10.

Espeleta v Avelino (1975) 62 SCRA 395 Facts: Shells counsel Bellaflor forwarded an oral motion for the revocation of appearance of Espletas witness Montano for cross-examination and the conclusion of her testimony. She was unable to appear in one of the trials due to her an audit for a job in the Department of Local Government at the day she was supposed to finish her testimony and cross-examination. Judge Avelino accepted this proposal and even allowed Shell to present its rebuttal witness for Espeletas testimony. The judge granted this request to the prejudice of Espeleta. The magistrate also did not consider Espeletas counsels letter for postponement. The judge told parties to submit documentary evidence afterwards but rejected the ones from Montanos testimony due to her being stricken from the records. The petitioner complains that he was denied procedural due process when respondent Judge acceded to the plea of plaintiff-respondent that the testimony of a witness deemed by him as vital to his case be ignored and disregarded in its entirety for failure to be present in court on the day set for her crossexamination, despite due notice given in open court. It appears that said witness who is a new employee of the Office of the Department of Local Government and Community Development at the time she was supposed to continue her testimony could not disregard the orders of her superiors to make an urgent audit in Baybay, Leyte and informed petitioners counsel of her unavailability so that the latter could make the proper representation with the trial court, for possible deferment. Issue: Whether the concept of fairness that is basic to procedural due process would be satisfied if the right to be heard of petitioner was revoked by the respondent Judge? HELD: No. Under the circumstances, the stress on the absence of procedural due process is understandable for as a result of the order of respondent Judge now sought to be set aside, there is more than just a probability that petitioner would be condemned to pay before he had been fully heard. It cannot be truly asserted then that the proceedings satisfied the constitutional standard for a judicious inquiry. To that extent, it would make a mockery of the requirement that the judgment should be only after a trial where the litigants are given full and unimpeded opportunity to sustain their respective claims and to have their evidence duly considered and weighed. Unless, the challenged order then were set aside, petitioner can assert a grievance grounded on the due process guarantee.