20. [ G.R. No. 182836, October 13, 2009 ] CONTINENTAL STEEL MANUFACTURING CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HON.

ACCREDITED VOLUNTARY ARBITRATOR ALLAN S. MONTAO AND NAGKAKAISANG MANGGAGAWA NG CENTRO STEEL CORPORATION-SOLIDARITY OF UNIONS IN THE PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT AND REFORMS (NMCSC-SUPER), RESPONDENTS. Doctrines: Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. In case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. Facts: Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel) filed a claim for Paternity Leave, Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). The claim was based on the death of Hortillanos unborn child. Hortillanos wife had a premature delivery while she was in the 38th week of pregnancy. The female fetus died during labor due to fetal Anoxia secondary to uteroplacental insufficiency. Petitioner immediately granted Hortillanos claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for bereavement leave and other death benefits. It was maintained by Hortillano, through the Labor Union, that the provisions of the CBA did not specifically state that the dependent should have first been born alive or must have acquired juridical personality so that his/her subsequent death could be covered by the CBA death benefits. Petitioner argued that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without legal personality. It claimed that there are two elements for the entitlement to the benefits, namely: (1) death and (2) status as legitimate dependent, none of which existed in Hortillanos case. Continental Steel contended that only one with civil personality could die, relying on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code which provides: Article 40. Birth determines personality; but the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following article. Article 41. For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies within twenty-four hours after its complete delivery from the maternal womb. Article 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. The effect of death upon the rights and obligations of the deceased is determined by law, by contract and by will. Hence according to the petitioner, the unborn child never died because it never acquired juridical personality. Proceeding from the same line of thought, Continental Steel reasoned that a fetus that was dead from the moment of delivery was not a person at all. Hence, the term dependent could not be applied to a fetus that never acquired juridical personality. Labor arbiter Montao argued that the fetus had the right to be supported by the parents from the very moment he/she was conceived. The fetus had to rely on another for support; he/she could not have existed or sustained himself/herself without the power or aid of someone else, specifically, his/her mother. Petitioner appealed with the CA, who affirmed the Labor Arbiters resolution. Hence this petition.

Issues: 1. Whether or not only one with juridical personality can die 2. Whether or not a fetus can be considered as a dependent 3. Whether or not any ambiguity in CBA provisions shall be settled in favor of the employee Held: 1. No. The reliance of Continental Steel on Articles 40, 41 and 42 of the Civil Code for the legal definition of death is misplaced. Article 40 provides that a conceived child acquires personality only when it is born, and Article 41 defines when a child is considered born. Article 42 plainly states that civil personality is extinguished by death. The issue of civil personality is not relevant in this case. The above provisions of the Civil Code do not provide at all a definition of death. Moreover, while the Civil Code expressly provides that civil personality may be extinguished by death, it does not explicitly state that only those who have acquired juridical personality could die. Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as death. 2. Yes. Even an unborn child is a dependent of its parents. Hortillanos child could not have reached 38-39 weeks of its gestational life without depending upon its mother, Hortillanos wife, for sustenance. The CBA did not provide a qualification for the child dependent, such that the child must have been born or must have acquired civil personality. Without such qualification, then child shall be understood in its more general sense, which includes the unborn fetus in the mothers womb. 3. Time and again, the Labor Code is specific in enunciating that in case of doubt in the interpretation of any law or provision affecting labor, such should be interpreted in favor of labor. In the same way, the CBA and CBA provisions should be interpreted in favor of labor. As decided by this Court, any doubt concerning the rights of labor should be resolved in its favor pursuant to the social justice policy. (Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. NLRC [199 SCRA 265 (1991)]) Bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a loved one. It cannot be said that the parents grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.

21. [ G.R. No. 120600, September 22, 1998 ] ERNESTO C. DAWSON, LOUIS P. DAWSON, JR., BENJAMIN C. DAWSON, JOSEPHINE DAWSON SOLIVEN, RALPH D. CUDILLA, ELIZA C. ISIP AND LARRY D. ISIP, PETITIONERS, VS. REGISTER OF DEEDS OF QUEZON CITY AND JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 85, RESPONDENTS. DECISION PANGANIBAN, J.: In a contract to sell, the title over the subject property vests in the vendee only upon full payment of the consideration. Where the installments agreed on have not been completely paid upon the death of the original vendee and the certificate of title was erroneously issued in his name, his heirs, who assumed his obligations and completed the payment, can resort to the summary proceedings under Section 108 of Presidential Decree (PD) 1529 to correct the manifest mistake. The Case Before us is a petition for review assailing the February 9, 1995 Decision and the May 29, 1995 Resolution of the Court of Appeals[1] in CA-GR SP No. 34515 entitled Dr. Ernesto Dawson, et. al., v. Register of Deeds of Quezon City, Judge of RTC, QC, Branch 85. The assailed Decision affirmed the Resolution [2] of the trial court[3] dated December 29, 1993 in LRC Case No. Q-6403 (93), dismissing the petition for cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. RT58706 (248057). The May 29, 1995 Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The Facts The undisputed facts, as summarized by Respondent Court of Appeals, are reproduced hereunder: [4] On October 7, 1993, the petitioners herein filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Quezon City alleging, inter alia, the following: -- On May 2, 1967, during his lifetime. Louis P. Dawson offered to buy on installment from the SISKA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, per contract to sell, a parcel of land in Quezon City, consisting of 638 square meters for P27,632.00, now covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-58706 (248057); -- On June 3, 1971, Louis P. Dawson died intestate; -- Upon his death, the petitioners assumed the rights and obligations of deceased Louis P. Dawson in the aforementioned contract to sell, paying in full the selling price of the lot from their own funds, which payment was completed in 1978; -- With said full payment, vendor SISKA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION executed on March 16, 1978 a deed of absolute sale in favor of deceased Louis P. Dawson who had died seven (7) years earlier, instead of in favor of the petitioners who assumed and to whom [were] transferred the rights and obligations of deceased Louis P. Dawson upon the latters death; -- Because of the obvious error, Transfer Certificate of Title No. RT-58706 (248057) was issued in the name of deceased Louis P. Dawson instead of those of petitioners -- hence, the petition for the cancellation and correction of TCT No. RT 58706 (248057) in the name of Louis P. Dawson and the issuance of a new title in the names of herein petitioners, to wit: Dr. Ernesto C. Dawson (1/5), Louis P. Dawson, Jr. (1/5), Benjamin C. Dawson (1/5), Josephine Dawson Soliven (1/5), Ralph D. Cudilla (1/15), Eliza C. Isip (1/15) and Larry D. Cudilla (1/15); -- this petition is filed pursuant to Section 108 of P.D. 1529 (formerly Section 112 of Act No. 496); -- the herein petition is not without legal precedent; -- the petition is not controversial, considering the unanimity among all the interested parties, who are all petitioners herein, being the only surviving heirs of deceased Louis P. Dawson. (pages 1-6 of the Record). On December 1, 1993, the respondent court issued an Order allowing the petitioners to present ex-parte their evidence before the Branch Clerk of Court. (page 16 of the Record). On December 20, 1993, the respondent court rendered its first assailed Resolution (pages 36-38 thereof), the dispositive portion of which was earlier quoted. On February 2, 1993, the petitioner herein filed a motion for reconsideration (pages 39-48 of the Record) from the aforequoted Resolution of the respondent court. Said motion was denied by the respondent court in its second assailed Order (dated March 21, 1994) which was earlier quoted. Hence, this petition for review.[5] Ruling of the Court of Appeals In affirming the dismissal of the petition for cancellation of TCT No. RT-58706 (248057), the Court of Appeals held that the summary proceedings under Section 108, PD 1529, do not apply to the present case, viz.:

Petitioners contention that the respondent court erred in holding that Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 does not apply was torpedoed by the following: --Wrong Action. Petitioners evidence showed that their father, Louis P. Dawson, died on June 3, 1971 (Exhibit D), while the deed of absolute sale for the subject parcel was executed on March 16, 1978 by the Siska Development Corporation in favor of Louis P. Dawson (Exhibit E). It was on this basis that a certificate of title (TCT No. RT-58706) was issued in the name of Louis P. Dawson, which title was entered at the Office of the Register of Deeds in Quezon City on August 17, 1978. As per the tax declaration and real property tax bill, the subject parcel is still in the name of Louis P. Dawson (pages 23-24, tsn of December 8, 1993), although his wife (Soledad Dawson) died in 1988 (Exhibit I). We are intrigued why the petitioners only took action by filing the petition for cancellation of the certificate of title in their fathers name only on October 7, 1993. Was it designed to evade the payment of the necessary taxes to the government? --Legal shortcut. As aptly observed by the respondent court in its assailed resolution, the case at bar pertains more to the partition of the estate which will in effect transfer ownership of title of the property to the petitioners as compulsory heirs of the decedent. Hence, Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (which calls for summary proceedings) does not apply. Certainly, to allow petitioners move will open the floodgate [of] tax evasion[s]. Petitioners posture can be likened to a petition seeking to change/alter ones paternity or citizenship by merely seeking the correction/revision of birth certificate. Such is not allowable -- there must be a petition for naturalization. In the case at bench, [w]e further took note of the fact that the wife of the property owner (Soledad Dawson) died in 1988, almost ten years after a certificate of title was issued by the respondent Register of Deeds in the name of Louis P. Dawson. With the foregoing, [w]e find no error committed by the respondent court in handing down its assailed resolution (dated December 20, 1993) and Order (dated March 21, 1994). The law abhors shortcuts.[6] The Issue Petitioners submit, for the consideration of the Court, a single issue: The Court of Appeals erred in affirming that Section 108 of P.D. 1529 does not apply herein. The Courts Ruling The petition is meritorious. Sole Issue: Applicability of Section 108, PD 1529 Section 108 of PD 1529 reads: SEC. 108. Amendment and alteration of certificates. - No erasure, alteration, or amendment shall be made upon the registration book after the entry of a certificate of title or of a memorandum thereon and the attestation of the same by the Register of Deeds, except by order of the proper Court of First Instance. A registered owner or other person having an interest in registered property, or, in proper cases, the Register of Deeds with the approval of the Commissioner of Land Registration, may apply by petition to the court upon the ground that the registered interests of any description, whether vested, contingent, expectant or inchoate appearing on the certificate, have terminated and ceased; or that [a] new interest not appearing upon the certificate have arisen or been created; or that an omission or error was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate; or that the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; or that the registered owner has married, or, if registered as married, that the marriage has been terminated and no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; or that a corporation which owned registered land and has been dissolved has not conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; or upon any other reasonable ground; and the court may hear and determine the petition after notice to all parties in interest, and may order the entry or cancellation of a new certificate, the entry or cancellation of a memorandum upon a certificate, or grant any other relief upon such terms and conditions, requiring security or bond if necessary, as it may consider proper; Provided, however, that this section shall not be construed to give the court authority to reopen the judgment or decree of registration, and that nothing shall be done or ordered by the court which shall impair the title or other interest of a purchaser holding a certificate for value in good faith, or his heirs and assigns, without his or their written consent. Where the owners duplicate certificate is not presented, a similar petition may be filed as provided in the preceding section. All petitions or motions filed under this section as well as under any other provision of this Decree after original registration shall be filed and entitled in the original case in which the decree or registration was entered. [7] Petitioners contend that, as the sole heirs of Louis P. Dawson, they assumed upon his death in 1971 the obligations under the contract to sell that he had entered into in 1967. Thus, when the contract price was fully paid by them in 1978, ownership over the property in question should have been transferred to them, and not to the deceased, Louis P. Dawson. Since the issuance of the aforesaid TCT in the name of the deceased was manifestly an error, petitioners posit that they can avail of the remedy provided under the aforecited statutory provision.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals and the trial court ruled that petitioners could not avail themselves of the summary proceedings under the said provision, because the present controversy involved not the cancellation of a certificate of title but the partition of the estate of the deceased. In his Comment[8] dated May 8, 1996 and Memorandum [9] dated May 5, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General sides with petitioners and argues that, under the given factual circumstances, a resort to Section 108 of PD 1529 is proper. We agree with both the petitioners and the solicitor general. On May 2, 1967, Louis P. Dawson and Siska Development Corporation executed a contract to sell, the subject of which was the parcel of land in question. By the nature of a contract to sell, the title over the subject property is transferred to the vendee only upon the full payment of the stipulated consideration. Unlike in a contract of sale, the title does not pass to the vendee upon the execution of the agreement or the delivery of the thing sold. In Salazar v. Court of Appeals,[10] this Court explained the distinction between a contract to sell and a contract of sale: In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; in a contract to sell, ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. Otherwise stated, in a contract of sale, the vendor loses ownership over the property and cannot recover it until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded; whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until full payment of the price. In the latter contract, payment of the price is a positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevents the obligation of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective. It is undisputed that Louis P. Dawson died in June 1971, without having completed the installments on the property. His heirs, herein petitioners, then took over the contract to sell, assumed his obligations by paying the selling price of the lot from their own funds, and completed the payment in 1978. Accordingly, the ownership of the lot had not been vested in Louis P. Dawson during his lifetime. Indeed, on March 16, 1978, Siska Development Corporation could not have transferred the title over the lot, through a Deed of Absolute Sale, to Louis P. Dawson, who had died seven years earlier in 1971. In 1978, the deceased had no more civil personality or juridical capacity. [11] His juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, was lost through death.[12] In other words, the said property did not become part of the estate of Louis P. Dawson. Necessarily, partition is not the remedy to determine ownership thereof and to consolidate title in herein petitioners. Hence, we agree with the following assertion of the solicitor general: Having stepped into the shoes of the deceased Louis P. Dawson upon his death in June, 1971 with respect to the said contract, and being the ones who continued the installment payments of the selling price from their own funds until its full payment in 1978, petitioners necessarily became the lawful owners of the said lot in whose favor the deed of absolute sale should have been executed by vendor Siska Development Corporation.[13] In view of the circumstances of this case, Section 108 of PD 1529 is clearly available as a remedy to correct the erroneous issuance of the subject TCT in the name of Louis P. Dawson. The issue is not really novel. Faced with substantially similar facts in Cruz v. Tan,[14] this Court also allowed the application of Section 112 of the Public Land Act, which is identical to Section 108 of PD 1529. A translation of the said case from Spanish reads: [15] Simeon de la Cruz purchased a parcel of land on a ten-year installment basis. He died in 1939 and his wife died in 1942, leaving three children. The vendor of the land executed the corresponding deed of sale over the land in 1950 upon completion of the payment. The transfer certificate of title was then issued in the name of the deceased buyer, Simeon de la Cruz. Petitioner filed this petition under the original land registration case praying that the court order the Register of Deeds to substitute the name of Regino de la Cruz, petitioner herein, for that of Simeon de la Cruz in the transfer certificate of title. Petitioner claimed that Simeon during his lifetime transferred all rights over the land to him. The petition carried the conformity of the heirs of the deceased Simeon de la Cruz. Respondent court denied the petition on the ground that the substitution of owners cannot be ordered by the court acting on its jurisdiction granted by the Land Registration Law, because Simeon de la Cruz and Regino de la Cruz are two different persons. The court also said that the petition should be brought before an ordinary court for the protection of the interested parties. Held: The danger that respondent judge feared that other interested parties might be prejudiced of their rights is remote, considering that the heirs of Simeon de la Cruz signified their conformity to the petition. Intestate proceedings are not necessary when the heirs have amicably settled the estate among themselves and when the deceased left no debts. Section 112 of the Land Registration Law (now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529) authorizes the court upon proper petition and notification to order the cancellation of a certificate of title and substitute the name of the person who appears to be entitled to the property. The order of respondent judge is revoked and the Register of Deeds is ordered to make the necessary substitution.

Accordingly, petitioners may avail of the remedy provided under Section 108 of PD 1529. This, however, does not necessarily mean that they are automatically entitled to the relief prayed for -- the cancellation of the title issued in the name of Louis P. Dawson and the issuance of new titles. It is incumbent upon them to satisfy the requirements and conditions prescribed under the statutory provision. Respondent Court questioned the filing of the petition for cancellation only in 1993, hinting that the remedy was designed to evade the payment of the necessary taxes to the government. Respondent Court, however, failed to state which taxes petitioners sought to avoid. Although they are required to pay capital gains tax and, thereafter, real estate tax, there is no showing that said taxes have not been paid. Thus, we cannot withhold the relief prayed for by petitioners, merely on the basis of some speculation of improper motivation. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the assailed Decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is ORDERED to cause the cancellation of TCT No. RT-58706 (248057) issued in the name of Louis P. Dawson and to cause the issuance, in lieu thereof, of a new certificate of title in the names of the petitioners as co-owners of the subject property, after said petitioners have fulfilled the requirements stated in Section 108 of PD 1529. No costs. SO ORDERED. Davide, Jr. (Chairman), Bellosillo, Vitug and Quisumbing, JJ., concur.
[1]

Special First Division, composed of J. Ramon Mabutas, Jr., ponente; with the concurrence of PJ Nathanael De Pano, Jr., chairman; and J. Artemon Luna, member. [2] Penned by Judge Bernardo P. Abesamis. [3] Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 85. [4] CA Decision, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 73-74. Petitioners agree with this narration which they also reproduced in their Memorandum signed by Atty. Manuel B. Imbong. [5] The case was deemed submitted for resolution on May 6, 1998, upon receipt by the Court of the solicitor generals Memorandum. [6] CA Decision, pp. 5-6; Rollo, pp. 74-75. [7] This provision is substantially similar to Section 112 of Act 496. [8] Signed by Solicitor General Raul I. Goco, Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez and Solicitor Edwin C. Yan; Rollo, pp. 108121. [9] Signed by Assistant Solicitor General Mariano M. Martinez and Solicitor Edwin C, Yan; Rollo, pp. 155-169. [10] 258 SCRA 317, July 5, 1996, per Davide, Jr., J.; Luzon Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Maritime Building Co., Inc., 46 SCRA 381; Jacinto v. Kaparaz, 209 SCRA 246; Visayan Sawmill Co., Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 219 SCRA 378; Pingol v. Court of Appeals, 226 SCRA 118. [11] The Civil Code provides: ART. 37. Juridical capacity, which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost. xxx ART. 42. Civil personality is extinguished by death. [12] Dumlao v. Quality Plastic Products, Inc., 70 SCRA 472, April 30, 1976, per Aquino, J; Ching v. Court of Appeals, 181 SCRA 9, January 11, 1990. [13] Solicitor generals Comment, p. 11; Rollo, p. 165. [14] 93 Phil. 348, June 17, 1953, per Pablo, J.
[15]

Noblejas and Noblejas, Land Titles & Deeds, 1986 ed., pp. 196-197.

22. G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961 ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.

FACTS: Her present husband impregnated Nita Villanueva before they were legally married. Desiring to conceal her pregnancy from the parent, she had herself aborted by petitioner Antonio Geluz. After her marriage, she again became pregnant. As she was then employed in the COMELEC and her pregnancy proved to be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by Geluz. Less than 2 years later, Nita incurred a third abortion of a two-month old fetus, in consideration of the sum of P50.00. Her husband did not know of, nor consented to the abortion. Hence Oscar Lazo, private respondent, sued petitioner for damages based on the third and last abortion. The trial court rendered judgment ordering Antonio Geluz to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 as attorneys fee and the cost of the suit. Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. ISSUE: Is an unborn child covered with personality so that if the unborn child incurs injury, his parents may recover damages from the ones who caused the damage to the unborn child? RULING: Personality begins at conception. This personality is called presumptive personality. It is, of course, essential that birth should occur later, otherwise the fetus will be considered as never having possessed legal personality. Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of injury or death pertains primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its pre-natal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from one that lacked juridical personality. It is no answer to invoke the presumptive personality of a conceived child under Article 40 of the Civil Code because that same article expressly limits such provisional personality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently born alive. In the present case, the child was dead when separated from its mothers womb. This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to damages. However, such damages must be those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished from injury or violation of the rights of the deceased child.

23. [ G.R. No. 142840, May 07, 2001 ] ANTONIO BENGSON III, PETITIONER, VS. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL AND TEODORO C. CRUZ, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen.

Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.

24. [ G.R. No. 183133, July 26, 2010 ] BALGAMELO CABILING MA, FELIX CABILING MA, JR., AND VALERIANO CABILING MA, PETITIONERS, VS. COMMISSIONER ALIPIO F. FERNANDEZ, JR., ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER ARTHEL B. CARONOGAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER JOSE DL. CABOCHAN, ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER TEODORO B. DELARMENTE AND ASSOCIATE COMMISSIONER FRANKLIN Z. LITTAUA, IN THEIR CAPACITIES AS CHAIRMAN AND MEMBERS OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (BUREAU OF IMMIGRATION), AND MAT G. CATRAL, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION PEREZ, J.: Should children born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father, who executed an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took their oath of allegiance to the government upon reaching the age of majority, but who failed to immediately file the documents of election with the nearest civil registry, be considered foreign nationals subject to deportation as undocumented aliens for failure to obtain alien certificates of registration? Positioned upon the facts of this case, the question is translated into the inquiry whether or not the omission negates their rights to Filipino citizenship as children of a Filipino mother, and erase the years lived and spent as Filipinos. The resolution of these questions would significantly mark a difference in the lives of herein petitioners. The Facts Balgamelo Cabiling Ma (Balgamelo), Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr. (Felix, Jr.), Valeriano Cabiling Ma (Valeriano), Lechi Ann Ma (Lechi Ann), Arceli Ma (Arceli), Nicolas Ma (Nicolas), and Isidro Ma (Isidro) are the children of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, 1 a Taiwanese, and Dolores Sillona Cabiling, a Filipina.2 Records reveal that petitioners Felix, Jr., Balgamelo and Valeriano were all born under aegis of the 1935 Philippine Constitution in the years 1948, 1951, and 1957, respectively. 3 They were all raised in the Philippines and have resided in this country for almost sixty (60) years; they spent their whole lives, studied and received their primary and secondary education in the country; they do not speak nor understand the Chinese language, have not set foot in Taiwan, and do not know any relative of their father; they have not even traveled abroad; and they have already raised their respective families in the Philippines. 4 During their age of minority, they secured from the Bureau of Immigration their Alien Certificates of Registration (ACRs). 5 Immediately upon reaching the age of twenty-one, they claimed Philippine citizenship in accordance with Section 1(4), Article IV, of the 1935 Constitution, which provides that "(t)hose whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship" are citizens of the Philippines. Thus, on 15 August 1969, Felix, Jr. executed his affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Jose L. Gonzalez, Municipal Judge, Surigao, Surigao del Norte. 6 On 14 January 1972, Balgamelo did the same before Atty. Patrocinio C. Filoteo, Notary Public, Surigao City, Surigao del Norte. 7 In 1978, Valeriano took his oath of allegiance before then Judge Salvador C. Sering, City Court of Surigao City, the fact of which the latter attested to in his Affidavit of 7 March 2005.8 Having taken their oath of allegiance as Philippine citizens, petitioners, however, failed to have the necessary documents registered in the civil registry as required under Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625 (An Act Providing the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen). It was only on 27 July 2005 or more than thirty (30) years after they elected Philippine citizenship that Balgamelo and Felix, Jr. did so.9 On the other hand, there is no showing that Valeriano complied with the registration requirement. Individual certifications10 all dated 3 January 2005 issued by the Office of the City Election Officer, Commission on Elections, Surigao City, show that all of them are registered voters of Barangay Washington, Precinct No. 0015A since June 1997, and that records on previous registrations are no longer available because of the mandatory general registration every ten (10) years. Moreover, aside from exercising their right of suffrage, Balgamelo is one of the incumbent Barangay Kagawads in Barangay Washington, Surigao City.11 Records further reveal that Lechi Ann and Arceli were born also in Surigao City in 1953 12 and 1959,13respectively. The Office of the City Civil Registrar issued a Certification to the effect that the documents showing that Arceli elected Philippine citizenship on 27 January 1986 were registered in its Office on 4 February 1986. However, no other supporting documents appear to show that Lechi Ann initially obtained an ACR nor that she subsequently elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. Likewise, no document exists that will provide information on the citizenship of Nicolas and Isidro.

The Complaint On 16 February 2004, the Bureau of Immigration received the Complaint-Affidavit 14 of a certain Mat G. Catral (Mr. Catral), alleging that Felix (Yao Kong) Ma and his seven (7) children are undesirable and overstaying aliens. Mr. Catral, however, did not participate in the proceedings, and the Ma family could not but believe that the complaint against them was politically motivated because they strongly supported a candidate in Surigao City in the 2004 National and Local Elections.15 On 9 November 2004, the Legal Department of the Bureau of Immigration charged them for violation of Sections 37(a) (7)16 and 45(e)17 of Commonwealth Act No. 613, otherwise known as the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended. The Charge Sheet18 docketed as BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 (OC-STF-04-09/23-1416) reads, in part: That Respondents x x x, all Chinese nationals, failed and continuously failed to present any valid document to show their respective status in the Philippines. They likewise failed to produce documents to show their election of Philippines (sic) citizenship, hence, undocumented and overstaying foreign nationals in the country. That respondents, being aliens, misrepresent themselves as Philippine citizens in order to evade the requirements of the immigration laws. Ruling of the Board of Commissioners, Bureau of Immigration After Felix Ma and his seven (7) children were afforded the opportunity to refute the allegations, the Board of Commissioners (Board) of the Bureau of Immigration (BI), composed of the public respondents, rendered a Judgment dated 2 February 2005 finding that Felix Ma and his children violated Commonwealth Act No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7) and 45(e) in relation to BI Memorandum Order Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively.19 The Board ruled that since they elected Philippine citizenship after the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625, which was approved on 7 June 1941, they were governed by the following rules and regulations: 1. Section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 625, providing that the election of Philippine citizenship embodied in a statement sworn before any officer authorized to administer oaths and the oath of allegiance shall be filed with the nearest civil registry;20 and Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID, now Bureau of Immigration [BI]) Circular dated 12 April 1954,21 detailing the procedural requirements in the registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. 2. Memorandum Order dated 18 August 195622 of the CID, requiring the filing of a petition for the cancellation of their alien certificate of registration with the CID, in view of their election of Philippine citizenship; 3. Department of Justice (DOJ) Opinion No. 182, 19 August 1982; and DOJ Guidelines, 27 March 1985, requiring that the records of the proceedings be forwarded to the Ministry (now the Department) of Justice for final determination and review.23 As regards the documentation of aliens in the Philippines, Administrative Order No. 1-93 of the Bureau of Immigration24 requires that ACR, E-series, be issued to foreign nationals who apply for initial registration, finger printing and issuance of an ACR in accordance with the Alien Registration Act of 1950. 25 According to public respondents, any foreign national found in possession of an ACR other than the E-series shall be considered improperly documented aliens and may be proceeded against in accordance with the Immigration Act of 1940 or the Alien Registration Act of 1950, as amended.26 Supposedly for failure to comply with the procedure to prove a valid claim to Philippine citizenship via election proceedings, public respondents concluded that Felix, Jr. Balgamelo, Arceli, Valeriano and Lechi Ann are undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens.27 Nicolas and Isidro, on the other hand, did not submit any document to support their claim that they are Philippine citizens. Neither did they present any evidence to show that they are properly documented aliens. For these reasons, public respondents likewise deemed them undocumented and/or improperly documented aliens. 28 The dispositive portion29 of the Judgment of 2 February 2005 reads: 1. Subject to the submission of appropriate clearances, summary deportation of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma, Taiwanese [Chinese], under C.A. No. 613, Sections 37(a)(7), 45(e) and 38 in relation to BI M.O. Nos. ADD-01-031 and ADD-01-035 dated 6 and 22 August 2001, respectively; 2. Issuance of a warrant of deportation against Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 37(a);

3. Inclusion of the names of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma in the Immigration Blacklist; and 4. Exclusion from the Philippines of Felix (Yao Kong) Ma, Felix Ma, Jr., Balgamelo Ma, Valeriano Ma, Lechi Ann Ma, Nicolas Ma, Arceli Ma and Isidro Ma under C.A. No. 613, Section 29(a)(15). (Emphasis supplied.) In its Resolution30 of 8 April 2005, public respondents partially reconsidered their Judgment of 2 February 2005. They were convinced that Arceli is an immigrant under Commonwealth Act No. 613, Section 13(g). 31 However, they denied the Motion for Reconsideration with respect to Felix Ma and the rest of his children. 32 Ruling of the Court of Appeals On 3 May 2005, only Balgamelo, Felix, Jr., and Valeriano filed the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 89532. They sought the nullification of the issuances of the public respondents, to wit: (1) the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, ordering the summary deportation of the petitioners, issuance of a warrant of deportation against them, inclusion of their names in the Immigration Blacklist, and exclusion of the petitioners from the Philippines; and (2) the Resolution dated 8 April 2005, denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. On 29 August 2007, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition 33 after finding that the petitioners "failed to comply with the exacting standards of the law providing for the procedure and conditions for their continued stay in the Philippines either as aliens or as its nationals."34 On 29 May 2008, it issued a Resolution35 denying the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration dated 20 September 2007. To reiterate, a persons continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, his being a registered voter or an elected public official cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. The constitutional mandate concerning citizenship must be adhered to strictly. Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. 36 Our Ruling The 1935 Constitution declares as citizens of the Philippines those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The mandate states: Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) xxx; xxxx (4) Those whose mothers are citizens of the Philippines and, upon reaching the age of majority, elect Philippine citizenship.37 In 1941, Commonwealth Act No. 625 was enacted. It laid down the manner of electing Philippine citizenship, to wit: Section 1. The option to elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with subsection (4), Section 1, Article IV, of the Constitution shall be expressed in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines. The statutory formalities of electing Philippine citizenship are: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry. In Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, 38 we determined the meaning of the period of election described by phrase "upon reaching the age of majority." Our references were the Civil Code of the Philippines, the opinions of the Secretary of Justice, and the case of Cueco v. Secretary of Justice. 39 We pronounced: x x x [T]he 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years. 40 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining the age of majority.41 The phrase "reasonable time" has been interpreted to mean that the elections should be made within three (3)

years from reaching the age of majority.42However, we held in Cue[n]co vs. Secretary of Justice, 43 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching the age of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. However, we cautioned in Cue[n]co that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not indefinite. Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been made "upon reaching the age of majority.44 We reiterated the above ruling in Go, Sr. v. Ramos, 45 a case in which we adopted the findings of the appellate court that the father of the petitioner, whose citizenship was in question, failed to elect Philippine citizenship within the reasonable period of three (3) years upon reaching the age of majority; and that "the belated submission to the local civil registry of the affidavit of election and oath of allegiance x x x was defective because the affidavit of election was executed after the oath of allegiance, and the delay of several years before their filing with the proper office was not satisfactorily explained."46 In both cases, we ruled against the petitioners because they belatedly complied with all the requirements. The acts of election and their registration with the nearest civil registry were all done beyond the reasonable period of three years upon reaching the age of majority. The instant case presents a different factual setting. Petitioners complied with the first and second requirements upon reaching the age of majority. It was only the registration of the documents of election with the civil registry that was belatedly done. We rule that under the facts peculiar to the petitioners, the right to elect Philippine citizenship has not been lost and they should be allowed to complete the statutory requirements for such election. Such conclusion, contrary to the finding of the Court of Appeals, is in line with our decisions in In Re:Florencio Mallare,47 Co v. Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives, 48 and Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching.49 In Mallare, Estebans exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age was deemed to be a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship.50 The Court of Appeals, however, said that the case cannot support herein petitioners cause, pointing out that, unlike petitioner, Esteban is a natural child of a Filipina, hence, no other act would be necessary to confer on him the rights and privileges of a Filipino citizen, 51 and that Esteban was born in 192952 prior to the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of Commonwealth Act No. 625. 53 In the Co case, Jose Ong, Jr. did more than exercise his right of suffrage, as he established his life here in the Philippines.54 Again, such circumstance, while similar to that of herein petitioners, was not appreciated because it was ruled that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of Ong would have resulted in absurdity, because the law itself had already elected Philippine citizenship for him55 as, apparently, while he was still a minor, a certificate of naturalization was issued to his father.56 In Ching, it may be recalled that we denied his application for admission to the Philippine Bar because, in his case, all the requirements, to wit: (1) a statement of election under oath; (2) an oath of allegiance to the Constitution and Government of the Philippines; and (3) registration of the statement of election and of the oath with the nearest civil registry were complied with only fourteen (14) years after he reached the age of majority. Ching offered no reason for the late election of Philippine citizenship.57 In all, the Court of Appeals found the petitioners argument of good faith and "informal election" unacceptable and held: Their reliance in the ruling contained in Re:Application for Admission to the Philippine Bar, Vicente D. Ching, [which was decided on 1 October 1999], is obviously flawed. It bears emphasis that the Supreme Court, in said case, did not adopt the doctrine laid down in In Re: Florencio Mallare. On the contrary, the Supreme Court was emphatic in pronouncing that "the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election. 58 We are not prepared to state that the mere exercise of suffrage, being elected public official, continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines, and other similar acts showing exercise of Philippine citizenship can take the place of election of citizenship. What we now say is that where, as in petitioners case, the election of citizenship has in fact been done and documented within the constitutional and statutory timeframe, the registration of the documents of election beyond the

frame should be allowed if in the meanwhile positive acts of citizenship have publicly, consistently, and continuously been done. The actual exercise of Philippine citizenship, for over half a century by the herein petitioners, is actual notice to the Philippine public which is equivalent to formal registration of the election of Philippine citizenship. For what purpose is registration? In Pascua v. Court of Appeals,59 we elucidated the principles of civil law on registration: To register is to record or annotate. American and Spanish authorities are unanimous on the meaning of the term "to register" as "to enter in a register; to record formally and distinctly; to enroll; to enter in a list." 60 In general, registration refers to any entry made in the books of the registry, including both registration in its ordinary and strict sense, and cancellation, annotation, and even the marginal notes. In strict acceptation, it pertains to the entry made in the registry which records solemnly and permanently the right of ownership and other real rights. 61Simply stated, registration is made for the purpose of notification.62 Actual knowledge may even have the effect of registration as to the person who has knowledge thereof. Thus, "[i]ts purpose is to give notice thereof to all persons (and it) operates as a notice of the deed, contract, or instrument to others."63 As pertinent is the holding that registration "neither adds to its validity nor converts an invalid instrument into a valid one between the parties."64 It lays emphasis on the validity of an unregistered document. Comparable jurisprudence may be consulted. In a contract of partnership, we said that the purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties; that failure to register the contract does not affect the liability of the partnership and of the partners to third persons; and that neither does such failure affect the partnerships juridical personality. 65 An unregistered contract of partnership is valid as among the partners, so long as it has the essential requisites, because the main purpose of registration is to give notice to third parties, and it can be assumed that the members themselves knew of the contents of their contract. 66 The non-registration of a deed of donation does not also affect its validity. Registration is not a requirement for the validity of the contract as between the parties, for the effect of registration serves chiefly to bind third persons. 67 Likewise relevant is the pronouncement that registration is not a mode of acquiring a right. In an analogous case involving an unrecorded deed of sale, we reiterated the settled rule that registration is not a mode of acquiring ownership. Registration does not confer ownership. It is not a mode of acquiring dominion, but only a means of confirming the fact of its existence with notice to the world at large.68 Registration, then, is the confirmation of the existence of a fact. In the instant case, registration is the confirmation of election as such election. It is not the registration of the act of election, although a valid requirement under Commonwealth Act No. 625, that will confer Philippine citizenship on the petitioners. It is only a means of confirming the fact that citizenship has been claimed. Indeed, we even allow the late registration of the fact of birth and of marriage. 69 Thus, has it been admitted through existing rules that the late registration of the fact of birth of a child does not erase the fact of birth. Also, the fact of marriage cannot be declared void solely because of the failure to have the marriage certificate registered with the designated government agency. Notably, the petitioners timely took their oath of allegiance to the Philippines. This was a serious undertaking. It was commitment and fidelity to the state coupled with a pledge "to renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance" to any other state. This was unqualified acceptance of their identity as a Filipino and the complete disavowal of any other nationality. Petitioners have passed decades of their lives in the Philippines as Filipinos. Their present status having been formed by their past, petitioners can no longer have any national identity except that which they chose upon reaching the age of reason. Corollary to this fact, we cannot agree with the view of the Court of Appeals that since the ACR presented by the petitioners are no longer valid on account of the new requirement to present an E-series ACR, they are deemed not properly documented.70 On the contrary, petitioners should not be expected to secure E-series ACR because it would be inconsistent with the election of citizenship and its constructive registration through their acts made public, among others, their exercise of suffrage, election as public official, and continued and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines since birth. The failure to register as aliens is, obviously, consistent with petitioners election of Philippine citizenship. The leanings towards recognition of the citizenship of children of Filipino mothers have been indicated not alone by the jurisprudence that liberalized the requirement on time of election, and recognized positive acts of Philippine citizenship. The favor that is given to such children is likewise evident in the evolution of the constitutional provision on Philippine citizenship. Thus, while the 1935 Constitution requires that children of Filipino mothers elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching their age of majority,71 upon the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution, they automatically become Filipinos 72 and need not elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority. The 1973 provision reads:

Section 1. The following are citizens of the Philippines: (1) xxx. (2) Those whose fathers and mothers are citizens of the Philippines. 73 Better than the relaxation of the requirement, the 1987 Constitution now classifies them as natural-born citizens upon election of Philippine citizenship. Thus, Sec. 2, Article IV thereof provides: Section 2. Natural-born citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof74 shall be deemed natural-born citizens. (Emphasis supplied.) The constitutional bias is reflected in the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. MR. CONCEPCION. x x x. xxxx x x x x As regards those born of Filipino mothers, the 1935 Constitution merely gave them the option to choose Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority, even, apparently, if the father were an alien or unknown. Upon the other hand, under the 1973 Constitution, children of mixed marriages involving an alien father and a Filipino mother are Filipino citizens, thus liberalizing the counterpart provision in the 1935 Constitution by dispensing with the need to make a declaration of intention upon reaching the age of majority. I understand that the committee would further liberalize this provision of the 1935 Constitution. The Committee seemingly proposes to further liberalize the policy of the 1935 Constitution by making those who became citizens of the Philippines through a declaration of intention to choose their mothers citizenship upon reaching the majority age by declaring that such children are natural-born citizens of the Philippines.75 xxxx xxx Why does the draft resolution adopt the provision of the 1973 Constitution and not that of the 1935? 76 xxxx FR. BERNAS. x x x Precisely, the reason behind the modification of the 1935 rule on citizenship was a recognition of the fact that it reflected a certain male chauvinism, and it was for the purpose of remedying that this proposed provision was put in. The idea was that we should not penalize the mother of a child simply because she fell in love with a foreigner. Now, the question on what citizenship the child would prefer arises. We really have no way of guessing the preference of the infant. But if we recognize the right of the child to choose, then let him choose when he reaches the age of majority. I think dual citizenship is just a reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another country is something completely beyond our control. But certainly it is within the jurisdiction of the Philippine government to require that [at] a certain point, a child be made to choose. But I do not think we should penalize the child before he is even able to choose. I would, therefore, support the retention of the modification made in 1973 of the male chauvinistic rule of the 1935 Constitution.77 xxxx MR. REGALADO. With respect to a child who became a Filipino citizen by election, which the Committee is now planning to consider a natural-born citizen, he will be so the moment he opts for Philippine citizenship. Did the Committee take into account the fact that at the time of birth, all he had was just an inchoate right to choose Philippine citizenship, and yet, by subsequently choosing Philippine citizenship, it would appear that his choice retroacted to the date of his birth so much so that under the Gentlemans proposed amendment, he would be a natural-born citizen? 78 FR. BERNAS. But the difference between him and the natural-born who lost his status is that the natural-born who lost his status, lost it voluntarily; whereas, this individual in the situation contemplated in Section 1, paragraph 3 never had the chance to choose.79 xxxx [on the period within which to elect Philippine citizenship] MR. RODRIGO. [T]his provision becomes very, very important because his election of Philippine citizenship makes him not only a Filipino citizen but a natural-born Filipino citizen, entitling him to run for Congress, to be a Justice of the Supreme Court x x x.80 We are guided by this evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of the right to Philippine citizenship.1avvphi1

Having a Filipino mother is permanent. It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry should not defeat the election and resultingly negate the permanent fact that they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative penalties, if any. The documents they submitted supporting their allegations that they have already registered with the civil registry, although belatedly, should be examined for validation purposes by the appropriate agency, in this case, the Bureau of Immigration. Other requirements embodied in the administrative orders and other issuances of the Bureau of Immigration and the Department of Justice shall be complied with within a reasonable time. WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 29 August 2007, and the Resolution dated 29 May 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 89532 affirming the Judgment dated 2 February 2005, and the Resolution dated 8 April 2005 of the Bureau of Immigration in BSI-D.C. No. AFF-04-574 OC-STF-04-09/23-1416 are hereby SET ASIDE with respect to petitioners Balgamelo Cabiling Ma, Felix Cabiling Ma, Jr., and Valeriano Cabiling Ma. Petitioners are given ninety (90) days from notice within which to COMPLY with the requirements of the Bureau of Immigration embodied in its Judgment of 2 February 2005. The Bureau of Immigration shall ENSURE that all requirements, including the payment of their financial obligations to the state, if any, have been complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate administrative fines; REVIEW the documents submitted by the petitioners; and ACT thereon in accordance with the decision of this Court. SO ORDERED. JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ Associate Justice WE CONCUR: RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice Chairperson PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA* Associate Justice Associate Justice TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO Associate Justice CERTIFICATION Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division. RENATO C. CORONA Chief Justice

25. [ G.R. No. 180088, January 19, 2009 ] MANUEL B. JAPZON, PETITIONER, VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JAIME S. TY, RESPONDENTS.

Facts: Manuel B. Japzon and private respondent Jaime S. Ty were candidates for the Office of Mayor in the local elections held on May 2007. Japzon filed a petition to disqualify Tys Certificate of Candidacy on the ground of material misrepresentation when the latter falsely represented therein that he was a resident of Barangay 6, Poblacion, General Macarthur, Eastern Samar, for one year before 14 May 2007, and that he was not a permanent resident or immigrant of any foreign country. Ty admitted that he was a natural-born Filipino who went to the USA to work and subsequently became a naturalized American citizen. However, he further claims that he had reacquired his Philippine citizenship through Republic Act No. 9225, which grants dual citizenship to natural-born Filipinos, and subsequently renounced his American citizenship through an execution of a duly notarized Renunciation of Foreign Citizenship. He further claims that he had been a resident of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar for more than one year prior to the May 2007 elections exhibiting his passport issued on 2005 bearing the aforementioned residence community tax certificates for the years 2006 and 2007, respectively, and his registration as a voter in Barangay 6,Poblacion, General MacArthur, Eastern Samar.Ty won the elections and was proclaimed Mayor of the Municipality of General Macarthur, Eastern Samar. The COMELEC ruled in favor of the private respondent. Issue: Whether a determination of a question of fact by the COMELEC, in the instant case, Tys compliance of the one-year residency requirement for running for public office, requires the Court to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented by the parties before the COMELEC. Held: The Court found no merit in the petition at bar. Factual findings of administrative agencies, such as the COMELEC, which have acquired expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court. The Court cannot evaluate again the very same pieces of evidence without violating the wellentrenched rule that findings of fact of the COMELEC are binding on the Court. The findings of facts of quasi-judicial agencies which have acquired expertise in the specific matters entrusted to their jurisdiction are accorded by the Court not only respect but even finality if they are supported by substantial evidence. Only substantial, not preponderance, of evidence is necessary. The resolutions assailed by the COMELEC were supported by substantial evidence and are, thus, binding and conclusive upon the Court.