SESBRENO VS.

CA GR 89252, 24 May 1993 FACTS On 9 February 1981, Raul Sesbreno made a money market placement in the amount of P300,000 with the Philippine Underwriters Finance Corporation (PhilFinance), with a term of 32 days. PhilFinance issued to Sesbreno the Certificate of Confirmation of Sale of a Delta Motor Corporation Promissory Note (2731), the Certificate of Securities Delivery Receipt indicating the sale of the note with notation that said security was in the custody of Pilipinas Bank, and postdated checks drawn against the Insular Bank of Asia and America for P304,533.33 payable on 13 March 1981. The checks were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Pilipinas Bank never released the note, nor any instrument related thereto, to Sesbreno; but Sesbreno learned that the security was issued 10 April 1980, maturing on 6 April 1981, has a face value of P2,300,833.33 with PhilFinance as payee and Delta Motors as maker; and was stamped non-negotiable on its face. As Sesbreno was unable to collect his investment and interest thereon, he filed an action for damages against Delta Motors and Pilipinas Bank. ISSUE Whether non-negotiability of a promissory note prevents its assignment. HELD Only an instrument qualifying as a negotiable instrument under the relevant statute may be negotiated either by indorsement thereof coupled with delivery, or by delivery alone if it is in bearer form. A negotiable instrument, instead of being negotiated, may also be assigned or transferred. The legal consequences of negotiation and assignment of the instrument are different. A negotiable instrument may not be negotiated but may be assigned or transferred, absent an express prohibition against assignment or transfer written in the face of the instrument. herein, there was no prohibition stipulated.

RADIOWEALTH FINANCE V. INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE BANK 182 SCRA 862

FACTS: The petitioner entered into a Credit Facilities agreement with Interbank. This is secured by a promissory note, trust receipts, security arrangements, which included provisions on payment of attorneys fees and costs of collection in case of default. The petitioner failed to pay. A compromise agreement was entered into by the parties but this agreement failed to include the attorneys fees and costs of collection. The trial court reduced the percentage of attorneys fees in its decision.

HELD: The courts may modify the attorneys fees previously agreed upon where the amount appears to be unconscionable and unreasonable. For the law recognizes the validity of stipulations included in documents such as negotiable instruments and mortgages with respect. The fees in this case are reasonable and fair.

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. CA Case Digest METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 122899. June 8, 2000 FACTS: Mr. Chia offered the subject property for sale to private respondent G.T.P. Development Corporation (hereafter, GTP), with assumption of the mortgage indebtedness in favor of petitioner METROBANK secured by the subject property. Pending negotiations for the proposed sale, Atty. Bernardo Atienza, acting in behalf of respondent GTP, went to METROBANK to inquire on Mr. Chia's remaining balance on the real estate mortgage. METROBANK obliged with a statement of account of Mr. Chia amounting to about P115,000.00 as of August ,1980. The deed of sale and the memorandum of agreement between Mr. Chia and respondent GTP were eventually executed and signed. Atty. Atienza went to METROBANK Quiapo Branch and paid one hundred sixteen thousand four hundred sixteen pesos and seventy-one centavos (P116,416.71) for which METROBANK issued an official receipt acknowledging payment. This notwithstanding, petitioner METROBANK refused to release the real estate mortgage on the subject property despite repeated requests from Atty. Atienza, thus prompting respondent GTP to file an action for specific performance against petitioner METROBANK and Mr. Chia. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in reversing the decision of the lower court. RULING: The Court found no compelling reasons to disturb the assailed decision. All things studiedly viewed in proper perspective, the Court are of the opinion, and so rule, that whatever debts or loans mortgagor Chia contracted with Metrobank after September 4, 1980, without the conformity of plaintiff-appellee, could not be adjudged as part of the mortgage debt the latter so assumed. We are persuaded that the contrary ruling on this point in Our October 24, 1994 decision would be unfair and unjust to plaintiff-appellee because, before buying subject property and assuming the mortgage debt thereon, the latter inquired from Metrobank about the exact amount of the mortgage debt involved. Petitioner METROBANK is estopped from refusing the discharge of the real estate mortgage on the claim that the subject property still secures "other unliquidated past due loans." Chavez vs. Sandiganbayan Facts:Civil case was filed against Enrile in the Sandiganbayan for alleged illegal activities made byEnrile during the Marcos era. Enrirle filed a motion to dismiss and compulsory counter-claim. In thecounter-claim Enrile moved to implead Chavez and other PCGG officials on the basis that the casefield agaisnt him was a harassment suit. The motion to implead Chavez and others was granted by the

Sandiganbayan.Chavez and the PCGG officials raised the defense that they are immune from suit by virtue of Sec. 4 of Executive Order NO. 1. It was found in the records of the PCGG, declared by Jovito Salonga,the there are no proof linking Enrile with the illegal activities performed by Marcos. It was further averred that the case filed against Enrile was instigated by Sol. Gen. Chavez.Sol. Gen. Chavez defended himself by saying that he was acting as a counsel and cannot bymade a defendant in a counter-claim. Issue:W het h er or n ot S o l. G en. C ha ve z c an b e m a de l i a b le f or dam ag es i n f i l ing t he su it ag a i nst Enrile. Held:The court held that the grounds for allowing the compulsory counter-claim of Enrile was basedon the malice or bad faith of Chavez in filing the suit.It was further stated by the court that immunity from suit is granted only because of the fact thatthe Commission has a multitude of task. Immunity for suit on members of the PCGG and other publicofficers is available only if such officers are acting in good faith and in the performance of their duty.If the acts done are tainted with bad faith or in excess of authority they can be held liable personally for damages.In the case at bar the Sol. Gen. exceeded his authority and his act is tainted with bad faith byfiling baseless suit against Enrile. His office does not give him the license to prosecute recklessly to theinjury of another. Thus he is made liable fro his actions in the opinion of the court.

Inre cunanan

Facts: Congress passed Republic Act Number 972,

commonly known as the Bar Flunkers Act of 1953. In accordance with the said law, the Supreme Court then passed and admitted to the bar those candidates who had obtained an average of 72 per cent by raising it to 75 percent. After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar invoking its provisions, while other motions for the revision of their examination papers were still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an additional ground for admission. There are also others who have sought simply the reconsideration of their grades without, however, invoking the law in question. To avoid injustice to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the motions for reconsideration,

irrespective of whether or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.

Issue:
valid.

Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional and

Held: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its

author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and inadequate preparation. In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and responsibility. We have said that in the judicial system from which ours has been derived, the admission, suspension, disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of the profession is concededly judicial. On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction between the functions of the judicial and legislative departments of the government. It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to grant license for the practice of law belongs exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by Congress on the matter is of permissive character, or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the minimum conditions for the license.

Republic Act Number 972 is held to be unconstitutional.