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Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 22:52:07 -0400
From: Philip Zelikow <pzelikow@9-11 commission.gov>^
To: commissioners@9-11 commission.gov <^
Cc: ckojm@9-11 commission.gov^P, dmarcus@9-11 commission.gov^, sdunne@9-11 commission.gov^,
glederman@9-11 commission.gov^, skaplan@9-11 commission.gov^, dcampagna@9-11 commission.gov^
Reply-to: pzelikow@9-11 commission.gov ^
Subject: Action Request: Draft Commission Determination Authorizing Further Investigation of the Intelligence Comrmunity
Part(s): jjfi 2 050803 Determination.doc application/msword 93.05 KB H _ rr^A
_ .j$ ~ ^v t 1

^ 1.2 unnamed text/html 5.90 KB

*
Commissioners -

Before we can proceed with further investigation of the intelligence community, our statute requires
that the Commission must first review the information compiled by the Joint Inquiry and then
determine what areas were not covered, or were addressed incompletely, or involve new information
obtained since the JI finished its work.

On your behalf we have reviewed the information compiled by the Joint Inquiry, paying special
attention to the JI's report, to the overall scope and character of its investigation, and to the kind of
information that was obtained in documents, in interviews, and in hearings. We have discussed the
JI's work in detail with its staff director, her deputy, and a number of its staffers (several of whom now
work for the Commission). With the assistance of our general counsel and his deputy and other
members of our staff, we have therefore prepared the draft determination that is attached to this
document.

We will have difficulty making any fresh document requests from the agencies of the intelligence
community until this formal determination has been made. To avoid any delay in our work we are
distributing the draft to you now, in this way, to seek your help.

If you approve, please let us know. If you have any suggested edits we will be glad to help you
circulate them to other commissioners. You also have the option of deferring action until the
Commission can meet to discuss the matter in person later this month. If you have particular
substantive questions about the JI's work, let me know and we'll try to get you the answer or
information you need. We hope you can contact us by Monday, May 12, so that we can compile a

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Date: Thu, 8 May 2003 22:52:07 -0400
From: Philip Zelikow <pzelikow@9-11 commission.gov>^
To: commissioners@9-11 commission.gov<^
Cc: ckojm@9-11 commission.gov £$, dmarcus@9-11 commission.gov^', sdunne@9-11 commission.gov^',
glederman@9-11 commission.gov^, skaplan@9-11 commission.gov^, dcampagna@9-11 commission.govH
Reply-to: pzelikow@9-11 commission.gov ^
Subject: Action Request: Draft Commission Determination Authorizing Further Investigation of the Intelligence Community
Part(s): ^ 2 Q50803 Determination.doc application/msword 93.05 KB m

$H 1.2 unnamed text/html 5.90 KB f|$

Commissioners -

Before we can proceed with further investigation of the intelligence community, our statute requires
that the Commission must first review the information compiled by the Joint Inquiry and then
determine what areas were not covered, or were addressed incompletely, or involve new information
obtained since the JT finished its work.

On your behalf we have reviewed the information compiled by the Joint Inquiry, paying special
attention to the JI's report, to the overall scope and character of its investigation, and to the kind of
information that was obtained in documents, in interviews, and in hearings. We have discussed the
JI's work in detail with its staff director, her deputy, and a number of its staffers (several of whom now
work for the Commission). With the assistance of our general counsel and his deputy and other
members of our staff, we have therefore prepared the draft determination that is attached to this
document.

We will have difficulty making any fresh document requests from the agencies of the intelligence
community until this formal determination has been made. To avoid any delay in our work we are
distributing the draft to you now, in this way, to seek your help.

If you approve, please let us know. If you have any suggested edits we will be glad to help you
circulate them to other commissioners. You also have the option of deferring action until the
Commission can meet to discuss the matter in person later this month. If you have particular
substantive questions about the JI's work, let me know and we'll try to get you the answer or
information you need. We hope you can contact us by Monday, May 12, so that we can compile a

http://kinesis.swishmail.com/webmail/imp/message.php?index=126 5/9/2003
Mail:: INBOX: Action Request: Draft Commission Determination Authorizing Further I... Page 2 of 2

complete set of votes or comments for Tom and Lee.

Philip Zelikow

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THOMAS H Page 1 of 3

DETERMINATION

Having reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions,
and recommendations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to the
Intelligence Community, the Commission hereby determines that:

a. The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the following areas of inquiry
relating to the Intelligence Community:

• The organization and operational methods of Al Qa'ida;

• The character of Al Qa'ida1 s relationships with foreign governments,

especially Iraq and Iran;

• The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida,
whether from organizations directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or from
other organizations, such as Hizbollah;

• The immediate response of the United States to the attacks;

• Lessons learned and the counterterrorism policies, programs, and

procedures instituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacks
of September 11, 2001;

• Assessment of national vulnerabilities and means of attack (beyond the

JI's investigation of pre-9/11 analyses of aircraft as weapons);

• The role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the collection,
analysis, and use of intelligence inside the United States; and

• Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community's

counterterrorism policies and programs.

b. The Joint Inquiry investigated the following areas of inquiry relating to

the Intelligence Community, some of them extensively, but did not
complete its investigation into:

• The reconstruction of the September 11, 2001 plot, including the

higher-level direction of the conspiracy and the activities of the
Hamburg cell;

• The activities of the conspirators and their support network inside the
Thomas H. Kean United States;
CHAIR • The global financing network of Al Qa'ida, including the financing of
the September 11, 2001 plot;
Lee H. Hamilton
• Controversies over the policy guidance provided by the Executive
VICE CHAIR Branch for the Intelligence Community's international counterterrorism
efforts, including the context and details of the debates over covert
Richard Ben-Veniste action and alternative options;

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THOMAS H Page 2 of 3

Max Cleland • The relative priority of the Intelligence Community's counterterrorism

mission as compared to other Intelligence Community missions;
Fred F. Fielding
• National organization and management of the Intelligence Community
Jamie S. Gorelick in performance of its counterterrorism mission;

Slade Gorton • Local organization and management of the Intelligence Community

counterterrorism efforts both overseas and in communities of the
John Lehman United States;

Timothy J. Roemer • Collection, processing, analysis, and dissemination of counterterrorism

intelligence, including policies, standards, analytic methods, and
James R. Thompson practices for gathering and pooling of foreign and domestic
information against a transnational foe;
Philip D. Zelikow
• Legal authorities for counterterrorism intelligence work inside and
outside the United States;
EXECUTIVE
DIRECTOR
• Liaison with foreign governments in counterterrorism efforts,
including the character of cooperation with Germany, Saudi Arabia,
and Pakistan both before and after the attacks;

• Strategic and tactical warning concerning terrorism against the United

States, including the sharing of appropriate warning information with
the private sector; and

• Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congress

and Executive Branch for the counterterrorism mission.

(c) The Joint Inquiry concluded its research and investigative work along
various tracks at different times during 2002. New information not reviewed
by the Joint Inquiry has become available with respect to the facts and
(circumstances of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the immediate
response of the United States to the attacks, and the lessons learned from the
attacks.

The Commission may supplement the categories above as the Commission's

investigation progresses or as new information comes to the Commission's
attention.

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. Kean

Chair

Lee H. Hamilton

Vice Chair

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THOMAS H Page 3 of 3

Philip D. Zelikow

Executive Director

Date:

xj 0x01 graphic

TEL (202) 331-4060

FAX (202) 296-5545

www.9-1 lcommission.gov

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 DETERMINATION
it/ f/. /
Having reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to the Intelligence
Community, the Commission hereby determines that:

(a) The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the following areas of inquiry relating to the
Intelligence Community:

• The organization and operational methods of Al Qa'ida;

• The character of Al Qa'ida's relationships with foreign governments,
especially Iraq and Iran;
The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida, whether
from organizations directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or from other
organizations, such as Hizbollah;
The immediate response of the United States to the attacks;
Lessons learned and the counter-terrorism policies, programs,/
tituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacks of/September
1;
e of state and local law enforcement agencies in the
:elligence inside the United States; and
Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community's
policies and programs.

The Joint Inquiry investigated the following areas of inquiry relating to the
Intelligence Community, some of them extensively, but did not complete its
investigation into:

The reconstruction of the September 11, 2001 plot, including the higher-level
direction of the conspiracy and the activities of the Hamburg cell;
The activities of the conspirator^aliJ theiFsT: inside the United
States;
The global financing ijefwork of al Qa'ida, including the financing of the
September 11,2001 .cA
Controversies over me policy guidance -beiftg provided/for^international
counter-terrorism efforts JajObe Intelligence Community, including the
context and details of the debates over covert action and alternatiye-eptlons;
The relative priority oYthe^Intelligence Coniniujdtyls-eoTmteMerrorisrn
mission as compared to otherTnlellig^rlcTCwnmunity missions;
NationaLmanagement of the Intelligence Community in performance of its
counter-terrorism mission;
Local organization and management of the Intelligence Community counter-
f terrorism efforts both overseas and in communities of the United States;
Collection, processing, a»4analysis.of counter-terrorism intelligence,
including standards for gathering anojjooling of foreign and domestic
information againsi a transnational targ

J
 Legal authorities for counter-terrorism intelligence work inside and outside of
the United States;
Liaison with foreign governments in counter-terrorism efforts, including the
character of cooperation with Germany, Saudi Arabiajmd Pakistan both
before and after the attacks;
Strategic and tactical warning concerning terrorism against) the7United States. I'1 *j
Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congress and - •//"
Executive Branch for the counter-terrorism ijussior/TT-* ^^

ew information not reviewed by the Joint Inquiry hxavbecome>^vailablellwlth respect

to the facts and circumstances of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
immediate response of the Unitedjtates to the attackst^and the lessons learned
the attacks

The Commission may supplement the categories above as the Commission's investigation
progresses or as new information comes to the Commission's attention. /t-*^

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. Kean
Chair

Lee H. Hamilton
Vice Chair

Philip D. Zelikow
Executive Director

Date:
DETERMINATION

Having reviewed the information compiled by, and the findings, conclusions, and
recommendations of, the Joint Inquiry of the Congress relating to the Intelligence
Community, the Commission hereby determines that:

(a) The Joint Inquiry did not investigate the following areas of inquiry relating to the
Intelligence Community:

• The organization and operational methods of Al Qa'ida;

• The character of Al Qa'ida's relationships with foreign governments,
especially Iraq and Iran;
• The wider terrorist threat against the United States beyond Al Qa'ida, whether
from organizations directly affiliated with Al Qa'ida or from other
organizations, such as Hizbollah;
• The immediate response of the United States to the attacks;
• Lessons learned and the counter-terrorism policies, programs, and procedures
instituted by the Intelligence Community after the attacks of September 11,
2001;
• Role of state and local law enforcement agencies in the collection and use of
intelligence inside the United States; and
• Congressional oversight of the Intelligence Community's counter-terrorism
policies and programs.

(b) The Joint Inquiry investigated the following areas of inquiry relating to the
Intelligence Community, some of them extensively, but did not complete its
investigation into:

• The reconstruction of the September 11, 2001 plot, including the higher-level
direction of the conspiracy and the activities of the Hamburg cell;
• The activities of the conspirators and their support network inside the United
States;
• The global financing network of al Qa'ida, including the financing of the
September 11, 2001 plot;
• Controversies over the policy guidance being provided for international
counter-terrorism efforts by the Intelligence Community, including the
context and details of the debates over covert action and alternative options;
• The relative priority of the Intelligence Community's counter-terrorism
mission as compared to other Intelligence Community missions;
• National management of the Intelligence Community in performance of its
counter-terrorism mission;
• Local organization and management of the Intelligence Community counter-
terrorism efforts both overseas and in communities of the United States;
• Collection, processing, and analysis of counter-terrorism intelligence,
including standards for gathering and pooling of foreign and domestic
information against a transnational target;
 • Legal authorities for counter-terrorism intelligence work inside and outside of
the United States;
• Liaison with foreign governments in counter-terrorism efforts, including the
character of cooperation with Germany, Saudi Arabia, and Pakistan both
before and after the attacks;
• Strategic and tactical warning concerning terrorism against the United States.
• Resource allocation to the Intelligence Community by the Congress and
Executive Branch for the counter-terrorism mission;

(c) New information not reviewed by the Joint Inquiry has become available with respect
to the facts and circumstances of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
immediate response of the United States to the attacks, and the lessons learned since
the attacks since the Joint Inquiry concluded its research efforts in December 2002.

The Commission may supplement the categories above as the Commission's investigation
progresses or as new information comes to the Commission's attention.

ADOPTED BY THE COMMISSION:

Thomas H. Kean
Chair

Lee H. Hamilton
Vice Chair

Philip D. Zelikow
Executive Director

Date: