Essays by BNK Sharma

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(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS
Madhvamunipriya, Mahamahopa dhya ya
by
Dr. B. N. K. Sharma,
M.A. PhD. D.Litt.
Retired Professor of Sanskrit and Ardhamagadhi Ruparel College Mumbai - 400 016.
2001
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(5TH PROOF)
MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS

by DR. B. N. K. SHARMA,
E-mail : bnksharma@usa.net
CONTENTS
Preface 1. (a) Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva (b) Vedanta Desika's strictures on Alepakamata in his Satadusani (Ch. 65) 5
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(c) His denunciation of interpolations by its activists in to the body politic of traditional Sampradayic Sanyasadharma Texts as quoted by Prof. Mesquita on Page 27 of his work. (d) These have absolutely nothing to do with the bona fides of M's now non - extant sources, on which he had developed his philosophical system and its theology, for which Appayya Diksita had arraigned him. 2. Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta A farfetched theory. The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya to the interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras. Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya
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April 2001 Copyright Reserved by the Author.
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PREFACE
The Dvaita School of Vedanta entered the modern academic forum effectively only in the early years of the last century. Since then, it has made steady and rapid progress, during the last sixty years and has crossed the seas, in the modern academic sense. It has established an enviable record of upto date literary output of research work of outstanding merit in the history of Dvaita literature and its philosophical classics through international literary medium, by way of translations and expositions through leading Publishing Houses like the Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Motilal Banarsidass and Munshiram Manoharlal. It has established its own institutes for Advance studies and research foundations at Bangalore and Anandatirtha Pratisthana under the Akhila Bharata Madhva Mahamandala. A Variorum edition of the Nyayamrta, Tarangini and Advaitasiddhi has been published in 3 volumes - a historical event, by Prof. K. T. Pandurangi. Many western scholars like Suzanne Siauve, Stafford Betty, Edwin Gerow and Michael Warren Myers have enriched Dvaita philosophy with their writings. Moving with the time spirit, the Dvaita School has established its links with the most modern electronic media of the Internet / Website through the pioneering efforts of a band of scholars from the States. In short, it has carved out for itself a niche in the temple of spiritual quest in the West and has acquitted itself very well in recapturing its esteemed position as one of the three living principal schools of Vedanta, whose study is capable of contributing seminal ideas for the development of a Global Philosophy of Theism in the future. Of late, there seem to be some undercurrents of hidden Agenda to denigrate the growing prestige of the school by maligning the fair name of its Founder, by calling into question the textual bona fides of his source books, many of which are now non - extant. They are sought to be made out to be works of his own authorship, intended to be passed off as ancient authorities to delude the gullible. Akin to this is another attempt to establish a Jain Background to the development of some aspects of Dvaita
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logic and Epistemology, its acceptance of Memory as a source of valid knowledge, the definition and classification of Pramana into Kevala and Anu etc. These claim to be in the nature of open research pursued for its own sake by Western scholarship and have been published in the West recently. The Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation and the Anandatirtha Pratisthana should lose no time in countering such moves, by undertaking a massive research project to deal with such issues, as and when they are raised. My aim in the present publication is to make a beginning to set the ball rolling in the right direction by drawing attention to the new challenges of the times which the school will have to face in the realm of advanced research. The two other papers included here, are in the nature of routine book-reviews. My grand daughter-in-law Smt. Asha Purandar Bhavani has most cheerfully taken the trouble to get the Mss. of these papers computer - typed for the press and my son Dr. S. K. Bhavani took the entire responsibility of seeing them through the press. I thank them both for their co-operation. - - kha S ukla Aks Vais a . aya Tr . ti ya 26-April-2001 4/2 Shah Building, Bhagat Road, Mumbai - 400 016. (Phone : 022 - 431 0035) B. N. K. Sharma

I. BRAHMATARKA AND OTHER UNKNOWN SOURCE BOOKS OF MADHVA

PART - I

It is significant that the question of the genuineness of a large number of unknown and non-extant literary sources cited by Madhva, the founder of one of the three principal schools of Vedanta in India, in the 13th century, was raised only in the Post -Vyasatirtha period, by Appayya Diksita and others. They had been dismayed by the devastating criticisms of the foundations and superstructure of Advaita Metaphysics and its interpretation of the Brahmasutras, by Vyasatirtha in his Nyayamrta and Candrika. In their chagrin, they raised the bogey of unknown source books of Madhva as a vulnerable point of attack. These critics were promptly met and answered by Vijayindratirtha and Narayanacarya of Advaita - Kalanala fame and many others like Vanamali Misra from the North. There the controversy ended. The question has now been re-opened in a big way by Prof. Roque Mesquita in his book written in German and published by the indological Department of the Vienna University (1997). It has been briefly reviewed in English by Prof. Jan Houben. I have also discussed this question in my History of Dvaita School of Vedanta (Motilal B. Dass publication), in the light of contemporary historical facts and internal evidences of these texts, of various kinds, linguistic and philological, the varying lengths of quotes and references to the names of interlocutors in the texts impugned. I am not able to see from the brief review in English, if Prof. Mesquita has given due consideration for accepting the genuineness of the sources and giving Madhva the benefit of the doubt, at this distance of time . It is not my contention that this matter should not be investigated afresh on modern lines. But this discussion should be in a balanced
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way, without imputing motives of fraud and fabrication and with the courtesy and regard due to the founder of one of the Principal Schools of Vedanta Philosophy, without straying into sensitive issues relating to the Avatarhood of the person concerned. The 13th Century which saw the birth of Madhva was a period of grave socio-religious and political upheavals in the history of the country - in the wake of Muslim invasions, occupation and expansion involving destruction of temples, forced conversions and destruction of vast manuscript libraries, housing priceless treasures in all branches of Sanskrit learning, in various parts of the country. From certain remarks of Madhva in his Mbh. TN (II 3-7) it seems, that he exerted himself to salvage and restore to posterity as much of the fading and forgotten sources, by incorporating them into his own works as much as was possible and in keeping with his requirements and pass it on to posterity. It is unfor tunate that instead of appreciating and being grateful to this Great Son of India and a Jnanopasaka, later day critics like Appayya Diksita should have chosen to accuse him of fraud and fabrication. It is difficult to believe with Prof. Mesquita that the authenticity of the Source Books of Madhva had already been raised in Madhva's own days or soon after, by Varadaguru and Venkatanatha and not by Appayyadiksita for the first time in the 16th Century after Vyasatirtha. It is indeed difficult to believe that so damaging a charge would have been left unanswered by any of the stalwarts among the followers of Madhva such as Aksobhyatirtha who disputed with the famous Vidyaranya on Tattvamasi or by the lynx-eyed great commentator Jayatirtha or by Visnudasacarya of Vadaratnavali fame or even by the great Vyasatir tha himself and it was left to Vyasatir tha's disciple V i j ay i n d r a t i r t h a . E ve n M a d h u s u d a n a S a r a s va t i h a d n o t raised the problem of the authenticity of the sources of Madhva. I t was V i j ay i n d r a - w h o w a s t h e f i r s t t o t a ke c u d g e l s against Appayya.
Brahma Tarka is Prof. Mesquita's main target of attack on Madhva. He regards it as a bogus work authored by Madhva himself and passed off as an ancient authority. This sensational theory of his rests on most slippery foundations of a passing reference to B. T. in the concluding Mangalacarana verse of Madhva's Upadhikhandana (Brahmatarkokti margatah) that the treatment of the subject is in accordance with the teachings of B. T. Reading too much between the lines of the Mangalacarana verse, Prof. Mesquita has a brain wave that the entire body of the text of the Up. Kh. is a verbatim carbon copy of B. T., barring the Mangalacarana. It so happens that in keeping with the title of his work Up. Kh., Madhva comes down heavily on a desperate plea of Istasiddhi of Vimuktatman that the very irrationality of the Advaita Concept of Avidya operating as an Upadhi (limiting adjunct) in obscuring the Nirvisesa - B and producing an illusory appearance of a multiplicity of Jivatmans, is not a defect : as such irrationality of Avidya is an embellishment and not a defect : Durghatatvam Avidyayah Bhusanam Na Tu
Dusanam. This invites a fitting retort from Madhva :

Durghatatvam Bhusanam cet Syad avidyatvamatmanah Andham tamopyalamkaro Nityaduhkham Siromanih (Up. Kh.) Having arrived at the conclusion that Up. Kh. itself is an integral part of the B. T., emanating from it, Prof. Mesquita triumphantly declares that the B. T. "polemizes upon Istasiddhi". And as the I stasiddhi can be placed only between 10th and 11th centuries, the B. T. too which "polemizes upon it" must have been written much later in the 13th Century in Madhva's own life time and by himself. It is all such simple logic! Only, Prof. Mesquita is reckoning without the host.
Prof. Mesquita's ascr iption of B. T. to Madhva's ow n authorship hinges on the casual reference to B. T. in the concluding Mangala verse of Madhva's Up. Kh. and gives him a jumping ground. But unfortunately for him, there are two other references to Durghatatvam of Avidya being an embellishment, in Madhva's A. V. one in 1 - 1 - 1 - Avidyadurghatatvam ced - tma - pihi ta - drsah and another - Alamkrtah Sadaivayam syada durghataireva bhusanih, in the Iksatyadhi. In both these cases, there is no mention of B. T. in the vicinity or neighbourhood t o g i ve a ny h a n d l e fo r P r o f. M e s q u i t a t o i n t r o d u c e h i s hobby horse. The Up. Khandana is an out and out dialectical work cap - jna - nava - da from a pie demolishing the Advaita doctrine of Brahma beginning to end, unsparingly going into the nooks and corners of the dialectical method. The B. T. on the other hand is a constructive treatise dealing with a wide range of subjects against a background of multi-dimensional subjects covering theistic logic, epistemology and metaphysics as well as principles of textual exegesis relating to Upasanas and Vaisnava theology in its widest range. The two works are not thus in pari materia and a dialectical work like the Up. Khandana cannot be treated as forming a part of the B. T. by any stretch of the imagination. Nay, there is one more full-dress dialectic refutation of Istasiddhi's desperate plea in the V. T. N of Madhva running over seventeen sentences , short and long, beginning with Na ca Mithyavastuno durghatatvameva bhusanam and ending with durghatasya bhusanatve durghatamapi atmamithyatvam syad eva. Here also, there is no contextual connection with the B. T. Above all, the VTN is a prose work of Madhva in the main, (though a few verses are quoted here and there) and Madhva expressly says that he is the author of VTN by using the first person - dhayisya - mi tanyeva kramad. Prof. in the second opening verse Sa Mesquita will do well to abandon his chasing a shadow and trying to make out that the B. T. is one of Madhva's own works, paraded as an ancient authority. He must apologise to Madhva.
It is significant that Madhva pays homage to Vyasa as his Guru de jure even in his first work on the Gita, before he went on his pilgrimage to Vyasasrama. What is most interesting is that even before he wrote his B. S. B. he had a deep insight and clear anticipation of the correct interpretation of the sutras - - vadatmabhavitvat (ii-3-30) such as A bha sa eva ca (ii-3-50), Ya in regard to the metaphysical relation between Brahman and - ru - pya, not based on any external the Jiva in terms of Jiva's Sa Upadhi. This is derived from two crucial terms Anasi and Aprameya in Gita II, 18. In the Anandamaya Adhikarana S. throws the Sutrakara overboard by saying Idam tviha Vaktavyam. Sutrani tu evam Vyakhyeyani and accuses the Sutrakara of a logical fallacy in giving the sense of superabundance to "maya" in Anandmaya alone in the Sutra Vikarasabdat neticenna pracuryat. Madhva shows that the Sutrakara is a much more astute logician than S. gives him credit for, as he has impartially extended the significance of superabundance to all the five forms in the series. A true disciple is one who stands by his teacher always and not one who defies him. Judged in this light, Madhva richly deserves to be regarded as a true disciple of Vyasa, irrespective of accepting or not accepting that he ever visited Vyasasrama. Trivikrama Pandita says that Madhva visited Badari twice in his lifetime. Madhva Vij. says Madhva observed a vow of silence and meditation for for ty-eight days praying for a call from Badari to meet Vyasa. If Madhva believed himself to have been sent down with a special mission to resuscitate Vedantic Theism and communicated it to his chosen disciples, it was fo r their edification. Others are free to judge him on his merits. The B. S. is a theistic treatise which debars the released soul from exercising the prerogatives of B's creative activities (iv-4-17). Does not this show that Madhva is a more faithful commentator? A Theistic philosophy is expected to give a high place to Bhakti among Sadhanas. According to S. there is no - tras. It is Madhva who has provided reference for Bhakti in the Su
- tras by allotting an entire a rightful place for Bhakti in the Su - da in Adh. III-2 immediately after Vairagya Pa - da, as a true pa disciple of the Sutrakara. The Upanishads extol Guru Bhakti and Guru's grace in the development of disciple's advancement, through many stories. It is Madhva who has given a special - tra Prada - navadeva taduktam place to Guru's Grace, in the Su (iii-3-44) where the prefix pra signifies bestowal of grace lovingly. Do these not show that Madhva was the most faithful disciple - trakara? These are crucial facts which entitle us to of the Su decide whether Madhva is justified in claiming himself to be a true disciple of Vyasa consistent with the tradition of his visit to Badari for a refresher course. OTHER NON-EXTANT SOURCES OF MADHVA Next to B. T. in importance are the numerous Pancaratra Samhitas from which Madhva has drawn most of his quotations. The number of Pancaratra Samhitas is more than two hundred. Prof. Otto Schrader former Director of Adyar Library in his
his own fabricated texts the stamp of divine authority - to defame Madhva. An Institute for the special study of P. R. texts, exclusively, called Pancaratra Parisodhana Parisad was established in Madras in 1982 headed by Prof. H. Daniel Smith an American Prof. in collaboration with Dr. K. K. A. Venkatachari. The institute brought out four publications. It has listed 104 Samhitas / Tantras with the Adhyaya titles where available, in full or in par t. These 104 works have been surveyed. The second publication pertains to Hindu Iconography based on P. R. texts. The third is jointly edited by Prof. Sampat of the Presidency College, Chennai, and Smt. Sita Padmanabhan of Q.M.C. Chennai. The fourth work on Padma Samhita Par t II was edited by the Indological Institute, Pondicherry. Prof. Otto Schrader has pointed out that P. R. Samhitas originated in North India, and gradually spread to the South. The Agama Pramanya of Yamunacarya, now lost, bore the title - gama Pra - ma - nya. of Kashmira The publication of the Pancaratra Parisodhana Parishad has six appendixes. In Appendix-I are found the names of Kapila or Kapileya, Citrasikhandi, Visnu Rahasya, Hayagriva Samhita, Sanatkumara Samhita, Dattatreya Samhita and Krsna Samhita, Satya Samhita, Narayanatantra, Mayavaibhavatantra etc. Appendix-II has Hari Samhita, Vaisvanara, Satyasamhitas. In Appendix-III we have Vyasayoga, Kriyayoga, Dattatreyayoga, Dhyanayoga, Mahayoga, etc. In Appendix-IV we have Guruviveka, Karmaviveka, Amsaviveka, - sa Bha . viveka, Bhavaviveka, Sakti Viveka, Vedar thaviveka, Padaviveka, Tattvaviveka. In Appendix-V we have Vibhutitattva, Sabdatattva, Jivatattva, Dharmatattva, Muktitattva, Sattattva, Bhavatattva.
Introduction to Pancaratras (of which he was pleased to present me with a complimentary copy) has listed a large number of them, which still await exploration. The P. R. Samhitas deal with their subject under four heads of Jnanapada, Kriyapada,Yogapada and Caryapada.
A verse from Mbh. expressly affirms Pancaratrasya krtsnasya vakta Narayanah svayam. Jnanesu etesu rajendra sarvesu etad visisyate Yatha yogam yatha nyayam nistha narayanah parah (XII. 359) that Visnu - Narayana is the sole author of the entire P. R.
literature . It is on this pronouncement that Madhva, while quoting from some of them describes them as Visnu Krta Sattatva etc. This way of reference to some of them in the course of citation has been twisted by Prof. Mesquita as calculated to confer on
In Appendix-VI
we h ave A d hya t m a , N a r aya n a d hya t m a , - dava - dhyatma. Vasudevadhyatma, Ya In Appendix-VII Gitakalpa, Narayana Astaksarakalpa, Narayana Gopala Kalpa, Ramakalpa, all quoted by Madhva. A more intensive search of the Adyar Library P. R. manuscripts may well reveal many more titles and sub titles of the P. R. texts there. Thus a preliminary survey of the contents of the P. R. Samhitas conducted by the Madras Institute has definitely improved the prospects of fur ther light coming from the Adyar collection also. Prof. Mesquita's effort to condemn Madhva on both the fronts of B. T. and P. R. Samhitas has definitely misfired. He should now have the grace to withdraw his sweeping charges against Madhva and apologise for rushing into print on delusive data. The G. T. of Madhva (III 42-43) deals with the subject of - ni davatas of different tattvas merger (Laya) of various abhima in their higherups at the time of utkranti of Aparoksa jnanis from their bodies, as stated in the srutis. However, there are several discrepancies in the accounts in the texts. These conflicting accounts of the merger of the abhimani devatas, is the subject of discussion in the G. T. (III - 42-43). This is represented by two quotes one of 6 lines in the beginning, which is followed by an objection in prose pointing to discrepancy and another
Trivikramapandita. He has suo motu raised this question of conflicting accounts of the manner of laya in other scriptural texts. In resolving this conflict amicably, Trivikrama has quoted the self same three verses beginning with Sarvabhimanino Devah and referring them to its source as Brahmatarka and the text of the two other single verses quoted in the G. T. as from Sabdanirnaya and Brahmatarka respectively. Trivikrama has explained that there is no difficulty in admitting that in the case of merger, more than one Abhimanidevata may be admitted in subordination to other ones, without conflict : Ekatra bahunam abhimana-avirodhah, citing the example of a King and his village officers Yatha visayasvami gramasya. It is a matter of simple logic and we need not suppose that Trivikramapandita was obliged to seek clarification from Madhva, as a school boy, when one of the two single quotes connected with the same topic has been traced to Brahmatarka in the G. T. itself.
PART - II

I have since got a copy of the complete English Edition of Prof. Mesquita's work "Madhva's unknown Literary Sources Some Observations" published by Aditya Prakashan, New Delhi. I am now in a better position to offer my comments on all aspects of the problem as dealt with by him. At the very outset, in the chapter on M and his Critics on P. 27, the Prof. makes an astounding statement about me. "As admitted by the followers of M. Venkatanatha (13th Century) was one of his outspoken critics" and in a foot note to this, adds "Sharma is widely mistaken in that he thinks Venkatanatha (1268-1369) lived after Appayya Diksita and his pupil Bhattoji". I am constrained to enlighten the Professor that the Venkatanatha I was referring to placing him after Bhattoji, is quite a different person, later than Madhusudana Sarasvati and a cantankerous commentator on the Gita. He has taken M to task on several occasions.
two verses solving the conflict in an amicable way. The three verses are quoted with just an itica as in the earlier case. It stands to reason that the two sets of verses form a unity of theme from the same source and further elucidation of the manner of the reconciliation is presented in the GT in the two other passages, one from Sabdanir naya and another from the Brahmatarka as such. Now the same subject of the manner of laya is referred to in BS IV.2.1 in a particular order. The earliest commentator on Madhva is his close contemporary
Venkatanatha was the personal name of the celebrated Leader of the Vadagalai sect of the Ramanuja school, respectfully referred to as Vedanta Desika in Visistadvaita tradition. We in S. India always refer to him as Desika or Vedanta Desika, following the custom. I have in all my writings all these sixty years and more always referred to him by that name and nowhere by his personal name. It is Prof. Mesquita in his over-enthusiasm who has committed an error of judgement of mistaken identification, which I can not help. The mistake could have been avoided if the Prof. had taken note of other established facts known about Desika's acting as a referee in the historic debate on the import of the Tattvam asi text between Aksobhya Tir tha and Vidyaranya and giving his verdict in favor of Aksobhya in the well known verse : - Tattvamasina - Parajivaprabhedina Asina Vidyaran . yam maharan . yam Aks . obhyamunir acchinat which is well attested by early Visistadvaitic works. Moreover, Vedanta Desika agrees with M. in condemning Advaita as Pracchanna Bauddha and calls upon the faithful to root it out and counsels them to remain steadfast to R. or else to accept M's school as nearest to R's heart. Both M and Desika hold the Pancaratras highly authoritative and do quote from Ekayana Srutis and Daivi Mimamsa which to S and Appayya are highly suspect. In these circumstances, it is highly incredible that Venkatanatha alias Desika could have accused M. of fabricating texts in support of his philosophical system (unlike Appayya). The subject matter of the Alepakamatabhangavada of Vekatanatha quoted by the Prof. and the charges it makes against unscrupulous writers advocating heretical innovations polluting the time honored rigid codes of Sannyasa Dharma and quoting from non - extant texts attributed to Vyasa and other sources in their support, has nothing to do with the theological and philosophical doctrines
of M and his interpretations of the Sutras and Upanisads-against which Appay ya had his complaint. But the quotes from Venkatanatha's Alepakamatabhanga given by Prof. Mesquita have
nothing to do with Vedanta or theology but are wholly connected

with the Yatidharma and its violators. How have these criticisms been presumed to be directed against M? The offenders are nowhere mentioned by their names and M's name is conspicuous by its absence throughout. Why, if he is the chief offender and the main culprit? While Appayya has expressly named M why has the author of the Alepakamatabhanga not named M? What is the Professor's answer to these straight questions? Or, is it all a case of pure hallucination on his part? Who are the Papis .t .has Venkatanatha has in mind? We wait for an answer. Or is it a case of Abaddham pat.hitva kucodyam karoti? There is not even a shred of evidence that these charges have been levelled against M. M has paid eloquent tributes to the sanctity of Yatyasrama and Yatidharma in his Gitabhasya (MGB III 4). He has quoted Narayana As .t .aks . arakalpa in support which according to the Prof. is an unknown source but which has been listed in the Pancaratra Samsodhana Publications referred to in Par t I. S had downgraded Karmayoga of the Gita and equated it - myakarma and deemed Arjuna to be unfit for Jna - namarga with Ka (SGB II 47). M on the other hand, showed that Karmayoga of the Gita was essentially the same as Nivrttakarma as opposed to Pravrttakarma and is based on enlightened action dedicated to the Supreme : - mam jna - napu - rvam to nivrttam iha cocyate, Niska R quotes a Parallel from P. R. - t samyak parambrahma Va - sudeva - khyam avyayam Tasma - d ava - pyate sa - stra - t Jna - napu - rvena karmana Asma . (Sribhasya II.2.41)
- dhikari not fit for jna - nanistha To S. Arjuna is only a Madhyama (II 47). To M. Arjuna is an Uttamadhikari like Janaka and Priyavrata of the Bhagavatapurana (II.7.45). Arjuna is the chosen exemplar of Lokasangraha (III. 20). Jnanamarga and Karmamarga are not water tight compartments. Efficient performance of either yields the benefit of both (V. 4) which implies that each has an appreciable content of the other. The only difference is there is more of external activity and social responsibility than in other (M. G. T). Hence the statement sankocat bahyakarmanah and - nina - m api hi karma anustheyam karmina the clarification : Jna .. - tavyo Bhagava - n (M. G. T). There is nothing in all this pi jna to warrant Prof. Mesquita's surmise that it refers to authors degrading the function of dharma or karma, going back to Vyasa himself and his disciples, like Jaimini, Asmarathya and "the principle of first interpolate and then claim to find them in some Puranas" (P. 28). Incidentally Vyasa Smrti has been listed in the P. R. Samsodan Publication and quoted by S. (VSNB). M would be the last person to countenance / encourage or connive at any inroads on Yatidhar ma by anyone. In his BSB III.4.3 he administers a ster n war ning that even an Aparoksajnani shall not transgress any established codes of conduct of ascetic discipline. - ni Trailokyoddharanaksamah Atita-anagatajna . . Etadrsopi naca ram s rautam sma rtam parityajet. Trivikrama Pandita records that M had set an exemplary record of adherence to Yatidharma, as a Paramahamsa : - ghyah Pa - ramahamsya a - sramavaro Yacchila Sla - jalasna - to Ganga vyaktam ayogya sangamabhuvo dos . a t Punar moks . itah The Prof. makes a sneaking attempt to connect the charges of meddling with Sanyasadharma by some unscrupulous authors mentioned by Venkatanatha, with the topic of the various ways
in which the Samanvaya of Karmakanda texts in B have been attuned with B by Audulomi, Jaimini Kasakrtsna as disciples - nvaya of Vyasa, as partial aspects of his teaching in the Vakya Sutra of the B. S. (1.4.20) with the licentiousness towards Ya t i d h a r m a l e t l o o s e by s o m e D i s s e n t e r s a c c o r d i n g t o Venkatanatha. This is highly objectionable . The two have nothing in common. Krsnadvaipayanamatad ekadesavidah pare Vadanti te yathaprajnam no virodhah kathamcana (M.BSB.1.4.23) The Professor's remarks in this connection are baseless, motivated and uncalled for. His is mixing up issues deliberately. His hypothesis that M. put up his claims to be an Avatara o f Vayu only after his visit to Badari and receivingVyasa's mandate, tho true, does not mean that M. was not sure or aware of his Avatarhood earlier. The fact that his earliest work the Gita Bhasya pays homage to Narayana and Vyasa as his Devata and Guru (see f. n. on p. 34 and also AV 2c). - sarvadosavivarjitam Devam Narayanam natva - n Gita - rtham vaksya - mi lesatah 1 Paripurnam Gurumsca confirms his faith in his being a direct sisya of Narayana - Vyasa come to fulfil a Divine mission. It would be otherwise impossible to explain his unerr ing quotations from many lost Vedic - khas like Gaupavana Agnivesya, Aya - sya, Anabhimlana, a S - ndilya, Pippala - da, Yaska and a number of a Madhucchandasa, S PR Texts like Narayana Astaksara Kalpa, Gita Kalpa, Vyasasmrti and others in his very first work. There are indications of this in M.Vij.V.53. The formal authorisation of M to write a commentary on the B. S. described in M.Vij. VIII.46 only completes the picture. Glowing with a new illumination and a renewed faith in his mission in life M returns to his camp, writes his Bhasya on the Sutras, has it copied by Satyatirtha, sends an advance copy of it to
Acyutaprajna his Asramaguru at Udupi and returns after visiting great centres of learning on the Godavari and acquiring fresh disciples on the way back. (M. vij IX. 5-6) Sayana in his introduction to Rgveda bhasya says : - nte antarhita - n Veda - n Setihasan maharsayah Yuga - ta - h svayambhuva -. Lebhire tapasa purvam anujna Among the direct disciples of M, Trivikrama Pandita is the only one who gives us a personal description of the Acarya's personality as a Mahapurusa both physically and intellectually. The Acarya himself defines a Mahapurusa : S . an .n . avatyangulotsedho Nyagrodhaparimandalah Saptatalas caturhastah sa Devairapi pujyate Vimsallaksanato anunah tapasvi bahuvedavit - nadarsana -t Veda ityeva yam pasyet sa vedo jna Trivikrama writes Pratyaks yate Bhagavati . am eva etallaks . an . am dr .s - syaka - re Bha . And proceeds saying : - hmanopanisadah nikhilas susiddha - h Veda - h vettum Sabra . - yam acintaniyah tadasya mahima The variety, voluminosity and multidimensional range of his literary contributions to the sum total of human knowledge of his times stands unparalleled to this day. His poetic talents find expression thro' different genre. His logic is inexorable and his spiritual mysticism deep and abiding. His devotion to God is unparalleled. He is the only Indian philosopher andVedantin who has recognised the continuation of Bhakti even after Moksa, as an end in itself. - Jna - nam tato Bhaktih Tato drstih tatasca sa Bhaktya . - t sukharupini Tato muktih tato bhaktih saiva sya . (A. V. 1639)
The Gita says God descends on earth in all Yugas and surely some of the gods too do so with Him. The BV Bhavan, Mumbai - ktas conforming to Rgvedic has published a volume of Vedic Su prototype in language, idiom and accentuation, tested by experts. 2 If a gifted genius of our own times can do this, why disbelieve the ability of a great thinker like M to be able to recapture lost
sakhas by his Yogic spiritual power, centuries ago, for the benefit of posterity?
Over a dozen commentaries are known to have been written on the Sutras of Badarayana till the times of M. Still, there is no consensus among Vedantins about their teachings. Commentators have been going on the merry-go-round of real Brahmaparinamavada either wholly or in part, Bhedabhedavada, Vivartavada, Sacchaktiparinamavada etc. Do these exhaust the possibilities of a solution? Is there no possibility of going beyond the beaten track including the Nyayavaisesika conception of a Cosmic Potmaker and conceive of B in a better light as the efficient cause only in terms of being the source of the being, becoming and functioning of all finite reality, with primordial Matter as the material cause, sinceVedanta philosophy does not subscribe to creation de novo and ex-nihilo . Why should such a conception be looked at askance, instead of as a viable solution? An unprejudiced critical and comparative study of the existing Bhasyas on the sutras discloses many directions in which M's Bhasya has been far ahead of earlier ones. While the others - di in BS i.1.2 as referring only to Sthiti and have explained a dissolution of the world, the internal evidence of Sutra III.2.5 shows obscuration of Jivas' Jnana by Ajnana and consequent bondage and subsequent release by the gracious will of the L o r d ( Pa ra - a b h i d hya n a t ) w h i c h a d d u p t o e i g h t c o s m i c dispensations by the Lord as Jagatkarana (See also BS i-3, 10-11). Sutra IV.4.17 debars released souls from exercising the Divine prerogatives of Jagadvyapara. Where then is there any
possibility of identity between Jiva and B in Moksa, in the philosophy of Badarayana? Advaita dismisses Jivasvarupa as an illusory appearance of B like the reflected image of the sun in the waters. The opening words of the Sutra Ata eva (meaning, as already stated) upama suryakadivat (iii, 2.18) calls attention to the particular grounds on which the relation is intended to be taken and not in a literal sense, which would reduce the Jivasvarupa to an insentient reflection brought about by a medium and hence impermanent non-eternal. But not only are Jivas Nitya according to Katha Up. (II:2, 13), B. S. (IV 4.17) and Gita (II.18.XIV.2) but are sentient
spiritual relation between Jiva and B which is yavadatmabhavi II.3.30 could be consistent with the status of both. The Sruti : Rupam R u p a m p r a t i r u p o b a b h u va Ta d a s ya R u p a m praticaksana ya (RV VII.47.18) makes it clear that the Bimba for m of B is intended to be perceived by the Jiva (asya praticaksanaya). The perceiving Jiva must be a real person and not a lifeless insentient projection, like the Suryaka. Such are the new trails of light on the teachings of the B. S. blazed by M's Bhasya It is sickening to see seasoned modern research scholars like Prof. Mesquita to still go on repeating parrot-like old and worn out opinions of Bhandarkar or Ghate and their assessment of M's bhasya as "a performance of little or no merit." "He (M) has interpreted the Sutras in a fantastic manner and he would very well have set them aside altogether but that their uncontested authoritativeness prevented his doing so" (P. 20 fn) as Gospel truth - at this distance of time . Why should our most modern scholars not profit by the latest critical and comparative studies of all the commentaries of the principal schools of Vedanta now made available to them and think for themselves instead of holding to the apron strings of a Ghate or a Bhandarkar; for a change,
beings and not Jadas - which shows that the words of the Sutra Ata eva (Upama) are intended to make clear in what precise sense the simile is to be understood and in what sense it should not be misunderstood. Hence, M commentary :
- drsya - bhya - m eva Ata eva-bhinnatva-tadadhinatva sa - dyupama - Na upa - dhyadhinatva - dina Suryaka (M.B.S.B. III. 2. 18)
referring back to Sutras II.3.1; II.3.28; II.3.29. The association - vada of Buddhi with Jivasvarupa cannot at all be regarded as ya - vi (II.3, 30) without interpolating of Samsarabhavi after tmabha - Atma as S would have it. The significance of the warning sounded by Ata eva (as above) cannot be missed.
- The term A bha sa (B. S. II.3.50) deserves to be understood in a much better sense than that of a lifeless, insentient reflection - of B. M's interpretation of Abha sa as one who shines forth as a conscious being on account of B and bears a similarity to - ratva raises the spiritual status of the it in terms of tadgunasa Jiva from that of a lifeless inanimate reflection to "Tata - bha - sate nityam tadvad abhasate pi ca Bha - nam astitvam api a - samantad yatas tatah. Jiva a - bha - sa uddistah sadaiva caiva a Paramatmanah (AV)". Only such an exalted inherent everlasting
even after so much has been written, discussed, published and

made available, on behalf of the Dvaita school? M believes in a threefold classification of souls based on their svarupayogyata (inherent fitness) or Trividha sraddha expressing itself according to Gita XVII. 2-3 (sattvanurupa) satva meaning the core of the being of the selves, as Aurobindo has pointed out. On P. 69 the Prof. acknowledges that Otto Schrader has shown that it has the support of PR. What is wrong then if M accepts it on the same authority, apart from his own independent logical arguments in favor of it :
- dir viseso na sa - mpratam katham eva tu Yadyana Adrs .t .a devacadrstam svikrtam sarvavadibhih (AV III.4.41) The BS speak of seven Hells (III. 1. 16). In the same context the wording of III. 1.14 referring to the Aroha (Upward Journey) and Avaroha (Downward Journey) of some others (itaresam) lends support to the existence of a region of utter darkness (andham tamas). The Hayagriva Samhita (p. 84) is not "unknown work". It is listed in the PR Samsodhanaparishad Publication - gavata is not along with Visnukr ta - Tattvaviveka. Tantrabha "unknown" (P. 211). It is mentioned by Jiva Gosvamin as a part - is not "unidentified" of Hayasirsa Pancaratra. Parama Samhita (P.231). It has been quoted by both R & M and listed in the PR Samsodhana Publication. The attempted raid on M's Library at the instigation of Padmatirtha mentioned in M. Vij (XIV. 2) is cur tly dismissed by Prof. Mesquita as a "myth" (P. 176). When religious passions are roused, such retaliatory measures are not uncommon and need not cause any disbelief. The M. Vij may be a hagiological work and may be in some respects panegyrical. But at the core, it is an outstanding historical biography and a near contemporary one at that. It has set a very high standard of authenticity and historical accuracy of details of M's tours, places visited en route, names of scholars met in disputation giving even the Tulu names of villages in South Kanara and wrestlers who challenged him for a trial of strength with them, in their Sanskritised form. In regard to copiousness of details and accuracy of facts narrated, it stands on a higher pedestal than the Sankaravijayas which are mutually in discord and are not less than four or five centuries later than the subject of their biography and often anachronistic - hadarpam Cf. Sa hi khan .d . anaka ramu d . The author of the M. Vij, on the other hand, in his own notes on M. Vij. (Bhavaprakasika) has given details of the steps he
has taken to verify the historical details from collateral sources collected and cross checking them. The miracles attributed to M in the biography are well within the possibility of Yogasiddhis (M. Vij. XVI. 25,26, 29 & 30). T h e s t a t u s o f M u k hya p r a n a ( Vay u ) w h o s e ava t a r M claims to be is very high already in the Upanisads. He is - devata - ) (Brh. the only deity who never sets (anastamita Up. IV, 5, 22). He renders account of our doings to God (Isa 4). He is the immaculate base of meditation on B unthwar ted by asuric influences (Chan. Up. 1.2.7-8). The Santi mantra recited by all Brahmins before commencing Vedic recitation and at its close, hails Vayu - Namaste Vayo. You are the visible Brahma. I proclaim you as such. I am stating the truth and nothing but the truth. Prof. Mesquita is precipitate in declaring "all unknown sources proclaiming Vyasa as a primary Avatar should be regarded as later productions of M" (P. 51). This statement is belied by clear statements to the contrary and the Skandapurana quoted both by M and Sudarsanasuri a predecessor of Desika. This quotation consists of twelve verses beginning with : Narayanad vinispannam Jnanam krtayuge... and runs on : Avatirno mahayogi bhagavan purusottamah cakara Brahmasutrani etc. The test of Anusandhana as the only proof of personal identity of being put forward by M to which the Prof. seems to demur is approved by the Lord in the Gita (IV. 5). One wonders why the Prof. should take exception to M's view that the body of Vyasa the direct Avatar of Visnu is not caused by karma and not made of Prakrti (P. 38). The authority quoted in support by M : - krta - murtih mamsamedo asthi sambhava Na tasya Pra
is also quoted by Ramanujiyas. We have already seen that Sudarsanasuri accepts Vyasa as a direct avatar of Narayana. At the conclusion of his Nyaya Vivarana M pays a soulful homage to his spiritual Guru Vyasa in the most eloquent terms and with deepest feelings : - spadabaloddhatah Aham tu tatprasadaika maha Tatprasadam rte kasya saktih samsarasagare - aikasamedhitah ..... tatkat .a ks . Ka nu saktih bhaven naiva tat kotra ativismayah? There are similar statements so often made by M in most of his other writings which show that he was imbued with a deep inward conviction of being a chosen instrument of the Almighty to redeem the eligibles (See M. Vij VIII.50). On P. 110 the Prof. has tried to play down the outspoken criticism of Mayavadins in the text of the Maitrayaniya Up (VII 8-9) as a mere general warning to orthodox believers to be on guard against those who try to mislead them with their deceitful argumentation. The words used in the text such as Mithyatarka, drstantas, kuhakendrajala have a close family resemblance with the terms of the Mithyattvanumana of Advaita and its Drstantas like shell-silver, snake in the rope and Dvaitendrajala used by Suresvara and especially the phrase Vaidikesu paristhatum icchanti which are all tell tale. They deserve to be compared with the outspoken denunciations by early writers like Bhaskara : Vigitam Vicchinnamulam mahayanikam Bauddha gathitam mayavadam vyavarnayantah lokan Vyamohayanti. Parthasarathi Misra writes Tadvaram mayavadan Mahayanikam andYadavaprakasa observes Yuyam ca Baudhasca samana sampadah. The words Vaidikesu paristhatum icchanti are particularly significant. Buddhists are frankly Nairatmyavadis. They do not care or wish to be regarded as Vaidikas or Atmavadins. Atmasvarupa according to Advaita is incapable of knowing itself as an object of its own consciousness
(Atmani svakriyavirodhat). As for accepting the Vedas as eternal, S writes isyate vedasyapi abhavah prabodhe (BSB). Advaita has a threefold classification of reality which has its parallel in the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asanga (310-390 A-D) (Edited by V. V. Gokhale JRAS 1947). The differences are purely terminological. Neither Paingi Up., Paingi rahasya brahmana nor Bhallaveya sakha is extant. If S's citations from them can pass muster why not M's? A quotation given by Suresvara speaks of the highest place of Visnu. M's quote from Bhallaveya also reads Tam vai Visnum paramam udaharanti and both are metrical and non - extant. On P. 10, 63 and 64-65 the Prof. has erred in misconstruing the verse from Mbh. T. N. (XXXII. 158) : "Vedetihasamsca purana yuktan as claiming that M himself has composed all the Vedas together with the PR" and adds a footnote that according to the statement M appears as the author of the Vedas' (P. 65). A little more attention to elementary Sanskrit grammar will show that the Vedas have already been mentioned in the plural as
Vedan in the first quarter and that the term Veda in the third quarter is the finite verb of the entire verse and is to be separated - n. from itihasa in Vedetihasa
M is a staunch believer in the Apauruseyatva of the Vedas and has established their Nityatva and svatah Pramanya at the very outset of his VTN and earlier in the GB III 5b quoting Vaca Virupa Nityaya (RV VIII, 75. 6) and Anadinidhana nitya vagutsrsta svayambhuva and Ata evaca nityatvam (BS). It is preposterous to maintain as the Prof. seeks to do that such an ardent believer in the Apauruseyata of the Vedas should put up an absurd claim to be the author of the Vedas . This is clearly a case of Abaddham pathitva kucodyam karoti. On P. 106 the Prof. has a fling at M that he has "twisted" the thesis of Monism expressed in the verse "Prapanco yadi
Vidyeta nivarteta" to mean just the opposite and interpreted vidyeta as utpadyeta and so on. First of all it is a disputed issue whether the verses are explanatory of the Mandukya Up. as its part or of Gaudapada's Agamasastra. Opinion is divided on this point even among traditional Advaitins like Appayya Diksita, Brahmayogi and Anandagir i, not to speak of Ramanuja, Kuranarayana and of course M. Irrespective of this difference of opinion about the status of the verses, it has to be admitted that the wording : Prapanco yadi Vidyeta and nivarteta shows that it is formulated as a hypothetical proposition with two Ifs and two ling forms of the predicate (Vidyeta and Nivarteta) which are unmistakable proof of a Tarka form of argument called Prasanga in Indian Logic, corresponding to a reductio ad absurdum . In short, it is not an affirmative proposition at all, either from the Advaita standpoint or the Dvaita. Both have to grapple with it as a hypothetical proposition. There is no alternative. The hypothetical proposition Yadi vidyeta has to rest on a sound invariable logical concomitance (Vyapti) between whatever exists and its sublation (from the Advaita point of view). That is impossible as the Advaita Brahman exists for ever and is never sublated . There is the rub and a complete breakdown of the Vyapti. This calls for a viable interpretation of Vidyeta and nivarteta willynilly irrespective of the question whether it is a part of Gaudapada's work or a Sruti. According to Dr. T. M. P. Mahadevan "Gaudapada had a deep insight into Tarkasastra" (Gaudapada - A Study of Early Advaita P. 86) and we cannot believe he would have blundered so egregiously in formulating a viable vyapti. Qua Sruti, a viable vyapti can be formulated in terms of Utpadyeta (if produced) it is sure to be destroyed some time (nivarteta) Utpattireva hi Nivrttiyuk prayah. The location of the intriguing explanatory verses in the Mandukya Up. renders it possible to overcome the breakdown of the Vyapti
between Vidyeta and Nivar teta by assigning more viable meanings to them, as has been done by M. The disapproval of the view of creation of the Universe as akin to dream creations of Maya in favor of the Siddhanta view as the outcome of the Lord's will as in "Apta kamasya ka sprha" (9 cd) provides support to accepting the viable interpretation of Vidyeta and Nivarteta put forward by M on sound logical foundations. The root vida sattayam can justifiably be understood in its nearest cognate sense of genesis Utpatti (asatas satta samavayo janih) and Nivrtti in the sense of liability to destruction later so that the Vyapti is not violated . The description of B as "Deva" and "Advaita" among all other existents - Devah Sarvabhavanam Advaitah - using the selective genitive (Nirdharana Sasthi) bears out the fact that B stands towering over all other reals (Sarvabhavanam). Thus M's interpretation fits in admirably in getting over the muddle created by the breakdown of the Vyapti created by the hypothetical proposition in its Advatitic application. In keeping with the requirements of the Vyapti the term Prapanca itself has to be construed in the sense of a group or a variety of five eternal distinctions embracing the three eternal verities of Anadijivas, Anadimaya and the Supreme Being and their mutual distinctions from one another, which add up to five - denoted by the term Pra-panca as explained by M. The grammatical derivation of Pancah as explained by Jayatirtha : Pancan sabdat jatiyaro arthe dah is incontestable. The prefix pra has the sense of excellence in that their knowledge is highly conducive to liberation. (Moksopayogi jnanangataya). All that we need is a contextual reference to the existence of these five distinctions in the text of the verses . They are embodied in the verse immediately preceeding verses 17-18 which reads : Anadimayaya supto yada Jivah prabudhyate Ajam anidram asvapnam advaitam budhyate tada (1.16)
Anadimaya is Jada. Jivas and B are both beginningless and eternal. The Jivas are overpowered by Avidya-nidra. The Supreme watching over them is wide awake (anidram asvapnam) and Advaita one without an equal or superior. He towers over all other existents Sarvabhavanam Advaitah as conveyed by the use of the selective genitive case : Nirdharana Sasthi (Pan II.3.41). Do we need any more evidence that the five eternal distinctions are given in the text of the verses themselves? It is therefore in keeping with these facts to read Jnate Dvaitam na vidyate with an elided "a" grammatically permissible here unlike in the case of 'Sambhuti' the
What more evidence do we need in support of M's position that all the three in the series Visva, Taijasa, Prajna (and Turiya) are indeed the monitoring forms of the Supreme Being? If the commentary on the Mandukya Up. attributed to Adi Sankara
disagrees with the views of S author of the BSB, it can only mean that the former must be apocryphal.
CONCLUSION After acquiring a copy of Prof. Roque Mesquita's English edition of his work "Madhva's unknown literar y sources - some Observations", I have carefully gone thro the two chapters 64-65 of Vedanta Desika's Satadusani edited and published with - in Sanskrit by Prof. V. Srivatsankacarya his erudite Bhumika (1974). In his Yatilingabhedavada, Vedanta Desika refers to the views of his Paramacarya Vatsya Varada on how best the authenticity and acceptability of the Tridandi and Ekadandi orders of Orthodox traditional Sanyasa Asrama, within the frame-work of Varnasrama Dharma, can be reconciled on the basis of Vikalpa (option) in terms of Mukhya and Amukhya respectively, with par ticular reference to Tridanda and Ekadanda and the retention of the Sikha (tuft of hair on the head) and the sacred thread (Yajnopavita) or of dispensing with them, as current in the Tridanda and Ekdanda orders. Desika quotes from Varada Guru's Yatilinga Samarthanam, on the scope of the Vikalpa as defined by his Paramacarya - ityadi vikalpasyapi, ikhi Va Mundah S Tridanda, Ekadandadharana Vikalpavat Mukhya Amukhyatayaiva nirvahya tvat . va sabdah carthah iti - ca - rya - Vya - cakhyuh parama (Vada 64 - page 268)
opening word in Isa Up.
14 in Sankara's Bhasya, without any grammatical warranty whatsoever. There are very good reasons to believe that the prose passages of the Mandukya Up. of which the verses of the Agama Prakarana are explanatory according to Anandagiri too that the four Padas of 'Atman' referred to there are not those of the Jivatman as such but of the Forms of the Antaryami Brahman monitoring the states of the embodied Jivatman in the Jagrat, Svapna and Susupti states under the names of Visva Taijasa, Prajna & Turiya. This is confirmed by the prose text of Mandukya 6 describing the Prajna the third (Prajnas Trtiyah) as Sarvesvarah Esa Sarvajnah and above all as Eso Antaryami etc. It goes without saying that when one of the three (Prajna) is identified as Antaryami (impeller from within antahsthitva yamayati) the others preceeding and following are also Antaryami forms. The Mandukya is not alone in holding the Prajna to be the Antaryami Brahman. BS i.2.18 also affirms it. Nay, Brh. Up. IV. 3. 21 tells us that the embodied self Purusah lies locked in the embrace of the Prajna Atman. This passage is made the subject of the adhikarana in B. S. i.3.42. And S. in his Sutra - rirah Pra - jnah a Bhasya commenting on this writes - Purus . ah . S
Paramesvarah.
It may be noted in passing that ascetics and Pontiffs of the Dvaita and Advaita schools follow Ekadandi traditions and those of the Ramanuja School follow the Tridanda Sampradaya. The subject matter of the Alepakamatabhanga (65) of Desika, on the other hand, is entirely different . The Alepakas have been defined as followers of an order of Sanyasins who have accepted - va - da (Ma - ya - va - da) and consider themselves the philosophy of Mrsa - sramins and Atya - sramins. They discard all taboos of right as Ana and wrong conduct as liberated ones, taking and sporting the name of "Knowers of Brahman" - in name only and indulging in forbidden food and straying away from righteous conduct. - mika - ). They pose as Atyasramins and Anasramins (P 7 Bhu not bound by traditional Asramic injunctions and prohibitions. They claim to be beyond the pale of disciplinar y codes of Varnasrama - based sanyasa system, practise nudity, sport locks of matted hair (Jata) on their heads, accepting food from all people indiscriminately. They impart Upadesa of Mahavakyas unrestr ictedly to their clientele. It does not appear from D e s i k a ' s w o r k that Va r a d a G u r u a l s o h a d a d d r e s s e d himself to the same subject. Desika comes down virulently on the Sanyasins of the Alepaka order of Mayavada. Perhaps, he had been feeling that various circles of Mayavadins of his days were inclined to turn a blind eye towards those who claimed or were regarded by the lay people as Atyasramins and Anasramins who were prone to Alepakavada and wanted to nip it in the bud, in all coscience. It is significant that Desika refers in this connection to the claims of some AlepakaVadins that their non-conformism has the approval and suppor t of the precepts and examples of respectable leaders of their school of ancient times like Gaud . apa da and Bhartr .hari (Va da 65 P. 281, Satadusani). It is in this connection , Desika discusses the Puranic accounts of the unconventional ways of life led by Jadabharata, Rbhu,
Suka, Samvartaka and others of the hoary past and offers suitable explanations of them. He quotes - sarmi, na tisthettu ksanama - tram api Dvijah Ana . . He probably takes his stand on the parting Upadesa in the Taitt. - nyasma - kam sucaritani tani tvaya Upasyani no Up. (1,11,3) Ya - ndityam nirvidya itarani. He debunks the misinterpretations of Pa - lyena tisthaset, quoting the Sutra Ana - viskurvan (B. S. III. 49). ba . It is in this context that Desika condemns the behavior of the Papis .t .has (great sinners) who freely resort to interpolations in favor of their defiance of established codes of ascetic discipline, from unknown and unheard of texts into the existing body of Puranic sources, attributing them to Vyasa and others, as quoted
by Prof. Mesquita on P. 27 of his English edition in the opening

chapter on 'Madhva and His Critics'. Any one who reads that
part of the text from Alepaka Vada Bhanga with open eyes in
the given context, will see that the subject matter of Desika's denunciation is absolutely different from the question of the bona fides of M's sources in support of his systematisation of his philosophy and theological doctrines, raised by Appayya Diksita in the 16th century. The way in which Prof. Mesquita has misused the quotation from Desika's text in the Alepaka Matabhanga, to mislead his readers is unforgivable . It is a case of Abaddham pathitva kucodyam Karoti - brazen suppressio veri and suggestio falsi . In his over-self confidence to put Madhva on the dock, Prof. Mesquita has placed himself in inextricable difficulties. He has not been able to establish any one of his contentions: 1. That M is the author of Brahmatarka which he has tried to pass off as an ancient authority, 2. That his quotes from PR Samhitas are spurious
(5TH PROOF)
3. That he claims himself to be the author of the Vedas and above all 4. That both Varada Guru and Vedanta Desika were the earliest par ties against Madhva in the controversy about the bona fides of his source books in support of his philosophical a n d t h e o l o g i c a l d o c t r i n e s - a g a i n s t w h i c h A p p ay ya Diksita raised a hue and cr y for the first time in the sixteenth century. To err is human. Even supposing that the Professor's charges against Madhva are due purely to errors of judgement, t h e i r c u mu l a t i ve e f fe c t m ay we l l h ave i t s ow n a d ve r s e r e p e r c u s s i o n s. I t w o u l d t h e r e fo r e b e a d v i s a bl e fo r t h e Professor to withdraw his charges, apologise to Madhva and close the chapter, for good once for all.
1. It is highly presumptuous of Prof. Mesquita to say "Nowhere in the works of M. did I find a corraboration for the opinion of M. Vij. that M. acknowledges Vyasa as his teacher" (Intro. P. 17 fn.). This is a good illustration of Yaska's Nahyesa sthanoraparadhah yadenam andho na pasyati. J. explains a n as honorific reference to Vyasa - Tannamasu pathat. 2. Chando Darsana by Daivarata Sharma (1968).

II. JAINA BACKGROUND OF DVAITA VEDANTA - A FARFETCHED THEORY

Madhva was the historical founder of a new system of Vedanta which superseded many earlier ones which had accepted Brahman's Parinama or personal transformation into the nature of the world of matter and selves, wholly or in part. This amounts to a loss of B's authentic being as an independent reality endowed with auspicious attributes of infinite knowledge and bliss, never subject to any change - as all change is ultimately due to external - dvaita causes, pressures and forces. The Vivar tavada of Sankara had made B a mute passive one subject to beginningless ignorance -s atva) (Avidya) not withstanding its self - luminosity (Svapraka and yet the abode of beginningless ignorance and the object of such an ignorance. A srayatva vis . ayatva bha gini nirvisesacitir eva kevala (Sanksepasariraka) In Nyayavaisesika, the atoms and Jivas are real in their own right and do not owe them to God, ontologically. The Mimamsaka had no place for a Supreme Being as such. He did not believe in periodical Creation or Pralaya. The yoga school had assigned no more than a secondary place to God as an auxiliary in creation like rains in the production of crops. In the field of epistemology, the Nyayavaisesika had defined Pramana in such a way as would rule out the claims of Memory to be a source of knowledge. The same was the case with Mimamsa and Advaita Philosophy which pledged its support to Bhattanaya in all Vyavahara. The thinkers of the Visistadvaita school were divided in their opinion on the status of memory. Madhva's mission in life was therefore primarily connected with setting right the anomalies of theVaidikadarsanas and restoring Vedantadarsana to its rightful place as a robust Theistic philosophy
-1936 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory
with B. as the ultimate source of the being, becoming and functioning of all else in finite reality (their satta, pratiti and pravrtti). His main interest was therefore confined to rectifying the shortcomings of the Vaidikadarsanas in the home front and only seconarily with such aspects of Avaidikadarsanas in principle as taken note of in the Brahmasutras. As there was already a broad agreement between Madhva and the Jainas on the question of the status of memory as a valid source of knowledge in principle there was no need for him to go into the nature of its configuration and its distinct terminology. But as this was not the case in the treatment of memory in the Nyayavaisesika, Mimamsa and Advaita schools, he had to address himself primarily to that task alone. The Jaina theory differed from Madhva's only in its methodology of arriving at its validity - whereas in Vaidikadarsanas its validity rested on the larger question of its pragmatic necessity affecting human experience as a whole. This comes out from Madhva's - rvanubhu - te kim ma - nam ityukte sya - t kim uttaram basic question Pu at the starting point. This moot question does not also seem to have been raised by the Jainas in their approach. As Madhva's philosophy accepted only three Pramanas, the case of memory could not be accommodated under Pratyaksa. To rely on the impressions of the past experience as an image for inference of memory, would again involve a memory of it. It has therefore to be accommodated under Pratyaksa. Madhva has therefore brought it under Manasapratyaksa as a direct mental perception, given the lightning speed of the mind and its power to penetrate in to the past as in Yogipratyaksa with the samskaras (latent impressions) acting as a link (sannikarsa) with the past. The involvement of Saksi, the Apperceiving Self and its - haka and Jnana - pra - ma - nyagra Svarupendriya as both Jnana - gra
haka in the system enabled Madhva to explain the presentation of the first experience as "past" by memory, For every act of awareness, be it a memory, a perception or an inference, has always an in-built relation to its time factor. Memory takes the form of that (past), experience that "this is X", and inference takes the form of X is or was or will be. The present, past and the future are not something unconnected with the time factor intuited by the Saksi. This is borne out by everybody's experience and cannot be gainsaid. Even the past and the future are not beyond the grasp of the saksi. - lau api nah sa - ksigocarau (AV) Atita anagatau ka . - -na has the suffix lyut (ana) which is used The word pra-ma . in the sense of both an instrument (karane lyu . t) and bhava (basic essence) or being true. The term saksi which according to Panini's Grammar means one that perceives directly and immediately. (Saksad drastari - ya - m) is the Apperceiving Self in mundane life. It is capable samjna of meeting all the needs of valid experience in life both physical and psychological. There is no need to invest the physical sense - vendriya and organs with their different innate powers as Bha dravyendriyas as in Jainism. The saksi or the Jivasvarupa as self-luminous in respect of its own being as well as in regard to its objective experiences can do duty for the Bhavendriyas as Saksi and its svarupendriyas are a unity in diversity (Savisesa - abhinna). Moreover, there was no need for Madhva to seek the help of Jainism to establish the claims of Smrti (memory) as a pramana as the recognition of Smrti as a pramana goes back to the Taittriya - Aranyaka text : Smr tih pratyaksam aitihyam anumanacatustayam Pramanam iti vijneyam dharmadyarthe bubhusubhih (T. A. II. 1)
Hence there was no need for Madhva to seek outside help to establish the validity of memory. The concept of Saksi is not alien to Vedanta. It has its roots in the Upanisads and is current coin in Advaita vedanta as the witness self (Saksi) which is the reflection of Suddhacaitanya in Avidyavrtti. As such it is a tainted instrument open and common to both Prama and Bhrama - valid knowledge in its Vyavaharic sense and erroneous ones alike. But the Saksi of Dvaita philosophy is not the reflection of Caitanya in Avidyavrtti and hence a tainted instrument. It is the pure Apperceiving Self never erring and - tha - rthya). For the ever infallible principle of validation (niyata ya place of Saksi in Madhva's epistemology see my English version of Nyayasudha of Jayatir tha Part II pp 252-53. Dr. B. K. Matilal in his Logic, Language and Reality (Motilal B. Dass P. 226) has argued that "it is not true that Memory hangs on that object as one whose previous state has ceased. For we do not have the awareness of the cessation of the previous state. If I do not have the prior awareness of something, I cannot have memory of it. If we did remember such a thing, it would not be a memory." (P. 226). The difficulty raised by Matilal has been met and answered by Jayatirtha centuries back in - napaddhati : his Prama . Nanu Nivrtta purvavasthataya smrtih artham visayikartum neste. - t. Ananubhuta visesa visayatve Tatha ananubhava - t (iticenna) atiprasanga - van ma - trasya saksi visayataya na Ananubhuta - eta a tiprasangah.
To explain - the mind with its power of penetration into the past, aided by the latent impressions which provide the link takes into account the first experience, by the saksi as the Jnanagrahaka which intuites all time and space with its inherent powers and coordinates the memory data with a past experience as its own,
as past and stamps it as "Past". Thus the temporal gap is bridged

by the saksi and legitimised in the memory report. Such is the position of Dvaita. Thus the Madhva theory of memory as the valid source of knowledge is a completely self contained and a viable re-exposition on the basis of its own epistemological resources. We have no such explanation from Zydenbos of how the discrepancy and gap has been explained in the Jain theory on its own. However, Prof. Zydenbos who has sought to maintain in his paper on Jaina Background of Dvaita Vedanta published in the Journal of Indian philosophy (1991), Kluwer Academic Publishers, Netherlands, has argued at length that the Dvaita view of the validity of Smrti is largely indebted to the Jain theory as presented in Tattvarthasutra and its commentary by Bhaskaranandi whose terminus ad-quem has been placed at 1250 AD. Zydenbos has also laid stress on circumstantial evidences such as the existence of Jain settlements and widespread influence of the Jain community in South Kanara and the existence of Jain rulers and chieftains and centres of learning in the neighbourhood in the days of Madhva himself. It should be clarified from the full accounts of the details of Jain theory and its epistemological concepts and categories of the system if there is no good case for holding the outlines, foundations and superstructure of the Dvaita theory on the status
of memory are not and cannot be a harmonious development from within, resting on its own distinctive epistemological presuppositions and their natural outcome. Above all, in the social and religious barriers between the Jaina and the Brahminical community of those days and the Atheistic character of the Jaina System it would be difficult to believe that there was scope for initiating any warm exchange of thought on matters of mutual interest in philosophical matters between the leaders of two communities to support any theory of borrowing or adaptation from one to the other. The circumstantial evidences cited are therefore purely for tuitous and tenuous and cannot be magnified and blown out of proportion. On P. 259 of his paper, Prof. Zydenbos has observed that under Brahmasutra II.2.26 all the Brahminical commentators have misrepresented the Jaina Theory of Mukti as everlasting upward movement of the soul which is far from correct and that it only describes the conditions of the soul in the few movements immediately following death in its final incarnation. Here he complements J saying Jayatirtha shows an independent spirit and greater fairness towards Jains when he describes their view - bha - vika - tma svarupa - virbha - vah. of Mukti as moksah sva These two ways of describing the Jain Theory need not be taken to be mutually inconsistent or subject to any self contradiction. Both may be equally true in themselves. There is, however, one crucial point about the Jain theory of the status of memory. Jayatir tha says (P. 250 NS press edition) that according to Jainas the definition of Pramana is sva-apurvaartha vyavasayatmakam jnanam and rejects it as inapplicable as its terms exclude memory from its scope.
- va-artha-visayakatva-abha - va - t as it depends on Tasya sva-apru an earlier experience, which is no longer existent. If the qualifying adjunct sva-apurva is to be justified because memory too is valid, in so far as it refers to a previous experience revealed as now past (which is true enough) the adjunct would still be
uncalled for as there is no disagreement on the point. The example

of Dharavahika Bhrama would be irrelevant as according to Anekantavada even ks . anikatva of thought is admissible and there will be no continuity of fact left and as such it would also come - pu - rva - rtha. under the scope of Sva It is on record that Jayatir tha was a native of N. Karnataka and lived and studied in Manyakheta (Malkhed) the ancient capital of the Rashtrakutas where Jainism flourished from earlier times and that there is still a famous Jain monastery in Malkhed. Jayatir tha in his NS (II. 2. See Page 414, NS Press edition) - h) used the term Pudgala tells us that ancient Jainas (Jarad Jaina in the sense of the Self as such instead of a physical substance composed of rupa, rasa, gandha and sparsa.
- na given by Similarly, the one and only definition of Prama - rva - rtha vyavasa - ya - tmakam him , according to Jainas as sva-apu - nam (II. 1. P. 250) rules out the validity of memory as it jna
falls back upon a previous experience (sva-purva) whose data have reference to an earlier space time setting, which is no longer in existence. This really shows that the earlier school of Jainas was against acceptance of Memory as a valid source of knowledge like the Naiyayikas, Samkhyas and the Advaitins. The question therefore arises - what were the forces at work responsible for the Jainas breaking away from and abandoning the earlier definition of Pramana and opting for a new, more
positive, forthright and pragmatic one of "being true to the nature
relation is derived in Dvaita thought on the basis of a Srutarthapatti based on Sruti texts like evam dharman prthak pasyan (Katha, II.1, 14), Ekadhaiva anudrastavyam neha nanasti kimcana (Br. - ayam atma - anucchittidharma (Br. Up. Up. IV. 4. 19), Avinasi va - sya Saktih vividhaiva sruyate svabhaviki jnana IV. 5. 14) and Para bala kriya ca (Svet. Up. IV. 8). Accepting parallel development on the question of Smr ti
of the object" - corresponding to the Dvaita definition of Pramana - tha - rthyam . The Jainas were Realists. They as Yathartham or Ya
could not have failed to realise that a denial of validity to memory would cut at the very root of rational life and business and other transactions in various spheres of human life and development. They were bound to answer the common man's rational question - in the absence of Memory and denial of its validity, as a source of knowledge, what is the proof of the - rva - nubhu - te kim reality of our own past experiences at all - pu manam? The two meanings assigned to Pramana as valid knowledge
pramanya in Jainism and Dvaita thought on the basis of their

own respective epistemological resources and retention of technical terms like Yatharthya > Yathathmya, Manasa Pratyaksa > Paroksa, the question still remains to be answered as to what led to the abandonment of the earlier definition of Pramana quoted by Jayatirtha in favor of a more positive and pragmatic one - tha - thmyam. From this point of view it of yatharthyam > Sic Ya has to be admitted that the ball is still in the other court. We have already seen that the classification of Pramana into kevala and anupramana in M's philosophy rests on the grammatical significance of the suffix lyut in terms of karana and bhava according to Sanskrit Grammar in their inbuilt sense. The basic definition (Pramana) as yathar tham is satisfied by both kevala and anupramana as both are true to their data. Similarly, the threefold classification of Jiva in Dvaita is derived from the doctrine of - which is intrinsic to the nature of the different threefold Sraddha types as explained in the Bhagavad Gita (XVII. 2. 3). The term - has been identified as per taining to the Svabhava of Sraddha different types of souls. And Svabhava cannot be adventitious. The term Sattvanurupa (XVII. 3) similarly refers to the essential nature of the Self as sattva has the sense of a living being, according to Amarakosa (3.5.26.43) and Raghuvamsa (II). This classification may be parallel to the Jain one of Jiva, Bhavya and Abhavya. The Rgveda (VI. 47. 16) too speaks of a three fold classification of beings.
as such and the instruments of its acquisition rest on grammatical

sanction of Paninian grammar. Neither Jainism nor Dvaita philosophy has a monopoly of them. - ksi which plays a vital role in Dvaita The concept of Sa . - ksa epistemology has its root in Panini's sutra 'Sa . d dras . tari Samjna - m' (V. 2. 11). It is the name given to the apperceiving Self ya - tha - rthya). It bridges whose judgements are ever veridical (niyata ya the temporal gap between the first experience of the Smrti data, which are now past and coordinates them with his own direct experience - as the intuiting self of all events in time past, present and future and establishes Tad - idamtva graha with the same self on the basis of its own resources as has been explained by Jayatirtha in his Pramana Paddhati quoted earlier. - ksi does not figure in the Jaina theory of the The term Sa . validation of Memory. The Jaina acceptance of five different bha vendriyas as 'Potentialities of the Soul' (Op. Cit. P. 256) by Bhaskaranandi and other Jains has to rest on the acceptance of Savisesa-abheda relation between them and the self. This
(5TH PROOF)
Commenting on the Syadvada of Jainism Prof. Zydenbos says Sankara and other earlier commentators on BS had perverted its original meaning and other Vedantins had followed suit (p. 254). As leading Jain writers like Bhaskaranandi (1250) came long after Sankara, it is not made clear why he had not spoken out and taken Sankara to task for his misrepresentation of Anekantavada or whether any other Jain writers have dealt with the point. If they had done so, it is upto Prof. Zydenbos to bring it to light, instead of saying simply that the "Syadvada does not say so" (p. 254). The exegetical principle of Upajivyapramanaprabalya is not in any way dependent on the Brahmatarka, as Zydenbos would have it. It is a principle of Mimamsa sastra and has been accepted in principle by Advaita writers also such as Sriharsa : - ramar thikam Advaitam pravisya saranam Srutih Pa Virodhat upajivyena na bibheti kutascana

III. THE ARS . A TRADITION OF - APPROACH OF MADHVACARYA TO THE INTERPRETATION OF THE VEDANTA SUTRAS

A friend of mine has just sent me a Xerox copy of the tenth chapter of Dr.S.M. Srinivasachari's work on the philosophy of the Vedanta Sutras from Ramanuja's point of view, published by Munshiram Manoharlal, New Delhi.(1998). I have carefully gone through this chapter containing the author's General Evaluation and Conclusion. I can understand Dr. Chari cannot approve of Sankara's interpretation of the Brahmasutras as he agrees with M's. views that the souls are many in reality and exist as separate entities even in the state of Moksa, without losing their individuality and that they cannot exercise B's prerogatives of creation of the world, its maintenance and its dissolution. Broadly speaking then, R's philosophy is in agreement with M on these points. But it disagrees with M's holding that the Cits (Jivas) and Acit (Avyakta or Prakrti) form an integral part of B. Theirs is an intraorganic relation of parts and whole (Aprthaksiddhi)-variously described in terms of Amsa-Amsi bhava, Ananyatva, neither absolutely different from B. nor absolutely identical, nor both different and identical in their primary senses at the same time. The serpent and coil relation is also utilised in the same connection. Though denied the right to exercise Jagadvyapara, the Muktas are never the less said to enjoy the fullest measure of the boundless and infinite bliss of B. Some of these ideas are not acceptable to M's philosophy. They have been discussed and set aside in the writings of M.and his commentators. It is expected of an evaluator to have gone into those objections of the Dvaita school and disposed of them in order to make his Evaluation authentic and conclusive. There is no sign of such a proceeding having been gone through in
-2446 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya
the main body of the book on these disputed issues in the Evaluation to make it authentic and decisive. This omission leaves R's stand on the disputed issues unsubstantiated. It is regrettable that Dr. Chari should have observed that M. seems to have developed an antagonism towards S to such
THE TRUE MEANING OF THE TERM 'VEDA-ANTA'. It is an error of judgement to hold that 'Vedanta' means only the closing part of the Vedic heritage- the Upansiads. Apart from the received tradition that the Vedas are 'Ananta' (endless), most of their thousand and more Sakhas mentioned by the Mahabhasyakara and others are now totally lost to us. Lingering statements such as "Sarve Veda yat Padam Amananti" (Katha i.2.15) and "Vedaisca Sar vair Ahameva Vedyo Vedanta Kr t Vedavideva Caham" (Gita XV.15) establish that the Lord alone is competent to fix their authentic import. This term 'Anta' in Vedanta Krit here can only mean the determination of their import (Tatparya Nirnaya) - as in the earlier use of the same term 'Anta' in the Gita itself. 'Ubhayorapi Drsto Antah Anayos Tattva Darsibhih' (II.6). Otherwise, Vedanta Krt may even tend to mean one who puts an end to or destroys the Vedas, which would be preposterous. Given then, the correct meaning of the term 'Anta' in Vedanta and the further reference to the BS in the Gita itself as 'Hetu madbhih' and 'Viniscitaih' there can be no doubt that we will be on the right track in identifying the BS as the Nirnayaka Sastra which holds the key to the correct understanding and interpretation of the entire source books of both the Vedic and Upanisadic heritage as their Nirneya Sastra. It is this sense that is conveyed by the opening Sutra of the Gunopasamhara Pada of the Sadhana Adhyaya of the BS declaring B to be Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam,the Being whose true knowledge (Pratyaya) is authentically established by the decisive ruling (Anta) on the p u r p o r t of the entire Ve d i c h e r i t a g e - S a r va Ve d a Nirnayotpadyajnanam Brahma - as M puts it. No sane person who holds the Vedic and Upanisadic heritage in equal respect can object to this interpretation. M's commentator, Raghuttama Tirtha explains the terse statement of M as follows: Sarva Vedanam Antena (Nirnayena Utpadyamanah) Pratyayo (Jnanam) Yasya tat (Brahma) iti Vyadhikarana Bahuvrihih. Anyapadartho Brahma.
an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas of the Sutras from

the Upansisads and go to the Rgveda and other sources instead. (P 173). We shall be seeing in what follows that M. has always taken great care in choosing his Visayavakyas in various Adhikaranas with due regard to the Adhyaya and Pada Sangatis of their topics, their freedom from overlapping or repetition and the criteria of homologous affinity between the key words of the Sutras and those of the Visayavakyas-which are often violated by S and R as we shall be seeing. The BS being a scientific treatise divided into well knit chapters with their own subject matter clearly fixed. it will be most improper to take up random topics and Sutars torn out of their context in the so called new
approach to the Sutras without going chapter wise . The question

of relevant Sutras without reference to this fixed division of topics will lead one nowhere. It is true M draws his Visayavakyas from the pre-Upanisadic sources of the Vedic heritage also, besides the Upanisads. This is not because of any animosity against S or others but to his adherence to the Arsa tradition which treats both the Vedic and Upanisadic heritages as one integral revelation and Illumination (Gati Samanyat) - whose contents form the subject matter of investigation and import in terms of Brahma Vidya par excellence as their Nirnayaka Sastra, for which role they have been cast according to the ancient tradition recorded in the Skanda Purana and borne out by the internal evidence of the wording of the Sutra, Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam (Brahma) (III.3.1) as we shall be seeing.
A veteran Mimamsaka and Visistadvaita scholar, the late D. T. Tatacarya, in his Krishnaswami Rao Endowment Lectures at the Madras University in 1948 has observed - "The Rgveda has the idea of Brahman. If we apply and I don't know why they cannot apply, the principles of interpretation enunciated by Badarayana as meaning B to the hymns of this Veda, we cannot escape the conclusion that this Veda is as much connected with B as to Upanisads. This august role of the BS as 'Sarva Sastrartha Nirnayaka' has been described in a group of twelve verses from the Skanda Purana cited by M at the outset of his Sutrabhasya beginning with the words: 'Narayanad Vinispannam Jnanam Krtayuge Sthitam'. After referring to the reclamation of the Vedas, their division into four with their respective sakhas and the composition of the BS to fix their import (tasyarthavittaye), by the Vyasavatara, the text of the Puranas concludes saying: Sutresu yesu sarvepi nirnayas samudiritah Sabda jatasya sarvasya yatpramanasca nirnayah Evam vidhani sutrani krtva Vyaso mahayasah The same group of verses from the Skanda has been quoted by Sudarsana Suri in his C. on R's Sri Bhasya. But the crucial line "Sabdajatasya sarvasya yatpramanasca nirnayah", as given above is missing in the printed editions of the Srutaprakasa. This creates a serious gap and a break of continuity of thought between the first and the third lines which makes the high compliment paid to the Sutras in such glowing terms as "Evam vidhani sutrani", hanging loose without a referent syntactically connected with a proper antecedent such as Sabdajatasya sarvasya nirnayah samudiritah. The mere fact of the Sutars being Alpaksara etc. like other Sutras could be no compliment to the august position of the BS as described earlier, as contrasted with other Sutras referred to as Savisesana Sutrani and the BS as Nirvisesana
Sutrani. I have published a note on the missing line from the Skanda Purana in the printed editions of Srutaprakasa in an appendix to my English rendering of Jayatirtha's Nyayasudha Vol. I (Raghavendra Ashram, Malleshwaram, Bangalore. 1995) to which further reference is invited. THE A RS . A TRADITION There is sufficient evidence in the RgVeda Suktas and the Aranyakas that according to the Seers there is only one Supreme Being who is the bearer of the names and epithets of the various gods like Agni, Indra , Varuna with their own respective jurisdiction over Cosmic government. Their names are applicable to them in their conventional sense only. In their highest and fullest primary connodenotation they refer to one Supreme Being. This is spelt out in such texts as : "Yo devanam namadha eka eva" (RV X.82.3) "Indram Mitram Varunam Agnim Ahur atho divyah sa suparno Garutman Ekam Sad Viprah Bahudha Vadanti (RV I.164.46) "Etam hyeva Bahvrca mahatyukthe Mimamsante etam agnav Adhvaryavah Etam mahavrate Chandogah etameva sarvesu bhutesu Brahmetyacaksate" (AA iii. 2. 3.) "Sarve Vedah sarve Ghosah Sarva Rcah Ekaiva Vyahrutih Pranarca Ityeva Vidyat (AA ii.2.2) "Kaschandasam yogam aveda dhirah (RV X.114.9) "Taddhaitat pasyanto rsayah Kavaseyah ahuh kimartha vayam adhyesyamahe kimar tha vayam yaksyamahe iti" (AA iii. 2.3) These texts have been quoted by M. They establish that there - mava - n. They endorse the position that all is only one Sarvana
sacrifices offered to various gods under their various names are really intended in principle to reach the One Supreme thro them. This is confirmed by the words of the Gita also: Aham hi sarva yajnanam bhokta ca prabhur eva ca. (xi.24) Thus the Arsa tradition provides the key to integrating the seeming Polytheism of the Pantheon with an overall conception of one Sarvanamavan. This paves the way for performance of all sacrifices as intended in principle for the one Supreme. By such an integral approach to the Vedic and Upanisadic sources as a whole, M. has been able to set right the age long injustice that has been done to India's Vedic heritage by the early Western Indologists and their followers among modern Indian scholars as well. By righting this wrong, M has also opened the eyes of traditional commentators on the BS to the unmerited denigration of their original status, to which our Vedic heritage has been exposed all along. Suresvara in his Var tika on the Brh. Up. Bhasya of S. has cited a metrical passage from the Bhallavi Sakha which speaks of dedicated performance of karma in the spirit of Phalatyaga which leads one to the highest abode of Visnu. Another metrical line from the Bhallaveya Sruti cited by M speaks of Visnu as the Sarvanamavan. M has therefore rightly focussed attention on the Arsa tradition as providing the master key to a smooth reconciliation of both the seeming Polytheism of the Vedas and their sacrificial system in the true spirit of the Upanisad : Yadeva vidyaya karoti sraddhaya upanisada tadeva viryavattaram bhavati. (Chan. Up. ii, 10) with Brahmavidya. He has accordingly worked out an excegetical method based on a dual Sabdavrtti in terms of Paramamukhyavrtti and a conventional mukhyavrtti of entire Sabda Jata by way of Samanvaya of entire Sastra in B which he has adopted in his interpretation of the Vedanta Sutras with remarkable results. His approach is ratified by the opening words of the BS (III.3.1) : Sarva Vedanta Pratyayam (Brahma) as has already been pointed out.
BS I.1.3 Sastrayonitvat declares that B is truly knowable only thro Sastras. S renders the word 'Sastra' as "Rgveda and others". Elsewhere in his C. on BS III.3.5 he has quoted from the Ait. A . III .2.3 "The one Supreme Being is the subject of worship, meditation and realisation of the Rgvedins thro the Uktha, of the Adhvaryus thro the sacred fire and of the Chandogas thro the Mahavrata rites. These are all parts of the Karmakanda.'' This shows that S was fully aware of the possibility of attuning the Karmakanda texts and rites also to BrahmaVidya in principle, as part of the Arsa tradition as commended by the Upanisadic passage 'Yadeva vidyaya karoti...' Very probably, the Arsa tradition had come to be forgotten and lost currency when long afterwards regular commentaries came to be written on the BS by historical personages who had therefore to confine their attention to the Upanisads alone. And S too had to fall in line with them. M was born in a family accredited to the Rksakha. He was very deeply read in the Vedas and Aranyakas which he had at his fingertips. He was naturally deeply inspired by the Arsa tradition as may be seen from his illustrative c. on the first forty Suktas of RgVeda and his c. on the Mahanamni hymns in his Karmanirnaya in which the higher Adhyatma interpretation of the Rks has been fully brought out. Many incidents of his early and later life narrated in his near contemporary biography, the M. Vij. (VI. 1, VI.13, VI.17, XVI.5; 43) bear witness to his mastery of the Vedas and how deeply he was moved by the message of the Arsa tradition. The spontaneous tribute he has paid to the words of the Aranyakas : "Sarve Vedah, Sarve Ghosah, Sarva Rchah, Ekaiva Vyahrtih Pranarca ityeva vidyat" (AA ii.2) in his c. "Kimuca Vedah Samudra Ghosa Vrksapatana bheritadanadayah sarve sabdah tasyaiva namani yatha yogam yojaniyani"
speaks volumes of the heighs of his Mystic experience of the Arsa tradition. No wonder his BSB should blaze a new trail of light in this direction . Dr. Chari seems to be under the impression that M. adopts a sectarion stance in using the term 'Visnu' with reference to B in his Sutrabhasya. We have seen that to M all the names of the Vedic gods refer to B in principle. But the words 'Visnu' and 'Narayana' used by him have a special significance as referring in their highest etymological sense in the highest context to the Supreme Being who is the sole survivor in Mahapralaya, when the entire universe, including the gods lay submerged in the waters of Mahapralaya. (Arvag Deva Asya Visarjanena) (RV X. 129). - There was only That One (Tadekam) which was breathing windless by its own power (Anidavatam Svadhaya tat ekam) and there was none else equal to or higher than it. (RV X. 129. 2b). There are frequent references to the Supreme B in the Vedic texts referring to it as Antah Samudre (T.A.X, 1.1). Samudre Antah kavayo avayanti (T.A.X, 1.1). Yam antah Samudre (T.A.X. 1.1). Mama yonih apsvantah samudre (RV X.125.7). It is this Supreme Being which is designated as Jalan (Jala-an) in the Chandogya text (III.14) : Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma. Tat Jalan ityupasita. The term Sarvam in its old Vedic usage signified what is full and complete (Purna) as in Sarvo vava mama patih (Jai Br.) The other term 'Narayana' refers to the Supreme One which alone survives in Mahapralaya. Nara means the waters of Pralaya and Narayana denotes the Being who abides (ayana) in the waters of Pralaya, as explained in the Manusmrti. It is to indicate the special importance of this name that M says 'Brahma - sabdasca Visnaveva Narayanam Natva Sutrartha ucyate' at the outset of his Bhasya. The Visistadvaita tradition too which believes in the triunity of the Karma, Devata and Brahmamimamsa Sastra holds that the two closing Sutras of the Daivi Mimamsa : Sa Visnur aha hi. Tam Brahmetyacaksate Tam Brahmetyacaksate, speaks for itself. If Dr. Chari had been acquainted with the Visistadvaita tradition, he would not have rushed to find fault with M for
his use of the word Visnu to denote the Supreme B in principle. R's Vedartha Samgraha which upholds the pre-eminence of Visnu must have cooled down in his Sutra Bhasya after his bitter experience in the Chola country which forced him to migrate to Karnataka. It is equally regrettable that Dr. Chari should have observed that M seems to have developed an antagonism towards S to such an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas from the Upanisads and go to the RgVeda and other sources instead, with a vengeance at it were. There is more heat than light in this comment of Dr. Chari. A close examination of M's Visayavakyas will show that they are chosen with the utmost regard for their contextual relevance to the Adhyaya and Pada Sangatis, logical maintainability of the wording of the Visayavakyas and their homologous affinity between the key words of the Sutra and the wording of the Visayavakyas. These are often transgressed by S and R, as we shall be seeing. Take S and R's inter pretation of the Sutras, 'Sar vatra prasiddhopadesa' (i. 2. 1). The 'Sautra' word is Sarvatra in the locative sense, but the wording in S and R's Visayavakya from Chan. Up. III. 14, is Sarvam Khalvidam Brahma, Tat jalan ityupasita. M's Visayavakya on the other hand, from A. A III.2.3, has nearly a dozen locative nouns, Mahavrate, Agnau, Vayau, Akase, Sarvabhutesu etameva Brahmetyacaksate. S and R's explanation of Tatjalan suffers from a needless transposition of the natural and logical order of creation, sustenance and dissolution of the world in Brahman as set forth in the Upanisad and accepted by S and R too under BS i.1.2. What is the necessity for this transposition of the natural and logical order here? Take again M's preference for the Visayavakya from AA for the Pranadhikarana. (i.1. 28-31) in lieu of S and R's choice from Kausitaki Brahmana Up. (iii.3). According to S the Adhi establishes B as Sarvatmaka but in the Kausitaki text, the
Paramatman manifesting itself in Indra tells Pratardana "I Am Prana". That is all. This does not make for Sarvatmakatva, whereas in the AA text B manifesting itself in Indra appears before Visvamitra, the interlocutor, who has at Indra's request tirelessly repeated one thousand Brhatisahasra verses three times, - m eva vijaniyam", O tells him in response to his request, "Tva Sage, I am Prana, You are Prana, so are all these beings Prana, which may tend to establish Prana's Sarvatmakatva, as S would like to have it. The declaration of Indra speaking thro the Antaryami B is explained on the basis of Sastra Drsti or Antaryami Drsti by M. According to S and R the term Vaktuh in the Sutra refers to Indra the speaker, who is already covered by the reflexive use of the pronoun, 'Atmopadesa' whereas in the AA text the term Vaktuh refers to Visvamitra, the reciter (Samsita) of the Brhati Sahasra and not Indra. Take again the Arambhanadhi (II.1.15) whose Visayavakya according to S and R is from the Chan. Up. (vi.1) based on three illustrations, of one clod of clay, one nugget of gold and a pair of nail scissors by knowing which all things made of clay, gold etc are known. (Eka Vijnanena, Sarva Vijnanam). The wording of these illustrations as they stand fail to support any such material cause and effect relation between the pairs named. A proper way of putting it would be Mrda Vijnataya Mrnmayam jnatam bhavati. However, the illustration of Nakhanikrntana is a misfit as it is itself an effect and not a cause of any other effect. These glaring inadequacies in the wording, from the point of view of S and R's interpretation cannot be dismissed as minor t e r m i n o l o g i c a l i n ex a c t i t u d e s, w h e n a b e t t e r a n d m o r e commensurate explanation of the text as it stands worded can be thought of on the basis of similarity, primacy and kaimutyanyaya, as pointed out by M in his Chandogya bhasya is available (see my Mahatatparya of Mahavakyas P. 75-77 and also my Nyayasudha rendering Vol. 2 P. 291).
Apar t from this, the key word in the Arambhana Adhi, according to S and R does not tally with the opening Sautra word 'Arambhana' (Sabda) which stands by itself as a single word whereas it figures in S and R's interpretation as the second member of a compound (vacarambhanam). M's interpretation of this Adhi. is not open to the defect of Gatarthata (repetition) as in their case. The problem raised by M in the Tadananyatva Adhi (II.1.15) is a fresh one of the utmost importance to all Theistic philosophy in general and with special reference to the Theism of the Up. which recognises the eternality of many entities besides B. : Nityo Nityanam - as creation in Upanisadic philosophy is not ex-nihilo, as it is in Christianity. Naturally, this leads to a vexed question : How far B's. making use of other eternal accessories like Prakrti, Jivas, space, time, etc. would not be compromising to B's metaphysical status of absolute independence of initiative, if it is obliged to make use of other eternal accessories . B cannot dispense with these pre-existent accessories which would lead to creation, ex-nihilo. There is a lurking fallacy in this dilemma. This adhi is therefore utilised by M to solve this riddle without affecting B's status of absolute freedom and independence of initiative in regard to accessories. The solution is found by reading the Guna Sutra, Satvaca avarasya (II.1.17) together with the opening sutra which would enable us to hold that B's making use of pre existing accessories which are also eternal is consistent with it's absolute independence in so far as even the eternal existence of the eternal accessories and their powers of functioning are all pre-determined by B's will and pleasure. This is suppor ted by texts like Pacyamsca sarvan parinamayed yah (Svet Up. V.5). Dravyam karmaca kalasca svabhavo jiva eva ca Yadanugrahatas santi na santi yadupeksaya (Bhag) Vedanta Desika has also held that the independence of B is not compromised in any way by making use of other eternal
accessories in creation as their very existence and powers of functioning are pre determined and subject to B's eternal will and pleasure : Sahakaribhih arambhe na svatantryam vihanyate Tatsadbhava pravrttyosca svadhinatva vyavasthiteh The double negative, Tat ananyatvam is to explain that the one independent source of all creation is no other than the Supreme One; Svatantra Karana - ananyat Brahma. There is no repetition of the topic in this way of dealing with the adhi. as there is in the interpretation of S and R in trying to establish B's material causality of the world again and again . On the whole, there are far too many adhis in R's interpretation on the subject of the intra-organic relation between Cit and Acit with B such as the Prakrtyadhi (I.4.24), Arambhana adhi (II.1.15), Amsa adhi (II.3.43) and Ahikundala Adhi (III. 2. 28). Amsa-Amsi bhava relation is possible only between a given substance and its physical par ts as between a large piece of cloth and a bit torn from it. It cannot be applied to two substances of opposite natures too with a third one. As B is impar tible and partless, it cannot have parts . The Ahikundala adhi is an ideal one for establishing an intimate and inseparable relation of identity which admits of a distinction of reference to the attributes as such without a distinction of essence. This relation is one of Savisesa-abheda as between the serpent and its coil or time as a whole and its divisions into past, present and future. It is not clear why R should fight shy of it while he is so keen on establishing again and again an organic and inseparable relation between B and Cit and Acit of opposite natures. One would however expect of R an ardent follower of Pancaratra theology which does not admit any mutual difference or distinction among the Vyuha forms and Para-Vasudeva or their six sovereign attributes as pointed out by S : Na ca Pancaratra siddhantibhih, Vasudevadisu ekasmin sarvesuva
jnanaisvaryadi taratamyakr to bhedah abhyupagamyate (SBSB II. 2. 44) . One is left to wonder if the sovereign attributes of Satyam Jnanam ananda etc mentioned in apposition with B in the Srutis are ineligible to be treated as organically related to B much more logically than Cit and Acit. The Svet. Up. speaks of jnana, bala and kriya as inseparable saktis of B : Parasya Saktih vividhaiva sruyate svabhaviki jnana bala kriya ca. The Visnu Purana often quoted by R likens them to the intimate relation betw een fire and heat . Saktayas sarvabhavanam acintyajnanagocarah Yato ato Brahmanastah sargadya bhavasaktayah Bhavanti tapatam srestha pavakasya yathosnata (VP I.3.1-2) Dr. Chari asserts that there is no mention of Aparoksa jnana or Direct vision of God in the Sutras as accepted by M. This observation is evidently due to the fact that according to R the highest experience of B thro Dhyana is only an approximation to actual vision (darsana samanakara) on this side of release. But Mund. Up. (III.3) clearly says that the Supreme B reveals its own for m (svam tanum) to one whom it chooses. Cf. Paramatmaparoksyam ca tat prasadadeva na jivasaktya (MBSB III.2.23). The Isa. Up. refers to the prayer of the Jiva to the Lord to show him that form of B which is Kalyana tamam, tat te pasyami (I,6). The Brh. Up. says, Atmava are drastavyah , srotavyo mantavyah. Sravana, Manana and Dhyana lead to Darsana. The Gita also says, Bhaktya tvananyaya sakya aham evam vidho Arjuna Jnatum drastum ca pravestum ca parantapa (XI, 54). Here, Jnana stands for Paroksa Jnana and Drastum for Direct vision and Pravestum for Communion. All that apart, in the Sadhana Adhyaya of BS (III.3) there are two consecutive Sutras Vidyaivatu nirdharanat (III.3.48) and Darsanat (III.3.49). The former evidently refers to Paroksa Jnana gained thro Sravana, Manana
(5TH PROOF)
IV. MEET MADHUSUDANA SARASVATI

and Dhyana and Darsana must naturally be Direct vision - for however short a while of a split second it may last, on this side of release. R holds that though forbidden to exercise the Lord's prerogatives of world creation etc which are an expression of His infinite blissfulness, released souls still enjoy the fullest measure of the Lord's blissfulness. Apart from its illogicality, such a position goes against the description of the highest state of Moksa described in Brh. Up. (iv.3.32) : Esa Brahmalokah Esasya Paramagatih Parama sampat Eso asya Paramolokah Eso asya Parama Anandah, which concludes with a clear statement : Etasyaiva anandasya anyani bhutani matram upajivanti (iv.3.32) that the denizens of this world subsist on an iota of the boundless bliss of B. The words Anyani bhutani in this context must necessarily denote the actual residents Samsara. Dr. Chari proffers an advice to followers of M to change the name of Dvaita of their philosophy. This designation of Dvaita is based on M's own classification of Tattva or Prameya defined as Anaropitam pramiti visayah into two kinds as Svatantra and Paratantra. Svatantra stands for the Supreme B which is not dependent on any other for its being, knowing, functioning, unlike the dependent (finite reality). Hence there is no need for a change of the name, "Dvaita". The philosophy of Ramanuja stands midway between Dvaita and Advaita with its acceptance of an inseparable intraorganic relation of body and soul with B. But it seems possible to subsume in principle the two categories of Acit and Cit into a single head of finite reality dependent on B. thus arriving at two broad categories. Would it not be more logical then for R's philosophy to be renamed Dvaita, instead? of this world and not those still in
Advaitasiddhi-a critical study by Prof. K. Maheswaran Nair - Kerala University - India Book Centre, 40/5, Saktinagar, Delhi - 7 (1990). Prof. Maheswaran Nair has made a distinctive, long awaited contribution to the world of Vedanta scholarship by bringing out a first English translation of Vyasatirtha's Nyayamrta and its criticism the Advaitasiddhi side by side. It fills a great gap, as till now no complete translation in English of either has been available for modern scholars specialising in Vedanta dialectics. But this edition suffers from want of a perspective index, which i s absolutely necessary for a modern work of such great importance. The Dvaita known to Gaudapada and Sankara was not an Aupanisada Darsana. It was Madhva who gave the final shape to Vedanta as a robust Theism of the Prasthanatraya - the triple canon and brought Dvaita - Advaita philosophical polemics to contemporary attention with his monographs on disputed themes like Mayavada, Upadhi and Mithyatva besides re-interpreting the ten Upanisads, Brahmasutras and Gita. Jayatirtha and others after him continued the polemics on the home front. It was Vyasatirtha the Saint - Philosopher of the Vijayanagar Empire who took Dvaita - Advaita philosophical polemics to an All - India Forum in his Nyayamrta by widening the range and scope of the subject and its dimensions, by placing in the hands of his contemporaries a New Agenda for a more complete, comprehensive and fruitful study, discussion and assessment of the credentials and credibility of the contending systems. Much of the credit given to Madhusudana Sarasvati for having ushered in a Neo - Advaita, in its traditional setup, must really go to Vyasatirtha, as has been handsomely acknowledged by the late Mm. Anantakrishna Sastri, long ago. In dealing with
-3160 Meet Madhusudana Sarasvati
the subject, Vyasatirtha had set for himself a very high standard of parliamentary decorum and discipline in the use of controversial language and vocabulary which was scrupulously adhered to by the Tarangini in its reply to the A-siddhi, in glaring contrast with the style of writing of both Madhusudana and Brahmananda. The Tg in its replies invariably begins with the words Atra vadanti and replies strictly to the point without heat or passion. Not so Madhusudana and his commentator who freely indulge in invective rhetoric, discourtesy, derision and abusive language, to the extent of unprintable insults as on pages 50 and 119 in the translation. Dr. Nair should have taken the responsibility to delete all such jarring notes in the English translations by using his discretion and better judgment. While paying dutiful respects to his Vidyaguru, Diksaguru and Paramaguru at the outset, Madhusudana has omitted to do so in respect of the Adiguru of Advaita namely A dis ankara - which is in glaring contrast with the example set by Vyasatirtha. Madhusudana wantonly twists and misconstrues Vyasatirtha's statement : Yadrsam brahmanah satvam tadrsam syat jagatyapi for the sake of jeering at his adversary, by resorting to a Chala, by cutting a bad joke at his expense in the form of a foolish suitor to the hand of a maiden, answering her father's question of what his gotra may be, by telling him "it is the same as yours, Sir". What the statement of Vyasatirtha actually means and is
nature and not identity. Vyasatirtha's statement does not mean that the material world has no reality apart from B's. Vyasatirtha has clarified : - latrayepi sat. viyada - di kada - cideva iti nityatva Brahma ka - bhyam eva anityatva - tvabhya -m vaisamyam na tu satyatva - mithya (P. 37 Nym. Nirnayasagar Press Edn.) There is nothing in this for Madhusudana to jump to the conclusion that the world and B. share one and the same reality. Evidently, Madhusudana is not aware of the fact that Dvaita Philosophy - among existents does not accept anugatasatta - nikhila - api (AV) Bhinnasca bhinnadharmasca padartha Difference and resemblance are both unique and sui generis to each particular, tho made out thro their counter - correlates. That apart, are we to take it that Madhusudana does not understand the difference between Nitya and Anitya, as explained by Vyasatirtha in the same work? No wonder, the Tg pulls up Madhusudana : Bhava - anavabodhat. Most Advaitins and their modern apologists continue to believe and accuse Dvaita Philosophers of deliberately confounding the Vyavaharika and the Paramarthika stand -points of S's Philosophy. Dr. K. Narain, in his Critique of Madhva refutation of the Sankara school of Vedanta, had done so and Prof. Nair has committed the same mistake. It is all very well for him to insist that " the
intended to convey is that like B the world too has an existence

and a reality, in the same way as B, though it may not be self luminous (svaprakasa) like B. It is doubtful however if the Advaitabrahman can be self - luminous, because it is claimed by Sankara that it cannot know itself (atmani-svakriya virodhat). That apart, the term yadrsam merely refers to a similarity of
practical reality of the world is never negated . What is negated

is its absolute reality." (P. 40 translation). But, the more important
question is from which angle or standpoint is the practical reality

sought to be negated. The Nym. has actually raised this moot question - whether the vyavaharika prapanca is negated from the Vyavaharika or the absolute point of view. Negation of the
practical reality from the practical point of view would be suicidal. The negation has to be from the absolute point of view. But that is beset by an inextricable logical fallacy of mutual interdependence (anyonyasraya). That is where the shoe pinches and there lies the heel of Achilles. The words of Nym. are crystal clear on the point. For Paramarthikatva, as defined by Advaita, consists in uncontradictedness (abadhyatva). Only when one has a complete knowledge of what is Paramarthika, as not open to sublation with reference to all the three periods of time, can one understand the nature of Mithyatva of the Vyavaharika as liable to be negated with reference to all the three periods of time. Unless one has such a knowledge of Mithyatva, one cannot understand what Paramarthika reality is as not open to negation at all. After quoting faithfully from Nym : Napi dvitiyah A b a d hya t va r u p a p a r a m a r t h i k a t va s ya b a d hya t va r u p a m i t hya t va n i r u pya t va t a n yo nya s r aya t va t , t h e L o g i c i a n i n Madhusudana is forced to admit tamely - Maivam Svarupenaiva traikalika nisedhasya prapance suktirupye ca angikarat (A - siddhi Sri Vidya Press Edn). This lets the cat out of the bag. This outspoken confession of Madhusudana, in dealing with second definition of falsity in his A-siddhi, is nowhere to be found, in Prof. Nair's English translation of the text of the Asiddhi. One wonders why. Anyway, the frank confession of Mdhusudana that both the illusory silver and the practical world (Prapanca) are negated per se in respect of their own respective forms of appearance as such (Svarupena as Asad - vilaksana = Mithya) would consequently reduce them to an essenceless void - as pointed out by Vyasatirtha - tasya - pi svarupenaiva traikalika nisedha iti Mithyabhu . . paks . e, nihsvarupatvasya durva ratva t The reader of the English translation is entitled to know what Madhusudana's reactions are to the crucial point raised by Vyasatirtha. The translation is silent on the point.
Madhusudana is prone to play tricks with evidence, in dealing with the Advaita interpretation of Ekameva - advitiyam he adver ts to the Nasadiya - Sukta (R.V. X, 129) where in the opening line, there is reference to Tadanim with reference to the existence of Time in Mahapralaya. Madhusudana, therefore, proceeds to shift it to the next line to avoid a survival of Time as a reality in Mahapralaya. But, the shifting of the term tadanim to the next line can serve no purpose as the context remains the same Mahapralaya. However, he also says the words Sat and Asat in the opening line should be construed in what he calls their we l l k n ow n ( P r a s i d d h a r t h a ) u s a g e o f Pa r a m a r t h i k a a n d Aparamar thika instead of in their scriptural meanings of Murta and Amur ta, as suggested by Madhva on the basis of the Brh. Up. (II.3, 2-3). The undesirable consequence of Madhusudana's move would be to reduce even the surviving residual B. in Mahapralaya, as the one Sat breathing windless by its own power (anid avatam svadhaya tadekam) to a state of anirvacaniya. To avoid this, Madhusudana proposes to call to aid some other Srutis from elsewhere , which is quite unnecessary, if Sat and Asat are understood as Murta and Amurta as supported by Brh. Up. As a Sastrajna, Madhusudana is expected to adhere to the principle of interpretation of Sastric words in their scriptural connotation : Sastrastha va tannimittatvat, as far as possible. What surprises one is that Madhusudana has not even cared to adhere to Sankara's interpretation of the words Sat and Asat, used in Prasna Up. (II. 5) as Murta and Amurta, respectively. Are we to suppose that Madhusudana had not read even Sankara's
own bhasya on the Upanisads? If he had, why has he not stuck

to them here? After valiantly fighting for the establishment of B's formlessness (nirakaratva), Madhusudana seems to have had a guilty conscience and seems to have hastened to make amends by saying "I know of no other higher than Murali Krsna : Krsnatparam kimapi tattvam
aham na jane." This verse is relevant to the present section and not to the beginning of the one as printed here. The Kumbakonam edition places it at the end of the present section. The same is the case with the abusive verse - Iha kumatih atatve tatvavadi varakah which should appear in the Epilogue and not where it is found in Prof. Nair's translation. The trouble taken by Advaita to castrate B of its vital essences of Satyam, Jnanam and Ananda and other metaphysical attributes by Akhandar tha surgery is an unfortunate exercise in futility by taking it to the brink of Apohavada. Intellectual sophistry cannot go beyond Akhandartha by smothering the Upanisadic Brahman with a number of gags without a single gap of attributes for it to breathe . When one reads the thrilling and sonorous description of B in the Taitt. Up. as Satyam jnanam anantam B, followed by an assurance that one who realises it reaches it along with the enlightened Brahmadeva, one hardly suspects that it can be twisted and mangled into so many negatives and exclusions of their opposites only (atadvyavrtti). No wonder, even a sincere Advaitin like Dr. P. K. Sundaram recoils from interpreting satyam, jnanam etc. as the absence of existence, absence of ignorance and absence of pain - a dark emptiness and blankness and bankruptcy of being. The profound depth of existence of B is not conveyed by denial but by affirmation , not by is not, but by is . A reality which is said to be Satyasya satyam cannot be an essenceless Vacuum (P. 6-7 E. T. of Istasiddhi). There must be some linking agency, some internal mechanism in the constitution of B to admit of a differenceless identity which however facilitates a distinction of reference without necessitating a distinction of essence. It cannot fall outside B's ontological essence or an expression of it or one alien to it. The name Svarupavisesa given to it in Dvaita philosophy is most appropriate, signifying its own internal dynamism.
Karl Potter has made it clear that tho Advaita thought looks upon self-knowledge as not given by any Pramana and is an immediate intuition, still the precise nature of its content has to be gathered from the sruti. Thus ultimately, it has to look upon scripture and language, as its critical means of proof of its truthfulness of such anubhava (Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies Vol - II P. 98). S too endorses the same : Brahmatmabhavasya sastram antarena anavagamyamanatvat (BSB I, 1, 4). It is for this reason that Vyasatirtha has given top priority to the discussions of over twenty Advaita Srutis, with special reference to their context, language, wording, syntax, concord and significance of the illustrations given. Of these Madhusudana has dealt with only Aham Brahmasmi andTattvam asi (Akhandartha) and has skipped Neha nanasti, vacarambhanam, Prapanco yadi vidyeta and such other crucial texts and giving cursory attention to Ekameva Advitiyam and a few others. Prof. Nair sums up his comment on Ekam eva Advitiyam in two or three sentences. We cannot, therefore, admit Prof. Nair's plea that Madhusudana "does not explain all these other Srutis for fear of inordinate length of the discussions" (P 74). He could have given more attention to them , instead of enlarging on the topic of Vipratipatti pradarsana at the beginning, which has no interest to modern scholars. The Nadi Samudra drstanta in Tattvam asi has been thrown out by Vacaspati Misra (Bhamati on BSB I.4.22). The illustration of salt dissolved in water, the invisible power hidden behind the tiny banyan seeds ordered to be cut open (broken), the thief and imposter with stolen property caught red handed and brought to trial, the dying man on his sick bed are all hard nuts to crack, from an Advaita point of view. A baffled Madhusudana beats a hasty retreat, saying that illustrations do not run on all fours, or that they are not transparent, or do not refer to
(5TH PROOF)
APPENDIX
any differences as really existing and lastly, and above all , that they are indifferent alike to the existence of real difference or real identity (between Jiva and Brahma - Vastavabheda abhedayor audasinyena, P. 836 N. S. Press Edition). Prof. Nair's Translation has drawn a black curtain over all such irresponsible and facetious pleas of Madhusudana, in hisTranslation. Such replies are evasive. The question is whether the illustrations given by Uddalaka support the thesis of difference between Jiva Brahman or their identity. They cannot do both. Neither can they be neutral and indifferent

THE QUESTION OF THE DATE OF MADHVACARYA

The date of Acarya Madhva given by him in his Mahabharata Tatparya Nirnaya (xxxii, 131) as "after the lapse of 4300 years of Kaliyuga" is not an epigraphical evidence or a diary entry. It is only a broad statement in terms of 43 centuries after (in Kali). The precise date has therefore to be fixed after taking into account all other relevant facts known about his life history. Hrsikesa Tirtha, one of the eight Taulava disciples of the Acarya, who later became the Head of the Palimar Mutt of Udupi, has left us a completeTulu Ms. copy of the collected work s (Sarvamula) of Madhva preserved in palm leaves in the Mutt for centuries. It has been printed, edited by Bannanje Govindacarya on behalf of Palimar Mutt, by the late Sri Vidyamanya Tirtha. The edition mentions that in this collection is found the text of a short work on Tithinirnaya by the Acarya dated corresponding to 1308 AD. The Madhva Vijaya mentions Hrsikesa T. as a beloved and leading disciple of the Acarya (Sisya Pravara XIII, 40) who used to recite the Bhagavata Purana in a melodious voice which matched the Acarya's. Two works of Hrsikesa T. have come down to us, a
to both . Yet, nothing daunted, Madhusudana coolly says they do neither !! This is no compliment to the Sruti or to Uddalaka
or to our intelligence .
Sampradaya Paddhati and an Anumadhvacarita . It is natural to

expect such a leading and beloved disciple of the Acarya to have left us a short life sketch of the Acarya in which he has given precise information about cyclic year of Madhva's exit from the scene of his worldly activities, the tithi and month and the cyclic year of his disappearance and his age at the time of his leaving the earthly life :Ekonasiti varsani bhutva manusadrstigah Pingalabde maghasuddha navamyam Badarim yayau The verse clearly says that the Acarya left the world in his 79th year on the ninth day of the bright half of Magha in the
-3568 Appendix - The question of the Date of Madhvacarya
cyclic year of Pingala which corresponds to 1317 (18) AD. To this day the departure anniversary of the Acarya is observed by the entire Madhva community and its Mathas on Magha Suddha Navami as "Madhva Navami". The broad statement of the Mbh. TN (XXXII, 131) read with the above precise data of the
By-passing all these data Seshagiri Acharya of Mysore has been doggedly upholding the date 1199-1270 in his controversy with me in the Kannada Tattvavada of the Akhila Bharata Madhva Mahamandala, Bangalore. His latest move is to exploit the incident narrated in M. Vij. V. 38 of a disputation between the young, rising M. and an Advaitic monk in Anantasayana over M's criticism of some interpretations of Brahmasutras by Sankara in the course of his own exposition of the Sutras to an audience there. The Advaitic Sanyasi is repor ted to have objected to M's criticising Sankarabhasya on the ground that M. had no business to criticise a Bhasyakara when he himself had not produced any Bhasya of his own. (Mahanatikramo Sutrarthavado akrtabhasyakesu M. Vij. V, 38). The Acarya asked him to reply and answer his criticisms if he were able to do so and that he will certainly be coming out with a Sutrabhasya of his own in good time (M. Vij. V. 39). Now who was this Advaita Sanyasi who had opposed M. at Anantasayanam? Seshagiri Acharya identifies him with no less a personage thanVidyatirtha the then ruling Pontiff of the prestigious premier Advaitic Matha of South India, the Sringeri Pitha, on the basis of a study of the records of Sringeri Matha by Prof. K. Nilakantha Sastri of the Madras University and a staunch disciple of the Matha that it was Vidyatirtha himself who is said to have humbled the pride of M. at Anantasayanam. Seshagiri Acharya has manipulated the date of Vidyatirtha to syncronise with that of his own date for M. viz. 1199-1270. The idea that it was Vidyatir tha, Head of the Sringeri Matha who had taken part in the disputation with M. was first put forward by CNK Aiyar of Coimbatore in his Madhva & Madhvaism (1907). C. M. Padmanabhachar of Coimbatore while refuting many of
Anumadhvacarita of the Acarya's own leading disciple Hrsikesa

T. should set at rest all doubts about the precise date of the Acarya as 1238-1317 (18) AD. The Guruparampara of the four up-ghat disciples of the Acarya who succeeded to their Pitha one after the other till we come to the fourth disciple Aks . obhya T. adds upto 33 years. If we go by the theory of P. S. Seshagiri Acharya that the Acarya lived for only 70 years from 1199 AD, the Acarya would have left the world in 1270 AD. That would clash with the evidence of the copper plate inscription of the fourth disciple Aksobhya T. dated 1337 AD in which he is stated to have purified two Brahmin brothers of their sin of Brahmahatya and restored their social status as before. This record has been published by Kapatral Krishna Rao of Gulbarga in the Kannada Tattvavada from Gadag in April, 1968. Narahari T. one of the four up-ghat disciples of Madhva was converted and admitted to Sanyasa order in 1264 AD by his Guru Ananda T. according to the earliest inscription of Narahari T. His Srikurmam inscription dated 1281 AD mentions that he belonged to the Ministerial family of the Kalinga kingdom and was earnestly advised by the Acarya, his Guru, to assume charge as Prime Minister of the state during the period of a grave crisis and break down of law and order situation in the state on account o f t h e i n s u r r e c t i o n s o f t h e S a b a ra h o r d e s ( ve r s e 6 o f Srikurmam inscription). These are clear guidelines for us to go by in fixing the date of Madhva between 1238-1317 (Pingala) overlooking the gap of 39 years as already explained.
CNK Aiyar's aspersions against M. in his Life & Teachings of
CONCLUSION : Irrespective of Nilakantha Sastri's study of the records of the Sringeri Matha, the identification of the Advaitic Sanyasi in question with Vidya T. of the Sringeri Matha can not pass muster from the point of view of either side . First look at it from the angle of the Sringeri Mutt. The Pontiffs of this Mutt which represents the premier Advaita Pitha in South India enjoy royal honors and insignia. It would be infra dig and highly compromising to the prestige, standing and status of its ruling Pontiff to let himself be drawn into any philosophical disputation with a rebel , much younger and absolutely unknown to fame and name from Udupi, who had not yet established his credentials and reputation as the exponent of a new school of thought by his writings - even as Kudiposaturaya himself puts it to him so sarcastically and disdainfully - Mahan atikramo sutrarthavado akrtabhasyakesu (M. Vij. V, 38). In the opinion of Kudiposaturaya too the young Madhva was an upstart rebel with no reputation to lose. Worse still would be the attitude of the great Pontiff of the
Madhva (1912) did not question his identification of the Advaita

monk (who disputed with M. at Anantasayanam) with Vidya (Sankara) Tirtha of the Sringeri Mutt. The reason was that neither of them had heard of or had access to the Bhavaprakasika notes on M. Vij. by Narayana Panditacarya himself published in 1923 by the Kaniyur Math of Udupi in which the Advaita Sanyasi who disputed with M. had been identified as a Taulava ascetic of the Advaita school bearing the Taulava family sur name of
Kudiposatur - aya whose Sanskrit equivalent had been given

in M. Vij. as Apramsunutnopapada - adhivasaja (M. Vij. V, 38). The subsequent publication of Visvapati T.'s Com. on M. Vij. by the Pejavar Mutt in 1951 also decodes it as Kudiposatur aya. The mistaken identification of this Advaitic monk with Vidya T. of Sringeri Mutt was first corrected by me in my paper on "Madhva Vidyasankara Meeting - A Fiction" published in or about 1932 in the Annamalai University Journal (Vol. II). I do not know if Pof. Nilakantha Sastri had taken any notice of it in his study of the Sringeri Mutt records as he is said to have done by Seshagiri Acharya. The Taulava lineage of Kudiposaturaya r ules out the possibility of his induction to the prestigious Sringeripitha, recr uitment to which was and is
Sringeri Mutt, Vidyatirtha, who would be the last man to be lured unwarily into a debate with an unknown rebel with no
not open to Taulavas.
locus standi . All that we know from M. Vij. is that the Advaita
Sanyasi raised a point of order and did not answer the criticism . - da at all. Seshagiri Achar has There was thus actually no va disarmingly tried to put in that it is natural for each party to a debate to claim victory. But the point here is Madhva's opponent merely raised a point of order on technical grounds that only a Bhasyakara can criticise another. He himself declined to go - da" into details in defence of Sankara. Where then is the "Va when one of the parties refuses to go further and rebut the other's criticism?
Most probably this ascetic owed allegiance to a Bhagavata Sampradaya Advaitic Matha of South Kanara of those days, such as the Edaniru Matha whose Svamijis worship Visnu (Krsna) and Siva on an equal footing, Krsna in the morning & noon and Siva at night, wear ing Gopicandana dvadasanamas during day Puja & Ahnika and Vibhuti (ashes) for evening Puja of Siva. The Edaniru Mutt at Vishnumangala is the Guru Matha of a large number of Tulu Brahmana families who had not joined the M. fold.
(5TH PROOF)
OTHER PUBLISHED BOOKS OF THE AUTHOR

1) Catus-Sutri Bhasya of Sri Madhvacharya with two unpublished commentaries. English Introduction and Notes, Foreword by Dr. S. Radhakrishnan, Law Journal Press, Chennai, 1934 (Now O. P.) Madhva's Teachings in His Own Words. E. T. and annotations of 150 selections from the Sarvamula. Pub. Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai, 4th Edn. 1998. Philosophy of Sri Madhvacharya. Revised Second Edn. Motilal Banrasidass, Delhi, 1999. History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature. Revised Enlarged Second Reprint Edition, (single volume) Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 2000. Lectures on Vedanta, Karnatak University, Dharwad, 1973. Brahmasutras and their Principal Commentaries of the three Major Schools of Vedanta of Sankara, Ramanuja and Madhva. First Edn. in three Vols. by Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Mumbai (1971-76) Reprint Edn. in three vols. Munshiram Manoharlal, Delhi, 1986. Satyam eva Jayate. A Hagiological work, Sri Vyasaraja Mutt, Bangalore, 1984. Kannada Tr. of my History of Dvaita School of Vedanta and Its Literature. By Prof. Bharatiramanachar in two Vols. D vaita Ve d a n t a S t u d i e s a n d R e s e a r c h Fo u n d a t i o n , Bangalore - 4, 1988, 1993. Madhva's Aupanisadam Darsanam. D vaita Ve d a n t a S t u d i e s a n d R e s e a r c h Fo u n d a t i o n , Bangalore. Brhadaranyaka Upanisad As Expounded by Madhvacarya. D vaita Ve d a n t a S t u d i e s a n d R e s e a r c h Fo u n d a t i o n , Bangalore - 1988.
When even Kudiposaturaya declined to argue with M. so patronisingly, worse still would be the attitude of the real Vidyatirtha of the Sringeri Mutt, not to get into trouble if the odds went against him as they seem to have from the evidence let in by M. Vij. V. 46 and comments on it in the Bhavaprakasika . Even when the famous Satyadhyana Tirtha of the Uttaradi Mutt issued an open challenge to all the Advaita pithas , the Sringeri Mutt only deputed its Pandits like Mm. Anantakrishna Shastri to take part in the famous Kumbakonam debate.
2)
3)
Now, let us look at it from the other side. Narayana Pandita must have heard all about the Kudiposaturaya episode from his father. If this Kudiposaturaya was really Vidyatir tha of the Sringeri Mutt why should he (Narayana Pandita) not have given us his (Kudiposaturaya's) official name and designation but go on only - dhivasaja throughout referring to him as Apramsunutnopapada both in his M. Vij. and in the Bhavaprakasika? Why has he not even once used his new official designation and name as Vidyatir tha of the famous Sringeri Mutt if it was the fact and the truth? Would it not have added greatly to the prestige of the young rising M. if he had done so as common sense tells us? Why has Narayana Pandita kept mum on this most important detail? What would Seshagiri Achar himself have done had he been the author of M. Vij.?
4)
5) 6)
7)
8)
9)
10)
-3874 Other published books of the Author
(5TH PROOF)
11)
English Translation of Sri Madhva's Gita Bhasya with Tex t . Ananda Tir tha Pratisthana, A . B. M . M . , Bangalore - 28, 1989.
12)
Aroor Srinivasa Rao Endowment Lectures on Dvaita Philosophy (1989-90 Madras University)
13)
Visvapriya-Vilasa Prabandha of Cochi Rangappacharya, - s t a k a e t c . E d i t i e d w i t h E n g l i s h S y n o p s i s, Va d i r a j a .. Chennai, 1992. Advaita Siddhi Vs Nyayamr ta - An uptodate Critical Re-Appraisal. Ananda Tir tha Pratisthana, A. B. M. M. Bangalore - 28, 1994.
14)
15)
Numerous miscellaneous works, Research Papers, Articles and Introductions to various Publications of other Scholars and Institutions.
16)
Two outstanding Contributions of Dvaita Thought to Indian
Epistemology . Narasimhacarya Endowment Lectures. (Pub.

Journal of Oriental Research, Kuppusvami Sastri Research Institute, Chennai 1991) 17) - yasudha - of Jayatirtha Panca - dhikarani, English renderNya ing with Fo r ew o r d by P r o f. Edwin G e r o w. Raghavendra Ashram, 56/10, 8th Main, Malleswaram, Bangalore - 560 055 (1995). 18) - va - kyas and other Advaita Srutis. Maha Tatparya of Maha Ananda Tirtha Pratisthana, Bangalore - 28, 1999. 19) Vijayindra Vijaya Kavya of Madhva Kavi. 1 1 1

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MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS

Madhvamunipriya, Mahamahopa dhya ya

M.A. PhD. D.Litt.

MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS

3. Pages : 74 4. 5. Price : Rs. 50/-

April 2001 Copyright Reserved by the Author.

I. BRAHMATARKA AND OTHER UNKNOWN SOURCE BOOKS OF MADHVA

-58 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 9

Dusanam. This invites a fitting retort from Madhva :

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-712 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

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-814 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

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nothing to do with Vedanta or theology but are wholly connected

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-1120 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

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even after so much has been written, discussed, published and

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-1630 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

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opening word in Isa Up.

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(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 33

by Prof. Mesquita on P. 27 of his English edition in the opening

-1834 Brahmatarka and other unknown source books of Madhva

II. JAINA BACKGROUND OF DVAITA VEDANTA - A FARFETCHED THEORY

-1936 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory

(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 37

-2038 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory

(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 39

as past and stamps it as "Past". Thus the temporal gap is bridged

-2140 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory

(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 41

uncalled for as there is no disagreement on the point. The example

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(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 43

positive, forthright and pragmatic one of "being true to the nature

pramanya in Jainism and Dvaita thought on the basis of their

as such and the instruments of its acquisition rest on grammatical

-2344 Jaina background of Dvaita Vedanta - A farfetched theory

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(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 47

an extent as to avoid even his Visayavakyas of the Sutras from

approach to the Sutras without going chapter wise . The question

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(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 49

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(5TH PROOF) MY LATEST FOUR RESEARCH PAPERS 51

-2752 The Arsa Tradition of Approach of Madhvacarya