University of Utah Western Political Science Association

Toward a Theory of Political Violence: The Case of Rural Colombia Author(s): Robert C. Williamson Source: The Western Political Quarterly, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Mar., 1965), pp. 35-44 Published by: University of Utah on behalf of the Western Political Science Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/445653 . Accessed: 17/04/2013 17:52
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TOWARD A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE: THE CASE OF RURAL COLOMBIA

ROBERT C. WILLIAMSON

LehighUniversity been associated withrevolution, IOLENCE has generally war,or organized forlarge-scale violence has been remarkable crime. The present century has been a product Much of recent massviolence in thesethree categories. of liberation from colonial or undeclared of guerrilla warfare, including struggles At the broadest one between different and conflicts base, might power groups. rule, are an erratic the and terror of that violence trifle a by-product say, pretentiously, a Yet this in world. article on the focuses vastsocialchangetoward equalitarianism since of civil has annihilated a of violence: war, which, 1948, variety uniqueprocess thisphenearly200,000people in the backlandsof Colombia. Beforeexamining context of and theoretical terror violence. the establish shall we nomenon, form of conflict, whichin as a severely Violencecan be defined dysfunctional an aborbetween thetwopolitical thecase of Colombiahas beena vendetta parties, to social frustration.' Violence and a "blind reaction" tiverevolutionary is, process, and in the Colombiancase, a traditional a culturalartifact, among otherthings, a cataclysm undercertain social pressures. behaviorpattern becoming periodically forgroupintegrity, is necessary thatconflict coheIf we acceptthe Simmeltheory2 the of the Colombian maintenance" the and group, example siveness, "boundary thecase to thebreaking point. pushes to produce is mostlikely The question maybe raisedas to whattypeof society Accordoutcome. is a predictable climate violence orin whatsociopolitical violence, non-instituare that with mass movements is associated violence ingto Kornhauser, violencehas occurred masssociety, In our twentieth-century tionalized.3 organized and legitimawhereformalized undertotalitarian mostdramatically governments or at least are available. tizedchannelsare a prescribed part of the social system, a different or developing climatehas transitional nations, sociopolitical Regarding the individual In case. recent is alienated from the been the Colombia, generally of the decline localism In rural has known. and of the he areas, emergence a society for both the federated socialorderhave poseda difficult problem campesino(peasdifferent as they are. Anomy from results ant) and thellanero(rangecattleman), manto theland and to theproprietor therelations ofthelittle are conflicting norms;
The author expresseshis gratitude to the Facultad de Sociologia of the National Universityof Colombia (at which he was a Fulbrightlecturerin 1961), and particularlyto Dean Orlando Fals Borda and Monsignor German Guzman, who provided much of the material. The author is also indebted to Jerome I. Fischman, Anthony Leeds, and Arist6buloPardo who have made suggestionsabout the manuscript. ' For a discussion of violence as a factorin power politics in the traditionLatin American patterns,cf. William S. Stokes, "Violence as a Power Factor in Latin American Politics," WesternPolitical Quarterly,5 (September 1952), 445-68. 2 Georg Simmel, Conflict,tr. Kurt H. Wolff (Glencoe: Free Press, 1955). Cf. also, Lewis A. Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict(Glencoe: Free Press, 1956). 8 William Kornhauser, The Politics of Mass Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1959), p. 36.
NOTE:

35

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36

THE WESTERNPOLITICAL QUARTERLY

is lostin territorial caudillismo caughtin theweb of larger allegiances.Traditional the national or other administrative partybureaucracy, large-scale police force, units. Moreover, cities on whatwas oncean unhave encroached Bogotaand other The in finds his values confusion. trampled landscape. campesino In developinga theory of violenceone inevitably turnsto the frustrationIt is to aggression hypothesis. hardlyrevolutionary suggestthat in mostunderor transitional areas of theworld,a majority of thepopulation developed mayfind thestatus How these release their tensions individuals quo unacceptable. militantly on a number of to and access depends factors, level,leadership, including literacy sanctioned channelsforexpression of discontent.To a large extent, Colombians have been deniedtheseoutlets.Thus, internecine warfare has been theend-result of social,political, and economic anomie. frustration as wellas ofpersonal
THE BACKGROUND OF La Violencia IN RURAL COLOMBIA

in the degreeof violenceevenwhen Colombiahas had an unenviable history However theseevents American standards. have beenmorein the Latin judged by In the of civilstrife thanof ruthless 1860'sand 1870'sit is direction dictatorship. in warfare, and again in 1899-1902 estimated thatroughly 80,000weredecimated The present era of ruralviolencebeganin 1949 perhaps100,000wereeliminated.4 witha lapse at the accessionto powerof Rojas Pinillain 1953,inand continued government creasing again from1954 to 1958whentheNationalFrontor coalition on a reducedscale sincethattimeand is described was created. It has continued thanas a political conflict. moreadequately as psychopathic banditry This tragicepisode arose froma deadlockbetweenthe numerically superior entrenched Conservative Liberal partyand the oligarchical, politically party.The in 1930,afterdecades of Conservative of the Liberalsto government return rule, of social underthe leadership in somewhat resulted legislation largely enlightened advance faltered in the forties, a charismatic AlfonsoL6pez. As the progressive leader,JorgeGaitan,receivedimmense popularsupport.The govrevolutionary because of a splitin theLiberalparty ernment returned to theConservatives largely Perez and Laureano G6mez, in 1946. The two key Conservative Ospina figures, rule. On an arbitrary April9, 1948,theassassinasuccessively provided increasingly a periodof mob rioting, the famousbogotazo, tionof Gaitin precipitated looting, returned to BogotA and other in thecapital. Whileorder and killing cities, political formuchof ruralColombia. Although theConservaviolencebecame thepattern the in from Liberal it not distinct had the was tiveparty party, generally ideology At the the Church. same the and were of the military time, Conservatives support and wereperceived as maintaining a minority powerbyfraudubytheLiberals party lentmeans.
STRAINS IN THE COLOMBIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE

relatedto social dislocations, Violence in Colombia is unquestionably which in otherLatin American areas. Asidefrom have theircounterparts themorethan
' Everett E. Hagen, On the Theory of Social Change (Homewood: Dorsey Press, 1962), pp. 379-80; and J6susMaria Henao and Gerardo Arrubla,Historyof Colombia (Chapel Hill: U. of N. Carolina Press, 1938), pp. 480-519.

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A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE:

COLOMBIA

37

one hundred of between thetwopolitical a number yearsofviolent struggle parties, or psychological conflicts withinthe social have been and are operating pressures fabric: 1. Particularismo or separatism until has precludeda senseof nationalunity Discontinuities include with barriers recently. geographic consequent regionalism from isolation of manypartsof thecountry as well as from ethnic resulting varying strains and cultural As withmostofLatin America, traditions. there is a feudalistic class system and an urban-rural the ruralpopulationand lower cleavagewhereby of the urban have been denied certainsanitary and medical segments population educational and socioeconomic services, facilities, occupationalmobility, general advance. Also,thereare the clericand anti-cleric rivalries whichare partially rein party flected loyalties. 2. A major problem forColombiahas been traditionalism and rigidity in the institutional for land tenure. disOther as, structure, example,grossly unequal social would include the of to the Church proportionate arrangements inability a functional failure of the educational to reform its curricuprovide program, system lum or to expanditsservices lack ofeffective and,mostserious, sufficiently, governmentbecauseofparty and the threat of intervention. WhileColomrivalry military bia has generally fared better thanmost LatinAmerican itsgovernment at countries, best has represented a "populistdemocracy" rather than a "liberaldemocracy." 5 The lack of efficient nationaladministrative has been labeled "ad hoc machinery federalism" UnderLaureanoG6mez (1950-52) and Rojas consultant.6 bya former Pinilla (1953-57) theseproblems wereaggravated as thecountry drifted gradually intodictatorship. 3. The country's economicplightcannot be overemphasized. The level of ofboththeminifundista and thequasi-serf ofthelatifundio, poverty alongwiththe dilemma ofspiraling urbanworker's inflation in thepostwar have beenseverely years With wider and communicaunhealthy symptoms. increasing geographic mobility thevocalizeddiscontent of thecity has affected thecountryside and viceversa. tion, of unwarranted 4. At therisk theauthor wouldposita hypergeneralizations, or even in certain elements ofLatin America. subcultures emotionality psychopathic The highhomiciderate of the area is evidence,although we grantthatpartsof Latin America have a lowerratethancertain North American cities.Alcoholic and and violence are outlets forthis"need aggresinterpersonal drugaddiction, rivalry, sion"7 triggered and economic frustration. bysocial,political,
SOME CAUSATIVE LINKS IN COLOMBIAN VIOLENCE

of unrest withcertain combined social situaDespite the generalbackground and extreme economic the still political tions, rivalry, question remains deprivations, warfare has continued forwell overa decade. Amongthe as to whythisguerrilla causesare: specific
'
5Kornhauser, op. cit., pp. 130-32. 47 (June 1943), 494-510. 7 Hagen, op. cit.

K. Caldwell,"TechnicalAssistance and Administrative Reform in Colombia," Lynton APSR,

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38

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

The use of the nationalpolice force involvement. (1) Politicaland military the Conservative Government became an factto theLiberals.Conirreconcilable by various units and members defected to the supportof proversely, police army Gait'n forces the and the rural violence of the In other fifties. during bogotazo early both sidesregarded the conflict as a kindof holywar. To what degreethe words, Communist influence assesseddespiteG6mez' played a role cannotbe accurately characterization of his as "Liberal 8 easy opponents crypto-communist banditry." It is true that extremely liberalcontingents were affected communist by foreign and organization in a socioeconomic - hardly order thatwasnot ideology surprising alien from the world described Karl Marx. the altogether However, battlewas by on the of basis and mainly fought party loyalties irrationally perpetuated byfamily tradition. village institutions. There has been in thecountry of traditional (2) The breakdown a partialshift from the"familistic Gemeinschaft" tothe"contractual Gesellschaft." 9 of localism Withthegradualdissolution have come a number ofchanges:cityward of cash economy, initiation migration, labor,and thesugappearanceof organized ofwomen's These and other innovations weredifficult tosuperimpose gestion rights. and the rigidpatriarchal on the ruralfolkways institution with itsextreme family of sex roles,sexual and otherliberties bifurcation the beingpermitted male,while It is significant the femaleis completely subservient. thattheCaribbeanor coastal area withitsmorevariedethnic and more sexualnorms as background permissive was not especially well as lessrigidCatholicism affected violence. On the other by hand, the moreHispaniccentralarea was lessadjustableto changing needs.x0 characterof the killingin (3) Inadequate socialization.The psychopathic whichwhole village populations have been eliminated on both sidesposes some To whatdegreethisaggression in viewofthem6lange of problems. maybe cultural feudalism with cultures cannot be known. One fact is clear howSpanish indigenous ever: leadersof violencewereisolatedfrom normalsociety duringtheirformative of the are children or ofthetraditional years.Many participants parentless products consensual union. The limited to family lifehas beenfurther exposure complicated thepresent byyearsof violenceand consequently day bandoleros (bandits) exhibit even more markedly thisbackground.Possibly 90 per cent are illiterate.Morea need to express one's deep hostility over,the mass carnagereflects a to society, finalsettling of scores,and suggests the lack of any adequate superego structure.
8

Testis Fidelis, El Basilisco en Accidn o Los Crimenes del Bandolerismo (Medellin: Tipografia Olympia, 1953), pp. 16f. continuumhas been variouslydefinedas traditionalist-rationSThe Gemeinschaft-Gesellschaft alist, sacred-secular. Cf. Talcott Parsons,The Social System (Glencoe: Free Press, 1951), pp. 496-520, or Charles P. Loomis and J. Allan Beegle, Rural Social Systems(New York: Prentice-Hall, 1950), especially chaps. 1-3. Regarding the application of this concept to transitional nationswould be Daniel Lerner, The Passing of Traditional Society (Glencoe: Free Press, 1958). Colombia was respondingby a vendetta or guerrilla warfare to the anomie precipi10 Possibly tated by the confrontation of old and new, or "traditionalized" and "emancipated" elements of the society,where a decade or two earlier Italy, Germany,and Spain responded to the higher level conflictof the traditionalizedand the rationalized by varyingexpressions of fascism; cf. Talcott Parsons, Essays in Sociological Theory (Glencoe: Free Press, 1954), pp. 134-37.

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A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE:

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In otherwords, an extremely thebizarrenatureof torture and death demonstrate lowcultural levelcombined needs." with obscure psychopathic and economic (4) Commercial aspects.The case has been made as muchthat violenceat present is theretention ofa quasi-institutionalized Yet it is habitsystem. not lesstheresult of economic motivation. It is no accidentthatviolenceshowsan the certain is attractive seasons:croptheft upwardspurt during during agricultural semi-annual coffeeharvest, and cheap land is available when the occupantsare threatened in certainareas thevictims those are generally by violence. At present who have failedto pay forprotective and violence.12 services againstbanditry
THE PATTERN OF VIOLENCE

While thecountry. revealthe degreeto whichviolencehas affected Statistics recent in been or another at one time has the largerpart of the country affected, have had the mostseverelosses: Tolima, Caldas, Valle, yearsfourdepartamentos 42 percentof theroughly and Huila. In Tolima,forexample, 750,000inhabitants of the decade endingin for most fromtheirhomes, have been forcedto migrate 1958.' Not lessthan 17,000werekilledof whom80 per centweremalesbetween of one refugee-crowded and forty fifteen barrio, study yearsold.14 In an intensive It maybe had lost an averageof two close relatives.'5 37 per centof the families calculated. as often is notas tremendous loss to thecountry added thattheover-all a maximum it is reasonable to consider Insteadof theconventional 300,000figure, some 20,000sincethatdate, or a totalof of 180,000deathsto 1958,withpossibly between 1 and 2 percentofthecountry's population.'6 on bothsidesto followers ofjefesand their to thedetermination Guzma'n points eradicate noteventheseed), or to completely no dejar ni la semilla(leave nothing, members." This fanaticism even the youngest or villagesincluding families entire are proportionately theabovefigures helpsto explainthehighdeathrate. However, belowthelossesin theUnitedStatesand Spanishcivilwarsor in Colomsomewhat deterred was onlyslightly civilwars. Colombia'spopulation bia's previous growth natural otherwise whichmight a 2.5 per cent theseyears, increase, roughly during over3.5 percent. havebeensomething iftheearly and the Also thelosseswouldhave beenhigher Rojas Pinillaregime inciand FrenteNacional had not come into existence reducingpartyrivalries, vioreduce violence. The continuance of efforts to the makingspecific dentally, in additionto thosementioned of barriers above: lence is a function of a number
n German Guzman, Orlando Fals Borda, and Eduardo Umafia Luna, "La Violencia en Colombia," Monografias Sociol6gicas, No. 12, Volume 1 (Bogota: National University,1962), especially chaps. 5-7. * Hispanic American Reports, 16 (May 1963). 19 Hernando Amaya Sierra, Alfred Wells, and Sergio Restrepo, La Violencia en el Tolima de Agricultura,1958). (Ibagu6: SecretariU 14 Ibid. 1 Roberto Pineda, "El Impacto de la Violencia en el Tolima: El Caso de El Libano," MonografiasSocidlogicas, No. 6 (BogotA: National University,1960), pp. 16-17, 16 Guzmin, op. cit.,p. 262. 1 Ibid., p. 205,

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40

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

and thehalf-heartedness ofinterest and organizaterrain, rugged army inefficiency, tionwithin thenationaland local powerstructure to implement meansofcombating theproblem.'8 Institutionalization and socialorganization One of the more remarkable aspectsof the violenciahas been the elaborate the of period1949 to 1952,thenationalpolice and deployment personnel.During entered on the carried Conservative units causes,and again theConservatives army of of their own in theRojas Pinillaperiod. The complexity warfare intoa guerrilla Libthe in kind were matched of and apparently by organization degree depravity of in theanticipation del Partido(party theDirectoria directorate) erals,defending Perin the government. to power,or at leastbeingrepresented one day returning was the guerrilla on the Liberal front army organization haps the mostextensive the in theory in the Plains the Eastern that controlled Generally, earlyfifties.9" from conventional different organization military armywas not radically guerrilla withthecomcharacter.20 At the sametime, hierarchical in itsgenerally especially was frequently informal.In the more or organization guerrillas, munist-inspired wereon a primary and organization initiated lessspontaneously movements, loyalty or governmental towardthevereda(local territorial unit) and groupbasis,oriented werelinkedinto a of guerrilla movements village. On the otherhand, a number de Autodefensa as withtheMovimiento nationalorganization, Campelarge-scale or the comando has been structure the large-scale sina. Integrating organizational titleComando Generalde las FuerzasRevoluEstado Mayor,withthe impressive functioned de los Llanos Orientales cionarios (EasternPlains), whichin reality only the of some dozen novels on paper. But the literature, violencia, including portray or thelieutenant. of thelocal jefe,thecorporal Today mostof thevioimportance small-scale is in theform ofgangs with lenceor bandolerismo relatively organization. In additionto the morefamiliar military roles,thereare specializedrolesor ofpeasants.There are a taskforce forexamplethecuadrilla, composed groupings; man carefully the activities ofthelocal residents; a contact theobservador, screening a who to theband at what indicates often thesefialador pre-adolescent (signaler), theaguantador, theprotector is mostvulnerable; who fora feewill hourthevictim ofmilitary frehold offthe bandoleros.Otherrolesincludethearrangement stores in thehandsof a woman. In somecases,thejefe'sconcubine has been the quently assistant leaderof the gang.21Whether thegroupis largeor smallthemovements
18

It has been suggested that another factor is underpopulation; cf. Theodore Caplow, "La Violencia," Columbia University Forum, 6 (Winter 1963), 45-46. However, an area most affectedby violence is also heavily populated, namely,the Quindio in the state of Caldas. Similar areas in Antioquia and Valle are also examples. 19 A vivid account, among others,is to be found in Eduardo Franco Isaza, Los Guerrillas del Llano (BogotA: Libreria Mundial, 1959). 20 Organizationally,the fuerzas were composed of a hierarchy: (1) the guerrilla or guerrilleras escuadra, generallyled by a cabo primero (corporal) and usually numberingthreeto nine men; (2) seccidn, composed of threeto fiveguerrillasunder the command of a lieutenant; fiveof (3) company,of threeto fivesectionsunder a captain; (4) agrupaci6n guerrillera, the agrupaciones under the command of a colonel or general. Cf. Guzman, op. cit., pp. 143-44. 21 Philip Payne, "Death in the Counntryside,"Time, August 6, 1951, pp. 30-31.

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A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE:

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of each member had to be managedby the leader,or pdjaro (bird) as he is more labeled- the chieftain withouta partyattachment.22 recently Despite the close tie between leaderand follower, For weresevereand fairly primitive. punishments theleaderas forthefollower, theroleswerenewones: in several areasthejefeswere almostall former farmers who had been deprived of theirlands by violencia, still others wereex-police a fewwereformer and one on lieutenants, students, keyfigure thePlainswas an ex-teacher. and informal therehas been themistica, or a Beyondtheformal organization kindofspiritual and ritualistic morale. The trappings included of the cross tattooing forthe Conservadores, and sicklefortheCommunists, often thehammer including the name of the jefe; a number of romantic and martialsongs;an extensive new folklore, withlengthy newspaper accounts regarding the jargon;23 and an elaborate and hisexploits, thenameitself considerable Mico Blanco conveying imagery: pda'aro (WhiteMonkey),LenguaBrava (Loud Mouth), El Mosco (The Fly), El Vampiro, - someaffectionate, El Condor,and manyothers some aimed at invoking terror. Not leastimpressive the werethevarieties ofmutilation which differed among rituals forregion or party;forexample, el cortede franela underofTolima (the "flannel wearcut") .24 OF La Violencia SOME IMPLICATIONS thishistory of guerrilla warfare and terror thequestion reUpon investigating to our knowledge of the sociology of violence. For mainsas to what it contributes as a costly civilwar,it was relatively unnoticed one thing, by worldopinionin the conflicts. this or indifference is an indexto of Perhaps ignorance global years larger of interest in the world at to Latin American issues. thedegree Also,violencia large of rural life in certain at leasttwoproblems illustrates underdeveloped partsof the of thecityto thiskindofwarfare, and thefrustration world: therelative immunity of land plotsand other of rurallifeas a cause ofviolence. Fracturization problems with erosion and soil all to the of tenure, exhaustion, point along potential dangers it maybe mentioned in otherpartsof our hemisphere.Parenthetically, thatthe to land reform is alloting AllianceforProgress highpriority problems. to the Colombianviolencepose a number Social psychological explanations is thepossible variables of problems.Amongtheperipheral effect of thereleaseof - ColombiabeingtheonlyLatin American Korean war veterans hardened country in thataction.25 This eventshouldbe considered to participate in light of G6mez' to communism hisloveofrightist aversion It isjustpossible alongwith dictatorships. was a meansof creating thatKorean involvement nationalunity and a distraction
During the Rojas period the Conservativegang leaders were called "Blue Birds" forthe party color, but with the continuance of violence the terms (godos, chulos, etc.) for Conservative chieftainsduring the high water mark of violence suggestthe dominant devotionsto the Liberal side. Chusmero has been used by Liberals as the preferredequivalent term of pdjaro. Chulavita (a town in BoyacA) became the term forpolice officers who in the years 1948-53 made war on the Liberals. 3 Guzmin, op. cit., chap. 8. 24Ibid., p. 206. " Vernon Fluharty,Dance of the Millions: MilitaryRule and the Social Revolution in Colombia (Pittsburgh: U. of Pittsburgh Press, 1957), p. 272.

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42

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

fromcertaindomestic violenceitself.26 Another problems, possibleexincluding ofthecrescendo ofviolence was thereleaseofsomehundreds ofprisoners planation brief and this terms factor in understanding cannotbe disregarded violence relatively in a number of Latin American countries. And formanyparticipants constant exthismodeof behavior.Socialization was posureto violenceonlyservedto reinforce devotedto aggression and sadismoverthelarger systematically partofa generation, at leastforsomethousands ofmalesin relevant areas. geographic revealthatthe"aggression wouldprobably need" in Colombia Deeper analysis for but lack ofa coherent not for economic the is particularly privation strong, only warm and stable betweenfamily with structure relationships adequately family and or and children. a number whether husband wife, parents However, members, lack this same of demonstrate of Latin countries psychological sophistication might or ofanyother without thehistory ofviolence, in family rolesand functions objective thescopeof thispaperto of behavioral or personality criterion defect.It is beyond of Freudianand neo-Freudian as to what it can examinethe contribution theory to ourunderstanding ofmassviolence buttherelationship ofvarious catecontribute of and sadism are relevant. aggression, gories frustration, has been a "selfimpelling A significant aspect of the violencephenomenon at or veredalevel.28 adherents the community process"carriedon betweenparty and whichis ascriptive villagebecomesa majormotivation by family Partyloyalty lifein thisdrivetowardrevenge.His own anxiety in the individual's level,fedby leads to violence as cyclicbehaviorwith snowballing environmental frustration, the1958 thanbefore labelsare lessmeaningful effect. although party Consequently, in of the Its continuance habit the coalition, rounding-up pervades. spite system rolewithin theculture. to a deviant butinherent ofbandoleros points or and subcultural to cultural of causation, we return on the problem Finally, to Spanishinstitutions variables.The deep relation alwaysbecomesa fulregional thatthe coastal It is significant of Colombianprocesses.29 crumin any discussion and milder industrialized area withitsCaribbeanethnicstrains, plantation system, of Colombia,but as have thesouthern has been spearedviolence, clericism regions culture Ecuadorhas had a stabilized reasons.The area toward fordifferent pattern; are the vast EasternPlains even the few Liberalsare pro-clerical.Still different individualist cattlepeon withtheirpeculiartypeof violencebased on the restless, thehighviolencearea oftheintenthelandowner.Even within in rebellion against there variations.For instance, the are regional sively highlands populateddissected richValle province made has diffuse, violencewhichhas incidentally unorganized the refugee centerCali the fastest major cityof the republic. Although growing
" Orlando Fals Borda, "El Conflicto,La Violencia, y La Estructura Social Colombiana," in GuzmAn,op. cit.,p. 373. " Political Survey (Chapel Hill: U. of N. Carolina John D. Martz, Colombia, A Contemporary Press, 1962), p. 117, cites thisamong various theoriesof mass violence. * Andrew Pearse, "Factors Conditioning Latent and Open Conflict in Colombian Rural Society," FifthWorld Congress of Sociology, Washington,D.C., September 2-8, 1962. * One writerasks whetherthe Civil War in Spain and Violencia in Colombia might be compared. Herbert Matthews,New York Times, April 23, 1951, p. 7.

mostcriminals,including bandoleros,serve during the bogotazo in 1948.27 In reality,

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A THEORY OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE:

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thecities theruralareas themselves are protected within enclaves, density population has no apparentrelationship of to the rate of violence. There is also theproblem some areas so in no earlier the violence culture are addicted, why caughtup longer notably Antioquiaand El Choc6. It is realizedthatsome of thesegeneralizations about regionalvariations are tentative further hypotheses requiring investigation.
CONCLUSIONS

of "viotranslation ofla violencia, instead We have chosentheliteral although have been selected. The lence" the term"civilwar" or someotherepithet might events in ruralColomof theterm"violence"is wellsuitedto thediffuse generality warfare: theprocess has theusual characteristics of guerrilla bia.30 For one thing, of the of with local units, a government organization deprived power, blending larger for to and its use of or a marginal predilection topographic relationship brigandage, in theadroitness is equal to theexploits recorded and climatic Certainly extremes.31 ofthishistoric of warfare. In and thelastfewcenturies type pillage, burning, killing of theNapoleonicera or ofsomeofthecivilor interwiththeextremes it compares and a half.32 warsofthelastcentury national a majoringrediofla violencia be considered A lesssecureinterpretation might In the Colombiancase, ruralviolencemaybe regarded ent of social revolution.33 to of a revolution to come off.The author's own survey, to the failure as reaction that nearly90 per cent of university students cite onlyone source,demonstrated ofbasicsocialchange(un cambioradical) and weretosome weredesirous in BogotA the of mostof their theelites extent However, reflecting aspirations compatriots.34 about how in too much this or revolution is to are be effected, disagreement change is opposedto anymarkedshift in thestatusquo. Not and the economic oligarchy leader- or of anycoherent and responsible leaderleast,the lack of a charismatic a difficult matter.Nonetheless, ship wouldmakerevolution manyof theaccomthe fourmotivesof violence as presentedby Wright: The Colombian episode also represents (a) "maintenance of law and political authority,"as effective governmenthas not functioned in the country,at least in the regimesof Ospina, G6mez, and Rojas; (2) "selfpreservationand retribution," namely,the Liberal party considered itselfas forcibly prevented from exercising any national power, in addition to the frustrations of citizens not to speak of economic disorientation; (3) both parcaught in a corruptpolice system, ties, as well as other alignments,were convinced of the "defense of honor and prestige"; (4) of their "promotion of social and political justice"; and (5) the role of "individual of violence impulses and interests"as both leaders and followershave found in the system a means of livelihood, status, and a most appealing means of expressingmachismo. Cf. Quincy Wright,A Study of War (Chicago: U. of Chicago Press, 1942), Vol. 2, p. 1395. SI Carleton Beals, "Guerrilla Warfare," Encyclopedia of Social Science (New York: Macmillan, 1950), Vol. 7, pp. 197-99. 32 Quite beyond the limits of the present paper would be a discussion of possible similarities between violence in such events as the Arab-Israeli conflict,the North Africa surge of nationalism,guerrillawarfarein Southeast Asia (including the Huks in the Philippines), and not least, the role of guerrilla warfare in Fidel Castro's accession to power and the aftermath. Cf. among others,Merlo Kling, "Cuba: A Case Study of a SuccessfulAttempt to Seize Political Power by the Application of UnconventionalWarfare," The Annals, 341
" 3

Ralf Dahrendorf,Class and Class Conflictin Industrial Society (Stanford: StanfordU. Press, 1959). "Some Students' Attitudesand Their Determinants: A Sample of the 4 Robert C. Williamson, National Universityof Colombia," Monografias Sociol6gicas, No. 13 (Bogota: Universidad Nacional, 1962).

(May 1964), 42-52.

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44

THE WESTERN POLITICAL QUARTERLY

ofrevolution variations havebeenpresent:demographic (espepanying phenomena ofsexnorms, an alteration and other cially migrations), family disruption, symptoms is replete ofsocialdisorganization. czarwithvariouspeasantrebellions, Too, history notedfor this But a rebellion is nota revoluistRussiabeingparticularly tendency.35 to one. a substitution or a prelude tion, although frequently in terms It is popular to discussviolenceor any phenomenon of itslatentas The Colombianepisodeis no exception.The citywell as itsmanifest functions.3 has already beenmentioned. It wouldbe illuminating to investigate wardmigration of theclergy.Economicconsequences of theparticipation the effects are visiblein ofland holdings, theconsolidation forone item, and probably in thedevelopment of causationalanalysis of theviolencepoints a nationaleconomy.A recent to frustrafrom thesevere on upwardsocialmobility. tionresulting there ceiling Consequently new "career"opportunities, not least of whichis mobility have emerged in theinunits.37The politicalaspectsare hardly formal lessimportant: subordinamilitary or regionalauthority to federalcontrol tion of community and integration. The of the coalitiongovernment creation was in largepart a productof the violencia. In other on thelatent leveltheepisodehas tended to unify thecountry terms, despite theintense and traditions. regionalism, stratification, particularist a form of crimeas well as beinga category violenceis itself of social Finally, both contenders conflict.In thisundeclaredwar or quasi-revolution were acting and yeteach ofthetwopolitical claimedlegitimacy to their violence. parties illegally To what degreethe processof violencehas complicated the future social developoffact, theyear1963saw possibly mentofColombiacannotbe known.As a matter since 1957. However,1964 appears to markthe captureand the worstoutbreaks end ofsomeofthemost theNationalFront is still important Although operatjefes.38 increased from 3 per centof the votescast in the ing,pro-RojasPinillasentiment to 15 per cent of the 1964 elections, 1962 elections withthe Generalhimself proin thedirection ofa coup.39 verbalthreats viding at present the country The AllianceforProgress as one of the more regards in bleak a hemispheric particularly panorama. One hopes that hopefulprospects be will In violencia la the history. any case, forthe sociologist merely eventually be recorded as one of an abortive will an unrevolution, inchoate, probably period civilwar, and an arena of collective behaviorin whichmasshysteria conventional becameacceptedbycertain ofthepowerstructure and masshomicide elements and on a basis. rural culture the regional by

Gross, The Seizure of Political Power (New York: Philosophical Library, 1958, p. 94. " H. L. Nieburg, "Uses of Violence," Journalof ConflictResolution, 7 (March 1963), 43-54. 8 Camilo Torres Restrepo, "La Violencia y los Cambios Socio-culturales en las Areas Rurales Colombianas," Memoria del Primer Congreso Nacional de Sociologia (Bogota: Editorial Iqueima, 1963), pp. 95-152. 88 Time, May 8, 1964, pp. 36-38. 8 New York Times, March 22, 1964, p. 7.

* Feliks

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