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Pp v Bayotas. G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994 ....................................... 1 Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977 ............................... 2 DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001 ................................................................................................................ 3 PRBL INC v Pp G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456 ....................... 4 Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 512 SCRA 642........ 5 SPS. Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010 .............................. 6 Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007 ...... 8 Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966 ......... 9 LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003............................................... 10 Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 241 SCRA 671 ....................................................................................................... 11 Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990 ........................................ 12 Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008 .................................................. 13 Picart vs. Smith March 15, 1918 37 Phil 809................................................. 13 Guillang v Bedania 588 SCRA 73 ................................................................... 14

carcinoma gastric malingering. Consequently, the Supreme Court in its Resolution, dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered. Issue: Whether death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his civil liability? Held: Affirmative. ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is totallyextinguished:1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to the pecuniary penalties liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment; Article 30 of the Civil Code provides:"When a separate civil action is brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense, and no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of the civil case, a preponderance of evidence shall likewise be sufficient to prove the act complained of."What Article 30 recognizes is an alternative and separate 1

Pp v Bayotas. G.R. No. 102007. September 2, 1994


Facts: In Criminal Case filed before RTC Roxas City, Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and eventually convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest secondary to hepatic encephalopathy secondary to hipato

civil action which may be brought to demand civil liability arising from a criminal offense independently of any criminal action. In the event that no criminal proceedings are instituted during the pendency of said civil case, the quantum of evidence needed to prove the criminal act will have to be that which is compatible with civil liability and that is, preponderance of evidence and not proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Citing or invoking Article 30 to justify the survival of the civil action despite extinction of the criminal would in effect merely beg the question of whether civil liability ex delicto survives upon extinction of the criminal action due to death of the accused during appeal of his conviction. This is because whether asserted in the criminal action or in a separate civil action, civil liability ex delicto is extinguished by the death of the accused while his conviction is on appeal. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code is clear on this matter. In pursuing recovery of civil liability arising from crime, the final determination of the criminal liability is a condition precedent to the prosecution of the civil action, such that when the criminal action is extinguished by the demise of accused-appellant pending appeal thereof, said civil action cannot survive. The claim for civil liability springs out of and is dependent upon facts which, if true, would constitute a crime. Such civil liability is an inevitable consequence of the criminal liability and is to be declared and enforced in the criminal proceeding. This is to be distinguished from that which is contemplated under Article 30 of the Civil Code which refers to the institution of a separate civil action that does not draw its life from a criminal proceeding. The Sendaydiego, however, failed to take note of this fundamental distinction when it allowed the survival of the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto by treating the same as a separate civil action referred to under Article 30.Surely, it will take more than just a summary judicial pronouncement to authorize the conversion of said civil action to an independent one such as that contemplated under Article30.Ironically however, the main decision in Sendaydiego did not apply Article 30, the resolution of notwithstanding. Thus, it was held in the main decision:"Sendaydiego's appeal will be resolved only for the purpose of showing his criminal liability which is the basis of the civil liability for which

his estate would be liable."In other words, the Court, in resolving the issue of his civil liability, concomitantly made a determination on whether Sendaydiego, on the basis of evidenced adduced, was indeed guilty beyond reasonable doubt of committing the offense charged. Thus, it upheld Sendaydiego's conviction and pronounced the same as the source of his civil liability. Consequently, although Article 30 was not applied in the final determination of Sendaydiego's civil liability, there was a reopening of the criminal action already extinguished which served as basis for Sendaydiego's civil liability. We reiterate: Upon death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal. Applying this set of rules to the case at bench, we hold that the death of appellant Bayotas extinguished his criminal liability and the civil liability based solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape.

Elcano v Hill July 17, 2011 77 SCRA 100 May 26, 1977
Torts and Damages Civil Liability from Quasi Delicts vs Civil Liability from Crimes Facts: Reginald Hill, a minor, caused the death of Agapito (son of Elcano). Elcano filed a criminal case against Reginald but Reginald was acquitted for lack of intent coupled with mistake. Elcano then filed a civil action against Reginald and his dad (Marvin Hill) for damages based on Article 2180 of the Civil Code. Hill argued that the civil action is barred by his sons acquittal in the criminal case; and that if ever, his civil liability as a parent has been 2

extinguished by the fact that his son is already an emancipated minor by reason of his marriage. Issue: Whether or not Marvin Hill may be held civilly liable under Article 2180. Held: Yes. The acquittal of Reginald in the criminal case does not bar the filing of a separate civil action. A separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if accused is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may be punishable by law. While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place by the marriage of the minor child, it is, however, also clear that pursuant to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or absolute. Thus Emancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall terminate parental authority over the childs person. It shall enable the minor to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the assistance of his father, mother or

guardian. Therefore, Article 2180 is applicable to Marvin Hill the SC however ruled since at the time of the decision, Reginald is already of age, Marvins liability should be subsidiary only as a matter of equity.

DMPI Employees vs. Velez Metal-NAFLU G.R. No. 129282, November 29, 2001
Facts: An information for estafa was filed against Carmen Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas the amount of P608,532.46.Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit with the teller of petitioner. Subsequently, on March 29, 1994, respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal of the civil case on the ground that there is a pending criminal case in RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, Trial court issued an order dismissing the case. However upon respondents motion for reconsideration, the order of dismissal was recalled On Feb. 21 1997 Issue: Whether or not the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case for Estafa without the necessary reservation exercised by the party Held: Yes. As a general rule, an offense causes two (2) classes of injuries. The first is the social injury produced by the criminal act which is sought to 3

be repaired thru the imposition of the corresponding penalty, and the second is the personal injury caused to the victim of the crime which injury is sought to be compensated through indemnity which is civil in nature. Thus, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from thecommission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately instituted. Rule 111, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which became effective on December 1, 2000, provides that: "(a) When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action." Rule 111, Section 2 further provides that "After the criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been entered in the criminal action ." However, with respect to civil actions for recovery of civil liability under Articles 32,33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code arising from the same act or omission, the rule has been changed. Under the present rule, only the

civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even without a reservation. The changes in the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure pertaining to independent civil actions which became effective on December 1, 2000 are applicable to this case. Procedural laws may be given retroactive effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage. There are no vested rights in the rules of procedure. Thus, Civil Case No. CV-94-214, an independent civil action for damages on account of the fraud committed against respondent Villegas under Article 33 of the Civil Code, may proceed independently even if there was no reservation as to its filing.

PRBL INC v Pp G.R. No. 147703, 14 April 2004, 427 SCRA 456
Facts: On July 27, 1994, accused was found guilty and convicted of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of 4

4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years, and to pay damages. Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention that Section 8, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also admittedly hired and provided by, filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused. Issue: Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused employee, may appeal the judgment of conviction independently of the accused. Held: Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a criminal action; that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of conviction meted out to the employee. What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasicontracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal prosecution remains, and the offended party may subject to the control of the prosecutor still intervene in the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein.

former's subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary civil liability.

Manliclic v. Calaunan G.R. No. 150157 January 25, 2007 512 SCRA 642
Facts: Petitioner Manliclic is a driver of Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. (PRBLI) While driving his bus going to Manila, he bumped rear left side of the owner-type jeep of Respondent Calaunan. Because of the collision, petitioner was criminally charged with reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property with physical injuries. Subsequently, respondent filed a damage suit against petitioner and PRBLI. According to respondent, his jeep was cruising at the speed of 60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side. At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep when the jeep was hit. On the other hand, according to petitioner, explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about togo to the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it was to overtake another jeep in front of it. Petitioner was then acquitted of the criminal charges against him. However, in the civil case, he, along with his employer, PRBLI, was still made to pay damages to respondent. Issue: What is the effect of Manliclics acquittal to the civil case? 5

The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his flight, then the

Held: Since the civil case is one for quasi delict, Manliclics Acquittal Does not affect the case. Manliclic and PRBLI are still liable for damages A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. It is now settled that acquittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on quasi delict. In other words, if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. However, if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto. In this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or ex delicto is not possible. In this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist). The responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a quasi-delict Is entirely separate and

distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under thePenal Code. An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

SPS. Pacis v Morales G.R. No. 169467 February 25, 2010


Facts: Petitioners filed with the trial court a civil case for damages against respondent Morales. Petitioners are the parents of Alfred Pacis, a 17-year old student who died in a shooting incident inside the Top Gun Firearms and Ammunitions Store in Baguio City. Morales is the owner of the gun store. On the fateful day, Alfred was in the gun store, with Matibag and Herbolario as sales agents and caretakers of the store while owner Morales was in Manila. The gun which killed Alfred is a gun owned by a store customer which was left with Morales for repairs, which he placed inside a drawer. Since Morales would be going to Manila, he left the keys to the store with the caretakers. It appears that the caretakers took the gun from the drawer and placed it on top of a table. Attracted by the sight of the gun, the young Alfred got hold of the same. Matibag asked Alfred to return the gun. The latter followed and handed the gun to Matibag. It went off, the bullet hitting the young Alfred in the head. A criminal case for homicide was filed against Matibag. Matibag, however, was acquitted of the charge against him because of the exempting circumstance of accident under Art. 12, par. 4 of the RPC.

By agreement of the parties, the evidence adduced in the criminal case for homicide against Matibag was reproduced and adopted by them as part of their evidence in the instant case. The trial court rendered its decision in favor of petitioners, ordering the defendant to pay plaintiffs indemnity for the death of Alfred, actual damages for the hospitalization and burial, expenses incurred by the plaintiffs, compensatory damages, MD and AF. Respondent appealed to the CA, which reversed the trial courts Decision and absolved respondent from civil liability under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. MR denied, hence this petition. Issue: Was Morales negligent? Held: Yes. This case for damages arose out of the accidental shooting of petitioners son. Under Article 1161 of the Civil Code, petitioners may enforce their claim for damages based on the civil liability arising from the crime under Article 100 of the RPC or they may opt to file an independent civil action for damages under the Civil Code. In this case, instead of enforcing their claim for damages in the homicide case filed against Matibag, petitioners opted to file an independent civil action for damages against respondent whom they alleged was Matibags employer. Petitioners based their claim for damages under Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. Unlike the subsidiary liability of the employer under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employer, or any person for that matter, under Article 2176 of the Civil Code is primary and direct, based on a persons own negligence. Article 2176 states:

Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. This case involves the accidental discharge of a firearm inside a gun store. Under PNP Circular No. 9, entitled the Policy on Firearms and Ammunition Dealership/Repair, a person who is in the business of purchasing and selling of firearms and ammunition must maintain basic security and safety requirements of a gun dealer, otherwise his License to Operate Dealership will be suspended or canceled. Indeed, a higher degree of care is required of someone who has in his possession or under his control an instrumentality extremely dangerous in character, such as dangerous weapons or substances. Such person in possession or control of dangerous instrumentalities has the duty to take exceptional precautions to prevent any injury being done thereby. Unlike the ordinary affairs of life or business which involve little or no risk, a business dealing with dangerous weapons requires the exercise of a higher degree of care. As a gun store owner, respondent is presumed to be knowledgeable about firearms safety and should have known never to keep a loaded weapon in his store to avoid unreasonable risk of harm or injury to others. Respondent has the duty to ensure that all the guns in his store are not loaded. Firearms should be stored unloaded and separate from ammunition when the firearms are not needed for ready-access defensive use. With more reason, guns accepted by the store for repair should not be loaded precisely because they are defective and may cause an accidental discharge such as what happened in this case. Respondent was clearly negligent when he accepted the gun for repair and placed it inside the drawer without ensuring first that it was not loaded. In the first place, the defective gun should have been stored in a vault. Before accepting the defective gun for 7

repair, respondent should have made sure that it was not loaded to prevent any untoward accident. Indeed, respondent should never accept a firearm from another person, until the cylinder or action is open and he has personally checked that the weapon is completely unloaded. For failing to insure that the gun was not loaded, respondent himself was negligent. Furthermore, it was not shown in this case whether respondent had a License to Repair which authorizes him to repair defective firearms to restore its original composition or enhance or upgrade firearms.

Clearly, respondent did not exercise the degree of care and diligence required of a good father of a family, much less the degree of care required of someone dealing with dangerous weapons, as would exempt him from liability in this case.

civil aspect of the case to the RTC of Makati, contending that the dismissal of thecriminal case should not include its civil aspect. The RTC held that while the evidence presented was insufficient to prove Chois criminal liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted Parks appeal and ordered Choi to pay himP1,875,000 with legal interest.- Upon Chois motion for reconsideration, however,the RTC set aside its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC for further proceedings, so that Choi may adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case. Parks motion for reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated the case to the CA which dismissed his petition. Issue: Whether the respondent has a right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case in view of his demurer. Held:

Hun Hyung Park vs. Eung Won Choi G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007
Facts: Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22,otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.- After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer, asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of insufficiency of funds did not arise.- (2/27/03) The MeTC of Makati, Branch 65 granted the demurrer and dismissed the case. The prosecutions motion for reconsideration was denied.- Park appealed the

Yes. n case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. Such denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in suchaspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.- On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally proceed. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when 8

there is a finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must perforce continue.- In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. Choi did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized that there is basis for a remand. Park posits that Choi waived his right to present evidence on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33, and (2) when respondent orally opposed petitioners motion for reconsideration pleading that proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue. Petitioners citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect. Where a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it to resolve. One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure, not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.- As for petitioners attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be determined with certainty from the records the nature of Chois alleged oral objections to Parks motion for reconsideration of the grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon; hence, courts must indulge every reasonable presumption against it. Dispositive Petition is DENIED.

On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines, Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right" to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused, and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued, and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man [manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the white man" and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first class" seat in the plane. Issue: Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims and therefore entitles to damages? Held: Yes. It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket. But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class seats. If, as petitioner underscores, a firstclass-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of the hands of an airline. What security 9

Air France v. Carascoso and CA G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
Facts:

then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule, a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the covenants in the ticket. Why, then, was he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat or, if another had a better right to the seat? To authorize an award for moral damages there must be an averment of fraud or bad faith. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth therein. The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is put on wrongful expulsion. It is, therefore, unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to conform to the evidence is not even required. Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is that any rule or discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages against the carrier.

On 14 October 1993, about half an hour past 7:00 p.m., Nicanor Navidad, then drunk, entered the EDSA LRT station after purchasing a token (representing payment of the fare). While Navidad was standing on the platform near theLRT tracks, Junelito Escartin, the security guard assigned to the area approached Navidad. A misunderstanding or an altercation between the twoapparently ensued that led to a fist fight. No evidence, however, was adduced to indicate how the fight started or who, between the two, delivered the first blow or how Navidad later fell on the LRT tracks. At the exact moment that Navidad fell, an LRT train, operated by Rodolfo Roman, was coming in. Navidad was struck by the moving train, and he was killed instantaneously. On 8 December 1994, the widow of Nicanor, Marjorie Navidad, along with her children, filed a complaint for damages against Junelito Escartin, Rodolfo Roman, the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization, Inc. (Metro Transit), and Prudent for the death of her husband. LRTA and Roman filed a counter claim against Navidad and a cross-claim against Escartin and Prudent. Prudent, in its answer, denied liability and averred that it had exercised due diligence in the election and supervision of its security guards. The LRTA and Roman presented their evidence while Prudent and Escartin, instead of presenting evidence, filed a demurrer contending that Navidad had failed to prove that Escartin was negligent in his assigned task. On 11 August 1998, the trial court rendered its decision, ordering Prudent Security and Escartin to jointly and severally pay Navidad (a) (1) Actual damages of P44,830.00; (2) Compensatory damages of P443,520.00; (3) Indemnity for the death of Nicanor Navidad in the sum of P50,000.00; (b) Moral damages of P50,000.00; (c) Attorneys fees of P20,000; and (d) Costs of suit. The court also dismissed the complaint against LRTA and Rodolfo Roman for lack of merit, and the compulsory counter claimof LRTA and Roman. Prudent appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 27 August 2000, the appellate court promulgated its decision exonerating Prudent from any liability for the death of Nicanor Navidad and, instead, holding the LRTA and Roman jointly and severally liable. The appellate court modified 10

LRTA v Navidad GR 145804, 6 February 2003


Facts:

the judgment ordering Roman and the LRTA solidarily liable to pay Navidad (a) P44,830.00 as actual damages;(b) P50,000.00 as nominal damages; (c) P50,000.00 as moral damages; (d)P50,000.00 as indemnity for the death of the deceased; and (e) P20,000.00 a sand for attorneys fees. The appellate court denied LRTAs and Romans motion for reconsideration in its resolution of 10 October 2000. Issue: Whether LRTA liable for tort arising from contract. Held: YES. The premise for employers liability for tort (under the provisions of Article2176 and related provisions, in conjunction with Article 2180 of the Civil Code) is negligence or fault on the part of the employee. Once such fault is established, the employer can then be made liable on the basis of the presumption juristantum that the employer failed to exercise diligentissimi patris familias in the selection and supervision of its employees. The liability is primary and can onlybe negated by showing due diligence in the selection and supervision of theemployee. Herein, such a factual matter that has not been shown. The foundation of LRTAs liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to indemnify the victim arises from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to exercise the high diligence required of the common carrier. In the discharge of its commitment to ensure the safety of passengers, a carrier may choose to hire its own employees or avail itself of the services of an outsider or an independent firm to undertake the task. In either case, the common carrier is not relieved of its responsibilities under the contract of carriage. A contractual obligation can be breached by tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well

apply. In fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of contract would have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. CA G.R. No. 108164 February 23, 1995 241 SCRA 671
Facts: In October 1986 Luis Luna applied for a FAREASTCARD with Fart East Bank. A supplemental card was also issued to his wife, Clarita. On August 1988, Clarita lost her card and promptly informed the bank of its loss for which she submitted an Affidavit of Loss. The bank recorded this loss and gave the credit card account a status of Hot Card and/or Cancelled Card. Such record holds also for the principal card holder until such time that the lost card was replaced. On October 1988, Luis Luna used his card to purchase a despidida lunch for his friend in the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant. His card was dishonored in the restaurant and he was forced to pay in cash, amounting to almost P600.00. He felt embarrassed by this incident. He then complained to Far East Bank and he found out that his account has been cancelled without informing him. Bank security policy is to tag the card as hostile when it is reported lost, however, the bank failed to inform him and an overzealous employee failed to consider that it was the cardholder himself presenting the credit card. The bank sent an apology letter to Mr. Luna and to the Manager of the Bahia Rooftop Restaurant to assure that Mr Luna was a very valuable client. Spouses Luna still felt aggrieved and thus filed this case for damages against Far East Bank. Far East Bank was adjudged to pay the following: (a) P300,000.00 moral damages;(b) P50,000.00 exemplary damages; and (c) P20,000.00 attorney's fees. 11

Issue: Whether Far East Bank is liable for damages to the Spouses Luna amounting the above-mentioned figures? Held: Spouses Luna are entitled only to nominal damages but not moral and exemplary damages. Moral damages are awarded if the defendant is to be shown to have acted in bad faith. Article 2219 states that, Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; It is true that the bank was remiss in indeed neglecting to personally inform Luis of his own card's cancellation. Nothing however, can sufficiently indicate any deliberate intent on the part of the Bank to cause harm to private respondents. Neither could the banks negligence in failing to give personal notice to Luis be considered so gross as to amount to malice or bad faith. Malice or bad faith implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity; it is different from the negative idea of negligence in that malice or bad faith contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or ill will. Nominal damages were awarded because of the simple fact that the bank failed to notify Mr. Luna, thus entitle him to recover a measure of damages sanctioned under Article 2221 of the Civil Code providing thusly: "Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him."

Spouses Andamo are the owners of a parcel of land which is adjacent to that of private respondent, Missionaries of Our Lady of La Salette, Inc., a religious corporation. Within the land of respondent corporation, water paths and contrivances, including an artificial lake, were constructed, which allegedly inundated and eroded petitioners' land, caused a young man to drown, damaged petitioners' crops and plants, washed away costly fences, endangered the lives of petitioner sand their laborers during rainy and stormy seasons, and exposed plants and other improvements to destruction. Petitioners filed a criminal and a separate civil action for damages against the respondent. Issue: Whether he IAC erred in affirming the trial courts order dismissing the civil case as the criminal case was still unresolved. Held: Yes. A careful examination of the afore quoted complaint shows that the civil actionis one under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delicts. All the elements of a quasi-delict are present, to wit: (a) damages suffered by the plaintiff, (b) fault or negligence of the defendant, or some other person for whose acts he must respond; and (c) the connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and the damages incurred by the plaintiff. Clearly, from petitioner's complaint, the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation are alleged to have inundated the land of petitioners. There is therefore, an assertion of a causal connection between the act of building these water paths and the damage sustained by petitioners. Such action if proven constitutes fault or negligence which may be the basis for the recovery of damages. petitioners' complaint sufficiently alleges that petitioners have sustained and will continue to sustain damage due to the water paths and contrivances built by respondent corporation. Indeed, the recitals of the complaint, the alleged presence of damage to the 12

Andamo v IAC G.R. No. 74761 November 6, 1990


Facts:

petitioners, the act or omission of respondent corporation supposedly constituting fault or negligence, and the causal connection between the act and the damage, with no pre-existing contractual obligation between the parties make a clear case of a quasi delict or culpa aquiliana. Article 2176, whenever it refers to "fault or negligence", covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, (if the tortfeasor is actually charged also criminally), to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary.

including Asst. Headmaster Castro. Ching relayed the information to Castro. At the end of the conversation, Castro said be careful talking to Tan, thats dangerous Ching then relayed the information to Tan, and Tan filed a grave oral defamation suit against Castro. Issue: Whether petitioner can still be held liable, or has double jeopardy set in? Held: No. Petitioner cannot be held liable as double jeopardy has set in. Double jeopardy occurs upon (1) a valid indictment (2) before a competent court (3)after arraignment (4) when a valid plea has been entered and (5) when the accused was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Thus, an acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or appellate court, is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy. The only exception is when the trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion or, as we held in Galman v. Sandiganbayan, when there was mistrial. In such instances, the OSG can assail the said judgment in a petition for certiorari establishing that the State was deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and prove its case. He rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason, void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.

Castro v Pp G.R. No. 180832, July 23, 2008


Facts: Justin Albert was the son of Mr. Tan. Justin was a Grade 12 student of Reedley International School (RIS). He was dismissed for violating the rules of his probation. Tan requested for a reconsideration and RIS imposed non-appealable conditions such as not allowing Albert to participate in the graduation ceremonies. Tan filed a complaint in the DepEd, claiming malice and bad faith. DepEd nullified RIS sanctions as unreasonable and a denial of due process. DepEd orders readmission of Albert without any conditions. Albert finally participated in the graduation ceremonies. After the graduation ceremonies, Tan talked to a fellow parent Ching, intimating his contemplating suit against officers of RIS in their personal capacities,

Picart vs. Smith March 15, 1918 37 Phil 809


Facts: Amando Picart seeks to recover from the defendant Frank Smith the sum of Php31,100 as damages alleged to have been caused by an 13

automobile driven by Smith. The incident happened on Dec 12, 1912, at the Carlatan Bridge, San Fernando, La Union. Picart was riding on his pony aver the said bridge. Before he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction driving his vehicle at 10 to 12miles per hour. Smith blew his horn to give warning as he observed that the man was not observing rules of the road. Smith continued his course and made two more blasts. Picart was perturbed by the rapidity of the approach that he pulled his pony to the right side of the railing. As the automobile approached, Smith guided the automobile to its left, that being the proper side of the road for the machine. Smith noticed that the pony was not frightened so he continued without diminution of speed. When he learned that there was no possibility for the pony to go on the other side, Smith drove his car to the right to avoid hitting the pony, but in so doing the vehicle passed in a close proximity to the horse that it became frightened and turned its belly across the bridge with its head towards the railing. The horse was struck on the hock of the left hind leg by the flange of the car and the limb was broken. The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. It showed that the free space where the pony stood between the automobile and the railing was probably less than one half meters. The horse died and Picart received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and required medical attention for several days. Issue: Whether Smith was guilty of negligence that gives rise to a civil obligation to repair the damage done to Picart and his pony. Held: Yes, the court ruled that Smith that he is liable to pay Picart the amount of P200. The sum is computed to include the value of the horse, medical expenses of the plaintiff, the loss or damage occasioned to articles of his apparel. In the nature of things, this change in situation occurred while the automobile was still some distance away. From this moment it

was no longer possible for Picart to escape being run down by going to a place for greater safety. The control of the situation had then passed entirely to Smith, and it was his duty to bring his car to an immediate stop or seeing no other persons on the bridge, to take the other side and pass sufficiently far away from the horse to avoid collision. There was an appreciable risk that a horse not acquainted with vehicles would react that way. The Test to Determine the Existence of Negligence in a particular case may be stated as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that reasonable care and caution which an ordinarily prudent person would have used the same situation? If not then he is guilty of negligence. The law in effect adopts the standard supposed to be supplied by the imaginary conduct of the discreet paterfamilias of the Roman Law. The existence of negligence in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy or negligent in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. A prudent man, placed in the position of Smith in the Courts opinion would have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught with risk and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as a reasonable consequence of that course.

Guillang v Bedania 588 SCRA 73


Facts: One afternoon of October 1994, Guillang was driving his Corolla along Aguinaldo Highway in Cavite when it was hit by a turning 10-wheeler truck driven by Rodolfo Bedania and owned by Rodolfo de Silva. The passengers of the car were rushed to the Medical Center in Dasmarias, Cavite for treatment. Because of severe injuries, Antero, one of the passengers, was later transferred to the Philippine General Hospital. However, on 3 November1994, Antero died due to the injuries he sustained 14

from the collision. The car was a total wreck while the truck sustained minor damage. On 24 April 1995, petitioners Genaro, Llanillo, Dignadice, and the heirs of Antero instituted a complaint for damages based on quasi-delict against respondents Bedania and de Silva. On 5 December 2000, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners. The trial court found Bedania grossly negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other motorists. The trial court also declared de Silva grossly negligent in the selection and supervision of his driver, Bedania. On appeal, the CA reversed the decision of the lower court and dismissed the civil case for lack of merit. Petitioners then filed a MR but to no avail. Hence, this case. Issue: Who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners? Held: The trial court held Bedania and de Silva, as Bedanias employer, liable because the proximate cause of the collision was the sudden U-turn executed by Bedania without any signal lights. On the other hand, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial courts decision and held Genaro liable because the proximate cause of the collision was Genaros failure to stop the car despite seeing that Bedania was making a U-turn. Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interest of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. In Picart v. Smith, we held that the test of negligence is whether the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act used that reasonable care and caution which an ordinary person would have used in the same situation Clearly, Bedanias negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the life of Antero and injured the petitioners.

Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have happened. The sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The trucks sudden U-turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of Antero and the injuries of petitioners.

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