint hasnt been dismissed, the spouses are violating the non-forum shopping rule. Third Case: CASE #3: Injunction: Filed in RTC by Buna gs against Bunags . Dismissed for res judicata since there is a substantial identity of parties in this case and with case #2 o Fourth Case: CASE #4: Annulment of title with damages: Filed in RTC by Bunag against Cruz In case #4, Cruzs filed a motion for dismissal, arguing res judicata, since the parties and subject matter in this case is the same as CASE #2. The RTC dismissed case #4. o In an MR, however, this was reversed and case #4 was ordered to proceed. Cruz was ordered to file an answer Aggrieved, Cruz went to the CA, still arguing res judicata. The CA denied this. o

Issue: Should Cruzs motion to dismiss prosper? YES Review: Elements of RJ: 1. Final judgment/order: In this case, there was a final judgment in civil case #2 2. Judgment/order must be on the merits Bunags argue that the dismissal of case #2 will not bar the filing of case #4 SINCE there was no litigious consideration of the evidence The SC, however, stated that the dismissal of case #2 was the Bunags fault. The case was dismissed for their failure to appear on several hearings wherein they couldve presented their evidence. Further, since the RTC ordered the dismissal without a qualification on whether the same is w/o or w/o prejudice, following Section 3 of Rule 17, it should be considered with prejudice and shall have the effect of an adjudication on the merits A ruling based on a MTD, without any trial on the merits or formal presentation of evidence, can still be a judgment on the merits 3. Court must have jurisdiction : Jurisdiction of the court was never questioned 4. The two cases must have the same parties, SM and cause of action Pertinent Rule: Dismissal of actions through the fault of plaintiff: 1. If he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chief 2. If he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of time 3. If he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court

Issue: W/N there was a valid dismissal of the original complaint - YES Ratio: Section 1 Rule 17 : An Action may be dismissed by the plaintiff without order of court by: 1. filing a notice of dismissal at any time This is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs even if the motion cites the most ridiculous grounds for dismissal. Trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed. 2. motion for summary judgment in the case at bar, while the motion is styled as a motion and contains prayers, there are innocuous erros and superfluities that do not detract from its being a NOTICE OF DISMISSAL made under Sec 1 Rule 17 which ipso facto dismissed the case: (considered as notice of dismissal) It is not the caption of the pleading but the allegations thereat that determines its nature. Thus, said court order is a mere surplusage as it can be done without order of the court. Cruz v. CA (If RTC orders dismissal due to the fault of the plaintiff, this will have the effect of adjudication on the merits. This dismissal will operate as fulfilment of the SECOND element of RES JUDICATA) There are 4 cases involved in this controversy. Bunags and Cruzs are fighting over land. o First case: CASE #1: Unlawful Detainer: Filed in MTC by Cruz against Boy Bunag. Cruz won. o Second case: CASE #2: Quieting of Title: Filed in RTC by Bunag against Cruz. Dismissed for failure to prosecute

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Pinga v. Heirs of Santiago (Plaintiffs filed a case. Defendant had a counterclaim. It was dismissed due to their own fault. Defendant can still prosecute his counterclaim even after the dismissal of the main case) Facts: The Heirs of Santiago filed an injunction against Pinga alleging that Pinga had been unlawfully entering the coco lands of the respondent cutting wood and bamboos and harvesting the fruits of the coconut trees. As a counterclaim, Pinga contests the ownership of the lands to which Pinga was harvesting the fruits. However, due to failures of Heirs of Santiago to attend the hearings, the court ordered the dismissal of said case. Respondents thus filed an MR not to reinstate the case but to ask for the entire action to be dismissed and not to allow petitioner to present evidence ex parte, o RTC granted it, hence the counterclaim was dismissed. o RTC ruled that compulsory counterclaims cannot be adjudicated independently of plaintiffs cause of action vis a vis the dismissal of the complaint carries with it the dismissal of the counterclaim Petitioner then elevates it to the SC by way of Rule 45 on pure questions of law (Santiagos motive: They just asked for the dismissal of their entire case so that their ownership wouldnt be put in controversy in the counterclaim) Issue: W/N dismissal of original complaint affects that of the compulsory counter claims? NO the counterclaims, in this case, can stand on its own Ratio: The dismissal of the complaint does not carry with the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute his counterclaim Section 3 contemplates a dismissal not procured by plaintiff, albeit justified by causes imputable to him and which, in the present case, was petitioner's failure to appear at the pre-trial. This situation is also covered by Section 3, as extended by judicial interpretation, and is ordered upon motion of defendant or motu proprio by the court. Here, the issue of whether defendant has a pending counterclaim, permissive or compulsory, is not of determinative significance . The dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is evidently a confirmation of the failure of evidence to prove his cause of action outlined therein, hence the dismissal is considered, as a matter of evidence, an adjudication on the merits. This does not, however, mean that there is likewise such absence of evidence to prove defendant's counterclaim although the same arises out of the subject matter of the complaint which was merely terminated for lack of proof. To hold otherwise would not only work injustice to defendant but would be reading a further provision into Section 3 and wresting a meaning therefrom although neither exists even by mere implication. Thus understood, the complaint can accordingly be dismissed, but relief can nevertheless be granted as a matter of course to defendant on his counterclaim as alleged and proved, with or without any reservation therefor on his part, unless from his conduct, express or implied, he has virtually consented to the concomitant dismissal of his counterclaim The present rule embodied in Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 17 ordains a more equitable disposition of the counterclaims by ensuring that any judgment thereon is based on the merit of the counterclaim itself and not on the survival of the main complaint . Certainly, if the counterclaim is palpably without merit or suffers jurisdictional flaws which stand independent of the complaint, the trial court is not precluded from dismissing it under the amended rules, provided that the judgment or order dismissing the counterclaim is premised on those defects. At the same time, if the counterclaim is justified, the amended rules now unequivocally protect such counterclaim from peremptory dismissal by reason of the dismissal of the complaint. Rule 17 Sec 3 provides : If for any cause, the plaintiff fails to appear on the date of his presentation of his evidence x x x the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or upon the courts own motion, without prejudice to the right of the defendant to prosecute his counterclaim in the same or in a separate action Petitioner wins, the counterclaim should proceed.

Ko V PNB (Plaintiffs filed a case. It was dismissed due to their fault. This dismissal has the effect of adjudication on the merits. Their remedy is RULE 41) 1. Ko filed for the annulment of a mortgage, extra-judicial foreclosure and the annulment of a TCT and deed for sale . It was alleged that the mortgage, the foreclosure proceedings were null and void because the written consent of the petitioners (as the beneficiaries of the mortgaged property, was not secured). During the proceedings, the petitioners failed to attend trial, despite proper notice, and upon motion of PNB the complaint was dismissed. PNBs counsel pointed to an apparent lack of interest on the part of the plaintiff to prosecute the action. The case was thus dismissed. Ko filed an MR claiming that this whole time they had been actively negotiating with PNB to buy back the property and that there were positive results. But the MR was denied. Petitioners filed for review on certiorari under Rule 45 and not an appeal with the CA.

2.

3. 4.

Issue: W/N RTC dismissed the case erroneously? W/N procedure should yield in this case? Held: NO Petitioners should have filed for an appeal with the CA . Sec 3 Rule 17 provides that if a plaintiff fails to appear on the date of the presentation of his evidence, or to prosecute the action for an unreasonable period of time, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of the defendant or by 7

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon the court motu proprio, without prejudice to the defendants right to prosecute a counter claim or separate action. The dismissal is equivalent to an adjudication upon the merits, unless otherwise provided by the court The MR of the petitioners was dismissed because failure to prosecute has the effect of adjudication on the merits, the proper action is an ordinary appeal with the CA under rule 41 and not petition under rule 45. Rule 41 provides: Appeal to CA from cases decided in RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction shall be by filing a notice of appeal with the court that rendered the judgment and serving a copy upon the adverse party. The rule is clear, in order to perfect an appeal all that is required is a pro forma notice of appeal within the reglementary period. The rules of procedure do not exist for the convenience of the litigalnts. The rules provide order and to enhance efficiency of the judicial system, mere invocation of substantial justice will not overturn them. The plaintiff did not prosecute the case with utmost diligence and was in effect clogging the dockets of the court.

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases: Default Rule 9: PDG Gajudo v Traders Royal (A complaint is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for just because the defendant is in default. Default operates only as a waiver of right to be heard and to present evidence in trial) 1. Gajudo filed before the RTC QC a petition for Annulment of extrajudicial foreclosure and auction sale by the sheriff of QC . She prayed for conventional redemption and damages. The foregoing is rooted in a loan availed of by petitioners from Traders Royal Bank in the Amount of 75k secured by REM over the land. Loan was not paid hence the foreclosure. Auction was set in june 1981 and moved to August 1981 on the request of one of the Petitioners Chua, but without notice to his co-petitioners. It was sold at the auction for 24k to Traders. Chua had attempted to buy back the subject property, plus interest, by making an initial payment of 4k covered by a check, but was later told to make a new offer because of a change in the market value. Petitioners complained that the sale was irregular because of the shocking or unconscionably low bid price and that they had been denied their right to redeem the property because they were not informed of the sale. Traders filed a counterclaim claiming that petitioners had slept on their rights and that it (traders) was acting within the law and legitimate banking practice and regulations . In 1988 the records in the city hall were destroyed, along with the records of the case. After reconstitution the petitioners discovered that the property had beensold to a Ceroferr Realty Corp and that the annotation of Lis Pendens on the Certificate of Title was cancelled. The complaint was refiled with these facts and summons was properly served upon the bank. A motion to declare Traders in default was filed and was granted. Petitioners were allowed present their evidence ex parte. On Appeal CA ruled for Traders. no opportunity to present evidence. The extent of the relief that may be granted is only as much as has been alleged and proved. A complainant is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for because a defendant is in default. Declaration of default is not a waiver of rights, only right to be heard and to present evidence in trial. Anything more would be denial of due process. In this case the petitioners were not able to establish their case under the required quantum of proof .

Vlason v CA 1. Poro Point Shipping is the local agent of Omega Transpo (of Panama). One of its Vessels, Star Ace had engine trouble and requested to unload cargo and store it at the Philippine Ports Authority in San Fernando La Union. Despite being granted permission by Customs, several of its personnel boarded the vessel on suspicion that it was the hijacked Silver Med and that its cargo would be smuggled into the country. Vessel and all cargo was seized pursuant to the tariff and customs code. During this time La Union was hit by three typhoons and the vessel ran aground and was abandoned. Cadacio entered into a salvage agreement with the respondents to secure and repair the vessel at $1M and 50$ of the cargo after all expenses, cost and taxes. Private respondent Duraproof (seeking to enforce a preferred lien as a salvor[person engaged in salvage of a ship or items lost at sea]) filed a petition with the RTC Manila, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. Vlason was among those who opposed. Duraproof moved to declare several of the defendants in their petition in default, but was denied by the RTC. (impt to note that it did not include any allegation against Vlason nor any prayer for relief against it) Duraproof eventually had Singkong, Comissioner Mison (PPA) and Omega in default. It was allowed to present evidence ex parte against the defaulting respondents. When only the private respondent and the parties declared in default were present at the hearing, the trial court declared the other respondents in default and allowed duraproof to present evidence against them. Vlasons was never ordered in default. However a judgment against it was entered. In fact they alleged that the RTC never acquired jurisdiction over the petitioner.

2.

3.

2.

4.

5.

3.

Issue: W/N CA erred in failing to apply Section 3 Rule 9 instead of applying the rule on preponderance of evidence under Rule 133 section 1? Held: Rule 9 Sec 3 provides: When a defending party fails to answer within the time allowed, the court shall upon motion of the claiming party with notice to the defending party and with proof of failure shall declare the defending party in default. The court shall then proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading warrants, unless it shall require the claimant to submit evidence. A party in default shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings but not to take part in the trial. He may, after notice and before judgment, file under oath a motion to set aside the order of default upon showing that his failure to answer was due to FAME (fraud, accident, mistake, excusable negligence) and he has a meritorious defense. There is no incompatibility between 133 and 9. Parties must still rely on the strength of their own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defense of their opponent. This principle is especially true when their opponent has

4.

Issue: W/n the judgment by default was defective? YES. W/n the RTC default judgment is binding on VEC? No. RTC had declared the other respondents in default upon motion of Duraproof because after due notice to them they failed to appear. No such order was issued ordering VEC in default. Thus there being no order of default against VEC, there could not have been any valid default-judgment rendered against it. The issuance of an order of default is a condition essential In order that a judgment of default be clothed with validity. There was never any record which shows that the court allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte against VEC. Without a declaration of default, trial court has no authority to order the presentation of evidence exparte against the petitioner. The rule that when a party fails to appear despite summons waives the objection to the presentation of evidence against it, applies only if the petitioner has submitted itself to 9

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon jurisdiction of the court. But as earlier mentioned the default judgment was improvidently rendered. Ramnani V CA 1. Spouses Dizon filed a complaint with RTC Makati against Spouses Ramnani for the collection of a sum of money representing an alleged unremitted amount of jewelry received by Ramnani on consignment. Ramnani counterclaimed, saying that while she did receive jewels in the amount of 900k from Dizon, Dizon received 1.6m worth of jewels and cash from Ramnani plus unpaid checks in the amount of 160k. In sum, DIzon owed her 787k. 2. The Ramnanis did not show for pre-trial and they were consequently declared in default on August 14, 1990, motioned for its lifting on Sept 12 1990 and were denied Nov 20, 1990. Evidence was received ex parte from Dizon, as per the default order. Judge Guerrero rendered judgment against Ramnani, holdling that they were liable in the amount of 884k plus legal interest, and 170k in damages plust cost of the suit. 3. Ramnani Filed an MR on the ground that a personal obligation contracted by the wife without the consent of the husband was being made enforceable against the conjugal partnership despite absence of allegations, much less proof that the same redounded to the benefit of the family, pursuant to the Family Code. 4. Ramnani filed for certiorari before the CA, saying that the denial of the motion to lift order of default was erroneous because Ramnani possessed a meritorious defense and that the reason for non-appearance was excusable neglect. Issue: was the decision of the RTC to deny the motion for lifting the order of default proper? Held: A party who fails to appear at pre-trial may be considered non-suited or in default (Rule 20 section 2) A party declared in default may, at any time after the declaration and before judgment file a motion under oath to set aside the order on the ground that the failure to answer was due to FAME and that he has a meritorious defense. (rule 18 sec 3) If a judgment has already been rendered but before it is final and executory he may file for a new trial under Rule 37 Sec 1a. If it is after it has become final and executory he may file petition for relief from judgment under rule 38 sec2. If the judgment rendered is contrary to evidence or to law he may appeal from the judgment under Rule 41 Sec 2. The first remedy was adopted in this case but was denied because the nonappearance was judged to be inexcusable by the trial court. It was claimed that Ramnani was sick but no medical certificate was presented to evidence such illness. A satisfactory showing of the existence of fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect is indispensable requirement for the setting aside of a judgment of default or the order of default. Ramnani utterly failed to do so. The mere allegation, even assuming it were true, of a meritorious defense (that Dizon owed them 900k as alleged in the counterclaim) is not sufficient to justify the lifting of the order of default. The two conditions must coincide ot grant the relief sought. Martinez v. Republic: a defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint , or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default.

Remedies from judgment by default: 1. The defendant in default may, at any time after discovery thereof and before judgment, file a motion, under oath, to set aside the order of default on the ground that his failure to answer was due to fraud, accident, mistake or excusable neglect, and that he has meritorious defenses; (Sec 3, Rule 18) If the judgment has already been rendered when the defendant discovered the default, but before the same has become final and executory, he may file a motion for new trial under Section 1(a) of Rule 37; If the defendant discovered the default after the judgment has become final and executory, he may file a petition for relief under Section 2 of Rule 38; and He may also appeal from the judgment rendered against him as contrary to the evidence or to the law, even if no petition to set aside the order of default has been presented by him. (Sec. 2, Rule 41)

2. 3. 4.

Jao & Co. vs. Court of appeals Due to non-appearance of Jao & Co. during a hearing, RTC declared the petitioner in default and allowed evidence to be presented ex-parte. Thereafter, a decision was rendered ordering Jao to pay respondent Top Service P150K as agreed rentals. After receipt of the decision, Jao filed a Motion for reconsideration which was denied and the court allowed the sheriff to sell two barges previously levied on. Jao filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of appeals contesting the jurisdiction of the trial court. The CA issued an order to stop the sheriff from conduction the said auction sale, but it was too late since the two barges were already sold to third parties. Thus, Jao brought to the Supreme court the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 to nullify the said auction sale for GADLEJ. On the other hand, respondent Top Service argued that the decision of the lower court had already become final and that the 2 barges have already been sold to third parties in good faith. Jao argued that the decision of the lower court cannot be final because the trial court improperly declared Jao in default since it was not given notice of the Order declaring it in default

Issue: is certiorari the proper remedy in contesting a default improperly issued? Decision: 10

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Under ordinary circumstance, the proper remedy of a party wrongfully declared in default is either to appeal from the judgment by default or to file a petition for relief from judgment and not certiorari. A default judgment is an adjudication on the merits, and is thus appealable. Since appeal is the proper remedy, the extraordinary writ of certiorari will not lie. Likewise, Jaos contention that it did not receive the copy of the decision was due to its own fault since the trial court was not furnished of its forwarding address. However, exception to such are: a) when issues are purely legal; b) public interest is involved; c) extreme urgency; d) special circumstances so warrant. In the case at bar, regulation of educational institutions is invested with public interest; thus there is not need to resort first to a motion for reconsideration. Lastly, an order denying a motion to dismiss is interlocutory; the proper remedy is to appeal after a decision has been rendered. A writ of certiorari is not intended to correct every controversial interlocutory ruling, it is resorted only to correct grave abuse of discretion In the case at bar, there was no grave abuse of discretion in the lower courts denial of the Motion to Dismiss since the acts of CHED such as declaring in a newspaper that Indiana was ordered closed for illegal advertisement, undermined the public's confidence in Indiana as an educational institution. This was a clear statement of a sufficient cause of action.

Indiana Aerospace University vs. Commission on Higher Education CHED received a letter from the Chairman of Professional Regulatroy Commission inquiring whether Indiano Aerospace already acquired university status in view of its advertisement as such in Manila Bulletin. Upon investigation, it was verified from SEC that Indiana School of Aeronautics failed to amend its articles if Incorporatio to change its name to Indiana Aerospace University. Thus, CHED ordered it to desist from using the term University. Prior thereto, Indiana Aerospace filed a complaint for damages with a prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction. CHED, on the other hand filed a motion to Dismiss. The lower court dismissed the Motion to Dismiss and Granted Indianas prayer for Preliminary Injunction. Likewise, Indiana Aerospace filed before the lower court a Motion to declare CHED in Default. CHED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File its Answer. The lower court ruled on Indianas motion to declare CHED in Default and directed it to present evidence ex parte. CHED filed with CA a petitioner for certiorari arguing that RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying its Motion to Dismiss and in declaring it in default despite its filing an Answer. CA ruled that Indiana had no cause of action against CHE since it failed to show that it had been granted university status by CHED, and ruled that CHED should not have been declared in default since its Answer had long been filed before the lower court ruled upon Indianas Motion to declare it in default. Indiana claims that the Petition for Certiorari of CHED should have been dismissed by CA because it was filed out of time and was not preceded by a motion for reconsideration in the RTC. Issues: Was the certiorari petition properly and timely filed? Decision: CHEDs Petition for Certiorari was seasonable filed. In computing its timeliness, what should have been considered is the date when the respondent received the Order declaring it in default. In the case at bar, CHED was able to comply with the 60-day reglamentary period to file its Petition for Certiorari. As to its contention that a motion for reconsideration should precede the petition for certiorari, the general rule is that the lower court should be given the opportunity to correct itself and thus a motion for reconsideration should precede a petitioner for certiorari.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases: Rule 18 (pre-trial) Geoc LCK Industries vs. Planters Development Bank LCK obtained a loan from Planters Bank amounting to P3M. As security, a real estate mortgage was executed on 2 lands located in QC and in Baguio. Upon default in payment, Planters Bank caused the extrajudicial foreclosure of the Baguio property which was sold for P2.6M and the QC property sold for P2.2M. Prior to the auction sale, LCK Industires filed with RTC an action for Annulmet of the Foreclosure of Mortgage and the Auction sale of the QC property on ground that Planters failed to comply with the requirements on posting and publication and that the foreclosure was not filed with the clerk of court. Thereafter a pre-trial was conducted. The issues raised during the pre-trial were: whether the foreclosure was filed with wit the clerk of court, whether there was compliance with the posting and publication requirements, and whether the parties are entitled to their respective attorneys fees. After the pre-trial, LCK, in its memorandum, claimed that there was an overpayment of the loan by P1.8M. the lower court declared the sale valid but ordered Planter Bank to return the overpayment,. CA reversed the portion of the decision regarding the payment of the overpayment since it was raised long after the pre-trial conference. Issue: whether the issue of overpayment was raised by the parties an included in the pre-trial order? The conduct of a pre-trial is mandatory in civil action wherein parties are given the opportunity to arrive at a possible amicable settlement and to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts which must be recorded in the pre-trial order. A pre-trial order, however, is not mean to state each and every issue that may be taken up during trial. Issues that are impliedly included are as much integral parts of the pre-trial order as those expressly stipulated. The case at bar fall under that case since the parties stipulated the price each property was sold for, and applying simple math by deducting LCKs obligation, the fact of overpayment, though not expressly included in the pre-trial order can be evidently inferred from the admissions of the parties. stating that it was interested in prosecuting the complaint against defendant Acropolis and Salceda, and that Filipinas Bank will move for the issuance of Alias summons on them. Again, the pre-trial was for Jan 1988. During the scheduled pre-trial, Filipinas Banks counsel was 15 minutes late due to heavy traffic. Thus, the case was dismissed by the lower court ad affirmed by CA. Thus, Calalang filed this case alleging that CA erred in absolving Filipinas Bank for the delay; declaring the January 1988 pre-trial as premature; and holding Filipinas bank did not entirely fail to appear.

Issues: was the pre-trial scheduled on Jan 1988 premature? The pre-trial conference scheduled for Jan 1988 was not premature. A pretrial cannot be validly held until the last pleading has been filed . Thus, the period to file the necessary pleading having expired on the Acropolis Trading, the lower court can direct that a pre-trial be held among the answering defendants. Likewise, the fact that counsel for Filipinas Bank was late during the pre-trial, the trial court should have called the case again. Absent any negligent or irresponsible conduct by the party, the court should consider lesser sanctions than dismissing the case.

Calalang vs. CA Filipnas Manufacturers Bank filed a complaint for a collection of sum of money against Calalang, Arca, Salceda and Acropolis Trading. Clalang filed a Motion to Dismiss, Arca filed a motion for Bill of Particular, while the two other were summoned but only a clerk-employee of Acropolis Trading received he summons. During the pendency of the cases, the Judiciary Reorganization Act was passed. The motion for Bill of Particulars was granted while the motion to dismiss was dismissed. The case has been set several times for pre-trial. For the first two scheduled meetings, the counsel for Filipinas Bank failed to appear. For the last two, Arcas counsel failed to appear. It was again rescheduled to April 1987. The court ruled that it did not acquire jurisdiction over Acropolis and Salceda for improper service of summons. Filipinas Bank, in response, filed a manifestation 12

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Spouses Corpuz vs. Citibank Azucena Corpuz was a cardholder of Mastercards and Visa Credit Cards issued by Citibank, each having a credit limit of P40K. in view of her impending business trip to Europe, Azucena paid in full her monthly charges on both credit cards via checks and made advance check payments of P20K for her Visa Card. While in Europe, both her Visa and Mastercard were not honored, making her pay the bill in cash. Upon inquiry of her husband Renato, Citibank informed the spouses that the said checks were not yet cleared at that time. Upon her return, she wrote Citibank to cancel the said cards. Notwithstanding her request, Citibank continued to send billing statements, charging her interest charges and late payment penalties. Thus, spouses Corpuz filed a complaint for damages against Citibank at RTC Las Pinas. On the other hand, Citibank filed its answer with Compulsory Counterclaim. During the pre-trial, the spouses Corpuz and their counsel failed to appear since the counsel failed to inform the spouses of the scheduled pre-trial since he forgot about it due to heavy workload. Thus their complaint was dismissed and directed Citibank to present evidence on its Compulsory Counterclaim. Spouses moved for reconsideration but was denied. On the same Order, the trial court directed Citibank to present evidence on its counterclaim within 30 days from receipt. However, Citibank, having failed to present evidence within 30 days from its receipt, the trial court dismissed it Counterclaim. Both spouses and Citibank moved for reconsideration and partial reconsideration, but only Citibanks partial reconsideration was granted on ground that its prior dismissal is without prejudice to the right of Citibank to prosecute its counterclaim in the same or separate action. The spouses however assert that their non-appearance at the pre-trial may be excused if there is a valid cause such as when a party forgets the date of the pre-trial, thus the merits of their case should have been considered when their Complaint was dismissed. action. However, Citibank should present its evidence within the 30-day period, as mandated by the trial court. In the case at bar, Citibank failed to present the same within the stipulated period, the trial court likewise properly denied its ex parte motion to present evidence.

Citibank N.A. vs. Chua Citibank granted to spouses Velez credit lines secured by real estate and chattel mortgages on equipment. Likewise, Citibank offered them special additional accommodation of P5M in exchange for the Spouses purchase of Citibank checks by exchanging their managers check. In Mar. 1986, Spouses Velez tried to exchange with Citibank 6 checks amounting to P3M but Citibank refused to continue with the arrangement. Instead, Citibank suggested to the spouses that the total amount covered by the arrangement be restructured to 30 months with prevailing interest on the diminishing balance. Pursuant thereto, the spouses Velez delivered a check for P75K but Citibank refused to accept the same demanding instead full payment of the entire amount. Thus, for the failure of Citibank to comply with this restructuring agreement the spouses Velez sued for specific performance and damages. The case was set for pre-trial and Citibank was directed to submit its pre-trial brief at least 3 days before the pre-trial conference. However, Citibank filed its pre-trial brief only on the date of the pre-trial conference itself. On the date of the pre-trial conference, the counsel for Citibank presented a special-power-of-attorney (SPA) in his favor executed by Citibank to bind the bank at the pre-trial. Notwithstanding this, the counsel for spouses Velez moved to declare Citibank in default on ground that the SPA was not executed by the board of Directors of Citibank. Respondent Judge Chua declared Citibank in default on ground that the bank has no proper representation during the pretrial. Citibank contends that no board resolution was necessary for its legal counsel or its employees to act as its attorney-in-fact in the case at bar because its bylaws grant to its Secretary power to delegate to a Citibank officer, in this case William W. Ferguson, the authority to represent and defend the bank and its interests. On the other hand, spouses Velez assail the authority of Citibanks counsel to appear at the pre-trial conference grounds that the authority did not come from the Board of Directors; and that the authority granted to the Executing Officer in the by-laws was ineffective because the same were not submitted to the SEC.

Issue: Does the Spouses Corpuz failure to appear at the pre-trial warrant dismissal of their complaint? Decision: YES. The spouses excuse to justify their non -appearance at the pre-does not warrant reversal of lower courts decision. While Sec 4 of Rule 18 allows as an exception a valid cause for the non-appearance of a party at the pre-trial, the instances cited by the spouses and counsel hardly constitute compelling situations which warrant occasional flexibility of litigation rules. The failure of petitioners counsel to record the scheduled pre -trial in his diary to justify his absence at the pre-trial cannot amount to excusable negligence. To constitute excusable negligence, the absence must be due to petitioners counsels failure to take the proper steps at the proper time, not in consequence of his carelessness, inattention or willful disregard of the process of the court, but in consequence of some unexpected or unavoidable hindrance or accident. As the failure of the spouses to appear at the pre-trial was due to their fault, Citibank could still prosecute its Counterclaim in the same or in a separate

Issues: a. whether a resolution of the BOD of the bank necessary for granting authority to an agent to represent the corporation in court cases? Otherwise, the declaration of default will have no basis b. whether the by-laws of Citibank, foreign corporation previously been a license to do business in the Philippines, are effective in this jurisdiction?

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Decision: As a general rule, all corporate powers are to be exercised by the BOD, however the same may be delegated to corporate officers or agents by the bylaws, articles of incorporation, or by a board resolution. In the case at bar, resolution of the BOD of Citibank appointing an attorney in fact to bind it during pre-trial is not necessary because its by-laws allows its Officers, such as the Secretary to execute a power of attorney to a designated bank officer, William W. Ferguson in this case, clothing him with authority to direct and manage corporate affairs. As to its second contention, the Court ruled that SEC grants licenses in favor of a foreign corporation only when it has complied with all the requirements of law, it follows that when it decides to issue such license, it is satisfied that the applicant's by-laws meet the legal requirements. This, in effect, is an approval of the foreign corporations by-laws. In the case at bar, SECs granting of a license to Citibank implies that its by-laws, though originating from a foreign jurisdiction, are valid and effective in the Philippines. Cases: TRIAL Swagman hotels vs. CA: Generally, the lack of cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during trial but such can take effect only when the complaint indeed states a cause of action. Otherwise, the absence of a cause of action cannot be cured by evidence presented during trial. Swagman Hotels obtained a loan from Neal Christian evidence by three promissory notes. Subsequently, Christian informed Swagman Hotels that it was terminating the loans since the latter only paid 6% annual interest instead of the 15% as agreed in the promissory note. Christian filed a complaint for the sum of money amounting to $150K and $13.5K unpaid interest Swagman, in its Answer, alleged that Christian had no cause of action since the promissory notes were not yet due and demandable. Subsequently, since Swagman was experiencing huge losses, Christian agreed to waive the 15% interest and instead accept a payment of $750 per month. In the course of the hearing and after the hearing, the trial court ruled that the first 2 promissory notes were already due and demandable, and ordered Swagman to pay the amount of the checks plus 6% annual interest. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial. However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at the time the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts. It thus follows that a complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amended or supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case is pending. In the case at bar, the defect of lack of cause of action at the commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of this case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on 7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.

Issue: May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the accrual of a cause of action during the pendency of the case? At the time the complaint was filed with the trial court, none of the three promissory notes was due, although two of which matured during the pendency of the case. Thus, when the complaint was filed, there was still no cause of action against Swagman. The defect of the complaint cannot be cured by amendment (citing Rule 10, Sec 5). Section 5 applies to situations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motion of a party.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases: Demurrer to Evidence Republic vs. Tuvera Twin Peaks is a real estate business with 5 incorporating stockholders including respondent Victor Tuvera. Subsequently, President Marcos granted a Timber License Agreement in favor if Twin Peaks allowing the latter to engage in logging operations. President Marcos was ousted. President Corazon Aquino assumed presidency. She established the PCGG and granted it the power to issue writs of sequestration. Pursuant thereto, PCGG issued a Writ of Sequestration on all properties of Twin Peaks on ground that all its assets are ill-gotten wealth acquired through fraud. PCGG filed this complaint against respondent Tuvera and President Marcos for the recovery of funds allegedly acquired through fraud. It likewise alleged that Tuvera, as presidential executive Assistant of Marcos, unjustly enriched himself accomplished by securing the TLA in behalf of Twin Peaks. On the other hand, respondent Tuvera filed a motion to nullify the Writ of Sequestration which was granted by the Sandiganbayan. During the trial, Republic presented several witnesses and rested its case after its formal offer of evidence. Subsequently, with leave of court, respondents Tuvera filed a Demurrer to Evidence on grounds that the Republic failed to present sufficient evidence to prove its claim. They further claim that the TLA presented during trial is not legal evidence; and that the income tax returns are not sufficient to show ones holding in a corporation. Republic, on the other hand, contended that the demurrer is not based on the insufficiency of its evidence but on the strength of the evidence of the respondents. The Sandiganbayan sustained the demurrer to evidence and held that the validity of the TLA cannot be disputed. The Republic now questions the correctness of the Sandiganbayans decision to grant the demurrer to evidence because it was not based solely on the insufficiency of its evidence but also on the evidence of respondent Tuvera mentioned during the pre-trial conference The general rule is that upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant loses the right to present his evidence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiffs evidence. It thus becomes the Court's duty to rule on the merits of the complaint, duly taking into account the evidence presented by the Republic, and without need to consider whatever evidence the Tuveras have, they having waived their right to present evidence in their behalf. Issue (2): What now is the course of action to take since we cannot affirm the Sandiganbayans grant of the demurrer to evidence?

The Manila Banking Corporation vs. University of Baguio Manila Banking Corp. granted a P14M credit line to University of Baguio for the construction of additional buildings and purchase of new equipment. On behalf of the University, its Vice-Chairman Bautista signed 4 promissory notes and executed a continuing suretyship agreement. He, however, diverted the net proceeds of the loan to Group Developers Inc. (GDI). The loan was not paid. Thus, Manila Banking filed a complaint for a sum of money with application for preliminary attachment against the University and Bautista. Later on, it amended its complaint, impleading GDI. However, by way of cross-claim, the University prayed that GDI be ordered to pay the University the amount it would have to pay the Bank. In addition, the University filed a third-party complaint against Victor G. Puyat, GDIs President and the heirs of Vicente G. Puyat, Manila Bankings president. Subsequently, Manila Banking and GDI executed a deed of dacion en pago, transferring to the Bank a parcel of land, in full settlement of the loan. Because of this, TC ruled that the Universitys motion to implead GDI had been mooted by the dacion en pago. The University moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that there was no more cause of action against it since the loan had been settled by GDI. This motion was denied on ground that the matters relied upon by the University were evidentiary in nature. The TC ruled that the Bank had no cause of action against the defendants because its claim for a sum of money had been paid through the dacion en pago.

Issue (1): was the grant of Sandiganbayan of the demurrer to evidence valid? NO. Sandiganbayans Resolution shows that dismissal of the case on demurrer to evidence was based on the Republics failure to show its right to relief because of the existence of a prior judgment which consequently barred the re-litigation. Sandiganbayan did not dismiss the case on the insufficiency of the Republics evidence nor on the strength of respondents evidence. Rather , it based its dismissal on the existence of the Ysmael case because of the substantial identity between the parties. This Court however disagrees and rules that there is not such identity in the parties. Republics cause of action lies in the alleged abuse of power on respondents part in violation of the law. .Ysmael, on the other hand, sought the revocation of a TLA and the reinstatement of its own timber license agreement. Indeed, there is no identity of parties and no identity of causes of action between the two cases .

Issue: Was the Order dismissing the said motion to dismiss proper? Decision: The Court distinguished between a motion to dismiss for failure of the complaint to state a cause of action from a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action. The first is governed by Section 1 (g),Rule 16, while the second by Rule 33,of the Rules of Court. The first, where the complaint does not allege a sufficient cause of action, is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 before a responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations in the initiatory pleading and not from evidentiary matters.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon The second [situation where the evidence does not sustain the cause of action alleged] is raised in a demurrer to evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim. The first does not concern itself with the truth and falsity of the allegations while the second arises precisely because the judge has determined the truth and falsity of the allegations and has found the evidence wanting. Hence, a motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has shown no right to the relief sought. While a motion to dismiss under Rule 16 is based on preliminary objections which can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case. In this case, the Universitys motion to dismiss the complaint was improper under Rule 16 because it was filed after respondent university filed its responsive pleading, its Answer. Also, the motions merit could not be determined based solely on the allegations of the initiatory pleading, the amended complaint, since the motion was based on the deed of dacion en pago, which was not even alleged in the complaint. And since the deed of dacion en pago had been expunged from the record, the trial court erred in its finding of payment and lack of cause of action based on the deed. In addition, the motion alleged that petitioner had "no more cause of action" or lacked a cause of action against the university. That motion was a motion to dismiss under Rule 33 in the nature of demurrer to evidence and would be proper only after petitioner had presented its evidence and rested its case. In the case at bar, there had been no presentation of evidence yet and petitioner had not rested its case.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases: Rule 34 Judgment on the Pleadings Meneses v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform: Who can ask for judgment on the pleadings? Only be the claimant. Petitioners Meneses et al were co-owners of a rice land in Bulacan. However, these were distributed to farmer-beneficiaries pursuant to PD 27. Thereafter, petitioners filed with the RTC a complaint for determination of just compensation alleging that they still havent been paid and that the value of their land was 6M o Answers were filed by the DAR (alleging that the value should be at the time of the taking), Farmers (they they paid rentals), LBP (that the computation was proper) The RTC dismissed the complaint for failure to state a cause of action because the determination of just compensation must be filed with the DAR. The RTC reversed its dismissal upon an MR, gave the complaint due course and in trial, it was agreed upon that the issue to be resolved was what valuation was to be used (under RA 6657 and Consti OR PD 27) The parties were then required to file their respective motions for judgment on the pleadings Thereafter upon submission, the RTC dismissed the complaint and ruled that PD 27 was to govern the valuation of the property (value at the time of taking) Petitioners prayed for the case to be remanded back to the RTC for further proceedings (so they can present evidence to prove the value of their land) CA however, affirmed RTC, stating that the motion for judgment on the pleadings filed by respondents (DAR) is valid, arguing that DAR was considered a counter-claimant. Diman v. Alumbres: Rule 34 v. Rule 35 A complaint was filed for quieting of title by Heirs of Lacalle against the Dimans in the Las Pinas RTC. The heirs claimed that their mother was the owner of a certain parcel of land in Las Pinas. When their mother bought it, the Narios were occupying the lot. However, the Narios were ordered to vacate the land upon the order of the court (in a complaint for ejectment filed by the Dimans) In their answer in the quieting of title complaint, the Dimans aver that they own the land and they had the right to eject the Narios. After joinder of the issues, the Dimans served on the heirs of Lacalle a request for admission of the truth of certain matters (like the fact that the Lacalle heirs TCTs were not registered and that the Dimans TCTs were ) This request was received but the Lacalle heirs did not respond. The Dimans then submitted a motion for summary judgment, arguing further that the matters they brought up in the request for admission be deemed admitted. Dimans basically asserted that since no genuine issue existed, a summary judgment be entered dismissing the quieting of title case. This was motion was denied by the court, stating that since both parties claim ownership over the land and that the presentation of evidence was required to determine factual issues . In trial, the Lacalle heirs presented very little evidence (they couldnt produce the original copy of the TCT showing that the land was registered in their mothers name, only a Xerox copy) After the heirs rested their case, Dimans filed a motion for judgment on demurrer to evidence, alleging that the evidence of the heirs was weak. This was, however, denied. Rebuffed again, Dimans went to the CA (certiorari, mandamus and prohibition) for the denials to be overturned. This was again DENIED. They went to the SC and their petition was given due course.

Issue: Was the RTC correct in requiring the respondents to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings? NO The SC held that the filing of a motion for judgment on the pleadings was improper. This is because a judgment on the pleadings is only proper when an answer fails to render an issue OR otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse partys pleading. A judgment on the pleadings may be sought ONLY by the claimant, the party seeking recover upon a claim, counter-claim or cross-claim. In this case, the separate Answers filed by the respondents tendered issues AND made specific denials and asserted affirmative defenses. Moreover, it was incorrect for the RTC to require LBP and DAR to file a motion for judgment on the pleadings for in the first place, they are neither plaintiffs nor counter-claimants. What the RTC obviously meant to be filed was a motion for summary judgment (Rule 35), a way to promptly dispose of actions, which may be rendered if the pleadings, supporting affidavits, depositions and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact . In this case, the answers raised issues but they were not factual ones/genuine issues requiring trial.

Issue: What should the court do with the quieting of title case? Dismiss As can be seen with the procedural antecedents, this case should have been dismissed already because there was NO genuine issue. The issues arising from the pleadings were fake. When the heirs failed to respond to the request admission, they were deemed to have admitted all the facts in the request for admission. Doctrine: ( The SC stated when a summary judgment is proper and when a judgment on the pleadings is proper) o Summary Judgment: Although the pleadings on their face appear to raise issues of fact (like a denial/conflict of factual allegations), if it is shown by admission, depositions or affidavits, that those issues are fake (not genuine except as to the amount of damages) , the court shall render summary judgment for whoever asks for it(plaintiff or defendant)-> Judgment on the facts as summarily proven by the A/D/A o Judgment on the pleadings: Here, there is no issue at all. -> Judgment on the facts as pleaded. Only claimant can file. The judge made a mistake in denying the motion for summary judgment as he stated that there was a material issue raised in the pleadings ( he obviously had 17

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon judgment on the pleadings in mind, for his reasons were reasons to DENY a motion for judgment on the pleadings!) Also, it was obvious that the heirs did not have title to their land. They did not present sufficient evidence to prove their claim. Asian Construction v. PCIB PCIBANK filed a collection case in the RTC against petitioner ASIAKONSTRUKT. PCIBANK alleges that the petitioner obtained a $4M loan. Petitioner then secured the loan by assigning its receivables to PCIBANK. PCIB also asked for damages, alleging that petitioner already collected the amounts on the receivables and also for a writ of preliminary attachment. The RTC granted the writ for attachment. Meanwhile, petitioner filed an answer, admitting the debt BUT denies its non-payment and the amounts allegedly due. Petitioner also pleaded as a defense ( fortuitous event) the economic crisis at that time (1997: After EDSA 2) Thereafter, PCIBANK filed a motion for summary judgment , contending that the defenses of petitioner were fake. Petitioner opposed the motion for summary judgment, alleging that there were genuine issues that required trial like w/n petitioner misappropriated the proceeds in the deed of assignment. However, petitioner did not append to its opposition any affidavit in support of the alleged genuine issues. The RTC then came out with its summary judgmen t and ordered petitioner to pay the $4M loan . PCIBANK waived its claim for damages. Petitioner went to the CA, which affirmed the RTC decision. Petitioner argues that the summary judgment was improper as there was a genuine issue that needed presentation of evidence.

Cases: Judgment on the Pleadings Ontimare v. Elep Ontimare and Elep are neighbors. Elep wanted to build an apartment on their lot and applied for a building permit. Elep asked Ontimare if he could build a firewall next to his existing firewall. Ontimare filed a complaint with the building official, requesting that the permit be withheld. Elep got the permit but a cease and desist order was issued due to Ontimares complaint. It was, however, lifted upon Eleps explanations. Construction began but while Eleps workers were working on the firewall, Ontimare filed his shotgun and threatened to kill anyone who would work on the firewall. As a result, the firewall was unfinished and water seeped into the apartment. Elep filed an action for damages w/ injunction with the RTC. After trial, Ontimare moved for a summary judgment while Elep moved for resolution on the merits. Afterwards, the RTC issued a summary judgment in favor of Elep, granting him actual and compensatory damages (from unrealized income), reimbursement and exemplary damages. CA modified and awarded Elep even higher compensatory damages. (from 75k to 344k) Ontimare died so his heirs appealed. They question the propriety of the RTCs summary judgment because Ontimare was the one who moved for the summary judgment and not Elep.

Issue: Was the summary judgment proper? YES The determinative factor in a motion for summary judgment is the presence/absence of a genuine issue as to any material fact . A genuine issue is an issue of fact which requires the presentation of evidence. When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue as to the facts and summary judgment is called for. The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact. More importantly, when the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed/contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial. In this case, petitioner did not deny its liability for the principal amount claimed by PCIB. Further, the genuine issues and defenses that petitioner claimed were NOT supported by affidavits . It could have shown figures showing its financial condition. It did not controvert the claims of PCIB. Thus, petitioner failed to show that its defenses were NOT merely for delaying tactics. The summary judgment was therefore proper, there being no genuine issue as to the facts.

Issue: Was the summary judgment proper? Not really SC stated requisites of summary judgment namely: 1. There must be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages 2. The moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law When on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. (Remember, in the previous case, as distinguished from a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the issues in a summary judgment ARE apparent but are in fact proven to be fake as per the affidavits, depositions or admissions) An issue is genuine if it requires the presentation of evidence as distinguished from a fake/false claim . In this case, the summary judgment was rendered AFTER the presentation of evidence by both parties in a full blown trial. The RTC decision was called a summary judgment but it is ACTUALLY a judgment on the merits. Hence, it follows that the rules on summary judgment were not applicable.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Cases: Judgments Final Orders and Entry BA FINANCE DOCTRINE: The settled rule that only a final order or judgment on the merits may be the subject of an appeal. o A final order is defined as one which disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action , leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined. o An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done upon its merits Eternal Gardens v. IAC ETERNAL GARDENS entered into a Land Development Agreement with North Phil Union Mission Corp. (MISSION) o Eternal to make a memorial park on missions land and divide and sell them accordingly. o MISSION will receive 40% gross profit from the sale o Eternal paid MISSION around 1M for the sale of the land which is part of the 40% GP o Maysilo Estate then asserted its claim of ownership on said land o Eternal then files interpleader against MISSION and Maysilo in CFI o Eternal wants to protect its interests a nd that it doesnt care who owns it, as they are willing to pay whoever owns the land. MISSION then files a motion for the placing of judicial deposit of the rest of the money owed by ETERNAL from the sale of land o Trial court denied such motion stating that the ownership of the lands are still being tried on (prejudicial question). o Trial court then subsequently reverses its decision and now wants MISSION to deposit the 1M paid by ETERNAL MISSION then files with the IAC praying to reverse the judgment of the RTC o Again, it first dismissed the petition and consequently reversed it stating that Eternal must deposit said amounts owing to MISSION, based on the LDA, to a reputable bank Thus, eternal files a petition for certiorari Motions for Reconsiderations are allowed to convince the court that their rulings are erroneous and improper and in so doing the courts are given opportunity to correct their errors. In the case at bar, Eternal Gardens admitted in its interpleader that it claims no interest in the amounts due and that it is still obligated to pay whoever is declared entitled to amounts under the Land Development Agreement. Such admissions were reaffirmed in open court before the IAC

NUNAL V. CA Emma Lyon de Leon as guardian ad litem to the respondents filed a case against Nunal, now represented by her heirs for partition and accounting of a parcel of land in Isabela o The land was owned by Frank Lyon under the TCT Said land was claimed to be in possession by Nunal since 1946 and made no accounting of the income that was derived therefrom, despite demands of partition and delivery of the shares to the respondents TC renders judgment in favor of respondents partially o TC grants the partition but dismisses the accounting o TC recommends that should there be no agreement as to partition, it shall appoint commissioners to make said partition o CA affirms judgment of CFI and an order for the writ of execution was issued Mary Lyon Martin, daughter of Frank then files a motion to quash said order with preliminary injunction o She contends that not being a party to the case, her share should not be prejudiced and that the partition should not include her share of the land. o TC dismissed said motion and ordered the commissioner to partition said land o However, the board of commissioners found out her name was included in the TCT and she should therefore be construed as one of the heirs. TC then issues an order to petitioner to list all the heirs o Petitioner files a manifestation praying that the partition be that of the previous ruling (di kasama si Mary basically) o TC then orders the commissioners to partition without ruling on the manifestation o TC then issued the assailed order directing the inclusion of Mary Lyon Martin as co-owner.

Issue: W/N CA committed GADLEJ by reconsidering its resolution and ordering Eternal Gardens to deposit the amount owed in the LDA to a reputable bank? No The courts have inherent power to amend their judgments, to make them conformable to the law applicable provided that said judgements have not yet attained finality.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon ISSUE: W/N the TC may order the inclusion of Mary as Co-owner? No. Partition was already final and executory. Nothing is more settled in the law than that when a final judgment becomes executory, it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The judgment may no longer be modified in any respect, even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law, and regardless of whether the modification is attempted to be made by the Court rendering it or by the highest Court of the land. The only recognized exceptions are: o the correction of clerical errors or the making of so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, o where the judgment is void RATIO: It is true that after a judgment has become final and executory, it can no longer be modified or otherwise disturbed. HOWEVER, this principle admits of exceptions, as where the facts and circumstances transpire which render its execution impossible or unjust and it therefore become necessary, in the interest if justice, to direct its modification in order to harmonize the disposition with the prevailing circumstances. 5 years had already lapsed since the Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on Feb 26 1987. Thus a Recomputation was necessary to arrive at a just and proper determination of the monetary awards due to private respondents.

Industrial Timber Corp v. NLRC Private Respondents obtained a favorable decision from Arbiter Amado Solamo on Feb 26, 1987. o Order called for a reinstatement and payment of back wages and other benefits amounting to P24,300 each. o This decision was affirmed by the NLRC on Feb 3, 1992. o In view of the 5year lapse since the promulgation of the decision, the NLRC likewise directed Petitioner Corp to pay the respondents severance benefits 1 month pay for every year from employment to date of resolution if reinstatement is not possible Decision became final and executory by Mar 9 1992 o Entry of judgement was made on Mar 25, 1992. o Respondents filed an ex parte motion for issuance of writ of execution with manifestation from Feb 26, 1987 till present, they have not been reinstated,. o Thus they were entitled to back salaries for the said period until actual reinstatement shall have been made. The amount totalled P387,122.65, including 3 years back wages, ECOLA, 13th month pay, holiday pay, VL and SL pay and other benefits. o Both parties filed objections to the computation and on appeal, the Commission only made a slight modification, totalling to P375,795.20. Petitioners then filed an MR but was late and was denied due to tardiness. Thus, Petitioners filed against the NLRC and is faulted with GADLEJ for merely modifying the award of damages and denying the MR

ISSUE: W/N the judgment can still be modified after it has become final and executory? YES. this case belongs to the exception 20

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Esquivel v CA The case arose from an ejectment case where a certain Alaurin secured a judgment against the private respondents Magno and spouses Encinas. Private respondent alleged that they had prior possession of the land and that Esquivels OCT was acquired through fraud. Alaurin won the case and the judgment became final and executory, thus a writ of execution was issued. Before it could be enforced, spouses Esquivel filed against Alaurin a case for reconveyance with nullity of judgment damages and preliminary injunction. The preliminary injunction was granted Alaurin naturally opposed the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction and filed a petition for certiorari with the SC to set aside the order granting the writ. During this hearing (regarding the prelim injunc) the parties, assisted by counsel, set forth that they agreed to a suspension of the consideration of the petition for certiorari and agreed to have the case (annulment of judgment and reconveyance) to be tried on the merits. They also agreed that the party who won the litigation (in this case Alaurin won) would possess the land . In light of this joint manifesto, court dismissed the case and ordered that the trial for the reconveyance begin and be decided within 90 days. When they lost, the Esquivels filed a notice of appeal within the reglementary period. They were directed to amend their appeal. But before they could amend their appeal, they filed a motion to file a supplemental complaint impleading spouses Encinas (Alaurin had sold the land to Encinas as evidenced by a deed of sale). The supplemental complaint was admitted in court and on motion of the respondents Alaurin, the defendants in the supplemental complaint were declared in default (Encinas). Encinas was declared the successor-in-interest of Alaurin and that the case would be binding upon them. Encinas was not satisfied with the judgment and filed a petition for certiorari in the CA praying that the decision against the supplemental defendants (encinas) be declared null and void. Denied. The supplemental complaint was resolved in favor of Esquivel, and affirmed by the CA. Petitioners now claim that the supplemental complaint revised the decision in the original complaint. That this amounted to a reversal of the original decision rendered by respondent Judge Alegre. judgment. In fact there was no declaration of the rights and duties of the parties. The decision merely said that ENCINAS was the successor in interest of Alaurin and that whatever the decision in the ORIGINAL complaint would be binding on Encinas. Further Esquivel appealed the original complaint in the CA, it cannot be said that they truly believed that the supplemental decision had superseded the original decision, if at all it could.

Cardoza v Singson In 1979, Sitoy (counsel for private respondents Alvarez) as counsel for the administrator of the Estate of Cardoza filed for a motion for execution of judgment of a decision which had allegedly become final and executory in 1938. It was alleged that by Cardoza that they had only acquired knowledge of the decision in 1974 because of the death of the original counsel in 1944. Attached to the motion was a certification to the effect that the plaintiffs nor their counsel had received a copy of the decision. Defendants did not submit a memorandum or reply. Cardoza moved for a deferment of the motion for execution because there was allegedly no entry of judgment therefore they prayed that the decision be recorded in the CAs book of entries of judgment. Pursuant to this the trial court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment. Thereafter the sheriff of southern leyte was directed to enforce the decision of the trial court. When the copy of the writ of execution was served upon Cardoza, e filed for a motion for reconsideration and that the execution be held in abeyance. It was. Heirs of Alvarez (private respondent) filed a manifestation to the effect that they did not object to the nunc pro tunc judgment. Cardoza was again furnished with a copy of the writ and was ordered to turn over the property. He harvested coconuts in the parcels of land and thereafter was ordered to appear in court to explain why he should not be held in contempt for the harvesting of the land in question. Cardoza filed the instant petition for certiorari mandamus with prohibition with preliminary injunction alleging that the respondent judge singson had usurped the jurisdiction of the CA by directing a nunc pro tunc decision be declared. Because the non-action for 40 years was a ground for the denial.

Issue: W/N The supplemental decision amounted to a amendment or reversal of the original decision? NO Amended judgment v Supplemental judgment. The former is where the lower court, through a thorough study of the original judgment renders and amended and clarified judgment after considering all the factual and legal issues, an amended decision is an entirely new decision and supersedes the original decision. A supplemental judgment does not take the place or extinguish the existence of the original, it serves only to add to or to reinforce the primary decision. It exists side by side with the original and does not replace it. In this case the record shows that there was no restudy made by the respondent court of the original decision but only on issues raised in the supplemental complaint. The said decision cannot stand on its own as a

Issue: W/N the decision of the trial court as modified by the CA can still be enforced? (this is the one from 40 yeas ago) W/N Singson committed GADLEJ when it made the entry of judgment nunc pro tunc and issued a writ of execution? YES and NO GADLEJ Under the code of civil procedure which took effect in 1901, the prevailing party in a civil action is entitled to a writ of execution of the final judgment w/in 5 years from its date of entry. The period is counted 5 years from the entry of judgment and not promulgation The trial court acting as a court of law and a court of equity correctly made the entry of judgment a nucn pro tunc decision. IT was merely ordering the execution of the judgment of the CA. 21

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon The decree of a judgment nunc pro tunc was not done arbitrarily as the petitioner was given ample time to oppose the motion in court and even submit a memorandum to support his position. HE failed to submit a memorandum nor adduce evidence to support his claims. Nunc pro tunc definition: A latin expression which means now for then. In general a court ruling nunc pro tunc applies retroactively to correct an earlier ruling. A judgment nunc pro tunc by the trial court corrects a clerical rather than a judicial error in a prior judgment (in this case it was the non entry of the judgment in the entry book). before any tribunal. This is otherwise known as bar by prior judgment/estoppel by judgment. This makes judgment conclusive as to matters offered and received as well as any other matter which may and which could have been offered and adjudged. This is a ground for motion to dismiss. Sec 47 C Conclusiveness of judgment: conclusiveness of judgment provides that any right , fact or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved n the determination of an action where a judgment is rendered n the merits is conclusively settled by judgment and cannot be litigated again. Basically that a judgment in the prior action only operates as an estoppel only as to the matters actually determined or necessarily included. This case qualifies as a bar by prior judgment fulfilling the 4 conditions a) finality of former judgment b) court had jurisdiction c) judgment on the merits d) identity of the parties, subject matter and cause of action between the first and second actions. In this case there was a judgment on the merits which determined the rights and liabilities of the parties. Namely that DATICOR overpaid, FEBTC was bound to refund the excess payment but only up to the extent prayed for by DATICOR and that PDCP had no further claim against DATICOr. Right or wrong, this judgment bars another case upon the same cause of action.

Del rosario V Far east Bank Davao Timber (DATICOR) entered into a loan agreement with Private Development Corp (PDCP) worth $265K USD and 2.5M PHP for a total of 4.4M PHP at the prevailing USD exchange rate. The loan agreement provided a 1% service fee (later increased to 6%) 12% interest and penalty charges of 2% per month in case of default. Loans were ecured by REM over 6 parcels of land including the Otis property in manila, in the name of Del Rosario. The other 5 parces were located in Davao Oriental. Chattel mortgage over machinery and equipment also. DATICOR paid 3M total which was applied by PDCP to interest, service fees and penalty charges. This left an outstanding balance of 10m. DATICOR filed in the CFI of Manila for a violation of Usury law, annulment of contract and damages. Dismissed by CFI. Set aside by the Intermediate Appellate Court declaring the stipulation of interest in the loan void and of no effect. During this time, PDCP assigned to Far East for 5.4M its receivables via a deed of assignment. DATICOR And Far East executed a memorandum of agreement where DATICOR agreed to pay 6.4M as full settlement. SC later ruled that the total remaining was only 1.4M. DATICOR filed for recovery of sum of money of 5.3M in excess payment. RTC ordered PDCP and far east to pay back the money and for the release or cancellation of the parcels of land from mortgage. But CA Ruled that since DATICOR only prayed for relief of 900k from Far east, it could not award more than the amount prayed for. PDCP for its part contended that there had been a previous final and executory decision which cannot be relitigated thus DATICOR had no cause of action and that FEBTC could not make it liable for the payment of money to DATICOR in any case. PDCP claimed that It was not privy to the MOVA between FEBTC and DATICOR thus it was explicitly excluded from the SC decision. DATICOR filed in the trial court for summary judgment, it was denied for lack of merit and on the ground of res judicata. Trial court noted that the moa between FEBTC and DATICOR clearly stated that the petitioners agreed to pay 6.4 m for full settlement of obligation and that the parties cannot be allowed to welsh on their contractual obligations.

Griffith v Estur Estur and co filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of legal holiday pay, 13th month pay, and service incentive leave pay against Gerald and Giffith. The Griffith corp is engaged in the manufacture of furniture. The labor arbiter ruled in favor of Estur and ordering Griffith to pay the amounts. The decision became final and executory and petitioner received the writ of execution. He filed a motion to quash this writ. He stated that he was unaware of the labor case as he was VP of Lincoln for Southeast Asia Operations. Further that he was not personally liable to pay the judgment debt because he acted in good fatih and within the bounds of his authority. Denied by the labor arbiter, motion for recon in NLRC. After another writ of execution was issued, he filed with the CA for a TRO or prelim injuction. CA dismissed and denied the subsequent MR. Hence this petition for review. Later claimed he was no longer part of Lincoln. He insists that the writ was defective because it should have been the sole liability of Lincoln, because he was only a coporate officer acting in good faith. He should not have been ncluded in the writ as solidarily liable with Lincoln.

Issue W/N the writ was proper?YES Labor arbiters decision is already final and executory and can no longer be subject of an appeal. He is bound by the decision and may no longer impugn the same. Once a decision has attained finality it may no longer be modified in any respect, even if it is meant to correct was a erroneous conclusion of law or fact 22

Issue: W/N there is res judicata between the parties? NO. Section 49(B) Bar by prior judgment: the judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction n the merits prevents further litigation between the parties and their privies, either in a new action or suit for the same cause of action

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon He moved to quash the writ because it modified the decision of the labor arbiter including the amount of the execution in the writ. This inclusion of the amount to be executed is not a modification. The amount to be executed is based on the amount of the award. Thus it could only have been determined after the order had been promulgated. Incidentally, the Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is non-litigious in nature, which does not require a hearing under the Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC without prejudicing the rights of the respondents.

Marina Properties v CA PCI Leasing v. Milan ( two motions for reconsiderations allowed on equitable grounds) PCI Leasing filed a complaint for sum of money against the Milans (civil case 1) in RTC QC. PCI alleged that it extended loans to the Milans and in consideration thereof, the Milans assigned their receivables (checks) However, when PCI encashed the checks, it was dishonored. The Milans still owed PCI 2.3M. When summons was attempted to be served on the Milans, they could not be found in their residence in Novaliches. In view of this, PCI filed a motion to archive the case, subject to its reinstatement after the whereabouts of the Milans were determined. This was, however, denied. Thereafter, PCI Leasing filed a motion for an issuance of alias summons but in the hearing for the motion, the counsel of PCI failed to appear because he was late. Due to this, the RTC ordered the civil case to be DISMISSED. PCI prayed that the order of dismissal be reconsidered . The RTC denied this MR stating that PCI was remiss in its duty to prosecute the case. PCI then filed an ex parte motion for reconsideration , stressing that it had a valid cause of action and that it never lost interest. This was also denied. PCI then went to the CA under rule 65 (denied for being filed out of time and because the petition involved pure questions of law) then went to the SC under rule 45. PCI alleges that the CA ignored its efforts to seek a rectification of the RTCs acts Marina, a real estate company, had a condominium project in Paranaque. Its contractor was H.L. Carlos. HL Carlos bought a unit, under a contract to sell in installments, (in the project it was in charge of) and even paid 1M as down payment. After paying more than half of the contract price, HL Carlos demanded for the delivery of the unit but Marina refused. In turn, HL Carlos filed a complaint for damages in the RTC. Marina responded by taking over the completion of the project, alleging that HL Carlos abandoned construction AND cancelling the contract to sell. HL Carlos then filed a complaint for specific performance with the HLURB, seeking to enforce the contract to sell, alleging substantial compliance. HLURB declared the cancellation of the contract to sell as null and void (basically ruled in favor of HL Carlos due to the Maceda law, ordering Marina to turn over the condo unit) Marina appealed to the board of commissioners of HLURB but the previous decision was affirmed. The OP also affirmed the previous decision. Marina also filed a motion for reconsideration with the OP but it was denied for being pro-forma (did not raise any new issue as the issues were already discussed in its decision) It then filed a petition for review with the CA. The CA also ruled that Marina did not raise any new issue in its MR. In the SC, Marina asserts that the complaint of HL Carlos shouldve dismissed and HL Carlos asserts that the complaint was filed out of time as the decision of the OP became final and executory as the MR did not create a fresh period, it being pro-forma.

Issue: Did the RTC err in dismissing PCI Leasings case? YES In the instant case, the crux of the controversy involves the property of PCI Leasing, i.e., the sum of money supposedly owed to it by the respondents. It will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the RTCs dismissal of the case with prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily upheld by appellate courts likewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural lapses committed were so gross, negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes In this instance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount ofP2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents . Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred from collecting the aforesaid amount, respondent Milan stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense of PCI Leasing. In its original MR, PCI Leasing explained that its counsel merely came late during the hearing scheduled for the said date, arriving at the time when Judge Domingo-Regala was already dictating the order of dismissal. Said hearing was not even for the presentation of the evidence in chief of PCI Leasing, where the latters presence would be indispensable, but merely for the issuance of Alias Summons.

Issue: Was Marinas MR merely pro forma? Did it toll the period to appeal to the CA? The general rule is that a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal, unless the motion is pro forma. An MR is deemed pro forma if it does not specify the finding or conclusions in the judgment which are not supported by evidence or contrary to law , making express reference to the pertinent evidence or legal provisions . It is settled that although an MR may merely reiterate issues already passed upon by the court, that by itself does not make it pro forma and is immaterial because what is essential is compliance with the requisites of the rules -> The MR must precisely convince the court that its ruling is wrong and improper, contrary to law and the like. HOWEVER, where the circumstances of a case do not show an intent on the part of the pleader to merely delay and his motion reveals a bona fide effort to present additional matters or to reiterate his arguments in a different light, the courts should not swiftly declare the motion as pro forma as this has a direct bearing on the movants right to appeal. 23

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon In this case, the SC held that the MR of Marina was not pro forma as the motion adequately pointed out the conclusions Marina regarded as wrong and contrary to law. It even referred to findings not supported by evidence as well as other jurisprudence to support its claim. It is of no moment that the OP already passed upon the issues as the declaration of an MR as pro forma is vital. In 2001, Petitioner Encarnacion then filed a complaint for ejectment in the MTC of Isabela. It was granted but on appeal, the RTC dismissed the case because the MTC had no jurisdiction. Encarnacion then filed a petition for review under Rule 42 with the CA. The CA then ordered the case to be remanded to the RTC for further proceedings, ruling that it was an accion publiciana. Encarnacion argues that the CA erred in ruling that it was an accion publiciana

Republic v. ICC ICC, a holder of franchise to operate domestic telecommunications, filed with the NTC an application for a certificate of public convenience and necessity to install, operate and maintain an international communications leased circuit service. The NTC approved the application subject to the condition that ICC pay a permit fee (1.1M) ICC filed a motion for partial reconsideration insofar as it required the payment of a permit fee. It was denied. ICC then went to the CA under 65. The CA sustained NTC. ICC filed an MR. On September 30, 1999 CA reversed itself in an amended decision and decided that ICC does not have to pay a permit fee Then in January 24, 2000, NTC filed an MR but it was denied. NTC went to the SC, alleging that the CA erred in not reversing the NTC. ICC contends, however, that the NTC petition should be dismissed for having been filed out of time. ICC argues that petitioners MR filed with the CA vis--vis its amended decision is a pro forma motion and therefore, did not toll the running of the period to come to the SC.

Issue: Was the action properly characterized by the CA? YES There are three kinds of actions for recovery of possession of real property to wit: an ejectment proceeding (accion interdictal), an action for the recovery of the real right of possession (accion publican) and an action to recover ownership (accion reinvindicatoria) The last two have to be brought in the RTCs The material element that determines the proper action to be filed for the recovery of possession of the property in this case is the length of time of dispossession. In this light, the CA committed no error in holding that the proper action is accion publiciana since Encarnacion was already dispossessed of ownership for more than 1 year. Further, it was correctly ruled by the CA that the RTC should not have dismissed the case. This is because if the case was tried on the merits by the MTC without jurisdiction over the SM, the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court, without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. o Legal basis: Sec 8 Par 2 of Rule 40-> Basically, RTC knew MTC did not have jurisdiction and it should not have dismissed the case because it had original jurisdiction over the case anyway, it being an accion publiciana. o Otherwise put, if MTC tries a case and it had no jurisdiction over the SM and a party appeals and the RTC has original jurisdiction over the case, the RTC shoudnt dismiss the appeal and instead decide the case!

Issue: Was NTCs motion for reconsideration pro forma? It is established that the mere fact that a MR reiterates issues already passed upon by the court does not by itself make it a pro forma motion. The purpose of a MR is to convince the court that its ruling is erroneous and improper, contrary to law or evidence, and in so doing, the movant has to dwell of necessity on issues already passed upon. If a MR may not discuss those issues, the consequence would be that after a decision is rendered, the losing party would be confined to filing only motions for reopening and new trial. In fact, even if NTCs MR was indeed pro forma, it would still be in the interest of justice to review the CAs amended decision a quo on the merits, rather than to abort the appeal on mere technicalities, especially where as here, the industry involved (telecom) is vested with public interest. As for the merits, the SC ruled that indeed, ICC should not pay any other permit fee as its franchise exempts it from payment of all taxes, assessments, charges, fees or levies of any kind except for a franchise tax.

Canlas v. Tubil In 2004, a complaint for unlawful detainer was filed by Tubil against the Canlas family before the MTC. (*Note: Tubil and Canlas: relatives) Canlas filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the MTC is without jurisdiction over the SM, and instead the RTC had jurisdiction. . This motion was denied because grounds relied upon were evidentiary in nature which needed to be litigated. Petitioners, in their answer, claim that they were the owners of the land pursuant to a free patent and that Tubils cause of action was for an accion publiciana. MTC dismissed the complaint for failure of Tubil to show that Canlas possession was by mere tolerance. Tubil appealed to the RTC which affirmed the MTC. Respondent Tubil then filed a petition for review with the CA which reversed the dismissal and ordered the RTC to decide the case on the merits merits. 24

Encarnacion v. Amigo Encarnacio was able to register a certain parcel of land in his name in Isabela in 1996. However, he discovered that sometime in 1985, Amigo, without the permission of the then owner, took possession of the lot and continued even after a TCT was issued to Encarnacion.

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Canlas went to the SC, assailing the CA order and alleging that the RTC does not have original jurisdiction over the SM of the case as it was an unlawful detainer case.

Issue: Does RTC have jurisdiction? NO. MTC decision dismissing the unlawful detainer case is AFFIRMED. Petition granted. In this case, Tubils allegations in its complaint clearly make a case for unlawful detainer, essentially conferring jurisdiction on the MTC . The complaint alleged that Tubil merely tolerated the Canlas familys presence and that on January 12, 2004, Tubil made a demand for Canlas to vacate. The complaint for unlawful detainer was filed on June 9, 2004 (within 1 year from the time the last demand to vacate was made) The timeliness of the filing of the complaint is not at issue here as the dispossession of the property has not lasted for more than 1 year. The ruling of the RTC that Tubil was dispossessed for 36 years and therefore the proper action was accion publiciana was without legal and factual basis. (In the previous case, it was different as it was proven that the dispossession lasted for more than 1 year) Also, the RTC affirmed the MTC and thus ruled that the MTC indeed acquired jurisdiction. It thus properly exercised its discretion in dismissing the complaint for unlawful detainer by affirming the MTC. Sec 8 Par 2 of Rule 40 DOES NOT APPLY HERE as the MTC had jurisdiction in the first place!

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Silverio, Jr. vs. CA In the settlement of the estate of Beatrice Silverio, the RTC issued an Omnibus order ordering Nelia Silverio-Dee to vacate a property belonging to said Estate. Instead of filing a Notice of Appeal and Record on Appeal, Silverio-Deee filed a MR of the Order. This was denied. Thereafter Silverio-Dee filed a Notice of Appeal and also a Record of Appeal. The RTC denied the appeal on two grounds: (1) that no appeal may be taken from an order denying a Motion of new trial or reconsideration under Rule 41 and (2) for filing beyond the reglementary period. Consequently, Silverio-Dee filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with the CA. The CA annulled the RTC decision. Thus, on Feb 28, 1997 respondents filed a motion for new trail for the retaking and presentation of testimonial and documentary evidence on the ground that the reconstitution of the transcripts were no longer possible and said stenographer had already been retired and could not be found. Petitioner then on Apr 22 1997, filed a MTD the appeal due to it having passed the reglementary period for filing an appeal. Trial court however dismissed the MTD and granted the new trial. The court rationated that because the final resolution of the case cannot be held in abeyance indefinitely and MMP waited for 8 years before filing a MTD Petitioner now files a petition for certiorari to the CA insisting that TC committed GADLEJ. CA however sided with the Trial court based on the ground that MMP should have filed it as early as 1989.

Issue: Whether the Omnibus order is an interlocutory order? Yes. While generally a denial of a motion of reconsideration of a complaint is not an interlocutory order but a final order (as correctly ruled by the CA), the SC held in this particular case the RTC Order is not a final determination of the settlement case o Rationale: It is only upon the partition of the Estate that each heir may lay claim on their share. The order was only for SilverioDee to vacate the premises! An interlocutory order is one which does not dispose of the case completely but leaves something to be decided upon while a final order is one that disposed of the subject matter in its entirety. o A final order is appealable while an interlocutory order is generally non-appealable. It is only when such interlocutory order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion that certiorari under Rule 65 may be resorted to. Since Silverio-Dee failed to employ the proper remedy of certiorari, the case is dismissed. The CA decision is reversed.

ISSUE: W/N MMP is estopped from raising the timeliness of the appeal considering it waited for 8 years to file an MTD? NO In an ordinary appeal from the final judgment or order 15 days o If such is interrupted or suspended by motion of new trial or reconsideration and is denied, the party has only the remaining period from the notice of denial in which to file an appeal o In this case, respondents had 1 day after Nov 28, 1989 to file such an appeal. Thus upon failing to do so, the judgment became final and executory. The perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional upon the court a quo . Failure to perfect an appeal renders its judgment final and executory o As such, the legality of an appeal may be raised at any stage of the proceedings and the court cannot dismiss the action for being out of time. NOTE: there are few exceptions where the court relaxed the reglementary period, however the respondents did not give reason as to why it should be relaxed instead relying on the timeliness of petitoners MTD

NEYPES v. CA (Fresh Period Rule) Manila Memorial Park v. CA Respondents filed an action for reconveyance and recovery of parcels of lands against MMP and co-defendants United Housing Corp, Hernandez, heirs of de Leon and heirs of Gatchalian. After a protracted litigation, the trial court dismissed the complaint on due to lack of merit and was already barred by laches. Thereafter, respondents received the decision only on July 4, 1983 and subsequently filed on July 19, 1983, the last day for appeal a motion for new trial and/or reconsideration. The motion was denied and respondents received the decision on Nov 28,1989 Respondents then filed a notice of appeal on Dec 7,1989 to which the trial court gave due course and directed the transmittal of records to the CA. However, the transcripts were missing.7 years after that the trial court made the parties appear in conference. Still, no transcripts were submitted to the trial court even after a year has passed. FACTS: Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against Bureau of Forestry and Development, Bureau of Lands, Land Bank of the Phil. and the heirs of del Mundo. In the course of the proceedings both parties filed various motions with the trial court o Petitioners filed a motion to declare respondents in default o Land Bank and heirs filed their MTDs respectively The court ruled in 1997 on the motions as follows o Respondents were declared in default for failure to file an answer except that of the heirs of del Mundo as there was an improper service of summons o Land Banks MTD for lack of cause of action was denied due to hypothetical admissions and matters that could be determined only after trial 26

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Heirs MTD based on prescription again based on factual matters that could only be determined after trial Respondent heirs then filed an MR on the ground that the court can resolve the issue based on the allegations of the complaint without waiting for the trial. The trial court ultimately dismissed petitioners complaint on the ground that the action had already prescribed. Petitioners allegedly received a copy of the order of dismissal on March 3, 1998 and, on the 15th day thereafter or on March 18, 1998, filed a MR. the trial court issued another order dismissing the MR which petitioners received on July 22, 1998. On July 27, 1998, petitioners filed a notice of appeal. The court a quo then denied the notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioners assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the Court of Appeals. the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint. According to the appellate court, the order was the 'final order appealable under the Rules o Trans International v. CA Trans International filed a complaint for damages against NAPOCOR and two of its principal officers arising from the rescission of a contract for the supply and delivery of woodpoles. The trial court rendered a decision sustaining the claim of petitioner. It awarded to petitioner the following amounts representing the amount of profits, expenses and attorney's fees. Respondents filed an MR but it was denied by the RTC. A copy of the aforesaid order was personally delivered to respondent NAPOCOR'S office on August 23, 1996 (Friday) and was received by Ronald T. Lapuz, a clerk assigned at the office of the VP-General Counsel. Considering that it was almost 5:00 p.m., Lapuz placed the said order inside the drawer of his table. However, on August 26 and 27, 1996 (Monday and Tuesday, respectively) said clerk was unable to report for work due to an illness he suffered as a result of the extraction of his three front teeth. Said order was retrieved from his drawer only in the afternoon of the 27th and was immediately forwarded to the secretary of Atty. Wilfredo J. Collado, counsel for the respondents. At 3:10 p.m. that same day, respondents thru counsel filed their notice of appeal. On August 29, 1996, petitioner filed a motion for execution before the trial court contending that its decision dated May 22, 1996 had become final and executory since respondents failed to make a timely appeal and praying for the issuance of an order granting the writ of execution.

ISSUE: W/N the petitioners filed their appeal within the reglementary period? YES new ruling : now you get a fresh 15 day period after getting denied of MR or Motion for New Trial the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. It is merely a statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the provisions of law. Thus, one who seeks to avail of the right to appeal must comply with the requirements of the Rules. Failure to do so often leads to the loss of the right to appeal. However, jurisprudence has shown that the courts seem confused as to what is the final order the order dismissing the complaint or the one dismissing the MR. The Supreme Court may promulgate procedural rules in all courts. It has the sole prerogative to amend, repeal or even establish new rules for a more simplified and inexpensive process, and the speedy disposition of cases. In the rules governing appeals to it and to the Court of Appeals the Court allows extensions of time, based on justifiable and compelling reasons, for parties to file their appeals. These extensions may consist of 15 days or more. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration. Thus, petitioners seasonably filed their appeal within the fresh period of 15 days counted from July 22, 1998 the order dismissing the MR

Issue: W/N the delay for filing of an appeal was justified? NO Ratio: The one-day delay in filing the notice of appeal was due to an unforeseen illness of the receiving clerk Ronald Lapuz in the office of the General Counsel of petitioner NAPOCOR. The court may extend the time or allow the perfection of the appeal beyond the prescribed period if it be satisfactorily shown that there is justifiable reason, such as fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, or similar supervening casualty, without fault of the appellant, which the court may deem sufficient reason for relieving him from the consequences of his failure to comply strictly with the law. Absent in the record is any independent proof of the alleged indisposition of Ronald Lapuz. To his affidavit, he attached an approved leave of absence form for two (2) days (Monday and Tuesday) to prove that he was absent on those days due to illness. However, there is no medical certificate to attest to the fact of illness, thus, there is no competent supporting proof of the alleged extraction of three front teeth. Another capital sin of Ronald Lapuz is his admission that he "forgot to deliver immediately the copy of the order . . .," despite the instruction of Atty. Collado for him to "immediately deliver to his secretary any order" in this case. Forgetfulness is neither accident, mistake or excusable negligence which would warrant justification for the one day delay in filing the notice of appeal. In essence, the court is NOT convinced that the test for substantial justice and equity considerations have been adequately met by respondents to overcome the one day delay in the perfection of their appeal. 27

Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon Kho vs. Camacho Facts As satisfaction for attorneys fees due to Atty. Camacho, Narciso Kho issued 6 post-dates Manila Bank checks in the aggregate amount of P57, 349. o One of the checks worth 10k was lost. o The other 5 checks were negotiated by Camacho to Philippine Amanah Bank, but the same were returned because the CB closed down Manila Bank. Kho refused to replace the Manila Bank checks, so Camacho instituted an action for a collection of a sum of money. o Khos contentions: he was under no obligation to replace the check worth 10k because it was Camacho that had lost it. Furthermore, he is in no position to pay Camacho until his money in the beleaguered bank is released. Contending that petitioner's answer failed to tender a genuine issue, Camacho moved for a judgment on the pleadings which respondent Judge Leviste granted. Kho seasonably filed a notice of appeal, which was granted by respondent judge. Camacho thereafter filed a motion to strike the notice of appeal off the record which was also granted by Leviste. o Leviste opined that since only questions of law were involved in the appeal, it should have been filed with the SC and not the CA. Issue Whether Leviste gravely abused his discretion in issuing the order which cancelled the order approving the appeal. Held: YES. Leviste acted with grave abuse of discretion. The RTC cannot dismiss an appeal on the ground that only questions of law were involved. What respondent Judge should have done under the circumstances was to sustain his approval of the notice of appeal and leave it to the Court of Appeals to certify the case to the proper tribunal if warranted. o Under the present rules, his role is to approve or disapprove the record on appeal (when required) and the appeal bond, but not a notice of appeal. A notice of appeal does not require the approval of the trial court. The question of whether an appeal involves only questions of law or both questions of fact and law should be left to the determination of the CA and not the RTC who rendered the decision appealed from. However, to give due course to the appeal and allow the records to be elevated to the appellate court would serve no useful purpose and will only delay the resolution of the case. The SC affirmed the order of Leviste which ordered Kho to pay P57,349.00 "minus the P10,000.00 pertaining to the lost check . Citytrust Banking vs. CA Private respondent Samara, an American who does business in the Philippines, filed a complaint against Citytrust and Marine Midland for the recovery of a sum of money. The complaint alleged that Samara purchased from Citytrust a bank draft for $40K, the drawee being Marine Midland. Subsequently, Samara executed a stop payment order of the bank draft instructing Citytrust to inform Marine midland of such, which acknowledged the receipt of the said stoppayment order. Pursuant to the said order, Citytrust credited back Samaras account due to the non-payment. However, after seven months, Citytrust redebited Samaras account for $40K upon discovering that Marine Midland had already debited Citytrusts own account. The lower court ruled in favor of Samara, ordering Citytrust and Marine Midland solidarily liable to pay Samara P40K with 12% annual interest with damages amounting to P100K. Citytrust and Marine Midland filed separate appeals. Citytrusts appeal was however dismissed f or having been filed out of time since it was file 51 days after it received a copy of the trial court decision. Marine Midlands was on the other hand seasonably filed. The CA modified the decision of the trial court, lowering the interest rate to 6% and removing the award for exemplary damages in favor of Samara Citytrust filed with SC a petition for certiorari to review the dismissal of its appeal alleging that the timely appeal of Marine Midland inured to its benefit. The SC denied the said petitioner on ground that the rights and liabilities of Citytrust and Marine Midland are not interwoven and that lthough the two were solidarily liable, only Marine Midland was ultimately held responsible for damages because it was the one ordered to reimburse Citytrust for whatever amount Citytrust will be made to pay the Samara by reason of the judgment. Citytrust alleges that the CA decision dated has superseded and rendered functus oficio the earlier decision of the trial court and is applicable not only to Marine Midland but also to the Citytrust.

Issue: is the decision of CA reducing the interest rate and damages in favor of Marine Midland applicable also to Citytrust, despite its own appeal being denied? The Court does not agree with Citytrusts contention that it can benefit from the modification of the judgment even if it has lost its own appeal on ground that rights and liabilities of Citytrust and Marine Midland are not so interwoven and thus the judgment cannot affect the party who failed to appeal. It was the trial court judgment that created a joint and several obligation to pay the Samara certain sums, not the relationship as drawer-drawee in the draft transaction. The joint and several obligation imposed by the lower court had a three-fold purpose: (1) to declare the prevailing party to be entitled to recover damages on account of the prejudice which resulted from the acts of the co-defendants; (2) to give the prevailing party the right to proceed against either one of them to recover the amounts awarded to him; and (3) to impress upon Marine Midland its ultimate liability to fully reimburse the petitioner Citytrust consistent with the finding that the proximate cause of the injury to the private respondent was the wrongful deed of Marine Midland.

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Civpro Case Digests 2C. Justice de Leon This judgment, however, does not alter the fact that the respective defenses of the co-defendants are distinct on trial and even on appeal. However, the Court in the case at bar decides not to apply the literal application said rule where the execution against Citytrust would be based on the trial court decision. The Court cannot close its eyes to the inexplicable situation where Samara would be given a choice of executing his claim for US $40,000.00 plus bigger interest exemplary damages, and attorney's fees from petitioner Citytrust, or US $40,000.00 plus a smaller sum inclusive of simple interest and reduced attorney's fees from Marine Midland. Even if it is admitted that Citytrust would anyway be reimbursed for the whole amount which Citytrust may be ordered to pay, such reimbursement would be a circumvention of the appellate court's judgment that Marine Midland is liable only for the modified sum. Thus, the Court shall apply basic principles of justice and equity. o There was substantial evidence to show that Marine Midland is the one actually responsible for the personal injury to Samara since it continued to release payments despite the stop payment order by Samara. If it were not for the said payments, Citytrust would not have debited the said amounts from the account of Samara. o Considering the above circumstances, the Court will not allow the absurd situation where a co-defendant who is adjudged to be primarily liable for sums of money and for tort would be charged for an amount lesser than what its co-defendant is bound to pay. Such a situation runs counter to the principle of solidarity in obligations as between co-defendants established by a judgment for recovery of sum of money and damages. o Substantial justice shall not allow Marine Midland, which is the source of the injury afflicted, to be unjustly enriched either by the direct execution against him of the judgment for the reduced amount or by the indirect execution by way of reimbursement at a later time.

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