MOISES JOCSON, petitioner vs.

COURT OF APPEALS, AGUSTINA JOCSONVASQUEZ, ERNESTO VASQUEZ, respondents Petition for Certiorari to review CA decision [February 16, 1989] Facts: Spouses Emilio Jocson & Alejandra Poblete had 2 children: Moises Jocson & Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to Ernesto Vasquez. Alejandra died intestate. April 1, 1972 Emilio died intestate. June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity of 3 documents executed by Emilio during his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null & void and that the properties involved be partitioned bet him & his sister: 1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic, Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilios manifestation that the lands was sold at a low price because it was his loving, helpful & thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He says his son possesses such qualities too. He further claims that the sale did not violate any law & that he did not touch his wifes properties. He acknowledged receipt of payment. 2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice mills & a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too. 3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition & Adjudication w/Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio & Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina. All documents were executed before a notary public. Nos. 1 & 2 were registered w/the Register of Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled & new certificates issued in the name of Agustina. Moises allegations: 1. #1 is null & void because his fathers consent was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure, influence & other illegal machinations. He also alleges that property was sold for a simulated price considering that his sister had no work or livelihood of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is fictitious, simulated & fabricated. 2. Same allegations re #2 & #3 with additional allegation that he was deliberately excluded & they intended to defraud him of his legitimate share. He also claims that defendants were employed in their parents business & they must have used business earnings or simulated consideration in order to purchase the properties. 3. No real sale between dad & daughter living under same roof. 4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties were all income-producitng. 5. #1 & #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties that Emilio cant validly sell. 6. #3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister but not extrajudicial partition. RTC: decided in favor of petitioner. Documents were simulated & fictitious because: 1) no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2) prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises. Declared #1 & #2 properties as conjugal by virtue of registration papers w/c declared: Emilio Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Ordered registration of prop to 2 children. CA: reversed. Nos. 1 & 2 barred by prescription because annulment of contract based on fraud must be filed 4 yrs from discovery of such w/c begins on the

date of the registration w/the Register of Deeds. All documents actually & intended to be binding & effective against Emilio. Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition w/sale in #3 is valid since it was done in accordance w/New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession & Moises 1/3 has not been prejudiced. ISSUES & RATIO: 1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred by prescription NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when consents obtained by fraud is voidable (CC Art. 1330) & action for annulment must be filed w/in 4 yrs from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4). Discovery means the time when contract was registered w/Register of Deeds (Gerona vs. De Guzman). If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by prescription. But he further assailed that sale was w/o consideration since amount paid were merely simulated. Contracts w/o cause or consideration produce no effect whatsoever (CC Art. 1352). A sale w/simulated price is void (CC Art. 1471 & 1409[3]) and action for declaration of its nullity does not prescribe (CC Art. 1410). 2. WON sales were w/o consideration. NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon him to prove his allegations, especially since documents show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of price & they are notarized. He failed to do so and thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his own witness contradicted his claim that his sister & her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas said that Agustina & Ernesto were into buy & sell of palay & rice. Even he himself said that he didnt know if his sister had other businesses. Agustina testified that she was into buy & sell even prior to her marriage. 3. WON prices were simulated NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase price was higher than assessed value (#1: P10k vs. P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs. P24,840.00). Besides difference bet market value & purchase price is understandable considering fathers filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No proof of defective consent. 4. WON sale is improbable. NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not relevant considering that all essential requirements for contract are clearly present: consent, object & cause. 5. WON properties in #1 & #2 were conjugal properties of Emilio & wife. NO. CC Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage is presumed to belong to CP unless proven otherwise. Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed acquired during the marriage (Cobb-Perez vs. Lantin). Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties in question were indeed obtained during the marriage of their parents before he can invoke the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold letters) are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual owning of land) is different from registration. Possible that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a bachelor & only registered such after marriage. Married to phrase is a mere description of Emilios civil status at the time of registration (Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is the owner, property registered in his name alone & that he is married. Consistent w/principle that registration of property in name of only one spouse doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy vs. Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear & convincing

proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have presented sufficient proof to show that properties were acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof, presumption does not exist, thus, properties are considered exclusive to Emilio.

HOLDING: Petition dismissed. CA affirmed. FRANCISCO v. CA 299 SCRA 188 (1998) Facts: Teresita (petitioner), is Eusebios (private respondent) legal wife second marriage. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F. Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private respondents) are children of Eusebio by his first marriage. Teresitas allegations: o Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, theyve acquired properties in Barangay Balite, Rodriguez, Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal. o These properties were administered by Eusebio til he was invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to administer them. o Private respondents succeeded in convincing their father to sign a general power of attorney which authorized Conchita to administer the house and lot together with the apartments situated in Rodriguez, Rizal. Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of said general power of attorney, thus enjoining its enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix of properties in dispute. RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that Teresita did not show that said properties were acquired during the second marriage, or that they pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this decision. Teresita files this petition, claiming that: o CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of new CC as said title has already been repealed by art. 253, FC o It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC However, issue in Teresitas reply: WON Art. 116, FC applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code [which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil Code" 4 Issue: WON properties are not conjugal but capital properties of Eusebio exclusively. Held and Ratio: Yes. Petition denied. Arts. 158 and 160, New CC have been repealed by the FC, specifically by Art. 254, FC (not Art. 253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art. 105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158&160 doesnt operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested rights. Rights accrued and vested while these articles were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be resolved based on provisions of New CC. Art. 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this presumption must first show proof of acquisition during the coverture (marriage). The presumption refers only to the property acquired during the marriage and does not operate

when there is no showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and convincing evidence showing exclusive ownership of one of the spouses. In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence to show that the properties which she claimed to be conjugal were acquired during her marriage with Eusebio. As regard land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut Eusebios testimony that he inherited the same from his parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name. Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to Art. 148, New CC. Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by either spouse during the marriage by inheritance, devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the land took place during his second marriage, the land would still be his "exclusive property" because it was acquired by him, "during the marriage, by lucrative title." As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed building permits for the house and the apartment, with her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in her name alone in support of her claim that it was conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that the improvements were acquired during the second marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or licensee is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the owner of the structures (Art. 1431, New CC; Rule 129(4), Revised Rules on Evidence). Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby become conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition that it was constructed at the expense of their partnership (Art. 158(2), New CC). Presumption of conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the source of funding (Art. 160, New CC) cannot be invoked because there is also lack in proof that it was erected during the alleged second marriage. Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate. The fact that the land was registered in the name of "Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita Francisco", is no proof that the property was acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two different acts. Registration merely confirms title already existing and phrase "married to" is merely descriptive of the civil status of Eusebio. Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator of the properties considering that the assets are exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to administer property.