8 MUTUC VS COMELEC, 36 SCRA 228 Facts: Amelito Mutuc is a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention COMELEC issued

ssued a rule prohibiting taped jingles for campaign purposes October 24, 1970: petitioner received a telegram stating that his candidacy has been given due course and prohibiting him from using the taped jingles in his mobile units (for campaign purposes) Petitioner Mutuc protested and invoked his right to freedom of speech. Respondents answer: no denial of the facts stated; but justified that the prohibition was premised on a provision of the Constitutional Convention Act, which made it unlawful for candidates "to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin."; contended that the jingle proposed to be used by petitioner is the recorded or taped voice of a singer and therefore a tangible propaganda material, under the above statute subject to confiscation; prayed that the petition be denied for lack of merit.

Issue: WON the said rule (prohibiting the use of taped jingles) denied petitioner of his freedom of speech. Held: COMELEC is restrained and prohibited from enforcing such rule. The respondent Commission is expected to not exercise any authority in conflict with or outside of the law; and there is no higher law than the Constitution. Regarding the petitioners invocation of his right to free speech, the Court has constantly held that this preferred freedom calls all the more for the utmost respect. What respondent Commission did, in effect, was to impose censorship on petitioner, an evil against which this constitutional right is directed. Nor could respondent Commission justify its action by the assertion that petitioner, if he would not resort to taped jingle, would be free, either by himself or through others, to use his mobile loudspeakers. Precisely, the constitutional guarantee is not to be weakened by confining it to a speaker having his say, but not perpetuating what is uttered by him through tape or other mechanical contrivances. If this Court were to sustain respondent Commission, then the effect would hardly be distinguishable from a previous restraint. That cannot be validly done. It would negate indirectly what the Constitution in express terms assures

MACARIOLA VS. ASUNCION 114 SCRA 77 FACTS: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Judge Elias Asuncion was the presiding Judge in Civil Case No. 3010 for partition. Among the parties thereto was Bernardita R. Macariola. On June 8, 1863 respondent Judge rendered a decision, which became final for lack of an appeal. On October 16, 1963 a project of partition was submitted to Judge Asuncion which he approved in an Order dated October 23, 1963, later amended on November 11, 1963. On March 6, 1965, a portion of lot 1184-E, one of the properties subject to partition under Civil Case No. 3010, was acquired by purchase by respondent Macariola and his wife, who were major stockholders of Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc., Bernardita Macariola thus charged Judge Asuncion of the CFI of Leyte, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals with act s unbecoming of a judge. Macariola alleged that Asuncion violated , among others, Art. 1491, par. 5 of the New Civil Code and Article 14 of the Code of Commerce.

6. 7.

ISSUE: Is the actuation of Judge Asuncion in acquiring by purchase a portion of property in a Civil Case previously handled by him an act unbecoming of a Judge? HELD: Article 1491 , par. 5 of the New Civil Code applies only to the sale or assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the persons disqualified therein. The Supreme Court held that for the prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment must take place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property. In the case at bar, when respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a portion of lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the parties filed an appeal within the reglementary period hence, the lot in question was no longer subject of litigation. Moreover at the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent s order date October 23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, 1963 decision, had long been final for there was no appeal from said orders.

Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot 1184-E from three of the plaintiffs after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010. Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code. Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines, Art. 14 of the Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been abrogated because where there is a change of sovereignty , the political laws of the former sovereign , whether compatible or not with those of the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign. MANILA PRINCE HOTEL VS GSIS267 SCRA 408 FACTS Petitioner Manila Prince Hotel, a Filipino corporation raised their case regarding the sale of the Manila Hotel in a Special Civil Action of Prohibition and Mandamus.Petitioner argued that the sale of the hotel should be awarded to them in pursuant to theFilipino First policy of the Constitution. The highest bidder during that time is Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm with ITT-Sheraton asits hotel operator. The 2 bid for the same number of shares however it was the Malaysianfirm who bid 2.42PHP higher than the petitioner at 44PHP.While the declaration of Renong Berhad as the winning bidder is still pending, the petitionermatched the bid at 44PHP per share and sent a managers check issued by Philtrust Bank for33 Million pesos. Respondent GSIS refused to accept the petitioners offer. The respondents argued that sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is not self executing and requires an implementing legislation for its enforcement. Such paragraphstates: in the grant of rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. ISSUE Whether or not sec 10, par 2 Art XII of the 1987 Constitution is self executing; and whetheror not the petitioner as a Filipino controlled corporation is also covered by the termqualified Filipinos of the Constitution. RULING The court ruled that Art II of the Constitution is generally not self executing. However, if aprovision is complete in itself and becomes operative without the aid of supplementary orenabling legislation or that which supplies sufficient rule by means of which the right itgrants may be enjoyed or protected, is self executing. In case of doubt, the Constitutionshould be considered self executing. Sec 10 par 2 Art XII of the Constitution is a mandatory,positive command which is complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines orimplementing laws or rules for its enforcement.According to the 1986 Constitutional Commission proceedings, the term qualified filipinoalso includes corporations at least 60% of which is owned by Filipinos. The court furtherhighlighted the exchange of views during the sessions of the Constitutional Commissionwhen framers explicitly provided that a qualified Filipino enterprise shall be given preferenceover a foreigner even if such foreigner is more qualified in some aspects. The phrase preference to qualified Filipinos was explained thus