STATE OF WISCONSIN COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT III APPEAL NO. 2012AP001029 CIRCUIT CASE NO.

2010FA000850

In re the marriage of: Rachael Sue Banerdt p/k/a Rachael Sue Lantto, Petitioner-Respondent v. Brian Mark Lantto, Respondent-Appellant, Brown County Child Support Agency Respondent ON APPEAL OF AN ORDER MODIFYING CHILD SUPPORT AND ORDERING PAYMENT OF VARIABLE EXPENSES ENTERED IN THE BROWN COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT BRANCH V. JUDGE MARC HAMMER PRESIDING RESPONSE OF APPELLANT By Brian Lantto 612A Willow Rd Apt 8 Marquette MI, 49855

Table of Cases

Haines v Kerner, Warden of Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard (1972) 404 US 519 (1972) Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, Section 342, FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. 1, ch. 20, 1789 Yoder v. Wisconsin 406 U.S. 205 (1972)

I.

Argument. A. The Right to Due Process: Corporation council Kocha has made the assertion that I have not cited any legal authority to the right to due process under this appeal. I have invoked the Right to due process under the legal authority of the United States Constitution. All states are required to be compliant with the right to due process under the 5th and 14th amendments. The supremacy clause of the U.S. Constitution holds these laws as higher authority than state law. The trial courts intentional misrepresentation of evidence and testimony as well as arbitrary threats of arrest have violated the basic premise of legalism itself. Corporation council Kocha makes the assertion that the due process argument has not been fully developed, and should be disregarded. As a Pro Se litigant from another state, my pleadings are not held to the same standard as members of the BAR. "Pro Se Litigants pleadings are to be construed liberally and held to less stringent standards than lawyers" Haines v Kerner, Warden of Illinois State Penitentiary at Menard (1972) 404 US 519 (1972) Furthermore the Judiciary Act of 1789 sets liberality of pleadings with regards to intent of the pro se litigant;

Pleadings of the Defendant SHALL NOT BE dismissed for lack of form or failure of process. All the pleadings are as any reasonable man/woman would understand, and:

"And be it further enacted. That no summons, writ, declaration, return, process, judgment, or other proceedings in civil cases in any of the courts or the United States, shall be abated, arrested, quashed or reversed, for any defect or want of form, but the said courts respectively shall proceed and give judgment according as the right of the cause and matter in law shall appear unto them, without regarding any imperfections, defects or want of form in such writ, declaration, or other pleading, returns process, judgment, or course of proceeding whatsoever, except those only in cases of demurrer, which the party demurring shall specially sit down and express together with his demurrer as the cause thereof. And the said courts respectively shall and may, by virtue of this act, from time to time, amend all and every such imperfections, defects and wants of form, other than those only which the party demurring shall express as aforesaid, and may at any, time, permit either of the parties to amend any defect in the process of pleadings upon such conditions as the said courts respectively shall in their discretion, and by their rules prescribe

(a)" Judiciary Act of September 24, 1789, Section 342, FIRST CONGRESS, Sess. 1, ch. 20, 1789. B. Considering Evidence Regarding employment. Corperation council asserts LeMere v. Lemere citing Long v. Long: A circuit courts discretionary decision is upheld as long as the court examined relevant facts, applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach In this case however when the judge goes on the record after supposedly spending an hour discussing details off the record(15 p5). The court discussion of the case the court shows a complete lack of understanding of the details surrounding both the employment of Ms. Banerdt (24 p9-10.) and the Place of residence of both parties (22 p8-9). Trial court only asked Ms. Banerdt about her employment after already deciding on the ruling, only to see when is convenient to schedule a review hearing on variable expenses. After spending an hour off the record

threatening Mr. Lantto, the court had failed to take basic evidence of the facts of both parties living and income. Ms. Kocha makes reference to testimony that Brian supposedly testified that his degree would qualify him for an assistant manager position with a Tribe. Later in the

transcript, however Judge Hammer goes on to say that he had asked him what good money was pertaining to a discussion focusing on Mr. Lantto legitimizing his decision to attend college (3 p6). Good Money does not adequately describe

an individuals actual earning potential. The transcript in its entirety is evidence of judicial intimidation and misconduct. At many points in the

transcript Brian makes statements in response to the off the record intimidation including Im sort of overwhelmed right now (11 p5). Brian asserts 5th amendment privilege near the end of the hearing (11 p15). These statements were made due to Brian being under duress during the hearing. The berating and threatening demeanor the trial court showed an unreasonable and irrational process contrary to Lemere v. Lemere and associated case law. C. Ordering Payment of Variable Costs Based on Rachaels Testimony. Corporation Council Kochas response points to a supposed lack of objection to the trial courts ruling. The trial

courts excessive summarizing of testimony on multiple issues prevented objection. The trial courts documented

threats of arrest and verbal berating of Brian was done intentionally to prevent correction of untrue summary of events.

The court was never petitioned through any notice that she was attempting to seek payment for variable costs. If

variable costs for medical expenses exist, there is no burden on any party to produce a bill from the medical facility. The Marital settlement agreement in this case sets variable expenses specifically for medical expenses alone. The order of $500 dollars for school related items is too vague to qualify for a variable expense under this marital settlement agreement as it lacks evidentiary scrutiny and points more toward clothing which is not a valid variable expense. Ms. Kocha cites Bahr v. Bahr, The weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witness is best measured by the trial court. This evidentiary standard is being misapplied to this case however as these variable costs are easily proven with a simple hospital bill, as would be expected in basic common law. In this case there is no documentation about what the supposed medical procedure in question even is. The court accepted the de neuvo hearing after Mr. Lantto submitted evidence that Ms. Banerdt testified falsely at the earlier commissioners hearing. To accept

Ms. Banerdts statement over Mr. Lantto directly after proving Ms. Banerdts lack of veracity is contrary to normal judicial practice.

D. Deciding the case Mindful of Excessive Costs. Ms. Kocha asks that the court dismiss the allegation that the handling of this case created excessive costs to everyone involved with this case. Scheduling a review

hearing instead of letting the child support agency handle the variable expenses was not necessary and was used to further intimidate Brian. The reason that this ruling is extreme is that trial court acted as aggressively as it could in Ms. Banerdts favor by setting child support far beyond what Mr. Lantto could pay and additionally helping Ms. Banerdt think up variable expenses to be paid in a short amount of time. Conversely to how Ms. Banerdt was treated, Mr. Lantto had his parenting plan denied (14 p9), was forced to return to Wisconsin in person instead of appearing by phone, and was threatened with arrest (12-18 p11). Additionally judge Marc Hammer made disparaging remarks about Mr. Lantto throughout page 11 of the transcript. The changes trial court made to the parties marital settlement agreement were all done in Ms. Banerdts favor. The transcript shows the trial court at several times stating that the agreement was poorly drafted but does not explain why (13 p12). Trial court appears to be relieving Ms. Banerdt of her expectation of co-parenting by eliminating variable expenses and raising monthly child

support to an extreme level.

The record reflects that Ms.

Banerdt was represented by Legal Action of Wisconsin (17 p12), while Mr. Lantto was represented pro se. At every

step of legal proceedings the state of Wisconsin has provided a lawyer to represent Ms. Banerdts needs while denying aid to Mr. Lantto. This treads upon the equal

protection clause based on the discrimination of both gender and state of residence. The marital settlement

agreement is a contractual agreement which requires at the very least some rational justification for the actions taken as well as attaining permission from the original trial court where the marital settlement was drafted. Parenting is a fundamental right. (Yoder v. Wisconsin) The trial courts unfounded hostility to a parent attempting to take lawful and legal actions through the court system trespass on that fundamental and constitutionally protected right. II. Edwards v. Edwards The trial court failed to consider the needs of the child or the payers ability to pay contrary to Edwards v. Edwards. The record clearly shows that after an hour of off the record discussion the judge came to his decision without doing anything but asking what Mr. Lantto wanted to do with his degree.

The trial court was unfamiliar with Ms. Banerdts employment situation and was also unfamiliar with where both parties live. The trial court could not accurately measure the needs

of the children if it failed to inquire about the financial state of Ms. Banerdts household. In similar fashon, the

trial court could not determine Mr. Lanttos ability to pay when it was not familiar with the fact that he lives in the rural upper peninsula of Michigan, a traditionally economically disadvantaged area. Trial courts failure to

weigh the payers ability to pay speaks to the same problem the Wisconsin Supreme court had in Edwards v. Edwards in that the trial court (in Brown County) did not have accurate information about Mr. Edwards local employment options in Milwaukee. (Edwards v. Edwards 120) III. Setting child support for a future date under 767.511. The court must find a substantial change in circumstances to change child support. Starting cases before an actual change in circumstances occurs makes it difficult if not impossible to calculate an accurate earning capacity. This difficulty is compounded in interstate cases like this one. Currently there is an entire cohort group of college graduates who cannot find employment in their field upon graduating. Forcing payers to estimate what they should be

paid based on the job they wanted when they started college is not a legal manner to set child support in a Wisconsin or interstate child support case.

IV.

Violation of federal poverty guidelines in this interstate case. Corporation council Kocha asserts that this is a wholly Wisconsin case. In reality and functionality however it is an interstate child support case governed by the Interstate Child Support Enforcement Act. The parties in this case were

married and lived in Michigan until the time of separation and the payer continues to live in Michigan. Interstate enforcement collection and enforcement actions have already been taken as a result of this case. Child support was

increased in January of 2012 through the interstate child support system. Ms. Kocha filed the official order in April

of 2012; 4 months after the increase went through the interstate system.

Trial court had no reason stated on record as to why the alleged variable expenses were to be ordered in the short time increments. The assigning of these dates was arbitrary and

capricious under the law.

On the lack of standing of Corporation council on variable costs During trial court Brown County child support had not submitted any claim to sue for variable expenses, evidence has

not made or any statements on the transcript in support of. In trial court Judge Hammer dismissed the child support agency from the variable expenses proceedings which were to continue on September 2nd. Brown County Corporation Council Kocha agreed to that decision. The variable expenses should have been documented in accordance with due process of the law and proof of the expenses and Brown Countys intent to peruse them if they had wished to be part of those proceedings. In

reality, the variable expenses were invented to punish Appellant for scheduling the De Neuvo hearing by Judge Hammer.

The trial court allows Ms. Kocha possibility to return to court for variable expense hearing (20 p8). Ms. Kocha made no objection to the agency dismissal. Trial court also asks Ms.

Kocha if she is running the variable expenses through the KIDS system, to which Ms. Kocha also declines. Trial court asked

Ms. Kocha if she wanted to stay on this case for the review hearing and Ms. Kocha declines. If the variable expenses were

added to the and paid through the KIDS system, Ms. Kocha would have standing but instead she waived any input on variable expenses and allowed the trial court to micro manage the case without oversight.

Brian Lantto

5/16/2013