CRITIC & A U T H O R

Human Ethology and Evolutionary Epistemology: The Strange Case of Dr. Eibl and Mr. Eibesfeldt
Glendon Schubert

Human Ethology, by Iren/ius Eibl-Eibesfeldt.

New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1989. pp. xvi, 848, $69.95

Context

Human Ethology is not the first, but it certainly is the most ambitious, general work on the
biology of human behavior. By "general," I mean: (a) introductory to a broad and diverse field of scientific knowledge, (b) written with the obvious intention of attracting a welleducated lay audience in addition to professionals in the scientific sub-fields that conlribute to knowledge of the subject, and (c) lavishly illustrated in a style and format likely to attract the trade book audience needed to pay the overhead for what must have been an unusually expensive book to publish (including xvi + 848 pages; hundreds of photographic illustrations; dozens of graphs, drawings, tables, and charts; 68 pages of bibliographical references; a 17 page listing of film references; and 40 pages of author and subject indexes). Human Ethology (henceforth, HE) was published as the fourteenth work in a distinguished series of biosocial volumes on the foundations of human behavior, of which I had previously (to HE) read a majority. A decade earlier another volume entitled Human Ethology (von Cranach et al., 1979) was published. This reported a colloqium, sponsored by the Werner-Reimers-Stiftung in Bad Homburg (West Germany) in October 1977, and focussed on the theme that is the subtitle of the book: "Claims and Limits of a New Discipline." It includes 22 papers, each by a different author or authors, and beginning with a more than fifty-page contribution by Eibl-Eibesfeldt (henceforth, EE) that covers much of the same ground as do chapters 2 and
Glendon Schubert, University of Hawaii at Manoa; and Southern Illinois University at Carbondale

Journal of Social and Biological Structures 13(4):355-386. ISSN: 0140-1750

Copyright 1990 by JAI Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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6.4-6.5 of HE). However, the following 21 chapters develop a multiplicity of themes, approaches, and substantive data about human behavior that extend vastly beyond the scope and interests of HE; and none of these subsequent chapters is ideologically committed (unlike HE) to the Lorenzian mechanistic dogma--indeed, seven of the eleven reference lists do not include Lorenz, and one of the other four lists only his popular book on aggression. Each of the eleven chapters pairs a contribution addressed to comparative animal behavior followed by one on human behavior, both in relation to the chapter topic. The first 60% of the work features discursive discussion that is non-empirical except for examples; beginning with chapter 7 the remainder of the book emphasizes the analysis and interpretation of quantified empirical data. In my opinion, this earlier volume--even though more than a dozen years old now--is much more up to date, comprehensive in its scope, and certainly more informative about human behavior than is HE, for reasons explicated in this review. There are a few other prior works with which HE might appropriately be compared. E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology (1975) on the social behavior of animals (and cf. EE, 1970) is even more physically impressive (700 pages oversize, double-column, and beautifully illustrated), and has been widely acclaimed professionally as an extraordinarily influential (i.e., paradigmatic) book. But neither in his concluding (27th) chapter ("Man: From Sociobiology to Sociology"), nor in his popularization of that chapter (On Human Nature, 1978), does Wilson make any serious attempt to relate his magnum opus to human behavior. Very much to the contrary, Eliot Chapple's Culture and Biological Man (1970) does focus on human behavioral biology in relation to ethnography and information theory as "cultural contributions." But medical anthropologist Chapple's approach is much more psychological than sociological, and consequently he does not undertake systematic exploration of human social behavior with that of other animals. The book that is probably closest in spirit and conceptualization to EE's HE is Valerius Geist's Life Strategies, Human Evolution, Environmental Design (1978; and cf. my review of it: Schubert, 1981b). Geist is (like EE) a field ethologist, and Geist's primary subject animals are wild sheep and goats in their Canadian Rockies' habitat (see also Geist, 1971). He approaches human evolution in terms of the habituation of ancestral humans to a similar habitat, at the fringes of the ice sheet glaciations from circa 15,000 to 200,000 years ago in Eurasia. Geist emphasizes the transactional relationship between ecology and human phylogeny, and the leading role of behavior in catalyzing morphological change in the hominid species of the past half million years. Like EE, Geist includes chapters on art and music and dance, and on environmental design; and both men exemplify in their own vigorous behavior and thinking the earthy qualities of the primitive humans with whose lives their respective books are preoccupied. But Geist has no photographs of his reference groups; he does not focus on the ontogeny of human infancy; and he pays no tribute whatsoever to the paradigms of such ideologies as those of classical ethology, or of sociobiology: Geist is an evolutionary pragmatist. This leaves us with the task and obligation of examining EE's HE as a contribution that is sui generis.

Content

The chapter structure of HE mirrors imperfectly, but suggests, the dichotomy that distinguishes the book's positive from its negative contributions. These in turn are direct byproducts of the

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schism in the author's own thinking and professional experience, in relation to the behavior of animals other than humans (on the one hand), and about human behavior (on the other hand). As a reviewer of his work, I hasten to state that I mean nothing ad hominem per se in postulating that dichotomy: my personal opinion of EE as a person is that he is a man of great talents who has made contributions of the most fundamental importance to the basis for our understanding of human nature. He is, however, trained as a zoologist, and he is not professionally trained as either a humanist or a social scientist; whereas I am trained as a social scientist but I cannot profess to equivalent competence as an ethologist (although I do have a year of postdoctoral field training in classical ethology, and some twenty years of study, research, and teaching of human ethology in particular relationship to political science). EE has specialized research experience with the behavior of fish and birds (but not with mammals generally or primates in particular); and concerning humans, with (1) infants and young children, and (2) primitive contemporary gathering-hunting peoples. But he does not have corresponding specialized knowledge based on research experience in the behavior of adult humans in modem societies; and it is in regard to the application to humans, of theories and methods for the naturalistic study of the behavior of other animals, that problems arise in regard to both his interpretations of, and prescriptions for, human behavior (and for examples of his ethnological research, see pp. 289-290, 330-334, and 409-414). The best chapter in HE is the sixth, on biocommunication; three other chapters (4, 8, and 9: on biosocial behavior, human bioecology, and bioaesthetics) are almost as good. These four chapters preempt quantitatively more than half the text; and even more importantly, from a qualitative point of view, they substantively constitute its heart. For example, the first 67 pages of chapter 6 discuss the biosocial behaviors of smelling, touching, and seeing (and of being smelled, touched, and seen including presenting oneself to be seen in a particular way), emphasizing facets and intimacies and emotionality of those three primal senses that are rarely recognized, let alone mentioned, by social scientists. This chapter then explores vocalization (including, but by no means limited to, speech), in an excellent survey (that is marred only occasionally by such truisms as that [p. 547] "speech can be more emotionally detached than nonverbal behavior' '--which as vice versa is of course at least equally true.) For reasons that are not evident, EE says very little about either tasting or heating:---as though these are both solipsistic senses (and cf. Velle, 1987). Yet he repeatedly emphasizes the importance of "kiss-feeding" (which certainly involves shared tasting), and not only as maternal behavior but also as the progenitor of kissing in modem human sexual behavior. Hearing-in-common is a sine qua non for survival among most socially adopted terrestrial vertebrates; and it is a fundamental social behavior in human face-to-face groups--which are also ear-to-ear. Nevertheless, if these 416 pages had defined the book, it would merit high praise, with only a few such idiosyncracies (which in comparison would seem much less significant). In the event, however, we must be concerned also with the other six chapters and their 304 pages. Three of these chapters (2, 3, and 7) are disappointing because each contains a mixture of good empirical, but detracting theoretical, component parts. Unfortunately, the theoretical flaws (on "innateness," "models," and "developmental theories") are basic to EE's thinking and approach to human ethology; and they must therefore be discussed (in the "Critique," below). The three remaining chapters (1, 5, and 10) are replete with major problems of evolutionary epistemology (especially in the introductory chapter 1) and of bioethics (especially in the concluding chapter 10); whereas chapter 5 (on human conspecific aggression) is hoisted

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on the petard of EE's obligatory commitment to the Lorenzian notion of a postulated innate (i.e., genetically determined) inhibition against humans killing other humans--an hypothecation that Lorenz himself attributes to none other than Sigmund Freud. It is bizarre in the extreme for EE to propose, in 1989, that social scientists accept (via such a convoluted route) a Freudianism that stems from 1913 (with Lorenz as its midwife and EE hs the sorcerer's apprentice) as the basis in evolutionary epistemology for social scientists to comprehend human aggression. (Little would either Lorenz or EE have suspected that political science had its own neo-Freudian-in-residence--as it were--in the person of Harold Dwight Lasswell, who for half a century, from 1930 until his death in 1978, reigned as the father of political behavioralism: cf. Lasswell, 1930, 1935, 1948, 1956, 1963, 1974). But chapters 1, 5, and 10 are the ones that appertain most explicitly and directly to human economic, political and social behavior in the groups larger-than-small-ones that characterize our species' contemporary cultural adaptation; so much of the critical discussion below will focus on them.

Critique
My critical discussion consists of four major sections: The first deals empirically with human behavior, especially EE's photographic description of human behavior, and with sexual behavior and sex roles. The second is about evolutionary theory, especially of classical ethology, sociobiology, homology and analogy, and neoteny. The third criticizes EE's elucidation of classical ethological theory, in terms of innate phylogenetic adaptations, fixed action patterns, innate releasing mechanisms, drives, innate inhibition of conspecific killing, and how EE's "interactionism" differs from transactional/epigenetic theory. The fourth is about social science behavioralism, and its difference from EE's reactionary political ideology of innate superiority, inegalitarianism, linguistic racism, and linguistic sexism.

Empirical Behavior
EE demonstrates in HE that he has succeeded in making some quintessentially important contributions to the scientific understanding of the nature of modem humans. His accomplishment is manifest, not in what he says but rather in what he shows about human behavior. What is most important, in what he shows, consists of his own photographs --taken over a span of three decades, in expeditiofis to Melanesia, the Orinoco basin, the north-central desert region of South Africa, the Philippines (Luzon), and Indonesia (Bali). The predominantly gatherer-hunter primitive peoples whom he studied constitute neither a complete nor (in the statistical sense) a representative (let alone a stratified) sample of the remnant surviving pre-transition aboriginal humans still alive in the last four decades of the 20th Century. But they do provide the best available sample of good visual records of the behavior of such people; and it would be fatuous not to recognize that the evidence EE presents means a great deal. And that is true notwithstanding that a few of the photographs do double duty by appearing more than once in differing contexts of HE; and even though many of them will bring d6j~t vu to readers familiar with EE's earlier books and articles. Neither are such behavioral records of contemporary aboriginals EE's only contribution; he presents also many of his own photographs of the behavior of modem (European) children handicapped by sensory deficits, mostly of vision and/or audition. These records of the

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behavior of handicapped children become important not as proofs of the effects of their sensory deficits, but rather as demonstrations of the "normality" of their behaviors notwithstanding their deficits. So these records are most important in relation to the behavior of "normal" children--who in H E are not sensorily unimpaired modem European children, but rather the children of the aboriginals who still lived in social and natural environments substantially characteristic of the way all humans lived fifteen thousand years ago. EE's very best photos are of aboriginal babies and toddlers; and it is the latter children whose behavior, as recorded and reported by him, best epitomizes for us modern humans that which constitutes the modal possibilities for optimal development and behavior of those other children, yet to be born during the 21 st Century, who may be lucky enough to live in habitats more like the aboriginal ones for which our species' capacities for development and behavior evolved. More generally, EE's photos of humans living as our ancestors once did demonstrate two main things about what we as humans are now: (1) physically, physiologically, emotionally, and socially we really are one species who from birth to death live and love and reproduce and think with a fundamental shared communality that unites us far more than we are divided by cultural accidents such as language or religion or residence or education or the attribution of formal social status, by biological phenomena such as pigmentation, or by biocultural characteristics such as sex or age; and (2) humans as neonates, and continuing on throughout the first five years of life, are infinitely more competent, comprehending, and complex humans than they are assumed to be by modal adults of modern industrial societies of the 20th Century. Infants and young children are not small adults; but they are a great GREAT deal more than blank slates waiting to enter kindergarten for the public educational system to precipitate the beginning of their intellectual and ethical life. However, EE's discussion of human sexuality, in terms of both reproductive behavior and social roles, poses epistemological problems and raises questions of social as well as of evolutionary theory. He does correctly point out (p. 258) that "Male dominance behavior is closely associated with male sexuality." Furthermore (p. 68), "readiness for aggressive behavior is linked in the human m a l e s . . , to the androgen hormone level." Characteristically, for this sort of question, EE cites no research in support of his assertions; but among the relevant books not listed in the H E bibliography is Zillman (1984, p. 64), who describes primate research denoting transitional zones for [penile] erection in the [male] hypothalamus. In these regions, stimulation did not only elicit erection, but behavioral manifestations of fear and anger as well . . . . The loci for sexual and aggressive stimulation were thus in immediate proximity of one another . . . . [Furthermore, the] integration of all divisions of the [mammalian] brain in sexual functioning is indicated by the fact that the delineated "erection pathway" penetrates areas that entail limbic, extrapyramidal, and neocortical outflows. Incest, like rape, is about power and dominance--not about sex. An example of the policy consequences of such brain physiology in humans too is provided by La Fontaine (i988, p. 9), who asserts that child sexual abuse is not about reproductive behavior, but rather about dominance; and that any comparison with animals should be not with mating patterns but that, instead, "Much of my material suggests to me that a more fruitful parallel with animals might be found in behavior signalling dominance and submission."

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EE's most explicit statements about male sexual aggression are (p. 258) that courtship is initiated with mutual display behavior. The female will also display threat in such contexts. The victor, usually the male, assumes the masculine role. Thus pair formation only succeeds when the male is able to dominate his partner. Male sexuality is thns associated with aggressivity but not with fear. Female sexuality is exactly the opposite. [Thus (p. 260)] human sexual behavior is characterized by love and affiliative responses which superimpose upon an archaic layer of agonistic sexuality characterized by male dominance and female submission. EE's views on male sexual aggression are presented in greater detail in his earlier writings, regarding which Zillman (1984, pp. 56-57) comments that the stag-fight analogue persists in much of the ethological literature (e.g., Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1970 [and 1974; and HE, p. 707: "in a number of animal species ritualized fighters protect themselves from being displaced by mutants (sic) who do not obey the rules of the tournament but instead fight in a damaging way" (emphasis added); and HE, p. 403: "cultural evolution strikingly phenocopies those animal ritualizations that lead from damaging fight to ritualized, tournamentlike fighting"]) . . . . The stag-fight model of sexual-access-striving grossly misconstrues the complexity of human behavior. It implies that the determination of access, evolutionarily speaking, has changed very little: It is a tooth and claw type of conflict among males in which both teeth and claws have become somewhat defunct, with women still passively awaiting the outcome of skirmishes. It is difficult to see what usefulness this kind of model could have. Useful models of sexual access--models that can accommodate the complexity of human behavior--simply cannot be derived from the courtship rituals of selected ruminants or birds. Such models, it seems, need to acknowledge that women, in general, play an active part in the choice of sexual partners, that both men and women have an enormous arsenal of nonhostile and nonaggressive means at their disposal to make themselves sexually attractive, and that--to the extent that coercion is involved--compliance with sexual expectations is more likely to be sought and achieved through hostility or the threat of hostility (i.e., the infliction of harm other than bodily pain and injury or the threat thereof) than through aggression. Rather than to regard access rivalry as a remnant of presumed "primal violence," it would seem appropriate to consider humans to have developed specific means of handling the problem of sexual access. EE's comments on the sexual behavior of women ranges from the ridiculous (p. 68) to the supine (p. 2 3 6 ) - - i f that is le mot juste to describe a somewhat naive Victorianism (and see pp. 259-260) that interprets human heterosexual behavior as having no relevant legitimate function other than to reinforce monogamy; and human homosexual behavior (p. 259) as " a pathological regression to an archaic reptile state level of sexuality" because (p. 707n) " i n fred living wild animals we know neither interspecific copulation nor homosexuality." But that suggests that E E i s Unfamiliar with the male/male and female/female mountings so common among nonhuman apes (see Fedigan, 1982; Goodall, 1986; Smuts et al., 1987), which, however much the conventional interpretation among primatologists is that such mounting is about dominance behavior rather than reproductive behavior, are same-sex mountings and literally homosexual. See especially de Waal's (1989, pp. 119-205) description of orgasmic-like responses to same-sex mountings among bonobos--supposedly the

closest relatives to humans among living primates. EE's ridiculous comment (p. 68) asserts that "Women, of course, always experience a non-ejaculatory orgasm, but the neuroethology of the female orgasm has not been closely studied." It is ridiculous on all three counts: some

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women never experience orgasm, notwithstanding modal intercourse frequency; there had been considerable scientific research published on human female orgasmic experience even before the G-spot was popularized a decade or so ago; and careful investigation by qualified human medical anatomists has established that the physiological differences between human males and females in regard to roles in and responses to sexual intercourse are very much smaller than had been theretofore assumed (see Davidson, 1979, 1980; and cf. Symons, 1979). Quotations from Davidson and others, and additional citations, appear in Schubert, 1983. A typical statement of EE's claim, repeated passim HE, that the evolutionary cause of sexual orgasm in humans was to reinforce heterosexual pair-bonding (for the ultimate purposes of enhancing direct genetic fitness) is (p. 236) that woman "provides the reward [sic] by satisfaction that strengthens the male's bond, while her orgasm strengthens her attachment to her partner." The "sic" denotes my amazement at the implied suggestion that intercourse is something women give to men to keep them in line; moreover, his statement is entirely speculative and he cites no scientific evidence to support it. Word of the sexual revolution of the sixties seems not to have reached EE in the remote and primitive enclaves where he spent so much time photographing the natives; but the published post-Kinsey evidence makes it clear (e.g., Hite, 1975; Henslin and Sagarin, 1978; Diamond & Karlen, 1980; Karlen, 1971) that most Americans and Europeans of the past thirty years have needed considerably more than orgasmic reinforcement either to put or keep them locked into lifetime post-pubertal exclusive marital sexual relationships. It is true that EE adds, immediately after the word "partner" in the quotation above, that: "In mammals, female orgasm is known to occur only in a few primates (D.A. Goldfoot et al., 1980)." What EE does not point out is that in those "few cases" other than humans, none of those species pair-bond at all! De Waal (1989, pp. 151, 153, 182) discusses in considerable detail the orgasmic experiences of both female and male stumptalled macaques, the first non-human species in which this behavior was demonstrated for females (by David Goldfoot et al., 1980, in their article in Science). Perhaps because he did not undertake the necessary physiological measurements (of heart rate and uterine contractions) de Waal does not explicitly assert that female bonobos experience orgasm; but the observational evidence he does present certainly strongly supports the conclusion that, judging from their overt behavior (vocalizations, grimaces, and gestures, during copulation), female bonobos are orgasmic. If stumptailed macaque and bonobo females--unencumbered by cultural sexual norms--are even more promiscuous in their copulations than human females, and enjoy their orgasms equally weU, then where does that leave EE's evolutionary argument concerning the orgasmic basis for pair bonding (i.e., marital fidelity) in humans? The remaining example of empirical behavior to be discussed concerns sex roles. One might think that, since human sexual behavior is discussed in exclusively biological--and mostly genetic--terms by EE, then he would explain sex roles with a greater emphasis on culture, experience, and learning. But that is not true; instead, EE explains the etiltural, developmental, and socializational aspects of sex roles in terms of the human species's phylogenetic development. Discussion here will focus on the two facets on EE's treatment of sex roles that most strongly and frequently exemplify his point of view. One relates to the Israeli experiment in trying to reform human sex, roles by indoctrinating selected settlers, grouped for this purpose in largely economically seN-sufficient community groups, in what the social experimenters believed to be the virtues of economic, political, and sexua! equally. The other is intertwined

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with the Kibbutzim, and concerns EE's manifest hostility to feminism (i.e., socioeconomic and political equality, and sexual freedom, for women) by his complete acceptance of and identification with "the problem of the woman," and his refutation of feminism and feminists, passim. He is certainly entitled to his private views on such matters, but not to proffer them as the logical imperatives of 60 million years of primate evolution that have achieved their highest form in the human genotype, the bioethic of which is that boys should be boys and girls should be girls. For example, among the genetic aberrations that result in occasional malformed female human phenotypes (see Goy & McEwen, 1980; Fried, 1982) are "masculinization" and "defeminization," which EE appears to have seized upon (p. 278) in order to comment upon the phylogenetic heritage, of our species, for human sex roles. (His selection of "sexual deviants" to demonstrate how phylogeny works seems poorly chosen, because in populational terms the tiny minority of such persons typify nothing about whatever that phylogenetic heritage may be: they are unfortunate developmental mutants.) Anyhow, EE describes the abnormal appearance of their external sex organs, and then continues: "They enjoy forming play groups with boys, compete with them for rank positions, enjoy roughhousing, and later have a more developed urge to maintain a career. They use less make up and have diminished interest in doll games and maternal-care behavior" (emphasis added). At least, this tells us how normal girls ought not to behave. Natural girl-like behavior is revealed by EE's secondary analysis of data reported by two female researchers on sex differences in the art fantasies of San children. He states that boys drew animals more frequently than girls--becanse real Bushmen hunt--and that the boys were much more interested in technical apparatus than were girls. Furthermore (p. 269), "No one encouraged the girls to be less occupied with these objects; they were genuinely less interested in them" (emphasis added); and he remarks that his finding here is relevant to his discussion ten pages later, on "egalitarian-raised kibbutz children." We can assume that San infants are adorned with neither pink nor blu.e booties; but neither EE nor we can assume that those children learned nothing (about their band's expectation as to how boy and girl San children ought to behave) during those many years before they were selected to take part in a "developmental" school project. Moving to ten pages later, EE concludes there (p. 279), again on the basis of secondary analysis of other researchers' findings, that "The kibbutz is a major social experiment in which, among other things, an attempt is being made to realize the utopian feminism of early socialism. But after one generation this feminist revolution terminated in a fenfinine counterrevolution with a return of the values of the tra~iitional female gender role, apparently a victory o f biology over ideology. What actually happened?" (emphasis added). He then supplies (pp. 279-283)five pages of empirical details to document the preceding conclusion. It happens that I have gone through all of that evidence, independently, and fairly recently (see Schubert, 1987a, pp. 71-74), where I point out that There is pretty much agreement about what happened in this reversion tO more traditional (i.e., "sexist") social and economic and political sex roles; and there is also substantial consensus as to why. The existing research literature.., entirely authored by m e n . . , tends to refer to this complex of events, giving direct translation to the phrase used by their informers in the kibbutzim, as "the. problem of the women,", bY which the men blame the women for what happened. It is hardly surprising that the male kibbutzniks did that; nor is it surprising that the social scientists who have reported on "the problem," themselves all males, should have taken at face value the claims of their respondents.

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So a more scientific answer than EE's own to his query "What actually happened?" is simply--no one really knows. And we may well never find out. But certainly a female anthropologist, examining the same situation and asking questions of the residents of the same kibbutzim, would have approached her inquiry with different presumptions about girls' and women's experiences and feelings and beliefs; and she almost certainly would have learned different things talking with the female kibbutzniks--and probably, even with the males--than did such notoriously machoistic male anthropologists as Joseph Shepfer, Lionel Tiger (see Tiger, 1969; and Tiger & Fox, 1971), and Melford Spiro in their discussions with the kibbutzim patriarchs. EE concedes that women do think differently than men (p. 272); for some striking demonstrations of the differences this makes even among scientists, see especially Haraway (1989), Birke (1986), and Bleier (1984, 1986). Among the explicitly empirical findings about sexual behavior of the pr6ducts of the kibbutz socialization is that the boys and girls who grew up together never marry. Age mates use common showers and toilets and often are naked in each other's presence until puberty: then the girls demand privacy and sexual isolation from the boys (but cf. Michener, 1965, pp. 53-56). Nevertheless, the effect of the earlier years together is to segregate cohort adolescents by sex classes in regard to sexual behavior, with each class going outside the cohort for heterosexual companionship and/or marriage partners. EE attributes this to the failure of the boys to experience dominance agonistic arousal, amongst each other, in regard to their shared surrogate sisters. He explains this on grounds of the general argument (p. 263) that "Since aggression is inhibited in the course of human familial socialization, the accompanying sexual arousal would be thereby reduced." (One is reminded of the remark of an English judge, to a persistent barrister: "The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it." These cohort boys had been subjected to the opposite of traditional, normal "human familial socialization"; so what EE must mean but doesn't explicitly say is that the boys were "inhibited" because they had frequently seen the cohort girls nude [just as Yanomami and San and Himba boys would be accustomed to seeing all the girls in their villages]. Yet for all such peoples there are elaborate and complex cultural norms to encourage exogamy--not pre-marital sexual intercourse--which suggests that biology must do a poor job of "inhibiting" the male adolescents of the very primitive groups that EE studied and knows best!) Anyhow, EE adds the supporting argument that not only do birds and bees do it, or rather, not do it, but neither do plants (p. 264): "The importance of incest avoidance [in humans] can be seen from the fact that even plants have many kinds of adaptations inhibiting self-fertilization." He also says some extraordinarily erroneous things about incest per se. Relying in part on census-type data 60 years old, and data from psychiatric interviews with patients, EE claims (p. 261) that father-daughter incest is extremely rare: one case per half million in the general population; and only one to two percent even among those diagnosed as mentally ill. But such ratios are fantastic underestimates of what is a major and unresolved social problem of sexual abuse, at least in the United States (Diamond & Karlen, 1980, pp. 234-r236). S.K. Weinberg (1955), on whom EE relies, constitutes a source long'since discredited and repudiated by American researchers in the field of child sexual abuse. According to Crewdson (1988, pp. 25, 32), "during the first half of this century, sex between adults and children in American was fairly commonplace"; and see Gordon (1988). Kinsey (1953) reported that sexual abuse (i.e., "molestation and harassment") was experienced by a fourth of his 4000 female respondents; and much more recently, in an official report b y the Canadian government (Report of the Committee on Sexual Offenses Against Children and

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Youths, 1984), "one out of every two Canadian women, and more than one in three Canadian men, had been subjected to some kind of sexual abuse as a child." Daro (1988, p. 13) reports that " a 1978 survey of 930 randomly-selected women in San Francisco revealed that 28% of the respondents had experienced unwanted sexual touching and other forms of abuse before the age of 14 and that the percentage of victims increasea to 38% if one included all episodes occurring before the women turned 18. Vander Mey points out (1986, p. 49) that although "one would expect that stepfathers would be more likely to be incest perpetrators" because there "is more social distance and no real blood ties involved in the stepfather relationship," in fact "the biological father is the most frequent perpetrator"; for descriptive details, see Crewdson, (1988, ch. 5). According to an expert in child sexual abuse, Linda Gordon (1986a, p. 253), the case records data go back well over a century in the United States, and "Incest as a form of family violence appeared in 10 percent of case records in Boston child-protection agencies between 1880 and 1930. These were overwhelmingly (98 percent) cases of father-daughter incest." La Fontaine (1988, pp. 2, 9) asserts that " A n y expectation that nuclear kin might engage in sexual activities but that they would stop short of full intercourse more often than less closely related persons i s . . . not supported by the evidence . . . . As is now well-known, the majority of victims are sexually abused by a father or stepfather." Rist (1979, p. 682) likewise says that "father-daughter incest appears to have a lower natural probability in occurrence [because of beliefs in the 'incest taboo,' and it] is therefore less strongly prohibited [than, for example, mother-son incest; but] in practice occurs more often"; and in a recent study of almost a thousand cases, reporting a detailed breakdown in terms of both perpetrator familial relationship to the abused, and degree of seriousness of the sexual abuse (Russell, 1988, pp. 27, 30), biological fathers were the principal sexual abusers of daughters. Such father-daughter abuse typically begins at a very young age for the child; and father-daughter abuse includes behaviors that are by no means confined to the legal definition of incest (i.e., copulation) but include also the variety of sexual deviations characteristically associated with forcible rape of male prisoners by other male inmates of penitentiaries (see McNamara & Sagarin, 1977). Given EE's penchant for Freud as an authority on "innate" human motivation, it is unfortunate that EE's attention was not directed to Freud's paper in 1896 on father-daughter incest, "The Aetiology of Hysteria," which is discussed in several books beginning more than a decade ago (as well as in popular magazine articles of the time). As r.ecounted by the Eberles (1986, pp. 10-11), Freud's paper postdated that a great deal of mental illnesswas caused by sexual abuse of children at an early age. In his medical studies in Paris Freud discovered that rape and violent sexual abuse of children was extremely common--most of it perpetrated by the victims' fathers or other members of the family, persons in a position to exercise direct authority over the child. [But when Freud] read his paper before the Society for Psychiatry and Neurology in Vienna on April 21, 1896, it was received with icy silence, not only by the physicians in the room, but later in the medical journals as well. He was urged never to publish it, and to repudiate it before his reputation was damaged beyond repair. The psychiatrists were not ready to accuse those who paid their fees . . . . In 1905 he repudiated the theory [and see Masson, 1984, pp. xvi-xxii, oh. 1, and Appendix B; and Sulloway, 1979, pp. 75-76, 128-129]. EE says also (p. 261) that "Incest is prohibited in all cultures by an incest taboo, [which] is universally valid"; and this too is false. Willner (1983, p, 135) says there is

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"repeated evidence that incest taboos are neither unitary nor universal." EE is more than a generation out-of-date in his sources; and cf. Schubert (1982a, p. 24; 1984, p. 221; 1987b, p. 280), and Sturtevant (1981). Vander Mey (1986, pp. 34, 41) states that Increasingly, sociologists are coming to the conclusion that incest is not rare--nor has it ever been . . . . [and] dropping the questionable assumption that there is an incest taboo or aversion [would] contribute to the development of more effective theoretical principles by which to understand, predict, and prevent incestuous b e h a v i o r . . , a gestalt change is needed in our orientation to this problem. And Harvard evolutionary biologist Richard Lewontin et al. (1984, p. 137n) say that The incest taboo is one of the odder sociobiological stories . . . . Yet even if it were true that there was a universal incest taboo that forbade genetically close marriages (which there is not), it is not possible to map social definitions of kin directly onto genetic ones; and even if it were also true that this taboo was followed in practice (which it is not), the argument makes no sociobiological sense. For if the "taboo" is indeed genetically prescribed, what need is there for mere social legislation to enforce it? A natural repugnance should require no legal shoring up in this way. Unless of course it is not that our genes inhibit us from copulating with our [relatives] but instead induce us to pass laws regulating such copulation [and this latter is apparently precisely what EE believes and argues in HE!]. EE does not mention (or apparently, know) a leading b o o k - - a t least, among anthrop o l o g i s t s - o f the remaining stalwarts who defend the "incest taboo": Robin Fox's The Red Lamp of Incest. I read this book a decade ago when it first came out, and dismissed it as in the tradition of 19th Century anthropological mythic literature and certainly not a work of science; but if EE had cited it, this would have provided him with at least some prima facie support. Vander Mey (1986, p. 3) mentions the book aspersively: "Ironically, incest has also been treated lightly, as perhaps a man's right or a female's fantasy (Fox, 1980"); and Hawkes (1983, p. 183) says that in Fox's book power and influence seem to have become ends in themselves for the older generation . . . . The book is in the traditional ethnological style. Generalizations about cross-cultural regularities are frequently asserted without supporting data. Argument is illustrated with ethnographic examples. Hypotheses are not proposed and tested; in fact, no suggestions are made about how this might be done. Too bad; even from a methodological point of view, EE should have loved it! Not only does EE deny the prevalence of the sexual abuse of children, in European as well as American cultures past and present, he even (p. 78) disputes (on "innate phylogenetic evolutionary" theoretical grounds, of course) that non-sexual violent abuse of children has been or i s - - o r indeed, in terms of the logic of his argument, can b e t a problem: "child abuse is relatively u n c o m m o n . " To that he adds, as though he were talking about Wildebeest neonate foals on the Serengeti, " a child that avoids its own mother out of fear would hardly have any chance of s u r v i v a l " - - w h i c h would be true in the kind of welfareless and merciless society that EE espouses as the innate ideal for American and other post-industrial countries (and see below, on "Social Science Theory").

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The claim that even nonsexual but violent child abuse is relatively uncommon is preposterous for a human ethologist to make: as Daro (1988, pp. 12-13) reports, A 1975 study on the level of physical violence in families estimated that between 3.1 and 4 million children in America are kicked, bitten, or punched by their parents at some point in their childhood . . . . Perhaps more alarming was the level of serious violence against children noted in that study. One in every 25 children 3-17 years of age living in a dual-parent household were seriously beaten by a parent or threatened with a gun or knife. The authors projected that over 46,000 children were actually shot or stabbed by their parents, and over 1,000 died as a result of these attacks . . . . the American Association for Protecting Children (AACP) notes that 1,726,649 children were reported as maltreated in 1984, an increase of 158% since 1976, the first year the agency began collecting and analyzing these data . . . . The number of maltreatment cases reported nationwide has steadily increased since 1976 [emphasis added]. For additional modem data and discussion on the scope of the problem, see Gordon (1986b), Hampton & Newberger (1984), Nelson (1984), and (for British data) Parton (1985). EE has problems distinguishing sex roles from gender roles, which he does define appropriately in relation to contemporary usage, in a footnote at the bottom of p. 265, as "that behavior expected or prescribed culturally for males or females." But he starts off that page with a remark about the division of labor between " M a n and wife." If he wants to be a dispassionate scientist, he should be less careless about linguistic sexism (and see my further discussion of this, below). Man and woman or husband and wife--either would have been acceptable; but not Man and wife, which makes the woman appear to be just a piece of property, another appurtenance to Man's patriarchical domain, as in "Man and his spear" or " M a n and his c o w . " This is an example of EE's implicit problem with gender roles; but he also makes it explicit in the middle of the same page when he remarks that " w e would expect from the biological perspective that phylogenetic adaptations exist f o r . . , gender roles" (emphasis added). The phylogeny of behavior that has been (as he defined it) culturally prescribed? Similarly, in discussing whether women "are by nature motherly" (emphasis added), EE ascribes that "innate" capacity as the basis for "gender roles." But the confusion goes both ways, because one of the subcategories for the item " G e n d e r " (in the Subject Index of HE) is "differences," with a sub-subcategory "in olfaction." I am willing to concede that gender may determine the way in which men and women choose to stink (as Shakespeare was wont to say, even of a rose), by. (e.g.) spraying their armpits, etc. ("tout usage"), with "Brut"; but to the extent that men and women smell differently (and see pp. 426--430; and cf. Velle, 1987, pp. 494-498), that is because of their differences in sex, not gender.

Evolutionary Theory HE is replete with implicit and explicit references to evolutionary theory, of which our major concern will be with its relation to classical ethological theory, the exposition of which is presented as a part of this section, while its critique constitutes the whole of the next section. But initially and first here we shall consider EE's commitment to gradualism, the neo-Darwinian-Mendelian modem synthesis that has dominated evolutionary theory in the latter half of the 20th Century; and then, briefly, we shall examine EE's stance in regard to sociobiology, the most popular fad among evolutionary zoologists during the past quarter of

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a century. Then comes classical ethology; followed by a discussion of homology and analogy, facets of evolutionary theory that are of central importance to EE's thinking and epistemology in HE. This section concludes with EE's unorthodox (for a contemporary zoologist) attachment to the pre-Darwinian notion that humans are the supreme product of creation and, by definition, superior to animals.
Gradualism: EE's gradualism is perhaps best exemplified in his suggestion (p. 15) that

cultural evolution phenocopies the biological evolution in many ways... [as] in the comparison of cultural and phylogenetic ritualization. . . . The same functional laws apply to both areas. Thus the rate of change should in neither case be excessive, for the excessive mutation rate is dangerous. Progress depends on the balance achieved between the preserving "Conservative" forces and those promoting change. We stick to the proven, but experiment with change in small doses [emphasis added]. This is evolutionary gradualism in its most blatantly reactionary ideological guise, ignoring completely (inter alia) all of the past half-century's alternatives to gradualism as evolutionary theory (Cavalli-Sforza & Feldman, 1981; Lumsden & Wilson, 1981, 1983, 1985; Boyd & Richerson, 1985), and the work of Sewall Wright, C.H. Waddington, S.J. Gould, Niles Eldredge, and Steven Stanley (and cf. Somit & Peterson, 1989; and Stanley, 1989). It is equally reactionary as political theory (see Schubert, 1985, 1989b and references therein), proposing a naive analogy that advocates a revival of Social Darwinism as the public policy explication of the neo-Darwinian modem synthesis. One inconsistency in EE's gradualist stance puts him into a half-way house between Lumsden and Wilson's mathematical transcendentalism with their "thousand-year rule" (and cf. Kort, 1983) and the prevailing time-frame for the plateauing of the genotype of Homo sapiens sapiens. EE comments (p. 718) that "We have not greatly changed our biological heritage over the past ten thousand years." Ten? That was even after the transition was well underway in the Fertile Crescent as archeological excavations conftrm. HE underestimates our period of species genetic stasis by a factor of at least 4, and quite possibly as much as 20. The prevailing opinion (Stanley, 1979, p. 63) is that "The fossil record shows no evidence of human evolution in Western Europe during the entire forty thousand years of our species existence" (and see also Eldredge & Tattersall, 1982; and Gould, 1985, p. 198). On the longer estimate of up to 200,000 years ago, see Kurten & Anderson (1980, p. 355); Leakey & Walker (1985); Rensberger (1988); and Stringer (1988).
Sociobiology: Sociobiology is a refinement of the work of R.A. Fisher (1930) and his (mostly, British) followers who study the effect of genetic relatedness on behavior; and contrariwise, the extent to which behavioral choices contribute to reproductive fitness. The theory emphasizes individual selection (Williams, 1966; Dawkins, 1976) and rejects group selection as an evolutionary consideration. Both EE (1980) and I (1981b, 1982b) have criticized the speculative application of sociobiological theory to human behavior, and likewise we both have strongly supported the importance of group selection as a major factor in human evolution. He continues to assert both positions in HE (pp. 90-103); and I continue to applaud both his discussion of group selection (pp. 100-101) and his concluding remark (p. 103) that "In humans . . . . we can discern various levels of selection: individual, kin, and group."

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Classical ethology: The two founders of classical ethology were Nobel laureates Niko Tinbergen and Konrad Lorenz. Classical ethology is the naturalistic study of the behavior of animals in their natural habitats; and both Tinbergen and Lorenz worked primarily with birds. Each of them made novel and fundamental discoveries about why and how animals behave as they do; each exerted great and worldwide influence upon the development of 20th Century zoology. Tinbergen's first doctoral student at Leiden University was Gerard Baerends, with whom I spent a (somewhat belated) postdoctoral year studying classical ethology in the field near Groningen during 1976-1977. A subsequent doctoral student of Tinbergen at Oxford (after he moved to England during World War II) was Nicholas Blurton Jones, who decided while still at Oxford that he wanted to use ethological theory and methods to study human behavior. He worked with children in London during the 1960s and 1970s, and was an associate of EE's in making studies of the San and their children during the same period. EE was Lorenz's chief disciple, close friend, and most renowned student as an Austrian scholar directing ethological research under the auspices of the Max Planck Society in Germany. He worked primarily with fish during the 1950s, and with children and aboriginal humans also during the 1960s. After 1967, EE concentrated his research and writing on human ethology. Given his career development, it is understandable that EE thinks about the social behavior of modem humans in terms of examples provided by nonhuman animals, aboriginal humans, and human children. HE is replete with a style of argumentation that impresses me (and likewise, Hawkes, 1983, p. 183) as sloppy, and that seems to stem from a concept of scientific method much looser than what one might have expected to reflect the aegis of an organization named after Max Planck (e.g., p. 387: "Humans experience fluctuations in their aggressive disposition, for which internal causal factors must exist since no corresponding environmental fluctuations can be [sic: have been] identified"). Perhaps that reflects the newness of ethology as a field of science: A.C. Crombie (1961, p. 13), a biologically trained historian of science, has described the problems of European physics four hundred years ago:
a quantified science.., comprises not only quantified procedures but also quantified explanatory concepts, each applicable to the other within a theoretical system. The development of a science then takes place through a dialogue between its theories and its procedures, the former offering an exploration of the expected world through predictions and explanations made by means of technical procedures, and the latter confronting these theoretical expectations with the test of quantified data. A dialogue of this kind requires that both sides should speak the same language. We are so familiar with the close and precise adaptations of conceptual and procedural language to each other in modem physics that it may come as a surprise to find authentic scientific systems in which this is not the case. Yet we do not have to look very far to find examples. In the contemporary social sciences and in psychology, they are notorious . . . . The main interest of medieval physics in this context seems to me to be that it provides the earliest example in the development of modem science in which we can study the state of affairs when the dialogue between concepts and procedures was incomplete or absent. Then we can study the difference it made when clear and exact communication was opened, as it was in the seventeenth century.

HE begins (p. ix) with EE's critique of 19th and early 20th Century behaviorism in psychology, an exercise that he undertakes apparently to lay a groundwork for the joint purposes of distinguishing the approach of classical ethology ("The decisive impetus for

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revising [the] extreme environmental approach [of psychological behaviorism] came from behavioral biology [ethology]"); but also to support his postulation (p. 707) of the superior morality of bioethical drives and traits. Given such premises, it is ironic to encounter (p. 59) EE's tribute to the important experimental empirical support from English and American animal behaviorists (as he claims, f o r classical ethology theory of the Continent) but "which seems to have its roots in the skillful experimental heritage of American behaviorism." It is even more bizarre to note EE's reference (p. 677) to "the ethological concept of key stimulus and releaser" (emphasis added), not least because ethology (wittingly or otherwise) borrowed such concepts directly from the stimulus-response psychology of early behaviorism, which he deprecates so confidently on p. ix. One is not surprised to find (p. 509) that "Human ethology seeks to identify similarities between cultures" (emphasis added). And yet, one wonders: why aren't their differences equally important?
Homology and Analogy: Homology denotes a similarity of structure or behavior, between animals or different species, due to their genomic communality resulting from common ancestry; similarities due to shared environmental influences are ascribed to analogy. EE discusses (p. 133) but never defines these concepts, which leads on to his discussions of human cultural behavior for which innate phylogenetic preadaptation is postulated, passim, notwithstanding the absence of empirical evidence. Thus (p. 139; and cf. p. 147) he remarks that

homology as a r u l e . . , indicates that bearers of homologous traits are genetically related. There are however also homologies of tradition . . . [and this] distinction between phyletic and traditional homologies is particularly important for humans . . . [as] in human speech. Using homology criteria, linguists established long ago that there are relationships between languages, although they are not genetic in nature [emphasis added]. The short answer to this is that if they are not genetic, then they are analogous and not homologous; and no amount of circumlocution can change that logica~ consequence of the definitions accepted by zoologists generally (and see Masters, 1973; and Schubert, 1983). An empirical example of a statement in H E (p. 235) that might appropriately have beenmbut was not--analyzed in terms of the conventional zoological distinction between homology and analogy is EE's remark that "Chimpanzee females seeking precedence at feeding sites present themselves sexually by turning their hind ends toward males," although his authority for this statement is the Yerkes (1929) and one might prefer to be guided by what Goodall (1986) or de Waal (1989) says on this subject. Anyhow, EE then states that "Here begins a certain emancipation of female behavior from its original purpose of reproduction' ' - - a n d the context of this discussion clearly is the human family and marriage --indeed, his next sentence is "The emancipation of sexual behavior is already well advanced in humans." But even the Yerkes' chimpanzees (and certainly, Goodall's and de Waal's) are modem primates, just as modem as humans are (and just as primate, too). This may be another "homology of tradition"; but if it isn't, then it must indicate that the contemporary "emancipation of [human] female behavior from its original purpose" finds it beginnings in the presenting of contemporary chimpanzee females--and that is fantastically wrong, if not empirically than certainly on theoretical grounds. Neither EE nor I can possibly have the

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slightest basis for any opinion on whether or not, why, or how the common female ancestors of chimpanzees and humans (and cf. Tanner, 1981) presented their rumps, certainly at least more than 6 million years ago. So EE's suggestion that "Here begins" comes millions of years too late to have any implication whatsoever of an homological sort about the behavior of human females today. (To express any opinion on the analogical point~ I ' m not sure about EE but I would require a great deal more empirical information about the common environmental influences to which contemporary chimpanzee and human females are subject if and when they present--especially in an age and time during which " m o o n i n g " became a fad.) Neoteny: This is not a concept that is ever mentioned, as such, in HE; but neither are Mendel, George C. Simpson, Ronald A. Fisher, C.H. Waddington, or Sewall Wright (although his political scientist brother, Quincy, is cited frequently) who, along with most of the other leading evolutionary theorists of the Twentieth Century, do not appear in either the bibliography or the "author" index of HE. Instead, EE (p. 607, and see also pp. 675-676, especially Fig. 9.8) resurrects the fetalization theory of Louis Bolk (1926), a relatively obscure (nowadays, at least in comparison to any of the five biologists whom I designated above) Dutch professor of anatomy in Amsterdam, "who shows that man has a number of morphological characteristics that can be considered to be long-term juvenile traits." Gould (1977, p. 355), in his chapter on "Retardation and Neoteny in Human Evolution," points out that paedomorphosis, "The resemblance of adult humans to juvenile apes," was remarked by Geoffrey in 1836, almost a century before Bolk's pamphlet quoted by EE. According to Gould (1977, pp. 356, 361-362), Louis Bolk (1866-1930)... linked valid and important data to evolutionary views now rejected. Bolk was not a Darwinian. He believed that inner factors controlled the direction of evolution by transforming entire organisms along harmonious and definite paths of vitalistic determination . . . . [However (p. 365), Bolk's] central insight may be reinstated as the foundation of a modem analysis: retardation in development must be distinguished from fetalization of form. [Gould further states that] I believe that human beings are essentially neotenous . . because a general, temporal retardation of development has clearly characterized human evolution This retardation established a matrix within which all trends in the evolution of human morphology must be assessed [emphasis in original]. [He adds, pp. 387,397,400]: What juvenile among living prirnates is most similar in form to the young stages of our forebears? The answer must be: our own juvenile form itself. . . . Our paedomorphic morphology is a consequence of retarded development; in this sense, ve are neotenous . . . . Human evolution has emphasized one feature of this common primate heritage--delayed development, particularly as expressed in late maturation and extended childhood.
. .

Creationism: EE begins (p. 365) a chapter summary on intraspecific aggression with the claim that " W e can define as aggressive behaviors through which humans or animals sustain their interests" (emphasis added). This is a statement that any zoologist purportedly writing in a scientific way for a professional audience ought not to make, because it both assumes and implies that humans are not animais.~Thereby it rejects Darwinism and puts EE in a position that is (as EE might put it) traditionally homologous to that of Bishop Wilberforce in the latter's denunciation of, The Descent of Man. The Judaic-Christian faith in the Great Chain of Being (Genesis, 1:26-29) still dominated the thinking of England when Darwin went public with The Origin of Species and his heretical data, following that up a dozen years

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later with his heretical theory of human evolution (see Gould, 1977, the unpaginated frontispiece by Saul Steinberg; and Gould, 1985, pp. 263-290; and Schubert, 1986). An implicit empirical exemplification of EE's belief in human superiority is provided by his assertion (p. 261) that "The upright human posture led to a change in the preferred sexual position and, in conjunction, to the development of sexual releasers on the front of the woman (the breast). In his face-to-face orientation, man [sic] distances himself from animals and humanizes the sexual relationship." (My " s i c " reflects the fact that it not only takes two to tango; and the female role in human copulation doesn't necessarily involve the passive compliance that EE's language implies. Moreover, even if EE were tight about our Garden of Eden origins, it was Eve who provoked Adam, and in a sexually reproducing species such as ours, man could hardly have distanced himself from animals, by introducing what is sometimes denigrated as the "missionary position," without woman becoriaing equally distanced.) In fact, however, EE is wrong again. De Waal (1989, p. 200) discusses frontal mating between bonobos (i.e., " p y g m y " chimpanzees), presents his photograph of such a copulation, and states that it is for anatomical reasons (which he describes) the usual mode of sexual intercourse among bonobos. Of course, even a neo-Darwinian-Mendelian gradualist could take some comfort out of the realization that this similarity between humans and bonobos reflects a true genetic homology: consensus is emerging among evolutionary anthropologists and zoologists alike that the cognate species closest of all to humans is not common chimpanzees, but rather bonobos (see Tanner, 1981; de Waal, 1989, ch. 5).

Classical Ethological Theory

Now that both Tinbergen and Lorenz are dead and Gerard Baerends has retired, EE remains probably the last of the classical ethologists (committed to such intellectual impedimenta, of the classic paradigm, as "fixed action p a t t e m s " - - F A P s - - a n d their "releasers," along with "drives," "vacuum activity," "action-specific energy," and "consummatory acts.") HE is likely to be, therefore, not only the ftrst handbook of classical ethology applied to human behavior; but also the last such to be published. Any of the future will want to substitute the more modem behavioral theory (proclaimed by Robert Hinde aTull quarter of a century ago in his Animal Behavior: A Synthesis of Ethology and Comparative Ethology) of the contemporary field of animal behavior plus a comparative psychology that (unlike HE) has put stimulus/response as well as nature/nurture behind it. Clearly EE has not done that, as his long footnote (at the bottom of pages 21-22) indicates: he mentions there a few of his critics a decade earlier who had commented on an article of his; but he says nothing about having changed his mind on any of the issues they raise (which include nature/nurture). It is therefore relevant to note here the remarks of another of the commentators, one not mentioned in the footnote, who states (Peterson, 1979, 43-44) that: There is a sampling problem inherent in the work. E-E often refers to "universals" in human behavior However, it is not clear on what basis these universals are derived . . . . The author seems to confuse hypothesis-generation with empirical testing of hypotheses. There are many conclusions throughout the paper that a particular human behavior reflects an "innate" propensity. There is no direct test of these propositions... [and to do so] four basic question~ would have to be answered: (i) What is the phylogeny of the behavior? (ii) What is the ontogeny of the behavior? (iii) What is the survival value of the behavior? (iv) What are the- mechanisms
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GLENDON SCHUBERT tmdedying the behavior?... Closely related to the preceding, there is no strong evidence that the homologies that E-E detects are really homologies . . . . One basic method in E-E's agenda for human ethology is cross-species comparison.., b u t . . , valid comparison demands valid data from the different species being compared . . . . Finally . . . E-E may devote too little attention to culture as a part of human ethology. The determination of what is "innate" [in humans] is rendered quite troublesome because of [human] development of language and culture. Some social scientists even speak of a "social construction of reality" as a result of these two intertwined notions . . . . The proposed program for a human ethology must address seriously such contentions as are raised by [Donald T.] Campbell and others [emphasis added].

HE is a very much longer version of the article of the same title that appeared in the Behavioral and Brain Sciences a decade earlier, so the quantitative difference is striking. Qualitatively, however, it is just a great deal more of the same thing--and as far as evolutionary theory goes, it is the same thing--without even much serious updating of references; and were it otherwise, this review would not have to keep using as examples references by EE to works that are at least sixty years old. The remainder of this section will perforce cover, as briefly as possible, ground that is already entirely familiar not only to EE but also to his readers of a decade or more ago (including me: Schubert, 1979, pp. 44-46). Instincts: For those who may not be previously familiar with classical ethological theory,' a caveat is necessary: its xierbal trappings entail some remarkably awkward descriptions of behavior (e.g., of one ambivalent gull confronting another of the opposite sex, EE says [p. 170] that "the conspecific bears signals"--which is not the most felicitous way to denote coyness in a human, to whom HE applies the same concepts in the same way they were invented to describe the behavior of birds and fish. "The organism," says EE (p. 579), "constructs its world in interactions with the environment, but it brings a prior knowledge with it, which has been acquired [by its genes] during the course of evolution and is thus innate." Moreover (p. 673), "Human behavior is c o n t r o l l e d . . , by innate templates and releasing mechanisms." One specific example of sucha phylogenetic adaptation is human personality (p. 265), at least in relation to sex roles; although he explicitly states here that such sex-specific genetically-determined personality differences are themselves in turn determinative of gender role behavior. But there is more: by page 698 (and el. p. 369) even our ethical templates are "innate." And by no means least, on page 663 EE opines that humans are phylogenetically preadapted "to live in anonymous society." These are certainly arresting claims; so our next task is to try to understand how--since that is not intuitively obvious--this can be true? Phylogenetie adaptations preprogram animals, we learn (p. 367), by means of "innate motor patterns (instinctive action paaerns)" and "innate releasing mechanisms," inter alia. Humans too (p. 425) "possess an innate repertoire of signals as phylogenetic adaptations" (so as to be able to act coy, etc.). Turning first to the fixed action patterns, or FAPs (pp. 84-85), "innateness is an essential c r i t e r i o n . . . [of] a process of self-differentiation based upon developmental instructions laid dowg in the genes." Thus, "Automatic groups of mot0t cells drive the fixed-action patterns . . . . They are universal entities in man," of which one importantexample consists of the FAPs that"are innate learning dispositions" (emphasis ~ e d ) r And yet, FAPs cannot work without IRMs (innate releasing mechanisms, or "releasers") --except, off,course, for FAPs that run on action-specific energy, which in the prolonged

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absence of suitable consummatory behavior may energize themselves into vacuum activity (as illustrated in Figure 1 of Schubert, 1979, p. 46). IRMs act (p. 55) "like a stimulus filter, in that they only effect the release of certain behavior patterns [in] which certain key stimuli are presented but remain impervious to other stimuli. They can be understood using a lock-and-key analogy." Unfortunately, however (p. 63), "it is only possible in exceptional cases to experimentally demonstrate the existence of IRMs. So, in the case of responses to simple key stimuli and releasers that appear later in life, we have to depend mainly on circumstantial evidence." Even though the IRMs present such difficulties, we tend to expect that neurological and physiological laboratory (not, of course, ethological) research will by now have made substantial headway in tracing out how some of the locks are built (even if we can't do that for the keys). But in science, nothing is quite as simple as laypersons tend to presume. Thus (p. 69), for example, "The phenomenology of excitatory buildup and abreaction (discharge) is well known, but its physiology is not yet fully understood." Even after we have cut up various parts of the brains of cats (to take another example), we still don't know what was going on in the intact cat, although (p. 385) comparing his twitching behavior before and after "permits us to presume that there are various neuronal networks within the cat metencephalon that inhibit those central nervous factors motivating aggressive behavior." Of course (p. 24), "How the neuronal network is 'wired' for a particular function is, to date, known for only a few behavior patterns" and more generally, "We still know very little about the neuronal substrate which controls behavior." Fortunately, for other aspects of psychobiology than those of particular interest to classical ethological theory, the kind of operationalized knowledge about how the human brain acts is available, to make possible more scientific knowledge of how humans think see, e.g., Changeux, 1985; Livingston, 1978; Edelman & Mountcastle, 1978). In the absence of such datafor classicalethology, it is difficult to understand in what sense its theory of human behavior is in any sense scientific. So there isn't much more that needs to be said about it, except briefly in regard to its style of self-presentation. EE leaps (p. 20) from the specific example of species-specific bird-song to a generalization about the specific levels of integration to which the concept of phylogenetic adaptation can appropriately be applied; but that argument says nothing about the vast gap, genetically and otherwise, between vocalization preadaptation in birds, and the "preadaptation" of humans for such astronomically more complex and culture-bound behaviors as "personality" and "territoriality." Any such comparison is inept, prima facie. On that same page EE attributes his use of the concept of "innateness" to the positive thinking of Konrad Lorenz some thirty years ago. EE says that the resulting hypotheses about phylogenetic adaptation are "tests by [natural] selection"; but throughout HE that test is performed by deductive inference; it is virtually never tested against empirical data that might refute it--nor is there much indication that such data are even looked for; what appears to be sought are examples that are not prima facie inconsistent with the hypotheses. And eYen such examples are rarely quantified and tested statistically for populations of individuals, instead individuals that exhibit the behavior are considered to be the proof of the pudding. Reliance is frequently placed on "deprivation experiments," which are said to pro~de " a means to discover whether a behavior pattern owes its adaptiveness to individual learning; or to phylogenetic adaptation." But this takes us fight back to the n a t u r e / n ~ diehotomy~ most behaviors, of humans at least, are complex and dynamically changing eombinati0ns of the conjoint and transactional (and see below for further discussion of that concept, ~'eh.15B

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never uses in HE) effects of both unfolding individual genomes and environments--especially human social ones--that are never static. This is a problem that demands that we turn much more to Goethe than to Nietzsche, which in biological terms means to look at animal behavior as always a facet of epigenetic development--and as often a cause as an effect; and to look at the genome not as some static array of protein macromolecules in linear sequences, but instead from the perspective of the genomic repertoire (as proposed by behavioral biologist Benson Ginsberg, who happened to be one of Sewall Wright's early doctoral students at the University of Chicago half a century ago, in a paper that remains unpublished, except for the most relevant portion which is reproduced in Schubert, 1989a, pp. 323-328). On the merits of "deprivation experiments" EE asserts (p. 23) that "it is possible to withhold specific information relevant to a specific adaptation. If the animal nonetheless performs the adapted behavior, its phylogenetic adaptiveness is demonstrated." Sentences (and thoughts) like this appear different when stripped of their verbal accoutrements and recast in Boolean logic. The short of the matter is that the experimenters cannot withhold everything relevant to the behavior, because they do not and will never know what is everything relevant to a behavior. Withholding some limited quantum of information and then having the behavior occur shows only that withholding that particular information does not preclude the behavior; it says nothing at all about what does explain the behavior. Classical ethologists can (as they. do) claim that they know it must be phylogenetic adaptation (or God's, will, or whatever); but they have proved nothing except that information X isn't necessary, or rather, it isn't always necessary. There is some really silly stuff on p. 314, about how humans as a species inherit a genetic disposition to retain into adulthood an infantile predisposition to be subordinate, i.e., obeisant to manifest authority (e.g., p. 415: "Man seeks authority figures.") On the one hand it is said that the phylogenetic origin of this can be traced to maternal dominance of infants; yet at the same time EE exhorts those afflicted (all of us) to "restrain" our tendencies to toady--notwithstanding its genetic origins. Or is it maternal origins? What he explicitly says is that our tendency to obey is " a fatal [fetal?] infantile disposition that we bear genetically and we must be aware of this tendency in order to restrain it." Yet "The phylogenetie origin of obedience can be traced back to the mother-child relationship and is a persistent juvenile characteristic maintained into adulthood." Maybe "phylogenetic" is a misprint for "ontogenetie": then mother's influence would make sense, and all we would then have to figure out is how to "restrain" the genetic cause of our subservience. But if EE doesn't know how that operates, how can he expect'the rest of us, who already have to deal with our guilt feelings toward Mother (and cf. p. 711), to figure it out? Inhibitions: HE states (p. 405) that "Killing a fellow human being is subject to powerful primary inhibitions which, I presume, have a biological basis (p. 194)." Page 194 turns out to be about infanticide among the Yanomami, not about intraspeeific warfare. Otherwise EE is indebted for this particular inhibition to his mentor Lorenz, who in turn got the idea from Freud (1913), who in turn was trying to promote a secondary interpretation (at many times removed) about purification rituals required of successful warriors who had killed their enemies. That is the complete and total empirical evidence reported in HE in support of the notion that an inhibition against humans killing their conspeeifics is an innate phylogenetie adaptation. On p. 402, EE says that in instances of inter-group aggression, "the biological inhibitions against aggression have to be deactivated so that combatants no longer respond to

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signals of submission and various appeals of appeasement, bonding, and the arousal of sympathy." Indulging, for the moment, the premise that it makes any sense at all to reason deductively about a genetic inhibition of human aggression, then even so the way EE reasons makes no sense in terms of his own very best evidence--which is about aggressive relations in primitive gatherer-hunter groups, of which the best studied ones (the San) are remarkably peaceful among themselves. What does make sense--in relation to the premise that there may be a genetic basis for inhibiting human aggression--is that such an inhibition arose as a fitness-assuring adaptation for the groups; and the survival of the groups was indispensable for the survival of its individual members in pre-transition times. There was no need whatsoever for any such inhibition in relation to inter-specific aggression; very much to the contrary, and forgetting all about EE's stag ritual premises, what would be fitness enhancing for groups that were in selective competition against each other would be for their respective members to be aggressive killers in confrontation with members of other bands. In relation to colleague-members of their own band, it could be assumed that the intimate recognition of each other, in combination with their strong mutual interdependence, would be sufficient to invoke the inhibition physiologically. And in relation to out-group members, a separate innate predisposition to fear and dislike strangers, which we can call xenophobia, would be invoked. I offer the above not as a scientific argument, although it is a much more logical one than what is presented on page 402. For a good example of how little biological inhibition against conspecific killing there appears to be among such contemporary aboriginal humans, see EE's report (pp. 411-412) of a feud among western New Guinean villagers, in which several men were killed in a dispute arising over a temporarily missing dog, whose owner presumed (falsely) that the dog had been killed by a neighboring villager. That was a presumption that had neither more nor less empirical support than the Lorenz-EE assumption about a biological inhibition among humans against conspecific killing. On page 404, EE asserts that " I n the cultural mitigation of war, our innate inhibitions against aggression may play a vital role." I understand this to signify, in relation to his own theory of inter-specific aggression, that human biology is likely to make a more positive contribution than human culture in promoting world peace (and see p. 422). And only two pages later, he confesses to having been the butt of occasional criticism for his claims in behalf of "the existence of an innate prohibition against killing"; but in this context, he states that he was only "assuming" that this was true. So EE appears to agree, at least in this instance, that the "inhibition" is an hypothesis, albeit one for which no direct evidence is available. Zillman (1984, p. 5) comments that It may appear that Lorenz's ritualization concept has taken the element of destructive violence out of the fight for sexual access. Aggression is trivialized, so to speak, and rendered innocuous through miraculous selective adjustments. More recent research has made it abundantly clear, however, that fighting for access is by no means innocuous . . . . If, among species as diverse as cichlid fish, hamsters, langurs, baboons, and gorillas, the inferior fighter fails to submit and escape in time, the victorious animal is likely to fight to the point of the opponent's incapacitation or death . . . . The fact that fighting for access often proves harmless is apparently more the result of nimble feet (i.e., a capacity for quick withdrawal), sturdy skulls, and thick s k i n . . . than of "knowing" when to stop. The so-called tournamental fighting, then, can readily turn

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But this recounting also has implications for the point under discussion here: if all of these animals fail to exhibit the least biological inhibition against killing their Own conspecifics, one must ask how it could possibly have appeared among humans uniquely for primates (and see Hausfater & Hrdy, 1984, another volume in the same series as HE; and Goodall, 1986, ch. 20). We noted earlier another putative biological inhibition among humans, in this case (p. 358) one "against forming sexual relationships with those with whom one has grown up during a specific sensitive period of development." The IRM for this particular inhibition is described (p. 264; and cf. p. 80) as that "During a sensitive period from infancy to about 6 years of age, children learn with whom they should not fall in love." (This sounds like the converse of the case of Lorenz's goslings, who became imprinted on him, loving him thereafter as though he was their mother, at a somewhat more tender age--but geese are, after all, a different species than humans, with a shorter life span, etc.) The entire evidence empirically in support of the "first six years" finding, rests upon data from a single study (Shepfer, 1983) dealing with an abnormally socialized experimental population (of kibbutzers), and a subsample of only 13 deviant cases out of a total of 2769 (i.e., less than one-half of one percent of that total); these he had overlooked in his original data analysis, but subsequently noticed and examined. It is inconceivable that there is any statistical significance in any manipulation of a subsample of a baker's dozen cases, in relation to a control group of almost three thousand. Nevertheless, that is the only datum mentioned in H E in support of the proffered explanation of how and why there is an innate inhibition against "incest" among biologically unrelated humans who happened to have known each other well when they both were young children. This is field ethology?
Transactions: Nowhere that I could find in HE does EE use the word "transactional" in any form; he always says "interaction." Examples occur throughout the book (e.g., p. 105); the following (pp. 16, 21) are typical: "As a prerequisite for adaptation to occur, an interaction between the adapted organismic system and its environment must take place" (emphasis added); and "Someone designates himself as an 'interactionist' and in the same breath maintains that it is impossible to disentangle the contributions of innate and acquired characteristics." Clearly, EE does not understand the meaning, in English, of"transactional" as distinguished from "interactional"; anybody can disentangle the contributions of innate characteristics when those are defined transcendentally as what Arthur Fisher Bentley (1908) denigrated as non-empirical "spooks" and "ghosts' ' - - a n d his work has been well known in political science throughout the 20th Century. The difference between interactions and transactions is like the difference between Newtonian (classical) physics, and quantum (and especially particle) modem physics. People in relation to each other, or individually or collectively in relation to their environment, behave like billiard balls on a pool table (or like apples falling out of a tree) when they interact with each other. Masses and velocities may influence each other in a linear way, but the objects interacting do not mutually and reciprocally change each other dynamically and simultaneously--as does happen for leptons and baryons. There is no E = mc 2 in interactions--but there isn't any in quantum mechanics either, for we now recognize that Einstein's relativity theory was the last gasp of classicism.

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The biological equivalent of quantum physics is developmental epigenetics (see Waddington, 1975; Geist, 1978; and Schubert, 1985), as extended by Ginsberg's concept of the genomic repertoire (supra), reported in Schubert (1989a, pp. 327-328). To give just one example, in epigenetic development it often is the case that animal (including human) behavior changes the environment to which the animal is exposed, and that at the same time in response to its constraints/opportunities the animal's genomically-based physiology changes in new ways, leading to changes in morphology, and of course in subsequent behaviors as well. This is a vastly more complex and open-ended concept of development than one anchored in bean-bag genetics that focuses on putative genetic stimulation of behavioral responses, in a scientific milieu such that nobody even knows where the bean-bag is.

Social Science Theory

Experimental, laboratory, psychological/psychobiological research in human physiology and behavior--at least, of the modern era of the past two decades--is used by EE only as highly selective examples--not in a systematic way to interface with the zoologicallybased, primarily European, ethological research to which EE has himself contributed; in which Konrad Lorenz was interested; and with which EE is overwhelmingly concerned in this book. His discussion of empirical social behavior constitutes an admixture of zoology (the animal behavior of "higher" vertebrates) and social psychology--whereas his references to other psychologists (i.e., Freud, B.F. Skinner, William James) are almost always historical. For example, even in regard to a subject that is contiguous to one of his own specialties (the behavior of infants), EE offers such gratuitous (and uninformed) comments as that (p. 212) "the heartbeat theory [that the fetus synchronizes its heartbeat with that of its mother] seems somewhat farfetched to me." No doubt he is equally skeptical that nonparous females living together in a small and close group relationship coordinate their menses; but that and the maternal/fetal heartbeat ought to be grist for his mill. The apparent problem is that although, indubitably, they involve physioflexibilities of two or more humans that are evoked in synchrony through environmental opportunities--the placenta, after all, defines at least the membranous environment of the fetus, in substantial measure--they also involve transactional relationships (in which no interest or awareness whatsoever is manifest in HE). Both the heartbeat and the menses examples are surely innate, at least somatically; but that's not Lorenz's or EE's kind of innateness. Maybe his disinterest reflects the circumstance that he has not photographed either behavior; but they both are certainly part of any discipline of human ethology that aspires to be in touch with modern human life. The social science theory that EE does invoke is used superficially by him, e.g., his reference (p. 314) to Parsonian socialization theory as though it were natural law: "Individuals maintain the[ir] roles according to age, sex, status, etc., established by the culture." What EE does here is restate what was an orthodoxy in social (including political) science (at least) forty years ago. If that is what he was aware of, then one would expect at least a genuflection in the direction of Talcott Parsons; but neither that sociological godfather nor any other of the leading spokespersons for structural-functionalism--one of the most ostentatiously biologically inspired and derived theories of 20th Century social science--is mentioned in the text, listed in the bibliography, or listed in the. author index of HE. The next best guess seems to be that social roles are considered by EE to be another byproduct of biologically innate phylogeny. If so his advocacy of such a static theory of social organization ought to reflect at least his

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awareness of such more modem and dynamic approaches to social structure theory as, e.g., one stemming from baboon primatology (Strum & Latour, 1987) proposing that baboons (and humans as well) construct their own individual social roles, and thereby transform the role structure of their group, through their behaviors in relation to each other; or for another example that spawned a substantial literature in the Journal of Social and Biological Structures, see the prolegomena to constructional biology (Wheeler & Danielli, 1982) subscribed to by about a dozen leading life scientists.

Innate superiority: The belief that aristos are born and best qualified to rule hoi polloi did not originate with classical ethological theory (although Baerends was a favorite of the Queen, and vice versa, at the time of my apprenticeship in the Dutch poulders); very much to the contrary, belief in governance by a privileged elite goes back at least to (and began almost certainly long before) Aristotle, and indeed it was a hallmark of many central European societies until after World War II for s o m e - - a n d even in contemporary times of perestroika and glasnost--until the very present in certain central European countries that were politically a part of Eastern Europe until a few months ago. So EE's advocacy of aristocracism will strike a familiar chord for readers whose own personal attachment is to a less reactionary ideology. Of course such an assertion must be demonstrated; but there are so many examples in HE (and especially in the last chapter) that it is hard to decide where to begin. But "the great success of Europeans throughout the world" (p. 13)--and thank God he did not say " A m e r i c a n s " - - i s as good as any. Skipping to page 618, we learn that " I n central Europe, work and leisure-intensive phases change with the seasons, permitting a rich cultural life to unfold enhanced by division of labor with people such as the aristocracy specializing in the promotion of the fine arts" (emphasis added), concerning which I suppose one might say: thank God for seasonality. In groups ranging from gathering-hunting bands to central European "states" (p. 678),
The group is quite willing to be represented by [noble] leadership. These high ranking individuals are regarded proudly as examples of the group, whose might, wealth, abilities, and values they represent. The magnificent palaces of Islamic princes served this purpose as did the castles and parks of European monarchs. As such, they functioned as display organs and as the adornment of the entire group, and are restored and preserved with sizable investment of love and funds . . . . The need for this kind of group representation is great, and this willingness to support such enormous artistic efforts for those'persons symbolizing the group was probably a decisive factor in the development of art [but see Wilson, 1988] [emphasis added]. A bit further on (p. 713), EE commits what is either a Teutonism, a Freudian slip, or a proofreading error, in his recounting (evidently in central European terms, because Garret Hardin's original example was very appropriate to the historical setting on which he d r e w - - o f English sheep, not Austrian cows) of one of the more hackneyed examples used to justify human sociobiology (and see Crowe, 1969). In any case: " A farmer wishes to preserve his private meadow and will not raise too many cattle, but on a collective meadow the farmer will attempt to graze as many cattle as he possibly can. This situation is known as the 'tragedy of the c o m m o n e r s . ' " In fact, the title of Hardin's article is "The Tragedy of the C o m m o n s " - - n o t "Commoners." As we shall see momentarily below, that kind of behavior

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is exactly what we should expect from persons of such poor breeding and status as the overgrazers patently were; and yet we cannot be positive--from this example alone--that "commoner" was what EE meant to say. Somereaders may share my own reaction: as a descendant of many generations of central European peasants, I cannot help feeling some slight empathy for those poor buggers with too many cows and too little land--no matter how many royal treasures were accumulated for them to glory in (vicariously, of course). In a footnote on page 13, EE directs "attention to the fact that in modem society the less economically successful produce more children than those better endowed. This leads to a decline of the IQ from one generation to the next in modern societies" (emphasis added). In doing so, he goes out of his way to identify himself with the position of those notorious eugenicists William Shockley, Arthur Jensen, and Sir Cyril Burt, on the issue of the postulated hereditarian theory of IQ (and see Gould, 1981, especially ch. 6 and 7, but most especially the dedication page).
Reactionary political ideology: EE's views about politics are related to his ideas about culture, which creates on initial problem. He generalizes loosely passim, but especially in the introductory and concluding chapters of HE, about "cultural evolution," but without any references to the extensive professional literature, in biology as well as in the social sciences, that discusses that subject. Since he cannot be pinned down to relevant general sources on the theory of cultural evolution, as distinguished from small-sample studies and Lorenz, it is necessary to examine a few examples of what he does say. Initially (p. 12), EE defines culture as "the totality of traditional adaptations." Then (p. 16) he expounds on that somewhat, stating that "cultural evolution phenocopies phylogenesis in many respects, since in both cases the shape of the resulting pattern is determined by selection. Customs must prove themselves in order to be retained" (emphasis added). So far as the phylogenetic model goes, it is hard to say what he means: biological selection operates on genes; but for cultural selection, he never even mentions, let alone defines, a unit of selection. To do that he would have had to undertake some familiarity with the research literature (mentioned above) that he ignores; for example, although he lists in the HE bibliography half a dozen items authored by my friend and associate, political scientist Roger D. Masters, these do not include the one that would have been of value to EE in the present context (Masters, 1970). On the emphasized sentence of the quotation above, he surely gives far too little credit to pure chance as a factor of major importance in all human affairs, including cultural evolution (and see Aubert, 1959; and Monod, 1971). Turning to political ideology, EE deplores (p. 662) "The anti-individualistic social ethic of anonymous society." Subsequently (p. 714) he warns that "conditions could obtain that the individualistic members of the society might become depressed to the extent that their willingness to reproduce would decrease dramatically" with such consequences as the disintegration of society itself. The context of his remarks'makes it explicit that it would be socialism and the obligation to share more equally with those less individualistic that would put such a damper on the individualists' reproductive behavior. The possibility that, under world conditions of exponentially increasing species population, more reproductive self restraint even from individualists (not to mention the social virtue being exemplified in this regard by the homosexuals whom he detests) might contribute to the longer range genetic fitness of the species does not appear to have occurred to EE. But he has thought long and hard about the welfare problem, leading him to such comments as (p. 714) that "The welfare

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state, in particular, has its appeal, since the infantile side in us responds positively to being taken care o f . " Furthermore, this can lead to "moral hypertrophy"; and "The development of ethics of welfare and the ethics of sympathy of the modem western world, which makes all kinds of charity an obligation under the catchword of a worldwide humanitarianism, [and] transforms the state from the guardian of rights to a milk cow." Indeed (p." 661), "The reader will no doubt be struck by the extent to which we are already headed in [the direction of Huxley's Brave New World]. We live in a welfare society, protecting the individual through friendly care in a social network infantilizing the individual, and making him dependent and leadable"; bat preferably by benevolent hereditary elites--so why worry? On this score, a good empirical example is available (p. 661): "This trend seems to thrive particularly in Sweden." This because (p. 709) Charity and generosity are virtues, but if an optimum level is exceeded they can become vices... [which] is also true in principle for excessive social services within a government . . . . The well-meaning social aid organizations within a country can deyelop to the extent that may restrict individual freedom and personal initiative . . . . [Also] it is appropriate to send medicine, foods, and other materials to regions struck by catastrophes. But sending food as relief into countries with chronic starvation due to overpopulation will worsen the problem. Here additional aids as in the form of educational programs to curb overpopulation [among the poor, of course] must be considered (emphasis added). One can only hope that the readers of H E will include such political profligates as George Bush, John Major, and Mikhail Gorbachev. Turning from egalitarianism to feminism, EE remarks (p. 661) that the issue of the rights of women has created a compulsory emancipation so that even women who do not wish to are being forced into .the working market since it is old-fashioned and unworthy to live as a housewife and mother . . . . What would happen to all the child care centers and everything that pedagogues and social workers have created if mothers took care of their children themselves? [emphasis added]. Sociologists have a name for this kind of logic: they call it "blaming the victim." Moving on from public policy to politicians (p. 717), EE castigates the political lie, intellectual seduction, and primitive manipulation [that] must give way to a politics based upon insightful rationality and intellectual decency. This kind of political ethics ought to be instrumentally conceived after the model of the scientific e t h i c s . . . [because] one must be honest, undogmatic, precise, fair and without bias, continually attempt to solve a problem, test alternatives, reject no information and make no compromises, use empirical data as the final arbiter, and other requirements such as to be precise in one's statements like EE himself throughout HE, one supposes. But do those scientific criteria explain how and why Jim Watson got the Nobel Prize instead of Rosie Franklin (see Watson, 1968; Sayre, 1975; Bleier, 1986, pp. 6 - 7 , 21; and Rose, 1986, p. 63)? EE (p. 320) declares that he is "in favor of plurality a n d . . , a social contract which guarantees each ethnic group ~urvival within their traditional borders . . . as long as [that does] not escalate to ethnoecentric domination over and intolerance of other groups." So

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how would he apply such advice? Send Israeli Jews back where they came from? Who would he deport from South Africa, the Europeans or the Bantus? How about American Indians: have they been free-loading off their welfare-providing more-civilized benefactors long enough; and if so what would he do with them or their benefactors? Besides, that talk at the end about intolerance of other groups smacks of the same knee-jerk liberalism that he refuses to condone elsewhere in HE, whenever other writers resort to it. Fortunately, international politics is somewhat less difficult than domestic politics (p. 716): "We must reach peace through trust, for distrust is presently our greatest problem and disturbs international relations." This can perhaps be understood as a wistful longing for the more personal diplomacy that prevailed in days of yore under the ancien regimes. Another suggested solution (p. 713) is to convince the multitude to renounce their nepotistic practices and identify their own interests with those of their Leader: "Since Man, during his long history, was selected to give priority to both individual and kin interest, the interest of the larger group must be constantly emphasized by indoctrination and nepotism must be counteracted (emphasis added; and see Adomo et al., 1950, in regard to the views expressed). There are limits to this sort of thing, however (p. 712): only "communities up to the size of modem nation-states form common interest groups without which the individual could not survive." (Of course, a solitary baboon is a dead baboon; but We're talking about humans here: what about Robinson Crusoe? or the Swiss Family Robinson?) In any event (p. 715), "An artificial homogenization and equalization of Mankind would require quite repressive measures of a world dictatorship," which I understand to signify that EE believes that the price for economic, social, and political democracy on anything approaching a global scale would be a Pax Romana. Ultimately, however, even the problems of national authority and global peace must be traced back to how children are raised (p. 329; and cf. 393, 396); thus, "the products of permissive upbringing are not particularly peaceful individuals but rather children whose aggressions are u n r e s t r a i n e d . . . [but the] strategy of exploratory aggression is not only restricted to children." The difficulty here seems to be a monumental error in the level of analysis of the behaviors discussed, jumping from individual children in individual homes all the way to nation-states, and beyond that (in the text below on the cited page) to "Europe." EE appears to understand and respect this methodological point when. he is discussing biology (p. 106); but when he turns to what are properly questions of the social science of human behavior, he shows no more restraint than those spoiled children.

(Linguistic) sexism: In the penultimate paragraph, supra, both " M a n " and "Mankind" appear, neither in a position in the sentence such that the ordinary rules of English grammar would require their capitalization. Indeed, in the literally dozens of instances in whiehithey recur throughout the book, " m a n " and " m e n " are left uneapit~zed (unless starting a sentence); but the opposite is true for the concluding chapter, when any such word is almost always capitalized, as though the masculine role in cultural affairs, if not quite deific,.was nevertheless somehow even more important than the male role in biological relationships. What is most relevant here, however, is that in either case EE prefers to practice linguistic sexism (Eichler & Lapointe, 1985) by designating the male human sexwhen he is speaking of both, and should therefore have said. "human." Often this leads to patently'ridiculous results, e.g. (p. ~705), "Man can behave appropriately on the basis of biological driv~"~;SO women can't? "At any rate, there are few observations of kissing in a sexual ton'text, for

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man generally hides his intimate behavior from public view" (p. 138); so what's going on here: is man kissing himself in a closet? "Our fellow man must behave appropriately in order to maintain a harmonious mutual relationship" (p. 503); but women can behave as they like? Although "the cultural variety of marital and family relationships demonstrate the adaptability of man . . . . Man is predisposed through phylogenetic adaptations to marital partnership and family life" (p. 186); and what is woman predisposed to do? There is one instance (p. 523: "Only man can conduct his affairs using verbal language") that one might think EE would have noticed as a possible problem. It is true that the "Only man" is intended to distinguish humans from "animals"; but what he literally says is that human women cannot conduct their affairs using verbal language. Now that is a simply extraordinary falsehood, which EE himself concedes elsewhere in HE, where he points out the superior speech facility that human females modally have in relation to human males modally (and of. Dearden, 1975). So this example is just more blatantly sexist than the dozens of others. I found only two exceptions to the above practice, in the entire book. In the first (p. 67): "In man the decline in the sexual drive after orgasm is in p a r t . . , determined by the fullness of the seminal vesicle' ' - - a n d here, even though this is accidental, he got it right because he really is talkin" g about males and not about females. The second exception is even more remarkable (p. 289): "The individual thus is embedded in a network of kin who ultimately will support her or him and fill her or his needs when necessary." For this latter anomaly, no explanation whatsoever is apparentwbut perhaps it does indicate that, with proper motivation, EE could learn to do it more often.
(Linguistic) racism: This leaves us with the problem of the Bushmen. Others (Richard Lee, Melvin Konner, and Nicholas Blurton Jones) who were EE's colleagues in field research of these gathering-hunting aboriginals,.in the Kalahari Desert of Namibia and Botswana, join in their use of the less pejorative name that these people have for themselves: " S a n " (which in their language means simply "the People"). It is true that EE is not a native speaker of English; but he presents himself as insensitive to the cultural nuances of contemporary social scientific language usage that avoid linguistic reinforcement of ethnic and sex discrimination. EE even manages to combine both types of discrimination in a single sentence (p. 266): "The extreme subordination of the woman, as exists in some modem and tribal cultures, does not occur in Bushmen" (emphasis added). There are dozens, probably hundreds of instances in which EE prefers "Bushman" or "Bushmen" to "San" in his reference to these people; but I did find three exceptions (at pp. 174, 292, and 695) so--just as in the case of linguistic sexism, he does know better. Afrikaners in South A_frica~who until only a few years ago ruled the San as a subject black people, just like~they rule the "Bantus" who were apartheided in tribal "homelands"--used the rterm "Bushmen", ;as one of special denigration for centuries, just as they refer to the "Bantus"~as "Kafftrs" when they really want to put them down in direc.t address, while referring to :themselves as "Europeans." (Coming as they did from Holland, the ancestral Afrik"~ e r s would hardy have wanted to refer to themselves, or their latter-day English conquerors, as " c e n t r a l Europeans.") Typical examples are (p. 697) "the trance dance of _the BuShmen"~ in the caption for aphotograph of such behavior; and (p. 692) EE's reminisc e n c e o f p l e a s ~ "m~thinldug~."ofBushmen life in the Kalahari" and (p. 600; and el. p. 172) a~referenee to a:"Bushman baby.'! The three exceptions are: (p. 174) a mention of "Bushmen

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(San)"; on p. 292, "the Kalahari Bushman (San); and (p. 695), "the San women"--which is the only instance in which " S a n " alone is used. Nevertheless, EE has no problem of accepting the indigenous names of other tribes with whom he studied (e.g., the " I n " people of Western New Guinea), which suggests a puzzling question: WHY single out the San for especial pejoration? Because they are too democratic? Possibly; but I can only speculate; and probably EE does not know why, either. There is one entailed consideration. At pages 289-290, and passim, without a single exception that I could find, EE insists on designating pre-transition (plus contemporary) primitive groups as "Hunter-gatherer" (instead of "Gatherer-hunter); and this is inconsistent with his conceded acceptance of the ample evidence that for all such groups, women generally supply more food than men do. Three possible explanations come to mind: (1) Huntergatherer was the first term to be used by anthropologists, and therefore is an-older, more traditional, quantum of human culture that ought not to be lightly supplanted; (2) Huntergatherer reinforces the patriarchal outlook toward women and family life that EE evinces throughout the book; and (3) "Gatherer-hunter" is explicitly a feminist concept (Slocum, 1975; Zihlman & Tanner, 1978; Zihlman, 1981; Haraway, 1983, 1986) and therefore ought to be rejected on that ground, an argument supported by the consistently anti-feminist views that EE espouses throughout HE. But no choice among these three is really necessary; they all reinforce each other in supporting a preference for Man the Hunter; and therefore together they provide the most probable explanation.

Postscript
EE thanks two women "for their faithful translation of this book." In fairness to him it should be acknowledged that in dealing with the prior work of several other authors who wrote in German, EE personally made the translations into English, as he points out in each case. HE was so carelessly proofread that he doubtless had help in that too; for example, it is replete with careless but consistent mistakes in the spelling of the names of well-known scholars in the subjects about which EE writes (i.e., Dian Fossey; Eleanor Maccoby; Frans de Waal; not to mention more historical personages such as "Thomas Hobb's" at p. 7!5). If he had done his own translation of what he wrote in German for the first edition of this book, it is possible that many of the most awkward and bizarre linguistic barbarisms would have been avoided. They do abound in the book, as exemplified by the use (at least dozens, and probably hundreds of times--but who's counting?) of the dictionary's "appetence" in lieu of the "appetite" that any native speaker of English would have used instead. (As I write this, my undergraduate degree with a major in the English language was conferred precisely half a century ago last week; at least in those days I read omnivorously works by hundreds of English or American writers; and I do not recall having ever encountered "appetenoe" before reading HE recently--although a Thesaurus plus copies of Fowler, and of Frllett, remain my constant companions. Nor do I find it in the glossary to my copy of the Globe Edition of the Complete Works o f WilliamShakespeare, which was originally published, in November 1864; and acquired by me, in Grosset and Dunlap's then inexpensive andnow still indestructible reprinting, circa 1938. Conceivably, the word was more fashionable in the days of Shakespeare's predecessor, Chaucer.) Anyhow, "appetenoe" certainly does fit.,in well with the aura of HE, which is more reminiscent of phlogiston:~than of. q u a r k . , :

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