SENATE BLUE RIBBON VS. JUDGE MAJADUCON, G.R. NO.

136760, JULY 29, 2003 FACTS: The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee conducted an inquiry on the alleged fund irregularities of the Armed Forces Retirement and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS). It subpoenaed Atty. Flaviano to appear before it. Atty. Flaviano secured a TRO against the Senate issued by Judge Majaducon of RTC-23 of General Santos City. ISSUE: Is the TRO issued by the Judge ordering the Senate to cease and desist from proceeding with its hearing valid? RULING: No. The principle of separation of powers essentially means that legislation belongs to Congress, execution to the Executive and settlement of legal controversies to the Judiciary. Each is prevented from invading the domain of the others. The RTC of General Santos or any court for that matter had no authority to prohibit the Senate committee from requiring the respondent (Atty. Flaviano) to appear and testify before it. SENATE VS. ERMITA, G.R. NO. 169777, APRIL 20, 2006 FACTS: Pres. Arroyo issued EO 464 and under Section1 thereof, it requires all heads of departments of the Executive branch to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is EO464 valid and constitutional? RULING: The requirement to secure presidential consent under Sec. 1 is valid if the appearance of the department secretary before Congress is under the question hour. The attendance of the department heads is discretionary during question hour. However, if the appearance of the department head is sought during a hearing in Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation, the appearance is mandatory with or without presidential consent. The only way for department heads to exempt themselves is by a valid claim of executive privilege. ABAKADA V. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, G.R. 168056, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005 FACTS: Republic Act No. 9337 was enacted for reasons of fixing budget, generation of revenue, inadequacy in fiscal allocation for education, compensation for health workers, and a wider range of coverage for full valueadded tax benefits. The petitioners, however, questioned, not only the wisdom of the law, but also the perceived flaws in its passage. RA 9337 is a consolidation of three legislative bills namely, House Bill Nos. 3555 and 3705, and Senate Bill No. 1950. Because of its provisions being in conflict with each other, the Senate agreed to request the House of Representatives for a committee conference, in which the Conference Committee on the Disagreeing Provisions of House Bill recommended the approval of its report. In due to that, the Senate and the House of Representatives did. On May 24, 2005, the President signed in to law the consolidated House and Senate versions as Republic Act 9337. Before its effectivity on July 1, 2005, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining government from implementing the law, in response to a series of petitions for certiorari and prohibition, questioning the constitutionality of the said Republic Act. ISSUES: 1) Can amendment proposals to revenue bills originate from the Senate without violating Section 24, Art VI of the Constitution? 2) Did the EVAT law violate the "no-amendment rule" under Section 26(2), Art. VI of the Constitution? 3) What are the powers and extent of authority of the Bicameral Conference Committee? 4) Did the EVAT law, RA 9337, violate the constitutional mandate on uniformity of taxation? 5) Is the EVAT law, RA 9337, regressive? RULING: 1) Yes. Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution states, "All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills, shall originate exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may

propose or concur with amendments." Thus, Section 24, Art. VI of the Constitution does not contain any prohibition or limitation on the extent of the amendments that may be introduced by the Senate to the House revenue bill. 2) No. The "no-amendment rule" refers only to the procedure to be followed by each house of Congress with regard to bills initiated in each of the aforementioned respective houses, regarding its transmission to the other house for its concurrence or amendment. Section 26 (2), Art. VI of the Constitution does not mean that the introduction by the Bicameral Conference Committee of amendments and modifications to disagreeing provisions in bills is prohibited.

3) The power of the Bicameral Conference Committee is to reconcile or settle the differences in the two Houses respective bills, but it is not limited to the conflicting provisions of the bills. It may include matters not found in the original bills but germane to the purpose thereof. If both Houses viewed the pronouncement made by this Court in such cases as extreme or beyond what they intended, they had the power to amend their respective Rules to clarify or limit even further the scope of the authority which they grant to the Bicameral Conference Committee. Petitioners grievance that, unfortunately, they cannot bring about such an amendment of the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee because they are members of the minority, deserves scant consideration. That the majority of the members of both Houses refuses to amend the Rules on the Bicameral Conference Committee is an indication that it is still satisfied therewith. At any rate, this is how democracy works - the will of the majority shall be controlling. 4) No. Article VI, Section 28(1) of the Constitution reads: "The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation." Uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Different articles may be taxed at different amounts provided that the rate is uniform on the same class everywhere with all people at all times. The EVAT law is uniform as it provides a standard rate of 0% or 10% (or 12%) on all goods and services. Uniform taxation does not deprive Congress of the power to classify subjects of taxation, and only demands uniformity within the particular class. 5) Yes, by its nature it is regressive. But the principle of progressive taxation has no relation with the VAT system inasmuch as the VAT paid by the consumer or business for every goods bought or services enjoyed is the same regardless of income. In other words, the VAT paid eats the same portion of an income, whether big or small. Hence, the petitions were DISMISSED and the temporary restraining order issued by the Court was lifted upon finality of the decision. ABAKADA VS. EDUARDO ERMITA, G.R. NO. 168056, SEPTEMBER 1, 2005 FACTS: Sections 4, 5 and 6 of R.A. No. 9337, amendingSections 106, 107and 108, respectively, of the NIRC give the President thestand-by authority to raise the VAT rate from 10% to 12% when certain conditionsare met. ISSUE: Does this constitute undue delegation of legislative power? RULING: It is not a delegation of legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature may delegate to executive officers or bodies the power to determine certain facts or conditions, or the happening of contingencies, on which the operation of a statute is, by its terms, made to depend, but the legislature must prescribe sufficient standards, policies or limitations on their authority. While the power to tax cannot be delegated to executive agencies, details as to the enforcement and administration of an exercise of such power may be left to them, including the power to determine the existence of facts on which its operation depends. GEROCHI vs. DOE, GR NO 159796, JULY 179, 2007 Constitutionality of EPIRA and Universal Charge Undue Delegation Power of tax: Universal Charge is not a tax but an exercise of Police power This feature of the Universal Charge further boosts the position that the same is an exaction imposed primarily in the pursuit of the States police objectives. The STF reasonably serves and assures attainment and perpetuity of the purposes for which the Universal Charge is imposed, i.e., to ensure the viability of the countrys electric power industry. (GEROCHI, ET AL. V. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ET AL., G.R. NO. 159796, JULY 17, 2007, NACHURA, J).

Sufficient Standard: total electrification, viability of power industry, electricity made affordable (Complete: amount of universal charge is based on guidelines provided in EPIRA) As to the second test, the Court had, in the past, accepted as sufficient standards the following: interest of law and order; adequate and efficient instruction; public interest; justice and equity; public convenience and welfare; simplicity, economy and efficiency; standardization and regulation of medical education; and fair and equitable employment practices. Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, to ensure the total electrification of the country and the quality, reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric power, and watershed rehabilitation and management meet the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the limitations on the ERCs power to formulate the IRR. These are sufficient standards. (GEROCHI, ET AL. V. DEPT. OF ENERGY, ET AL., G.R. NO. 159796, JULY 17, 2007, NACHURA, J).

GEROCHI V. DENR Congress enacted the Electric Power Industry Reform Act of 2001 (EPIRA) on June 8, 2001; on June 26, 2001, it took effect. National Power CorporationStrategic Power Utilities Group (NPC-SPUG) filed with respondent Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC) a petition for the availment from the Universal Charge of its share for Missionary Electrification. NPC filed another petition with ERC, docketed as ERC Case No. 2002-194, praying that the proposed share from the Universal Charge for the Environmental charge of P0.0025 per kilowatt-hour (/kWh), or a total of P119,488,847.59, be approved for withdrawal from the Special TrustFund (STF)managed by respondent Power Sector Assets and Liabilities Management Group (PSALM) for the rehabilitation and management of watershed areas. ERC then issued an Order in ERC Case No. 2002-165 provisionally approving the computed amount of P0.0168/kWh as the share of the NPCSPUG from the Universal Charge for Missionary Electrification and authorizing the National Transmission Corporation (TRANSCO) and Distribution Utilities to collect the same from its end-users on a monthly basis. On the basis of the said ERC decisions, respondent Panay Electric Company, Inc. (PECO) chargedpetitionerRomeo P. Gerochiandall other end-users with the Universal Charge as reflected in their respective electric bills starting from the month of July 2003. Issues/Held: (1) WON the Universal Charge under the EPIRA is a tax? NO. The power to tax is an incident of sovereignty and is unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very nature no limits, so that security against its abuse is to be found only in the responsibility of the legislature which imposes the tax on the constituency that is to pay it. It is based on the principle that taxes are the lifeblood of the government, and their prompt and certain availability is an imperious need. Thus, the theory behind the exercise of the power to tax emanates from necessity; without taxes, government cannot fulfill its mandate of promoting the general welfare and well-being of the people. On the other hand, police power is the power of the state to promote public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. It is the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three fundamental powers of the State. The justification is found in the Latin maxims salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law) and sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas (so use your property as not to injure the property of others). As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually extends to all public needs, police power grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the State, as parens patriae, gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. We have held that the power to "regulate" means the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control, with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and of its patrons
SENATE OF THE PHIL. VS. ERMITA, 488 SCRA 1, APRIL 20, 2006 FACTS: Pres. Arroyo issued EO 464 and under Section1 thereof, it requires all heads of departments of the Executive branch to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Is EO464 valid and constitutional? RULING: The requirement to secure presidential consent under Sec. 1 is valid if the appearance of the department secretary before Congress is under the question hour. The attendance of the department heads is discretionary during question hour. However, if the appearance of the department head is sought during a

hearing in Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation, the appearance is mandatory with or without presidential consent. The only way for department heads to exempt themselves is by a valid claim of executive privilege. KMU VS. DIRECTOR OF NEDA, 487 SCRA 623 FACTS: President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 420 that directs a unified ID system among government agencies and Government owned and controlled corporations in order to have a uniform ID for all government agencies. Kilusang Mayo Uno and other respondents assailed this executive order for being a usurpation of legislative powers by the president and it infringes the citizens right to privacy. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 420 is valid RULING: Executive Order 420 is a proper subject of executive issuance under the presidents constitutional power of control over government entities in the executive department, as well as the presidents constitutional duty to ensure that all laws are faithfully executed, thus said executive order is not a usurpation of legislative power. Furthermore, it is not usurpation of legislative power because the act of issuing ID cards and the collection of some necessary information to imprint in them do not require a legislation. What needs legislation is the system of appropriation to enforce the unified ID system, when unified ID system includes the citizens and when personal data that are beyond of what is routinely needed is collected for the ID. FACTS: Under EO 420, the President directs all government agencies and government-owned and controlled corporations to adopt a uniform data collection and format for their existing identification (ID) systems. Petitioners allege that EO 420 is unconstitutional because it constitutes usurpation of legislative functions by the executive branch of the government. Furthermore, they allege that EO 420 infringes on the citizens right to privacy. ISSUE: Whether or not EO 420 IS A USURPATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY THE PRESIDENT. RULING: No. The President may by executive or administrative order direct the government entities under the Executive department to adopt a uniform ID data collection and format. Under her constitutional power of control, the President can direct all government entities, in the exercise of their functions under existing laws, to adopt a uniform ID data collection and ID format to achieve savings, efficiency, reliability, compatibility, and convenience to the public. Of course, the Presidents power of control is limited to the Executive branch of government and does not extend to the Judiciary or to the independent constitutional commissions. Thus, EO 420 does not apply to the Judiciary, or to the COMELEC which under existing laws is also authorized to issue voters ID cards. This only shows that EO 420 does not establish a national ID system because legislation is needed to establish a single ID system that is compulsory for all branches of government.

BANTAY REPUBLIC ACTS (BRA) VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 177271 & 177314, MAY 4, 2007 FACTS: On January 12, 2007, the Comelec issued Resolution No. 7804 prescribing rules and regulations to govern the filing of manifestation of intent to participate and submission of names of nominees under the partylist system of representation in connection with the May 14, 2007 elections. Pursuant thereto, a number of organized groups filed the necessary manifestations. Among these and ostensibly subsequently accredited by the Comelec to participate in the 2007 elections - are 14 party-list groups, namely: (1) BABAE KA; (2) ANG KASANGGA; (3) AKBAY PINOY; (4)AKSA; (5) KAKUSA; (6) AHON PINOY; (7) OFW PARTY; (8) BIYAHENG PINOY; (9) ANAD; (10) AANGAT ANG KABUHAYAN; (11) AGBIAG; (12) BANAT; (13) BANTAY LIPAD; (14) AGING PINOY. Petitioners BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR presented a longer, albeit an overlapping, list. Subsequent events saw BA-RA 7941 and UP-LR filing with the Comelec an Urgent Petition to Disqualify, thereunder seeking to disqualify the nominees of certain party-list organizations. Both petitioners appear not to have the names of the nominees sought to be disqualified since they still asked for a copy of the list of nominees. Docketed in the Comelec as SPA Case No 07-026, this urgent petition has yet to be resolved. Meanwhile, reacting to the emerging public perception that the individuals behind the aforementioned 14 partylist groups do not, as they should, actually represent the poor and marginalized sectors, petitioner Rosales, in G.R. No. 177314, addressed a letter dated March 29, 2007 to Director Alioden Dalaig of the Comelecs Law Department requesting a list of that groups nominees. Another letter of the same tenor dated March 31, 2007 followed, this time petitioner Rosales impressing upon Atty. Dalaig the particular urgency of the subject request. Neither the Comelec Proper nor its Law Department officially responded to petitioner Rosales requests. The April 13, 2007 issue of the Manila Bulletin, however, carried the front-page banner headline "COMELEC WONT

BARE PARTY-LIST NOMINEES", with the following sub-heading: "Abalos says party-list polls not personality oriented." On April 16, 2007, Atty. Emilio Capulong, Jr. and ex-Senator Jovito R. Salonga, in their own behalves and as counsels of petitioner Rosales, forwarded a letter to the Comelec formally requesting action and definitive decision on Rosales earlier plea for information regarding the names of several party-list nominees. Invoking their constitutionally- guaranteed right to information, Messrs. Capulong and Salonga at the same time drew attention to the banner headline adverted to earlier, with a request for the and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. Comelec, "collectively or individually, to issue a formal clarification, either confirming or denying the banner headline and the alleged statement of Chairman Benjamin Abalos, Sr. xxx" Evidently unbeknownst then to Ms. Rosales, et al., was the issuance of Comelec en banc Resolution 07-0724 under date April 3, 2007 virtually declaring the nominees names confidential and in net effect denying petitioner Rosales basic disclosure request. ISSUES: 1. Whether respondent Comelec, by refusing to reveal the names of the nominees of the various party-list groups, has violated the right to information and free access to documents as guaranteed by the Constitution; Whether respondent Comelec is mandated by the Constitution to disclose to the public the names of said nominees.

2.

RULING: The petition in G.R. No. 177271is partly denied insofar as it seeks to nullify the accreditation of the respondents named therein. However, insofar as it seeks to compel the Comelec to disclose or publish the names of the nominees of party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 elections, the same petition and the petition in G.R. No. 177314 are GRANTED. Accordingly, the Comelec is hereby ORDERED to immediately disclose and release the names of the nominees of the party-list groups, sectors or organizations accredited to participate in the May 14, 2007 party-list elections. The Comelec is further DIRECTED to submit to the Court its compliance herewith within five (5) days from notice hereof. PELAEZ VS. AUDITOR GENERAL, GR NO L-23825 FACTS: From Sept 04 to Oct 29, 1964, the President (Marcos) issued executive orders creating 33 municipalities this is purportedly in pursuant to Sec 68 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides that the President of the Philippines may by executive order define the boundary, or boundaries, of any province, sub-province, municipality, [township] municipal district or other political subdivision, and increase or diminish the territory comprised therein, may divide any province into one or more subprovincesThe VP Emmanuel Pelaez and a taxpayer filed a special civil action to prohibit the auditor general from disbursing funds to be appropriated for the said municipalities. Pelaez claims that the EOs are unconstitutional. He said that Sec 68 of the RAC has been impliedly repealed by Sec 3 of RA 2370 which provides that barrios may "not be created or their boundaries altered nor their names changed" except by Act of Congress or of the corresponding provincial board "upon petition of a majority of the voters in the areas affected" and the "recommendation of the council of the municipality or municipalities in which the proposed barrio is situated." Pelaez argues, accordingly: "If the President, under this new law, cannot even create a barrio, can he create a municipality which is composed of several barrios, since barrios are units of municipalities?" The Auditor General countered that only barrios are barred from being created by the President. Municipalities are exempt from the bar and that t a municipality can be created without creating barrios. Existing barrios can just be placed into the new municipality. This theory overlooks, however, the main import of Pelaez argument, which is that the statutory denial of the presidential authority to create a new barrio implies a negation of the bigger power to create municipalities, each of which consists of several barrios. ISSUE: Whether or not Congress has delegated the power to create barrios to the President by virtue of Sec 68 of the RAC RULING: Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the government the power to fill in the details in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions. Indeed, without a statutory declaration of policy, the delegate would, in effect, make or formulate such policy, which is the essence of every law; and, without the aforementioned standard, there would be no means to determine, with reasonable certainty, whether the delegate has acted within or beyond the scope of his authority. In the case at bar, the power to create municipalities is eminently legislative in character not administrative.

YNOT VS. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT (AIC), G.R. NO. 74457, MARCH 20, 1987 FACTS: Under EO 626-A, it is authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of carabaos. ISSUE: Is this valid delegation of legislative power? RULING: The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their generosity, and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers. PEOPLE VS. VERA FACTS: Cu Unjieng was convicted by the trial court in Manila. He filed for reconsideration which was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial. While awaiting new trial, he appealed for probation alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of. Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation Office. The IPO denied the application. However, Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing. The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if Manila is covered by the law it is unconstitutional because Sec 1, Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws. The said law provides absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power. Further, the said probation law may be an encroachment of the power of the executive to provide pardon because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon. ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation of power. RULING: The act of granting probation is not the same as pardon. In fact it is limited and is in a way an imposition of penalty. There is undue delegation of power because there is no set standard provided by Congress on how provincial boards must act in carrying out a system of probation. The provincial boards are given absolute discretion which is violative of the constitution and the doctrine of the non delegability of power. Further, it is a violation of equity so protected by the constitution. The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not avail of their right to probation. SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 127325, MARCH 19, 1997 FACTS: PIRMA (Peoples Initiative for Reforms, Modernization and Action) filed a petition before the Comelec to amend the some provisions of the Constitution relying on R.A. 6735. ISSUE: Whether or not R.A. 6735 provides sufficient mechanism for the conduct of initiative on the Constitution RULING: The Court ruled that the constitutional provision granting the people the power to directly amend the Constitution through initiative is not self-executory. An enabling law is necessary to implement the exercise of the peoples right. Examining the provisions of R.A. 6735, the Court held that said law was incomplete,

inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned. ABAKADA VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY (SUPRA) Rule: Congress cannot delegate its legislative power. The powers which Congress is prohibited from delegating are those which are strictly, or inherently and exclusively, legislative. Purely legislative power, which can never be delegated, has been described as the authority to make a complete law complete as to the time when it shall take effect and as to whom it shall be applicable and to determine the expediency of its enactment. (ABAKADA vs. Eduardo Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005) Southern Cross Cement Corporation vs. Cement Manufacturers Association, 465 SCRA 532 (2005) - SUPRA In our recent rulings in Southern Cross Cement Corporation v. The Philippine Cement Manufacturers Corp.,[60] this Court had occasion to examine the authority granted by Congress to the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) Secretary to impose safeguard measures pursuant to the Safeguard Measures Act. In doing so, the Court was impelled to construe Section 28(2), Article VI of the Constitution, which allowed Congress, by law, to authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national development program of the Government.[61] While the Court refused to uphold the broad construction of the grant of power as preferred by the DTI Secretary, it nonetheless tacitly acknowledged that Congress could designate the DTI Secretary, in his capacity as alter ego of the President, to exercise the authority vested on the chief executive under Section 28(2), Article VI.[62] At the same time, the Court emphasized that since Section 28(2), Article VI authorized Congress to impose limitations and restrictions on the authority of the President to impose tariffs and imposts, the DTI Secretary was necessarily subjected to the same restrictions that Congress could impose on the President in the exercise of this taxing power.