THE UNTOLD STORY ABOUT GREEK RATIONAL THOUGHT: BUDDHIST AND OTHER INDIAN RATIONALIST INFLUENCES ON SOPHIST RHETORIC

by

BASNAGODA RAHULA, B.A., M.A.

A DISSERTATION IN ENGLISH Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of Texas Tech University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements fop the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY Approved

Cliairperson of he Comm'ittee

Accepted

Interim Dean of the GraduaTe'Sdiool December, 2000

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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I wish to express my gratitude to the foUowing persons who helped me complete

my dissertation successfiilly: Dr. Fred Kemp, chair of my dissertation committee, who both inspired my interest in rhetoric with his courses in the discipline and offered useful suggestions for the revision of the dissertation, committee members Dr. James Whitlark who provided useful suggestions about the Eastem and Westem philosophical and religious traditions, and Dr. Locke Caiter who helped me with the writing strategies for the dissertation, and Dr. Rebecca Rickly who assisted me in writing Chapter n in an independent study course. I am also grateful to Dr. Donald Rude, former graduate advisor, who initially directed my graduate studies and always encouraged me towards the completion of my doctorate and to Dr. Bryce Conrad, present graduate advisor, who planned my graduate program creatively to make it practically useful to me.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS TABLE OF CONTENTS ABSTRACT CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION Notes II. INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST RATIONALITY: SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURE OF EARLY BUDDHIST RATIONALIST THOUGHT Early Hindu Thought as a Precursor to Pre-Buddhistic Rationality Social Connections and Rhetorical Value in Early Hindu Beliefs System Social Opposition to the Vedic Belief System as a Precursor to Advanced Rhetoric Development of Rational Thought against the Brahmin System New Persuasive Techniques in the Brahmin Tradition Persuasive Fervor Social Response to Persuasion Rise of the Buddha as a Powerful Speaker Rational Thinking in Early Buddhist Teaching

ii iii vi

1 38

41

41

44

53

58 63 67 80 87 92

Different Transformations of Early Buddhist Teaching that Hide Its Rational Persuasion Notes III. BACKGROUND OF SOPHIST RATIONALITY Original in Greece or Adopted Tom Outside? Evaluation of Popular Views about the Origin of Sophist Rational Thought Foreign Influences on lonian Speculations Pythagoras and Jainism Notes Influential Sources of the Last Pre-sophist Thinkers Empedocles and Indian Materialism andBuddhism Democritus and Buddhist Rationality and Indian Atomism Notes rV. BUDDHIST AND OTHERINDIAN RATIONALIST INFLUENCES ON SOPHIST RHETORIC From Democritus and Empedocles to Protagoras and Gorgias Empedocles and Democritus as Forefathers of Sophist Rationality The Causes that Evaded the Comparison of Buddhist Rational Thought with Sophist Thinking General Signs of Indian Influence on Protagoras and Gorgias Notes 218 218 108 123 142 162 166 166 189 213 97 103 108 108

218 220 225 236

Theory of Knowledge in Indian Rationality and Greek Sophist Thinking Indian Empiricism and Positivism and Protagoras' Theory of Knowledge Skepticism in India Rational Thought and in Greek Sophist Rhetoric Conclusion Notes Buddhist Parallels with Protagoras' Arrangement, Style, and Presentation Notes Personal Philosophy and Social Ethics in Buddhist and Sophist Teaching Personal Philosophy Social Equality as a Major Aspect of Buddhist and Sophist Social Ethics Notes Social Evolution in Buddhism and Sophist Rhetoric Notes V, MORE EVIDENCE OF INFLUENCE AND CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ANCIENT GREECE AND INDIA Notes WORKSCITED

238

240

250 256 258

260 277

279 279

298 305 307 317

319 351 353

ABSTRACT

During the fifth and the early fourth century B. C. E.. Greek Sophist rhetoricians developed rational thinking in many fields such as in epistemology, anthropology, sociology, rehgion, and politics. Despite the popular belief that the traditional Greek society provided the influential sources for sophist rationalists, the dissertation argues that Greeks sophist thinkers-Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Critias, and others-were mainly influenced by Buddhist and other Indian rationalist thinking that was prevalent in India prior to the rise of the Greek sophist movement. This dissertation is the first indepth study of Buddhist and other Indian rationalist influences on Greek sophist rhetoric. Afler the introduction that prepares the background for the discussion in the dissertation, Chapter II deals with the natural origin and development of Indian rationality. As a reaction to the social difficulties caused by the metaphysical and ideological concepts in\ented by the early Hindu tradition, Indian skeptics, materialists, Jains, and Buddhists developed rational argument against Hindu beliefs. In this development, the Brahmin myths of creation, transmigration of the soul, and Brahma were challenged vigorously by the rationalist traditions. Also, the competition between the orthodox Hindu beliefs and the rationahsts' free inquiry about those behefs gave rise to other rhetorical techniques such as style, organization, and presentation of arguments. Chapter III discusses the parallel development of rational thought in Greece with attention to the possible influence of Indian concepts on Greek thinkers from the sixth

century B. C. E. Attention is drawn in this chapter mainly to Pythagoras, Empedocles. and Democritus, the forefathers of Greek sophist rhetoric, as the followers of Indian rational concepts. Chapter IV discusses in detail the similarities between Indian and Greek rational thought. Here, the rationalist concepts of Protagoras, Gorgias, and several other sophist thinkers, as well as their techniques in presentation, are closely evaluated in the light of Indian rationality in order to indicate a possible Indian influences on the Older Sophists. Chapter V reveals more evidence of possible influence, easy accessibility to Indian concepts in Greece and in Persia, and the ancient routes of communication between India and Greece.

CHAPTERI INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of the present work is to narrate the previously untold story about the origin and the development of Greek rationality, the story that Buddhist and other Indian rational concepts could have been the influential source for most of the Greek sophist rhetoricians. While a great majority of scholars in philosophy and rhetoric strongly advocate that the original sources of Greek sophist thinkers existed within Greek society itself, this dissertation presents a drastically different view, claiming that the major rationalist concepts of the Older Sophists-of Protagoras, Gorgias, Antiphon, Prodicus, Critias and othersmight have originated and developed in connection with the Indian materialistic, skeptic, and mainly Buddhist rationalistic concepts. First of all, "Greek rationality," the master term m the above paragraph, needs a clarification in order to establish the scope of the present discussion. Perhaps, the best way to specify this term is to recognize what it includes and excludes in the present context. Modera discipline of rhetoric accepts that the Older Sophists "'represent [ed] an intellectual movement that raised problems in critical areas," such as metaphysics, theory of knowledge, moral philosophy, logic, sociology, theology, and political philosophy (Grimaldi 23). This sophist enlightenment challenged not only the religious and social values of the traditional Greek society but also the ideahstic and metaphysical concepts of the lonian and the Eleatic philosophical traditions developed during the sixth and the

early fifth centuries B.C.E. To be more specific, the term "Greek rationality" in this dissertation includes the concepts and thinking developed within this intellectual movement of the Older Sophists. The present work focuses on this new development in Greek thought as a trend that was possibly influenced by the then-prevalent Indian rationahst movement. This clarification of the term "sophist rationality" excludes from the present investigation Edward P. J. Corbett's and Robert J. Connors' term "the appeal to reason" (32) or logos as defined by Aristotle and practiced by the Older Sophists in Greek deliberative, judicial, and epideictic oratory. Aristotle clarified this reasoning as the proof "achieved by the speech" itself apart from the emotional appeal of the speech and the speaker's character, the other two requirements for persuading an audience. Apparently, there was no extemal influence on the origin and development of rational argument in these areas. As Athens and its colonies changed from tyranny to democracy, people's participation in political decision-making became an integral part in Greek politics. As a result, the Greek public was constantly engaged in making proposals, defending them, and refusing other proposals without falling into the danger of being accused or prosecuted. Besides, deliberative argument was an essential requirement in Greece in order to persuade the citizens of each state to defend itself from extemal attacks and to persuade other states into allies. Evidence suggests that Greeks, particularly Athenians, possessed masterful skill in this kind of deliberation. It appears that the Greek victory in 479 B.C.E. against the formidable Persian empire, a victory that surprised

everyone including the Greeks themselves (Dewald ix), was achieved mainly through the persuasive skill of the Greeks in argumentation. As Herodotus indicated, Athenians commanders' and diplomats' persuasive speeches that appealed to inner Greek city-states and the lonian states that supported the Persian invasion of Greece played a predominant role in sending the Persian troops into a crushing defeat.^ This kind of deliberative argument was natural in Greece, and the Greeks were the masters of that practice. The change from tyranny to democracy also offered Greek citizens, mostly Athenians, the freedom to stand for their legal rights and to accuse the fellow citizens in public. In this freedom, Greeks developed rational argumentation in their legal appeals, accusations, and defenses. Athenians could have been familiar with this kind of reasoning since the time of Solon's legal reforms in the late sixth century B.C.E., but "the emergence of democracy in fifth century B.C. Athens," required citizens' "broader participation in . . . legal affairs" (Jerratt xv). Thus, one may conclude without much endeavor that the rational argument in Greek law was of Greek origin without any extemal influence. The other appeal to reason the Greek society permitted its citizens was to rhetorically construct someone's personality and present it to the public. This practice seems to have linked more to the constant wars Greece fought over centuries than to democracy. Dead war heroes were given higher praise partly to appreciate their service and partly to motivate society towards self-defense; therefore, the reconstmction of a personality, particularly highlighting the heroic qualities of fighters, became an essential

need in Greek society. This practice first became formalized in Greek literature, such as in laudatory odes of Pindar, who believed that the fimction of poetry was "to commemorate great men andnoble deeds" (Freeman, God, Man, andState\\\). He

poetically reconstructed the characters of war-heroes, raising them to the state of gods (Hammand 274). Gorgias' "Encomium of Helen" indicates that, by the time of the fifthcentury B.C.E., this tendency had evolved to such an extent that even an ancient historical figure could be reconstructed, completely challenging the firmly held public opinions about such a person. Obviously, these speeches required reasoning such as the argument in the Gorgias' work that indicates "relative detachment [of Gorgias] in the scratiny of moral problems. . ." (Rankin 43). Again, no extemal influence is detectable in this kind of reasoning in ancient Greek society. Since these three forms of appeals to reason were social needs in the ancient Greek society, there was also a social demand for such rational thinkers and speakers. To fiilfill this demand, Greek society produced such handbook writers as Corax and Tisias during the mid fifth century B.C.E. Particularly in Athens, "as a natural occurrence of Pericles' democracy, the need arose for training in public speaking" (Katula and Murphy 17). This need apparently attracted the Older Sophists who wrote model speeches and taught people the art of argumentation in respective fields. Here, too, no disagreement would arise with the view that this social upsurge originated in the traditional Greek society. Clearly, the Older Sophists did not introduce legal and politcal, as well as ceremonial, speeches into Athens. They (the Older Sophists) simply responded to the

Greek social demands by employing their rational skill in politics, law, and laudatory speeches. It is obvious that the appeal to reason in the entire area of traditional Greek rhetoricmainly in political, legal, and laudatory speeches-originated and developed in the traditional Greek society without any notable foreign influence. In fact, one must credit the ancient Greek society for its initiation of modera legal and political discourse, which, by any standard, is one of the greatest contributions to the modem world by any ancient nation. Then, to repeat the scope of the present research, this dissertation focuses only on the sophist intellectual involvement with such areas as epistemology, anthropology, sociology, religion, and ethics and argues on the possibility that sophist thinking in these fields originated and developed in connection with Buddhist and other Indian rationalist concepts. The story about sophist thinking in these areas seems to be totally different from the story about the appeal to reason in legal, political, and display speeches. When Tisias visited Athens in 431 B.C.E., about three decades after Corax and Tisias prepared the earliest handbook on legal discourses, "Athenians were already deeply interested in persuasive discourse," and "this interest was surely not a Sicilian invention" (Katula and Murphy 20). It was not an Athenian invention, either. The Older Sophists "were all aliens, strange guests to Athens, who impressed its citizens with their expertise as diplomats, teachers, and performers" (Jarratt 2). Protagoras, the disciple of Democritus, came to Athens from Abdera in the mid-440s. As Chapter III reveals, Democritus was a visitor to India, and his thinking bears a striking similarity with Buddhist and other Indian

rationalist thinking. Democritus "is supposed to have influenced his [Protagoras'] thought" (Rankin 31). One can assimie "an influence exercised by Democritus on the sophist [Protagoras] apart from an actual and specific master-pupil relationship" between the two thinkers (Untersteiner 2). Gorgias came to Athens from Sicily in 431 B.C.E., but he was a disciple of Empedocles whose thinking, as Chapter III reveals, suggests a possible coimection with both Buddhist concepts and Indian materialistic views. The influence of Empedocles on Gorgias "is generally recognized by scholars" (Untersteiner 92). Prodicus who came from Ceos was a student of Protagoras. While this background of the early sophists provides an initial clue to justify the legitimacy of the argument that Indian rationality probably influenced sophist thinking, the dissertation examines in detail the possible evidence of such an influence with attention to the similarities between Indian and sophist rationality, connections between ancient Indian and Greece, routes between the two countries, and visits to India by Greek thinkers who influenced the Older Sophists. Since the Older Sophists are generally known as the itinerant teachers who made money out of teaching political and legal discourses to the public, a clearer explanation of sophist thinJcing and practices as an intellectual movement seems necessary and appropriate at this point. Most of the sophist thinkers wrote treaties on trath and on metaphysical concepts, displaying their intellectual strength in respective fields. According to Plato, Protagoras wrote Tnith which Socrates' ftiend Hermogenes rejected altogether.' Importantly, the opening sentence of this book was "Of all things the

measure is man, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not."* Theodor Gomperz believed that the opening sentence of Truth was an attack on the beliefs of the Eleatics school of thought (450). Edward Schiappa and several others' held that thisfi-agmentwas specifically an attack on Parmenides (121122). What these remarks suggest is Protagoras' intellectual engagement with metaphysical beliefs. He seems to say that "we cannot know anything except that which perception offers us to know," and "our thought does not function except by means of experience, outside of and without which we cannot have knowledge" (qtd. in Untersteiner 171). Intellectuality and rational inquiry are at their best here. As reported by several Greek and Roman writers, Protagoras also wrote several other treatiesOn the Gods,'' On Being,^ On the Original Social Sructure, and On Firt e*which clearly classify him as an intellectual. Both Diogenes Laertius and Eusebius said that in his On the Gods Protagoras presented himself as an atheist, and consequently, Athenians voted to execute him, and the copies of the book were buraed in public'' Again, Porphyry remarked in his Lectures on Literature that Protagoras in On Being argued "against those who propose[d] Being as one."' Porphyry fvuther noted in the same book that Plato borrowed his counter-arguments in dialogues from Protagoras' method of arguing in 0 Being." No details are available on On the Original Social Structure and On Virtue other than Laertius' remarks that the two books survived during the forth century B.C.E.'^ Nevertheless, the titles of the two books give an indication of what the books might have contained. Protagoras did not believe in the concept of

creation so that in On the original Social Structure he could have possibly argued about the social evolution just as Critias argued on Sisyphus. In On Virtue, it is more likely that Protagoras emphasized the value of virtue. According to Plato, Protagoras proclaimed himself as a teacher of culture and virtue." These remarks indicate that, even though Protagoras refiised to accept any divine power, he never disregarded human values. Similar to a modem humanist, Protagoras prevented himself from promoting metaphysical concepts but accepted virtue as an indispensable prerequisite for the wellbeing of society. These concepts that he advocated in his books clearly place him as an intellectual and rationalist in Greek society. Similar to Protagoras, Gorgias wrote On the Nonexistent or On Nature, which is clearly an intellectual approach to the theory of knowledge. Isocrates noted that, in contrast to Parmenides' and Melissus' theory that the truth is One, Gorgias said in this treatise that the trath is none.'" Referring to the same treatise, Sextus remarked in Against the Schoolmasters that "Gorgias of Leontini began from the same position as those who have abolished the criterion [of the Truth], but did not follow the same line of attack as the school of Protagoras."" These remarks, along with Sextus' summary of the Gorgias' book given in Against the Schoolmasters,"' clearly indicate his (Gorgias') intellectual approach to metaphysics. Prodicus, Antiphon, and Critias, in the meantime, dealt with the social creation of traths. Prodicus wrote On Nature, a treatise on natural philosophy. Referring to this text in particular and to sophist writing and speaking in general, Cicero noted that Prodicus,

along with Thrasymachus of Chalcedon and Protagoras of Abdera, "wrote and spoke on the subject of natural philosophy."" On nature is a perfect demonstration of Sophist involvement with sociology. As far as the extant fragments indicate, Prodicus argued in this text that human beings created gods out of natural objects because of the usefulness of those objects to humans just as Egyptians regarded the Nile as a god.'* Similarly, the earliest signs of the Greek Theory of Social Contract can be found in Antiphon's intellectual thinking (Khan 92). He remarked that "the demands of the laws are the results not of natural disposition but of agreement, but the demands of nature are exactly the opposite."" Critias, another sophist, developed the Theory of Social Evolution in his Sisyphus. He held that "ancient lawgivers fabricated the deity as an overseer of men's successes and failures in the interest of no man's secretly injuring his neighbor, guarding against retribution on the parts of the gods."^ Religion was thus recognized as a social creation. Overall, sophist thought in these areas demonstrates the perfect legitimacy of the argument that the sophist thinkers were intellectuals, not mere itinerant teachers who taught political and legal speeches for money. This conclusion may flirther be authenticated by ancient writers' recognition of sophist thinkers as philosophers. According to Sextus, "some reckoned Protagoras of Abdera in the company of those philosophers who do away with the standard of judgment."^' Sudas remarked that Prodicus was a natural philosopher and sophist,^^ and Hippias a sophist and philosopher." As aheady noted, Cicero held the view that both Protagoras and Prodicus were philosophers. The title of philosopher, in the sense that

this word etymologically means "lover for wisdom," perfectly fits sophist thinkers. As Schiappa saw it, Antiphon, Protagoras, and Gorgias left fragments directly pertaining to Eleatic philosophical doctrines. At least Protagoras, Prodicus, and Critias offered anthropological explanation of religion" (78). All these signs are the indications that sophist rhetoricians represented an intellectual and rational movement that challenged metaphysics and the popular myths about religion, society, and the human being. Perhaps it is a puzzling question why Protagoras, Gorgias, and others are derisively known as sophists and mere teachers of civil discourse for a fee when evidence clearly suggests that "the Sophists were continuing and expanding a "movement" started by the Pre-Socratic philosophers, teaching and speaking in a culture still dominated by preliterate practices and modes of thinking" (Schiappa 56). A clear answer to this question seems essential since "sophist" itself is a key word in the present dissertation, and a proper defnition of this word will certainly facilitate the discussion in the following chapters. As it is well-known, the word sophist contains a pejorative meaning according to the Platonic interpretation, but, before Plato and the Platonic tradition attached this derisive connotation to this word, "sophist" was used in a highly respectful manner. Aristides' Orations has given many examples of how the word sophist was used among the Pre-Socratics to recognize wise, leamed people. For instance, Herodotus used this word to mean all leamed men in Greece including Solon. Herodotus mentioned that "when Sardis was at the height of its prosperity, many leamed men [sophists], including Solon of Athens" visited this island." Again, Androtion, a contemporary of Plato,

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recognized the Seven Sages as sophists." Schiappa has referred to George Grote's and K. B. Kerferd's remarks that "a wide variety of people in ancient Greece were called sophists, including poets, musicians, rhapsodies, diviners, and persons now called philosophers" (4). Protagoras called himself a sophist to mean that he was an educated person capable of teaching the young generafion virtues, oratory, and property management.^' This evidence proves that the word sophist was used in pre-Socratic and Socratic Greece to convey a highly respectful meaning and to identify wise, learaed people even though this word connoted a defamatory meaning in Greece after the fourth century B.C.E. Most scholars agree that Plato and his followers attached the popular negative meaning to the word sophist, and it is useful to know why Plato and his tradition thus condemned their contemporary intellectuals using a redefmition of the word sophist. As Kerferd has correctly observed, Plato's hostility to the sophist thinkers is obvious, "but exactly what he says about them has not always described with precision" (The Sophistic Movement 4). Nevertheless, with a close examination of Plato's derogatory remarks on sophist thinkers, one may detect the motive of Plato's condemnation of sophists. His famous debasing comments on sophist thinkers are as follows: First, he (the sophist) was discovered to be a mercenary hunter after the young and rich. . . second, a sort of wholesaler of leaming for the soul. . . and thirdly, was he not shown up as a retailer of the same goods?. . . and forthly, a salesman of his own products of leaming to us. . . but fifthly,. . , he was a sort of master in the art of combat about words, appropriating to himself the eristic technique . . . now the sixth instance was disputed, but nevertheless we agreed to assign him the role of the purifier, as regards the soul, of opinions that obstract leaming."

As Kerferd has obser^ed, along with these six causes, the same text Sophist also has given m the end the seventh point that qualifies sophist thinkers to conderrmation: the point that the sophist is "the false counterfeiter of philosophy, ignorantly framing contradictions that are based on appearances and opinions rather than reality" {The Sophistic Movement 5). Observing closely, one may notice that all these seven arguments against sophist intellecmals are actually the amplifications of two points that Plato might have thought worthy of condemnation: sophist insistence on receiving payments from their students and sophist argument against and rejection of the so-called reality found in philosophy. To clarify it further, the first four points in the argumentssophists are mercenary hunters, wholesalers, retailers, and salesmenseem to elaborate rhetorically on the same sophist practice, the practice that sophist thinkers always looked for money from students as a compensation for teaching. The other three pointssophists are the combatants of words, purifiers of the listeners' opinions that hinder leaming, and counterfeiters of philosophy-appear to indicate sophist thinkers' rejection of absolute traths through argumentation. Apparently, most of the derogatory comments in the second group are directed towards Protagoras. He was the one who, for the first time, introduced eristic to Greece, conducted debates on any given topic, and rejected all absolute traths. He refiised to accept the Being, arguing that the being was not subject to his empirical knowledge. He also argued that nothing could be acceptable beyond human experience. It is possible that what Socrates, Plato, and the Platonic ttadition hated most was this

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intellectual approach of the sophists rather than the Older Sophists' charging a fee from their students. The Platonic conderrmation of the sophist practice of charging a fee itself was seemingly based on the Platonic attachment to the so-called absolute traths. Socrates, answering Antiphon's question of why he (Socrates) did not charge money for his profession, said: I think that it is an attribute of God to want nothing, and it is next to divine to want as little as possible: that the divine is the best, and that what is next to the divine is the next best thing.^' So, evidently, Socrates did not charge from his students because of his love for god, and consequently, it is reasonable to assume that he regarded sophist intellectuals who taught for money as pagans who failed to foUow the divine path. Overall, Plato's derogatory interpretation of the word sophist and his attack on sophist thinkers seem to have predominantly been motivated by Socrates' and Plato's respect for philosophy, for which sophist thinkers displayed scarce admiration. This argument can further be justified by Xenophon's and Aristotle's placing of the dangerous sophists in the opposition of philosophers. A strong advocate of the Platonic tradition, Xenophon wamed his readers to beware of the instractions of the sophists, but not to disregard the considerations of the philosophers." Aristotle regarded sophist thinkers as those who had only apparent, not real, wisdom, clearly implying that only philosophers had actual wisdom.'" The major crime of sophist thinkers to be condemned as worthless and dangerous was, conceivably, their lack of respect for the socalled philosophy, a characteristic that is evident in sophist texts.

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What did Plato actually mean by philosophy, which he respected and defended so stoutly throughout his works and placed in the direct opposite of the sophist intellectual thinking? It is perhaps intriguing to find out that the sophist intellectual movement, which was also linked to pre-Socratic philosophy, was thus condemned by Plato as nonphilosophical and dangerous. Based on a judgment that "philosophy" includes metaphysical concepts, one can find several philosophical beliefs in Greece during the Socratic age. First of all, there was the concept of Being, the universal Oneness, among the Eleatics. Second, there was among Pythagoreans the theory of the soul and the belief that liberation of the soul from transmigration could be possible through the practice of austerities. Again Empedocles and his followers propagated the belief of the happiest world of existence after death. Empedocles cited the practice of non-violence as a means to entering the happiest world after death. Democritus, in the meantime, advocated the practice of a middle path between self-indulgence in pleasure and self-mortification as a way to achieve mental serenity and imperturbability, a conceptualized ideal. He also had the "habit of going into contemplative retirements, during which he lived in tombs, a practice which may well have been derived from Eastera sages" (Baily 110). It seems that Plato did not promote all of those metaphysical beliefs under philosophy. He either ignored or derided all of them except the metaphysical views accepted by the Eleatic school: One thing stands out clearly: the deep and genuine admiration that Plato held for the uncompromising defender of the One [Parmenides] as the unchanging object of knowledge against the advocates of the Many of sense-perception. .. Plato gives one the impression that, like Parmenides,

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he would rather have sacrificed the sense-percepfions to intellect than the reverse, if he had had to choose between them; and that he respected the Eleatic point of view in a way which placed its founder outside the range of the irony and even scom with which he visited, for instance, the followers of Heracleitus and Empedocles. (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 152) These remarks of Freeman might become clearer when one comes to know about Socrates' personal experience with the Eleatics. Parmenides and his disciple Zeno visited Athens about 450 B.C.E. when Socrates was very young, probably about twenty years of age. The reading given by Zeno at the residence of Pythodoras during this tour impressed Socrates tremendously. He was equally fascinated with the views expressed by Parmenides: Plato's dialogue Parmenides undoubtedly represents an actual meeting, but the views attributed therein to Parmenides cannot be regarded as a report of a conversation: they represent rather a criticism of Plato of his own theory from the Eleatic point of view, with which he was anxious to reconcile it. (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 140) It seems that, ever since this meeting took place and paved the way for Plato to intemalize, in his young age, the Being of the Eleatics, not only did he begin to promote vigorously that concept, but he also developed and expanded it, adding a spiritual and a religious meaning to it. Obviously, the Eleatics dealt with the concept of Being as an exteraal concept in metaphysics, but Plato used it both as an ideal to take refuge in and as a rhetorical device to influence society, asserting that he himself possessed the power to communicate with the Being. Thus, the philosophy Plato admired was apparently a blend of the Eleatic metaphysical concept of the Being and Socrates' and Plato's own modifications of that concept.

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This discussion both elucidates the difference between Platonic philosophy and sophist intellect and probably explains why the Platonic tradition condemned sophist intellectuals as a greedy, socially harmf il group of cheaters who lacked wisdom. On one side, there were Socrates, Plato, and their supporters-the natives and the established personalities in Athens-who were trying to inject a new breath to the Eleatic philosophy. On the other side, there were the sophist intellectuals, all foreigners, who, with the political support of Pericles, were challenging the Being, tradition, and authority. A conflict between the two groups was certainly inevitable, and, even though sophists were triumphant while they were living, Plato and his followers succeeded in attaching a permanent derogatory label on sophist thinkers. This appears to be the story behind Platonic condemnation of sophist thinkers whose intellectual engagement with various topics in sociology, religion, history, and ethics would clearly be called sophist rationality. Since the word rationality itself and it variants such as "rationalism" and "rational" are constantly used in the dissertation with reference to both Buddhist and other Indian materialistic and skeptic views and sophist thought in Greece, it is necessary at this juncture to define this word as a prerequisite for the discussion in the following chapters. In a general sense, the word reason and its numerous variants can be used to mean the inquiry in any area including metaphysics, but sophist ratonality was more concentrated and specific. In brief, sophist ratonahty means "free inquiry and the dissemination of ideas on social customs, political authority, and religious faith" (Coby 39). As Chapter IV discusses in detail, in their "free inquiry,"

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sophist thinkers rejected authority, tradition, and the conceptualization of metaphysics and adopted investigation through empiricism and positivism as a means of knowledge. This inquiiy was totally opposed to the inquiry both in the Eleatic philosophy and the Platonic tradition just as the inquiries in the Buddhist and other Indian rationalistic traditons opposed to the Brahmin system of thought. An elucidation of this difference would fiirther facilitate the understanding of sophist ratonality. Inquiry itself would be a common word employed by both sophist ratonalists and Greek philosophers to define the function in each discipline. As Pythagoras remarked, the contemplaton and knowledge of the universe was the objectve in philosophy." According to Plato, philosophy meant "desire [for] knowledge of the whole of trath and reality, and hence of the world of essential Forms, in contrast with the world of appearances" (Coraford 180). A sort of methodical and rational inquiry, dating back to the Eleatics, also existed with the philosophical inquiry. "With Parmenides and his fellow Eleatics, we can observe logic and metaphysics in the making" (Long 15). They implicitly employed logic to prove their intuitve hypotheses and arguments in metaphysics. Since the rational inquiry among the Eleatics was strikingly similar to that of the Brahmins, it seems apt to analyze both inquiries together: Chandogya Upanishad: In the beginning, my dear, this universe was Being alone. Some say that in the begirming this was non-being alone, and from that non-being, being was bora. But how, indeed, could it be thus, my dear? How could being be bom from non-being? No, my dear, it was being alone that existed in the beginning.'^

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Melissus of the Eleatic School: If being had a beginning, that is, a coming into being, it can only have come from Not-being; but nothing can come out of Not-being, which is nothing." Both traditions endeavor to prove that the Being had no beginning, and therefore, the Being is etemal with regard to the past. Logic is the tool employed to justfy the conclusion in the implicit syllogism that is identcal in both systems. Melissus' syllogism in the argument may be cited as follows: Major premise: Only nothing comes out of nothing. Minor premise: The Being is not nothing (The Being is everything.). Conclusion: Therefore, the Being did not come out of nothing. Everything in this philosophical argument seems perfect except the minor premise, which, similar to most of the syllogisms in Greek dialectc, is a metaphysical hypothesis taken as an incontestable trath. One fmds that Socrates employed logic in a similar fashion. Arguing on why Athenians should not condemn him to death, Socrates constracted the following argument: Major premise: Condemnation of God's messenger to death is a sin. Minor premise: I am God's messenger. Conclusion: Condemnation of me to death is a sin." Again, the minor premise in this syllogism is a certain trath for the philosopher, but for a sophist thinker this incontestable trath is a myth and a fragile and refiitable belief Sophist rationalists would challenge any of such seemingly safe and trae but actually assailable and false beliefs that could be found in the tradition, religion, politcs, or society in general and that are fortified by personal or textual authority, realization, or

revelation. This is the difference in the inquiry between sophist thinkers and Greek philosophers. Sophist thinkers were the first in Greece to challenge these myths and beliefs rationally. Protagoras' statement that in every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other seems to have referred to the fallibility of the so-called philosophical traths. He originated the argument against these myths "by the method of questioning."" He was the first to introduce the Socratc method of argument.'' He conducted debates and eamed the nickname "master of wrangling"" probably from Plato and his supporters. Perhaps to shun the ratonal argument of the sophists, Plato disparagingly called it eristc and antlogic and respected only dialectc, in which the so-called syllogism was present, as a means to know the trath. In the hand of Aristotle, the ratonal argument of the sophists was subject to severe restriction with the introduction of the enthymeme into rhetoric. Nevertheless, "there were reasoners before Aristotle. . . The application of mles of reasoning and strategy does not have to wait the work of their codifiers" (Ryle 233). Protagoras in particular and the Older Sophists in general ratonally challenged all beliefs, myths, and social practces. This is the sophist inquiry and sophist ratonality. This is also the sophist rational inquiry which appears to have been influenced by Buddhist and other Indian ratonalist thought. The Indian rationalistc age emerged and flourished during the sixth and the early fifth centuries B.C.E. The Buddha, whose death occurred in or around 483 B.C. E," roughly a little less than a half-century before the emergence of the sophist age in Greece, was the last and the most influental figure in the

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Indian rationalist traditons. The following words of the Buddha addressed to the residents in the city of Kalama, provides an epilogue to the free inquin that was prevalent among Indian ratonalists: Yes, Kalamas, it is right for you to doubt, it is right for you to w aver. Come, Kalamas, do not accept anything on mere hearsay, (thinking that thus we have heard it from a long time). Do not accept anything by mere traditon, (thinking that it has thus been handed down through many generatons). Do not accept anything on account of ramors, (believing what other say without any investigation). Do not accept anything just because it accords in your scriptures. Do not accept anything by mere supposition. Do not accept anything by mere theorizing. Do not accept anything by merely considering the appearances. Do not accept anything merely because it agrees with your preconceived noton. Do not accept anything because it seems acceptable. Do not accept anything thinking that the ascetic is respected by us. When you know for yourselfthese things [beliefs and practices] are moral, these things are blameless, these things are praised by the wise, these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to well-being and happiness-then do you live and act accordingly." One would observe in this passage the Buddha's rejection of speculations (conclusions with insufficient e\idence), metaphysics (traths beyond objective experience), and ideology (ideas taken as certain traths), as well as the tools used to justify these traths: authority, logic, and theorizing. These aspects of Buddhist rationality, as well as empiricism, positivism, and pragmatsm, the tools employed by Indian ratonahst traditons to know and constmct tmths, will be discussed in Chapter FV, but for now this particular quotaton would allow the reader to glimpse the nature of Indian ratonalist thought that, presumably, was the background for sophist ratonality. hnportantly, one may not leap into the conclusion that the present dissertation, while dealing with Buddhist and other Indian ratonalist influences on sophist rhetoric.

20

has selected the field of research from an altogether new area. Even though Indian influence on sophist rationality has so far evaded the researcher's attention, many writers have already researched and written books about Indian influence on Greek thinking before and immediately after the sophist age. Of course, it is well known that a number of writers have indicated Indian influence on Pythagoreanism. Besides, se\eral other writers such as Elmer Graber and Kersten Holger, Helle Lambridis, Timothy J. Lomperis, H. G. Rawlinson, and M. L. West" have written about Indian influence on other presophist Greek thinkers. Edward J. Urwick, in the meantime, has written a briUiant book"' solely on the Indian influence on Plato's Republic, a treatise composed immediately after the sophist age. These books clearly indicate scholars' awareness about and interest in the Indian inluence on Greek thinking before and after the sophist era. The present dissertation f irther explores the possible Indian influence on Greek thinking and on sophist rationality. As aheady explained, sophist ratonal thinking covered a broad area, and therefore, despite the use of "sophist rhetoric" in the ttle, this dissertation does not focus only on limited areas of sophist practices, the areas that Aristotle's discipline of rhetoric assigned to that discipline. Instead, this work deals with all sophist thought and practices pertaining to ratonality except the Greek appeal to reason in politcal, legal, and laudatory speeches. It is an obvious fact that, as academics began to develop in Greece during thepost-Socratc age, disciplines and di\isions such asphilosophy, rhetoric, dialectic, logic, antlogic, and eristc also appeared, and the scope of some of the

21

disciplines was also decided, but they all were probably the inventions of the Platonic tradition. "The Greek words for eristic (eristike), dialectic (dialectike), and antilogic (antilogike) all originated in Plato's writings" and "there is inductive evidence" supporting the possibility that "Plato first coined the word rhetorik" (Schiappa 44). Next, Aristotle defined the boundaries of rhetoric, claiming that rhetoric is a counterpart of dialectic, and, while dialectical argument should be based on the syllogism, the logical argument that leads to the understanding of universal traths, rhetorical argument should be based on the enthymeme, which "leads to a tentatve conclusion on probable premises" (Corbett and Cormors 53). However, "the meaning that rhetoric had for the Greeks can be sensed only in the context of the life of the ancient Greeks" (Walter 373). According to modem rhetoricians such as Kenneth Burke and Richard Cherwitz, this limitaton of rhetoric seems artificial, arbitrary, and impossible and stands totally against the rhetorical practces of the Older Sophists. This dissertation, while dealing with the ratonal thought in sophist rhetoric, leaves aside all these limitations imposed on sophist practces in particular and on the discipline of rhetoric in general and focuses on all sophist rational concepts under rhetoric. As Burke indicated, Aristotle himself failed to remain within his own limited scope of rhetoric when he (Aristotle) began to elaborate his common topics. Expanding his topics towards various other disciphnes, Aristotle practcally proved that rhetoric is broader than what he strove to limit it to: Though Aristotle rigorously divided knowledge into compartments whenever possible, his Art ofRhetoric includes much that falls under the

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separate heading of psychology, ethics, politics, poetics, logic, and history. Indeed, according to him, the characteristically rhetorical statement involves "commonplaces" that lie outside any scientfic specialty; and in proportion as the rhetorician deals with special subject matter, his proofs move away from the rhetoric and towards the scientfic. (575) So, it is evident that rhetoric is naturally broader than the popular Greek tradition w anted it to be, so much broader that even Aristotle, while imposing limitations on rhetoric, unknowingly broadened the boundaries of rhetoric into many other disciplines. As already mentioned, sophist rhetoricians persuaded, convinced, and enlightened their society, constracting rational arguments in every possible field, to change beliefs, attitudes, and practices that were more idealistic than rationalistc. The term sophist rhetoric used in the tte of the dissertation includes all these aspects of rational inquiry and the tools, such as debatng, dialogues, and methods of argumentation, employed for this purpose. The present dissertation concentrates on these aspects as the ratonality in sophist rhetoric. In other words, the present work is an effort to see all sophist rationality as it was-not as the Platonic tradition wanted it to be-and to investigate the possible Buddhist and other India rationalist influences on it. The suggestion that Buddhist and other Indian rationalist thought probably influenced Greek sophist movement will certainly surprise most of the readers, and, obviously, such a surprise is quite understandable. Textual and personal authority in the modem disciphnes of philosophy and rhetoric has assertively reiterated the originality of Greek rational thought, leaving no room for the reader's investigation about a possible

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extemal influence on Greek rational thinking. Modem and recent scholars have written a quantity of books and articles in the two disciplines in a well-concentrated effort to convince the readers about the origin of rational concepts within Greek society itself These books and articles enjoy authority among professors, students, and general readers. Influenced by these authoritative sources, society in general seems to have embraced the behef that Greek rationality originated without any extemal influence. This belief, which is apparently grounded not on rational investigation but on tradition and authority, seems to be so conclusive that one hardly questions it. This situation is quite similar to the existence of the so-called indisputable traths in some closed societies, the traths that would be revealed as fallacies after investgation, comparison, and analysis. Mainly because they do not test the correctness of those commonly accepted and firmly held traths, such societies sustain mythical concepts as facts. A notable example that also connects to the present work is the modera Hindu belief that Buddhism is an integral part of Hinduism and the Buddha is a reincaraation of the Hindu god Visnu. This is the picture portrayed within Hindu society. Hindu scholars never speak or write about the Buddha's rejection of Brahma and creation and the Buddha's oppositon to the Hindu caste system and the oppression of women. Subsequenty, Hindus hardly think that the Buddha presented a ratonalist system of thought to counter the social practices invented by early Hinduism. This example, just as many others, provides relevant evidence in support of how the absence of argumentatve dialogues prevents an entire society from seeing the facts that would have otherwise been

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obvious. Perhaps the modera belief that Greek rational thinkers are original in their thoughts has emerged from a similar rhetorical situation. The unavailability of trae informaton about Indian rationalist traditions and their arguments and the obscurity of the routes through which these thoughts entered Greece have contributed to the absence of challenge to the convicton that Greek ratonal thought is original. The only comprehensive work on the nature and development of Indian rationalism is K. N. Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory ofKnowledge, but this book, a Ph.D. dissertation in Buddhism, has been designed for a handful of Pali and Sanskrit scholars. With numerous Pali and Sanskrit terms recurring in its every page without their English translations, a modera reader in Greek philosophy and rhetoric might encounter numerous problems reading this book. No other texts are available to offer reliable and complete information about Indian rationalism. This simation seems to have prevented society from knowing that most of the Greek Sophist thought existed in India before the fifth century B.C.E. Even though one may still gather some information about Indian rationahst concepts that bear striking similarities with those of the Older Sophists, one may simply conclude that these similarities are mere coincidences. The main reason behind that hasty conclusion is the assumption that the communication between the two distant countries was impossible in the ancient world. This false assumpton can be attributed to the scarcity of information about ancient connections between India and Greece. However, history records that Southera and Westem India and many lonian islands were parts of

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the same Persian empire during the sixth and the early fifth centuries B.C.E., and both Indian and lonian satrapies of Persia used the same language to communicate with Persia. Similarly, Democritus, from whom "major theoretcal contributions came" for the sophist ratonalists, just as from Empedocles and Anaxagoras (Kerferd, Sophistic Movement 39), went to India and leamed from Indian thinkers. These and many other coimections between India and Greece since the sixth century B.C.E. are virtually unknown to most modem readers, and this factor has again contributed to the absence of an opposing argument against the traditional belief that Greek rationalists are original to Greece. Possibly some scholars in modera philosophy have realized an Indian influence on Greek rationalism, but this realization has probably horrified rather than interested them, as observed by M. L. West in H. Frankel's characterization of Upanishads as "always a danger signal in Heracleitus-studies" (201). At the mere sight of any possible Indian influence on Greek thinking, these scholars in philosophy and other disciplines perhaps took much pain, just as Jean W. Sedlar did in India and the Greek World, to remodel every sign of Indian influence in the form of the traditional Greek concepts. Of course, liberal Westera scholars contnue to emphasize Indian influence on Greek philosophy, but the traditonalists seem to have regarded the books and jouraals of such liberal thinkers as the works of outcasts and would never allow them a respectable place in philosophy. For instance, referring to a host of Westem writers such as Thomas Colebrooke, Leopold Schroeder, and Richard Garbe who highlighted Indian influence on Pythagoras, Felix M. Cleve wrote that their new findings were "interesting and

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remarkable," but it was also "amusing" to see "some volumes about apparent 'relationships' and 'influences' which actually never took effect" (520). Ridiculed, attacked, and denigrated, Westem investgaton of the Indian influence on Greek concepts has suffered severe setbacks, thus allowing the alleged originality of Greek concepts to prosper and to retain absolute power throughout recent history. CoUege professors in philosophy, except for a sprinkling of liberal thinkers, have reiterated in their teaching the originality of Greek thought, leaving no room for any questoning about the authenticity of such an assertion. Moreover, had early Indian thought been a part of the discipline of philosophy, what is discussed in the present work as new discoveries would, perhaps, have aheady been known as well-recognized facts, but philosophy has ignored India concepts umeasonably, providing no opportunity for interested students to research and discover the trae sources of Greek rational thinkers. As P. T. Raju has pointed out, "due to lack of right acquaintance with Indian philosophy," much misunderstanding has arisen among Westem scholars about Indian thinking, and this situaton has partly been lesponsible foi the exclusion of Indian philosophy from the discipline of philosophy (12). He also has indicated the view of "many gieat philosopheis that the gap between Eastem and Westem philosophies has to be bridged" (12). Howevei, such a union between Eastera and Westera philosophies has never taken place. John Stambaugh has stated that "Westem philosophy seems to have exhausted its capacity to produce a new vision of reality" and suggested that with a assimilation of "some elements of Eastem ideas'' one

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"can perhaps see new possibilities for philosophy" (xi), but the chances of such an assimilation seems very remote at present. Having dislodged the connections between Greek thought and its most probable influental sources, the discipline of philosophy apparently inhibits the investgaton of how Indian rationahst concepts played an influental role in Greek sophist ihetoric. This disseitation, as alieady mentioned, strives to leveal the piobable connecuon between Indian lationalists and Gieek sophists, the connecton that lay hidden behind the numeious causes discussed above. To elucidate this point, sophist lational approach to epistemology, anthropology, sociology, rehgion, ethics, and personal philosophy of Ufe will be evaluated in comparison with Indian materialistic, skeptc, and Buddhist thoughts. As Chapter III discusses in detail, one group of scholars asserts that Greek iationaht>originated in Gieek legal and politcal aiguments while another group emphasizes that rational concepts found their roots in original Greek philosophy. This dissertation argues against both of these views. Chapter IV points out the possibiUty that Protagoras, the first sophist thinker, had afready famiharized himself with the then-prevalent Indian practices of debating and rational arguments in various fields before he was engaged in lega! and political speeches and training. It is likely that he used this knowledge to profit from a Greek social demand for legal and political discourses and training, and other sophists possibly followed Protagoras' practce for financial gains. The present dissertaton challenges the view that Greek philosophy is the original source of Greek rational thinking, arguing that most of the Greek philosophical concepts

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could have reached Greek thinkers from outside, particularly from India. It is certainly trae that Greek philosophers paved the way for the sophist thinkers to introduce their rational concepts, but Greek philosophers' background support seems to be just imitative since they appear to have followed mostly the idealistc and ratonalistic concepts that were predominant in India prior to their time. With the comparison of Indian and Greek thinking and the investigaton of ancient connections between India and Greece, one may get the impression that Greek philosophers and rational thinkers were engaged in the same activity: the constant borrowing from Indian sources. Perhaps, sophist rational concepts in various fields are the culmination of this borrowing. The discussion in the following chapters also focuses on two main concepts in Greek rhetoricthe enthymeme and Kairosas possible derivations from the Indian practices of debating and argumentation. When Aristotle formalized the discipline of rhetoric, he emphasized that rhetoric means the argument about enthymeme or probability related to the day-to-day life. This rale is probably a restriction on Protagoras' argumentaton about probabilities in any topic and his foUowers' penchant for the same. Intolerant of sophist arguments on idealistic concepts that were highly valued by Aristotle's teacher Plato, Aristotle could have imposed restrictions on topics for argumentation by introducing the enthymeme. Nevertheless, it is more likely that argument from probabilities first entered Greece from India through Protagoras, and Aristotle's enthymeme could be a resuh of that borrowing. Kairos or the right time for speech, the predominant concept of Isocrates, also appears to have entered Greece in the

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same manner. Protagoras first highlighted the value of right time for speech at a time when the same concept was widely legaided by Indian rationalists as an essental requirement m persuasive speech. This dissertation argues that Indian ratonalism could also have played an influental role in the formalization of the Greek discipUne of rhetoric. Organization of this dissertaton was a challenging task because of several reasons. First, the Indian rationalist thought is altogether new to most Westem readers, and therefore, an introduction to Indian ratonality had to precede the comparison of Indian thoughts with Greek rational concepts. Second, to stress that sophist ratonal concepts probably appeared as a result of the continuous Greek tendency to borrow from Indian sources and to pinpoint that these early borrowings contained the seeds of sophist rational thinking, a detailed chapter on how Greek thinkers appear to have imitated Indian thoughts since the sixth century B.C.E. up to the time of Protagoras had to be included. Again, comparison, analysis, and interpretation of sophist and Indian rationalist views were essentally required in order to elucidate the suggestion that Indian rationahty influenced sophist thinkers. Finally, other evidence of how Indian rational thinking could have reached Greek thinkers was needed to indicate the possible routes through which Indian concepts could have reached Greece. Chapter II deals with the natural origin and development of Indian rationalist thinking. As a leacton to the social discomfort caused by the metaphysical and idealistc concepts invented by the eaily Hindu tiadition, Indian materialists and skeptcs developed

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lational concepts such as empiricism and positivism. The unique Biahmin concept of Brahma's creation of Brahmins from the primeval man's mouth, ralers and warriors from shoulders, common public from hip, and servants from feet occupied the central positon in both the social reaction against Brahmins and in the stmulaton of ratonal thinking in ancient India. Mainly in ralers' and warriors' effort to reverse the Brahmin superiority in society, such metaphysical concepts as Brahma, creaton, transmigration, and the soul were subject to severe criticism, and, in the aftermath of this criticism, the importance of worldly life was overemphasized. Materialists and skeptcs also invented the theories of elements and atoms to reject a permanent entity in the human being (individual soul) or a permanent Being in the universe (Brahma). Jains continued this ratonalistic investgation by refusing to accept Brahma and creation, the two Brahmins concepts that laid the foundation for social division and discrimination, and by advocating humanism. Eventually, the Buddha emerged as a powerful persuader who introduced such rational concepts as social evolution and causal argimient to reject early Hindu ideologies and modulated the materialistic overemphasis of worldly happiness by infroducing such rational concepts as social ethics and personal philosophy for life. Chapter UI discusses the parallel development of ratonal concepts in Greece. Such early Greek thinkers as Pherecydes and Thales were apparenty influenced by Phoenician and Egyptan concepts, but it seems that Gieek thinkeis soon found Indian ideology worthy of imitation. The Eleatics may be legaided as the fiist bonoweis from eaily Hindu idealism. Pythagoias, who is said to have hved foi twelve yeais in Babylon,

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piobably learaed from Jainism and established in Croton, Italy, a society similar to that of the Jains. His respect for women's rights and his equal regard for the so-called barbarians, the first notable signs of Greek rational thinking that were later followed by the Older Sophists, may be regarded as direct borrowings from Jainism. Empedocles presumably imitated Indian materialistc theory of four great elements and the Buddhist ideahstic theory of Nirvana, showing his inclinaton both to the rationality promoted by Indian materialists and to the metaphysical values surrounding the concept of Nirvana. Democritus, who visited India, appears to have foUowed the theory of atoms, the next advanced stage of the Indian materialistic theory of elements, and seemingly borrowed from the more secularized Buddhist concept of Nirvana. Thus, both Empedocles and Democritus possibly paved the way for their students Gorgias and Protagoras to reheve themselves from all ideological concepts and to become fijlly rationalistic. Chapter IV elaborates on the similarities between sophist rational concepts and the Indian, materialistic, skeptic, and Buddhistic rational views, suggesting Indian rationalism as the possible background for sophist thinkers to develop their rational concepts. Gorgias' and Protagoras' skepticism about idealism may be regarded as adoptations of Indian skeptc views towards knowledge. Protagoras' human-measure fragment, the two-logoi fragment, and his concept oKairos appear to have been adopted from the then predominant Indian practce of debating and argumentaton. Similarly, Protagoras' personal philosophy for life could have been influenced by Buddhist concepts. Antiphon's, Prodicus', and Critias' rational concepts such as social evolution.

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Theory of Social Contract, and social ethics based on humanity bear striking similanties with Buddhist concepts and may be regarded as borrowings from Buddhist sources. Chapter V highlights evidence other than similarities between Indian and Greek concepts to strengthen the claim that Indian rational concepts could have prepared the Greek sophist environment and enriched it. One fragment of Empedocles strongly suggests that he had known about the Buddha while another of Democritus provides equally strong evidence in support of his familiarity with Indian ratonalists. The Buddha himself had heard about the social practices in lonian islands. Both Greek and Roman writers have constantly remarked that Democritus, the teacher and most influental figure in Protagoras' rational concepts as shown repeatedly in the present work, had visited India and leamed from Indian sages. Besides, Phoenicians had carried on their trade between India and lonia since the sixth century B.C.E., thus facilitatng the communication between the two societies. During 480-479 B.C.E., just before the rise of the sophist movement, thousands of Indian and lonian troops combined together as the soldiers for the Persian empire and fought together against other Greeks in central Greece. Persian empire connected both India and lonia and allowed religious freedom in its entire territory. These details would both provide more support for the claim that Indian rationalism appears to have bred sophist ratonal thinking and help eliminate the misconcepton that in the ancient world communicaton would be impossible between two distant societies.

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This dissertation does not praise ancient Indian thinkers as the inventors or highlight the Greek rationalists as the bon-owers but interprets the origin and development of Greek sophist movement. The thinking power of human beings is basically the same in most societies, and only the presence of complex social conflicts and needs probably activates the brain to invent new concepts. In societes where those conflicts and needs are minimal, the human power of creating new concepts seems to remain dormant. Early Indian thinkers, including the Buddha, probably would have never developed rational concepts had there not been the Early Brahmin concept of divine creaton, the concept that Brahmins were created by god's mouth, ralers from shoulders, common public by the hip, and the servants from feet. This teaching cracked open a huge social difference, which soon gave rise to a huge social conflict, and, as a result of the intellectual war fought between the groups of the same society to wrestle social power, rationalistic and scientifc concepts originated in the ancient Indian society. Chapter IV discusses that, in contrast to the intellecmal wars of the ancient Indians, Greeks fought physical wars, for which unity in each state-society was essentally required, and this requirement minimized social differences and conflicts within each democratic state. This situaton, in retum, apparently prevented Greek society from inventing complex ideological and metaphysical concepts and ratonalist views to counter those concepts. As Kathleen Freeman put it succinctly, Greek religion was "beautiful and rich in emotional appeal, but with little moral and no intellectual content, and with many elements both stupid and ugly as well as crael" (Gods, Man, and

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State 9). Obviously, social factors shaped Greek religion in this manner. Greek religious beliefs were "the projected wishes of an aristocratic society" and "even when city-states became completely democratic, they did not discard their aristocratic gods, especially the god or goddess chosen as pafron. . ." (God, Man, andState 9). As Chapter IV indicates, these patron gods and goddesses provided a perfect rhetorical device to motvate citizens of each city-estate to defend it from constant extemal attacks. Therefore, they (pafron gods and goddesses) flourished in Greece without much modifications. Eastem Greek islanders, in the meantime, seem to have been fascinated with sfrange ideas that came from beyond the seas, and, having been duly rewarded by the Greek society for bringing in those ideas, Greek thinkers including the Older Sophists seemingly borrowed, imitated, and adopted Indian metaphysics, ideology, and rationality. To say that Greek social conflicts in each society were less complicated than those of the ancient Indian society is not to deny the presence of conflicts in Greek societies. The fght between ralers and subjects was a persistent conflict in Greece, a conflict that eventually gave rise to democracy in many Greek city-states. This is an instance that social conflicts gave birth to ideology in Greece even though those ideals did not belong to metaphysics and religion. Besides, in Greek city-states there were various social groups such as ttibes (families belonging to a single clan or race), phratiy (a kingship group in a subdivision of a city-state), and guild (a social association with similar interests). However, "they were racially tolerant, each comprising in its citzen body peoples of different origin. They [also] perpetuated the cults, tiie dialects, and the tiibal

35

systems which their forefathers had developed. . ." (Hammond 98). Under the burden of inter-state wars, differences among these social groups thus became minimal, and unity flourished among all gioups of the same state, oi else, theii veiy existence would be thieatened. Poets, philosopheis, thinkeis, and the geneial public all weie the united membeis of the same society, united for the same goal of defending the state for the sake of their own survival. Poetry "was meant to be sung, often in Choras, to an audience large or small. . .'' as an exhortation or propaganda of a common political purpose, and the philosophers who lived in study simply did not exist in that society (Freeman, God, Man, and State 112). This socio-historical background of ancient Greece probably answers the question why complex metaphysical and religious beliefs did not originate in Greek society. While this dissertation thus recognizes socio-historical factors, "the generative rales and conflicts of a given culture" as Stephen Greenblatt defned it (74), as the predominant force behind human thought, it (the dissertaton) also disregards both the ideological overemphasis of mysterious acquisition of personal powers and reduce the value of individual genius as the factors behind the rationalistic concepts of early Indian thinkers. In this sense, the traditional belief that Enlightenment bequeathed the Buddha unusual powers to proclaim his rationalistic concepts has no justification in the present discussion. Similarly, this dissertation does not overemphasize the Buddha's individual human genius. Brilliant human beings can exist in any society, but only the social

36

conditions may determine the directions of their thoughts and the nature of their new concepts. The present work is an invitation for readers to reevaluate their knowledge and understanding about both Indian and Greek rational thought. They heard and read about it in a different way for years, and they intemalized and fondly entertained what they heard and read. Here is the untold story about the origin and development of Greek ratonal thought along with the unseen aspect of Indian ratonality, both of which would mostly challenge their previous leaming.

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Notes ' Arstotie, Rhetoric \Zi6a. ^ Herodotus, Histories IX 45-46, 47, 106. ' Plato, Cratylus 391 BC, " Diogenes Laertius IX 51. ' See Schiappa's discussion of Protagoras' the human-measure fragment in Protagoras and Logos (Co\\xrab\?: U. of South CarolinaPress, 1991), 117-133. ' Eusebius, Preparaion ofthe Gospel XIV 3, 5. ' Porphyiy, Lecture on Literature 1 in Eusebius' Preparation ofthe Gospel X 3, 25. ' Diogenes Laertius IX 55. ' Diogenes Laertius IX 52. ' Porphyry, Lecture on Literature 1 in Eusebius' Preparation ofthe Gospel X 3, 25. " Ibid. '^ DiogenesLaertius IX 55. " Plato, Protagoras 349a. '* Isocrates, 15,298. " Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters VII 65. " Ibid., 66-87. " Cicero, On the Orator III 32, 128. " Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters IX 18. '" DK87B44. 2 DK 88 B25.

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^' Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters VII 60. See Douglas J. Stewart's translation of this fragment in Rosamond Kent Sprague's TheSophists, ed. (Columbia: U. of SouthCarolinaPress, 1972), 71. See Francis E. Sparshott's translation of this fragment in The Sophists, 86. ^" Herodotus, Histories 1 29. ^' Aristdes, Orations 49. " Plato, Protagoras 349a. " P\a.to, Sophist 23\D. Translated in Sprague's TTie SopAijs, p. 2. ^* Antiphon, A/emora6i7a 1 VI 10. ^' Antiphon, On Hunting 13, 8. ' Aiistotie On Sophistical Refutalions \ 165a21. " lamblichus, Life ofPythagoras XII.

'^ Chandogya Upanishad VI ii 2. " DK30B1. " Plato, Apology 30 31, trans. Benjamin Jowett in Reginald Allen, Greek Philosophy: Thales to Aristotle, ed. (New York: The Free Press, 1966) 75-96. "And now, Athenians, I am not going to argue for my own sake, as you may think, but for yours, that you may not sin against God by condemning me, who am his gift to you. . . I am that gadfly which God has attached to the state, and all day long and in all places am always fastening upon you, arousing and persuading and reproaching you. You will not easily find another like me, and therefore I would advise you to spare me." ^^ Diogenes Laertius IX 51. " Ibid., 53. " Ibid., 52. " 483 B.C.E. was the year of the Buddha's death according to early Buddhist chronology, but there is no proof that the Buddha died exactly in 483. As Rhys Davids

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suggested in his "The History of the Buddhists," "we must be satsfied to accept. . the general belief among modem European scholars that the period foi the Buddha's activity may be approximately assigned to the sixth century B.C." E. J. Rapson. The Cambridge History Qflndia, ed. (New Delhi: S. Chand & Co. 1968) 176-195. " Kindred Sayings I, ttans. Narada Maha Thera in The Buddha and his Teaching, 4th ed. (Colombo: The Associated Newspapers of Ceylon Ltd., 1980) 284-285. According to the author's footnotes, the parenthetcal notes in the translation are the commentarian's lemarks about the original text. " See the books of these writers that have been listed m the Works Cited pages of this dissertation. " Edward J. Urwick, The Message ofPlato: a Reinterpretation ofthe Republic, (London: Metiuen & Co. Ltd., 1920).

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CHAPTERII INTRODUCTION TO BUDDHIST RATIONALITY: SOCIAL BACKGROUND AND THE NATURE OF EARLY BUDDHIST RATIONAL THOUGHT

Early Hindu Thought as a Precursor to Pre-Buddhistic Rationality To trace the origin and development of ancient Indian rationalist thought including Buddhist rationality, one needs, first of all, to examine the earliest scriptures of modem Hinduism. These scriptures include the Vedas and the Upanishads, popularly known as some of the earliest human religious and speculative experiences in writing, and the La^ws ofManu,' the book of laws in the ancient Indian society. The oldest of these texts was the Rig Veda, the first of the four Vedas compiled over a long period of time beginning approximately from the twelfth century B.C.E. The Upanishads, another group of religious texts containing numerous volumes spread over many centuries, began to appear a few centuries later than the Rig Veda. The La-ws ofManu was composed after the early Upanishads to further organize the social norms and speculative thoughts conceived in the early scriptures. Historically, these texts belonged to an Aryan race that invaded and conquered the Southwestera region of India during the prehistoric period. Speculatve beliefs and concepts which originated and achieved prominence in these ancient texts include creation, gods, a predeterminated social and political systera, the concept of fransmigration, and the individual soul's uUimate unification with the etemal macrosoul. The Rig Veda initated the speculative process, infroducing creation

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and gods and laying the background for fiirther development. AIl other Brahmin texts that followed expanded the speculative thoughts tius initiated by the Rig Veda and firmly established them in the then Indian cultare. For instance, the radimentary social and pohtical system in the Rg Veda was made a social law by the Laws ofManu. Numerous gods in the Rig Veda werett-ansformedinto monotheism and monism by the Upanishads. Most of the Brahmin concepts found in post-Rig Vedic Hindu literattire clearly harkened back to the Rig Veda itself The Rig Veda began the description of creaton as arising from a paradoxical condition before the existence of anything. "There was neither non-existence nor existence then; there was neither the reahn of space nor the sky which is beyond,"' maintained the text. Then appeared the unknown god, the golden embryo: "In the begiiming the golden embryo arose. Once he was bom, he was the only lord of creaton. He held in place the earth and his sky."^ This verse suggests that from the golden embryo arose the original human being. God is not the extemal creator; rather, he is the very source of creation. Similarly, according to the Rig Veda, from the primeval man's body came into existence the four castes: "His mouth became the Brahmin; his arms were made into the Warrior [Shastriyas], his thighs the People [Vaishayas], and from his feet the Servants [Shudras] were bora."' The same text claimed that warriois and nobles weie cieated to rale the countiy.* The La-ws ofManu categorized the duties assigned to the foiu- castes by the divine powei: teaching, learaing, giving and leceiving, and conducting lehgious

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services and sacrifices were the dutes of Brahrains;' raling was the assignment for the Shastriyas;' manufacturing, farming, and busmess were the dutes of the Vaishayas;* the only duty the creator assigned to the Shudras was to serve all other three castes.' As the following sectons of the present chapter reveal, this concept was a vital speculation for the emergence of rationalist thought in the Indian system of thought because this mythical concept soon cracked open a huge social difference. Early Hindu texts also asserted that every human soul originated from the creator's body would eventually retura to the creator'" but not before each soul's ttansmigiation in numeious lives." During the period of fransmigiation, one would be bom not only as humans and deities but as animals as well. Karmas, or one's deeds motvated by intenton, are the determinant force behindboth the duraton and the U%es of one's ttansmigration.'^ If one's action, for instance, is raotvated by desire and anger, one is doomed to be bom in evil reahns. Absence of desire, on the other hand, would qualify one to be bom in higher realms before one's final emancipation.'^ This teaching not only advocated after-death existence of each individual but also recognized one's own actions as the determinant factors of one's own fate in future lives. These are the major speculatve beliefs that originated in the pre-Buddhistc India and paved the way for the development of rationahst thought that was based on the free inquiry about these beliefs. In order to facilitate an understanding of social connections of these speculatons, it should be stressed that the myth of creaton, seemingly based on political agenda, was the oldest of these concepts. Rig Veda is the oldest text of the early

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Hinduism, and, as already quoted, the creatton of the caste system first occuned in this veiy text. All othei concepts, such as soul and tiansmigiation, seem to have evolved, depending on this eailiei myth, the veiy first root of all Indian speculations.

Social Connections and Rhetorical Value of Early Hindu Belief System Ancient Hindu texts assertand modem Hindu tradition firmly believesthat the speculative concepts thus arose in ancient India were discovered by Rishis, the spiritually enlightened sages, with their superior knowledge of the invisible/invincible mysteries.'" Some scholars within the Hindu tiadition may attribute this ttend to the genius of the independent thinkers who Uved in the ancient time. However, from a socio-historical point of view, neither seems to be completely trae. The first argument that the enlightened power of the sages revealed the textual trath to the world looks like another speculative concept that needs rational authority for acceptance. The argument about individual genius, on the other hand, appears to be a blatant disregard for the social forces that shape individual thought. New historicism holds that "actions that appear to be single are disclosed as muUiple; the apparently isolate power of the individual genius turas out to be bound up with collective, social energy" (Greenblatt 75). In reality, the so-called individual genius is a reflection of the complex social conditions that molded human thought in ancient India. In a systematic approach to the origin and development of speculative thoughts in ancient India, one may connect ttie Hindu concepts mentioned above to the Brahmins' effort to foimalize and stabilize a unique social stractuie.

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Intioducton of a caste system was the most sophisticated effort made by eaily Indians to oiganize the ancient Indian society. It is unknown exactly when the caste system originated in ancient India, but the Rig Veda's lemaiked that the cieatoi cieated the foui castes from his body, and he (the cieatoi) assigned raling to Shastriyas, indicate that the caste system took its foim as eaily as the Aiyan settlement in the newly conqueied India before the twelfth century B.C.E. It is clear that the caste systera took its shape mostly in the hand of Brahmins, the textually authorized spiritual and intellectual leaders of society. According to tUe Laws ofManu, learning and teaching were strictly assigned to the Brahmin caste,'* and teaching was stricty prohibited for ralers and the common pubhc." Brahmins repeatedly said that the trath in their texts was either revealed to them by a divine being," or they themselves realized it with their exfrasensory perceptve powers." Clearly, no other social class had any hand in Early Brahmin speculatons, so it is certain that the caste system and the social rales with regard to the caste systera were invented by the Brahmins. This social division based on castes suggests itself as the framework upon which the entre speculative process in India was constracted. The early Indian speculatons could have taken a different directon had there not been a social stt:ucture centering on the caste. Inventon alone does not stabilize a social system in society; those inventors must also persuade society to accept a system. The Indian social order based on the caste system needed rigorous campaigning, for such a system did not satisfy every social class. Under normal circumstances, Shudras, for instance, would not accept the servile duty as

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their only service to society, nor would other social groups let themselves be confined within an assigned profession. Use of force was a possible method to curb the opposition to the intended social order. The Laws ofManu, for instance, recorded that Shudras could be punished and killed if they did not follow the social role assigned to them. However, experience might have revealed to those ancient Indian legislators the fijttlity of force. What they actually needed was an attitudinal revolution, to which the entre society would meekly surrender. It seems that, as Brahmins endeavored to fiilfill this need, the need to justify the legitimacy of the caste-system, the so-called philosophical thoughts emerged gradually. With an ignorant mass ready to listen and accept, the easiest way for the educated to achieve the desired social changes would be to garb the deplorable existence of the masses in a religious and philosophical attire. Origin of human life from the creator's body, transmigraton, Karma, and the soul's eventual union with the creator all look like new innovations to persuade the Indian society to accept each group's assigned social role. Apparently, all these speculatve concepts have derived not from the philosophical minds that freely wondered about the etemal trath-for free wondering itself is probably impossible-but from the so-called philosophers' need to estabUsU a segregated, yet highly partial and biased social order. The Brahmins' success in this effort was also due to the social permission and freedom granted to them in order to invent speculatve beliefs, a point that George A. Kennedy has already observed (172). As noted above, teaching and leaming were the

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duties the tradition assigned to Brahmins, who, in tum, became the undisputed authorities in the field of education. Ancient Indian society thus produced a group of people, thousands in number, to interpret human nature in teims of absolute traths. This piofession was also a luciative one foi Biahmins: with wealth and honoi coming frora all diiections and ease and comfort greeting tUem," BraUmins found ample time and opportunity and self-satisfying interest to invent and enlarge speculations that interpreted social life. Hundreds of tUousands of hymns in the Vedas, the Upanishads, and other texts came into existence in this way. Thus, speculators, as well as speculations, seem to have appeared in ancient India as a social product. The persuasive power of these speculations was enormous. Creation and the individual soul's eventual unification with the creator belonged to one group of methods that persuaded society to accept its unfair division. Importantly, the Rig Veda 's message that Brahma created all social classes from his own body meant that, even though some social groups experienced vast discriminaton and others huge privileges, all these social groups were stll a part of Brahma. Despite all the suffering and misery of the present life, the servants and the coinmon public would one day join the original cieatoi and experience the etemal joy. This idea could have encouraged people to tolerate their present misery of life in anticipation of tUe greatest Uappiness in tUe corapany of tUe creator. TUis teacUing also suggested tUat a social revolt against tUe Uigher classes would simply be the revoU against the creator, from whose body all classes have emerged. All social classes, despite their vast differences in rights and responsibilites, carae frora the

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same source and would retum to the sarae source; therefore, actual unity and togethemess were stressed behind the apparent social differences. Thus, one can detect an intricately woven persuasive method playing its role in the concepts of creaton and liberation. Karraa and reincaraation, working together, appear to have served the sarae purpose of persuading society to tolerate its caste systera. As raentoned previously, unwholesome Karraas were the actions motivated by desire and anger. These Karmas would confer upon individuals lower lives, sucU as animal life, in their transmigraton. Wholesome deeds were the ones raotivated by the absence of desire and hatted. The Karraic energy produced by these wholesorae deeds would grant individuals better lives after death., These concepts embodied enormous power to influence by keeping society calm and manageable. The masses would accept their deplorable lot as an unalterable, inexorable divine will. Only tolerance and peacefiil acceptance of the present misery in life would make their next life better. Both the concepts of Karma and reincaraation appear to have been invented in order to prevent social opposition to the prevailing cast system. One sees here the so-called philosophy ttansform into rhetoric. "The ttacts are sermonic rather than philosophical, therapeutc rather than investgatve. . . In practcal use, they are rhetorical. . ." (Oliver 47). Amid numerous social differences, which under normal circumstances would appear to be highly unfair, unjust, and discriminative, to promote the concepts that suffering originated in a past life and would end in a fiiture life or the cause of suffering is the creator's will are persuasive methods indeed. One may

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recognize a system of thought as religious or philosophical simply because one tends to isolate it from its social origin. Unable to locate or simply disregarding its origmal source, one raay attach labels to each thought, categorizing it under metaphysics, theology, philosophy, and so on. Social connectons of these thoughts, however, might awaken a careful observer to the possible trath that, whatever these speculatons are called, they all are persuasive techniques or rhetorical methods. Sometiraes one might be misled by the Aristote's interpretaton of rhetoric-the inteipietation that ihetoric centeis upon enthymeme and example.^" As mentioned in the infroduction, he separated religious, philosophical, and metaphysical concepts frora rhetoric and included only deliberative, forensic, and laudatory speeches in the discipline.^' WUat Aristotle endeavored to prove was tUat only persuasion in tUe field of tUe day-to-day social affairs belongs to rUetoric. TUis effort, in otUer words, impUes tUat philosophy in ancient Greece did not aim at social persuasion, and therefore philosophy was not rhetoric. This iraplication is justfied by botU Plato's and Aristotle's view tUat pUilosopUy begins witU curiosity and wonder. "Curiosity is the feeling of a philosopher, and philosophy begins in wonder," said Plato." He further elaborated that the trae philosopher's curiosity would be to see the absolute trath." Aristotle confirmed these remarks, saying that people philosophize because of their curiosity." Furthermore, the very raeaning of the Greek word philosophy-Iove for wisdora-separated philosophy from society and made the philosopher an isolated seeker of the trath. Only the person

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who spoke on legal, political, and laudatory topics was the social persuader and rhetorician. It should be asserted, however, that the so-called wisdom, if it originated wittiin society, must be teeming with persuasive power directly connected to social existence. Thinkers may not wonder without social connection, social peimission, and social demand. Any concept that originates within society may have a social connection, and those concepts that connects to society seems to be piedominantly ihetoric oi persuasive techniques. The Greek discipline of pUilosopUy, of course, is a possible exception to this general principle because most of the philosophical concepts could have reached Greece from outside. When borrowed ideas are promoted in a society, those ideas bear no social connection and appear to be purely intellecttial. Here, persuasion does not serve as a raeans to some other end but evolves only within those speculatons and only for the sake of those speculations. In fact, Aristotle may be correct when he separated philosophy from rhetoric on the basis that philosophy had no social bearing. However, his theory may be applicable only to Uis own society in wUicU intellecmals wrangled witU each other about the ideas that probably came from several Eastem countries. Absence of social persuasion in the concepts entertained by the pre-Socratic Greek thinkers, however, does not invalidate their enormous persuasive sttength in societies where those concepts originated. As the introducton of the present dissertation has aheady highhghted, rhetoric can not be confined to a nariow aiea as defined by Aristotle. "An idea, aftei all, is neithei

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a tangible thing noi the condition of the psyche. . . Despite their apparent imraateriality, ideas are commonly attributed with great power and influence" (Lyne 149). This description elucidates the point that ideas are rhetoric. They are predominantly rhetoric in societies where they originate. Such early Hindu concepts as Brahma, creation, and ttansmigration appear as speculative ideas "with great power and influence." Social matters are unique in societies. Both historical and geographical factois, joining togethei, may create the fields of persuasion in respectve societies, The failure of tyranny, a historical factor, shaped deliberatve oratory and judicial discourse-persuasion in political and legal actions-in Greece, Going fiirther back, one finds the geographical conditions of Greeceits numerous islands and mountainsas contributory factors to the failure of aristocracy and tyranny, and the evenmal rise of small democratc governments, Had Greece been a flat land without hundreds of islands, ancient Greece would have been an empire just as Persia rather than being a cluster of small kingdoms under aristocracy, tyranny, and democracy, In ancient India, however, the situation was completely different, Sunounded by thick jungles, vast deserts, and broad rivers, it rarely experienced any foreign invasions after the Aryan settlement during the pie-Vedic eia. Tiaditon had alieady handed over the politcal and legal decisions to Shasttiyas, tie raling caste. India's raost indispensable need was to retain its afready existent social order. While Greek persuasion encouraged creative human acton in deliberatve speeches, Indian persuasion seeras to have tried exacty the opposite: social inaction to the slightest threat of the prevailing social systera. To create a society tUat would resist

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social changes, persuasion must attempt to influence huraan attittides ratier than actions. Metaphysics, or the concepts that are beyond human understanding, may be the most helpfiil techniques of persuasion in such a sittiation. Therefore, persuasion m early Indian society was based on religious and philosophical concepts. Another reference to Kenneth Burke's and Richard A. Cherwitz's broad inteipietatons of ihetoric would fiirthei justfy the ihetorical powei buried in the eaily Indian system of thought. Accoiding to Buike, one needs but to "rediscover rhetorical elements that had become obscured" when other disciplines such as "aesthetc, anthropology, psychoanalysis, and sociology carae to the fore." These other disciplines tend to outaw "rich rhetorical eleraents" hidden in these disciplines (521). Religion and philosophy seera to be several raore "other disciphnes" that would obscure the rhetorical value in ancient Indian thoughts. In The Rhetoric ofReligion, Burke reiterated that "the subject of religion falls under the head of rhetoric in the sense that rhetoric is the art of persuasion, and religious cosraogonies are designed, in the last analysis, as exceptionally thoroughgoing modes of persuasion" (v). Cherwitz fiirther elaborated on this concept, saying: Whether our interest is in making ethical judgment, articulating the preferability of a particular philosophical, scientifc, or historical theory vis-a-vis another, or in gaining followers for a political, social, or religious cause, rhetoric abounds. . . It might be that some of these rhetors desire conversion or change in audience attitudes, beliefs, and values, whereas sorae seek modifications in human behavior, and still others wish only to obtain the understanding of those with whora they communicate. Yet in every case the dynamic relationships among rhetor, message, and the auditor indicate the potential for, if not the fact of, symbolic influence. (2)

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This passage reinforces the legitimacy of emphasizing the rhetorical value of early Hindu speculations. Cherwitz's remarks about the persuasive tendency in philosophical, rehgious, and social theories, in particular, comfortably places early Indian thought in the field of rhetoric. As this discussion so far has revealed, Brahma, creation, soul, Karma, and Brahma's assignment of dutes to the four castes were more or less the theories that one may categorize under philosophy, religion, and sociology. These other labels, however, are perhaps deceptve and arbitraiy since they raay distort the very purpose of those speculations, the purpose of persuading society to accept the social power of Brahmins. To state it plainly, at the very beginning Brahmins apparently eraployed a curming but simple ideathe metaphysical concept that castes were created from the creator's bodyto control society. As tirae passed, the inadequacy of this single concept could have became apparent, thus giving way to more sophisticated and far-fetched metaphysics for social control. Concepts appear to have confroUed society, and society, in retum, influenced the concepts to expand and take new forms. This mutual interdependence of ideas and society seems to have produced, in the forra of metaphysics and religion, a well-organized persuasive systera in the pre-Buddhistic India.

Social Oppositon to the Vedic Belief System as a Precursor to Advanced Rhetoric Persuasive methods thus invented in ancient India under the name of religion and philosophy would remain unchallenged and any rhetorical progress would stagnate unless

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a serious defect in the system raade itself gradually manifest. As already noted, the Brahmins claimed that the four social groups-Brahmins, Shastriyas, Vaishayas, and Shudraswere created by the creator's mouth, shoulders, hip, and feet, respectively. This theory of creation was, obviously, a highly confroversial and sensitive one. It could onK' subdue sorae social fractions, but not all. Certainly, no oppositon would arise frora Shudras, the servants, who were virtually powerless. Vaishayas, the general public, on the other hand, bred a powerfiil business class, but they knew that their wealth was their sfrength. Therefore, neither of these two groups openly attacked the scriptural authority, which gave the highest social position to the Brahrains. However, the reacton of the Shastriyas or ralers to the Brahrain's alleged supremacy was altogether different, and there were reasons for it to be different. Brahmins were the alleged leader of society, but the practical leadership was held by Shasttiyas who raled viUages, provinces, states, and the entire countty. Living in luxurious palaces with all comfort and respect and attending to the needs of society's day-to-day existence, Shastriyas would have regarded themselves the rightful leaders of society. However, Brahmins, who, under the pretext of textaal and personal authority, ttaditon, and hearsay, were trying to arrogate higher social powers. The Laws ofManu, a text composed by Brahmins, constantly remarked that Brahmins were higher than ralers." As noted before, teaching was exclusively left aside for Brahmins. The text wamed tiat a

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member of the raling caste should never be proud to assume the livelihood of Brahrains, the betters of the ralers.^' Some politcal leaders, of course, followed tUe ttaditon, respecting tUe Brahmins' alleged supremacy, but the relationship between the two social groups was not always smooth. An opposition to the Brahmin positon of supreme authority arose from the raling class itself The following passage spoken to the Buddha by Ambattha, a reputed Brahmin, clearly reflects the deteriorating relationship between Brahmins and ralers: Once, Gotama [the Buddha], I had to go to Kapilavastu on sorae business. . . and went into the Sakyas' Congress Hall. Now at that tirae here were number of Sakyas, old and young, seated in the hall on grand seats, making raerry and joking together, nudging one another with their fmgers; and for a trath, methinks, it was I myself that was the subject of theirjokes. Not one of them ever offeredme aseat. That, Gotama, is neither fitting, nor is it seemly, that the Sakyas, menial as they are, mere menials, should neither venerate, nor value, nor esteem, nor give gifts to, nor pay honor to Brahmins.^^ Hindu texts recommended, and the Hindu ttadition asserted that a member of any caste should respect, honor, and give gifts to Brahmins. The Katha Upanishad, for instance, said that, when a Brahrain entered a house, the residents of that house must welcome the Brahmin, the "venerable guest," initially offering him water and a seat.^' The passage quoted above, however, indicates it otherwise. histead of receiving respect, Brahmin Ambattha became tie very object of ridicule in ttie company of ralers. The Buddha's humorous response to this compIaint-"A quail, a little hen bird though she be, can say what she likes in her own nest. And ttiere the Sakyas are at their own horae in Kapilavasta. It is not fitting for you to take offense at so trifling a thing.""-fiirther shows

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his own defensive attitude towards ralers, his own social class. The conflict between Brahmins and Shastriyas is clearly evident in this conversation. Hindu, Jain, and Buddhist texts provide more evidence to suggest a major conflict between Brahmins and Shastriyas during the sixth century B.C.E. According to Hindu scriptures, most of the debates about metaphysical concepts took place in royal palaces where the ralers were amazed by the Brahmin wisdom and were convinced of the divine trath revealed by Brahmins. Jain and Buddhist texts, on the other hand, show exacty the opposite: in debates and dialogues with ralers, Brahmins became wordless and were ashamed of their ignorance. Some Buddhist scriptares compared corrapted Brahmins to dogs. The Buddha said: Brahminees, the wives of Brahmins, are known to be fertile, are seen to be with child, bringing forth and nursing children. And yet it is these very womb-bora Brahmins who say that Brahmins are the genuine children of the Brahraa, bom frora his raouth, his offspring, his creaton, and his heirs! By this they raake a travesty of the nature of the Brahma. It is false what they say, and great is the demerit that they thereby eara.' The discourse ends, rhetorically placing Shastriyas above Brahmins. "For those who trast in lineage, Shastriyas are the best. In reality, wise and virtuous person from any castes is tUe best."" BotU tUe BraUmins and tUe SUastriyas sUowed an increasing tendency to place tUeir own caste above the other. This conflict and the deterioratng relationship between Brahmins and Shastriyas paved the way for a unique occurrence in the history of mankind: not only did the ralers tolerate and encourage any oppositon to flie orthodox teaching, but they theraselves searched for the ways to downplay the early Hindu rehgious and philosophical teaching.

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Most of the leaders of the new generation, including Mahavira and the Buddha, belonged to the ruling class. In this social background, one can witaess a highly fertile ground for rational thinking to flourish. What else othei than the sepaiation of leligion and government would encourage people to tUink freely and speak freely! TUe unity between goverament and leligion has always suppiessed free thinking thioughout huraan histoiy. Fiora the persecution of Galileo to tUe conderanation of Salman RusUdie to death, one finds numerous exaraples in support of this statement. In ancient India, however, the caste system of the Brahmins paved the way for the separaton of religion and goverament, at least for a sUort period. TUe raling class itself being tired of tUe estabhshed system of persuasion (religious and philosophical thoughts), society enjoyed every freedom to say anything. It seems that ratonal argument against the Brahmin social system was bora in this free environment. Despite Brahmins' intolerance of the social oppositon to ie ascending ratonal appeal, they were powerless to stop the new developraent in persuasion. The only altematve left for Brahmins was to iraprove their own persuasive system to compete with the rationalists. This historical situation paved the way for the emergence of advanced rhetoric. Robert T. Oliver's suggestion that persuasion in ancient India was not for a probable trath but for a certain trath, in which only the message rattier than means of persuasion was important (48), is apphcable only to the early stage of speculatve developraent in ancient India. When the orthodox teaching began to encounter opponents, the Brahrains'

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emphasis on mere message gradually took new tums, looking for other raeans of persuasion. Numerous schools that opposed the Brahrain authority, on the other hand, stiengthened their arguraents with powerfiil ratonal systems of thought. Thus, in the same way that the invention of the caste system gave birth to a system of persuasion in ancient India, the subsequent social opposition to the caste system appear to have injected new power to the then Indian rhetoric.

Development of Ratonal Thou ht against the Brahmin System The metaphysical concepts the Brahmins introduced in ancient India in order to maintain the caste system in society have already been mentioned in this chapter. These concepts were fascinating, far-fetched, and intriguingly constracted to persuade society but were devoid of unobstracted reasoning since they all were based on a belief system ratUer tUan on free inquiry and understanding. TUe first two rationalist scUools tUat persuaded society to reject tUis belief system were materialists and skeptics wUo vigorously attacked or doubted the concepts nourished by Brahmins. They developed their views "as a kind of reaction against the metaphysical theories presented by the Upanishadic thinkers" (Kalupahana 9) and conceived in the early Vedas. The immediate negative reaction to the Vedic and Upanishadic metaphysics and theology would have been to negate the existence of any speculations beyond sensual experience. The Rig Veda mentioned several times the existence of raaterialists.'' Charvaka, an atheist, who rejected gods and all sacrifices, was the raost popular of all

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these matenalists. That he was a student of Braspati, another atheist, is an indication that an atheistc school of thought actaally existed as early as the seventh century B.C.E. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad also remarked about a school of thought that admitted the so-called soul as mere consciousness produced by the combination of four great elements: earth, water, heat, and air." By the time of the Buddha, these materiahstic thoughts had gained rauch popularity. The Samannaphala Sutta described the summary of materialism as foUows: A human being is buiU up of the four great elements. When he dies, the earthy in hira returas and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his faculties pass into space. The four bearers, on the bier as a fifth, take his dead body away. TiU they reach the burning ground, men utter forth eulogies, but there his bones are bleached, and his offerings end in ashes. . . Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, and aftei death they aie not." One can glimpse the taiget of attack in these rationalist arguments. The Brahmin concept of soul, as discussed before, was a persuasive technique to neuttalize social opposition to the caste system. The materialist's negation of the soul with rattonal argument was, probably, an act of persuading society to oppose the caste systera. Crashing the concept of soul would invalidate both the link between the creator and the individual and each individual's after-death existence. This invalidation, in rettim, would persuade unprivileged social groups-Shudras and cornmon public in particular-to stand for tUeir rights during their present life itself rather than to expect happiness in their existence after death.

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Another materialist school that denied morality and overemphasized self-interest deserves attention as another development against the orthodox teaching of the Brahmins. Puraa Kassapa, a renowned materialist during the time of the Buddha, maintained that moral practice had no value. He also held that charity was useless, and good and bad actions would yield no subsequent effects: Were he [any one] to go along the South bank of the Ganges, striking, mutilating and having people mutilated, oppressing and having them oppressed, there would be no guilt thence resulting. Were he to go along the North bank of the Ganges giving ahns, and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, no increase of merits." The entire passage appears to be an example of materialistic rejection of Karma, tUe Brahmin technique to persuade the mass to accept the misery in life. According to Early Hindu teaching, there was no way that the masses could get rid of their present misery of hfe; only accumulation of wholesome Karmas would help thera eradicate suffering in their fiitare lives. Resistance to the established social order, an act raotivated by desire which would defnitely breed unwholesorae Karmas, would deny the only possibility of making people happy in their fiiture lives." Submission to the established norms, on the other hand, would breed wholesome Kaimas, foi desiie and angei weie absent heie. "Guilt" and "merits" in the passage quoted above aie, m fact, the wholesome and unwholesome Kaimas. Kassapa's nullification of Karmic effects in human actions could have invited the common public to resist the social system fearlessly, for such a resistance would never bring any harm.

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The teaching of Ajita, another matenalist contemporary of tUe Buddha, fiirther elucidates materialistic rationality developed against ttaditional persuasive metUods in pre-BuddUistic India. TUe Samannaphala Sutta Uighlighted the foUowing points in Ajita's teaching: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Sacrifice and offering has no meaning. Good or evil deeds do not reproduce any Karraa. There is no such things as this world and the next. One does not have to be dutifiil to one's parents. No recluse or Brahmin can achieve super knowledge about the universe and beings.

6. No recluse or Brahmin can make wisdom known to others." Targets in these points are, quite obviously, the orthodox docttines. Sacrifices and offerings were the Brahmin practices to please gods who, in retam, would bless the offerers. Karma and next birth were essentally the original docttines in Indian thought. The concept of superior knowledge was originally developed by Brahmins in their effort to elevate theraselves as the seers of universal trath, which was unreachable to the common public. Ajita's teaching shows an all-round attack on the traditional Indian teaching in order to awaken the blind followers of the ttaditon. To counter the materiahstic argument, Brahmins apparently developed more sophisticated rhetorical methods which will be discussed shortly, but the secular section never gave up, either. The rise of skepticism is a more compettive way to meet the belligerent Brahmin's assertion that the absolute trath was existent but not intellectaally graspable. Despite the absence of original texts of any skeptc schools, early Buddhist texts have provided evidence that skepticism flourished in India during the seventh and

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sixth centuries B.C.E. Even though these texts do not show much admiraton of skeptics, perhaps because skeptcism was a rival school of the eariy Theravada Buddhists, Buddhist texts have piesented a clear view about ancient Indian skeptics. Accoiding to the Brahmajala Sutta and the Samajjapala Sutta, skeptics aie the ones who "wiangle like eels, and, when a queston is put to them on this oi that, they lesort to equivocaton."" Theii main point was, "I neithei know the good, as it leally is, nor the evil."" They tackled metaphysics in the following manner: If you ask me whether there is another world-Well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don't say so. And I don't think it is thus or thus. And I don't think it is otherwise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is, nor is not, another world. And if you ask me about the beings produced by chance, or whether there is any fruit, any result, of good or bad actions, or whether a man who has won the trath continues or not after deathto each or any of these questions do I give the sarae reply."" Behind the apparent complication of the skeptic thought given here, this passage conveys the underlying trath of the skeptic tradition: the human being's inability to make any definite conclusion about things beyond sensual experience. The passage imphes that mere speculations, which aie not leal human experiences, have no wanant, and theiefoie, to make definite statements about metaphysical concepts would be misleading. Silanka, a latei commentarian of the Jain tiadition piesented a tarthei description of the skepticism which stiessed its moie intellectual natuie (Jayatilleke 117). He said that the skeptic school of thought maintained that "skepticism is the best since it is diffcuU to gauge the thought piocesses of anothei." Because the teachei's mind is

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unknowable, his words are incomprehensible. AU teachings are like tUe utterances of barbarians since those teaching have no basis (JayatUeke 118). While Buddhist texts highlighted the skeptic's focus on the incoraprehensibility of the criteria of good and bad, the Jain coraraentarian emphasized that the early skepticisra was based on the incoraprehensibility of the master's inner natare and ability to communicate. Perhaps, the Buddhist portrayal of skepticism is simply general, but Silanka's description, even though it appeared a few centaries later, had a direct parallel to the new development in the Brahmin system of thought. When materialists cited lack of evidence as a reason to deny Vedic metaphysics and divinity, Brahmins defended the Vedic tmth, developing the argument that only the highly developed minds through meditation could see the phenomenon beyond sensual experience and intellect. Silanka's description of skepticism, which doubted any inner achievement of the master and his abiUty to convey any message, appears to be the immediate counter-attack on this Brahmin thought.

New Persuasive Techniques in the Brahmin Tradition It is evident that all the branches of materialism and skepticism developed in the pre-Buddhistc India mainly targeted the Brahmin's orthodox teaching that justfied the prevalent social values. Reduced to minimum, the conflict was, perceivably, between the persuasion to reject and the persuasion to accept coraraon social beliefs and piactces sunounding the cast system. As the Biahmin school of thought leceived heavy blows

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from the ascending lationalist aiguraents, its lefoimeis developed pseudo-iationalism-a method of thinking which would appear to be a free inquiry about knowledge but was notin defense of its traditional teaching. Now one would see the rise of different Brahmin persuasive raethods other than the emphasis on mere textaal and personal authority. In these new developments, attempts were made to interpret such Vedic concepts of creation, soul, and reincamation as indescribable through words and unintelligible to the ordinary knowledge. This method of argumentation would be called pseudo-rationalism because, under the guise of rationality, it simply placed knowledge beyond the rational level. The Mundaka Upanishad said that Vedic concepts are beyond causality: "As long as a person clings to the belief of causality, Ue will find cause producing effect, But when this attachment to causality wears away, cause and effect become non-existent,"^' TUis and similar stanzas in several Upanishads regarded Uuman intelligence as an inadequate means to answer Uuraan problems. Only tUose wUo were specially qualified with yoga experience would know the mysteries beyond the ratonal level. So far, two stages of developraent in the Brahmin system of thought have been discussed. At the very beginning, they asserted that all social beliefs and practices were divine revelations so that society should unquestonably accept them. This theory rans back to the Rig Veda, which remarked that Brahaspathi, a god in early Hinduisra, revealed the trath to the ancient poets and seers, who fashioned it through their speech."^ As this theory of revelaton was constantly challenged by materialists, Brahmins seem to

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have combined revelation with realization. The Svetesvatara Vpanishad, for instance, said that, through the power of austerity and through the grace of the lord, the sage Svetesvatara realized the highly sacred knowledge."' Apparently, pseudo-rationalisra had a close connection with this assertion of realization. Human intellect has been presented here as an inadequate means to grasp the trath. Meditation, self-mortification, and faith would jointly confer upon dedicated individuals the special skill to realize the conectaess of practices and behefs prevalent in society and given in ancient texts. Sophisticaton of these far-fetched speculatons and the arguments in defense of those speculatons would easily mislead one to regard the ancient Indian intellectual fermentaton as pure episteraology. It might appear that the tireless endeavor of Brahmins-as well as others-was to clanfv- a trae theory of knowledge. This assurapton appears to be the biggest pitfall one raay f nd oneself in as one continues to examine the development of ancient Indian tiiought. Taken away by tie fascinaton of the early Indian speculations oi simply disiegaiding the importance of social connectons of those speculatons, one may leap into the conclusion that the eaily Indian system of thought giew out of that societys effort to answer the questons beyond ordinary human understanding. However, what actaally happened seems to be the inventon of concepts, contnuous modificaton of those concepts, and \igorous defense of thera in order to conttol and to win the upper hand in society. The Brahmin defense of speculatons against ratonalist arguments was difficuU since rationalists, as discussed in the next chapter, constantly challenged ttie authority of

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the text, person, and traditon. Ostensibh, what was left for the Brahmins was to denigrate the rational argument as an madequate raeans to the trae knowledge and to compensate with more sophisticated rhetorical techniques. They systematcally developed the concept of speech as a rhetorical technique to appeal to the audience. The Mahabharata, the first epic of the early Hindu traditon, has given a detailed analysis of the speech, elucidatmg the style, presentaton, and the objecttves of speech." As Satischandra Vidyabhushana has suramarized it, a disingenuous and faulty speech w as the one agreeable only to the speaker, not to the listener. A good speech should lead to a decision and indicate its puipose. The foUowing characteristcs are some signs of a good speech: fraught with sense, unequivocal, not redundant, smooth, determinative, not bombastic, agreeable, trathfiil, not haimfiil, not laconic, not abstnise, not unsystematc, not fai-fetched, not superfluous, not inopportune, and not devoid of an object (13). Ratonal argumentaton, according to the Brahmin traditon, seems to have no place in a skiUfuUy delivered speech. This description of a good speech confirms that the Biahmin traditon had now begun to modify the style and delivery of speech rather than to focus on its ratonal side. This approach to an argument is the inevitable conclusion that any conventonal riietorical tradition might eventually airive at. As the Biahmin tiaditton stiove to pieserve it social values with the help of its behef system, free inqufry found no place in it. Even in debates and dialogues, specific rales weie imposed to leave aside ie questons tiat lationally challenged the Brahmin authority. Thus, it seems conect to suggest that

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elaborate mles, cunningly invented to evade the ratonalist inquiry about the idealistic speculations, began to dominate the Brahmin system of argumentaton.

Persuasive Fervor It needs to be reiterated here that the speculations, pseudo-rationalism, and rhetorical methods of the Brahmins and the rational thought of other unorthodox sections meant to establish their social power by winning moie membeis to the respective groups. There were rarely any prosecutons, threats, or other intimidations to achieve this objective; the most effective and widespread method left for each group to recrait more members was to appeal to the audience through persuasive language. In the absence of organized prosecution and conspiracies, rhetorical methods thus became prominent in each group's attempt to sttengthen its power. Based on the common assumption that ancient societes were rigid and oppressive, the emphasis of overwhelmingly predominant rhetorical methods of sophisticated nature as a means of persuasion in ancient India may seem as a highly exaggerated statement. Particularly, the modera reader might wonder how rhetorical permission to challenge religious concepts prevailed in ancient India when no other ancient nation ever enjoyed that freedora. This apparently irapossible but actaally trae situation was caused, as already noted, by unusually unique historical causes. The inital separation of the religion and the govemment and the increasing differences between the

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orthodox religious leaders and the ralers kept social oppression under confrol, thus leaving persuasion through rhetoric the only means for those social groups to strengthen their power in society. Unusual power balance of rival social groups, on the other hand, kept persuasive fervor through language lively, predominant, and advancing. Even though the holy texts had granted Brahmins permission to prosecute heretics,"' probably, such prosecutions could not be carried out without royal support, which Brahmins often failed to secure since their own self-proclaimed social superiority had already annoyed ralers. Under this situation, even Shudras, the people of the lowest caste, were persuaded by the rationalists to oppose the orthodox teaching of Brahmins. Both Mahavira and the Buddha asserted that the Shudras were equal to any other caste, ordained the members of the Shudra caste, and instracted them to regard themselves as equal to others. Despite the ralers' intolerance of the Brahmins' assertion of the highest social position, most of the kings and ministers, on the other hand, took a safer side, not suppressing the orthodox teaching, either. This reaction of the ralers is understandable since the parents of most ralers, following the traditon, educated their children under Brahmins, and most of the advisors to the ralers were also Brahmins, who were generally considered brilliant, educated people. As a resuU of this complex sitaaton, most of the ralers both provided lands and support to Brahmin teachers and encouraged the ascending ratonalist moveraent. King Ajasatta's statement-"How should such a one as I think of giving dissatisfaction to any recluse or Brahmin in my realm?""''-exemplifies the raler's general attitude towards all

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kinds of rationalistic and idealistic views. This unique sitaation that caused a healthy power balance in ancient India gave the uUimate freedom to the persuasion through language. It, of course, is unieahstc to assert that wiongful methods of peisuasion weie altogethei absent in ancient India. Conspiiacies and muidei-attempts have taken place in some groups' endeavor to win upper hand in society. A notable example is the charge on the Buddha and his several disciples about sexual abuse and murder of a woman whom the Buddha's rivals employed in a conspiracy to discredit the Buddha. Embanassed by the sitaation, the Buddha and his disciples remained inside for several days while the king Bimbisara, himself tolerant to different views, employed spies to unravel the conspiracy. Although rare, these unfair means of persuasion emerged occasionally but never superseded the already predominant persuasion through rhetoric. Interestingly, it seems that, within this power balance, vigorous propaganda developed among various groups as the most aggressive method to convince their power and to win more members. As Buddhist texts often noted, the leaders of each group including the Buddha himself traveled with a large group of supporters and merabers ostensibly to convince their power. Besides, winning an iraportant person to a group provided an excellent opportanity for that group to advertise its teaching and to appeal indirectly to people to join it. When UpaU, a millionaire businessman, was converted by the Buddha, Upali remarked, "If raerabers of other sects had secured rae as a disciple, they would have paraded a bannei all aiound [the city of] Nalanda" while the Buddha

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asked Upali to "make a piopei investigaton" about the Buddha's own teaching," This speech is an indicaton that various gioups used their newly converted raembers as a means to attract raore merabers to their own groups. In a society in which violence was hardly tolerated as a persuasive method, this propaganda could be quite predictable. Competitiveness of persuasion, in the meantime, was intensified by the gradual increase of new groups. The tradition of the Brahmins had developed different sects after receiving the dissenters' initial blitz on textual authority, each of these sects campaigning for followers separately. Opponents of the traditioncausalists, rationalists, materiahsts, skeptics, nihilists, to narae a few-on the other hand, competed not only with traditionalists but also with themselves. This situation sheds ligUt on tUe highly competitive and keen straggle present in the arena of persuasion in the sixth century B.C.E. India. As Hermann Oldenberg remarked, "Buddha found the rival ascetic leaders and their monastic orders more subtle and dangerous opponents than in the champions of the ancient faith [the orthodox teaching of the Brahmins]" (174). Rationalists themselves were challenged by other rationalists, thus making persuasion a keen competition. Direct approach to the audience was one popular way of persuading society to accept and reject various views. Leaders of various groups-those who "had a pleasant voice and pleasing delivery, and were gifted witU polite address, distnct, not husky, suitable of making clear the matter in hand""*-regularly visited cites and villages and gave discourses, eagerly hoping to win more members. When the Buddha visited the city of Kalamas, people in the city told the Buddha that numerous leaders of different schools

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had aUeady visited their city, given speeches, and asked Kalaraas to accept different teachings. They (Kalamas) asked the Buddha whether he was also going to insist Kalamas on accepting his own teaching and rejecting those of others."' Because so many persuaders approached people, Kalaraas were at loss, unable to decide what to accept and what to reject. Again, the Buddha's advice to his very first group of disciples "Bhikkhus, go frora place to place for the happiness of the many, for the benefit of the many"indicates not only his preparaton for persuasion through speech but also a similar trend in the Buddha's society. The following dialogue between the Buddha and Sariputta, the most renowned disciple of the Buddha, sheds more light on the persuasive fervor in India: The Tathagata [Buddha] makes his hon's roar in assembhes, and sets rolling tUe BraUma-WUeel [proves wUat Ue tUinks conect]. . . TUese, Sariputta, are tUe eigUt kinds of asserablies. Assembhes of nobles, asserablies of Brahmins, assemblies of UouseUolders, assemblies of recluses, assemblies of tUe retinue of the four great regents, asserabhes of the Thirty-Three, Mara's assembhes, assemblies of BraUmas. These eight, Sariputta, are the assemblies. A Tathagata [the Buddha] who is endowed with those four convictons [four-fold self-confidence] approaches those eight assembhes, enters them. Now I, Sariputta, call to mind approaching of many hundred assembUes of nobles, Brahmins, householders,. . . Yet before I sat down there, and before I held converse there, and before I fell into conversaton there, I did not behold any ground for thinking [I nevei felt] that feai oi nervousness would come upon me there." Behind the Buddha's apparent self-exaltaton, one can observe in this passage the persuasive nattu-e of ttie Indian society. The eight kinds of assembhes and tie Buddha's visiting them indicate that all social classes held regular assembUes, in which recluses like the Buddha gave talks to the audience and participated in conversatons. The

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Buddha's remarks that he kept the Brahma-wheel roIUng in these assemblies reflect the persuasive natare of these discourses. His emphasis on his ovra fearlessness implies that some speakers were actaally overwheUned by fear and nervousness, which were harmta! to the speaker in such talks and conversations. In addition to the Buddha's exposition of his own persuasive skill, this passage porfrays a clear picture of the persuasive fervor present in those pubUc discourses. Debates and dialogues between rival groups, often Ueld in debating halls constracted for this particular purpose and at private places, mark another raanifestation of persuasion. Winning a debate with a famous speakei oi having the uppei hand in a dialogue often piovided an excellent oppoitunity foi a group to win more members. The Mahabharata cited Brahmin Ashtavakra's defeat of another Brahmin Vandin in a debate and winning the support of king Janaka." Buddhist texts have given numerous instances of the Buddha's defeating his rivals and winning thousands of theii supporters. After many heated dialogues with the Buddha, some of his rivals would say, "Most excellent, Gotama, are the words of your mouth, raost excellent! May Gotama accept me as a disciple, as one who, from this day forth, as long as life endures, has taken him [the Buddha} as his [my] guide."" One can assume througU these words that the Buddha was just one powerflil persuader of many who could have won members in a similar fashion. Every school seems to have developed its own argumentative techniques, theories, and principles, and the debates and dialogues weie often highly competitve. The Udumbarika Sihanada Sutta" reported the Buddha's failure to impress a group of

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Wanderers, who believed that the Buddha's discourse was raotvated by his mere desfre to win more members. The Buddha sttove to prove that his objectve was to help thera, not to win pupils, by saying, Maybe, you will tiink: the Samana Gotama [the Buddha] has said tiis from a desire to get pupils, but you are not thus to explain my words. Let him who is your teacher be your teacher stll. . . . Let that which is your rale be your rale stll. . . Let that your mode of livelihood be so stll.. . Let those points in your doctrine which are wrong and reckoned as wrong by those in your community reraain so stiU for you. .. Let those pomts in your doctrine which are good, reckoned to be good by those in your community remain so stU. But there are bad things not put away, corrapting,. . . And it is for the putting away of these that I teach my teaching, according to which if you waUc, the things that corrapt shall be put away,.. ." The Buddha presents a well-constracted and rather cunning argument here in favor of his own interference with the Wanderers: the argument that his intenton was not to change them but to help. Nevertheless, he failed to convince. The Sutta says, "When he [the Buddha] had thus said, the Wanderers sat silent and annoyed, with hunched back and drooping head, brooding and dumbfounded."" The Buddha left the place unsatisfied and fiTistrated. This encounter suggests that society evaluated the speakers frora diferent angles, raaking persuasion harder for the speakers. Some listeners were well aware tUat, behind the speakers' apparent benevolence towards the listener, a personal motve was lurking. Besides, tUis incident also Uints at the powei of diffeient patteras of peisuasion, othei paiadigms, which have encouiaged the Wandeieis to leject the Buddha's aigument. Various passages thioughout the Sutta Pitaka cleaily depict the high standaid i debating. Debates weie held only between the peisons who weie pioficient in debating

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and who followed the pioceduies in debates, and, as JayatiUeke has aheady indicated (233), the Gradual Sayings said that if "a peison, on being asked a queston, does not abide by the conclusions. . . assumptions, lecognized aiguments, and the usual pioceduie" of a debate, that peison should be incompetent as a debatei.^' Reasoning, debating, continuous argument, wrangling, caviling, quibbling, ascertainment, explaining the purpose, giving proof, and the clarifying the object of knowledge were generally recognized as the techniques in a debate (Vidyabhusana 20). Development of these technical methods and terms indicates the professional standard in Indian debating during the sixth century B.C.E. Obviously, persuasive fervor was the hidden force that raised the standard of debating to such a higher level. Debaters, eager to convince thefr points to the audiences and opponents, were engaged in thefr profession with confidence and enthusiasm. The Buddha spoke about "certain recluses and Brahmins who aie clevei, subtle, experienced in conttoveisy, hafrsplitteis, who go about bieaking into pieces by thefr wisdom the speculatons of thefr adveisaries."-' Saccaka, a leadei of a materialistc scUooI, cUalIenges tUe Buddha, sayig: The Buddha, whom, when taken in hand by me [when I caught him in a debate], would not ttemble, shake, shake violenty, and from whose aimpits sweat would not poui? Even if I weie to take in hand, speech by speech, an insensate post, even that would ttemble, would shake-Iet alone a human being." These passages leflect the high enthusiasm and couiage of the debaters. Similar to a bragging boxer who vows to knock down tie opponent m an early round, early Indian debaters publicly announced thefr superior skiU over other debaters. Some of these

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debaters were well-prepared by thefr masters before sending them for a debate. The Abhayarajakumara Sutta"' described how Mahavira trained his follower Abhaya to defeat the Buddha in an argument. Mahavira invented a double-edged questton and instracts Abhaya to pioceed with this aigument caiefuUy: "If he says thus, then you should speak to him thus. . . ' Mahaviia beUeved, "On being asked this double-edged question by you, the Buddha will neithei be able to spew out noi swallow down the puzzle."" Aftei caiefiil training and practice, a debater would engage with the opponent in a debate. Sunounded by the supporters of both sides, the two debaters would continue vehemently, following the formal procedures of debating. To reiterate thefr objectives, all these debates and dialogues were intended not just to defeat a popular leader, but to compete in the race of winning more members to one's own group. The foUowiag preparation of Saccaka, a Jain master, for a heated argument with the Buddha indicates that his main focus was the audiencein this case about five hundred membeis of the Licchavi clan that had gatheied in a confeience hall on a debating day: Let the good Licchavis come foiward, let the good Licchavis come forward. Even as a powerful man, having taken hold of the fleece of a long-fleeced lam, might tag it towards him, raight tag it backward, might tag it forward and backward, even so wiU I, speech by speech, tog the recluse Gotama forward, tag him backward, tag him backward and forward. . . Let the good Licchavis come forward, let the good Licchavis come forward. Today there will be a conversation between me and the recluse Gotama." Clearly, Saccaka was preoccupied with the audience before he challenged the Buddha. His persistence that Licchavis should Usten to the conversaton between the Buddha and

himself highlights how nportant the audience was to him. Wmnmg tie appreciation of tie audience w as the primary concem here. Saccaka apparently sttove to convice tie audience that what he was gomg to speak to tie Buddha would be coirect and ttue and worthy of acceptance. This endeavor, m rettim, reflects the high intensity of the persuasive fervor among those debaters. Yet, tie picture vaguely presented to tie West about tiose debates is a totally different one. George A. Kermedy remarked: Debates in rehgious cfrcles spread to the pubUc assembly where it became a popular fonn of entertainment, but themes remained principally drawn from metaphysics and reUgion. Indian sophists did not exploit mythological and secular subjects nor paradoxes. .. (180) This passage suggests two characteristcs of ancient Indian debates: the main objectve of those debates was to entertain the audience; the topics for those debates were conventional and idealistc ones without any connecton to social Ufe. Any livelv acton, of course, would provide entertainment to any audience, but to lay sttess on mere entertainment of Indian debates is to miss thefr peisuasion, the most immediate objective of those debates. Second, it is enoneous to say that the themes foi those debates were drawn from metaphysics and reUgion. Perhaps, Kennedy has made a generalization after reading about the debates in the Brahmin tradition. Goveraed by idealism and pseudorationalism, it is trae, the debates between two Brahmin traditions rarely penettated beyond the so-called metaphysics and religion. Some questions that would challenge the Brahmin speculations were deUberately removed irom discussions simply because speculattons were simply the premises for the Brahmin fradition rather than the topics for

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debating. Nevertheless, when rationalists entered tUe arena of debatng and discussions, metaphysical and religious concepts were clearly exploited, crashing them and rationally grounding them on earth. The following passage is from an argumentative conversation between Brahmin Vasettha, who had accepted the concept of the reunion with the Brahma, and the Buddha, who rejected this concept: So you say, Vasettha, that the Brahmans are not able to point out the way to union with that which they have seen, and you further say that neither any one of them, nor of their pupils, nor of their predecessors even to the seventh generaton has ever seen Brahraa. And you fiirther say that even the Rishis of old, whose words they hold in such deep respect, did not pretend to know or to have seen where, whence, or whither Brahraa is. Yet these Brahmins, versed in the Three Vedas, say that they can point out the way to union with that which they know not, neither have seen. Now what think you, Vasettha? Does it not foUow that, this being so, the talk of the Biahmans, veised though they be in the Thiee Vedas, taras out to be foohsh talk?" Rationalist appioach to raetaphysics and religion is clearly evident here. Most of the rationalists, the Buddha befrig one of the most prominent, veheraently attacked metaphysica! and religious concepts, sttessing sensual experience as tUe only rehable means of knowledge. Several other ratonalists sucU as Ajita and KacUchayana campaigned for followers, openly challenging after-death existence and human ability for enlightenment. Then, it is enoneous to suggest that ancient Indian debates remained within the scope of metaphysics and religion. Robert T. Oliver, the other Westera scholar to write about ancient Indian rhetoric besides Kennedy, had already made similarly conclusions about Indian debates. The

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theory that those debates provided entertainment appears to be, in fact, a concept conceived initially by Oliver and ttansfened to Kennedy: It is clear that the debatmg of the trae was highly sophisticated and that speakers were expected to adhere to expected rales. It is also evident that audiences hugely enjoyed the debates and that the debatng processes were debased into entertainraent, rather than maintained as intellectaal friquiries or contests. These were faults, which, as wiU be seen, Gotama Buddha deliberately undertook to eradicate wUen Ue proposed Uis own program of debate and discussion. (55) It is unclear on what basis Oliver Uas concluded tUat, during the sixth-centary B.C.E., Indian "debating processes were debased into entertainment" and were devoid of "intellectaal inqufres and contests." Ambiguity arises from his previous remarks that "debating became for a tme in the immediate pre-Buddhistc period a major feature of Indian intellectaalism" and "great crowds gathered to listen to the contestants and to judge the effectveness of their argumentation" (52), These remarks mean exactly the opposite of what he notes in the passage quoted above. In the latter he says that debates were intellectaal inquires (instead of entertainments), and the crowds judged the debaters (instead of enjoying the debating processes). It is a mystery how the intellectaal inquiry and the crowd's judgment of the debates "in the immediate pie-Buddhistc period" tumed to be meie entertainments without intellectaal inquiries oi contests at the time of the Buddha. He seems to have airived at this conclusion aftei leading about Charaka Sanhita, a Biahmin text in which elaboiate rales foi debating are given. This book was actaally written during the first century A.D., but Oliver inconectly believed that it was written at the time of the Buddha. With this wrong conclusion, he seems to have

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assumed that debating in the sixth-century B.C. provided mere entertainment to the audience and was govemed by sophisticated rales. Speculatons formed with the help of inadequate and inappropriate sources seem to have played a major role in these misinterpretatons about ancient Indian debates. It was during the sixth century B.C.E. that persuasion through debatng reached its pinnacle in India. Whether they were pubUc debates with huge audiences or verbal contests with nvo groups, riva! groups debated with their eye on winning the raembers from the opposition. These debates can not be compared to modem high school debates in which no consensus would ever be arrived at. Out of honor for the eradity and skill of the winner and out of the conviction that the winner was actaally worth following, the losing party was often prepared to accept the power of the winner. "The vanquished opponents of Buddha" for instance, would "invite him and his disciples to dine on the following day" and after the meal the Buddha would give more admoniton and instractions, aftet which the host would take "with his family at Buddha's side" (Oldenbeig 149). In cases wheie social pressure was so sttong for the defeatst to openly foUow the winner, the foimei would at least secietly give in. Sonadanda, a Brahmin leader who was convinced by the Buddha in a debate that the caste system was irrational and baseless, took the Buddha as his guide despite the intolerance of Sonadanda's supporters. However, the pressure in the Brahmin communitv' was so sfrong that Sonadanda told the Buddha: If, oh, Gotama, after I have entered the assembly I should rise from my seat to bow down before the Gotama, then the assembly would find fault in me. Now he with whom the assembly should find fault, his reputaton would grow less. And he who should lose his reputaton, his income

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would grow less. For that which we have to enjoy, that depends upon our reputation. If, then, when I am seated in assembly, I sttetch forth ray joined palms in salutatton, let the Gotama accept that from rae as a rising up from my seat." Sonadanda's pietense that he would legaid the Buddha just as he would legaid any speakei in futuie debates and dialogues in Biahmin asserablies is purely for pragmattc reasons; inwardly, he is an ardent follower of the Buddha. This incident clarifies the very purpose of those debates. Even in assembhes of exttemely rigid and ttaditonal comraunities, debaters won members of the opposition. In fact, popularity of debates remained undiminished in ancient India because skillfiil speakers found debates to be highly influental to adding more supporters from rival groups.

Social Response to Persuasion Even though the debaters themselves and thefr close associates constitated a certain secton of the audience and responded to the speaker's rational argument in varying degrees, evidently, the general pubhc of the ancient Indian society was the ultimate audience of tie speakers. What boti tie ttaditionalists and ratonahsts essentially needed was the social support, which would eventaally make thefr views general rales in their society so diat tieir own social power would remain predominant. This point signifies the importance of the mass coramunity as tie ultimate target of all sort of persuaders. The previous section of the present chapter briefly refened to the comraon pubUc as an iraportant part of the audience, but this sub-topic may stil! need

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more description to clarify what social groups consttated tie general audience. and how tiey responded to tie speakers. Before tie sixti centur.' B.C.E. when tie Brahram metaphysics and ideals domiated the field of persuasion, common hidian mass was not considered an hnportant secton in tie audience. Only tie educated sections of flie privileged social groups were ivolved in debates and discussions, and, predictably, the common public had no choice but to accept tiie autiority of tie Brahmms. Lower social groups and woraen, in particular, had to accept tie textaal and personal auttiority of tie Brahinins unquestoningly. The comraon pubUc, tien, was not an audience that would judge tie speakei but a poweiless body of people tiat would unconditonally sunendei to tiie powei of the speakei. This sitaation, however, began to change drastcally towards tie sixti century B.C.E. People of the so-called lower castes and women were gaining increasing strength as a part of the audience. The "radical democratic spirit" of Jainism and Buddhism and "the development of heretica! sects" would be regarded as the causes that made this change (Murcott 59). They approached the Shudras and women to awaken them to the suppression they (Shudras and women) were kept under, and as a result, the audience began to expand. It would be inconect to say that ratonalists made the Shudras a powerful section in the audience, but the emerging rarionalistic power, at least, made Shudras fee! that they were a part of the audience. The Buddha used such thematc phrases as 'By deeds, not by birth, one becomes a Brahmin or a Shudra."" 'Tisheiman,

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scavengeis, courtesans, togettiei with Waniois and Biahmins, weie freely adraitted to tie [Buddhist] Oidei and weie also given positions of lank" (Naiada 310). Uiteiestingly, tfie Buddha appointed UpaU, fomieriy a baiber who later became an ordained disciple, as tie chief monk in dealing witi tie disciplmary matters of his fellow raonks, most of whom were from the Brahmin and Shasttiya castes. Amid this respectability the rattonalist groups granted to tUe SUudras, tiey (SUudras) also began to participate in judging the speakers fristead of acceptmg tie undeniable ttiith of the Brahmins. Women became a powerfiil part of the audience during the same time as Jains and Buddhists regarded woraen's intellectaa! sfrength as the same as men's and campaigned for female foUowers. The Buddha said: Not merely a hundred, not two, three, four or five hundred, but many more are those women layfollowers, disciples of mine, householders clothed in white, and who, though enjoyers of sense-pleasures, are doers of the instraction, those who accept the exhortaton, who have crossed over doubt and, perplexity gone, fare in the teacher's instraction, won to conviction, not relying on others [other persuaders].'*' This self-proclaimed sttength of the Buddha indicates that women became a major force in the Indian audience during the ratonalist age. The Buddha's remarks that he won women to conviction, preventing thera from "relying on others" clearly suggest the eagemess of other persuaders to win women to their own groups. Jains and Buddhists, in fact, ordained women, thus estabhshing the first ever Order of Nuns, to sfrengthen thefr appeal to other women. These nuns were frained to answer the questons comraon public often asked, and they "carried their accomplislmient... by communicating their understanding to others" (Murcott 57). The Buddha often praised nuns and encouraged

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people to listen to them. Referring to some answers a nun in Kajangala gave to the questions asked by some people who visited her monastery, the Buddha said: It is well! It is well, householders. A wise woman is the Kajangala nun. If you, householders, were to come to rae and ask about the meaning of this, I would give just the sarae explanation as that given by the Kajangala nun. Indeed, that is the raeaning of it, and so should you bear it in inind." Not only did women become a part of the audience, but they also made up a usefu! gioup of peisuadeis, who would, in lettira, add moie merabeis to thefr lespective gioups. One of the most lemaikable chaiacteristics of the audience was its ttemendous interest in debates, dialogues, and pubUc speeches. The very act of constracting debatfrig and conference halls in many cites reflects this interest and enthusiasm. One of the famous building complexes erected for diis purpose was Sala, Uterally "The Hall" put up in Queen Mallika's Park in Savatthi "for tie discussion of systems of opinion."^ Buddhaghosa, a fourth-century Buddhist commentarian, remarked that "after 'ttie hall' had been estabUshed, others near it had been built in honor of various famous teachers, but the group of buildings contfriued to be known as The Hall."" These halls, which existed in various parts of Eastem and centtal India, and "various teachers, Samanas, and Brahmins met togetier" m tiem to discuss various topics, were considered essental to tiefr communites by many social groups. The followfrig frivitation to ie Buddha by Sakyas, a royal clan, to open a newly consttiicted conference hall indicates how frnportant such a haU to the Sakyans: Master, tiere is a new conference hall here, buih not long ago for tie Sakyans of Kapilavatta, which has never been occupied by a recluse of Brahmin or any human bemg. Let the master be the ffrst to use it. When

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the master has used it. the Sakyans of Kapilavatta will use it afterwards, and for a long tfrne tiat wiU be for the welfare and happfriess of tie Sakyans of Kapilavatta."' The passage suggests tiat tie haU was to be dedicated to ie recluses and Brahrafris for discussion of different opmions. The Buddha, who accepted tie invitation, "roused, fricited, and dehghted tie Sakyans of Kapilavatta wifli reasoned talked far into tie night." - People tironged frito fliese halls whenever a speaker or a debater visited tiere. They Ustened attentively to any speech however dififerent fr was from ottieis. To spend thefr leisuie meaningfiilly, people belonging to various social groups chose to visit private places of popular speakers and Ustened to talks and held conversations. Sunounded by his ministers on a fiiU raoon day, King Ajasatta wondered whom he should caU upon to satisfy his heart. His ministers gave seven names of recluses fricluding the name of the Buddha, sorae of whom were "the heads of an order, teachers of a school, well known and of repute as sophists, revered by people, raen of experience, and old and weU-stricken in years."'' The king, in fact, had afready visited many of these teachers, who had drastcally different view with regard to human Ufe and tUe universe. Buddhist Suttas have given numerous examples of many people thus visiting renowned thinkers and listening to tUem poUtely whether those thoughts were agreeable or not. King Ajasatta's remarks that, despite his dissatisfaction about the answers given to his questions by several famous speakers, he "gave utterance to no expression of dissatisfaction" since he did not want to hurt them'" indicate pohte

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enthusiasm of the hsteners. Similariy, many visited various teachers and listened to them whether what those teachers said was agreeable or not. The interest of the audience can further be detected in people's quick readiness to meet the speakers who constantly visited towns and villages. The news of the speaker's visit spread like wind, and people started "going in companies, crowds, and groups" to raeet the speaker." The foUowing passage which also has recuned in several Suttas exemplifies Uow tUe people in a city of Kura state met tUe Buddha and listened to his discourse: Then the Brahrains and householders of Thulllakotthita [city] approached the Tathagata. Having approached, sorae greeted. Some, having greeted the Tathagata, sat down at a respectta! distance. Some exchanged greetings with him, and having conversed in a friendly and courteous way, sat down at a respecttal distance. Some having saluted the Tathagata with the joined palms, sat down at a respectful distance. Some, having made known their names and clans, sat down at a respectta! distance. Some, becoming silent, sat down at a respectfvil distance. The Tathagata gladdened, roused, incited, and deligUted tUem witU a talk on tUe Dhamma." This passage reflects that these visitors were not the followers of the Buddha, but some of thera were just admirers of the Buddha, and others were just friendly towards him or simply curious about him. Nevertheless, they all paid a visit to the Buddha and were ready to listen to Uim. One can expect a similar interest of people towards other speakers as well. The audience also seems to have reacted to the speaker's arguments positively. Even though the Brahmins were generally the defendants of the tradition and other castes its opponents, some members of the audience disregarded their caste orientation in

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responding to tie speaker's persuasive speeches. For instance, many Brahmins abandoned their former beliefs after listening to the Buddha or Mahavira. Similarly, ralers, persuaded by Brahmin speakers, accepted the orthodox tradition. Most of the listeners questoned and chaUenged the speaker openly. As mentioned in the present chapter, the Kalamas' deraanded a rational basis to accept the Buddha's discourse. Brahmins were often counter-questioned by the supporters of rational schools. Constant repudiation in the Upanishads of the so-called heretc views may be regarded as the Brahmin reaction to the rationalist challenge to the orthodox teachings. Rational sttength of the audience is tarther reflected by the listener's doubts about the speaker's ethos. Most of the Brahmins and sorae recluses including the Buddha and Mahavira sttengthened the genuineness of their argumentaton, clafrning that thefr wisdom came tlirough enlightenment. While some people accepted this claim, some did not. The Mahasihanada Sutta'^ has given an example of how the Buddha's achievement of enlightenment was challenged by one listenei: "The lecluse Gotama teaches Dhamma on a system of his own devising, beaten out by leasoning and based on investigation." ' This shows that the audience was not always docile but chaUengfrig, evaluating ttie speakei's message from diffeient angles. Certainly, tiis descripton of tie audience does not suggest that the entie Indian society of the sixti centuiy B.C.E. could be legaided as tie interested and rational audience of tie speakers. The majority of tie common public and servants, most of tiem being uneducated, probably failed to show an interest m the new developraent of

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intellectua! fermentation and to grasp the rationa! appeal of the speaker. However, Brahmins, ralers, the rich, and a minor secton of the cornraon public and servants obviously responded to persuaders enthusiastically, wisely, and ratonally, thus making persuasion a living subject in the then Indian society.

Rise of the Buddha as a Powerfii! Speaker This discussion has so far revealed the persuasive methods employed by ancient Indians up to the sixth century B.C. and the highly favorable social reaction to persuasion. At the very beginning, Brahmins invented the so-called metaphysical concepts to convince their audience about the conectness of social norms developed around the caste system. During the seventh century B.C.E., rationalist groups, mainly materialists and skeptics, gradually emerged, began to cUallenge tUe traditiona! persuasive metUods, and impressed Uuge audiences. They persuaded society to discard the Brahmin teaching based on traditional beliefs and to stand for its own rights. To counter this development, Brahmins developed pseudo-rationality and focused more on tUe style and anangement of their discourse. Now tirae was ripe for the new generation to breed raore rational thinkers who would invent new concepts to influence society and to win more members to rationalist groups. TUe BuddUa's rise as a powerfii! speaker fuIfiUed the need of this new age. Bom in the Shastriya caste, he corapleted his early education under the guide of Brahrains, then

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married, and became the heir to his fatier's little kingdom, but the passion of the day-the search for the trath-never escaped his attention. During this time, "realization of the trath" had become a powerfiil technique foi peisuasion. As noted above, Biahrains first developed this concept in an effort to justify their authority to mterpret human life in terms of divine traths. Many others such as Mahavira, wanderers, and various ascetics used this technique, pioclairaing theraselves as the enlightened peisons who had bettei knowledge than the common public had. A part of ethos, "realization" served these persuaders an excellent opportunity to make a convincing appeal to the audience. To make themselves acceptable to society, most of these early persuaders disappeared into jungles, stadied under renowned sages, and retumed to human society a few years later with the highly prestigious qualification of receiving enlightenment. FoIIowing the same pattera, the Buddha, then known as prince Siddhatta, withdrew, at the age of twenty-nine, into the thick jungle, a ttaditiona! ancient Indian college in which a professor and a group of stadents could easily be found in a cave or under a ttee. During the next six years, Siddhatta learaed under various renowned teachers who taught him not only the ttaditional orthodox teaching but also the new developraents in the Brahmin system, and soon he mastered in what he leamed." He also practiced various raeditationa! raethods leading to enhghtenraent. His own realization of tUe trath is said to have occuned at the age of thirty-five. Retaming to society, he quickly organized his persuasive system. The most urgent need was to prepare a well-quahfied and fully dedicated professionals to convince the people about the conectaess of the Buddha's

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message. The very first of such groups consisted of sixty-two Bhikkhus. Immediately after they were trained, the Buddha discharged thera, instt-uctfrig to go in different routes spreading his message. He went to his own native city for the same purpose, For forty-five years since then, the Buddha tirelessly continued, along with a ttained group of monks and nuns, his task of persuading people to accept his teaching, His dialogues, lectares, debates, and instractions, which are popularly known as religious, plfrlosopUical, or psychological discourses, reflect one particular purpose: his indefatigable endeavor to influence and persuade society, The most predominant characteristic of his persuasive techniques is his rational argumentation. Whether he spoke to a single visitor at his residence, a group of people in a lectare, or to a huge audience in a debating hall, he conveniently defended his views thanks to his lationalist appioacU. The foUowing self-evaluation of the Buddha portrays not only his ttemendous interest and engagement in persuasion but also the underlying rationalistic nature of his appeal: The Saman Gotama both utters forth his lion's roar, and tUat too in assemblies where men congregate, and in fiill confidence in the justice of his claim, and men put theii questions to him on that, and on being questioned, he expounds the problem put, and by his exposition thereof, satisfaction arises in their hearts, and they hold it worthy to listen to his woids, and in listening to it, they experience conviction, and being convinced, they give outwaid signs theieof and they penefrate to the point, and having grasped it, they are able to live upon it. The passage is a clear indication of ttie Buddha's pursuit of supporters through rationa! argumentation. He challenged the opposing views in public, refiited them, and vigorously defended his own view. In debating he was firm and emphatic, displaying a

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strong personality tUat would easily win adoration. As Ue continued Uis mission successfully, people began to follow Uim. In fact, tUe BuddUa did not hve at a permanent residence; instead, he constantly traveled, temporarily residing in debating halls, at places that were given to him, or simply in a forest and always looking for supporters. To heighten his strength, he always traveled with a large group of Bhikkhus that usually exceeded several hundreds. A conversation between Mahavira and his two followers reported in a Buddhist Sutta fiirther reflects the Buddha's persuasive skill through argumentation. Mahavira was prepared to send Upali to defeat the Buddha in a debating conversation. After offering instractions on a controversial topic, Mahavira told Upali, "Go you, householder, and re&te the words of recluse Gotama on this point of controversy."" After hearing this conversation, another supporter of Mahavira said, "1 am not pleased, reverend sir, that the householder Upali should refute the words of recluse Gotama. For the recluse Gotama is deceittal, he Icnows the enticing device by which he entices disciples of other sects."*^ His fear was fiilfilled when Upali retumed with fiill appreciation of the Buddha's teaching. Astonished, Mahavira said, "As a man, having gone away, might retura with removed eyeballs, you retum enmeshed in a great verbal tangle."" As the entire Upali Sutta shows, the Buddha has lationally peisuaded Upali to foisake his foimei beliefs and to follow tUe BuddUa's own teaching. The Buddha's powei of peisuasion lay not only in his lationa! aigumentation, but also in his ihetorical methods which wiU be discussed in detail in Chaptei FV. As he

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talked to a highly rational audience, he argued against Karraa and past and tatare existences, recognizing these concepts as harmful to human progress.'" An idealistic audience, however, would hear the Buddha say Karma and rebirth actaally exist. In this case, his persuasion is based on absolute traths, which he seems to have recognized as usefiil on sorae occasions. These differences, which some Buddhist scholars recognize as contradictions, appear to be the different teclmiques that the Buddha eraployed on different occasions to convince his audiences. The Buddha's remarkable success itself speaks volumes of his persuasive intention, skill, and strength. By the tirae of his death, he had eraerged as the raost powerfu! ratonaUst among his contemporaries. The Buddha's own words demonstrate his power. A few years before his death, he marveled at his astonishing success as follows: I am now grown o l d , . . . I have come to my joumey's end. Yet, senior Bhikkhus. . . sisters. . . laymen. . .laywomen now are there. Among them there are men and women of wealth. This order of mine is successful, prosperous, widespread, and popular in all its tall extent, well proclaimed among men. . . I cannot discem any teacher, who has attained to such a leading position in renown and support as I have." To have this success during his life trae, particularly in a society in wUicU persuasion was highly competitive, he had to be highly tactfii! and professional. He never insisted or received any underhand support, such as the raler's prosecuton of tie opposing views, to reach this height. Verbal persuasion was the only means available to win members. What apparently comes to the forefront as the Buddha secret of success is his careful application of persuasive techniques.

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The Buddha's organizaton of tie order of tie Bhikkhus provides tie final chapter of his persuasi\ e intention, He recognized Bhikkhus as "wise and well ttained, ready and leamed" to defend and spread the Buddha's message, "When otiers start opposed doctrines, Blfrkkhus are able to confute and to teach in confiiting,"" On several occasions, the Buddha taught Bhikkhus how to keep concenttation in an argument, how to handle an opposing arguraent, and how to adduce one's own arguraent. These instractions support the view that the Buddha, besides his own tfreless engagement in persuasion, also organized the order of Bhikkhus to carry on his persuasive raethods.

Ratonal Thinking in Early Buddhist Teaching Early Buddhist ratonal thinking that was predominantly meant to persuade society to reject the orthodox teaching of the Brahmins can be found in the Sutta Pitaka (The Basket ofSuttas), one of the three main divisions of the early Buddhist texts preserved by the Traditon of the Elders, The Suttas, mostly tae conversatonal teachings of the Buddha, are categorized under five divisions as the Dialogues ofthe Buddha, Middle-length Sayings, Kindred Sayings, Gradual Sayings, and Condensed Sayings. Sorae sections of the Condensed Sayings such as the Jatakas and the Buddhavamsa are obviously later additions, but scholars generally agree that the Sutta Pitaka contains the original teaching of the Buddha. As Hehnuth Glasenapp observed, "there is little reason to doubt that it [the Cannon of the Elders] substantally represents tie spfrit of the Buddha's own doctrine" (129). Ananda Coomaraswami remarked that "some parts of the

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texts ahnost as ceitainly go back to an eaily period, and lecoid the sayings and doctrine of Gautama as lemembeied by his immediate disciples" (262). The Suttas, from which the quotatons aie taken foi the piesent dissertaton, aie the eailiest parts of the Buddhist canon. It has been lecoided that the eminent disciples of the Buddha held a council immediately aftei the Buddha's death and took steps to pieserve the Buddha's teaching by coramitting it to memory." In this council, tie Buddha's discourses were "collected together by his disciples into the Four Great Nikayas," and the other sayings and verses attributed mostly to Buddha's disciples "w ere put into a supplementary Nikaya [the Condensed Sayings]" (Rhys Davids, Dialogues of the Buddha I xix). In his preface to the Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, Rhys Davids has discussed in detail the historical and other evidence that justfy the authentcity of these Suttas. In coUaboration with the views expressed by Hofrath Buhler, Rhys Davids has concluded that "these books [the Nikayas} are good evidence certainly for the fifth, probably for the sixth, century B.C" (xx). Of course, it is inatona! to believe that eveiy woid found in these Suttas were uttered by the Buddha and lus disciples, but it seems justifable to accept that the fiindamental Buddhist teachings and argumentaton present in the Suttas belong to the tirae of the Buddha, and, undoubtedly, connect to the sociohistorical background of the Buddha's contemporary India. One of the sahent characteristics of the Buddha's ratonal thought found in the Nikayas is his reluctance to interpret human problems in terras of any totaling concepts. "Everything exists-this is one extteme; nothing exists-this is the other extteme; not

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approaching either extreme, the Tathagata teaches you a doctrine by the middle way," proclaimed the Buddha.*" "Everything" here refers to all forms of absolute traths in the Brahmin teaching: gods, creaton, Kaima, tiansmigiatton, and the eventaal union with god. The Biahrain method of peisuasion asserted that these traths actaally exist so that social nonns weie worth foUowing. "Nothmg exists" lefeis mainly to the exttemist materialistic views in which all of these absolute traths weie negated as a means to peisuade people to leject ttaditional social values and piactices. The Buddha's lemaiks suggest that he did not fall into any of taese two categories. While eithei lejectmg oi leaving aside all speculations that the pie-Buddhistc society employed to peisuade society, the Buddha also lefiised the materialistc latonality that emphasized self-inteiest and self-giatificaton as the centtal aim of hfe. To leject the peisuasion based on speculative concepts, the Buddha constanty challenged authority, which langed from textaa! to peisonal. As noted in the intioducton, the Kalama Sutta, foi instance, peisuaded the citizens of Kalama to leject five kfrids of autiority namely the sacied fradition of tie Vedas (anussava), coramon tiaditona! beUefs (parampara), heaisay (itikira), text (pitaka), and the aUeged authority of the peison (samano no garuti). Most of the tiaditionalists during tie BuddUa's time used tUis five-fold authority to make society accept tiefr views. A detailed descripton of how the Buddha lejected authority will be given in Chaptei IV, but it seeras lelevant to eraphasize heie tiat vehement lejecton of authority was a piedorafriant therae in the Buddhist latona! system of thought.

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Rejecton of authority itself was a rationa! piocess, but the ultimate objectve of that rejecton was to make people more rational. Whenever the Buddha rejected authority using his rationa! skill, he immediately appealed to the audience to investigate, examine, and then to accept or reject. As Upali expressed his willingness to become a follower of tUe BuddUa, tUe BuddUa said, "Now, Uouseholder, make a proper investigaton. Proper investigation is right in the case of well-known men like yourself "*' After rejectng authority, the Buddha gave a similar advice to Kalamas asking them to know first and then to accept or reject. Overall, any kind of authority received harsh criticism in early Buddhist texts as a fragile and inaccurate teclmique employed to persuade society. To reject the materialistic erapUasis on self-interest and self-indulgence in sensua! pleasure, the Buddha rejected logic (takka), theory (naya), apparent fittingness of a concept (bhavyarupata), and fttingness of a concept to one's own personal philosophy of life (ditthi nicchanakkhanti)^ It raust be remembered here that the materialists, wUo rejected tUeoIogy, metapUysics, and pUiIosopUy, argued logically and tUeoretically, breeding new concepts that were enticing to people. For example, several raateriaUsts argued that nothing would exist after death, and therefore, self-indulgence in pleasure should be the sole purpose of life. Buddhist rejecton of logic, theory, and the apparent soundness of a concept meant to persuade society to reject this materialistc appea! Rejection of botU exttemes placed tUe BuddUist rationa! argumentaton in a unique position. WUen a system of thought consistently refiises metaphysics, theology, and philosophy as inadequate raeans to answer human problems, more rationalist methods

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naturally come to the forefront. Thus, such concepts as natural origin of the universe and life, Uuman creation of tUe social systera, and Uuraan responsibility for Uuraan problems occupied a centra! position in tUe early BuddUist rationality. As Buddhism also rejected materialism which emphasized self-interest and degraded raorality, humanism became the main focus in it. Such humanistic values as love for life, practice of charity, and the individual's socia! duties and responsibilities occupied a vital position in the early Buddhist teaching. In short, early Buddhism became a rational system of thought that vigorously promoted humanism without metaphysics. Buddhist causal arguraent came to the forefront in an effort to fiilfill this need of establishing a humanistic society that would discard most of the metaphysics and ideals of the pre-Buddhistic Indian society. The following formula is the minimum summery of the Buddhist causal argument: When this is, that is; Having this arisen, that arises; When this is not, that is not; This gone, that goes." The Buddha and his followers used this formula consistently to persuade society to action. Its overwhelming importance is highlighted in the statement that only if one understands dependent origination, one understands the teaching of the Buddha.'^ Causes were defined as those comprehensible to human thought. Crime, for instance was not a divine curse but a social offshoot due to complex situations." The origin of caste systera was not a god's creation but a human invention to help mankind survive.'" Thus, early

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Buddhism deliberatively investigated causes, tUe causes tUat could be subject to one's empirical knowledge and free inquiry, in order to answer the questions related to the past, Sirailariy, Buddhism persuaded society to investigate the possible effects of an action before doing it. Pragraatism can be seen as a main criterion of judging an action, according to eariy Buddhist teaching. The Kalama Sutta itself advised society to prevent from doing an action that would "conduce to rain and sonow" and to do an action that would "conduce to well-being and happiness," '* One must reflect on the benefit and harm of an action to oneself and others before one raight do it, If an action should be harmless and beneficia! to oneself, others, and both parties, one would prefer to do it, and, if the possible effects would seem otherwise, one should prevent from doing it," As these investigations ranged from the evaluation of one's own motives to the rational evaluation of common benefits of an action, psychological, moral, and pragmatic arguments strengthened Buddhist rationalistic persuasion.

Different Transformations of Early BuddUist TeacUing tUat Hide Its Rattonal TUougUt One migUt wonder at tUis point wUy tUe rational tUougUt which the Buddha and his disciples consistently employed to win followers has not yet been clearly recognized if early Buddhist rationality was so striking. TUe overall teaching of the Buddha is generally called a moral religion, a pUiIosopUy, a system of tUougUt, or a way to liberation. Its psycUoIogical and scientific significance Uas also been liigUIigUted in tUe recent past. During the last two decades, in particular, Americans have also begim to

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believe that Buddha's teaching is a raystica! religion. Surpnsingly, however, rarely do they observe the rationa! value in the early Buddhist teaching. Behind these different interpretations that overemphasize seemmgly less significant aspects of the Buddha's teaching, Buddhist rationa! thought, the very core of the original Buddhist teaching, has failed to achieve its due position. Causes of these exaggerations and the subsequent suppression of rational thinking in the origina! Buddhist teaching are, in part, buried in the history of India. After the Buddha's death, Buddhist leaders seem to have foimd metaphysica! concepts more usefiil than the rationa! argumentation to persuade society. As a resuU 'it [early Buddhist teaching] soon underwent elaboraton, and some would say, speculative contaraination" (Roberts 28). In this new development, such concepts as Karma, rebirth, and enlightenment received broader metapUysical interpretations, wUicU clearly overweighed the early Buddhist ratonal thought. Coramentarians magnified and multiplied whatever sign of metaphysics present in the origina! teaching and presented it to society as gigantic absolute traths, Huge numbers of books were written in Pali to inteipiet origina! Buddhist teaching in teims of raetaphysics, The Tiadition of the Eldeis (Theravada) included these new concepts into the original texts, attributing all of them to the Buddha, In the raeantime, a new Buddhist ttadition called the Mahayana emeiged to countei the Hindu peisuasion based on logic and metaphysics, Written in Sanskrit, Mahayana texts corapleted the task of raaldng the Buddha's teaching a puie leligion and a deep

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philosophy. Xourished, cherished, and constantly enlaiged, these othei labels virtually suppiessed and thiew into obUvion the rational thinking in the origina! Buddhist teaching. The other factor that probably suppressed the early Buddhist ratonality is the elevation of the Buddha to the position of 'super raan' According to aU Buddhist traditions, the Buddha is the enlightened person who had developed extrasensory peicepttve poweis. Heis also themasteiof gods and men. With his superioi poweis, he could do things beyond human skill. Undei these cfrcurastances, one may not need to recognize the Buddha as a mere rhetorician. On the other hand, to admit that the Buddha was a persuader with mere human skill would be a less powerfit rhetorical technique than to say that he is tie seer of aU mitis: people usually tend to trast the power tiat is divfrie than human and enlightened than natural. Throughout history, aU Buddhist traditons employ the Buddha's enlightened stattis as a persuasive technique without refening to his human skiU in persuasion. Despite all these other labels that have achieved prominence in the Buddha's teachfrig, some Asian societies stll stress the early Buddhist rational appeal. Theravada Buddhist education in Malaysia, Sfrigapore, and Sri Lanka are notable examples. What fliese societtes leam under Buddhism is such topics as "Buddhist Freedom of Thought," "Buddhist Teaching of Human Evolution," and "Buddhist Rejection of Metaphysics." However, these topics have not achieved that prominence fri ttie modem West. During the late decades of tie nfrieteenti centuiy and ie early years of flie twentiefli centary, Britsh and German Buddhist scholais, m partcular, sfrove to highhght Buddhist

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rationality, but the religious West seems to have suppressed the widespread rational appea! thinking in the early Buddhist teaching. Buddhism is now a religion, and it is difficult for a Westeraer to tiink about a religion without absolute traths. Eariy Buddhist rejection of metaphysics as a persuasive technique would both disappoints and baffles most of the Westeraers who respect religious beliefs. TUis factor, coupled with modem tendency to highlight similarites of different thoughts, has constantly kept westem inteipieters of Buddhist teaching away from eariy Buddhist ratonalistc appeal. They either shun the ratona! appeal in Buddhisra or interpret it in terras of absolute traths. What has achieved overemphasis today is Buddhist meditaton and mysticism, which clearly denies "the very social nature of early Buddhist movement" (Glazier 310). While "meditation" itself is an inaccurate translaton of Buddhist Bhavana, which means "mental culture and development" (Nyanatiloka 31), mystcism is a concept that could be found nowhere in the early Buddhist teaching, The Buddha clearly rejected and condemned mysticism and instracted raonks never to be engaged in it." The long, uninterrapted evolution of Buddhism in Tibet, in the meantime, absorbed Tibetan ritaals into it and created a Buddhist traditon that displayed great flavor for mysticisra. It is this ttadition that, owing to numerous reasons which are too broad to unfold here, raainly represents Buddhism in America, Even though the Dalai Laraa himself would favor the ratona! teaching of the Theravada tradition, in all Tibetan Buddhist services and perfoimances in America, one would obseive a cleai mystic atmosphere associated with

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all activities, However, despite its close connection with Tibetan Buddhist practices, mysticism had no connection at al! witi the original Buddliism, Westem writers on Buddhism, on the other hand, tend to use English words and translations with heavy metaphysical connotatons to dress tie early Buddhist rationality in a raetaphysical and religious attire. As American tUeosophist Henry Steel Olcott pointed out almost a century ago, the veiy coinage "Buddhism," which hints at a metaphysica! system of thought, has failed to present a conect pictare of early Buddhist teaching (1). What the Buddha taught throughout his life was Dhamma, which means "conect thinking and conect acton" not any metaphysical theory as implied in "isra." Translations have pushed the rationa! thought of early Buddhist teaching further back. The word Nibbana, which means the highest state of mental development, is translated as heaven or enlightenment. "Punabbava," or mind's constant renewal in the materia! world, is translated as rebirth. "Atta," which means "oneself," is translated as "self' or "soul." "Saddha" is the confidence the Ustener may Uave in the teacher and speaker in what is taught and spoken, but this word is inconectly ttanslated as "faith." Worse of all, the word Sacca, a provable or probable trath according to the Buddha's own meaning, is always franslated as the Trath-with the big 'T.' Ostensibly, these words and ttanslatons have submerged the rational thought in early Buddhist teaching. Inaccurate franslations that suppress early Buddhist ratonal thinking abound in other areas as well. Bhikkhu, when it is translated as "Buddhist monk" or "priest," makes people identify his role with that of the Westera clergy. However, a Bhikkhu, a male

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disciple of the Buddha, never appealed to the audience with the help of absolute traths, nor did he live in a permanent residence. Instead, he constantly wandered, challenging firmly held belief systems and being engaged in numerous social affairs. Similarly, a Sutta, a regular speech of the Buddha, is not a sermon as commonly tianslated, but often a foicefii! defense of the Buddha's views, an argumentatve dialogue, or instractions to Bhikkhus. These translatons make the EnglisU readers believe that the early Buddhist teaching was metaphysics, theology, or religion. Despite all tUese different interpretatons that tend to detract one's attention from the rationa! thought that early Buddhist traditon constantly employed to influence the Indian society, the Pali tradition has also preserved the texts that clearly depict the early Buddhist ratonality. Later additons abound in tUese texts, but, as previously discussed, the original Buddhist rationality certainly remains witU most of tUe Suttas in the Sutta Pitaka. Chapter FV of this dissertation wiU both discuss in detail the ratonal methods employed by the Buddha in these Suttas and compare those raethods with the persuasive techniques found in the Greek sophist movement.

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Notes ' Even though this text was composed after the Indian ratonalist age, most of its concepts are the repettons of the Vedic and Upanishadic teachings. Vedic and priestly authority was fiilly accepted in the Laws ofManu. ' Rig Veda 10. 129. ' Ibid., 10. 121.

" ftid., 10. 90. ' ftid., 10. 173. ' LawsofManu ' n3id.,7. 1-4. ' Ibid., 10. 79. ' Tbid., 10. 121-125. ' Mundaka Upanishadll. ii. 1. " Svetesvatara UpanishadN. 12. '^ ftid., V. 11. " Katha UpanishadW. n. 15. '" Svetesvatara Upanishad, I. 3. " LawsofManu 10. 76. 10.74.

" U>id., 10. 77-78. " LawsofManu\. 102.

" Svetesvatara Upanishad I. 3. " Buddhist texts have given many instances of honor and luxury the Brahmin teachers enjoyed in society. For instance, according to the "Discourse with Dhananjani" (Middle-length Sayings IT), Brahmin teacher Dhananjani enjoyed social privileges "under the king's pafronage" (372), According to the Ambattha Sutta (Dialogues ofthe Buddha

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/), Brahmin Pokkharasati lived at Ukkattha "on a royal doraain granted him by King Pasenadi of Kosala as a royal gift, with power over it as if he [Pokkharasati] were the king" (109). Tevijja Sutta in the same text mentions about "very distinguished and wealthy" BraUrains (301). ^ Aristotle,i?eoncl356b, " Ujid., 1358b. ^^ Plato, Theaetetus 155. " P!ato,iepMW!cl83, ^" Aristotle, Metaphysics I, 1 980a. " Laws ofManu 1 93; 10 81, 95. " LawsofManu\0 95.

" Dialogues oftheBuddhaI,p. \\3. TUis dissertationraostly quotes, parapUrases, and summarizes tUe BuddUist texts ttanslated by tae Pali Text Society, the most authoritative organization to have ttanslated PaU Buddhist texts into English, and follows the ttaditional practice among Buddhist scholars of citing the page number of these franslated Buddhist texts. When other renderings than the PTS franslations are refened to, the relevant endnote will indicate tae section number instead of the page number. ' Katha Upanishad I. i. 7-9. ^' Dialogues oftheBuddhaI,p. 114.

' Dialogues ofthe Buddha, III. p. 79. " n3id.,94. ' ' Rig Veda 8. 70; 10. 38. 3. " Brihadaranyaka Upanishad 4. 5. 13. '" Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 74. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 70. =' The Laws ofManu 10 127-130. 104

' ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 73. ^' Dialogues ofthe Buddha, I, p. 37. " U3id.,p. 38.

'" Ibid.,p. 75. "' Mundaka Upanishad IV, 55. "- RigVeda \0.7\.

"' Svetesvatara UpanishadW. 21. "" Mahabharata, CCCXXl. " LawsofManu\\.3\-3i.

"' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 70. "' Middle-length Sayings II, p. 44. "* Dialogues ofthe Buddha I,p. 146. "' Gradual Sayings 1, p. 189. ' Mahavagga, p. 20. " Middle-length Sayings 7, p. 97. " Mahabharata CXXXI-CXXXIV. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 157. '" Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, pp. 33-57. " n)id.,p. 52. ^' njid.,p. 52. " Gradual Sayings 1, 179. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 224.

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" Middle-length Sayings 1, p. 280. ' Middle-length Sayings II, pp. 60-64. " Ibid.,p. 61. " Middle-length Sayings I, pp. 281-282. " " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 306. Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 58.

"' Sutta Nipata, Vasala Sutta; The Dhammapada, verse 393. " Middle-length Sayings II, p. 170. " Gradual Sayings V, p. 40. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 244. " Ibid. See the translator's footaotes.

' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 246. " Middle-length Sayings II, pp. 18-19. " n)id.,p. 19.

" Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 66. '" n>id.,p. 71. '* Middle-length Sayings II, p. 355. " Ibid.,p.251. " Middle-length Sayings /, pp. 91-110. " n)id.,p. 92. Middle-length Sayings I, pp. 207-209. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I,ip. 239. " Middle-length Sayings II, p. 40. 106

*' Ibid. " n)id.,p. 48. '" Gradual Sayings I, pp. 158-159. *' Dialogues ofthe Buddha III,p. 118. '" Tbi. " Vinaya Pitaka II, 284 ff " KindredSayingsII,p.\3.

" Middle-length Sayings I, p. 44. ' Gradual Sayings I, p. 189. " Middle-length Sayings II, p. 229. '^ Middle-length Sayings I, p. 237. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 67. '" Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, pp. 77-94. '^ Gradual Sayings I, p. 189. " Middle-length Sayings II, pp. 89-90. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, pp. 276-278.

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CHAPTERIII BACKGROUND OF SOPHIST RATIONALITY

Origina! in Greece or Adopted from Outside? Evaluaton of Popular Views about the Origin of Sophist Rationa! Thought Severa! factors may pose impediments on one's way to discover the origin of the Greek ratona! thought present in sophist teaching. The main difficulty in this regard arises from the scarcity of original sophist texts. Early Indian raateriaUsm and skepticism and the Greek sophist ttaditon met the same fate: idealists frowned at them and other schools of thought gained ground in society, so no ttadition existed to preserve these texts. As noted in the infroducton, angry audiences in Athens buraed some books of the sophists; ascending idealistic values soon sent others out of sight. What remain today are mostly the fragments of sophist writings and a large quantity of secondaiy sources, definitions, and interpretations spread over severa! centuries. In order to constract a probable history of Greek sophist rhetoric, one needs not only to scratinize these available materials but also to investigate the history of rhetoric and philosophy in Greece, genera! Greek history, and the history and thoughts of other ancient natons during tie sixth and the ffth century B.C.E. Modem interpretations about the origin and development of sophist rational thought, the free inquiry as it was defined in the infroduction of this dissertation, generally convey two significant raessages: first, sophist rationality was origina! in

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Greece; second, how and in what Greek territory it originated is highly confroversial, When William Grimaldi said that sophist thought was an entirely new discipline that had no antecedent among tie literate people in tie ancient worid (18), he presented the common view of his conteraporary rhetoricians about sophist rationa! thinking, This assertion seems so conclusive that it has become an indubitable fact araong raodem rhetoricians, so indubitable that no foreign influence on the Older Sophists has ever been addressed, The controversial issue, according to these scholars, is how and in what Greek territory sophist rationality originated. Here, tUe unanimous consensus about tUe origin of sophist thought in Greece seeras to tum into a sheer confrontation with several renowned rhetoricians offering drastcally different theories. The most popular of all these theories is, perhaps, the one which links the origin of sophist rationality to pre-Socratic philosophy. Arguing against the exclusion of the sophists from the history of Greek philosophy, "[G. W. F.] Hega! who, in Iiis lectures on the History of Philosophy given over aperiod of some fifteen years between 1805 to 1830 at Jena, Heidelberg, and Berlin, dramatically restored the sophists to a central place in that Ifrstory" (Kerferd, "The Future Directon of Sophistic Stadies" 2). His effort established the iraportant link between pUiIosopUy and sopliist rUetoric, tUe link that was devastated by the Platonic tradition. "In sum, Hegal's redefmiton of the Sophists held that they were a necessary and iraportant step in Greek philosophy" (Schiappa 8). This idea has fiirther been developed by G.B. Kerferd with "the re-introduction of the sophistic movement into the history of philosophy at an integral rather than a trivial level," and,

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according to his own remarks, one of the Kerferd's atterapts in his TTie Sophistic Movement was to develop tfrs therae fiirther ("The Futtire Dfrection of Sophistic Stadies" 6). Sophist rationaUty has thus been connected to lonian and the Eleatic speculatons as an inevitable development frora tie discipline of philosophy, This tieory has recenty been challenged by those scholars who insist fliat Athens was flie center for the origin and development of the sophist ratona! thought. According to Grimaldi, for instance, Greek philosophy was only of peripheral significance in the development of sophist ratonality. He believed tUat "significant changes m the intellectaal-cidtural, pohtcal, social, and rehgious hfe of the people" in Athens mainly contributed to the emergence of ratona! thought among the Older Sophists (24). This theory cleaily undeimines the pieviously discussed assumpton that Gieek latonality derived from philosophy. What Grimaldi has suggested, in fact, is the origin of ratona! thought in Athens and spreading it towards the islands in lonia and the West. For example, he has detected the presence of ratonal thought in the historical writings of Herodotas and Thucydides and suggested that "this kind of tiinking was fiirther broadened by continuing Greek colonizaton to the East (lonia) and the West (Sicily, Italy)" (26). John Poulakos, anothei advocate of the aigument that Athens bied sophist wisdom, cited two significant pohtcal and social changes in the Athenian society to stmulate sophist ihetoric including sophist latonal thought: demociacy and the rise of a new middle class (12-16). He argued that both of these factois jointly inspfred sophist

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tiiought in Athens. Oveiall, one observes in these scholars a sttong tendency to highlight the Athenian society itself as the bieeding giound of tie sophist latonal thinking. A view drastically difTeient frora the two arguments summanzed above has been developed by Richard Leo Enos who recognized Sicily as the birthplace of sophist ratonality and Empedocles as the inventor of it (61). Judging Empedocles' rational thinking as an initial and indispensable part of ihetoric, Enos, similai to Aristotle, ciedited Empedocles as the inventoi of the veiy discipline rhetoric, "Self-consciousness about man's abilities plus methods of stracturing and acquiring knowledge were the foundations of sophistic ihetoric," leraaiked Enos, "Heiein, we discovei a key to understanding Empedocles' lole as the friventoi of ihetoric" (61). Empedocles' sttess on "man and probabiUty rather than gods and mytha maiked depaiture from his Homeric tiadition and a comeistone foi sophistic ihetoric" (64) has piovided Enos a stable giound to conclude that sophist lationaUty originated with Empedocles, a Sicilian citizen. Uniqueness of this theory lies in its ef ort to identify sophist rational thinking as inherent particularly to SiciUan society and generaUy to the central Greek society. In a chart Enos indicated that, sfrice Empedocles was directly and indfrectly influenced by Pythagoras and Eleatics respectively, his (Empedocles')frfrtialwisdom came fiom Italy (69). He (Enos) fiirther argued that sopliist ratonaUty actually originated m Sicily since Empedocles was bom in the Sicihan city of Acragas. Corax, Tisias, Gorgias, Polus all being Sicilians, Enos found more evidence to conf nn his asserton.

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Deahng wii Enos' theory first, one may suggest that the writer has presented an iraprobable view in his effort to trace the origin of sophist ratonality, First of all, his assertion of Italian influence on Empedocles seems misleading. Enos has clearly stated that Pythagoras taught Empedocles and lived in Italy so tUat Italian influence was present in Empedocles' rationa! tUought (60-65). However, no recorded evidence indicates that Empedocles was Pythagoras' pupil. In fact, Pythagoras died before Empedocles' birth or during his (Empedocles') early childhood. What is heard from ancient Greeks about Empedocles' education is the doubtfiil news that he was taught by Telauges, Pythagoras' son.' Pythagoras' own Uving in Croton, an Italian city, may not justify Italian influence on Uim, eitUer. He was bom in Samos and developed Uis tUinking while fraveling widely and later settled down in Croton. WUatever influence he passed to his son Telauges and Telauges to Empedocles, if Empedocles was ever taught by Telauges, could probably have originated in territories where he traveled extensively, not necessarily in the Italian city of Croton where he later chose to settle down. Enos' argument that sophist rationality began in Sicily because Empedocles was a SiciUan seems equally raisleading. Even tUougU Empedocles' own travels in otUer countries are uncertain and Uis early life is obscure, Ue studied under Xenophanes whose wide wandering was "over the land of Greece" (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 89). As a part of his education, Xenophanes "acquired the lonian scientific outook that made him observe and classify interesting phenomena during his ttavels" ( Freeman, PreSocratic Philosophers 89). It is probable that he passed his knowledge, the knowledge he

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accumulated during his travels for 68 years, to Empedocles who could have searched more from where Xenophanes accumulated his knowledge. TUus, it is questionable to assert tUat Empedocles' rationa! tUougUt was rooted in Sicily. Idealistic views of Empedocles, on tUe otUer Uand, sfrongly support the emphasis that his thinking might have originated outside Sicily, and that he favored foreign thoughts. As Kathleen Freeraan reraarked, One of Empedocles' strongest religious beliefs was tUat there could be no greater sin than the shedding of blood, even of animals; it is this crime that has caused divine spirits to be cast out of heaven and to wonder through the long circle of earthly existence, and it is such a crime that brings Empedocles himself on to the earth. (Pre-Socratic Philosophers 174-175) One may notice at a glance that these beliefs, wUicU bear striking similarities witU tUe Indian tUeories of Karma and transraigration of tUe soul, could not Uave existed in tUe traditiona! Sicilian society. A detailed analysis of Empedocles' idealistic views wil! be given in a separate section of tUe present cUapter to UigUIigUt tUeir possible indebtedness to Indian tUougUt, but, to say it briefly at present, Uis speculative views do not appear to be of Sicilian origin but seem to have been adopted from an alien source. Sicilian birtU of Empedocles alone may not justify his thoughts as Sicilian, TUe overall argument tUat tUe sopUist rationality originated in Sicily itself may tum to be an unconvincing tUeory since the Sicilian origin of Empedocles' tUinking is doubtfiil.

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The effort to find the roots of sophist rational thought in the fraditiona! Athenian society may be equally fiitle. As already noted, it is trae that the rise of democracy and a new middle class in Athens paved the way for ratonal argument in politcs, law, and dayto-day matters, but it seems to be an enoneous argument to claira that freedora of thoughtthe indispensable prerequisite for the emergence of rational thoughtexisted in that democratic society to enkindle any challenge to idealistc speculations. With regard to the theory of knowledge, Athens was exfremely conventiona! and rigid. In that society, one could have freely argued for or against, defended, attacked, or confronted with any view related to a highly confmed area of politcs, law, and social life, but one must also be aware of one's own limitatons in the field of argument, or else one should have to sacrifice one's own life or accept banishraent. The punishraents that was meted out to several rational thinkers who moved to Athens from the Eastem Greek islands may bear witaess to the exfreme Athenian rigidity and the absence of favorable conditions for rational thought in the fraditional Athenian society. The earhest known rationalist to suffer in Athens for his rational thought was Anaxagoras, who leamed his theories from Milesians and came to Athens from Clazomenae, He was imprisoned and banished for his reraarks that the sun and moon are earthly bodies, not gods.^ After his banishment, he setted down in Lampsacus with his Athenian pupil Archelaus. A similar pimishment was given to Diagoras of Melos, who immigrated to Athens with his atheistc views and challenged Athenian leligious concepts. Aristophanes' Birds leraaiked about an Athenian inscription which announced

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a lewaid of one talent foi killing and two foi captaring Diagoias,' Piotagoias of Abdeia was awaie of tUe strong Athenian rigidity tUat condemned Diagoras, Uis close associate, so Ue was carefu! not to criticize tUe Uighly sensitive religious mentality in AtUens, Yet, the rational inquiry he developed in Abdera was inesistible in Protagoras, and he wrote On The Gods, displaying his skepticism about the existence of gods, It is said that Protagoras softened his atheism in his book, antcipating punishment if he voiced his n:ue feelings about tUe existence of gods." NevertUeless, AtUenian rigidity would not tolerate Protagoras' indifference to AtUenian religious beliefs, either. He was condemned to death and then banished from all Athenian tenitories, and Ifrs book was bumed in public' Had Athens been a lational society or conducive to ratona! thought, rationa! inquiry would not have thus been rejected in Athens. Athenian rigidity was such that that society seems to have rejected not even any ratona! theory of Icnowledge but any foreign ideology that confradicted Athenians' own fraditiona! systera of beliefs. According to the Apology, the reason for Socrates' condemnation to death was his rejection of traditiona! Athenian gods and acceptance of sttange gods.' By doing so, Greek society beUeved, Socrates corrapted tUe young generation in AtUens. Here, tUe conflict appears to be between local and foreign ideology. As mentoned in tUe inttoducton, Socrates probably embraced tUe Being Parmenides and Zeno biought to Athens with them when the two Eleatcs visited Athens and met Sociates when he (Sociates) was twenty yeas of age. Evei since, Sociates endeavoied to piopagate his new concept, claiming to have achieved divine favoi to

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coimmmicate with the Being. The death penalty eventually passed on Sociates indicates how intolerant Athens was to mere speculatons that were different from the traditional behef system in Athens. Such being the strict rigidity of Athenian societ>, it is hard to beUeve that sophist rationaUty, which openly challenged Athenian traditional beUefs, originated in Athens. Apparently, Athens had constracted a strong defense system not only against foreign invasions, but also against foreign thoughts. Athenians quickly demolished any threat to thefr own system of thought,fiTinticaUydefending its own rigjditv'. Under these circumstances, only the rational inquiry in the field of law, politics, and laudatory speeches seems to have originated and flourished in Athens. The Older Sophists, most of whom were either bora in lonian islands or educated under lonian teachers, were cautious in Athens not to talk or write freely about thefr rational investigattons. Had thefr not being Pericles, the syrapathizer and fiiend of rational thinkers, the doom of the Older Sophists in Athens would have been more pathetic. Pericles protected several sophists whose rational arguments had angered Athenian society. In brief, the coraraon Athenian society neither encouraged nor tolerated sophist rationality but suppressed it, expelling and prosecuting ratonal thinkers and buming thefr books. In a broader sense, a background conducive to the origfri of rational thought could not have existed in Sicily, Athens, or any central or Westem Greek territory. The previous chapter observed how the speculative concepts, which were invented to retain a forcefiil social order, backfired to enkindle rational thought in ancient India. Seemingly,

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such speculations did not exist in the pre-rationalist era of ancient Greece. NotUing is heard about one's previous existence. After death, everybody would go to the underground after lingering for sometime around the grave. There was, of course, the mighty god Zeus, a fatherly figure, and his wife Hera and children, humanlike deites with emotions, craelty, and corrapton, but they were not particularly partia! to any social group. In short, none of these concepts were meant to influence and stabilize an elaborate socia! order in ancient Greece sucU as tUe caste system in ancient India. The simpUcity of tUese speculations was caused not by any intellectaal deficiency of early Greek thinkers, but, probably, by the socia! understanding that complex speculations, like tUose in ancient India, were useless in ancient Greece to form a single, controlled society. TUe Greek naton was made of numerous islands, most of wUicU were mountainous. Most of the islands were also inhabited by various tribes that held different custoras and beliefs. TUese geograpUica! and historical factors could have made an established social order in Greece virtually impossible. What Greek city-states and islands wanted was separated existence and independence, not togethemess as a unified nation. Continuous intemal and inter-island wars bear witaess to this stateraent. Thus, hair-splittng speculative concepts tUat would persuade Greeks to accept a unified socia! order raay not have been a social need, and therefore, coraplex speculations could not have originated in ancient Greece. Some of the speculative concepts Greeks developed appear to be rhetorical techniques that might have persuaded the Greek naton to exist separately. The very

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concept of city-gods and deities, for instance, is probably a persuasive device to make people accept city-states and island nations and to organize their own societies. Athens, Megra, and Sparta worshipped Athena, ApoIIo, and Zeus, respectively, wliile many other states adopted gods and heroes personal to each state. Persuasion towards unity as a single Greek nation was far remote here; existence as independent states could be the central therae behind these concepts. Yet, there must be an essential unity in separation. The raore they wanted to exist as separate comraunities, the stronger they felt the need to maintain unity within each community. Unity was essential for survival, More than anything else, each city-state or island had to defend itself from constant attacks. Thus, self-defense became the most urgent need in each separate island and city-state. Each society in ancient Greece expected from its members to be actvely engaged in its straggle for survival. Unlike in India, no specia! group of tUinkers lived in Greece, for tUeir acton was not for tUe immediate beneft of society. "TUe life of a recluse or even a life devoted to personal concem only, was not Uighly thought of" AII members of society were expected "to take as much part as their ability and means allowed in the pubUc affairs of the city" (Freeraan, God, Man, and Stae 111). Both speculators and speculatons were not encouraged or tolerated in ancient Greece. People had neither trae nor necessity to indulge in speculatons; instead, they were busily at work, taking steps to defend their own govemment from foreign attacks.

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Theoretically, one has to antcipate sorae speculations that raight sprout frora this social need, the need to defend the city-state or the island. Self-defense from incessant attacks being each state's primary concera, it might be surprising if speculations did not persuade Greek societies to render their best service to the war. Freeman's following remarks indicate how speculatve thoughts developed in this essentia! area of persuasion: The cardina! virtues are piety, self-control, courage, justce. Probably to the ordinary Greek the greatest of these was courage. The emotion nearest to the religious fervor tUat Ue felt was for his city-state and for the deity wUo was its protector. AtUena protected AtUens, and so to tUe Athenians she was great; but she demanded, not a pure life, but service, tUat is, willingness to devote one's life to the safety and welfare of one's native city. It is no accident that Greek word Virtae (arate) was also used to mean Courage. (God, Man, andState 7!) This passage perhaps shows how speculations developed in different ancient Gieek societies to suit the socia! needs. Couiage became the greatest human virtae probably because bravery in fighting was the most indispensable need to survive as independent states and islands. Superiority of faith in modera religions was here clearly superseded by courage. Athena's first blessing would go to the courageous person in fighting than to the more faithta! follower. People were rewarded not mainly for their pure life but for their courage. This speculative development may indicate how unique socia! needs gave rise to unique speculations in ancient Greece. Other early Greek speculatons included magical power of deities, the influence of underworld spirits, oracles, and deified human heroes. These concepts also seem to have originated from the etemal straggle of the ancient Greek: the straggle to estabhsh and defend colonies, cities, and islands. As Freeman noticed, "the conflict [between groups]

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fonned an inseparable part, not only in Greek religion but in Greek thought in general" (God, Man, and State 10). When one colony was invaded and captared by another, the deities of the former also lost power and sometimes life. These dead deities were converted into spirits for persuasive purposes. Similarly, oracles of dead and living gods can be found everywhere in ancient Greece. They persuaded people to retreat, counterattack, or begin new colonies (Hammond 113). Fighting also caused assassinations and the banishment of colony leaders, who later became deities to encourage regrouping of the defeated. AI! this evidence suggests the birth of speculations in paralle! to the socio-historica! factors in ancient Greece. These were the main speculations sociohistorical factors in ancient Greece gave rise to, and theoretically, nothing else could there be. Some have attempted to show Orphic concepts of creation and reincaraation as early developments in Greek thought, but this attempt may not be justified mainly because socia! causes did not exist in ancient Greece to support such Oiphic thoughts. As Fieeraan reraarked, "the debt of Greek pliilosophy to Orphisra cannot be measured because of the uncertainty regarding the date of composition of the Orphic writings" (Pre-Socratic Philosophers 18). The most rational conclusion could be that these concepts, which apparently had no connecton with ancient Greek society, entered Orphisra after the sixth centary B.C.E. The purpose of discussing those early Greek speculations is to exaraine whether any doimant power of rationa! thought was lurking behind these concepts. In other words, were these concepts powerfiil enough to give rise to an intellectaal ferraentation-a

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fermentation that kindled by the Older Sophists-in ancient Greece? It should be reiterated here that an intellectual ferraentation means a socia! leaction to the peisuasive methods oi concepts that have cieated social imbalance. In ancient India, foi instance, the concepts that piomoted the caste system gave rise to latonality. Howevei, eaily Greek speculations, out of necessity, do not seem to have supported socia! injustce among socia! beings, or at least people hardly felt such an injustice, and therefore, ambers of rational thinking would not have been present in those concepts. To clarify this arguraent fiirther, most of those speculations in ancient Greek society were meant to persuade society to one main purpose: to defend each state. Selfdefense was an essential necessity for survival; therefore, people would not show an inclination to challenge these speculations. One may take, for example, the belief that human courage would be the best human virtue for Athena to bless the city of Athens. To resist this concept could mean to sound the death bell for Athens and its citizens, for courage, fighting, and surviva! were all intenelated, essential requirements in Athens. As long as the surviva! need reraained predominant among Athenians, it is highly unlikely that they would challenge this concept. Speculations in ancient Greece persuaded people indiscrirainately to defend their state, themselves, and their faraily, and, as long as this raain purpose reraained unchanged, people would not challenge the speculations thus employed by ancient Greeks. Even though a handfiil of individuals might have entertained different views and doubts about those fraditiona! speculations, the social and politica! power would never

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allow those views and doubts to emerge since speculations theraselves were the foundation of self-protection in each Greek city-state, and they had to be preserved for each city-state's survival. For instance, "city states depended upon the good-wil! of the gods, and if tUese gods were ignored, misdefined, or reinterpreted, tUe safety of the city was placed in danger" (Rankin 135). Similarly, doubts about gods would disrapt the unity of the socia! organization raeant for self-protection. Therefore, such a departure from the tradition would cause "dismay araongst the citzens" and create "a security problem" (Rankin 136). Members of each city-state could have felt that the more they preserved their fraditional system of thought, the better their chance of surviva! would be. What this discussion has so far revealed is the possible powerlessness of early Greek speculative concepts to stimulate an intellectual fermentation in that society. They were apparently unbiased, essental persuasive methods, in which no sparks were hidden to ignite an opposition. In suramery, ancient Gieek speculative concepts do not seem to have piepaied a bieeding giound foi the sophist thinking, and therefore, it is highly unlikely that the ratonal thought employed by the so-called sophists originated within Greece. As discussed in the introducton, it seems that the original ratonal thought in ttaditional Greek society was associated with Greek deliberaton, law, and laudatory speecUes. TUis is tUe sort ologos tUat democracy, a clear product of Greece, gave birth to. Finally, there reraains the most popular and firmly held view tiat sophist ratonality spiouted frora Gieek philosophy. This sub topic is so bioad that it raay need a

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concentiated tieatraent in a sepaiate section. Obviously, theie is a cleai distincton between tiaditona! Gieek speculations, which have alieady been discussed, and Greek philosophy. While the traditional beliefs probably served the Greek society as an essential social need, a host of philosophica! concepts suddenly began to raushroora in the Islands of lonia and made inioads on the centia! Gieece. Since the seeds of sophist lationa! thought seem to have been hidden, as many scholais Uave also suggested, in tUese philosophical concepts, it seems impeiatve to seaich foi the loots of Gieek philosophy as a pieiequisite to tiace the origin of sophist latonal thought.

Foieign Influences on lonian Speculations A detailed examination of the original souices of all Greek philosophical concepts might seem a long process which may not be directly relevant to the present dissertaton, but a brief attenton to the sources that possibly shaped the earliest lonian speculations appears usefu! for tUe present discussion before giving a detailed evaluation of tUe philosophica! concepts that were related to sophist rationality. The importance of an inquiry into the original sources of early Greek speculations lies in the possibility tUat tUe lonian rational thinking that followed the early speculatons could also have been influenced by the similar sources. Of course, there are scores of traditionalists wUo Uave endeavored to highlight an independent origin of speculative beliefs in the lonian islands. Jolm Bumet lead the way asserting that his "aim has been to show that a new thing came into the world with the

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early lonian teachers" (v), and "the Greek philosophy originated quite independently of Orienta! influences" (18) He fiirther remarked tiat tie early lonians' comparatve awareness of life and nature made them speculate about the traths beyond physica! world (8-9). According to J. M. Cook, thoughts of Pythagoras and Heracleitas 'were inherent in their age" since "people were feeling the need of spiritaal experience or personal reassurance" (115). N, G. L. Hammond believed tUat "altUough Thales piobably denved a knowledge of asttonomy from Egypt and Babylon, his [Thales'] inquiiy into the principles of the universe began from the assumptions of Greek religious thought" marked by man's attempt to "understand the divine force which gave meaning to the human world (174). The underlying meaning of these remarks is the absence of any extemal influence to shape the early Greek speculative process. Some of these fraditionalists also rejected, perhaps angrily and disparagingly, the suggestion that extemal influences actaally shaped the Greek discipline of pUilosophy. According to Bumet, the question was not whether the Greek philosophy was influenced by Oriental thoughts, but whether 'any of these people [of the Orient] had a philosophy to communicate.'' He beUeved that "the Indians were the only ancient people besides the Greeks who ever had anytrrag tiat deserves tie narae [of philosophy]." However, "everything points to the conclusion tiat Indian philosophy arose under Greek influence" (18). Again, as noted fri the inttoduction, Felix M. Cleve lefened saicastically to a host of orientalists, saying that thefr suggestion of the Indian influence on Pythagoias was nonsensical. He wanted them not to write amusing volumes on something that nevei

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happened (519-520). On the whole, a stiong tiadition has emeiged to leject foieign influence in geneial and the Indian influence in particulai on Gieek philosophy. Sorae scholais, of couise, have expiessed theii curiosity about sorae Greek thoughts, either iraplying or suggesting the unfraceable origin of these thoughts, Reginald E. Allen exclaimed that such concepts as "the purification of the soul and its release from the prison of the body" and "salvation, release [of the soul] frora the whee! of rebirth" never existed among Milesians, "who were motivated by simple curiosity, not desire for salvation" and for whora the concept of the soul "had no ethical or religious imphcatons" (6). Jean W. Sedlar remarked that "the Greeks themselves were puzzled as to where the metempsychosis-idea came from: they agree only that it was an idea somehow alien to their own mainline traditon." However, tUis disputed queston would be insoluble "in view of tUe fragmentary preservaton of sources from pre-classica! times" (32). What tUis group of writers Uas suggested is their inability to give a definite answer to how some speculatve concepts appeared in lonian islands during the pre-Socratc era. The present work suggests that both the impetas that roused the early lonian raind to speculate and the speculatve concepts tie lonians forraed were influenced by foreign sources. Most of tiie suggested coincidences would have been caused by Egyptian, Middle-Eastem, and fridian influences. Particularly, Sedlar's view that most of tie concepts and tieories of Greeks were also prevalent in fridia, but they aU were coincidences (16-32) and Felix Cleve's assertion that, although tie argument of Greek bonowing from India is 'stiiking and sometimes almost convincing," similarities are

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actually caused by "the likeliness of Uuman nature" (520) seem to be unconvincing. As tUe introduction of tUis dissertation mentoned, it seems merely speculative and untUeoritical to assume tUe striking similarities of Uuman tUougUt in two societes as coincidences or tie results of "tUe likeliness of Uuraan nature." TUe Uuraan being appears to be a "constract, not a Uuman essence" (Howard 23), and so could be tUe Uuman tUoughts that are found in the history. Modem society has shown an increasing tendency to believe that ideas, concepts, and beliefs in a particulai society are tUe weapons used in that society to subdue the opposfrion in numerous social straggles for power. This assumption is evident in John Brannigan's summarizaton of the New Historicist's views that "history is a contest of ideologies, and, as a resuU, follows a radica! revision of the notion of the trath" (5). Only with an identical power straggle, a supposition that can hardly happen, would an identical system of thought emerge in some other society. This elucidation makes it clear that the Greek system of thought, while always lagging behind foreign thoughts, particularly Indian concepts, by a few decades, may not realistically coincide for two centuries with those foreign beliefs, metapUysical views, and the constantly modified concepts of the trath. Greeks could have been in the receiving end simply because foreign concepts were older than similar Greek concepts and were natura! in foreign societes wliile Greek thoughts, except for such original concepts as democracy and law, appear to be alien to tUe Greek social background. One of tUe arguments tUe fraditionalists have put forward in defense of the originality of Greek speculations is tUat tUe Roman writers, wUo made numerous

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references to Uow Greeks were influenced by tUe East, atterapted to disparage Greeks, tUe arcU-rivals of Roraans, by staining tUe originality of Greek concepts. SucU Roman writers as Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius, and Sextus Empiricus, in this sense, were the Greek enemies who attempted to tamish the noble Greek image. Of course, it is undeniable that Roraan writers often harped on and soraetiraes exaggerated Greek indebtedness to foreign cultures, but, notably, trath also probably preceded-the trath that some ancient Greek writers never revealedwhatever exaggeraton. AIso, one could find numerous passages in Roman works that have shown much respect to Greek writers and their thoughts, a respect that found no place in some of Plato's or Aristote's works, Of course, one may ignore Eusebius' report that an Indian philosopher talked to Socrates' and Clement's remarks that Homer was an Egyptan,' but Roman hostility to Greece should not provide a scapegoat to reject every word that Romans wrote about Greek bonowings, including the bonowings from India, In fact, it was Greeks, not Romans, who initally suspected Greek indebtedness to India and initiated the disclosure of Greek bonowing from India, Megastiienes (350-290 B.C.E.) noted in his Indica that "all that has been said by the ancients about nature is also said by philosophers outside Greece, the Brahmans in India, and people called the Jews in Syria.'" Alexander Polyhistor said during the early first century B.C.E. that Pythagoras leamed his doctrine from Brahmins.' These remarks show that, in the twiIigUt of idealistic pressure, Greeks theraselves could have found their own indebtedness to India

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as a legitimate topic. In this situation, it may be unjustfiable to suggest that Roman insistence on Greek bonowing from India was a mere slur on Greeks. Besides, "bonowing" was a very common topic, and sometimes an accusation, among Greeks theraselves since the time of Thales, and the only absence was any reference to the bonowing from India. Particularly, Athenians during and after the Persian invasion regarded all foreigners except Egyptians as barbarians and Indians as more barbarous than some other nations." Holydaying and doing direct business in Egypt'' and studying and displaying respect for ancient Egyptan achievements, Greeks could have prefened to attribute any of their bonowing to Egyptian sources as suggested by Rawlinson ("India in European Literature and TUougUt" 5). WUen Greeks accused each other of stealing tUougUts, Uowever, they (accusers) rarely mentioned Egypt; rather, they mentioned some other sources and gave unnamed sources, or whatever source given probably disappeared from history. Such accusations were many. Heracleitus accused Pythagoras for coUecting wisdom from all wise persons and made it Uis own." Democritus blamed Anaxagoras for bonowing from ancient sages.'" Severa! persons accused Democritus for making a PUoenician tUeory of atoms as Uis own." TUese remarks constantly sUed ligUt on Greek awareness of their own bonowing from other sources than frora Egyptian, an awareness that may have submerged in Greek pride and the subsequent tendency to conderan other civihzed natons. In preparation for the discussion of why and how early lonian thinkers were exposed to foreign speculations and accustoraed to bonow thera, it seems apt to begin

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wifl a quick survey of the world when the lonian islanders began to advance in their civihzaton. The far West and the North of Greece were still uncivilized territories, and the inner Greek states such as Athens and Sicily were just sttTiggling to emerge from the Dark Age. In the East and South, there were great civilizations and powers such as Egypt, Phoenicia, and Babylon, of which Greeks were well aware. In this sitaation, one may easily imagine what directons ancient Greece would tum to for its own advancement. On the one hand, knowledge coming from ancient civilizations ofFered Greek islanders immediate benefits, an incentive that could have uiged eaily Gieeks to follow the beliefs and concepts coming from the East and the South. Such a tendency, on the othei hand, could have been simply inescapable since any emeiging nations would natuially tend to adoie the highei politcal poweis of their time. lonians being islanders, knowledge from other civilized nations easily reached Greece from the sea. As Theodore Gomperz suggested, the initial intermediary assistance for bonowing was provided by Phoenician merchants who sailed between lonian islands and other civilized natons: The bays that offer the best harborage on the Greek peninsula open towaids the east, and the islands and islets, with which that legion is thickly sown, affoid, as it weie, a series of stepping-stones to the ancient seats of Asiatic civilization. Gieece raay be said to look east and south. Hei back is tumed to the north and west, with theii semi-baibaric conditions. Anothei ciicumstance of quite exceptiona! good fortune may be langed with these natuia! advantages. Theie was Gieece in her infancy on the one side, and the immemorial civilizations on tUe other: who was to ply between them? The link was fotmdas it were by deliberate selection- in those hardy adventures of the sea, the merchant-people of Phoenicia, a nation politically of no account, butfiiUof daring, and eager for gain. Thus it happened that Greeks acquired the elements of culture from Babylon and Egypt without paying the forfeit of independence. (Gomperz 4-5)

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Gomperz must be conect for many reasons. At a time during which lonian ships were not strong enough for long voyages in turbulent water, Phoenicians brought various products in thefr ships to lonian islands including from India. As relationships between Phoenicians and Greek islanders gradually iraproved, some Phoenicians piefened to settle down in lonia. Heiodotas lemaiked that those Phoenicians who chose to live in lonia inttoduced "Gieeks to a numbei of accomplishments, raost notably the alphabet, which the Greelcs did not have before then." He fiirther remarked, "At this time most of thefr [Phoenicians'] neighbors were lonians. So it was the lonians who leamt the alphabet from the Phoenicians lonians."" It is clear that "Greeks were illiterate until their fraders brought home this alphabet" (Roberts 90). Along with the alphabet, Phoenicians also brought thefr religious texts to lonia, tUus revealing tie raythology of the developed natons. Obviously, Phoenicians seem to have played the interraediate role in bringing sorae speculatons of the raost civilized world to tae feet of Greeks. Apparently, Greek speculatve thinking took a sharp ttim and a sudden foiwaidmovement in the shade of ttiis backgiound during the early sixtti-century B.C.E Greeks could have found tiiemselves fri a very fortunate position to have far-fetched speculations of tie East at thefr home and began to absorb them. Pherecydes, most probably a son of an Asian father," was one of those early lonians who piobably raaximized tiis oppoitunity to levolutomze Gieek tiought. His concept of god Time was "soraetfrng entiiely witiout piecedents in eaily Gieek accounts of tie origin of tfrngs" (West 28). This concept, a peisonificaton of tme as piogenitoi of tie woild, as West has suggested,

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had appeaied in Babylonian, Egyptian, and Phoenician myths raany centaries befoie it leached Pheiecydes during the sixth centuiy B.C.E. (35-36). It was also piesent in the Atarvan Veda, a text in eaily Hinduism." It is possible that Pheiecydes carae to know about this concept frora Phoenician tiaveleis oi souices. Suida's lemaiks that Pheiecydes had no teachei but gained his knowledge aftei leading Phoenician sacied texts sttongly support this assumpton." Appaiently, Eastem influence had now begun to inject a new breath to the traditional lonian speculative concepts. Amid lonian trade with Asia and Asian immigration in lonian islands, the tature directon of the Greek philosophy was now decided. Greeks could have been aware that fantastic speculatve thoughts existed in the Orient, and the appeal for those thoughts could have been simply inesistble. Trave! and educaton in those countries would be the next step for Greeks both to familiarize tUeraselves more witU tUose taougUts and to gain more recognition and honor from their own society. Trave!frselfbeing the ancient way of gaining knowledge, Greek thinkers began to consider fraveling tiie most indispensable requirement for knowledge. TUales of Miletas, father of Greek philosophy and an immigrant from Phoenicia according to Aristotle and a man of Phoenician lineage according to Herodotas,^' was one of those early Greeks who accumulated knowledge through traveling. His bonowings may not Uave a direct connection with the development of sophistic rhetoric, but he, probably, was the first known Greek to direct later thinkers including the Older Sophists towards foreign thoughts. Not only did he visit Egypt, but for raany years he

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stayed there, studying various subjects. Besides, "He had probably familiarized himself in Sardis with the eleraents of Babylonian wisdom, and he bonowed from it the law of the periodicity" (Gomperz 47). Similariy, his view that water is the primary element of everything should have corae from elsewhere. "This conception of unbounded primordia! water is not Greek; it is found in the rayths of the great river-civilizations of Egypt and Babylon, and in Genesis" (Allen 2). Finally, Thales' view that gods are everywhere can be traced back to Babylonian and Indian religious texts wliicU recognized thousands of gods. Virtaally everything of Thales' knowledge and thoughts came from liis farailiarity witU Asian concepts, wUicU Ue leamed during his stay in Egypt and nearby islands. After retaming to Miletas, Thales becarae a sage, prophet, and hero. His famous prediction about a total eclipse of the sun on May 28, 583 B.C.E., which raay be attributed to the knowledge he gained frora Babylonian sources, astonished everybody in Greece and made his bonowed wisdom divine. One can imagine the awe-inspiring attitade people held towards Thales' education abroad. He was elevated to the level of a sage who would perform such miracles as diverting a river for army to cross it.^^ Ever since Thales demonstrated the enormous power of his foreign Imowledge, trave! in the East and inquiry into Oriental thoughts could have become a social demand as a compulsory requirement for a thinker. Besides, Thales' prediction could have tempted a host of brilliant Greeks to search for more wonders in foreign lands individually. It is also probable that ramors about incredible miracles in Orienta! societies could have reached lonian islanders by this time, and Greeks could have been eager to deraonsttate

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their own acquisition of that skiU just as Thales had already done. The inevitable outcome of this new development might have been the tireless search for knowledge and the increasing demand for travel in the East. Anaximander, the pupil of Thales, and Xenophanes, the father of the Eleatic schoo! of thought, could have conceived their speculative concepts in this manner, Even though Anaximander's travels in Eastera countries have not been recorded, his concepts reflect his close familiarity with and affinity to Eastem thought (West 93), Especially, Anaximander's universe originated from infinite Boundless, a concept that was wel! established in Indian philosophy before his time. To be more specific, Anaximander raaintained that the primary substance was not any eleraem, "but 'some diffeient kind of substance,' which he called the Apeiron, the Non-Limited" (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosopher 56). Total strangeness of this concept to Greece is marked by Anaximander's coinage of this altogether new word Apeiron. This main concept of Anaximander, including his negation of any element as the primary matter of the universe, had appeared in Indian thought in exactly the same way at least a century before the Greek thinker talked about it. The Svetesvatara Upanishad said: SUouId tirae, or nature, or necessity, or cUance, or tUe elements be regarded as the cause? Is it the self?. . . The sages, absorbed in meditation tlirough one-pointedness of mind, discovered the power belonging to the deva himself [literally self-Iuminous one]. That nondual deva rales over all those causes: tirae, the self, and the rest." Anaximander's and the Upanishadic thoughts seem so close that one would, justifiably, suspect a possible Indian influence on Anazimander. Both systeras rejected elements as

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the primary cause of the universe; both recognized the boundlessness of the newly-found cause, The non-dualistic power of tUe deva (or Brahraa as is frequently called) over all other causes indicates boundlessness of the original cause in the early Hinduism while boundlessness itself is the name for Anaximander's universa! cause, Furthermore, Anaximander held that the Boundless is etema! and indestractible, two characteristics that clearly match with the nature of the primary cause in early Upanishads. The quotation given above from the Svetesvatara Upanishad may also shed light on one specific point that relates to Greek philosophy in general: most of the concepts Greek philosophers held before and after Anaximander were already quite old theories among Indian schools of thought. As P. T. Raju remarked, The Svetesvatara Upanishad [1.2-3] enumerates a number of doctrines prevalent at that time. One held that Time was the source of the universe; another that it was nature herself . . another that it was fate; another held to the doctrine of elements. . . There raust have been several philosophies at that time, but unfortunately we do not know the names of the founders or the protagonists of all these schools. And all the otaers were superseded by the Philosophy of Atman [Brahma]. (62) A raere glance at Upanishads would indicate the overwhelraing predominance of the universa! being or Brahraa over al! other concepts that were prevalent in ancient India. This concept gained such an ascendancy between the seventh and sixth century B.C.E, ttiat it soon absorbed all other theories about the origin of the universe into it under the category omaya or illusion, However, what seeras to be clear is the fact that Pherecydes' theory of Time, Thales' Water, Anaximenes' Air, and Heracleitus' Fire had all existed in India before the theory of the Boundless appeared.

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Xenophanes, who revolutonized the Greek concept of gods, seems to have been engaged in the same activity of searching speculations in the East. Notably, Xenophanes was first a stadent of Anaxiraander before he (Xenophanes) began his wandering for decades, and it would be surprising if Xenophanes lacked interest in Anaximander's Boundless, a vita! theory in Greece during that time. The association between Anaximander and Xenophanes could have sharpened the latter's interest in the Boundless and defned the area of search during his ttavels. Motivated by "his search for knowledge," he "drove his musing mind to and fro in Greece for many restless decades" and during his traveling he found "ample opportunity of gathering and utilizing tUericUestintellectua! harvest" (Gomperz 162). He was roaming in Malta, Paros, and Egypt and many other places for sixty-seven years, a unique duration that would fll him with most of the lcnowledge available in other ancient nations. He also left his native place of Colophon in 545 B.C.E. at the age of 35 after Persia captured the island, so he could have easily leamed about Eastem thoughts from Persian sources during this age of Persian dominance over lonia, What the Greeks revered for centuries was anthropomorphic polytheisra, and what Xenophanes found was a kind of monotheism mixed with monisra. It, of course, is a question how "Xenophanes broke away so suddenly from the habits of his own people and whence he derived this reaction" (Gomperz 157). He said that God is One, and among gods and men, God is the greatest. He rejected the anthropomorphic appearance and characteristics assigned to god by Greeks including former poets, saying that God

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must be "hymned with reverend strains and pure words" (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 99). He fiirther maintained that God sees, hears, and thinks as a whole, and human mind alone sees and hears, and all the senses are deaf and blind. Undoubtedly, there is a vast difference between the fraditional anthropomorphic polytheisra and Xenophanes' raonotheistic monism, a difference that, in the absence of any visible evolution of the original Greek polytheisra, could not have surfaced without bonowing. Three ancient civilizations had afready developed the concept of god as one entity. Fiist of aU, there were the Jews whose theological docdines such as monotheism and creation could have been as old as the Mosaic era (Sigal 12). Next, there were the Persians who beUeved in Ahura Mazda, the wise lord and the creator of the world and man (Rogers 21-22). Thfrd, tiiere were Indian Brahmins whose Brahma was ttie source of everything. Xenophanes could have leamed about all these three concepts of divimt\' during his traveling for sixty-seven years. The Mosaic reUgion had afready prohibited all images of God, thus advocating transcendentaUsm and rejecting any anthropomorphic appearance of God. Xenophanes' rejection of antiropomoiphic appearances and quaUtes of god may be seen fri the Ught of this rehgious practce fri Israel. Zoroaster had written volumes of hymns (Gahas) to Ahura Mazda," a practice tiat might fridicate tie source of Xenophanes' remarks that God must be hymned with reverend and pure words. Indian Brahmtns, fri the meantime, had developed elaborate philosophizig of Brahma, a practice which was probably absent fri oflier monotheistic reUgjons before tie fourth-centaiy B.C.E. Foi flie Jews, "only undei flie frnpact of Gieek philosophy did fliey

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begin to philosophize about theii faith" (Bickeiman 258). Pan-en-theism, the behef that God is in eveiything, "is a lelatively late development and populai araongst Jewish mystcs from tie medieva! period on" (Unteraian 20). The eaily Hindu concept of tie uUimate trath, in the meantirae, had undeigone evolutionaiy changes foi seveia! centuries befoie the sixth centuiy B.C.E. to becorae a monistc concept. As already noted, this natural development of the uUimate ttnth in early Hinduism resulted in connecton with materialists' and skeptcs' continuous attacks on the original Vedic concept of polytheism and Brahmins' straggle to defend thefr idealisra with pseudo-ratonaUsra. TUe concept tUat everythfrig is a different manifestation of Brahma took its form along with the teaclung that the absolute trath cannot be sensually graspable. Xenophanes' and his followers' "One Reality [of] underlying materia! phenomena is very much the same spirit as the authors of some of the later Vedic hymns and the Upanishads" (Rawlinson, "India in European Literature and TUougUt" 4), DespUe the scarcity of origina! sources explicitly recognizing Xenophanes' teacliing, the available sources give the impression that he did not present a mere monotaeism, but ad\ocated a monistic teaching. His statement that the Being sees as a whole, thinks as a whole, and hears as a whole gives an indication of the Being's power that pervades through all sensual phenomena as described in the Upanishads. This assumption is confiimed by his assertion that all human senses except the mind aie deaf and blind, It was the wellestablished theoiy in the Upanishads that sensual experience is a meie Ulusion oi Maya, and only through intellect and contemplaton that one could visualize the Brahma, the

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ultimate reality. Xenophanes' remarks clearly conespond to that Upanishadic teaching, a conespondence that might indicate an Upanishadic influence on the Greek thinker. Xenophanes' pupil Parmenides expanded Xenophanes' thought of the Being, and this new developraent may sttengthen the assumption that the early Hindu ttadition possibly influenced the Eleatics. Parmenides' being was "ungenerated, unperishing, unmoving, not divisible, and unchangeable." Believing that various things people have posited as trae, they (people) have named those things by various names such as kettles, pigs, rainbows and hobgoblins, but all these names reflect the inept human attempts to talk about the one thing: the Being. Two characteristtcs of Parmenides' Being are apparent here: first, "the character of the Being he [Parraenides] describes, for the raost part, is a series of negatves"; next, "the world presented to us by the senses" is "a world of falsity," and "senses, therefore are for Parmenides, the sources of all iUusion and enor" (Stace 44-45). This illusion, however, needs to be closely observed. Sense perception is not totally enoneous; rather, beyond the sense percepton lies tUe absolute tratU: the Befrig. "Monisra, then, ispreserved"(SedIey 121). Sense percepton means various manifestations of the Being. This discussion has now brought up a vital point regarding the possible Indian influences on Greek philosophy. "In fact, the Eleatic teachings are basically the same as those of the Pre-Buddhist Upanishads" (Graber and Kersten 52). Parmenides' description of the Being in negative terms was a well-established pre-Buddhistic Indian method to

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shun the ratonal argument against Brahma. "He [Brahraa] is revealed by the negative teaching of the Vedanta," said the Svetesvatara Upanishad " since "there is no other more appropriate descripton than this 'Not this' to describe 'the Trath of the trath."'" Tliroughout various Upanishads, one finds numerous negative adjectves used to describe the indescribable Brahma. To name a few, Brahraa is iraperishable, without shadow, without body, without color, undecaying, not graspable by eye, speech, or other senses, soundless, intangible, formless, tasteless, odorless, without beginning and end, unchanging. "Being prior to speech, time, and causality means being beyond the characteristics of the empirical universe, and therefore beyond empirical description" (KoUer 20). Exactly a similar descripton of the Being of Parraenides may lead one to the conclusion that Parmenides could have been influenced by the Brahmin thinking. Similarly, Parmenides' illusion of sense percepton, a concept that was also vaguely presented by Xenophanes, was original only in the Hindu thought. The Svetesvatara Upanishad said that "the non-dual Lord who, by the power of his maya [illusion], covered himself like a spider witii tUreads drawn from primary matter."" "TUe wUoIe universe is fUed witU objects which are parts of His Being":" Thou art woman, Thou art man; Thou art youth and maiden too; . . . It is Thou alone who, when bora, assumes diverse forms. Thou art the darkblue bee; Thou art the green panot with red eyes; Thou art the thunder cloud, the seasons, and the seas. Thou art beginningless and all-pervading. From Thee all the worlds are bom." Now it is evident that maya is not illusion, but a "pecuUar power of God for creating tUe worid" (Raju 62). Human skill lies in one's ability to penettate through the sensual

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phenoraena and grasp the Brahraa inside the sensual worid. In this context, who was Brahma, actually? The Mundaka Upanishad remarked that "through serenity of intellect" one could see the Brahma who is without parts.""' Here, monism is at its best here, The repeated assertion in the Upanishads that everything is Brahma "does not mean that eveiything, as we see it, is the Supieme Spirit itself" Rathei, it means that "without the Supermen Spirit, nothing, not even the worst, could have existence" (Raju 61), "Tracing the world not to a creator but a single primordial cause which unfolds itself as the univeise in its diveisity" is a cenfral theme in these eaily hymns (Hiriyanna 15), To reinforce the assertion that the Upanishads were a possible source of influence for the Eleatcs, one more comparison may be made, this time Hindu thought in the Upanishads with those of Melissus, tUe alleged associate of Parmenides. TUe following two quotations, wUich were also cited in the infroduction for a different purpose, iUusfrate the identca! nature of the Upanishadic and the Eleatic thought: Chandogya Upanishad: In the beginning, my dear, this universe was Being alone. Some say that in the beginning this was non-being alone, and from that non-being, being was bom. But how, indeed, could it be thus, my dear? How could being be bora from non-being? No, my dear, it was being alone that existed in the beginning.^' Melissus: That which was, was always and always will be. For if it had corae into being, it necessarily follows that before it carae into being, Nothing existed. If however nothing existed, in no way could anything come into being out of nothing.'^

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Both texts accepted that the Being had no beginning, and both asserted that the Being could not come out of non-being. Notably, Parmenides had already said that Being did not come from non-being, and Melissus has argued in favor of his teacher's view. Furthermore, the negative adjectves employed by the Upanishads and the Eleatic school to describe the Befrig are very much the same: Svetesvatara Upanishad: The Being is motionless (3.9), formless (4.21), bodiless (6.7), having no beginning and end (5.13); imperishable and undecaying. Melissus: TUe Being is Uaving no beginning oi end, infinite in extent, changeless, motionless, and bodiless.'' Gieek thinkers have now developed a virtually indescribable god who is alraost identica! with Brahma. In fact, Parmenides said exacty what the Upanishads had long held: words are inadequate to express the ultimate ttTith. In Parmenides' theory of the Being, "the utmost has been done to present a Being robbed of all sensible qualities and functions" wUich are "mere words, names given arbittarily by men, representing things not conceivable by the mind" (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 145). The Kena Upanishad said, "That which cannot be expressed by speech, but by which speech is expressed-That alone [you must] know as Brahma."" Knowledge would corae through serenity of intellect, not through sight, speech, or other senses." Sttikingly sirailar ideas of the two traditions raay persuade one to believe tUat tiie Eleatc scUoo! of tiougUt developed raainly from tUe influence of UpanisUadic system of thought. Zeno's remark that he would love "to see one single Indian in the fire to mastering al! the theoretca! arguments about hardship"" may indicate that the Eleatics tiemselves were willing to

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appreciate Indian concepts in addition to the possibility that the Indian system of thought had afready reached thera. The discussion in this section could have elucidated the point that not only did early Greek speculations grow out of the lonians' perennial desire to leara from foreign sources, but Indian speculatve concepts could also have reached Greece by the mid-fifth century B.C.E. This understanding may, in retura, provide a credible groimd to assurae that the earliest lonian speculations could Uave already determined the sources of Greek ratonal thought, which gradually attained a prominent position in Greek thinking during and after the Eleatic thinking.

Pvthagoras and Jainism Pythagoras seems to have entered the Greek race of searching new ttioughts in the East durfrig this cracial age. He is important fri this discussion mainly because of two reasons. First, Pythagoras is regarded by severa! scholars as an influental source for sophist rhetoric. Second, tiere is sfrong evidence to justfy tiat Pyiagoras was tie f rst Greek to depart from the Eleatic ideology and to open flie path of rationality for tie rest of Greek thinkers, thus preparing the friital background for sophist rhetoric. An evaluaton of his tiought and a clarificaton of tie possibility tiat he wasfrifluencedby Jain concepts wiU justify the argument that sophist rhetoric could have been formed out of Indian rattonahst concepts.

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Mario Untersteiner was one of the early scholars to have detected the Pythagorean influence on sophist thinkers. We have found it necessary to assume connections between Pythagoras and Protagoras," remarked Untersteiner (44). Pythagoras' descripton of natare "as in a state of flux" and his recognition of tie huraan being as "a continuous and manifold fransformation" provided Protagoras the materials to consttiict his "principle of matter fri flux" (45). Again, According to Richard Enos' list of "possible influences sUaping sopUistic rUetoric," PytUaogras came first (69). Enos tartUer remarked that "antthetical concepts" of Pythaogras became "the conceptua! foundation" of Gorgias' rhetoric (76). These remarks would persuade one to examine the nature and sources of Pythagorean ratonal thought that allegedly influenced sophist thinking. It needs to be reiterated here that speculatve thinking originate and develop, and again some other thoughts sprouts, presumably not in societes where a unified mentality prevails but among tUe corapeting socia! groups witUin the sarae society. Egypt, Persia, and Babylon all belonging to the former group, it may be unrealistc to expect in tUose societies confrasting tUougUts and fabulous speculations that would vigorously compete with the dominant thought. A unified mentality was an essental requirement in those societies for power-expansion, self-defense, and survival. In Persia, for instance, Ahura Mazda, along with the ritaals of Magi, served the purpose of unifying and encouraging the Persian society in its ambitious enteiprise of expanding the empiie and then defending it so that it is haidly possible that contiasting views about divinity would emeige in that society. 'WhiIe the same might have been trae with Babylon and Egypt, an aUogethei

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diffeient situation existed in India. It was a powei straggle within society itself, a situation highly conducive to a multitude of different concepts that would keenly tussle with themselves. The importance of these apparently digressive details lies in the argument that Pythagoras, as well as Empedocles and Democritas, who contnued the search for Eastem wisdom, would no longer find much noteworthy concepts originated in other ancient societies than those coming from India. While the harmonized mentality of Persia, Egypt, and Babylon had brought a winter for speculative thoughts in those societies, the Indian system of thought always experienced a glorious spring, having a full-bloomed verbal battle for social supremacy among tae inner socia! groups. Pythagoras could have familiarized Uimself witU Indian concepts tUat were available in Babylon (Ferguson 75) or visited India and leamed under Indian sages as Clement of Alexandria reported." PerUaps, tUe outcorae of his endeavor was tarther remodeling of Greek tiought in the cast of the then popular Indian speculations and the gradua! tendency towards the free inquiry of those speculations. Pythagoras' speculatve systera and the values developed sunounding that systera deserve a specia! attenton here because of the numerous views given to its origin despite the close resemblance of Pythagoreanism to the Indian systera of thought that had gained enormous popularity during Pythagoras' long stay in the East. The following summary of the possible origin of Pythagoras' philosophy may reflect tae cautous and lethargic

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attitade of the raost recent conservative fraditton of Westera philosophy towards any Indian influence on Pythagoras: Pythagoras offers what AchiIIes asked for and raore, rebirth on earth, and, through a cycle of rebirth, an approach to the imraortality previously reserved only for tUe gods. Pythagoras raay have originated the doctrine himself or drawn it frora Egypt (Herodotus 11.123) orIndia(more hkely), but his introduction of it into the Greek world had a widespread impact, particularly in Southera Italy and Sicily where he was active. (Hufftnan 70) Huffinan's fist suggestion that Pythagoias could have invented the doctrine by himself is the most populai assertion among the tiaditionalists in modera philosophy. Buraet, for instance, noted that the Pythagorean theory of soul-transmigraton was "a development of the primitive belief in tUe kinsUip of men and beast" (93). Contrary to these remarks, Gomperz argued, however, that, "though kindness to aniraals was the foundation on which the [Pythagorean] doctrine rested, yet the temperament of the Greek people was never especially fiiendly to aniraals," and "it is a priori in the highest degree improbable that Pythagoras invented a belief wUicU was already firmly seated in many popular creeds" (126). It raay be easy to shun the question of bonowing by elevating the bonower to the level of inventor, but the puzzle associated with the question remams umaveled. In the possible absence of a conducive background in Greece for the Pythagorean philosophy, the assertion of a spontaneous invention of transmigration theory by Pythagoras seems iraplausible. The second view that Pythagoras derived his metempsychosis frora Egypt was based on the following reraarks of Herodotas:

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The Egyptians were also the first to claira that the soul of a human being is iraraortal, and tUat eacU time the body dies, the soul enters another creature just as it is being bora. They also say that when the soul has made the round of every creature on land, in the sea, and in the air, it once more clothes itself in the body of a human being just as it is being bora, and that a complete circle takes three thousand years. The theory has been adopted by certain Greeks toosorae from a long time ago, some more recentlywho presented it as if it were their own. I know their names, but I will not write them down.'' It is clear that Herodotus pointed at Pythagoras, followers of Pythagoras, and perhaps Erapedocles and some others as the bonowers of raeterapsychosis from Egypt, but "it is exfremely doubtfal whether Egyptians did actually beUeve in transmigration" (Rawlinson, "India in European Literature and TUougUt" 5). Of course, tUe concept of soul was tUere in tUe Egyptian "Book of tUe Dead," but Herodotus "is exceeding his Egyptian text" in his remarks since Egyptans only believed that the souls of privileged people would exist in mythical figures, flowers, snakes, and other animals, changing the forms almost on daily basis, while wicked souls would seek a human body to suffer in bloodshed and madness (Gomperz 126-127). No support could be found in favor of Herodotus' assertion that Pythagorean transmigration, which was drastically different from the descripton of the sou! given above, was bonowed from Egyptan mythology. Indian influence on Pythagoras, in the meantime, stands out as the most acceptable source of his reincamation tieory. "The concept of the reincamation of the sou! in other forms and Uving beings was only to be found in India from early tiraes, playing an iraportant part in everyday religious life" and Leopold Von Schroeder's

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assertive remarks-'Pythagoras can only have taken over this teaching from Indians'would be the raost accurate stateraent to identfy the source of P\lhagoras' theory of fransmigraton (Graber and Kersten 53). Since the later years of tie eighteenth centaiy, numeious scholais have sensed the Indian Influence on Pythaogras, but they might have failed to recognize the specific source raainly due to the unavailability of the raost relevant original Indian sources. The theory of transraigraton was predorainant in the early Hindu fradition, the earliest India scUool of tUougUt to reacU the West, so that Westem scholars always pointed at the early Hinduisra as the source of Pythagoras. AIl the flowers emitting somewhat similar fragrance, those orientalists could Uave hastly picked and ttiumphantly displayed the biggest and the nearest flower within their reach as the source of Pythagoras' exotc touch for his philosopliical theories. This chapter will would soon look into both Indian teaching of soul-fransmigration and that of P\thagoras and make a study of Pythagorean and Indian social practices to see the probability tUat tUe Greek pUiIosopUer's Indian source was not tUe Bralimin fradition but Jainism. Looking at Herodotas' version of Pytaagoreanism alone, one may finds specific evidence to believe that the Greek concept of fransmigration came from Indian sources. Ffrst, the belief of tUree thousand years of existence in rebirth was an Indian concept. Makkhali, a pre-Buddhistc thinker in India, maintained that, out of many existences, there are "three thousand purgatories" in which one has to be rebora." Besides, Herodotas' remarks that every individual according to the Greek theory of soulttansmigraton must go through a definite number of rebirths has only Indian parallels.

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Makkhali maintained that "both fools and wise alike, wandering in tiansmigiation exactly foi tUe allotted teim, sUal! tUen, and only then, make an end of existence.""" Furtheiraoie, one's lebirth again as a huraan being in the last birth befoie the end of tiansraigiation was specifically Indian. This concept was developed by Jains in the eaily sixth centaiy B.C.E. and adopted by Buddhists to countei the Biahmin concept of god's creation of society into castes. To eraphasize huraan ability rather than divine grace to end fransmigration, Jains asserted that everybody would be bora as a human being in the last birth. Therefore, this concept, which natarally originated in India, had probably no connection with the Egyptian system of thought at all. Overall, all characteristics of transmigraton found by Herodotas among Greek thinkers origmated and flourished in India with strildng similarities, thus making the possible source of Herodotas' version of Greek fransraigration purely Indian. According to Herodotas' own remarks, what he presented in his Histories was not Pythagoras' own theory of transmigration but an amalgaraation of diverse forms of transmigration that various Greek thinkers had adopted up to his tme. It is possible that from tme to trae various Greek thinkers bonowed and raodified different forms of ttansmigraton that flourished in India, and Herodotus gave a minimum summary of those forms. Thus, in Herodotas' version of ttansmigraton, one may find a mixture of rebirth concepts propagated by various Indian schools of thought. To understand Indian influence on Pythagoras in particular, one raay need to investigate the predominant Indian

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thoughts immediately before and during Pythagoras' visit to the East and compare those thoughts with Pythagoras' own systera of thought. When Pythagoras probably began to be acquainted with Indian thoughts, Brahrain concepts of creation and the universa! being had lost their early prestige having been incessantly attacked by the ascending Jain power. Jain thoughts had a long history before the sixth century B.C.E., but Jainism established itself as an enormous power against the Brahmin system during the early sixth century as Mahavira, bora in 599 B.C.E., campaigned success&IIy until his death in 527 as the Jain tradition admits. He rejected creation and creator, but retained the concepts of soul, reincaraation, and self-purification for the release of soul from rebirth. Notably, he also organized the first social system, which included women as well, to counter the Brahmin authority. Rulers and the common public promoting Uis ascendancy, Mahavira enjoyed enormous popularity and gained much power, and his thoughts received wide acceptance during the second and third quarters of the sixth century B.C.E. Pythagoras, in the meantime, was, reportedly, taken to Babylon in 525 B.C.E.,"' two years after Mahavira died,"^ as a captive of the Persian army that invaded Egypt. He stayed in Babylon for 12 years! " Whether he went to India or not during his long stay in Babylon is a different question, but it could have been impossible for the curious philosopher, one who "fraveled to the end of the earth from the desire for learaing"*' not to have heard anything about Mahavira's teaching in Babylon and Persia. Alexander Polyhistor of Miletus, the early-first-century B.C.E. encyclopedist, recorded in his On

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Pythagorean Symbols that Pythagoras learaed from Brahmins."' This statement clearly expresses Pythagoras' possible familiarity with Indian thinking. Easy access to Indian thought in these two countries during this age will be discussed in a separate section of this work, but the similarities between Mahavira's and Pythagoras' teaching alone would justify the Greek philosopher's possible indebtedness to Jain philosophy. The main characteristics of Pythagoras' religious teacUing consisted of transmigraton of tUe soul, respectta! treatment to animals and plants, purification of the soul through ascetcism and contemplation, absence of any absolute divinity, and social organization as a commimity for religious practices, all of wUicU closely resemble tUe teacUing of Jainisra. Not only did Pythagoras teach that the soul would take numerous forms of births, including of animals, in the human world, but he maintained that the soul could be bora in other realras of existence where raore intelligent beings would live (Gorman 72), and he taught that he could remember his numerous past existences (Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 78). AU these three concepts attached to ttansmigraton existed in Jain beliefs. According to MaUavira's tUeory of rebirtU, tUe sou! would take various forms of lives in the human world, aniraal kingdora, and in outer worids among higher beings. With developed mental faculties, one could remember one's own past existences. Pythagoras' alleged ability to remember his own past lives clearly conesponds to Jainism. At a tme when Greeks showed scarce respect for animals, Pythagoras treated both animals and plants with utmost respect."' He forbade the eating of beans, raallow, and

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other plants and opposed anima! sacrifices, and eating meat was strictly prohibited for his inner community."' His respect for aniraal life was based on his belief that "animals were men's brothers, having the sarae elements and the same consttation" (Gorman 126) including the soul that would transraigrate to humans in another life. One would wonder how and why the Greek philosopher introduced all these revolutionary changes to the Greek way of thinking without being influenced by a society in which those practices existed. Again, Jainism raay provide the answer. Mahavira taught that al! forms of life were wortUy of respect since tUe soul, wUicU ttansmigrates, is associated with every from of Ufe. Jains abstained from eating meat andfisUand refrained from Uarming plants and trees. PytUagoras, apparenty, infroduced tUe same practce into Greece witU sligUt modificatons. Furthermore, ascetcism and contemplaton were two more Pythagorean modes of Ufe to purify tUe soul. He advocated "an asceticism based on a system of taboos" (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 79). TUose taboos were related to food as already noted, clotUes, personal belongings, speech, and so on. "He frowned on luxury especially and would not let his followers wear anything but simple white linen clotUing" (Gorman 125). The members of his inner circle were expected not to own any personal property but to share everything. The new members entering the inner circle were subject to more sttict asceticism such as Pythagoras' neglect of them for three years and the insistence on their silence for fve more years to test whether they were suffcienty prepared to despise woridly life."' All these practices suggest that Pythagoras imposed strong asceticism

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against worldly life. His discouragement of woridly pleasure and refusal of persona! belongings for the novices and the members of the inner cfrcle are particularly stiiking. It was a strict rale for Jain monks and nuns to shun worldly success, to retase worldl\ pleasure, and to live in a community equally sharing their belongings and not possessing anything personally. These rales came into effect as Mahavira preached that enjoyment of sense pleasure and possession of material objects were raotvated by greed, a terrible hindrance to enlightenment. To release the soul from the bondage of rebirth, Mahavira recommended strict asceticism. This doctrine, which was original and unique in Jain teaching, could have reached Pythagoras from nowhere else other than from a Jain community. Still, what would make a reader more curious is the five-year silence Pythagoras insisted on the new disciples who wished to enter the inner circle of his comraunity. It is difficuU to accept that Pythagoias advised them to letain silence contmuously foi five yeais. Meie silence itself would seive no puipose when the novices were trying to qualiy themselves as members of the inner circle. Silence could, most probably, be the contemplation to develop concenttation as a raeans of innei developraent. This was also a corapulsoiy piactce invented by Jains and followed by Buddhists to qualify new membeis to tUe highei oider. After a recommended period of silent contemplation, one was expected to develop inner awareness, after which one would be regarded as the members of tie highest order. It seems probable tiat Pythagoras adopted tfrs practce to quaUfy his new members to the inner cfrcle. Contemplation itself was a practce all

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frmer-cfrcle members of Pythagoras adhered to on daily basis just as Jain monks did. 'They lived together and, unlike the akousmatcs, who came together during the day and went home at night, pursued a Ufe of conteraplation unintenupted by political and economic concems" (Gorraan 129). Similarly, Jainism asserted that its priests, the highest qualified members of the Jain society, should not get involved with extema! affafr other than practicing Yoga or meditation, which would improve thefr own innei development. Pythagoias' admonition to his highei disciples on contemplation cleaily matches with what Jain masteis eraphasized foi their senior disciples, and therefore, it is quite reasonable to beUeve tUat Pythagoras may have adopted this practce from Jainism, the dominant social power in India when Pythagoras was in Babylon. Another point of Pythagoras' teaching that conesponds to Jainism is his reluctance to deffrie the soul in terms of any divine terms. He sUnpIy said that life originated in water, a theory that Thales had afready popularized in Greece, and never saw a unifying force behind the transmigraton of the soul. The end of fransmigration would be the release of the soul from the prison of tiie body, a Uberation that required only human effort. Obviously, a notable absence is a manipulating power behind the theory of transmigration, particularly in a period in which Heracleitus and Xenophanes had just emphasized oneness and flie Being respectvely. Jain refusal of any Oneness behind the theory of tt:ansmigraton was a natural development in the Indian system of fliought since Jafris found tiefr fridiffeience to Brahma, the Oneness fri flie Early Hinduism, very effective to challenge flie Brahmin's self-asserted social superiority. It is

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hard to find a relevant social need in PytUagoras' disinterest in a universal force beUind the transmigration of the soul, and it may be reasonable to assume that Pythagoras adopted it from the Jain sources Just one similarity between the Jain and Pythagorean systems would persuade one to call it a coincidence rather than an influence. However, when striking similarities appear repeatedly, the initial assumption of coincidence would steadily give way to the possible conclusion that the older ttadition could have influenced the later. Some modem scholars' arguraent that Pythagoras' predecessors could have bonowed frora the East and the reported evidence that Pythagoras lived in tUe East for nearly three decades provide sfrong support for such a conclusion. If all this evidence justifies the assertion that Pythagoras was presumably influenced by Jainism, striking similarities between Jain and Pythagorean societies should tarther strengthen the beUef of sucU an influence. Jains were tUe first unortUodox socia! group tUat systematically countered tUe BraUmin supremacy in society. As already noted, one of tUe judicious and unique steps they took in this process was to organize a society within the traditiona! Hindu society. Jain society, or sangha as it was known, which regarded all castes as equal and both men and women as having equal intellectual sfrength to reach tiie ultimate liberation, consisted of four groups: monks and nuns wUo carried on their mission as the fiiUy dedicated, equally qualified members of the higher order and the lay men and women who supported the monks and nuns and followed the rales of tie monks and nuns in a milder form.

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Gender difference excluded, it was actaally a comraunity of two groups: the higher order of raonks and nuns and the lower order of lay raen and lay women: The term Sangha embraces the four orders of monks (saadhus), nuns (saadhvis), layraen (sraavakas), and laywomen (sraavikaas) in fact the whole Jain community. The Jain sangha is involved in al! major decisions affecting the community and has supreme authority over the individua! orders. TUe ascetic order [monks and nuns] plays a very important part in Jainism; it observes Ue teacUing of MaUavira rigorously. It is impossible for laymen and women to foUow tUe teaching to the same extent, as they are involved in worldly actvites and in earaing their livelihood. However, they follow the teaching of Mahavira to the best of their ability. (SUaU 137) This passage indicates that, as far as the rales were concemed, the Jain comraunity was divided only into two sections, the higher order foUowing the striker rales of the same precepts. Monks and nuns were supposed to adhere to strict asceticism: they had to foUow strict vegetarianism, meditate continuously, have daily penitentia! retreats, show love for all sort of life including plants, and give up all kinds of personal belongings. Svettambara sect wore only wUite clotUes wUile Digambaras went naked. To demonsfrate their detachment to the body, they let their hair and fingemails grow, rarely bathed, and lived on food gatUered in a bow! from tUeir daily visits to Uouses. TUe lay comraunity of tUe Jains followed milder rales. Its members Uad to observe tbe "four restraints-of body, senses, speech, and mind-and the five great vows of nonhurting, nonstealing, sexua! purity [abstnence from preraarita! and exframarita! sexua! relatonsUips], tratifulness, and nongrasping" (Koller 32). One cannot compare tUe higher order and the lay community of Jains to the priests and the merabers of the congregation in a raodera Westem church. Members of the Jain society constantly met.

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jointly carried on their practices on daily basis without recognizing any divine message or service. Both groups had one goa! in common: to release the soul frora the bondage of rebirth with one's own effort. The members of the higher order would achieve this target within their present life itself as they strove harder while the lay community that followed the same rales in a railder form was expected to acliieve the release in a tatare birtU. WUat were tUe nature and tUe objectives of tUe PytUagoras' society? First of all, it was "not a politica! organization, but a mystical and pUiIosopUical one" (Gorman 113). Some would say more specifically tUat "tUe PytUagorean society was not primarily a schoo! of philosophy at all. It was really a religious and mora! Order, a society of religious reforraers" (Stace 32). However, tUe pUrase "a society of religious reforraers" deserves some attention. A reformation means raaking changes to a systera that is already existent, but one would wonder whether a system similar to that of Pythagorean ever existed in Greece to recognize the Pythagorean society as a social reformation. Orphic religious groups were tUe only models some of tUe scholars in philosophy have cited for Pythagoras to imitate in forming his coramunity,"' but the plain tttith is that there is no evidence at all of any Orphic society in Greece before Pythagoras, Orphic theogonies and the Rhapsodies, which contained the oldest Orphic teaching "were coraposed much later" than the sixth century B,C,E, (West 28), The oldest Orphic society existed only in the fourth century B,C.E, (Freeman, Pre-Socratic Philosopher 8). In fact, the allegation is that Pythagoras himself wrote some books and attributed thera to Orpheus.'" It seems that he modeled Orphism out of his own teaching rather ttian that

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Orphic societies were a model for the Pythagorean society. Such a modeling would have been felt indispensable to localize Pythagoras' alien teaching and society that w ere attacked by the citizens in Croton and Pythagorean headquarters were reduced to ashes.*' Apparently, the Pythagorean society was not a reformation of any prevailing system but a sttange new inttoducton to the Greek society. Instead of having any connection to Greek values, "its [Pythagorean society's] austerity of life and sttict moral code, as well as its acceptance of male and female disciples from all Greek racesand even frora the Barbarianswent against the customs and prejudices of the tirae" (Larabridis 35). Quite clearly, Pythagoras presented an altogether new concept to Greeks with the establishment of his society. A closer obser\'aton would reveal that Pythagoras could have raolded his sfrange communit\' closely imitating the one invented in Jainisra. Jain characteristcs in the Pythagorean society v^ere abundant and striking. Sirailar to Svettambaras in Jainism, members of the Pythagorean inner cfrcle dressed only in white and wore "a garb peculiar to tiemsel\es" (Stace 32). It sUould also be noted tiat some later Pytiagoreans, imitating the exact behavior pattems of Jain wanderers, became wandering ascetics who Begged and lived a precarious Ufe in poverty and strict conformity to any of the docttines of Pythagoras such as vegetarianism, not bathing in public baths like Plotinus (Uence they seldom washed), the growing of thefr hafr and f ngemails, and a fanatcal belief in frnmortahty and leincaraation. (Gonnanll9) These ascetics appeai to be an exact piototype of Jain monks in thefr appearance, behavior, and attitades. Both adhered to vegetarianisra, seldom cleaned themselves. grew

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their hair and fingemails, and believed in immortality and reincamation. Again, PytUagoras' acceptance of Barbarians and women to Uis inner circle could possibly be an frnitation of tUe rales of Jain community. As Clement of Alexandria reported on tUe autiority of Didyraus who wTote On Pythagorean Philosophy, Theano of Croton, a disciple of Pythagoras, was the first Woraan philosopher m Greece." This raove in the Greek society was a revolutonary change indeed since women had so far "stayed at home in seclusion" and they "were thought of unworthy of educaton" (Roberts 127), and without a sfrong exteraal influence, such a revolutionaiy change would not take place. Furtheimoie, similai to the rales foi the Jain Highei Oidei, members of the Pythagorean inner circle "insisted upon the utmost purity of life" (Stace 32) and Uad to follow strict rales sucU as tota! vegetarianism and tUe tota! giving up of persona! belongings. TUe members of PytUagoras' outer circle, in tUe mean time, were ailowed moderate vegetariaism, private property, and family life just as tUe lay group of tae Jain community was permitted. Similarities between the daily routne of the Jain Higher Order and that of Pythagoras fiirther sttengthen the claim that Pythagoras could have imitated Jain practices to form his own community. lamblichus described*' that the merabers of Pythagorean inner circle got up at dawn and then had solitary waUcs at places which were appropriately silent and ttanqui! to make their rainds sedate. Next, they gathered together for leaming and teaching and for the conecton of raora! quaUtes. TUen tUey turaed to tUe care of tUeir bodies, after wUich they took their breakfast. The next item of thefr daily routne.

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according to lamblichus, was devoton to political and economics affairs, but many modem scholars have challenged this practce. Gorman, for instance, believed that "they [members of the inner circle] lived together, and unlike the akousmatics who came together during the day and went home at night, pursued a life of contemplation uninterrapted by political and economic conceras" (129). TUus, it would be raore appropriate to say tUat tUe members of tUe inner circle were engaged in contemplation during tUis period ratUer than having politica! and economic discussions. TUeir mid-day activities are missing in lamblicUus' descripton, but at dusk they started walking again in small groups, memorizing their lessons, and next they met the lay community. After dinner they had reading and learaing. At night an elder member of the community recited, "Do not harm or destroy a mild or cultvated plant or fruit tree nor an anima! which is not harmfii! to humanity." At the end of each day, they "confessed whatever they had done, and whatever they had omitted to do that they ought to have done" (Lambridis 37). Gorman believed that "during the lifetime of Pythagoras, the philosophica! members of the society would have lived a more inspiring life tUan lambhcUus' routine portrayed (130-131). Fortunately, Jains Uave also preserved tUe daily routine of tUe merabers of their Higher Order. The Uttradhyayana Sutra gave it as follows: 4:00 a.m, 4:00-5:30 5:30-6:00 6:00-7:00 7:00-8:00 8:00-9:00 Rise Silent recital, self-introspection, and meditation Service to senior merabers of the order Natural bodily duties Self-stady and penitentia! retreat Cleaning and begging for alms [for breakfast]

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9:00-10:00: 10:00-12:00: 12:00- 2:00 p,m.: 2:00- 5:00 5:00- 6:00 6:00- 8:00 8:00-10:00 10:00:

Sermons and guidance Visitng temples, begging for alms, and lunch Service to seniors, stady, meditation, and rest Serraons and receiving visitors Cleaning Evening penitential retreat, meditation, teaching laity Religious discourses, reflection, recitaton Sleep "

Similarities abound in the two routines of Pythagoras' Higher Order and that of the Jains, Members of both groups rose at dawn, contemplated, and had their breakfast after attending to their bodily needs. After breakfast, both groups participated in spiritual activites. At dusk, the group members again raeditated, did self-stadies, and then met the visitors or the members of the Lower Order. Each member of the Jain and Pythagorean higher groups confessed his or her wholesome deeds and wrong deeds comraitted during day. At night the members of the Lower Order returaed home, while the members of the Higher Order stayed at the monastery, sharing their common property, to continue the same process the next day as well. These similarities of their daily routines strongly support the assuraption that Jainisra could have influenced Pythagoras. Perhaps, Pythagoras' contribution to sophist rhetoric was more noteworthy than most of scholars have ever thought. Not only did he leave aside the Being, the raetaphysical belief probably adopted by the Eleatics frora the Brahrain fradition, but he also emphasized the strength of human effort for one's salvation just as the Jains, the first Indian rationalist organization, advocated self-effort as tUe way to the liberation of the soul from rebirths. Especially, Pythagoras' disregard for high birth as a requirement for

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high social position seems to have occupied a central position in sophist humanism. Similar to the Jains, Pythagoras still retained severa! metaphysica! concepts, but his system of thought as a whole indicates a visible departare from metaphysica! speculations and a clear inclination towards tUe rational concepts propagated by tUe Older Sophists.

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Notes ' DK31A155, 56. ' DK59A1,A3. ' Aristophanes, Birds 1071 f " See 80 A23 in Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed. The Older Sophists (Columbia: U. of SouthCarolinaPress, 1972), 15. ' Philosttatas, Lives ofthe Sophists 1 10, 1; Sextas, Against the Schoolmasters IX 55, 56, ' Plato, Apology 26; Xenophon; Apology ofSocrates to the Jury 11-14, ' Eusebius, Praep. Evang. XI 3. ' Clement of Alexandria, Sromaeii. 1 66. ' niid., 1 72. ' Voi., 1 70. " Perhaps, the Greek attitade towards other nations as barbarous developed out of the Athenian attempt to inspire Greeks against foreign attacks. Herodotas' Histories indicates how the concept Barbarianism was used by many Greeks, notably Athenians, to instigate a unified Greek revolt against Xerxes' invasion of Greece. As a persuasive method, Gorgias labeled any nation that insulted or attacked Greeks as barbarous. Paris was a barbarian since he seduced Helen ("Encomium of Helen" 7) In "Defense on behalf of Palmedes" (7), he clearly separated Greeks as civilized people and otaer nations as barbarous. Herodotas made Indians appear more barbarous than most of the other nonGreeks, highlighting the priraitive nature and the animal-Iike qualities of the Indians and giving false and exaggerated evidence to belittle Indians (iiistories 3 99-101). '^ Herodotas,//i/one 3 139. " DK22B129.

" DK68A1.

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" "

DK68A55. Herodotas, Histories 5 58.

" M. L. West. Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1971), 3. "It is interestng to note that while he liimself has a good Greek name and called an island near Delos his home, his father's name Babys of Babis belongs to a group. . . which are certainly of Asiatc origin, being raost frequent in Phrygia, Pisidia, and Galatia." " Atarvan Veda 19. 54, 53. " DK7A2.

' DK11A12. " Herodotas.//ij/orej 1 170.

^ D K I I A6. " " " Svetesvatara Upanishad 1.2-3. Yasna 43: 5 f. Svetesvatara Upanishad TV. 17.

^' Brihadaranyaka Upanishad II iii 6. " Svetesvatara UpanishadVl. 10. '* Ujid., rv. 10. " ftid., rv. 2-4. " Mundaka Upanishad IH. 1.8. " '' " Chandogya Upanishad VI ii 2. DK30BI. DK30B2.

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'" Kena Upanishad 1.5. " " " n3id.,m. 1.8. Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis. 2 125. nsid., 1 70.

^' Herodotas, Histories 2 123. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha 1, p. 72.

" Ujid., p. 73. " lamblicUus, Life ofPythagoras fV,

" According to tUe Jainfraditon, Mahaviradied in 527 B.C.E. Eventhoughno historica! record authenticates his death in this year, scholars generally agree that Mahavira lived during the sixth century B.C.E. the Sutta Pitaka records Mahavira's death at a time when the Buddha was stU vigorously active (Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 203). " lamblichus, Life ofPythagoras IV.

"" Cicero, De Finibus V. 19. 50. "' Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis. 1.70. "' lamblichus, Life ofPythagoras "' ftid. XKW.

"* lamblichus, Life ofPythagoras XVII. "' See Peter Gorman, Pythagoras: a Life (London: Routedge & Kegan Paul, 1979), 113; W. T. Stace, A Critcal History of Greek Philosophy (London: MacmiUan & Co. Ltd., 1965) 31-32. " DK36B2.

" lambUchus, Life ofPythagoras XXXV. " Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 2 80.

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"

lambUchus, Life ofPythagoras XXXV.

'" See Natabhia Shah, Jainism: the World ofthe Conquerors, vol. 1 (Brightton: Sussex Academic press, 1998) 146. Shah's detailed descripton of the Jafri routine has been summarized in the piesent woik.

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Influental Souices of Last Pie-sophist Thinkeis Empedocles and Indian Materialism and Buddhisra With legaid to the development sophist ihetoric, the next important Gieek thinkei that may deseive attention is Empedocles. Not only did Aristotle lecognize Empedocles as the inventoi of ihetoric,' but modera scholaiship accepts, and evidence suggests that Empedocles was an influential figuie behind sophist lationa! thought. Enos' comments about Empedocles' contribution towaids the origin of sophist ihetoric aie noteworthy quoting heie: Empedocles cannot piopeily be consideied a sophist. Rathei, he was a pie-Sociatc philosopher; he belongs to the group of thinkers who initiated serious inquiry into the nature of the universe and mankind. Selfconsciousness about man's ability plus metUods of stracturing and acquiring lcnowledge were the foundation of sophist rhetoric. Herein, we discover a key to understanding Empedocles' role as the inventor of rhetoric. . . The raethods by which Empedocles invented sophistc rhetoric are disceraible both in his writings and in ancient cornmentaries about his effort. (61-62) Enos' emphasis on Empedocles' contributon to sophist rhetoric seems conectly based on Empedocles' "self-consciousness about man's ability" to acquire knowledge and "his (Empedocles') metiods of sttTicturing and acquiring knowledge." A detailed analysis of how these rational atttades possibly reached the Greek thinker will certainly facihtate tie search for the possible Buddhist and other Indian ratonalistc concepts both in Empedocles' teaching and in the teaching of the Older Sophists. As a prerequisite to the elucidation of this search, it seems apt to initiate tifrs discussion with a quick survey of the predorainant Indian concepts at the tirae of

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Erapedocles. Now the time was the early fifth centary B.CE,, an era of huge transition in Indian thinking. The Brahmin traditon was just reorganizing its defense system of argument after enduring the attack of the first ever systematic unorthodox ttadition of the Jains; materialists were vigorously challenging the idealistic views of both Hinduism and Jainism. Buddhism was just bora, and it would take at least a few decades to be a dominant power. Apart from Hindu orthodoxy and Jainism, it was the rational theory of raaterialisra that dominated the field of Indian thought at the beginning of the sixth century B.C.E. Tlfrs point-the point that the rationa! thinking of materialism was a dominant power in India during the early sixth century B.C.E.is vital to the understanding that Empedocles' first influential sources were possibly Indian materialistic teaching. In his On nature, Erapedocles cited the four great elements as the primary cause of the universe, an argument that denied both the Being of the Eleatcs and the soul of Pythagoras. As already noted, severa! of previous Greek thinkers had cited one of the elements as the primary cause, but Empedocles was the first Greek to take all four elements together in explaining the origin of the universe: There is no man so wise that he could guess in Iiis mind; that which they livewUat tUey call lifetUere Uappen to tUem things good and bad. But before (the elements) adhered together and after they have separated, they were, and are, nothing at all.^ Many ills penetrate through them into their rainds and blunt their wits. Having seen in their life only a small part of the whole, quick death overtakes them, and rising into the air, they fly away like smoke; being aware only of what each man happened to have crossed upon; driven hither and thither, but boasting each that hey have seen the whole trath.'

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They (elements) are for ever themselves, but running through each other they become at tmes different, yet are for ever and ever the sarae. When, having come together in the proper mixttu-e (tie elements) tiey rise to the light fri the shape of man, or as beast. . . and when they separate, they call it ill-fared death." These quotatons give a clue to Empedocles' elements: life raeans nothing otier than a combination of elements, and death means the separaton; nothing exists after or before death; the elements are neither created nor perishable but eteraal. Along with other fragments of On Nature, Empedocles conveyed the idea that "thoughtless raen call this disappearance [of eleraents] death, and their coraing together birth, as they lament or rejoice accordingly," but they [men] "perish miserably, having understood notfrng of the real essence of the world" (Lambridis 44). Retuming to Indian materialisra, one may find no original sources to clarify its views on eleraents, but, fortanately, original BuddUist texts Uave preserved two relevant pieces of informaton, which are adequate at least to frace Empedocles' possible source of elements. Of course, the theory of elements had a long liistory in the Indian fradition, but it gained momentum only in the sixth centary B.C.E. Buddhist text Samannaphala Sutta summarized the concept of eleraents held by two raaterialists at the time of the Buddha. Ajita held the view that There is no such tliing as alras, or sacrifice, or offering [no benefit can be achieved with these acts]. There is neither finit nor result of good or e\il deeds. There is no such things as this world or the next [since only elements exist]. There is neither father nor mother [Only the elements cause birth.], nor beings spring into life without them [nothing originates without elements]. There are in the world no recluses or Brahmins wUo Uave reached the highest point, who walk perfectly, and who having understood and realized both this world and the next, make thefr wisdom

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known to others. A human being is built up of four elements, When he dies the earthy in him retums and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the windy to the air, and his faculties [senses and raind] to the space. The four bearers, on the bier as the fifth, take his dead body away. .. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not.^ A comparison may be made after quoting the second theorist on elements as given by the Buddhist text. Pakudha Kacchayana said: The foUowing seven things are neither made nor cornraanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created. They are banen, steadfast as a mountainpeak, as a pillar firmly fixed. They move not, nor do they vary. They sfretch not one upon other nor avail ought as to ease or pain or both. What are the seven? The four elementsearth, water, fire, and air-and ease and pain, and the soul as the seventh. so there is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer.' The very first irapression one would conceive after reading the two theories of elements held by Empedocles and Indian materialists is the reraarkable resemblance of the two views to one another. Ajita asserted that there would be nobody who had realized "this world and the next" and who could "make their wisdom known to others." Empedocles said that "there is no man so wise" to guess the things taat would happen to others but are only "boastng each that they have seen the whole ttiith.'' Again, Ajita said that "a human being is built up of four eleraents" which would retam to each after one's death and faculties would "pass into space." AU beings, "on tie dissoluton of tie body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not." Erapedocles highhghted tie same idea, saying "after they [elements] have separated, they (beings) were, and are, notng at all." "Rising into the air," all beings "fly away like smoke," and nothing would remain. The two thinkers are astonishingly similar indeed.

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A coraparison of Pakudha Kacchayana's and Erapedocles' views wil! raake the similarities between tUe Indian and Greek concepts of elements fiilly complete. According to KaccUayana, the four elements are "neither made nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be created." They are well-fixed, unchangeable, and perraanent. Empedocles also claimed that "they [the elements] are for ever themselves, but ranning through each other, they become at times different, yet are for ever and ever the same." Both advocated the four eleraents as unchangeable, etemal entities that jointly create beings who, in actuality, do not exist. TUe very words birtU, creation, and deatU are merely conventional, according to Empedocles. WitU the negation of tliis world, next world, hearer, speaker, knower, and explainer, both Ajita and Kacchayana emphasized the same idea. These exphcit and undeniable similarites provide strong support for the suggestion that Empedocles' elements could have taken their shape from Indian materialism. In contrast to tUis assertion, one migUt argue tUat tUe characteristcs of eleraents are univeisal, and theiefoie, the sirailarity between Erapedocles' descripton of elements and that of Indian materialists should not necessarily be legaided as a bonowing howevei close the similarites might appeai to be. The weakest point of this aigument may he in the fact that the elements both the fridian materialists and Erapedocles lecognized did not contain any univeisal tratU but lepiesented only a certain stage of human thinking. One would conectly call this stage an iUusionaiy one lathei than an advancement in human thinking since the very recogniton of the four elements as the primary cause of the

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universe was frself a myth.' While Ajita and Makkali Gosala eventaally combined all four elements together to defeat the Brahmin concept of Brahraa that hurt some socia! groups in India, what caused Empedocles to fall into the sarae illusion, lagging behind the Indian materialists just a half century or so? Going for the eventaa! scientfic trath, should Greek thinkers follow the same path and get stack in the same decepton that the unique sociohistorica! factors placed Indian thinkers in? Theoretically, "never" would be the answer, which would clearly bring one closer to the other assumption that Indian influence itself could have raade Greek thinkers foUow a similar path with Indians. Empedocles was not only a scientist who searched for the priraary cause of the universe but also an idealist who conceptualized on the being's after-death existence in the universe. Obviously, the two confradictory paths he followed would baffle any reader since Erapedocles' theory of eleraents denied any existence after orbefore death. Did someone convert Erapedocles frora raaterialism to idealism or vice versa? WUy did he hold two opposing views to each other as trae? Answers to these questions may Ue in a carefu! stody of his biography, which sheds lights on Uis shifting thoughts from one to the other. His On nature, which offered his firm theory of elements, could be an early work, and his Purifications, which contained idealistic views, seems to have been coraposed during his later years. Based on this information, one would conectly decide that Empedocles forsook his early theory of elements after "a definite and profound change occuned" in Ifrm with "a sort of conversion to a new outlook" that he advocated in Purifications (Lambridis 19).

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He was frst an admirer of the Eleatics, and whatever frack through which the concept of the Boundless and Being reached Eleatic thinkers could have brought the theory of elements for Erapedocles as well. What is raore important here is why he changed from materialism to idealisra in his later life. The sole cause the tradition has given for this change is the influence of Pythagoreanisra, which had now developed into the second generation, and Pythagoras' own son Telauges is credited to have taught Empedocles.' One may not rale out any Pythagorean influence on Empedocles. Yet, some notable differences between Pythagoreanism and Empedocles' later philosophy would persuade one to cite some other source as well for Empedocles: With great diffidence I venture to suggest that the conception of the spiritaalization of tUe SpUairos, wUo Uas now become 'all a sacred mind," may be due to a more remote influence: that of Buddhism. The dates do not clash with this suggestion, for the rise of Buddhisra is put around 500 B.C., half a century before Erapedocles' raaturity. Nor was it irapossible for this new religious raovement to prelocate tUrougU tUe Persian empire, which stretched frora the westera most parts of India to the shores of Asia minor. Traffic was frequent. The Sphairos would conespond to Nirvana; the retura to human or lower form of life to Karma; tUe choice spirits, who sprout up again as 'god's immortals' to a Buddha. Empedocles' abhonence of animal sacrifices, especially bulls and cows, also conespond to beliefs which are still alive, not only among Buddhists but among those faithtal to the older Hindu religion. (Lambridis 120) According to tUe possible Greek bonowing that has been discussed so far, Erapedocles could not have missed the Buddha, and Lambridis, with rauch courage rather than diffidence, has cited the most probable source for Empedocles' later philosophy. This chapter wil! later exaraine how the Buddhist concept of Nirvana conesponds to Sphairos, but, it seems appropriate to initiate this discussion with an emphasis on how Empedocles

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was different frora Pythagoreanism, a disclosure that would also highlight how much closer he was to Buddhism. As already discussed, similar to Erapedocles', Pythagoras' ultiraate aira was also self-purification in order to release the sou! from recunent births. His means to this end, however, consisted of predominantly ascetic practces related to persona! needs and behavior. Thus, he expected his inner-circle members to achieve the final release of the soul from the body mainly by observing restrictions to food, belongings, sexual needs, and other personal needs. As already elucidated, this practce was apparently a bonowing from Jainisra. The Jain follower Digha Tapassin sumraarized this theoiy as follows: Nathaputta the Jain [Mahaviia] lays down thiee kinds of wiongs foi the effecting of an evil deed, for the rolling on of an evil deed [for contnuous rebirtU], tUat is to say wrong of tUe body, wrong of the speech, wrong of mind. Of these three wrongs thus divided, thus particularized, Nathaputta the Jain lays down that wrong of the body is the more blamable in the effecting of an evil deed, in the rolling on of an evi! deed.' TUus bodily contro! became raore predominant in Jain practices. In consequence, sucU beUavior patteras as seclusion, fasting, vegetarianism, self-mortification, renunciation of worldly pleasure and objects entered tUe life of Jain monks and nuns as essenta! requirements to acUieve tUe ultimate purification of tUe soul. Sirailar practices occupied a vital position in PytUagoras' and his followers' way to purify taeir souls corapletely. Observing closely, one raay notce that the absence of this practice-the practice of austerity-was a salient characteristic in Erapedocles path to purification. As far as the few extant fragraents reveal, Empedocles' only method of purifying the soul to release it

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frora the body required nonviolence towards aniraals and living objects. In tUis extraordinary move, Empedocles scoraed Uuman life as an intolerable, paintal, suffering experience wUile PytUagoras empUasized suffering itself as an indispensable necessity for purification. This difference could be the most cracial point to detect possible Buddhist influences on Empedocles. While Mahavira emphasized asceticisra as the most effective practice to acquire the gradual purification and the fina! liberation, the Buddha condemned it. The naked ascetic Kassapa's statement that "the Samana Gotama dispaiages all penance; verily he leviles and finds fault with every ascetic, with every one who lives a hard Ufe"' summarized tUe BuddUa's attitude towards ascetic practices. In Uis very first discourse, tUe Buddha condemned asceticism as a dangeious extreme that would delay selfpurificaton indefinitely. He emphasized that hfe itself is fiiU oDukkha (suffering, dissatisfaction, etc.) just as to reject ascetcism as a twofold burden that would take the living person to tUe unfatUomable deptU of raisery. Just as tUe BuddUa departed from Jain asceticism and empUasized tUat suffering itself is a part of life, Empedocles gave up Pythagorean austerity and saw human hfe as an intolerably agonizing experience. According to the Buddha's first public discourse, birth itself is the first cause of suffering. AII other forras of DuWcAa-sickness, death, worry, finsfration, etc.-taper back to fls original cause. Taken as a whole, Dukkha runs through all human experiences." Empedocles sfressed the same idea, saying, "Oh, woe, you pitifu! race of mortals, of all joy bereft! From what contentious Strife were you bora.

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from what depth of grief "'^ He lamented over his own birth on this earth of the mortals, which is: A place without any charm Where Murder and Wrath and a host of other sraall Destinies And shivering Diseases, and Rottenness, and all works of man Run away like water; all tUese wander about in tUe dark in the field of Avenging Power." Just like the Buddha's concept ofDukkha, which recognized suffering, impermanence, and human ignorance as related to each other, Empedocles' theory of suffering was essentially connected to ttansition and huraan ignorance. AII different raanifestations of Dukkha such as death, sickness, and old age seem to be present in the fragment quoted above. Unalterable iraperraanence was UigUIigUted in the phrase "all works of raan run away as water." Huraan ignorance about this inexorable law of nature achieved prominence in the plirase, "AII these wander about in the dark in the field of Avenging Power." A theory ahnost identical with the Buddha's main teaching ofDukkha appears to have pervaded though Empedocles' Purifications. Buddhist purification meant to release oneself frora tliis kind of suffering, an objective that can be achieved through wholesome conduct and mental development. Dukkha itself is a universal trath, but, as already mentioned, ignorance (Avijja) prevents people from seeing this universal trath as fr is. Those who understand Dukkha with mindfiilness would find the way to eventaal enligUtenment during tUeii own Ufetime, and tUeieafter, there would be no more rebirths for that individual. Similarly, Empedocles' sole objective was to help his listeners release themselves frora perpetaal suffering, a

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condition of which the majority would be ignorant, At the beginning of his Purifications. he perceived the human race as "men ignorant of raisforttme," Man's inability to see tUis universa!ttiitUwas tartUer UigUlighted in his reraarks that huraan beings, while gratifying their sense of taste with raeat, fail to see their misforttme and, consequently, ttim a blind eye to the perpetaal sonow of the world: Do you not see that you are devouring one another because of your careless way of thinking?'" That is why, being disfraught with bitter raisfortune, you will never ligUten your Uearts of grievous sonows.'^ Indulgence in eating raeat migUt symbolize gratification of senses, which, in retura, would prevent people frora seeing the "bitter misfortune" of life. This ignorance would be the cause of their failure to "lighten" their "hearts of grievous sonows," a metaphorical expression which would mean achievement of the ultimate purification of the soul as highlighted in "to be empty frora misfortune."" Those who fai! to grasp this expression of trath will contnue to kill living beings and eat meat and, consequently, wiU be bora again and again in the world of perpetaal suffering. The fragment "For from living creatures it set out dead bodies, cUanging tUe form" contains tUis meaning with its exfreme pessimistic tone. A clear resemblance to the Buddhist teaching oDukkha and rebirth is evident here. The very first precept prescribed by the Buddha to begin one's endeavor to stop rebirth and thus to end suffering was the abstinence from killing. As a means to persuade sociefy to respect this rale, early Buddhisra attached an ethical value to the concept of ttansmigration by saying that all beings are related to each other in kinship because of

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dieir long history of ttansmigration. According to this teachfrig, "seldom do we find a being who, in the course of our wandering, had not at one tme being a mother, a father, a sister, a son, a daughter" (Narada 476). The Buddha declared: Many tmes have you suffered tie death of father and mother, of sons, daughters, brothers, and sisters, and while you were thus suffering, you have verily shed tears upon this long way, more than there is water in the four oceans. Long time did your blood flow by the loss of your heads when you were bora as oxen, buffaloes, rams, goats, etc." It is the same idea taat Empedocles employed to sfress his nonviolence toward animals: WiII you not stop this noisome awfu! slaughtei? Do you not see how you teai each othei to pieces in the blindness of youi mind?" The fathei, the uttei fool, Ufting his knife sUts the throat of his own son, who has changed his form, and the bystanders offer prayers while he sacrifices. He, mindless to the enfreates of the poor victim, having killed him prepares in his princely halls a horrible meal. In the same way, a son catches and kills his mother, children their father; and having tom the Ufe out of tUem, they consurae thefr kindred flash." Just like the Buddha, Empedocles clearly asserted that all Uving beings are related to each other in fainily lcinship. Based on the complexity and the complex social conditions associated with this teaching, it might have been impossible for Erapedocles to invent the same teaching independenty. Such Jain and Buddhist teachings as indefinite ttansmigration of the soul in the past, indefinite past births of the soul in numeious animal fonns, and unusual corapassion towaids animals, along with the long Jain histoiy of crittcizfrig the Biahmfri sacrifice of animals, weie flie backgiound from which flie cieatve concept of huraan kingship to animals was eventaally invented to safeguard

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unique Indian social values. Without sirailar social conditons and a long histoiy of contiasting views on animal sacrifice, one may haidly invent an identical concept. Peihaps, Empedocles knew Buddhist myths and the Buddha's life more taan could be imagined, and more striking similarities should clearly support this assumption. One of the arguments the Buddha presented against animal sacrifice was that ancient kings never shed animal blood to please deities but raade other offerings such as gee, butter, milk, and honey, On one occasion, the Buddha unexpectedly visited a place where a huge anima! sacrifice had been prepared, and, in order to prevent that sacrifice, he related a mythica! story, in which king Maha Sararaata, the fiist evei king befoie al! Hindu deites and raleis and the sole erapeioi of the ancient utopia, made a bloodless sacrifce and obtained the perfect blessing of gods: At that sacrifice neither were any oxen slain, neither goats, not fowls, nor fatted figs, nor were any kind of living creatures put to deatU, , . . And tUe slaves and raessengers and workmen there employed were driven neither by rods nor fear, nor carried on their work weeping with tears upon their faces. . . With gee, and oil, and butter, and milk, and honey, and sugar only was that sacrifice accomplished. Empedocles' argument against animal sacrifice was almost identcal: in the ancient utopia-Iike worid in which Kypris was the worshiper-queen, sacrifices were made witiout shedding animal blood: Nor Zeus the king, nor Kronos or Poseidon; but Kypris was the queen. They worshipped and consoUdated her with pious delight, With painted semblances of animals and sweet smelling bumt incense, Whose clouds of scented sraoke raade all sort of pattems in the air With mynh and bloodless herbs buming. On the floor, before her altar they made libatons of blonde honey. Her altars

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were never sraeared by the blood of bulls, for this was considered of heinous crime among men, to wet their own limbs with the pure red gushing blood, having tora the life out of the beast,^' What is striking is the remarkable sameness in the content, appearance, organization. and the objectives of the two myths given by the Buddha and Empedocles. Both stories were set in ancient paradises before the known history; both asserted that people during that golden age did not shed animal blood to please divine beings; both reminded the listeners that, instead of animal sacrifices, ancient people offered other iteras such as honey to please the deity. More significantly, both myths were meant to stop anima! sacrifices to gods in the two speakers' present society. Empedocles seems to have followed not only the Buddha's themes but the Buddha's techniques of persuasion as well. If Empedocles Icnew some Buddhist myths and teaching, he raust have known about the Buddha's life as well: "Who said it?" is the queston that any curious listener would ask after Uearing a fascinating story or a teacUing. Besides, fr is Uardly possible tUat Erapedocles' sources would Uave left out tUe life of tUe faraous, deified BuddUa if tUey offered Empedocles some knowledge and myths from Buddhism. The first few fragments of Empedocles Purifications raay support this assumpton. It is likely that not only had Erapedocles heard about the Buddha, but he also prefened the Buddha's initiation of his mission. Empedocles' high-handed reaction to his own acquisition of the deathless state, his hesitation to raake his wisdom loiown to the world, his emphasis on sonowfiil ttansraigration, and his decision to launch his raission frora the city of Acragas aU bear an

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unusua! resemblance to the Buddha's initation of his own program of purificaton, In the following step-by-step comparison, quotations were taken from the Buddha's very shon first speech" and the first few fragraents of Empedocles Purifications. The Buddha: Opened for those who hear are the doors of the Deathlessness. Let those who have ears repose with confdence". , , To establish the wheel of the trath, to the city of Kasi I go, In this blind world, I sUalI beat tUe drum of DeatUlessness. Empedocles: My friends wUo live in tUe great town of tUe tawny Acragas, on the city's citadel, who care for good deeds (havens for kindness for sttangers, men ignorant of misfortane) Greetings!" The Buddha will soon launch his path to purificaton frora Kasi while Empedocles has already begun his mission from Acragas. Importantly, both have initially selected cities to set forth their missions. The Buddha, after a little Uesitation, Uas shown confidence in human ability to realize Uis teacUing, and Empedocles believes that people in Acragas, unlike tUose wUo were "ignorant of raisfortune," Uave wisdora to follow liis patU to immortality. Empedocles: I tell you I ttavel up and down as an immortal god, morta! no longer, Uonored by all as it seems, crovraed by ribbons and fresU garlands.^^ TUe Buddha: In the world including gods, there is no rival to me, Indeed an enligUtened person am I in tUe world; An unsurpassed teacUer am I; alone am I the AlI-enligUtened.^'' Both Erapedocles and the Buddha speak in high praise of their own achievements of the deathless state. Achieving immortality while being alive would obviously be a confradictory statement, but it had its own meaning in the Buddhist system of thought, which did not coimt the inevitable final death of the enlightened person. Buddhist

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immortalify means there will be no more rebfrths for the enhghtened person and, consequently, no more deaths. One would wonder how Empedocles would find the same idea without the Influence of this Buddhist teaching. Empedocles' own assertion that he was an iinmoital god is anothei point that conesponds to Buddha's hfe. Attribution of immoitality and divinity to a hving huraan being is a unique inventton, which was attached to the Buddha during his hfe time. Even though the Buddha did not present himself as a god, his rhetoric made him appear so. He was above all gods, who would seek his assistance in solving thefr own spiritaal problems. Even Brahma, the ahnighfy creator in Hinduism, would bow dovm in the presence of the Buddha and request him to help society.^' These rhetorical raethods were meant to constract an unassailable ethos for the Buddha, but they, in fact, made him a powerful god during his own lifetime. Clement of Alexandria remarked, "Among the Indians are some who foUow the precepts of Buddha whom for his exceptional sanctity they have honored as a god."" So, the concept of god was clearly attached to tie Buddha, and Clement's remarks during the second century A.D. mdicate the long-estabhshed Buddhist belief, which could have influenced Empedocles to elevate himself to the level of immortal divinity while being alive. The Buddha: Thiough raany a birti in existence wandeied I." Empedocles: Foi befoie now I have been at some time a boy and gfrl, bush, bfrd, and a mute fish in the sea.' Both tie Buddha and Empedocles lelate the histoiy of ieir transmigratton before flie final bUss of achie-vfrig enlightenment. One may observe fri Empedocles' utterance tie

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possibihty that he was also influenced by Jainism since the Buddha did not admit that huraans would be lebom as plants. The Buddha: Sonowfiil is lepeated birth.^' Erapedocles: A place without any charm where Murder and Wrath and a host of other sraall Destnies and shivering Diseases, and Rottenness, and all works of man run away like water; all these wander about in the dark in the field of Avenging Power." According to the Buddhist teaching, rebirth is sonowfa! because of sickness, old age, death, and a multitade of problems that would follow birth. Empedocles expresses the same idea by referring to murder, disease, rottenness, and other destinies that Uving beings have to encountei. The human woild itself, accoiding to Empedocles, "is a place without any chaim.'' The Buddha: If I were to teach tliis trath, others were not to understand me. That will be wearisome to me; that will be a vexation to rae, . . This that through many toils I've won-Enough! Why should I make it known?" Empedocles: My friends, I know that there is trath in the words which I shall speak, but indeed it comes hard to men, and the onrush of conviction to the mind is unwelcome.'" But why do I lay sfress on this, as if it were some great achievement of mine, if I am superior to many-tirae-dying mortal men?'' The same hesitation occurs m both the Buddha and Empedocles. The Buddha feels that his listeners' possible failure to understand his teaching, which is hard and profound, would make him wearisome, while Empedocles thinks that his profound doctrine would cause his listeners to reject it. Both have hesitaton for tiefr listeners' abihfy to realize the profound doctrines and an overweening respect for thefr own achievements.

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The Buddha: By folks with lust and hate consumed, this trath is not understood. [This trath which is] Leading on against the stream, deep, subte, difficult to see, delicate. . ." Empedocles: Fools, for tUeir meditations are not far-reacUing tUoughts, men who suppose that what formerly did not exist comes into existence, or that something dies and is completely destroyed." Here, both the Buddha and Empedocles give reasons as to why their listeners fail to understand tUe way to purification. According to the Buddha, it is lust and hatred interestingly the two forces that draw Empedocles' four eleraents together and separate them as given in On Naturet\\a.t prevent people frora seeing the trath. Frora Empedocles' points of view, it is his listeners materialistic view that hinders their understanding of the trath. Here, Erapedocles has clearly relinquished his materiahstc theory that he avidly promoted in On Nature. Behind the apparent dissirailarify between the two views given by the Buddha and Empedocles, there lies tUe close similarity: the Buddha cited hatred and lust as the causes of human ignorance mainly because his contemporary materialists clearly denied Uumanistc values and empUasized sensual gratfication as tUe sole purpose of life. KaccUayana's assertion tUat "killing with a sword" means only a conventonaltiTithin which the reality is only tUe penefration of an element into otUer elements witU which body is constitated" indicates how materialism took tUe form of Uafred. Again, the popular materialistic empUasis tUat one must bonow money and gratify senses since ttiere is no existence after deatti and, consequenty, no commitment to pay back UighligUts how materialism bred lust. Therefore, behind tie

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Buddha's indication of lust and hatred as the causes of human blindness lies materialism, the cause of Empedocles' listeners' failure to grasp the trath. Realistcally, one may not expect Empedocles to have gained a deeper knowledge of BuddUism, considering tUe sUorter time span, roughly a little longer than a halfcentury, between the Buddha and the Greek philosopher. Presumably, Empedocles was the first known Greek to make himself acquainted with Buddha's life and Buddhist thought so that what he got from the Buddhist environment, in additton to the preBuddhistc materialistic teaclng of tUe four elements, could be the Buddha's biography and the basic and popular Buddhist teachings such as transraigraton, Nirvana, Karma, human ignorance, and suffering. Nevertheless, he probably made the best use of his limited knowledge of Buddhisra by writing Purifications, in which not only did he present himself in the Buddha's personalify, but Ue also apparently introduced Buddhist concepts into Greece as his own. A possible Buddhist influence on Empedocles would be farther confirmed by the inefatable closeness of the Buddhist enligUtened state to tUe Uighest purificaton of Empedocles, a similarify that Lambridis has already mentioned. In this comparison, no attempt raay be made to present Buddhist Nirvana in terms of how it was interpreted by the Buddha to his contemporary intellectua! elite since such interpretations would not have been available to Empedocles. The best Imowledge about Buddhist Nirvana Erapedocles could have acquired was probably the basic knowledge that carae from common Indian sources. Notably, the Buddha did not present Nirvana to the comraon

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public as a non-existent level after death. Perhaps he knew that self-preservation after death was an essential huraan psychological need in that sociefy, and, to popularize his concept of Nirvana araong his listeners, Ue interpreted it in attractive positve terms. Narada MaUa TUera gave tUe following list of descriptve adjectves and nouns tUat tUe Buddha employed in his cornmon discouises to inteipiet Niivana: Infinite (anatta), non-conditioned (asmkhatha), incompaiable (anupameya), supieme (anuttara), highest and beyond (para), highest lefage (parayana), safety (tana), security (khema), happiness (siva), unique (kevala), abodeless (analaya), imperishable (akkhara), absolute purify (visuddh), superraundane (lokuttara), iinmortalify (amata), emancipation (mutti), peace (santi). (495) TUese adjectives and synonyms employed by tUe Buddha to describe Nirvana do not suggest one's non-existence after death; rather they present Nirvana as an etema! place in which all enlightened persons would be bom and live for ever. TUerefore, tUe general public during tUe BuddUa's time, as today, accepted Nirvana as an eteraal, blissfa! place, in which virtuous people would enter after death and live Uappily for ever. TUis common belief entertained by tUe tUen Indian common public is a key point to the undeistanding of Empedocles' knowledge about Buddhist Niivana. Keeping this inteipietation of Nirvana in mind, one may now raake one more analysis of the Buddhist enhghtened persons before comparing Nirvana with Empedocles' highest level of purificaton. The enligUtened persons in BuddUism would undergo twofold existence: first, they experience perfect happiness as long as they exist physically; after death, they achieve perfect bliss in wUich no decay, death, or any problem exists:

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There aretwo levelsofNibbana. Whattwo? The achieveraent of Nibbana with the basis [physica! body] still remaining and that without basis. A Bhikkhu [one who follows the path to purification] is an Arahant [an enlightened person], one who has destroyed defilements, who has Iived the life, done wUat was to be done, laid aside tUe burden [of rebecoming], wUo Uas attained Uis goal, wUo Uas desttoyed the fettered of existence, who, with right understanding, is delivered. His five sense-organs still remain, and as he is not devoid of them, he undergoes the pleasant and the unpleasant experiences [but are not attached]. What is [the level of] Nibbana without basis? A Bhikkhu who is an Arahant is delivered [from sonow]. In tUis very life all the sensations will have no deligUt for Uira, tUey will be cooled {so tUat tUey wiU not be bom again]. TUis is called the level of the Nibbana without basis." This description of the enlightened personality was farther elaborated at different places. Arahants, or those who stll physically exist after achieving enlightenment, are the most respectable, most knowledgeable, happiest people on earth since they have purified themselves from all defilements, have ended suffering, and have developed supermundane knowledge. A mere glance at "Arahanta Vagga" and "Brahmana Vagga" in the Dhammapada would reflect how highly the Arahants were regarded in the Buddhist fraditon. They were supreme beings," conquerors, and the wisest and most accoraplished and coraplete people."' Thus deified, Arahants received greater honor ever since the Buddha estabUshed the order of Bhikkhus. After their physical death, they would attain etemal bliss and deathlessness as described by the numerous adjectves and synonyms listed above. As It Was Said, an early BuddUist text, remarked that those who are bom are made of elements, and therefore, do not last. Nirvana is not conditonal so that it is eteraal. Perfect bliss could be found only in Nirvana:

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The sonowless, the stainless path that ends The things of woe, the peace from worries: bliss."^ This etemization of Nirvana and the deification of the living enlightened person, the two concepts that the common public during tUe BuddUa's time had clearly accepted, provide the basis to recognize the Buddhist elements in Empedocles' highest achieveraent in purification. There are three fragments that related the natare of Empedocles' purified persons and state. The following two fragments describes the persons who have reached this highest level of purification: In the end they becorae seers and coraposers of hymns and physicians, and leaders of men on earth. From these (states) they sprout up again as gods immortal, honored above all."' Sharing the hearth and board of the other immortals, untouched by human ills, set apart, not subject to decay."" The two levels of Buddhist enlightenment are clearly manifest here. In the first level, the self-purified persons become seers, composers of hymns, physicians, and leaders of men; from that level, they reach the imraorta! state in which no decay or human sonow exists. Of course, the Buddha did not say that Arahants are the composers of hymns and physicians. Nevertheless, since Empedocles hiraself had already become a poet and a well-known physician and has presented himself as one who had reached the leve! of the highest purification, his own attribution of poetic and raedica! skills to the self-purified persons may be understandable. Perpetual sonow that accompanies the whole process of Empedocles' reincamation and the eventua! purification that releases the purified from all kinds of

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sonow are the most notable characteristics that probably relate his purification to the Buddhist concept of Nir\'ana. It is worth repeating here the first utterance the Buddha made immediately after he attained Nirvana. Through many a birth in existence wandered I, seeldng but not finding the builder of this house [prison of body]. Sonowfal is repeated birth. . , Mind attains the birthless and deathless state"' Impermanence and dissatisfaction that pervade through aU sensua! experiences are wellrecognized traths in Buddhism, and Nirvana lis exactly in tUe opposite of those two worldly conditions, Similarly, Empedocles' sphere, in which purifed beings sprout, is "untouched by human ills" and is "not subject to decay," Permanence and happiness, the two qualities the Buddha and his disciples rhetorically proved in Nirvana, seem to be the essential characteristics in Empedocles' sphere in which the purified appear after tiiefr physical death. In concluding this analysis of Empedocles' philosophy, it should be reiterated that the Greek thinker's indebtedness to Indian thoughts seems immeasurable. His eariy fascination with the Indian materiaUstic tUinking could Uave been superseded by tie newly discovered BuddUisra, which probably carae to stay with him. Overall, his possible iraitaton of tie Indian materiaUstic teaching of the four elements provided the Older Sophists a scientfic theory to reject both the traditonal Greek rayths about gods and the Eleatic myth of Being. However, one would argue that tiie fresh Buddhist concept of Nirvana, which reached Empedocles m its idealistc forai, prevented him from becoming more ratonalistc. Even though the Buddhist eraphasis of huraan effort as a

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means to achievfrig Nfrvana probably remained prominent in Empedocles, he, as shown above, stll believed the myfli of Sphairos and flie concept of ttansmigration. Ceitainly. Empedocles was an frifluential figuie m the development of sophist ihetoric, but a few ideological and metaphysical huidles had yet to be leraoved befoie tie rise of tie age of sophist ihetoric.

Democritus and Buddhist Ratonality and Indian Atomism To make the analysis of sophist backgiound moie complete, one moie majoi Gieek philosophei namely Democritus may deserve a place in this discussion. Democritus' influence on sophist rhetoric, paiticularly on his pupil Protagoras' argumentaton and rational thought, is a well-known topic. "An echo of Protagoras' thinking [about logos] is found in an aphorism of Democritus: 'By encouragement and persuasive speech one wiU prove a more powerfal advocate of excellence than by law and compulsion generally accepted as trae'" (Schiappa 185), Besides, "his [Protagoras' ideal of conduct was the Democritean imperturbability" (Freeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 351). These and many other similarittes of the two thinkers discussed in Chapter Three clearly suggest that Democritus profoundly influenced sophist rhetoric. It would be essental to know the possible influental sources of Democritus to discover the original influential sources of sophist rhetoric. According to his own remarks, Democritos traveled extetisively, more extensively than any other Greek of his time, saw more cUmates and cotmtries, and Ustened to a great

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number of learaed men."' Reportedly, the countries he traveled included India, and some of the learaed men he listened to were Indian naked sages. It seems a timely necessify here to focus on this obscure topic in order to highUgUt a possible Indian influence on Democritus. The first echo of Democritus' trip to India was heard from Strabo, the Greek geographer and historian of the first centary B.C. Citing Megasthenes, Strabo said that Democritus, who traveled extensively in Asia, denied an Indian river namely Sila, on which nothing would float."' Next, Diogenes Laertius reported that he had heard some say that Democritos associated with the naked sages in India."' Again, Suidas remarked tiat Democritos went to Persia, India, and Egypt and leamed their wisdom. According to Hippolytus, the Greek philosopher associated with many Indian naked sages."' Finally, Aehan noted that Deraocritus visited the sages of India." Altogether, one hears at least from five historians and other writers about Democritus' Indian visfrs and connections. The populai modem tendency, as discussed pieviously, is the immediate lejecton of any classical Gieek connections with India, and Democritus' alleged Indian visit, of couise, is no exception. One would unquestioningly accept this lejection if Democritos' views weie notably diffeient from Indian views and if a visit to India during Democritas' time weie consideiably difficult. The trath, howevei, would be otheiwise: instead of being notably diffeient, raost of Deraocritas' views, as discussed in the foUowing pages, aie almost identcal with his contempoiaiy Indian thoughts; instead of being consideiably difficult, a Gieek's visit to India during that time, as the last chaptei of this dissertation

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leveals, was easier and safer than one would ever imagine. These two factors, along with already elaborated interest of Democritus' piedecessois in Indian thoughts, would make it haid to durap the allegation of the Gieek philosophei's Indian visit. Cyril Bailey adraitted that Deraocritus' trip to India is "nothing iraprobable" and Democritus' "contemplative retirements during which he lived in tombs" would have been "derived from Eastem sages" but admitted that "it is difficult to trace any oriental influence in the main notion of his philosophy" (110). One needs to analyze Democritus' philosophica! concepts closely and compare them with mainly Buddhist and some other Indian thoughts to find out that Bailey's negation of Eastem influence on Democritus might be a hasfy conclusion. The comparatve analysis of Democritos' concepts and Indian thoughts may be initiated with attention to his idea of happiness and the Buddhist theory of raenta! WellBeing, The happy state of mind for Democritus is a specia! kind of attainment, which he called "Well-Being, or cheerfalness, or sometimes negatively, Freedom from Disturbance, Freedom from Alarm, Freedom from Wonder" (Freeraan, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 102), Other synonyras given to this higher state of mind were harraony, symmetry, undismayedness, and serenity of spirit, This happiness, which "does not dwell in flocks of cattle or in gold," resides only inside human soul," Importantly, "tliis is the best condition for man, and it is attained only by effort" (Freeraan, Pre-Socratic Philosophers 102). Cicero recognized this highest mental state as "the supreme good cheerfulness."" The fact that Democritus wrote freaties on this subject-0 Contentment

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ofSpirit and On Cheerfulness or Well-Being-indica.tes that his highest raenta! achievement was a broad concept, and he had rauch to say about it. Clearly, he maintained a theory of undistarbed raental happiness, which individuals need to find within themselves, not in the materia! world. Buddhist Nirvana was, probably, behind Democritas' mental "Well-Being" and his path to that level. As afready discussed, Empedocles gained only a vague knowledge of Nirvana through his mere hearing of the Buddha's life, but Democritas was in India probably in direct toucU witU BuddUist teacUers and practtioners, so Ue could have obtained a more complete loiowledge of the Buddhist concept of happiness. As noted in the discussion of Erapedocles' and the Buddha's concepts of purifcation, achieving happiness was the raain bliss witU Nirvana. "TUere is indeed a world exclusively Uappy," proclaimed tUe Buddha," answering the repeated inquiry of a curious listener, but "world" was itself a rUetorica! expression wUich meant one's own mind. Entering the happy world meant attainment of happiness within oneself The concept of happiness was so intenelated with Nirvana that the word happiness itself was identica! with the Buddhist highest achievement. "Nirvana is the greatest happiness"'" is the most famous utterance of the Buddha about tiis ultimate achievement. To highlight tie incomparable happiness in Nirvana, the Buddha constantly used such words as serenify of heart," sublime and exquisite Uappiness," peacefalness, mental franquiUify," highest bliss,'' and fearlessness." Deraocritas' application of sirailar words to define his raental Well-Being indicates the nearaess of his concept to Nirvana both in appearance and inner meaning.

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Again, Democritas' use of negative attributes to define his concept of higher happiness brings him another step closer to Buddhist Nir\'ana As discussed before, it has been a long practice fri tie Indian fraditon of thought to present some concepts in negatve terms. Following the sarae pattera, early Buddhists defined tie "state to be attained" in negative terms. (Thomas 132). "BIiss of Freedom"* is tie key word here: they commonly recognized the attainment of Nirvana as freedom from distarbance," fear,'^ doubt," and sonow.'^ Freedom from disturbance, alarm, and wonder in Democntus" higher happiness raakes his concept alraost identcal with Buddhist Nirvana. Deraocritas' eraphasis that one needs to acliieve the ultimate happiness through one's own effort'' raakes this concept raore attuned to Buddhist Nirvana. According to the Buddha, this highest leve! of happiness was not a divine revelation or a gift since no such divine power was recognized in Buddhism but a pure self-acquisition through selfendeavor. "You yourself raust raake the effort; the Buddhas are only teachers'' was his advice." Democritas maintained the same principle: rejecting any divine power or a creator behind sensua! phenomenon, he recognized the highest happiness as one's own success with one's own effort. This assertion, again, clearly conesponds to the Buddhist emphasis on human power and skill over any invisible force behind sensua! phenomenon, One may now observe the most remarkable similarify between the Buddha's and Democritos' ways to the highest happiness. The Buddha pointed out that virtae. concenttation, and wisdora would lead one's way to Nirvana, but his raost obvious and initial concem was to reject extteme sensua! gratification advocated by his contemporary

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materialists and asceticism promoted by Jains and some Ajivikas. Witi ttiis preoccupation in mind, he made the following statement: There are two exfremes, from which one who leads Ufe to happmess must abstain from. What are those two exttemes? One is the hfe of pleasure, devoted to desfre and enjoyment. This Ufe is base, ignoble, unspiritaal, unworthy, unreal. TTie otheris the Ufeof self-mortification. It is gloomy, unworthy, unreal. I am removed from both of these exfremes and have discovered the way which Ues between thera: the middle way, which enhghtens the eyes, enUghtens the mind, and leads to rest, to knowledge, to enUghtenment, to Niivana." Both self-indulgence in pleasuie and self-moitification in various foims of asceticism weie thus lejected by the Buddha as fatile means to achieving happiness. The balanced path between the two exfremes was the Buddha's cleai choice foi achieving Nirvana. Democritus" similar statement runs as follows: For man joy arises from moderation in indulgence and harmony of Ufe. The "too Uttle' of enjoyment as well as the "too much" of enjoyment is bad because it uses to tum around and engender great suffering in the souL'* He clearly rejects both extravagance and denial of sensual enjoyment as hindrances to one's mental WeU-Being. Of course, "restraint" (Sophrosyne) was afready in use with Xenophones' writings to mean self-conttol, but Democritus was probably the fiist Greek philosopher to have ever discussed theoreticaUy a middle path between self-indulgence in and self-deprivation of pleasure. This theory was also one of Democritus' key concepts not only because it connected to his main teaching of mental Well-Being, but also because it was repeated in several of his fragments." The exfraordinary nature of his concept Ues not in itself but in its connection to Democritus' highest happiness, which.

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sirailai to Buddhist Niivana, was itself a theorized concept-"the best condition of man" (Fieeman, Pre-Socratic Philosopher 3\6)-not the happiness of oidinaiy life. It seems fltat Democritas inttoduced to Gieece the path to Buddhist Niivana, peihaps aftet diopping frs high spiritaal value that would not suit the Gieek sociefy. It is well-known that Buddhist wisdom means one's ability to see Tanha (ciaving, gieed, desiie, attacUraent, etc.) as tUe primaiy cause of mental dissatisfaction. Bhava Tanha and Vibhava Tanha, wUich means desiie foi existence and desiie foi selfannihilation aftei death, found their place in Buddhism as the Buddha and his contemporary disciples strove to reject both the theory of the soul advocated by the etemalists and the theory of non-existence proraoted by materialists wUo discarded all moral values. The other kind of clinging in Buddhism is Kama Tanha, endless desire for possession of material objects and sensual gratification. This is the craving that the early Buddhism cited as the greatest hindrance to mental Well-Being: From craving springs grief; frora craving springs fear. For him [or her] who is wholly free frora craving, there is no grief much less fear.' Wherefore better than wealth is wisdom by which one here secures accorapIisUraent [attainment of utmost happiness]" These beings who are not yet devoid of attachment to sensual pleasures, pursue them. The more their craving for sensual pleasure increases, the more they bum with the fever for sensual pleasures. Moreover, there is only a sony leUef and satisfaction to be had of the five stiands of sensual pleasuie.'^ Thus craving was recognized in Buddhism as the major disturbance to highest happiness. Craving would breed grief, sonow, lamentation, or whatever word that reflects unsatsfactory mental reacton. Therefore, holding the rein of craving would be the most

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appropriate and essental requirement to elirainate suffering and acquire menta! WellBeing. Democritas' repeated empUasis of tUe same point-craving as the breeding cause of dissatisfaction and restraint of craving as the gateway and path to happiness-is again identical with the Buddhist teaching: The best way for a man to lead his Ufe is to have been as cheerfa! as possible and to have suffered as little as possible. TUis could Uappen if one did not seek one's pleasure in mortal things." Men fnd happiness neither by means of the body nor through possession, but through uprightness and wisdom.'" AII who derives pleasures from the stomach, overstepping due season in eating or drinking or sexual pleasure, have pleasures that are but brief and short lived, that is, only while they are eatng and drinldng, but pains that are many. For this desire is always present for the same things, and when people get what they desire, the pleasure passes quickly, and they have nothing good for themselves except a brief enjoyment; and then again the need for the same things retara . . .'* Obviously, Democritas repeatedly asserts that craving is the cause of suffering and moderation is the way to get rid of it. In fragment 189, he, quite uniquely for a Greek, goes onto suggest that mortal things would give no pleasure at all. In fragment 235, ephemera! pleasure in sensua! satisfaction and its eventoa! dissatisfaction are clearly recognized. He goes fiirther with an exceptonally strange suggeston for Greeks: not to be engaged in "many activities, both private and public": TUe man wUo wisUes to have serenify in spirit should not engage in raany activities, either private or public, nor choose activities beyond his power and natura! capacify. He raust guard against this.. . A reasonable falUiess is better than overfalhiess."

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Ostensibly, there were no causes in the Greek sociefy to discourage people towards worldly pleasure and to make them less actve both in persona! and govemmental level. "The Greeks were a happy, not a gloomy race. They enjoyed life to the fall when it could be enjoyed, and saw no reason why they should do other wise" (Freeman, God, Man and State 70). Only philosophers introduced the concept of moderation, and in Heracleitos' fragments, one finds, for the first time, tie reraarks about moderation. Democritos' wandering in India could have helped him follow this concept exactly in the same way as early Buddhists interpreted it. "Less is more" was a comraon Indian concept and a specifc Buddhist thought. "Contentment" pervaded through all Buddhist teachings as an essential prerequisite to the ultimate happiness. The following is just one exaraple from many: He who is sldlled in his good and who wishes to attain that state of Calm should act thus: . . Contented, easily supportable, with few duties, of light liveliUood, controlled in senses, not impudent, not be greedily attacUed to families." PerUaps, Democritas could not use in Greece some portions of the wisdom his probably bonowed from the Buddhist sources. Apparently, he needed to be aware of the Greek socia! conditions with which his teaching should match. In Greece there were no special groups of people who were fally dedicated to the achieving of the ultimate happiness so that his audience was the coramon public. Theiefoie, it was a necessify foi him to farthei modeiate the Buddhist modeiaton, which, in its original foim, would be a bit harder for the Greek public. Democritas' statements "One should not be engaged in activites beyond one's natural skiU and abilify" and "Reasonable fallness is better than

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overfallness" are, apparently, softened forms of the Buddhist moderation, in which no pursuit of woridly success or raateria! fallness was recommended for the happinessseeker within his or her own lifetme. Similarly, Indian ralers did not expect any duty to tUe state from tUe pursuer of Uappiness, but in Greece, states were mucU closer to the life of the public, and Democritas, quite predictably, Uad to menton tUat need as well. However, beUind tUese differences caused by tUe different socia! conditions in Greece, tUe sarae path to happiness-the path with fewer dutes and much contentment-seems to prevai! in both the Buddha's and Democritus' philosophies. It is fiirther revealing tUat some of tUe wise sayings that were associated with the Buddhist concept of the highest happiness can also be found in Democritas' teaching in exactly the same foim. These similarities aie numeious, but only a few of them raay be cited heie: The Buddha: Friend, I do proclaim that in this very fathom-Iong body, with its perception and consciousness, is the universe, the arising of the universe, the cessation of the universe, and the path leading to the cessation of the universe." Democritus: Man is a universe in little microcosm." TUe BuddUist concept tUat every individua! is a universe originated in tUe BuddUa's and Uis contemporary disciples' endeavor to reject any exteraal power that would grant salvation for the human being. Buddhism asserted that happiness exists within oneself, and one can find it with one's own effort. Apparently, Deraocritas raeant the same emphasis in his short fragment since he also clairaed that happiness could be found within individual.

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The Buddha: behold this beautifal body, a raass of sores, a heaped-up lump, diseased, much thought of, in which nothing lasts, nothing persist. Of bones is tUis cify made, plastered witUflesUand blood. Herein are stored decay, deatU, conceit, and detraction. Deraocritus: Inside we are a complex store-Uouse and treasury of ills, witU many possibilites of suffering." TUe BuddUa asserted tUe impermanent, sonowfa! state of tUe body to convince Uis listeners that sensua! gratificaton did not provide ultimate happiness. The stronger one gets attached to the body the more one experiences dissatisfaction. Democritus also emphasized moderation in worldly Ufe and, probably, Ue also drew attenton to tUe importance of menta! Well-Being by UigUIigUting tUe sickness and sonowfa! nature of tUe body. TUe BuddUa: Here he rejoices, Uereafter Ue rejoices. In botU states tUe well-doer rejoices. He rejoices, exceedingly rejoices, perceiving the purity of his own deeds. Here he suffers, hereafter he suffers. In both states the evil-doer suffers. Thinking, "Evil have I done," he suffers. He suffers farther after going to an evil state.'^ Democritus: The cheerfal man, who is impelled towards works that are just and lawfal, rejoices by day and by night, and is sttong and free from care. But the man who neglects justice, and does not do what he ought, find all such things disagreeable when he reraerabers any of thera, and he is afraid and torments himself" Self-consciousness about virtae and sin as a determinant factor of mental Well-Being and suffering respectively is highlighted in both quotations. The Buddhist concept that one's own righteousness and sin deterraine one's o'wn inner happiness and sonow finds it roots in the old Karraa theory. Volitiona! deeds, botU wUolesorae and unwUoIesorae, do not remain inactve throughout one's OWTI life only to release a tonent of subsequent effects

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in one's after-deatU existence. Instead, some Karmas begin to be effective ever since tUose Karmas are committed, and one's own rejoicing and lamentation tUrough the ramination of those Karmas is, essentially, a part of immediately noticeable Kaimic effects. The same concept of rausing ovei one's own wholesome and unwholesome deeds and the subsequent acquisition of innei exultaton and agony is highlighted in Democritus' fragment quoted above. To conclude in legaid to the Buddhist influence on Democritus, two unusually similar episodes from the Buddha's and Empedocles' lives may now be compared. According to a Buddhist story, a young mother Gotami, who was overwhelraed with grief caused by the death of her little son, approacUed tUe BuddUa and requested him to restore the life of her dead son. The Buddha, realizing Uer sonowfal condfrion, told Uer that the child could be cured if she would bring a handfa! of mustard seeds from a home where no death had occuned. Overjoyed at the prospect of having her son restored to Ufe, Gotami ran from Uouse to Uouse begging for some raustard seeds. Everybody was willing to Uelp Uer, but sUe could not find a single horae where death had not occuned. As the day dragged on, she realized that hers was not the only faraily that had faced death and that there were more people dead than living. As soon as sUe realized tUis, Uer atttude towards Uer dead son cUanged; she was no longer attached to the dead body of her son and she realized Uow simply tUe BuddUa Uad taugUt Uer a most important lesson: everything that is bom eventually raust die." Much relieved, sUe buried Uer dead son and returaed to tUe BuddUa's raonastery. TUe Buddha told her, "Gotami, you should not think that you are the only one who has lost a

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son, As you have now realized, deatU comes to all beings, Before tUeir desires are satated, deatU takes tUem all away."'* Julian reported tUe following episode from Democritas' life: It is said tUat Democritus, being unable to console Darius for the death of his beautfal wife, promised to bring her back from the dead, if the king was willing to provide everytUing necessary. WUen Ue told Uim to spare notUing wUicU he possessed, Democritus reaffirmed Iiis promise, and then after a little said tUat everytUing necessary had been supplied, except one tUing wUich he could not provide, but which Darius, the king of al! Asia, could no doubt find without difficulfy. And when Darius asked what this thing was, which it was granted only to the king to know, Democritas said that if he could inscribe on his wife's tomb the names of three people who knew no grief, she would immediately retum to life, consttained by tUe nature of tUe spell. And wUen Darius, after long pondering, was unable to find anyone wUo Uad not suffered some misfortune, Democritas laugUed in Uis cUaracteristic way and said, "WUy tUen, most foolisU of men, do you grieve just as if you alone had such sonow, when you cannot find one who has ever lived wUo is witUout his own grief?""* Similarity between tUe two episodes is never a question, but tUe immediate impression one would get from these two stories is the realistic tone of the Buddha's dealing with Gotami and the highly artificial and improbable nature of Deraocritas' persuasion of Darius to accept death of his (Darius') wife. A docile, powerless, and ignorant woman such as Gotami would easily leam a lesson from the Buddha's approach to the sitoation, but the eraperor Darius' reacton to the similar situaton set by Deraocritus would be altogether different. The powerfal, independent, and knowledgeable king would clearly take the situation as an insult, and Deraocritos, a clear object of royal indignaton, would hardly retura home aUve to tell Uis story. Highly unrealistic nature of Democritas' stor>' would make one conclude tUat sucU an episode never took place.

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TUe most probable conclusion raay be tUat Democritus Uiraself took tUe BuddUa's place in tUe story that he heard frora Indian Buddhist sources and reconstracted it in such a way that he would present hiraself in the character of the Buddha. Gotami and her son in the original story probably became Darius and his wife in the new version, and the handfal of mustard seeds frora a house where no death had taken place was transformed into the names of three persons who had never experienced grief, but the rest of the storv' reraained almost tUe sarae. BotU tUe BuddUa and Democritus offered Uelp to persons who are lamenting over death of thefr beloved, expected their subjects to leam about invincible death with self-experience and self-conviction, and employed indirect means to awaken their subjects to the trath. In the end, both elaborated their intended moral lessons, which they previously allowed their subjects to realize. An actoal repetton of tUe exceptonally unique Buddhist story is highly iraprobable, particularly in the Persian court with Democritos, who was perhaps returning frora India, as the main character. Despite all these Buddhist characteristcs present in Democritos' teaching, he apparently did not depend entirely on Buddhist sources alone to constract his many-sided philosophy. Instead, he probably stodied several other Indian schools of thought and readily bonowed whatever he found enticing araong those schools. This probable tendency-the tendency to bonow frora whatever source-was quite distinctve in Deraocritos who genuinely believed that one with interest in philosophy should boti leam from others and share one's own wisdom with tie wise persons in a foreign country:

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Wise men when visitfrig a foreign land must silently and quietly reconnoiter while tie\ look and listen to find out the refataton of flie wise men there: what fliey are like, and if fliey can hold tieir own before tiem while they secretly weigh tiefr words agamst iefr own in iefr nfrnds. When they have weighed and seen which group is better than the other. then they should make known the riches of tieir own wisdom, so tiat they raay be prized for the sake of the freasure which is their properfy, while they enrich otheis from fr. But if theii knowledge is too small to allow then to dispense from it, they should take from the otheis and go thefr way." While tiis statement piovides usefal advice for tiose who intend to leam in foreign lands, it also reflects Democritus' own atttode towards his own leaming. One may need to compare other views of Democritus with popular Indian thoughts during his time to f nd out to what extent Democritus himself practiced what he recommended for others. Democritos' theory of the soul, from the Greek point of view, was an extraordinary concept indeed. He maintained that soul consists of two parts: intellect and the non-rational. The intellectual part resides in the bosom while the non-rational part is spread in the whole body. Breathing would prevent the soul frora being squeezed out. However, the entfre soul perishes with bodily death. An interesting question that would arise here is: "Why did the atomist, who moved a step fiirthei from elements of Empedocles, legiess to the concept of soul?" It has afready been observed that Empedocles found no subte entify as the soul when he declared that the body is made of four elements, but Democritos, who would, predictably, confirm Empedocles' view even more aggressively since his atoms are more scientific than Empedocles' elements, has, instead, retumed to an idealistic myth by constracting a strange kind of a soul, The

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answer to this curious question may lie in Democritos readiness to bonow any enticing concept from whatever source, Even though Buddhism rejected an invisible entify in the body, other popular Indian traditions maintained a variefy of soul concepts with which Deraocritos' concept of soul shares a remarkable resemblance, Particularly, the belief that the soul consists of mind and intellect was an Upanishadic concept, The Taittiriya Upanishad said that within the sheath of the vital breath (prana), a maintenance-force of the soul, lies mind (manomayakos) in tUe sUape of the huraan body, and within mind lies tUe inteUect (vijnana)." Also, Democritos' belief tUat breathing maintains soul" closely reserables the "vital breath" in the Taittiriya Upanishad. So, the influence of the Upanishads on Deraocritos' theory of the soul is also noticeable, Similarly, the belief that individual soul perishes after bodily death is a preBuddhistic Indian concept that emerged in the raidst of this highly-contested straggle between idealists and ratonalists. WUen some ratonalist groups such as Ajivikas rejected soul completely, the Brahmin ttaditon challenged this rejection, emphasizing that body could not be maintained or actvated without the soul. A choice left for rationalists in tUis contenton was to accept soul as long as body continues to exist: Since, Sir, this soul has form, is build up of the four elements, and is the offspring of father and mother, it is cut off, desttoyed, on the dissolution of the body, and does not continue after death, and then, Sir, the soul is completely aiinihilated.'" By the tme Democritos went to India, these debates weie still at theii high pitch, and Democritus would have gained immense benefit from them. His own concept that "soul

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is mortal, and that it perishes witi the body"" is exactly the same concept of this lationalistic gioup. Finally, tUere is the atomic theory, the important scientific concept that Democritus allegedly bonowed from Leucippus and then developed by himself AIso, connected to the sarae theory are the two forms of knowledge-conventonal and absolutewhich defmed the sensory phenoraenon and the inner trath of the sensoiy impiession lespectvely. It is a well-known fact that ancient Indian thinkeis also held an atomic theory and a concept of two traths, but the main concera here is to find out in what land these theories originated first and who influence whom. Bailey, responding to Arthur B. Keith who raised the issue, made the following comments: If there was then an old atomic tradition in India, fr may be that sorae inkling of it Uad penetrated to Greece, eitUer, as tUe legend of MocUus would suggest, by way of PUoenicia, or possibly through lonian colonies, but there is certainly no reason for supposing that Leucippus owed any direct debt to it, or that he is other than an "original thinker" in the sense that he evolved his Atomism for himself as the direct outcome of the theories of his Greek predecessors. (65) This passage raakes two clear assertions. First, Leucippus was original in his atomic theory even though the old Indian atomic tradition had already penetrated into Greece through Phoenicia or Persia. Second, Leucippus' atomic theory was an evolution of the theories of his Greek predecessors. The underlying assuraption behind these two statements is that the early penefration of the Indian theory of atoms would be virtually insignificant and simply negligible for the origin of the Greek atomic theory since Greek predecessors of Leucippus had already prepared a natoral environment, one that was

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perfectly conducive to the evolution of the theory of atoms, for Leucippus to evolve his theory. Bailey's firm conviction that there was an original, related tradition in Greece for Leucippus to develop his theoiy of Atoraisra makes him (Bailey) dismiss the penetrated Indian concept of atoms as an utterly insignificant source of influence for Leucippus. However, the stated reason of this claim seeras highly questionable. As already elucidated, Erapedocles, the nearest predecessor of Leucippus' atoraic theory, seems to have leamed from Indian thinking just as most of his own predecessors were apparently accustomed to, and therefore, the phrase "evolved. .. as a direct outcome of the theories of his Greek predecessors" may not fit to describe Leucippus' theory of atoms. Since raost of the theories of previous Greek thinkers seem to be of foreign origin, the idea of evolution is unlikely for Leucippus' tUeory. On tUe other hand, to assume that Leucippus could have bonowed since his predecessors consistently bonowed is a better hypothesisand a better non-sequitur-than to believe tUat Leucippus did not bonow even tUough his predecessors consistently bonowed. The concept of atomism began to evolve in India at least since the seventh century B.CE,, and, ostensibly, Leucippus and Democritus, following Erapedocles' bonowing of the concept of elements, took Atomism from the Indian sources. Several centories later, however, Greece returaed the polished form of the same theory to India when Greeks and Indians maintained direct political, cultural, and social relatonships. Later Buddhist, Hindu, and Jain traditons constantly employed tiis renewed theory of atoraisra to defend their own concepts. This tendency can be attributed to the increasing Greek influence on

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India during Maurya period. However, what Indian received frora the Greeks could be a remodel of what Greeks took frora India a few centories earlier: In Greece tUe docttine [of atoms] was not merely one of a small scUooI; the adoptation of it by the Epicureans raised it into a widespread belief, and it would be inatonal to deny that it might easily have been conveyed to India, just as Greek astronomy and asttology unquestionably were. The natare of such bonowings is often misunderstood; the mere adoptation without alteration of an opinion would be whoUy un-Indian; though we know that Greek astronomy was bonowed, we find it was recast in an entirely un-Greek fashion, and so changed and developed were Greek mathematics that the bonowing has often been ignored. It is no argument against bonowing then that the Greek doctrine that the secondary qualities were not inherent in the atoras was not accepted, and that the motion of the atoms was ascribed, as early as Pracastapada at least, to a creator. On the other hand, the raost peculiar part of tUe Indian doctrine, which finds that the smallest thing processing magnitade must be made up of three double atoms, and which has, therefore, been claimed as disproving Greek origin, is no original part of the system. (Keith 17) So, what Keith suggests in this passage, as well as in many places in his book, is the possibility tUat Atomisra first went to Greece from India, and later India adopted tUe modified form of tUe same tUeory from Greece. 'WhiIe asserting the legitiraacy of Keith's claim, one raay now examine the history of Indian Atomisra and compare Indian concepts related to Atomism with its Greek counterparts in order to justfy the soundness of Keith's assumption. Considering the likely background for such a concept, nowhere else other than in India could the theory of Atomism have originated. The concept of Brahma, the earliest idealistic rayth in India and the absolute trath behind the sensory world, attained raaturity, holding within itself the origin for atoraic developraent. A challenge to this concept would prepare the conditions for iraraediate germinaton of these seeds. Of course, it

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happened-the challenge took place-more intensely than expected. Skeptcs, materialists, and some schools within the Brahmin tradition itself poured water and provided fatile soil and ligUt for atomic seeds to germinate and grow. TUe BraUrain assertion that the visual worid is an illusion is an early step in the sarae process, yet Brahrain traditon felt that they raust provide raore conclusive support if they were to defend the Brahma: "Bring me a fhiit of that Nyagrodha (banyan) tree." "Here it is, Sir." "Break it." "It is broken, Sir." "What do you see there." "These seeds, exceedingly small, Sir." "Break one of these, my son [pupil]." "It is broken, sir." "What do you see there?" "Nothing at all, Sir." "That subtle essence [suksma anu], my dear, which you do not perceive therefrom that very essence this great Nyagrodha arises. Now that which is the subtle essencein it all that exists has its self That is the trath. That is the self That thou art.'"^ One raay clearly observe the early stage of atomism in these, and many similar, lines. The idea behind the conversation is to prove that an invisible essence, which the master Brahmin in the conversation means to call the Brahraa, exists behind sensory phenomenon as the origin of the phenomenon world. That essence is called suksma anu (subtle essence), which came to know as just anu (essence) orparama anu (ultimate essence) at the developed stage of the theory. There is also evidence that the dissenters of the Brahmin tradition used the same theory of atoms to deny any permanent entfy in the individual and beyond-sensory phenomenon. However, as afready discussed, any original texts of those fraditions do not

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exist since no tradition survived to preserve thera. It needs to be mentioned here that, if the Buddhist text Samajjaphala Sutta did not preserve the two theories of elements-flie theories that were discussed above in the secton of Empedocles, no fraces would be found about that all-important theory. Buddhist texts or any other ttaditon did not preserve any fragments of the eariy Indian atomism of the materialistic fraditon so that one may have to reconstract that theory with the help of later references to it. As A. L. Basham has already suggested, the theories of elements found in the Buddhist Samajjaphala Sutta contain "a very primitve atomism" (91). Here, the elements are not created, empfy, immovable, and the same (74). These adjectves are more suitable to describe what is within elements rather than elements themselves. This suggestion is confirmed by the evidence found in some secondary sources that refer to a Southem atomic theory of Ajivika school, a pre-Buddhistic ascetic tradition: The three chief Tamil sources, Manimekalai, Nilakeci, and Civananacittiyar, all declare that, according to Ajivika doctrine, there are five immutable atomic elements (anu orporul): earth, air, water, fire, and life (uyir ocivam). Manimekalai, however, the oldest of these sources, adds, "but joy and sonow, these two are atoms." (Bashara 91) This evidence suggests that an atoraic theory actually existed in India before Democritas went to India and before Leucippus adopted the theory. As far as the available evidence indicates, the Brahmin traditon emphasized a single essence or anu behind huraan body and sensual objects while materialists and Ajivikas recognized the elements as iramutable atomic units. Thus, the eailiest India atomic concepts has loots "going back to a very early period, perhaps as far as the sixth centary B.C. or before" (Smart 235), and it is

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possible that these early stages of Indian Atomism had reached an advanced level by the time Leucippus and Democritus contacted with it. Finally, there is the concept of conventon and realify wUicU Leucippus was said to Uave talked about and Democritas elaborated. Deraocritas maintained that all forms of sensory recognition are conventional, and in reality only atoras and void exist: "By convention sweet and by convention bitter, by convention Uot, by conventon cold, by conventon color; but in reality atoms and void."" However, Ue did not always cite atoras as tUe ultimate trath behind sensory phenomenon. According to Sextas, Democritas' bastard knowledge is subject to senses while genuine knowledge is acquired through thought (147). One may conclude tiat, while dealing with epistemological topics, he interpreted the genuine knowledge less scientifically than in terms of atoms. What is obvious is the presence of the twofold knowledge in the Indian systera of thought since as early as the early sixth century B.C.E. This concept, as far as the extant texts indicate, originated in the Upanishads and spread towards Charvaka and other unorthodox schools, Jainism, and Buddhisra, With all Indian fraditions displaying a wider interest in it, the theory of knowledge itself reached a highly coraplex and advanced stage. The Mundaka Upanishad, gave an earliest example of the twofold knowledge as follows: Two kinds of knowledge raust be known. They are the higher knowledge and the lower knowledge. Of those two, the lower knowledge is the Rig Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, the Atharva Veda, phonetcs, ritaals, grammar, etymology, mefre, and asfronoray; the higher knowledge is that by which the iraperishable Brahraa is attained.'"

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As Nikhilananda explained, the lower knowledge given in these verses is "the knowledge of the phenoraenon world. In reality it is ignorance, for it does not lead to the Highest Good" (263). The higher knowledge is the realization of the Brahraan which transcends the phenomenon world. The Jain tradition interpreted the twofold knowledge under immediate knowledge, gained directly through consciousness, and mediate knowledge gained with the help of memory and sensory perception. Buddhism advocated a pragmatic approach to the theory of knowledge, but implied tUat tUe sensory perception is tUe conventional knowledge and tUe deep understanding is the genuine knowledge: A being! Why seize upon this word? A wrong word Mara [death personified] sure has. A mere heap of conditions Where no being can be found. As when, with all its parts assembled, "Chariot" is the word then used. So, when the aggregates exist One speak of "being" by conventon.'* Here, the concept of conventional and actual trath is clearly apparent. Anguttara Nikaya Attakata, the commentary to the text in which the above lines appear reraarked tUat the word "individual refers to conventional speech, not to absolute speech. Twofold is the teaching of the Buddha: conventonal teaching and the absolute teaching."" Tlie absolute teaching means the impermanent, sonowfal, soulless constitaents of the being. \t is thus evident tiat Democritus' concept of the bastard knowledge and the genuine knowledge have been present in the India systera of thought since at least the sixth centory B.CE. Atoms as tie genuine trath was, however, widely held by Ajivikas, and it is possible that

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Democritus prefened this theory to others which had already penetrated to Greece. It was discussed previously that the Eleatic tradition, the Pythagorean tradition, and Empedocles had held Being, the soul, and sonowlessness as the uUimate traths. AIso, Empedocles earlier held that permanent eleraents are the trath behind the sensory world. Democritos probably prefened to all other theories, as it is quite natural, the concept of atoras, the latest model of the absolute trath in the Indian tradition. So, Democritas might be a syncretist who apparently bonowed from whatever Indian source even though his philosophical concepts closely follow the Buddhist teaching. Democritas' importance in the development of sophist rhetoric probably lies not only in Uis bonowing of rational concepts tUat were eraployed by Protagoras in his rhetoric, but also in the interest he enkindled in Protagoras in his (Protagoras') search for more rational concepts and rhetorical raethods bred in Indian ratonalistc ttaditons, The next chapter of the present dissertaton includes the sectons about how Protagoras could have leamed more from Indian sources apart from how he closely foUowed what Democritus has already leamed from Indian practices.

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Notes ' DK3I A5; Al; A19. ' DK31B15.

' DK3I B2. " DK31 B17. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 74. ' Ibid. ' See Theodor Gomperz's Greek Thinkers, Vol. I (London: John Munay, Albemarle Street, 1901) 231. "The 'four elements' which compose and preserve the world, now surviving merely in folklore and poetry, have a long and glorious history. . . Nevertheless, it was devoid from the start of all intrinsic justfication. It obviously rest on the cradest possible confasion, for we shall hardly be asked to prove that it reverts in the last instance to the distinction of the three states of aggregaton-the solid, fluid and gaseous-and tUat tUe fourtU element wUicU was tUe raere accessory of a process, and was nothing but the phenoraenon, so dazzling to tUe senses, wUicU accorapanies corabustion. TUe mistake was to regard tUe fandamental forms of substance as Uomogeneous kinds and as tUe only fandamental kinds of substance." ' DK31 Al. ' Middle-length Sayings 11, p. 37. ' DialoguesoftheBuddha l,p. 223. " Kindred Sayings V, p. 420. " " DK31B124. DK31 B121.

'" DK31B136. '' DK31 BI45. " DK 31 BI44. See this franslaton and cornraents in M.R. Wright Empedocles: the Extant Fragments, ed. (New Haven: Yale Universify Press, 1981), 288.

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" "

Gradual Sayings I, p. 34. DK31B136.

" DK31 B137. ^ Dialogues ofthe Buddha /, p. 180. " DK31B128.

^^ The Buddha's very first speech includes a soliloquy, a paean, which occurs in the Dhammapada (10 153-154) and a poetical dialogue given in the Entreaty (Kindred Sayings I, p. 171-176) and in the Ariyapariyesana Sutta (Middle-length Sayings 1, p. 212-215). " Homer ttanslated "ye sotavanta pamucantu saddham" as "let them give forth their faith," but the word saddham does not mean faith. Faith itself was absent in early Buddhism, and the best EnglisU rendering for saddham should be confidence. Narada Maha Thera's franslation as "Let those who have ears repose with confidence" seems conect. See his The Buddha andHis Teachings, 4th ed. (Colombo 1980), 67. " DK31 B112. " Uiid.

" Middle-length Sayings /, p. 215. " n3id.,p. 213. " Clement of Alexandria, Stromateis 1.72.

Dhammapada 153. " DK31B117.

" Dhammapada 153. " DK31 B121.

" Middle-length Sayings 1, p. 212. " " DK31B114. DK31B113.

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"

Middle-length Sayings 1, p. 212.

DK31 B l l . According to H. Diels' and W. Kranz's grouping of Empedocles' fragments, this fragment belongs to On Nature. However, M. R. Wright believed tiat it should be in Purifications. Empedocles: the Extant Fragments (New Haven: Yale Universify Press, 1981), 268. " " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 74. AsItWasSaid,p. 144.

" Dhammapada 97. "' ftid., 422-423. "^ As It Was Said, p. 144. "' DK3IB146. "" DK31 B147. "' Dhammapada 153. "' DK68B299. "' Sttabo, Geog7-aj3A;;^703. "* Diogenes Laertius, IX 35. "' Hippolytos, Refutation ofAllHeresies 1.13. ' Aelian, Miscellaneous History IV. 20. " " DK68BI70-171. Cicero, De Finibus V. 29. 30

" Middle-length Sayings II, p. 233. " Dhammapada 204. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 92. " Middle-length Sayings II, p. 69.

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" fljid., p. 126. " " n)id.,p. 189. Middle -length Sayings II, p. 96.

* Middle -length Sayings II, p. 290. " " As It Was Said, p. 144. The Dhammapada 205.

" njid.,414. " Ibid.,412. " " " " " DK68 B40, 191. Dhammapada 276. Samyutta Nikaya V, 420. DK68B191. DK 68 6102,189,211,285,286.

Dhammapada 216 Middle-length Sayings, p. 266. '^ n)id.,p. 187. " " DK68B189. DK68B40.

'' DK68B235. " DK68B3.

" Sutta Nipata, Metta Sutta. Gradual Sayings II, Trans. Bhikkhu Nanananda in Concept and Reality in Early Buddhist Thought (Kandy: Buddhist PubUcation Sociefy I97I), 83. Bhikkhu

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Nanananda translates "loka" as "world," but this word means both world and universe. Since the Buddha mean "everything outside" by the word loka, the best translation should be "the universe," DK68B34. ' Dhammapada 147. *' DK68B149. '^ Dhammapada 16-17. '^ DK68B174. '" The Dhammapada, trans. K. Sri Dhammananda (Kuala Lumpur: Sasana Abhiwurdhi Wardena Society, 1988), 238. " ftid.

" Minn, Epistles20\. " DK68B303. According to KatUIeen Freeman, TUeodor Gomperz beUeved tUis fragment to be genuine even though Diels and Kranz grouped it as spurious. Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press: 1948), 120n. ** Taittiriya Upanishad II. iii-iv. " Aristotle, On Respiration 470b28-30. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 46. " Plutarch, Epitome FV. 7. 4.

'^ Chandogya UpanishadVl. xii 1-3. " DK68B9.

'" Mundaka Upanishad \.i. 4-5. " An Anthology from the Samyutta Nikaya, trans. John D. freland. (Kandy: The Wheels, 1972), p 9. " Anguttara Nikaya Atuva I 94.

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CHAPTER D. BUDDHIST .^ND OTHER INT)LV< RATIONALIST INTLUENCES ON SOPHIST RHETORIC

From Deraocritas and Empedocles to Protagoras and Gorgias Empedocles and Democritus as Forefathers of Sophist Rationality The discussion in tie previous chapter has revealed that ratonal thought pertaining to epistemology, antiropology, and sociology had afready been present m Greek thought prior to tie sophist movement even though none of Uiose thinkers can clearly be grouped as ratonalists. Empedocles could be called a ratonalist if he were evaluated in terms of his On Nature alone, and so was Democritos whose approach to epistemology reflects a clear deviaton from metaphysics idealistic dogma. However, they both regressed to metaphysics and ideology, Empedocles in his later years and Democritus concunently, making fr hard to indude either of them in the category of ratonaUsts. In this sense, the modem Westera traditon seeras conect to recognize Protagoras, the disciple of Democritos, and Gorgias, the disciple of Empedocles, as the ftrst clearly recognizable rationalists in the Greek ttadition for their complete departure from idealism and metapUysics. The acceptance of Empedocles and Democritos as the foreranners of the Greek ratonaUst traditon apparenty justifies the pre\iousIy discussed theory of Hegal, Kerferd, and others: the theoiy that Gieek rational thought was an integral part of Greek

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philosophy. Howevei, the most notable inadequacy of this aigument lies in its disiegaid foi the piobable souices that shaped and piofoundly enriched Gieek philosophy itself and its ascending lationalist powei. As ttiis discussion Uas so fai UigUlighted, lational tiiougUt in pUiIosopUy Uad giadually gained giound in Gieek thinking not because natoial Gieek metaphysical and idealistic views paved tUe way foi such a development but because Gieek thinkeis may have closely followed an exteraal system in which idealism giadually gave way to lationalism. This vital point may go unnoticed in the widely accepted theoiy that Gieek lationality was an integial part of Greek pUilosophy. Probably tUe earliest Indian traditions to contribute to tUe development of Greek rational thought were not Buddhisra but mainly the pre-Buddhistic materialists and Ajivikas. The previous chapter discussed the possibilify tUat Empedocles' elements and Democritus' atoms could Uave been influenced by Indian sources. Along with those theories, rejection of a creator and after-death existence also probably entered Greece. Speculations were rejected in India not because scientific theories originated first; rather. scientific theories were created as some social groups strenuously searched for the better ways and means to reject the speculations that hurt certain social fractions. Therefore, the Indian theories of elements and atoms would have hardly left the original land without the rational inquiries which gave birth to those theories. Empedocles' rejecton of afterdeath existence and Democritus' rejecton of a creator are perhaps some examples that rational thinking in theology and epistemology also fraveled to Greece along with Indian theories of elements and atoms.

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The previous chapter also indicated the possibilify tUat tUe inital BuddUist contribution to the Greek thought was not ratonalify but ideology. Empedocles' concepts of human suffering and the sonowless existence after death and Democritus' highest state of happiness achieved within one's own lifetime were believably derived from BuddUist Nirvana. As already made clear, one cannot include Buddhism-or any natorally developed system of thought-in an artificial and arbitrary category such as ideology, metaphysics, or rationality. Any system of tUougUt tUat Uas developed naturally migUt contain idealistic, metapUysical, and rationalistc concepts, depending on tUe usefalness of tUose concepts to persuade social beings to certain ends. Besides, the influence of other corapeting systems of thought would also be inescapable for Buddhism, a new-bom social power in India during the sixth century B.C.E. Thus, amid its widespread rational thinking, Buddhism also maintained such idealistc concepts as Nirvana, wUicU were eye-catcUing to foreign observers. One raay argue tUat, even tUough Buddhism initially made imoads into Greek thinking with its idealistc views, tUe trend could have swung immediately, bringing in rational thought that dorainated the apparent idealistc outlook of early BuddUism.

The causes that Evaded the Comparison of Buddhist Ratonal Thought with Sophist Thinking As discussed previously, the issue of Buddhist influence on Greek ratonalify has escaped the attention of past scholars, and, notably, the raain reason for this unusual disregard of the most probable source of Greek ratonal thought may be the unpleasant

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Platonic mask that had covered the profound Greek rational appeal throughout history. This mask sttll remained fixed when the Westem scholars began to stody Buddhism during the late nineteenth century, and, having accepted the Platonic mask as the trae face of sophist thought, early Buddhist scholars of the modem age, quite predictably, never observed a similarity between Buddhism and sophist thought. In other words, traditional Greek definitions that sophist thinkers distorted the trath with mere verbal skill, and sophists were the impostors and money-mongers kept Buddhism clearly away from Greek sophist thinking. It is also interesting to find out that some later Buddhist traditions such as the Theravada presented the Buddha's contemporary ratonaUsts as very mucU similar to tUe traditonal Greek presentaton of sopUists, tUus persuading some recent BuddUist scholars to compare Greek sophist thought not with Buddhist concepts but with the views of the Buddha's contemporary ratonalists. According to BuddUagosa, tUe renowned TUeravada commentarian in the second centuiy A.D., Purana Kassapa who denied any moralify was a former slave who became a naked sage simply because his clothes were stolen during his ran-away saga,' and Makkhali Gosala, the nihiUst, was another slave who taught because he had nothing else to do.^ Epicuras' remarks that Protagoras was previously a porter whose skill in tying up bundles of wood raade Deraocritos select Protagoras as his secretar/ indicate that Greek fraditons also derided the ratonalists in a similar fasUion. TUe Brahmajala Sutta itself recognized tUe BuddUa's contemporary skeptcs as eelwrigglers wUo avoided questions because of tUefr ignorance and fear of giving wnrong

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answers." These derisive remarks bear aresemblance to the negatve deftnitions gi\en to Greek sophists by the Platonism. Such sfrnilar misinterpretatons of Greek sophists and fridian rationaUsts are tie background for several nineteenth-century Buddhist scholars to corapare Greek sophistry only with the views of the Buddha's contemporary ratonalists. Caroline Davids was one of the earliest writers to recognize several of the Buddha's contemporary ratonalist scUooIs as sopUistry. SUe categorized raoral skeptcs, logical skeptics, materialists, and Ajivikas under Indian sophistry (Buddhism 85). Making this comparison raore expUcit, Hermann Oldenberg, another early Westera Buddhist scholar, wrote: Certain phenomena, which developed themselves in the busy bustle of these ascetic and philosophizing circles, may be described as a species of Indian sophistic; wherever a Socrates appears, sophists cannot fail to appear. The conditions under which these sophistic arose are in fact quite sirailar to those which gave birth to taefr Greek counteipart. In the footsteps of those men, such as the Eleatics and the enigmatic Ephesian, who opened up the highways of thought with thefr simple and laige ideas, theie foUowed Goigiases and Piotagorases, and a whole host of tngenious, specious, somewhat fiivolous virtaosi, dealers in dialectic and rhetoric. In exactly the sarae way in India their came after the eamest thinkers of the masculine, classical period of Brahamenical speculation, a younger generation of dialecticians, professed conttoversialists witU an overweening raaterialist or skeptic air, wUo were not deficient in eitUer the readiness or the ability to show up all sides of the ideas if their great predecessors, to modify them, and to tum thera into their opposites. (68-69) Of course, Oldenberg was one of the earUest Westem scholars to notice the exact sraiilarify between Greek sophistry and Indian rationalisra, but, again, Uis comparison does not show admiration of either Greek sophists or Indian rationalists. Greek sophists were "the specious, flivolous vfrtoosi" and the Indian rationalists were the similar

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debaters who appeared after the earaest Brahrnin thinkers. Neither the Greek sophists nor Indian rationalists had been exonerated by the time Oldenberg made this comparison, and, as it is apparent, his remarks, as well as his exclusion of Buddhism from the Indian rationalist group, show how he was influenced by the derogative interpretations about Greek sophistry and the Indian rationahstic system. More recent Buddhist scholars, however, observed that the Buddha's contemporary rationalists were serious tUinkers, and that the Indian rationalists could not be compared to Greek sopUists, the fallacious reasoners and quibblers: It seeras desirable, therefore, that we have a clear idea of the meaning of the term 'sophist' before we apply it in the Indian context to refer to any of the thinkers mentioned in the Pali Canon. Its meaning derives from its usage in reference to the itinerant teachers of Athens in the Fifth century BC. These 'Gorgiases and Protagorases' as Oldenberg calls thera, were ffrst and foremost skeptics who denied the objectivity of knowledge and therefore the possibility of knowledge. They were also the first to found schools for the stody of rhetoric and reasoning. But since they did not believe that reasoning led to valid knowledge, tUey cuUivated and taugUt foi a fee the art of using fallacious reasoning meiely foi tae sake of victory in debate or discussion. Thus the Conscious Oxford Dictionary defines a sophist as an 'ancient Greek paid teacher of philosophy and rhetoric; captious or fallacious reasoner, quibbler' and sophism as a 'false argument' intended to deceive.' (JayatiIIeke 209) With this clarifcaton of sophists, JayatUeke quickly denied the suggeston that Indian ratonalists were similai to the sophists, saying, "Fiom oifr investgatons so fai we found that, with the possible exception of Sanjaya's school, theie was little evidence foi the existence of sophists in the Gieek sense of the teim" (230). Obviously, what raade JayatUeke leject the similarity benveen Greek sophists and Indian ratonalists is tUe pejorative Platonic misinterpretation of sopUists given in the Concise Oxford Dictionary,

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not any dissimilarify that actoally existed between the two traditions. With the most recent research and evaluatons, Greek sophists have now been exculpated to a greater extent and their reputation restored. They are no longer the spurious reasoners or quibblers but serious thinkers who stood against idealistc mytUs and metaphysical speculations that actoally hindered the progress of huraan tiinking. If this knowledge were available to JayatUeke, he would accept a closer sirailarify not only between Greek sophists and Indian ratonalists, but also witU Greek sopUists and the early Buddhists. So, the issue of Buddhist influence on Greek sophistry was never addressed mainly because of the attacks by the Platonic ttadition upon the much respectable sophistiy. The Gieek sophist ttadition, mistakenly identified as specious, was compared only with another inaccurately defined ttadition of Indian ratonalism, from wUicU BuddUism was carefally separated. Now tUat those marks have been reraoved and the original brightaess of sophistry has been restored, one can see Buddhism, as well as other Indian rationalist ttaditions, retain a close and honorable resemblance to the Greek sophistic ttaditon. Skeptcism, self-interest, and disrespect for moralify in Greek sophistry are strikingly similar with tae views of other ratonalist ttaditons of tUe Buddha's tirae, but most of the important ratonalistic concepts in Greek sophistry, including humanism and natural evoluton of the government, are closer only to the early Buddhist concepts. This closeness, just as the similarites discussed previously, may again be tteated as more than a mere coincidence.

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General Signs of Indian Influence on Protagoras and Gorgias Three factors may justify the possibilify that the unusual reserablance of Indian rationalist thoughts to Greek sophist thinking was caused by a connection between the two societies. Ffrst, Protagoras, the alleged father of Greek sophistry, was given Persian education, an easy route to the access of Indian wisdora. During Xerxes' invasion of Greece, Protagoras' father, an extteraely rich person in Abdera, entertained Xerxes and received the eraperor's perraission to educate Protagoras under Magi.* This report was supported by Herodotas' notes taat Xerxes, during his retura joumey, "stopped at Abdera and made a fact of friendship with thera [people in Abdera]."' As Untersteiner noted, Protagoras was a young child when Xerxes' visit to Abdera took place, and Protagoras education under Magi could have been ananged for a later date (2). Based on the ttaditonal practice of the pupil's visiting the master, one may conclude that Protagoras later went to Susa and stadied under Magi. This visit would have been more profitable for Protagoras since he would hardly miss Indian wisdom taose days in the centtal part of the Persian empire. On the other hand, wherever Protagoras was educated, knowledge coming from Persia could have included Indian tfrnking since Darius had afready accommodated, as the next chapter wiU elucidate, Indian wisdora in tie Persian erapire. Protagoras' Persian education seems to be a sttong support for his possible acquisition of Indian concepts fri epistemology and otier felds. Second, Protagoras was the pupil of Democritas who was presumably benefited by a multtode of Indian concepts, including Buddhist concepts as his major source of

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influence. Philostratas was the first informant of Protagoras' leaming from Deraocritas,' and this information can also be trae, "conceming the intellectaal development of Protagoras" (Untersteiner 2). Particularly, Democritas' theory of knowledge seeras to have enkindled a new interest in episteraological inquires araong his followers, and Protagoras' directons in the same field may have been guided by Democritas. Protagoras' closeness in his epistemological studies to the Indian counteiparts will be discussed latei, but heie it should be briefly stated that Deraocritas' possible Indian influence could haidly leave no maiks on his pupil Piotagoias. Third, Gorgias was the student of Empedocles, whose philosophical theories reflect his possible familiarify witU Indian idealistic and rationalistic views. Laertius and QuintiIIian' and some otUers reported that Gorgias studied under Empedocles, and there is no reason to doubt these reports. As Untersteiner indicated, Empedocles' influence on Gorgias is "'generally recognized by scholars" (92), and Gorgias' particular interest in epistemology is a possible sign of this influence. It is probable that both Protagoras and Gorgias exhibited a sirailar interest in epistemology and bota maintained skepticism towards metaphysical concepts since the teachers of the two sophists retained a particular interest in the same feld. The major aspects of sophist rational thought and their sirailarify with the Indian counterpart will be discussed in separate sections, but it seeras apt to highlight here a unique flavor in argumentaton entertained by Protagoras-the flavor for arguing for or/and against any topic-as a possible Indian derivation. Perhaps this hypothesis appears

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to be an overstatement since argument on probabilittes is said to be of Greek origin. Nevertheless, a carefal examination of the practces in Indian debating during the sixth centary B.C.E. and coraparison of those practices with Protagoras' attitade towards argumentation justify the possibility of this hypothesis. Interestngly, there was a group of Indian debaters naraely Vitandavadins who roamed among all sorts of thinkers and challenged other views. "He [a Vitandavadin] had no views of his own but merely indulged in eristc for the purpose of securing victory in argument" (Jayatlleke 217). Even though the word Vitandavadin did not occur in the Sutta Pitaka, one finds numerous examples that during the sixth centary B.C.E. these debaters frequented debating halls, parks, and other meeting places, challenging all sorts of views of other traditions, without maintaining any particular philosophy or theory of their own: There are recluses and Brahrains who are clever, subtle, experienced in controversy, hair-splitters, who go about breaking to pieces by their intelligence [pannagatena] tUe speculations of others. Were I to pronounce this to be good, or that to be evil, these men might join issue with rae, call upon me for my reasons, and point out my enors.' These remarks suggest that those "recluses and Brahmins" were not those who held any particular view or theory but those who were indulged in debating raerely for the sake of defeatng the opponents and establishing rhetorical power. Whatever concept or theoty one held, those debaters opposed one's position using their intelligence and verbal skiU. This practce is farther confirmed by the sentence, "Sorae recluse or Brahrain is addicted to logic and reasoning."'" Saccaka, who eamed the descripton of "one who indulged in

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debate, a learaed controversialist, who was held in high esteera by the comraon people"" was, undoubtedly, one of thera. The Majjima Nikaya has pieserved a veiy iraportant sentence that leflects his ihetorical piactice and skill: If 1 attacked a lifeless pillai witU my language, it [the pillai] would tottei, tierable, quake; how much moie a human being!'^ Saccaka was moie a demonstiatoi of his veibal powei than a theorist. Heie, he has presented no theory, but siraply boasts about his invincible rhetorical power. 'Whoever he argued with, he refated the opponent's theory without insisting on a particular view of his own but only using his verbal skill (eristic) and arguraentation (antilogic) that would suit to the occasion. The Samyutta Nikaya has provided "an eye-witness's account of these recluses and Brahmins in action" (JayatiUeke 221). Kundaliya, a visitor to tUe BuddUa's monastery, told tUe BuddUa tUat Ue (Kundaliya) would visit parks and frequent assemblies as a regular Uabit because he had found interest in seeing some recluses and Brahmins having being engaged in debates. The purpose of those debates was only to emphasize their own argumentation (itivadapa mokkhanisamsam) and to disparage that of others." All this evidence indicates that debatng for the mere sake of refating the opposition had become a prevalent practce, as well as a crowd-gathering entertainraent, during the trae of the Buddha. The topics reportedly argued about by those confroveisialists speak a volume of tUis peculiai piactice of debatng. Most of the topics weie in paiis, lepiesentng tie thesis and the antithesis of the same subject. The foUowing is the first list of such topics given in Pali texts:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

The universe is eteraal/The universe is not eteraal. The universe is fmite/The universe is not finite. The soul is identcal with the body/The soul is different from the body. The enlightened person exists after death/The enlightened person does not exist after death. 5. An enlightened person does and does not exist after death/An enligUtened person neitUer exists nor does not exist after death.'"

A more expanded list of thirfy-one topics, all in pairs and each pair dealing with the opposite of the same subject as given above, is found in the Lankavatara Sutra.'^ The fact that they were originally in pairs is confirraed by the remarks attested to one particular pairof topics: The threefold world is caused by ignorance, desire, and Karma. The threefold world is not caused by ignorance, desire, and Karma. This pair too belongs to the Lokayata category of questions. (qtd. in JayatiIIeke 53) It is obvious that this development of questons in pairs echoes tae practce of debating, in which the mere skiU in argumentation was emphasized. Debaters such as Saccaka, whose primary interest was "displaying dialectical skill and defeating their opponents, regardless of the natare of the arguments used" (Jayatilleke 219), would probably argue one day in favor of the infiniteness of the universe and the other day against it, depending on the position of his opponents. Even though some debaters actaally held some taeories of thefr own, rhetorical skiU was the raain weapon that tiiey employed to attack the oppositon and defend their own views. The important point here is that in India there was a predominant and widespread debating practice in which both the proponents and opponents vehemently debated on the thesis and the antithesis of the sarae topic, adducing equally powerfal arguments.

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In Greece Protagoras was the first rhetor to introduce this kind of argumentation. Laertius said that "Protagoras was the first to say that on evety issue there are two arguraents opposed to each other."" Clement repeated the sarae statement, saying taat Greeks said, "Every argument has an opposite argument," foUowing Protagoras." Seneca wrote, "Protagoras says that one can argue equally well on either side of any queston, including the question itself whether both sides of any queston can be argued."" Not only did Protagoras introduce this "eristic argument" as remarked by Hesychius," but he also demonstrated the trath of his theory, arguing "by the raethod of questioning, a practce he originated."^ Protagoras also "wrote down and prepared disputations on notable subjects."^' Thus it is evident that Protagoras held his tv/o-logoi theory as one of his major concepts, having introduced it, practiced it, and written tteatises on it. This theory of arguraentation seems strikingly sirailar to the popular Indian concept of arguing for and against the same topic. Just as the topics used by Indian debaters consisted of the direct affirmation and the direct negaton of tae same statement, Protagoras' topics also consisted of pairs of two extrerae opposites. Sirailarly, the field frora which these questions were drawn seems to be exactly the sarae for both Protagoras and the Indian debaters: Protagoras, when once the existence of'two logoi in oppositon to each other' was discovered as inherent in all realify whenever one tiies to consider it abstractly, translated this properfy of the metaphysical world into confradictory pairs of opposites, making of it a precept for arguraent; that is to say, he raust have deraolished by dialectical arguraents and with a certain systeraatic severity all the principle concepts created by Reason, beginning frora the problem of God in order to pass on to the others. (Untersteiner 35)

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Notably, Protagoras' "contradictor\' pafrs of opposites," as Untersteiner has stated abo\e, did not originate in ttaditional Greek rhetoric; rather, it originated in metaphysics, the field from which the Indian debaters also selected thefr topics. There is the possibility that Protagoras learaed this practice from Democritas, who could have been ven. much exposed to the Indian way of debating while he was in India. One should also wonder why Protagoras was not exposed to the sarae taeory of arguraentation while he was receiving his Persian education. A conttoversial sitaation raight arise frora this disclosure since the arguraent about probabilities Uas long been accepted as an essential, inUerent cUaracteristic in fraditional Greek rUetoric. It sUould be repeated, however, that the origin of systematic persuasion in Sicily was a little over two decades old when Protagoras came to Athens, and whatever arguments on probabilites tUatraigUthave existed in Sicily before Protagoras began his rational persuasion in Athens was probably in legal discourses. Conttadictory references to the existence of argument about probabilities in Sicily would make tUis second assumpton even more doubtfal. Plato, refening to tUe example of a weakling's assault on a sttong man, indicated that Tisias argued about probabilities in legal discourses.^ However, Aristote cited tae same example to suggest that Corax, not Tisias, argued on probabilites in legal speeches.^^ In confrast to both, Cicero, relying on another Aristotelian source that is now lost, reraarked that Corax and Tisias prepared only a handbook for the civiUans to regafri their (civilians') lost properfy frora the fallen tyrants." Another alleged reference is that Corax "developed a tripartite scheme of

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oratory to help the citzens speak in the assembly" (Kennedy, Art ofPersuasion in Greece 59). However, no argument about probabilities was ever mentioned in this scherae of oratory that was invented at least a decade after the origin of judiciary discourses. If whatever persuasion on probabilities ever acUieved any importance in Sicily before Protagoras entered upon rational arguraentation in Athens, that would probably be only in legal speeches. As noted in the introducton, when Gorgias and Tisias visited Athens about three decades after Corax and Tisias prepared the earliest Uandbook on legal discourses, Protagoras had already enkindled an interest in debates, eristic, and antilogic, using his tv/o-Iogoi theory. He introduced "the raethod of attacking any thesis," conducted debates, and earaed the nicknarae "master of wrangling."'' His two booksTTe Art of Debating and Contradictory Arguments in Two Booksmay fiirtUer autUenticate Uis initiation and interest in tUis field, TUis rUetorical situation, which apparently had no roots in Greek culture, connects, both in appearance and content, only to the debating habits practiced by the Indian debaters during the late sixth century and the early fifth century B,C,E, The difference between Protagoras and Sicilian Gorgias raay be marked by the latter's overemphasis on the invincible power of language, ft is apparent that Gorgias had developed this attitude towards language before he visited Athens in 427 B,C,E, as an ambassador to Leontni since his sensatonal speech in Athens against the impending attack on Leontni by Syracuse bears witness to his confdence in the power of language

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and his demonstration of that power, "Encomiura on Helen" farther clarifies his attitude towards language, "Speech is a powerfal lord," which affects the mentalify of all sort of people," Words are like magic and drags tUat cause unbelievable cUanges in individuals,^' While Protagoras maintained that antilogic and eristic would empower the opposing argument, Gorgias mainly held that the power of the language itself raight deterraine the skill in persuasion, One may observe a close similitade between Gorgias' empUasis on tUe power of words and tUe Indian debater Saccaka's assertion of the sarae, Saccaka, as quoted above, raaintained the invincible power of words, giving his own exaggerated skill of fnghtening a lifeless pillar witU Uis words. Based on tUe awareness of tUe highly competitve debatng background during this time, it may be assumed that there were a host of Saccakas in India, maintaining the same power of words wita some variations. This widespread emphasis on the power of language might invite one to investigate a possible Indian influence on Gorgias, who also asserted the sarae power of words. Overemphasis of language as a tool to beat the opposition in India and to convince the opposition in Sicily was determined by the demands in each society, but the invincible, almost magical power of words might have originated frora the same source. One important clue available to suggest a fransraission of this concept to Gorgias is the possibilify that Gorgias' teacher Empedocles had known about the debating practices of Saccaka and of sirailar Indian debaters. The discussion in the previous chapter revealed that at least two contemporaries of the Buddha-Ajita and Kacchayana-

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had held the theory of elements exactly in the same forra as Empedocles held it, providing strong support for Erapedocles' possible bonowing of that theory frora the Indian sources. Both Ajita and Kacchayana were theraselves debaters, but the vital point is that they both were engaged in debates with Saccaka: Saccaka is made to say that when he joined them [the six famous debatersincluding Ajita and Kacchayana] in debates, they evaded in one way or other, shifted the topic of discussion, and showed signs of irritation, anger, and displeasure. These are among the recognized 'occasions for censure,' and their mention here implies that Saccaka was victorious in these debates. (JayatiIIeke 219) So the probable assurapton should be that, if Ajita's and Kacchayana's theories of elements reached Empedocles exactly in the same form, the Greek thinker should also have heard about the debating power and practices of Saccaka, the more famous figure than the two theorists of elements. The rest is understandable. Even though one may not hear Gorgias say anything about Empedocles, U is probable that Gorgias came to know about the invincible power of words from Empedocles. This assumpton wiU be farther justfied in the next secton of the present chapters when Gorgias' theory of knowledge is evaluated in the light of Indian skepticism. The lives of the other sophist thinkers except of Critas are surprisingly obscure; little is known otUer tUan tUe reports tUat several of tUera were the pupils of either Protagoras or Gorgias. Nothing is known about Thrasyraachus other than that he came from Chalcedon in Bithynia and lived in the second half of the fifth century B.C.E. Hippias was a contemporary of Socrates, but his life is unknown except Suidas' report that Hippias leamed from virtually unknown Hegesidamus.'* Antiphon the Sophist was

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mixed up with two other Antphons, and, despite having a certain collecton of his writings, his early life remains unknown. Despite tUe unavailability of biographical details about these sophist thinkers, sfrong similarities exist between thefr thinking and Indian thought. Particulariy, tae common Indian theory of knowledge and the Buddhist taeories of sociology and ethics bear an undeniable resemblance with the thoughts of Prodicus, Antphon, and Critias. Perhaps, Protagoras' and Gorgias' inquiry into epistemology paved the way for the rest of the sophists to continue with the same investigation. AII sophist thinkers generally maintained a close relationship with other sophists. Several of Platonic dialogues have shown that sophists gathered together and held conversations together. It is possible that the younger sophist thinkers leamed from raore honorable Protagoras and Gorgias, whose teachers were the possible bonowers from fridian sources.

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Notes ' Digha Nikaya Atuva, 1.4^ ' ' ftid. DK68A9.

" Dialogues ofthe Buddha 1, p. 37. ' Philosfratas, Lives ofthe Sophists 1.10. ' Herodotas,///tone 8. 120. ' Philosfratas, Lives ofthe Sophists 1.10. ' Diogenes Laertius VIII, 58, 59; QuintiIIian III 1, 8ff ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, pp. 38-39. " n>id.,p. 36. " Middle Length Sayings 1, Sections 227 & 237. See Jayatilleke's ttanslation in Early Buddhist Theory ofKnowIedge (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1963), 219. " ftid., 227. CondensedSayings V, p. 73. '" Middle Length Sayings II, pp. 162-163. " In K.N. JayatiUeke's Early Buddhist Theory ofKnowIedge, pp. 52-53. " Diogenes Laertius IX 50. " Clement, Mce//aiei V 65. " Seneca,ie er5 88, 43. " 80 A3 in Rosamond Kent Sprague, ed. The Older Sophists (Coltimbia: U. of South Carolfria Press), 1972. ^ Diogenes Laertius IX 50. ^' Cicero, Bruto 12, 46. 236

^^ Plato,/"Aaednu 273a6 ff. " " " Aristote, Rhetoric 1402a. Cicero, Brutus 46ff. Diogenes Laertius IX 52-53.

^' Gorgias, "Encoraium on Helen" 8. " njid., 10.

" DK86A1.

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Theory of Knowledge in Indian Rationality and Greek Sophist Thinking The theory of knowledge was one of the raost discussed topics both in Indian rationalist schools and Greek sophist rhetoric. While Jains, materialists, skeptics, and Buddhists all displayed remarkable interest in epistemology, Protagoras, Gorgias, and Antiphon all wrote at least one book each on the sarae subject, and several other sophist thinkers discussed the same topic at various places. While this unusual interest itself shared by both Indian and Greek traditions might persuade a curious reader to suspect an interconnection between the two societies, striking similarities that dominate the episteraological inquiries in both traditions may justify the validify of that initial suspicion. As previously mentioned, the Indian ratonal theory of knowledge, a rhetorical device to subdue the Brahmin authorify in sociefy, emerged from a series of metaphysical concepts invented to manipulate society. In the center of all those concepts was Brahma, the Trath behind all sensual phenomenon. Any apparent injustce in sociefy, according to this doctrine, was actaally resulted from the divine will, so one needed to tolerate one's lot in anticipation of a better existence after death. Thus, the objective of one's life was not to challenge the Trath, but to "understand the reality experienced by self-falfilled personalities," and then to guide oneself "to the realization of tae TratU" (Bemard 2). TUree main BraUmin scUooIs existed to lead sociefy towards tUe TratU: the pure orthodox fradition, the metaphysical school, and the self-realized group of sages: Firstly, tUere were tUe ortUodox BraUmins who believed in the superaatural revelation of the Vedas and held the Vedas to be the supreme

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source of knowledge. Secondly, there were the metaphysicians of tiie early Upanishadic period, who held that the highest knowledge was to be had by [pseudo] rational arguraent and speculation based on their faith in or acceptance of preraises. . . Thirdly, there were the contemplatives who believed tUat tUe highest knowledge was personal and intuitional and was to be had by extrasensory perception. . . (Jayatilleke 63) Thus, the three Brahmin fraditions employed textual authority, inference through belief, and personal authorify as the possible raeans for the trae knowledge. Those who emphasized textual authority had faith in the Vedas and insisted that leaming the Vedic hymns would facilitate one's seeing tUe tratU. The tradition that advocated inference maintained that highly constrained logic and argument would reveal the trath. The third fraditon that indicated the Brahmin sages as the seers of the trath held that the inner perception could lead one to the trath. Importantly, all these three modes of knowledge led the seeker to the same trath: to the realization of the Brahraa and all other metaphysical concepts sunounding Brahma. Yet the very concept of Brahma was already shaken. With the realization of the possible deception sunounding the Trath, various Indian social groups had already begun to question the very authenticity of Brahma, the soul, creation, and liberation. When the highest position in the Brahman tradition was thus rejected, all the paths to that position inevitably encountered severe criticism. The Indian rational theory of knowledge geiminated in this natuial social backgiotmd. Empiricism and skepticism emeiged as two poweifal foices, denying any assertion about textaal authority, peisonal authorify, and infeience conceming the Trath.

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Indian Empiricism and Positivism and Piotagoias' Theory of Knowledge The eailiest Indian unortUodox tUeoiy of knowledge that originated in contiast to the epistemological theories of the Biahmin ttadition could be called the empirical and positivistic theories of knowledge. It should be noted heie that such technical EnglisU woids as empiricism, positivism, and logical positivisra Uave been coined to explain the lecent epistemological theories invented in the West, and it is arbitrary, artificial, and fatile to compress Indian rationalist theories into tae concepts represented by these English words. In the Indian rationalist tradition, tUere are nuraerous tecUnical words and pUrases, sucU as ahetu appacchaya vada (tUeory of no invisible cause and effect), akiriya vada (tUeory of fruitlessness of action), nastika vada (niUiIisra), and uccheda vada (tUeory of no existence after death), each representing relevant arguraents which deny any existence or possible knowledge beyond sense percepton and accept what humans experience as trae. Even the translations rendered above are clearly inadequate and perhaps even inaccurate based on the fact that those words originated and evolved in the ancient Indian society, gathering momentum from that very sociefy itself If, for Friedrich Nietzsche, "only that which has no history is defmable,"' these epistemological terms whicU Uave a unique Uistory of tUeir own can Uardly be translatable witU accuracy. One may accept "empiricism" and "positvism" as suitable words to explain the epistemological concepts erabodied in the Sanskrit and Pali words given above not

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because the two EnglisU words clearly raatch with the these terms but because we find "empiricism'' and "positivism" convenient to cany on this discussion. As fai as lecoided evidence leveals, Indian empirical and positivistic concepts go as fai back as the seventh centuiy B.C.E. As alieady mentioned in Chaptei 11, Carvaka is geneially legaided as fathei of these lational epistemological theories. It has been lecoided that he wiote Brhaspati Aphorism, and soraebody else wiote a commentary on it, but both are now lost, The earliest extant text of tUis fradition is Jayarasi's Tatvopaplavasimha, written in tUe seventU century A.D. NevertUeless, witU the help of secondary sources one may constract Carvaka's teaching as follows: As a reaction against the whole of the Mimansa teaching and claim, the Carvaka philosophy attacked ahnost every doctrine of the Mimansakastheir epistemology, raetaphysics, and way of life. It constitated a sttong check on the excesses of speculation and practice of the followers of Mimansa. Of the three important sources of knowledge accepted in common by all the orthodox schools (perception, inference, and verbal testimony), the Carvakas accepted only percepton as the valid source of knowledge and rejected both inference and verbal testimony. whatever we know through perception is trae and real. (Raju 86-87) What Carvaka actually did was to reject two of the three raodes of knowledge as totally enoneous and to reinterpret the other. Leaming the trath from the Vedas and from inference was regarded as unacceptable, and only perception-not the subtle apprehension through mind but only the normal percepton through senses-was accepted as trae. "They [Carvakas] accepted the realify of whatever we can perceive with our senses and deny the realify of whatever we cannot so perceive" (Raju 88). In short, Carvaka philosophy asserted that the trath exists only with what human beings experience as Vme.

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Perhaps, the Carvaka tradition was not the only school of thought that advocated empirical and positivistic knowledge as tie only trath; there were several schools of thought that propagated the same view in different foims, The Katha Upanishad gave one of such eaily exaraples in which knowledge was measuied only in terms of positivistic values: [Yaraa, King of Death, speaks:] Fools dwelling in darkness, but tainking themselves wise and eradite, go round and round, by various tortaous paths, like tUe blind led by tUe blind, The Hereafter never reveals itself to a person devoid of discrimination, heedless, and perplexed by the delusion of wealth, "This world alone exists," he thinks, "and there is no other," Again and again he coraes under my sway,' Of course, the Katha Upanishad, a text defending the orthodox theories of knowledge, would not present a favorable pictifre of tae rational theories of knowledge, but these Unes depict a pictare of widespread beliefs taat erapUasized only the positivistic knowledge as trae, Those fools "dwelling in darkness," and "thinking taeraselves wise and eradite," held the view that only this woild, nothing beyond, would exist, Theii tendency to argue rationally is here highligUted witU tae words "wise and eradite." Their materialistic attitade towards life is portrayed in tUe phrase "perplexed by the delusion of wealth.'' Overall, the quotaton above clearly establishes the emerging rationalist attitade towards life: the attitode that nothing could be knowable beyond sensory perception. The absence of original materialistic texts and the scarcify of fragments hinder the effort to present a detailed description of the erapirical and positivistic epistemological concepts held by the early Indian fraditions. Nevertheless, the marks those concepts left in Buddhisra justify the high regard and influential power enjoyed by raaterialistic

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erapiricism and positivism during the sixth century B.C.E. The following dialogue between the Buddha and Vasettha reveals the Buddha's assertion that sensual experience is the most reliable source of knowledge: Just, VasettUa, as if a man sUouId say, "How I long for, how I love the raost beautifal woraan in this land!" And people would ask hira, "Well! Good friend! This raost beautifal woman in the land, whora you thus love and long for, do you know whether that beautifal woman is a noble lady, or a Brahman woraan, or of the trader class, or a Shudra?" But when so asked, he should answer, "No" And when people should ask him, "Well! Good friend! This most beautifal woman in all the land, whom you so love and long for, do you know what the name of that most beautifal woman is, or what is her family name, whether she be tall, or short, or medium height, dark, brunette, or golden in color, or in what village or town or cify she dwells?" But when so asked, he should answer, "No!" And then people should say to him, "So, then, good friend, whom you know not, neither have seen, her do you love and long for?" And then when so asked, he should answer: "Yes." "Now what think you, Vasettha? Would it not tum out, that being so, to be that the talk of that man was fooIisU talk?" "In sootU, Gotama, it would tora out, tUat being so, that the taUc of that man was fooUsU talk!" "And Just even so, VasettUa, tUough you say that the Brahmins are not able to point out the way to union wita that which they have seen, and you fiirther say that neither any one of them, nor of taeir pupils, nor of their predecessors even to the seventh generation has ever seen Brahma. An you further say that even the Rishis of old, whose words they hold in such deep respect, did not pretend to know, or to have seen where, or whence, or whither Brahma is. Yet these Brahmans, versed in the Three Vedas, say forsooth, that they can point out the way to union with that which they know not, neither have seen! Now what think you, Vasettha? Does it not follow that, this being so, the talk of the Brahmans, versed though they be in the Three Vedas, is FooIisU talk?" "In sooth, Gotama, that being so, it follows that the talk of the Brahmans versed in the Three Vedas is foolisU taUc!'" The whole effort in this interesting dialogue is to deny the existence of Brahma, arguing that nobody who holds the view of Brahma has ever experienced sensually the existence

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of Brahma. Knowledge means physical experience, mainly sight in this particular case. The advocates of Brahma have never seen Brahma; therefore, Brahma does not exist. Similar arguments to reject several other metaphysical concepts such as the soul and the noble birth of the Brahrain can be found at various places in the Sutta Pitaka. Logical positivism may be the most appropriate terra that describes this kind of argument. One raay observe that this concept attained the highest rational level in some other discourses of the Buddha. What is trae is not what one speculates regarding the mysteries beyond the sensory phenomena, but what one realizes as trae at present. Rational investigation and causal analysis of one's sensory experience would reveal to one tUe tratU that is evident at present. Any queston taat one fails to solve ratonally would neither be rejected as nonsense nor embraced as a mysterious trath but carefally left aside: Either he [anyone interested in fature existence] could ask me a question conceraing the fature, or I could ask hira a question conceming the fatore; either he could tura his raind to answering my question conceraing the fature, or I could tum my mind to answering his queston conceming the fature [We both may have whatever question to ask and whatever answer to give.]. Wherefore, Udayin, let be the past; let be the fature. I wiU teach you the Dhamraa [what I regard as trath]. If this is that comes to be, from the arising of this, that arises; if this is not that does not corae to be, from the stopping of this, that is stopped." So, understanding the trath is essentially related to the present human experience. Sensually and mentally graspable causes produce relevant effects, and, when those causes disappear, effects also cease to exist. Trath is identical with what one ratonally understands at present. Conceptualized ideologies are essentally absent in tUe concept of

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tratU; instead, there is the causal arguraent from which the trath can be rationally constracted. The following dialogue between the Buddha and Bhaddiya, a visitor to the Buddha, iUustrates this concept: Now, what think you Bhaddiya? When greed arises m man's self, does it arise to his profit or to his loss? To his loss, sir. Does not this man, thus become greedy, being overcome by greed and losing control of his mind,-does he not kill a living creature, steal, go after another's wife, tell lies and lead another into such a state as causes his loss and sonow for a long trae? He does so, sir. Now what think you, Bhaddiya? When malice arises. . . when delusion arises . . . when violence is added to these in a man's self, do they arise to his profit or his loss? To his loss, sir. Then what think you, Bhaddiya? Are these things profitable or unprofitable? Unprofitable, sir. Are they blameworthy or not? Blameworthy, Sir. Are they censured by the intelligent or not? They are censured, sir. If performed and undertaken, do they conduce to loss and sonow, or how isit? They do conduce to loss and sonow. Come now, Bhaddiya, be not misled by report or traditon or hearsay. Be not misled by proficiency in the collections nor by raere logic and inference. . . When you known for yourself that these things are blameworthy, censured by the intelUgent, wUen performed and undertaken, conduce to loss and sonow, then do you reject them. . . But at any time you know of yourselves: These things are profitable, these things are not blameworthy, these things are praised by the intelligent, these things, when performed and undertaken, conduce to profit and happiness,then undertake them and remain doing them.* Now the trath is realized or knowledge gained thanks to the rational analysis of causes and effects. It is trae that greed, raalice, delusion, and violence are wrong, but this

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conclusion was drawn nor frora any authoritative teaching but from one's own understanding. The opposite of greed, malice, delusion, and violence is acceptable as wUoIesome because an acton motivated by tUese tUougUts and feeUngs would lead one to profit and Uappiness. Pragmatsra is at tUe center of BuddUist criteria of good and bad. Tradition and authority have no place in one's search for the trath; instead, there is the personal experience, as well as the experience of other members of one's sociefy, that would help one rationally constract the trath. While early Indian raaterialists and early BuddUists tUus developed erapirical and positivistic concepts centering knowledge on sense-perception, Protagoras, evidently, Ueld similar ideas about knowledge. "It is not possible to tUink tUat wUicU does not exist, nor anytUing except what one experiences, but the latter is always trae,'" he remarked in Apology ofProtagoras. Here he rejects all speculatons that are not subject to senseexperience and emphasizes perception itself as the trath. As H. Rensi clarified it fiirther, Protagoras' positon with regard to the knowledge beyond sense perception was that "we cannot know anything except that which percepton offers us to know . . ." and "our thought does not fimction except by means of experience, outside of and without which we can not have knowledge" (qtd. in Untersteiner 48). This teaching is not different at all from both Carvaka philosophy and the Buddhist view that experience itself offers knowledge. Protagoras conveyed the sarae idea in his huraan-measure fragment, "Of all things the measure is Man, of things that are, that they are, and of things iat they are not, that

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tiey are not."' Notably, fliis fragraent occuned in Truth (or On Being), obviously a tteatse on epistemology, and thepresened sentence, no doubt, reflects Protagoras' theory of knowledge. As Gomperz noted, Protagoras here meant that "man or human nature is the standard for the existence of the things. Only what is real can be perceived byus. Theunrealcannot supply anyobjecttoourpercepton"(453). Connected to the same idea is another important reraark of Protagoras, the reraark that eveiy appeaiance is trae as reported by Sextus and several others." What is trae to one is what one perceives, not what one speculates through mind. Several writers including Gomperz himself' have indicated the human-measure fragraent as an attack on the theory of knowledge recognized by the Eleatic school. Schiappa and several other writers specifically remarked that thisfi-agmentwas aimed at Pannenides.' Poiphyiy's remarks, the suggested nearest evidence for such a conclusion, however, did not raention any name but simply said, "I happened to have been reading in Protagoras' book On Being the argument he uses against those who make Being One. . ."" The most rational conclusion might be that Protagoras' tteatise presented knowledge as an effect of human experience. Without being aware of the possible Indian influences on Protagoras, one may regard this theory as an attack on the Eleatics, but it seems probable that Protagoras adopted fliis attitode towards knowledge after famiUarizing himself with Indian rational thinking. Furtheimoie, defining Protagoras' theory of knowledge as agnosticism or skepticism may also be mconect. His epistemological views seem to demonstrate a

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cautious approach to metaphysics, not supporting either rejection of or doubt about metaphysical concepts. That Protagoras was a skeptc is a raodera interpretaton, and that he was an atheist is a disputed allegaton since ancient trae. Sextos said that only sorae believed tUat Protagoras was an atUeist,'^ and Eusebius noted tUat Protagoras "acquired the reputation of an ataeist," iraplying that On the Gods would have made Protagoras appear so." Probably, some Athenians misunderstood his rational approach, in which he disregardedrather than rejectedthe existence of gods since divine beings were impossible for him to experience sensually. The very first sentence and the only extant fragraent in On Gods and another quotation preserved by Aristotle in his Theaetetus may sttongly support this conclusion. The following is the fragment from On the Gods: Conceraing the gods I cannot [oi unable to] know eithei that they exist or that they do not exist, oi what form they might have, for there is much to prevent one's knowing: the obscurify of the subject and the shortness of man's Ufe.'" Obviously, two conclusions that clearly have been avoided in these lines are: "I do not know" and "I know" with regard to the existence or non-existence of gods. To say "I do not know either this or that" means to imply skepticism; to say "I know this" raeans to assert knowledge. Protagoras' intentional avoidance of both exfreraes suggests that he was neither a skeptic nor an agnostic. To say "I cannot know either tais or that" raeans mainly to suggest the unavailabilify of proof to accept or deny the concept under discussion. The rest of the fragment confirms this positon: obscurify of the subject of gods and the shortness of one's life-span are the causes that prevent one from knowing the trath about gods.

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Aristotle's Theaetetus illustrated the sarae idea of Protagoras with raore clarity. Here, addressing a group of citizens praying, Protagoras said, "Noble boys and elders, there you sit together ranting and bringing the gods in, the question of whose existence or non-existence I exclude frora ray speeches and writngs."" Clearly, Protagoras did not reject or accept gods, nor did he exhibit his doubt about their existence. He only left aside the question, showing no interest in it at all. Again, one raay retura to Buddhist episteraology to elaborate further on the neamess of Protagoias' theoiy of knowledge to it. One of the foui methods of the Buddha's dealing with questions was leaving some questions unansweied." As afready noted, "If you know as trae, then you accept it," is a key sentence in the Buddha's dealing with knowledge," and whenevei the Buddha feU that he would not be able to appeal to the listenei's knowledge, the Buddha waived the question. In leply to Vaccha's question "Does the good Gotama has any (speculative) view?," the Buddha answeied, "Vaccha, going to 'speculatve view'-this has been got rid of Tathagata [me]."" Aftei lefasing to offei comments on ten contradictory metaphysical views, the Buddha remarked that speculatve concepts would cause mental iraprisonment, social conflicts, and personal distress." Furthermore, he maintained that, if he actaally dealt with those speculative views, the listener might develop suspicion about tie conectness of the answers given and about the Buddha's ability to deal witU tUe queston raised.^" TUerefore, tUe BuddUa was carefal not to address an issue tiat was beyond tUe listener's knowledge. The same

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tendency is apparent in Protagoras' rejection of dealing with the concept of gods, obviously a metaphysical topic. In general, Protagoras' eristic, antlogic, and epistemology, as already discussed in the previous chapter and in this one, share an exceptional reserablance to Indian eristic and the theory of knowledge. This similarify will eventually makes itself more complete with one more agreeraent, this tirae with Protagoras' anangeraent, style, and presentaton of speech with that of the Buddha, a sirailarify that wiU be discussed in the next secton of the present chapter.

Skepticisra in Indian Rational Thought and in Greek Sophist Rhetoric In addition to empiricism and positivism, the other Indian rationalist approacU tUat initially wrestled with the Brahrains' idealistic tUeory of knowledge was skepticism. Ancient India witnessed a particular fradition of tUought by the very narae of skeptics (Sansayavadi); besides, Ajivikas, Buddhists, Jains all used skeptic thoughts as effective means to counter all the idealistc tUeories of knowledge. In fact, by the time of the Buddha, skepticism had become the most popular and broadly accepted of aU unorthodox theories in epistemology. Interestingly, similar and identcal skeptc thoughts occuned in every Greek sophist's theory of knowledge, thus persuading one again to queston all the familiar assuraption of coincidental occunences of similar thoughts in India and Greece. Essentially, Indian skeptcism, even though it is tteated separately in this secton just for convenience, can not be regarded as a separate discipline or a theory of

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knowledge. The present work only sttives to analyze acaderaically a systera of thought that developed naturally and had a practical purpose in the very sociefy in which those thoughts originated and developed. The main purpose of all Indian rationalist thoughts, as repeatedly stressed in the present work, was to deny the authority of idealistc and metaphysical speculations that generated power to conttol sociefy. To achieve this goal, Indian rationalists employed wUatever argument tUat they accepted as convincing to grapple with the idealists. In this effort, skeptic thoughts emerged intermingled with nihilism, agnosticism, atheism, empiricism, positivisra or whatever "ism" as one may call it. Denial of any trath beyond sense-percepton was thus the primary goal in skeptic thought, and therefore, it is understandable why and how Indian skepticism, quite realistically and naturally, mixed with all other nihilistic theories of knowledge. The Buddha's recognition of his contemporary skeptics as "eel-wrigglers" was clearly a pejorative label, but the very identification in Buddhist scriptures of various skeptic groups indicates that these thinkeis weie a social powei during the Buddha's time. Accoiding to the Brahmajala Sutta, the Buddha knew foui gioups of skeptics, who weie vigoiously active,^' This Sutta cleaily indicates an effort to demean all the diffeient sects of skeptcs saying that the skeptcs "lesort to equivocation" since taey do not "undeistand the good in its leal natuie nor the evil,"" but behind this apparent denigration, one observes the profound episteraological thoughts held by the skeptics, frora whom the Buddha himself bonowed, This Sutta gives the foUowing reasons as to why the skeptics would not be interested in speculations:

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fri the first place,, , , he [the skeptic] thinks: "I neither know what is conect, as it really is, nor what is not conect, That being so, were I to pronounce this to be conect or that to be not conect, I raight be influenced therein by my feelings or desires, by ill-will or resentment. And under these circumstances I might be wrong." In the second place, . . . he thinks: "I neither know what is conect, as it really is, nor what is not conect. . . Under these circumstances, I might fall into that grasping condition of heart, which causes rebecoming, and by so falling, migUt cause me pain and remorse, and the sense of remorse." In the third place,. . . he thinks: "I neither know what is conect, as it really is, nor what is not conect. . .Were I to pronounce this to be conect or that to be not conect, men might join issue with me, call upon me for my reasons, point out ray enors. And on their doing so, I might be unable to explain. And that might cause me the pain of remorse. . ."^' The skeptics' attack on idealism Uad now developed into such a position that they resisted idealistic views by just ignoring, ratUer than directly negating idealism, or so it was presented by Buddhism. Taken together, the reasons given by the three skeptic ttaditions in defense of their skepticism may be summarized as follows: 1. I do not know whether I know the trath or not. 2. My understanding of the trath may be deluded by my own feelings, emotions, and motivations. 3. fri trying to present the trath, I may get entangled in ray own personal attachments to concepts, which would raake rae unhappy. 4. Even though I tty to speak the trath, the listenei raay not understand ray words and raay cUalIenge ray views, and tUat condition may raake me imUappy. TUe doubt about tUe conectaess of tUe tratU, about tUe speaker's abilify to present tUe tratU, about tUe listener's abilify to understand tUe tratU, and tUe possible mental pain of tUe speaker caused by the fatile effort to present the trath thus persuaded the so-called eel-wrigglers to avoid speculative concepts. Owing to these reasons, skeptics offered no definite answers to the popular fourfold predication of any speculation such as: "There

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are gods who arise here or in other worids without parents; there are no such gods; there are and are not such gods; there neither are nor are not such gods."" Among Greek sophist thinkers, Gorgias raay be the first to elaborate his skeptic views on raetaphysical speculations. He presented the following arguments in favor of his theory: 1. Nothing exists. a. Not-Being does not exist. b. Being does not exist. i. as everlasting. ii. as created. iii. as both. iv. as One. V. as Many. c. A mixture of Being and Not-Being does not exist. 2. If anything exists, it is incoraprehensible. 3. If fr is incoraprehensible, it is incommunicable." The immediate impression one raight get frora this fragraent is the presence of a confradiction in it. Statement one clearly indicates Gorgias' nihilistic view, with which the next two statements do not match. In othei woids, having fiist asserted that nothing exists, he may not logically begin the second statement with "If anything exists" since his second stateraent denies his fiist. To be logically and factaally conect, all the thiee statements must support eithei nihilisra oi skepticism. Peiceiving tUe Uighly skeptic tone in Gorgias' overall arguraent, one may assume that his objective here raeans to express his skepticisra towards knowledge. Sextas is the only person who quoted and summarized Gorgias' arguraent, and probably the skeptic overtone of the first statement was lost in Sextas' ttanscription. Writing a cornmentaiy

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on the same fragment, Sextas comments that Goigias said, "E^en if anything exists, it is unknowable and incompiehensible to raan."^' Then, Goigias fiist statement in the aigument must be a skeptic reraark rather than a nihilistc claira, such as "I do not know whether anything exists." This reconstracted first stateraent of Gorgias makes his approach towards knowledge given in the entire argument identical with that of the Indian skeptics, but tae other two statements in the same argument may have afready indicated Gorgias' possible indebtedness to Indian skepticism. Similar to Gorgias' beUef in tUe "incompreUensibiIity of tUe trath," Indian skeptics asserted that their understanding of the trath "might be wrong" because of their own "feelings or desire, ill-will or resentraent." For Gorgias, too, comprehension of the trath would be wrong because what appears to have been comprehended is "a possible [mental] attribute to what is existent."" According to Gorgias, "pure mind, as opposed to sense-perception, or even as an equally valid criterion, is araytU."'*TUis is a firraly held, very popular view of the Buddha's contemporaries. Negating exttasensory perceptive powers of the so-called seers, Ajita said: There are in the world no recluses or Brahmins who have reached the highest point, who walk perfectly, and who having understood and realized, by themselves, both this world and the next world, make their wisdora known to otaers.^' Jain coraraentarian Silanka's later comments that skeptics held skepticism to be the best "since it is difficuU to gauge the thought process of anotier," and that "all teachings are

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like the utterances of barbarians since they have no basis" (JayatiUeke 117) farther highlight the same idea presented by Ajita and shared by Gorgias. The third statement of Gorgias' argument-If it [the trath] is comprehensible, it is incommunicable-might make his indebtedness to Indian skepttcism more probable. Indian skeptcs clearly asserted that they would prefer a skeptic approach to the trath since they "might be unable to explain" the trath to the listener. "The trath" is already tainted with the speaker's own personal feelings, emotons, and desires, and the listeners would challenge, counter-question, and reject the views presented by the speaker. Gorgias' point in this regard was that words cannot explain what mind has grasped. Even though this arguraent did not occur in the Brahmajala Sutta, in which the above description of the skeptics was given, the assuraption that the trath cannot be coraraunicated through speech was a very popular Indian concept dating back to the early Upanishadic age. For instance, the Mundaka Upanishad remarked that the trath, which is Brahma, "cannot be grasped by speech," while the Kena Upanishad said that trath cannot be explained by speech.'' Theie is no doubt that the Indian skeptcs employed the same aigument to strengthen their own claim that whatever one realized cannot be communicated through speech. After all, Gorgias' theory of skepticisra suggests a strong possibility that he was influenced by the Indian skeptcism. Interestingly, it seems that Pynho, the post-Socratic Greek thinker, not Gorgias, made the Greek bonowing frora Indian skeptcism fally complete. Gorgias probably missed two points from Indian skepticism as given in the Brahmajala Sutta. First, a

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major benefit the India thinkers sought from being skeptc towards speculations, as given above, was mental peace for themselves derived from the uninvolvement with verbal tangles. Gorgias did not mention this point in his treatise perhaps because the social demand during his time essentally required his own involveraent in arguments. Second, Gorgias did not clearly recognize the fourfold predication of an arguraent as was seen by the Indian skeptcs: is, is not, both is and is not, neither is nor is not. Pynho, who reportedly leamed from the Indian naked sages, appears to be the Greek thinker who eventually picked what Protagoras probably missed or dropped from fridian skepticism. According to Pynho, neither human senses nor the opinions are trae or false so that the best way of living would be not to let oneself be distarbed by sucU conclusions as is, is not, botU is and is not and neither is nor is not about opinions and sense-perception. According to him, this impartial atttude towards opinions and sense-perception would help one achieve mental imperturbability.^' Now it seems tUat almost everytUing from tUe Indian skeptic tUeory of knowledge Uas been adopted into Greek epistemology.

Conclusion TUe tUeory of knowledge is popularly known as a part of pUilosophy, and this interpretation could have arisen out of a possible misconception that accepts human curiosity and human intellectual sttength as the raost predominant force behind all theories of knowledge. The trath, however, may be that any theory of knowledge, if it originated in a particular society, is a rhetorical device invented by competing social

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groups to gain social control. As already discussed, the origin and developraent of Indian theories of knowledge exeraplify tUis stateraent. Now, the curious queston is that among the Older Sophists similar rhetorical methods known as the theories of knowledge sprouted seemingly without relevant social conflicts and without a noticeable effort of those sophists' to use those theories as rhetorical devices for social control. Interestngly, while in tae ancient Indian sociefy social conflicts bred theories of knowledge, in Greece it may have worked the other way: theories of knowledge gave rise to social conflicts. Apparently, the Platonic condemnation of the Older Sophists as a dangerous group of thinkers and the etemal conflict between the Platonic ttadition and sophist thinkeis derived in part as a lesult of the sophist theories of knowledge that refased to accept the Being of Socrates and Plato. This very fact, the fact that sophist theories of knowledge caused social conflict in ancient Greece, may indicate the aUen natare of tUe epistemological tUeories inttoduced to Greece by tUe Older SopUists. More curiously, tUese tUeories, as compared above, were strikingly similar and soraetimes identical witU tUeir Indian counterparts. WUiIe tUe possible absence of a tangible connection between Greek sociefy and sophists theories of episteraology provides a strong ground to reject the natural origin of those theories in Greece, the strong reserablance of the sarae theories and those of tae Indian rationalist ttaditions may Uelp one assume tUat Indian rationalify played a major role in sUaping sopUist tUeories of knowledge.

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Notes ' Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy ofMorals. tt-ans. Walter Kaufinan & R. J. Hollfrigdale (New Yoric: Vmtage, 1969). 80. Katha Upanishad I. ii. 5-6. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, pp. 307-308. " Middle-Iength Sayings II, p. 229. ^ GradualSayfrigsII,pp. 280-281. ' Plato, Theaetetus 167A. ' DK80B1. ' Aristotle, Metaphysics FV 4, 1007BI8; Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters, VII 389. ' Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, vol. 1, frans. Laurie Magnus (London: WiIUam Clowers and Sons Ltd., 1901), 450. ' See Schiappa's discussion on this topic in Protagoras and Logos (Columbia: U. of SoutiCaroIfriaPress, 1991), 121-125. " DK80B2.

'^ Sextus, Against the Schoolmasters DC 55. " Eusebius, Preparation ofthe Gospel XTV 3, 7. '" DK 80 B4. " Plato, Theaetetus 162D. " " Gradual Sayings II, p. 54. Gradual Sayings II, p. 202; Kindred Sayings I, p. 172. p.\64.

" Middle-lengh SayingsU, " n)id.,p. 165.

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"

Gradual Sayings I, Tittayatana Sutta.

^' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, pp. 37-40. ' ' n)id.,p. 37. " " " "
"

njid., pp. 37-39. n)id.,p.39. DK82B3. Sextas, Against the Schoolmasters VII 77.
Ujid.

^' DK 82 B3, ttans. Kathleen Freeman AnciIIa to Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press: 1983), 129. ^' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, p. 73. ' Mundaka Upanishad III. i. 8. ^' Kena Upanishad I. 5. '^ See JayatiIIeke's discussion of Pynho's skepticism in Early Buddhist Theory ofKnowIedge, p. 129.

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Buddhist Parallels with Protagoras' Anangeraent, Style, and Presentation Arrangeraent, style, and presentation of speech are special techniques particularly in Protagoras' rhetoric and generally in sophist rhetoric. Protagoras was, reportedly, the first Greek to talk about both ratonal thinking and the organization of the speech in order to persuade the audience, and therefore, Aristotle's later conceptaalization of rhetoric as a discipline was initally based on Protagorean concepts on persuasion. Protagoras divided speech into categories, ananged it under those categories, and suggested opportune time or Kairos as an essential consideration for presentation. These concepts, as well as their appearance, share a clearly visible similitude with those of the Buddha and his contemporary disciples. The purpose of the discussion in the present section is to compare these sirailarities and to examine whether Protagoras was influenced by the Buddhist techniques that were related to the exteraal modification and presentation of speech. It may be reUerated here that all the rational concepts found in early Buddhism were mainly directed towards the practcal purpose of persuading society to certain ends. Early Buddhism as a whole, as already raentioned on various occasions, was a rhetorical system, and the recent coinage of the term "Buddhist epistemology," in which all the rational thoughts are erabodied, was the logos in the so-called Buddhist system of rhetoric. AIso, the Buddha and his disciples, as well as numerous Indian groups that keenly competed with one anotier to win the upper hand in social power, had apparently leamed from their own and their ancestors' practcal experience that their appeal to

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society would reach maximum effectveness if they systematically organized other aspects of persuasion as well. This understanding, again a natoral development in the Indian society, seeras to have led them to the systematic categorization of speech, modemizaton of sfyle, and the investigation of the Ustener's psycUological process. These techniques were, undoubtedly, various in quantify and qualify, but, because nobody preserved raaterialistic, skeptic, and Ajivika traditions, one Uas to depend mainly on the anangement, sfyle, and presentation of speech in the Buddhist tradition in order to present a general pictare of that practce prevalent in ancient Indian rationalist schools. The earliest recorded instance of dividing speech into parts can be found in the Anguttara Nikaya, in which the Buddha said that a queston must be answered in four ways according to the nature of the question: There are these four ways of answering a question. What four? There is the queston which requires counter-question, that which requires a categorical reply, that which requires to be waived, and there is the question which requires a discrirainating reply. These are the four.' So, this passage clearly advises the disciples of the Buddha to handle different questons in the most appropriate manner, selecting one of the four methods prescribed. Those who thus handle the questons are "hard to overcorae, hard to vanquish, and invincible." They can 'reject the false and grasp the trath" by categorically answering the questons raised by various opponents.^ Even though a detailed descripton of these raethods of answering questons is absent in Suttas, one finds nuraerous references in Suttas to how different questons should be answered in different methods.'

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It should be observed that judging the answer to a question according to the nature of that question was not probably the Buddha's own inventon, but a prevalent practice since the times of the early Upanishads. Counter-questioning was a comraon practice in later Upanishads, and waiving the answer to a question was, as already mentioned, probably practiced widely by skeptics. Brahmins also left aside the questions that challenged the concept of Brahma rationally. Similarly, short dialogues were eraployed in later Upanishads to answer some questons. However, a systematic division of speech into groups would probably have developed during the Buddha's time, a period of intense debating and argumentation. Most of the debaters during the time of the Buddha both employed these methods extensively and probably developed different divisions of speech by themselves. The Buddha's division of speech into four groups was, apparently, what he found to be raore effective in order to handle the opposition. Interestingly, Protagoras also, for the first tirae in the history of Greece, divided speech into parts, four in all, namely entreaty, queston, answer, and command." No details are available to discuss more about this division, but what he meant by it seems clear. Based on the awareness that Protagoras was engaged in debates and earaed the nickname "master of wrangling,"' he, undoubtedly, used this division of speech to win his debates, to gain dominance in dialogues and conversatons, and, of course, to know the audience better and to express himself better. Platonic text Protagoras mentoned that Protagoras spoke at length, responded to the questons frora the audience, refened his owTi questons to the audience, and listened patiently to the answers.' These reraarks

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indicate that Protagoras both introduced tie di\ision of speech and practced it by himself More interestingly, two of Protagoras' parts of speech-queston and answer-are identical with those of the Buddha. Moreover, even though coramand and request were not recognized in the Anguttara Nikaya as different divisions of speech, these n\ o methods were employed consistently by the Buddha throughout his discourses. The following is one of the numerous examples that the Buddha used request to handle the opposition effectively. The questioner in this dialogue was king Ajasatta, who, with some sarcasm and pretended interest and respect, asked the Buddha about the immediate benefits of a monk's living the life of a recluse: [King Ajasatta:] TUere are, sir, a number of ordinary crafts [professionals]: mahouts, horseraen, charioteers, archers, standard bearers, carap marshals, carap followers, high railitary officers of royal birtU, militaty scouts, men brave as elepUants, champions, heroes, warriors, home-bom slaves, cooks. barbers, bath attendants, confectioners, garland-makers, washerraen, weavers, basket-makers, potters, arithmettcians, accountants, and whatsoever others of like kind there raay be. All these enjoy, in this very world, the visible fhiit of their craft. They maintain themselves, and their parents and children and friends, in happiness and comfort. , . Can you, Sir, declare to rae any such iramediate fruit, visible in this ver\' world, of the lifeof arecluse? [The Buddha:] Do you admit to us, O king, that you have put tae same question to other recluses or to Brahmins? [King Ajasatta:] 1 do, Sir. [The Buddha:] Then tell us how they answered it if you do not mind.' While tais dialogue reveals the Buddha's pradent and systematc approach to the highly ratonal and pragmatc question raised by the king Ajasatta, one may observe that "request" was the technique the Buddha employed to win the upper hand in the dialogue As the Buddha politely asked the king to reveal the answers of other teachers given to the

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same question, kfrig Ajasatta would not disregard that request, and, as tie king began to speak, the Buddha would both receive rauch feedback about what sort of an answer tie king would expect and find ample tme to constract his own answers. After Ustening to the king, the Buddha started jokingly and as sarcastically as the question was asked, saying tiat the raost iraraediate benefit of one's living tie Ufe of a recluse was taxexception while all other people paid "taxes and increase the king's wealth,"' but what is relevant to this discussion is the fact that the Buddha used the form of request as an effectve means to deal with a rhetorical sitaation. Similarly, he eraployed coraraand consistently to deal with different rhetorical sitaatons that emerged during his dialogues. The foUowing conversaton took place between Brahmin Sonadanda and the Buddha while a group of otaer Brahmins, the supporters of Sonadanda, were watching. Sonadanda was defending his view that a Brahmin is the one who is endowed wita fi\'e blessings: high birth, educaton, fair complexion, virtae, and wisdom, but the Buddha has afready persuaded Sonadanda to reject fafr complexion and education as criteria to be a Brahmin. Now the question is about the most sensiti\e criterion: high birth: [The Buddha:] But of these three things [since you have afready rejected fair coraplexion and education], oh Brahman, is it possible to leave one out, and to declare the raan who has the otaer two to be a Brahman? [Sonadanda]: Yes, good Gotaraa, that could be done. We can leave out bfrta. For what does birth raatter! If he has tae otaer two-virtae and wisdora-Brahmans would stll declare hira to be a Brahman. And when he had thus spoken, the other Brahmins said to Sonadanda, "Say not so, Sonadanda, say not so! You depreciate not only our coraplexion but also our verses and our birth. Verily Sonadanda is going over to the doctrine of Saraana Gotama."

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Then, the Buddha said to tiose Brahraans: "If you, Brahmans, think that Sonadanda is unleamed, that he speak unfittingly, that he is unwise, and that he is unable to hold his own with me fri this raatter, let him keep silence, and do you discuss with me. But if you tiink him leamed, able in speech, wise, able to hold his own, then do you keep silence and let him speak with me.'" This, ob\'iousIy, is comraand with rauch authorify, emphasis, and rhetorical power, and the manner he employed it is an indication of its higher significance to the Buddha. At a tirae when Sonadanda had just begun to sunender somewhat meekly to the Buddha's counter arguments raised through questions, it would be highly disadvantageous for the Buddha if the audience intervened to change Sonadanda. So, the Buddha's cornmand to the audience would be the best approach to retain his firra grip on the opponent. The Buddha consistently eraployed this technique to conttol an unraly audience, to get an answer frora a reluctant speaker, and to press a change of views on the opponent. So, it is evident taat the Buddha employed request and command as effectve devices in dealing with some rhetorical sitaations even taough he did not mention taem in his categorization of speech just as Protagoras used tae technique of waiving the answer but did not specifically raention that method. Protagoras' parts of speech and other techniques of persuasion had afready been used widely and categorized systematcally by the Buddha and, most probably, by his contemporary debaters. The fact that Protagoras used the method of questoning in his debates and dialogues is a topic that raay need moie elaboiation. Some scholais have made an effon to pinpoint Plato as the inventoi of this piactice, considering the well-known Platonic

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dialogues in which Sociates has been depicted as consistenty applying the same method. The following emphasis exemplifies tUe geneial view of these scholais: Despite aiguments by scholais that the foira has loots in Horaeric speeches, Euripidian draraatic debates, and the general Greek fascinaton for verbal jousting and agonal argument, Plato's use of dialogues as a vehicle for conveying philosophy may be justifiably regarded as one of his significant achievements. After all, none of his predecessors used this sfyle. Sophists used handbooks, and pre-Socratcs for the raost part composed in hexameter verse of pithy maxiras (e.g., Heracleitas' "everything flows, nothing stays"). Thus, tae philosophical dialogue would seem to be genuinely Platonic inventon. (Segal xi) Obviously, Protagoras has no place either in Segal's argument or in the counter-arguraent that Segal rejects. "Sophists used handbooks" and the philosophers conveyed their thoughts in verses or maxims, but Plato was the sole inventor of "philosophical dialogues." It should be asserted, however, that tae very terra of inventing philosophical dialogues itself seems an illusionary and misleading phrase. Evidently, philosophical dialogues were not an invention but a combinaton of what had afready introduced into Greece. Various Greek thinkers adopted philosopUy, and Protagoras inttoduced dialogues and discussed philosophical concepts in dialogues. Recogniton of Plato as the inventor of this practice-simply because he widely used tiiis raethod, and his dialogues have been preserved while Protagoras' tteatses are lost-is a denial of Protagoras' own discovery of the dialogue-raetiod, which Plato later found to be worthy of iraitation. That Protagoras inttoduced tts method seeras quite obvious. The one who taUced about ttie question-form previously was Zeno, but "notiing in tie report of his opinion or

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in the quotations of his book support the view that they were in dialogue form; ratier, ttiey seem to be in the foim of a set of logical deductons from a given piemise" (Fieeman, The Pre-Socratic Philosophers 154). In contiast, lecoided evidence cleaily states that Protagoras was the first to use the question-answer method or the dialogue form in Greece. Laertius said: Protagoras was the first to say that on every issue there are two arguments opposed to each other; these he made use of by the method of questioning, a piactice he originated.' Theie is no reason to doubt Laertius' remarks because of several reasons. Protagoras' introduction of the two-Logoi theoiy and his piactice of debating closely lelated to and lequiied the use of the question-answei method. Having also inttoduced "disputants to the tricks of arguments,"" questioning could have been an essentially relevant practice for Protagoras. He also wrote, as already mentioned, two treatises on debating in which the question-answer method, an essential tool for debating as already proved by the Buddha and his Indian counterparts, could hardly have foimd no place. Therefore, Protagoras' introduction of the dialogue foim to Gieece seems virtually indisputable. It is moie than piobable that Plato latei followed and developed the questionanswei method inttoduced by Piotagoias. As Poiphyry noted, Plato was a constant bonower, but only because of the scarcify of the treatises composed by Plato's predecessors, Plato's bonowings are hard to detect. More importanty, Porphyry noted that he found in Protagoras' On Being the technique of coimter-arguments that was later employed by Plato to defend the Being.'^ This evidence clearly confirms that Protagoras

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was the first user of the dialogue method. Plato's Protagoras seems to be a shrewdly constracted piece of writng, in which he employed Protagoras' own method of argument to disgrace Protagoras hiraself Plato's predetermination for writing his dialogues was clearly to defend Socrates' ideals, and therefore, Plato would willfally change anything in the dialogue between Protagoras and Socrates if such a dialogue ever took place. One would hardly accept Socrates' dominance in this dialogue over Protagoras who had afready familiarized tUis practce of argumentaton in Greece, gained considerable experience in tUis practice with his constant involvement in debates and dialogues, and had written several treatises on debating and counter-argument. Returaing to the Buddhist tradition, one finds that the Buddha's favorite way of argumentation was the dialogue method. He vanquished famous, belligerent rivals witU the help of dialogues which are over one hundred in nuraber as preserved by the Theravada, the oldest Buddhist traditon. The list of the longer dialogues of the Buddha, which was separately categorized in the first Buddhist council held three raonths after the Buddha's death, contains thirty-four dialogues, and thefr Enghsh translation spreads over nearly one thousand printed pages. This inforraation reveals the paramount importance and the consistent applicaton of the dialogue form in Buddhist argumentaton, and Protagoras use of the same method during the late fifth centtuy B.C.E. seems to have been influenced by Buddhism The same may be trae with the Greek concept oKairos. As Schiappa noted, Poulakos has stated that the concept oKairos can be traced back to Greek poets and

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tragedians (73), and one may agree that, besides poets and tragedians, Greek thinkers also had used this word before Protagoras did. However, it should be asserted that none of the other Greek thinkers before Protagoras ever used the word Kairos to advocate the opportune time for speech. The first Greeks thinkers to use "Kairos" in a philosophical sense were probably the anonymous Pythagoreans. They once mentoned Kairos vaguely to suggest the right moment as an assignment to various people and places in the univeise, a concept that corapletely puzzled Aristotle." Again, the same Pythagoieans mentioned Kairos, leferring to the right time for sex and marriage for young people,'" Democritus, of course, used "Kairos" to mean tming for speech, but he apparently used the term to oppose the concept. According to him, one's right to speak is a sign of freedom, and therefore, "danger Ues in disceraing tUerigUtoccasion."" PerUaps, Uis strong sense of democratc freedom made Uim oppose to tUe timing for speecU. Until Protagoras used "Kairos" to support tUe selection of tUerigUttime for speecU, no Greek tUinker ever addressed tUis important metUod of persuasion. Laertius, who has provided more information about Protagoras' use of this method in rhetoric, remarked, "He [Protagoras] was also the first to . . . expound the importance of the right moment,"" and one finds no reason to doubt this claira. Its reliabiUty is "confirraed by the treatment ofKairos in the Protagorean-influenced track Dissoi Logoi" (Schiappa 73). Gorgias highligUted tUis concept, and Isocrates overemphasized it, but Protagoras was the first Greek to introduce it into Greek rhetoric.

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To stress the Indian parallels of the Protagorean concept oKairos, one raay again go back to the Buddhist systera of persuasion. Here, the Buddha is addressing Prince Abhaya, who was send by a leader of another tradition to defeat the Buddha in an argument: Whatever speech the Tathagata [the Buddha] knows to be fact, trae, but not connected with the goal, not liked by otUers, disagreeable to them, the Tathagata does not utter that speech. Whatever speech the Tathagata knows to be fact, trae, connected with the goal, but not liked by others, disagreeable to them, the Tathagata is aware of the right time for explaining that speech. Whatever speech the Tathagata knows to be not fact, not trae, not connected with the goal, but that is liked by otUers, agreeable to thera, that speech the Tathagata does not utter. Whatever speech the Tathagata knows to be fact, trae, but not connected with the goal, yet liked by otUers and agreeable to tUera, neitUer does Tathagata utter that speech. 'Whatever speech tae Tathagata knows to be fact, trae, connected with the goal, and liked by otUers, and agreeable to tUera, the Tathagata is aware of the right tirae for explaining that speech." In addition to the Buddha's summarization of the appropriate speech itself, he has clearly recognized here the significance of appropriate time for speaking. If what he thinks right appears to be not agreeable to the audience, he raay wait for the right tirae to speak. Similarly, even though he is aware that his speech would be agreeable to the listeners, still he would calculate the opportune trae to deliver his words. Even in a highly favorable situation, the Buddha considered tiraing as a very cracial factor to address an audience. Evidence reveals that "tiraing of speech" as given in this Sutta was neither a passing reference nor an isolated occunence, but a welI-establisUed and well-recognized tecUnique in early BuddUist rhetoric. In the Gradual Sayings the Buddha again

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mentioned the importance of traing in speech, saying that nobody could "roll back his [the Buddha's] Dhamma Wheel" since the Buddhaknew the right time to speak.'* In the Middle-Iength Sayings, he reiterated that he was a "speaker at a right time."" This concept was foUowed not only by the Buddha but also by his disciples in their speeches. Buddhist monks were specifcally instracted to be aware of the tming factor whenever they talked to others. FoIIowing is how Sariputta, a learaed disciple of the Buddha, advised his junior monks about peisuasive techniques in speech: You must place youiself in the foUowing five positons whenevei you impel anothei into acton. I will speak timely not untimely; I wiU speak about what has happened, not what has not; I will speak with genteness, not harshness; I will speak about the goal, what is not the goal; I will speak with mind of araify, not of ill will.^ So, out of five techniques to peisuade the listener, "timing" was given tUe first priorify. TUis utterance indicates tUat, as a part of their ttaining and education, monks were instracted on persuasive techniques in which the opportune tirae for speech was given a raajor position. Since Buddhist persuasive methods developed in connection with the rhetorical techniques eraployed by other schools of thought, one may airive at the doubtess conclusion that the Buddha's contempoiaiy schools had also developed a majoi emphasis on tming. Conceming Piotagoias' othei ihetorical innovations, except foi his embellishment and impiovement of language, no clear evidence is available, but U is probable that he, along with other conteraporary thinkers, made some contributons to the methodical organization of the speech. Plato's remarks in Phaedrus indicate that by that

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time speech consisted of seven sectons namely introducton, nanation, testimony, proof, probabilify, confirmation, and supplementy confirmation, of which, as he said, the last two items were introduced by Theodoras, Protagoras' great friend.^' This reraark raight raake one surmise that both Theodoras and Protagoras shared some aspects in the organization of speech. Plato farther mentoned in the same text that Prodicus "discovered the art of appropriate speech," which was neither length nor brevify but "due measure."^^ With regard to Protagoras' contributions, Plato only said, "He had propriefy of phrase and many other fine things,"" and one may conclude that, while Protagoras raade the most notable contributon to the development of speech, his contemporaries also introduced various innovatves to modify the organizaton of the discourse. This conclusion is an invitaton to make a general coraparison between the characteristics of speech organization and presentation shared by all Protagoras' contemporaries and the early Buddhist fradition. The previous paragraph revealed that the speech was divided into sections, and the length of tae speech was systematically modulated during the time of Protagoras, and perhaps Protagoras hiraself had a hand in it. Several of the Buddha's discourses show that speech was similarly organized by the Buddha himself and his contemporaries. The Buddha, according to the Gradual Sayings, was aware of the foUowing fve factors when he spoke: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. Usefalness of his words. Goodnessofhis words. The measure of the speech (appropriate length). Opportone time for the speech. The natare of the audience (assembled men)."

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Besides, the passage quoted above to indicate the Buddha's raindfalness about the opportune time for speech sheds more light on other techniques he employed when he approached an audience. That Sutta recognized the following four requirements for a successfal speech in addition to proper timing: 1. Presentation of accurate evidence from the past. ("I will speak about what has happened, not what has not.") 2. Attention to the diction, phraseology, and tone. ("I will speak with gentleness, not harshness.") 3. Focus on the main purpose throughout the speech. ("I wiU speak about the goal, what is not the goal.") 4. Extensionofhumanistic feelingstowards tUeaudience. ("I wiU speak with mind of amity, not of ill-will.")" These various characteristics that highligUt organization and presentation of speech can also be found in several other Suttas. For instance, highlighting attention to diction and tone, the Buddha said in the Middle-length Sayings that he would avoid "harsh speech" and utter only the words that would be "gentle, pleasing to the ear, affectionate, going to the heart, urbane, and pleasant." These words would be "worth treasuring with sirailes at a right time."^' These examples indicate that the major rhetorical techniques of Protagoras and his contemporaries actually existed in India before the time of the Older Sophists. Division of the same speech into sectons was also recognized in India as an effective means to impress the audience. The following confradictons that might arise in an arguraentative dialogue or a speech indicate how organized the speakers should be: You said at the end what should have been said at the beginning, and said at the beginning what should haven been said at the end. Youi raethod is leveised, you aie lefated, you aie caught out. Go away and think out youi woids, 01 umavel them if you can."

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This is an indicaton of theii well-awaieness of the raethodical anangement of speech. Intioduction and conclusion aie clearly recognized here. Without a clear organization of the speech, one would fail to impress the audience. The speaker's failure to conform to the accepted rales of giving a speech made the speaker subject to "censure," a sitaation that would cause humiliation and disgrace. Besides, the speaker's threefold awareness of himself (and herself since Buddhist and Jain nuns were engaged in persuasion), the speech, and the audience was a wellrecognized requirement to succeed as a persuader. Buddhist psychology of selfawareness, comparison, and adjustment could definitely have played a major role here and made the Buddha and his disciples highly successfal in their persuasive process. Several Suttas including the Anumana Sutta instracted monks in greater details to adjust their speech, as well as other behavior patteras, through inference and comparison. One may present oneself to society as a suave, acceptable person if one foUows this process: I do not like but resent the person who tends to exalt himself or herself and disperse others. Similarly, if I exalt myself and disparage others, I am too not liked by otUers. I raust look into myself whether I exaU myself and disparage others. If 1 find this weakness in me, I must try to get rid of that undesirable characteristic." The more one understands what others are, the more one understands what one is. The same process may yield excellent results with a reversal: the more one understands what one is, they more one knows what others are. This understanding facilitates one's act of sUaping speecU to present oneself as a more acceptable person. Even tbougU tUese instractions are not specifically mentioned as the requirements to be a great speaker 274

before an audience, they contain enormous power to make one a successfal speaker, and there is evidence that the Buddha and his disciples constantly used these techniques in their persuasive process. Despite the Buddha's clear rejecton of self-mortification as a way to self-purificaton, he spoke the following words to a group of ascetcs who practiced extreme asceticisra: Those who say so [that I find fauU in ascetcisra] are not following my words. On the contrary, they are reporting rae falsely, and at variance with the fact. . . How could I disparage all penance or bluntly revile and find fauU with every ascetic, with everyone who lives a life that is hard! There are certain recluses and Brahmins who are clever, subtle, experienced in confroversy, hair-spUtters,. . . And as between them and me, there is, as to some points, agreeraents, and as to sorae points, not. As to some of those things they approve, we also approve thereof As to some of those things they disapprove, we also disapprove thereof As to some of those things they approve, we disapprove thereo As to some of those things they disapprove, we approve thereof And some things we approve of, so do they. And some things we disapprove, so do they. And some things we approve, they do not. And some things we disapprove of, they approve thereof. As those things, my friends, on which we do not agree, let us leave them alone. As to those things on which we agree, let the wise put questions about them, ask for reasons as to them, and talk them over. . .'' This speech of the Buddha, considering that he addressed in an assembly of rival ascetics, must be regarded as one judiciously and elegantly crafted in his own advice to his disciples on various psychological techniques that would help them shape their speech. While the Buddha clearly rejected asceticism in principle, here he praised the ascetics for their perseverance and hardship. Suggesting his flexibilify to opinions, he encouraged the ascetics to elirainate tUeir defensive raood and to participate in a reciprocal dialogue. TUe arguraentation suggested by tUe BuddUa is, clearly, not to accept or reject anybody's view but to join in a tratU-seeking effort and to arrive at a rautually agreeable conclusion. This

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speecU is astonisUingly raodera for any given standard, and tUe BuddUa's empUasis on human psychology seems to have played a vital role in his abilify to consttiict Uis speecUes with such persuasive power. AU these discourses and practices provide ample evidence in support of the assertion that a highly developed rhetorical systera, existed in early Buddhism and in other rationaUst systems in India during the sixth centaty B.C.E. The sttiking similarities between these rhetorical techniques and those of Protagoras in particular shed ligUt on tUe possibility that tae Greek sophist thinkei was influenced by the Buddhist and othei Indian rhetorical practices and values. It is also possible that Protagoras passed his own influences into other sophists and eventaally to the discipline of rhetoric.

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Notes ' Gradual Sayings II, pp. 53-54. ' njid., 54. ' See K. N. Jayatilleke's Early Buddhist Theory ofKnowIedge, pp. 281 -293. " Diogenes Laertius IX 54. ' fbid.,52.

' Plato, Protagoras 329B. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, pp. 68-69. ' ftid., p. 77. ' n5id.,p. 155. '" Diogenes Laertius IX 51. " bid.,52.

'^ Porphyry, Lecture on Literature I in Eusebius' Preparation ofthe Gospel X 3, 25. '^ In Kathleen Freeman's The Free-Socratic Philosophers (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1966), 252. '" n)id.,258. " DK 68 B226. '" Diogenes Laertius IX 52. " Middle-Iength Sayings II, pp. 62-63. '* Gradual Sayings //, p. 114. " Middle-length Sayings I, p. 225. "" GradualSayings III, ^' P\a.to, Phaedrus 266D 277 pp.\44-\45.

" " "

DK84A20. DK86A12. Gradual Sayings I, p. 225; III, p. 114.

^' Gradual Sayings /, pp. 144-145. ^' Middle-length Sayings I, p. 225. " Middle-Iength Sayings II, p. 205.

^' Middle-Iength Sayings I,p. 129. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha I, pp. 253-255.

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Personal Philosophy and Social Ethics in Buddhist and Sophist Teaching Another vital aspect that rational thought enriched both in Buddhism and in the sophist teaching is the philosophy foi life and tUe etUics foi sociefy. Leaving aside both the tiaditional and the scriptural authority, Buddhism first rejected idealistically formed etUical values in tUe BraUmin traditon. Second, it cast aside tUe materialistic overemphasis of sensual gratification and disrespect for morality, botU of wUicU grew as a direct opposition to the idealistic BraUmin system of tUougUt. WUiIe asserting tUat individual Uappiness achieved through the combination of personal success and virtoe should be the primary objective in life, BuddUisra also invented a rationally constracted system of etUical values, wUicU is generally known today as a clear exaraple of Uumanism. Personal pUilosopUy and social etUics in the sophist teaching were basically the same. Sophist rhetoricians equally emphasized both personal happiness and social raorality, and "the intellectual resuU of this philosophical teaching has been very righty recognized as the coming of humanism" (Untersteiner xv). This secton wiU elaborate on these similarities, again focusing on a possible Buddhist influence on sophist thinking.

Personal Philosophy It is well known that the concept of individual happiness achieved a predorainant significance in Plato's and Aristotle's writings. 'WhiIe Plato maintamed that "huraan happiness consists in spiritual perfection, and spiritaal perfection implies and is implied by self knowledge" (Allen 19), Aristotle made tUis concept raore secularized by

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balancing its spiritaal and worldly elements. Achievement of happiness, according to him, was the main objective in Ufe, and one would reacU tUis goal through \irtuous welfare, self sufficiency, security in life, wealtU, orpUysical well-being.' Probably, taese stages of Uappiness were not the inventions of Plato or Aristotle, nor were they the naturally developed concepts in Greece. Rather, their original source raay be located in Buddhist Nirvana. As explained in the previous chapter, there is a strong possibiUfy that Democritas bonowed this idealistic form of happiness during his Indian visit and then passed it to Protagoras, who seemingly focused on its secular side, thus paving the way for Socrates to oppose it and Aristotle to conceptaalize it in a revised form. TUere was no idealized and conceptaalized form of Uappiness in Greece before Democritas infroduced the concepts of mental well-being, an acquisition through an impertarbable mental reaction to various vicissitodes of life. Ostensibly, Democritos passed this concept to Protagoras, his disciple. There is enough evidence to believe taat "his [Protagoras'] ideal of conduct was the Democritean imperturbabilify" (Freeman, PreSocratic Philosophers 351). TUe application of tUis tUeory is "shown unmistakably in what he [Protagoras] says of Pericles' behavior on hearing the news of the deata of both his sons in only eight days" (Untersteiner 66): When his sons, who were very fine young men, died within eight days, he (Pericles) bore it without raouming. For he held on to his serenity, frora which everyday he derived great benefit in happiness, freedom from suffering, and honor in the people's eyes-for all who saw him bearing his griefs vahantly thought him great-souled and brave and superior to themselves, well knowing their own helplessness in such a calamity.^

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While this quotation may reveal how far the Buddhist concept of Nirvana could have already ttaveled, it is apparent that Protagoras was the one who shaped Pericles' mind in this manner. Pericles' "serenify, from which everyday he derived great benefit in happiness [and] freedom from suffering," helped him bear "his grief valiantly." Obviously, this serenify was an acquired mental developraent rather than a natural raental reaction to the extemal world. Pericles was unusually open to rational thought, and Protagoras, the close friend of Pericles, could have instracted and guided his friend to shape mentalify fri this manner. It is probable that Protagoras acquired frora his teacher Deraocritos a coraplete knowledge and instt-uctions about this raental iraperturbabilify and the way to achieve it. It has afready been mentioned that Deraocritos was used to refreat into tombs and contemplate as a means to develop and retain his mental serenify. Protagoras could have leaned from his teacher these metaods of ttaining mind to retain its imperturbabiUfy. This dissertation discussed previously the Buddhist attitode towards worldly problems, the attitode that closely resembles taat of Pericles and Protagoras. An offshoot of the idealistic Nirvana, tUis attitade developed in an effort to demonsttate the practicabilify of Nirvana in tie day-to-day life. Buddha recommended his lay disciples to remain unmoved in the presence of worldly problems and instracted them how to achieve that stabihfy. His instractions raafrily consisted of a reinteipietaton of sensual worid as a constantly changing phenomena and meditatonal methods as a means to mteraalize this

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leinteipieted attitode. Thus inteipieted as a psychological cieation lathei than an actual existence, the Buddha asserted that various vicissitodes of life would not distuib the wise. This teaching can fiirthei be elaboiated wita tie examples of how tie Buddha deah with people who experienced such pioblems as the death of theii beloved. King Pasenadi was having a conveisaton with the Buddha when a messengei biought the new s that the Queen Mallika was decid. Having heaid the news, the king "was solely grieved and sick at heart, his shouldeis diooped, his mouth fell, and he sat biooding, unable to speak."' The Buddha said to the king taat noble people should leact to the death of the beloved with calmness and sonowlessness. Such a peison is called "a learaed Aiyan disciple," one who has "drawn out the poisoned dart of the sonow with which the unleamed average man torments himself," and "the sonowless, dart-free, Aryan disciple has cooled the self entirely."" Protagoras' appreciation of Pericles' behavior after Pericles calmly accepted the death of his two sons raay be rooted in the same philosophy. The serenity" of Pericles Protagoras is praising is not natural human nature but an achievement with daily practce of looking at the worldly nature from a rational point of view. Under normal circumstances, a father's calm acceptance of such a double blow is highly unusual, but Protagoras could have influenced Pericles to view the calamites in life as inexorable and unwortUy of taking seriously. As mentioned several times previously, tUe otUer BuddUist concept that closely relates to the personal life is the advocacy of a moderate Ufe between asceticism and

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indulgence in sensual gratfication. It may not be necessary to repeat here the previous discussion in Chapter III of the Buddhist middle path, but it is worthy to discuss the similarity between the sophist attitude towards life and tUe middle path recommended in Buddhism. One observes that a form of asceticism based on Parmenidean idealistic concepts was gaining popularity in tUe non-sopUist intellectual circle in AtUens during this time, and Socrates, undoubtedly, was the most ardent supporter of this theory. Apparently, this asceticism had no connection with the Pythagorean belief of tUe soulliberation in wUich only individual effort, not any divine power, was required. Rather, this forra of asceticism was a Brahmin-type practce in which worldly happiness was denied in the anticipation of the union with God. The Katha Upanishad, for instance, indicated that renouncement of worldly pleasure would be the most essental prerequisite to realize Brahma.' As explained by Nikhilananda, "the knowledge of the Brahma is possible only for him who has renounced all the enjoyments of the relative universe. . ." (135). The following words of Socrates in his conversation with Antiphon reveal the natore of this philosophy: You seem to rae, Antiphon, to think that happiness is luxury and expensive living, but I think that it is an attribute of God to want nothing, and it is next to divine to want as little as possible: that the divine is tae best and that what is next to the divine is the next best thing.' While Socrates genuinely foUowed this personal philosophy and bred a coterie to popularize it, sophists obviously opposed to it. With no raetaphysical theraes disturbing their rational thinking, sophist thinkers developed a more realistic attitade towards life. AntpUon, in retum, responded to Socrates as follows:

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I thought, Socrates, that philosophers should be happier than other people, but you seem to me to get just the opposUe out of philosophy. You live indeed in a fasUion wUich no slave in his master's house would tolerate. Your food and drink is of the coramonest kind, and the cloak you wear is not only coraraon but the same suramer and winter, and you are always without shoes or shirt.' These words of Antiphon do not suggest his support for luxury even though Socrates thinks it otherwise; rather, they reflect a ratonalist attitade towards life witU a tone of persuasion to use available material objects and resources for pUysical existence and corafort. Antiphon believed that wisdom means the understanding that the use of material objects and other resources for bodily comfort and maintenance makes one happy. This atttade is not an effort to push one into self-indulgence in sensual pleasure but a guidance to drag one out of self-mortification. Despite the Platonic traditon's effort to present sorae sophist thinkers as the extteraists in self-indulgence of sensual pleasure and the advocates of the sarae philosophy, one raay hardly find evidence to wanant this claim. In Protagoras, Plato evidenty meant to present Prodicus as a pleasure-seeker,' and Philostratus later said, perhaps following Plato's depicton of Prodicus, that the sophist was "addicted to his pleasures."' Nevertheless, the available fragments of Prodicus would prove it otherwise. Xenophon in Memorabilia has preserved a long fragment in which Prodicus expressed hiraself with the help of a parable which he recited to a big gathering.'" This fragment contains invaluable guidance for the young generation on the importance of selecting a pattera of Uving that avoids self-indulgence in luxury and sensual gratificaton. Pleasureseeking was presented in the fragment in the guise of a beautfal but fickle lady who

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would induce Heracles, the main character in the story, into vice and destraction while moderation, another pretfy lady, would lead Heracles into success, happiness, and good health in life. 'WhiIe this fragment probably sheds light on why sophists were so deraanding in the Greek society and what they raeant by the teaching of virtue, it strongly supports the assertion that sophist thinkers were not pleasure-seekers but those who insisted on moderaton in life just as tUe eariy Buddhist teachers who emphasized the same. The other Buddhist teaching that requires a comparison with the sophist philosophy for personal life is the concept of worldly success. Despite the popular belief that early Buddhisra presented a pessimistic theory about life, it sUouId be asserted that individual success in the material world was a cenfral philosophy for life as given in early BuddUist texts. As tUe orders of monks and nuns were firmly establisUed in BuddUism, "a concem with the quality of tUe life lived by lay people" became apparent araong tUe order of tUe monks (Ling xiv). TUe raodem tUeory about Buddhist pessimism probably arose mainly out of a raistaken identity: readers inconectly believed that the instractions given to monks and nuns in original Buddhist Suttas were also the instractions for the Buddhist lay community. Thus, the Buddha's numerous instractons that were raeant to discourage monks and nuns towards worldly life were regarded as equally applicable to tUe BuddUist lay life. In tUis mixed-up reconstracton of Buddhist advice, some of the recent Westem scholars seem to have ignored Buddhist instractions on personal success and eraphasized that Buddhism is a pure pessimistic religion.

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However, the Buddha "was vety far form denying the possibilify of happiness, spiritual and material" (Stark xliii). The confasion that the Buddha's teaching was pessimistic may be untangled by studying why two kinds of drastcally different instractions were required for the Buddhist clergy and the lay communify. The main concem of the Buddha was to appeal to the whole sociefy but, to achieve this objectve, he needed, first of all, a qualified, fally dedicated, and reliable group of people to convey his message to society. Similar to the Jain society, the orders of raonks and nuns were established for this particular purpose. Ostensibly, the Buddha was well-aware that his success as a social leader would depend on the discipline, dedicaton, and the skill of the monks and nuns who would act as intermediate of the Buddha's message. Then, the most essential requirement was to frain predominantly young monks and nuns rigorously, in such a way that they would maintain an unblemished reputation with their behavior and would never retom to lay life after a sUort stay in tUe Order. Total discouragement of sensual gratifcaton was, apparently, meant for tUis purpose. After entering tUe Order, a young novice would receive instractions from tUe Buddha or a senior monk, and then he or she would refreat to "the forest, or to the roots of a free, or to an empfy chamber"'' and start meditaton on imperraanence of sensual pleasure, mental suffering caused by the attachment to sensual pleasure, and the selflessness of all sensual experiences. After developing this mentality for several raonths, he or she would again see the Buddha a few raonths later, wishing raore guidance. After receiving raore instractions and education about the Buddha's own

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teaching, other teachings, natore of people, and the art of persuasion, this monk or nun, along with brothers and sisters of the same order, would begin the task of spreading the Buddha's raessage. With their bodily requfrements faithfally provided by the la> communify, monks and nuns, along with the Buddha himself, had to ttavel from place to place 01 meet the visitois at theii own lodging and teach them the Buddha's message. Howevei, the Buddhist lay coramunify was completely diffeient. Unlike tUe Jain lay commumfy, Buddhist lay people weie allowed to live a fally liberated material life within its ethical codes. To win appreciation, acceptance, and support of these people, the Buddha and his disciples had to prove themselves usefal to sociefy. They achieved this objective by involving with social affairs and offering usefal advice and guidance to people for individual success in worldly life even though this aspect of Buddhism is relatively unknown to the West: Even nowadays it is sometimes said that Buddhism has no concem with the social dimension of life. If this is not explicitly stated, it is often impUed. TUis denial of a social dimension to tUefr lives on tUe part of those who claim to be Buddhist is leally lathei curious, foi the notion of an un-social Buddhist is a confradiction in teims. (Ling xiv) Despite the modem misinteipietaton that eaily Buddhism was concemed only with individual libeiaton, it (eaily Buddhism) displayed a lemarkable interest in tae social life of the lay Buddhist cornraunify. Neither the Buddha nor his disciples never claimed to be the messengers of any divine power so that they would not play the role of the intermediates between divinify and the lay communify. Their best service to sociefy would be their guidance of people to various ends such as success in business, happiness

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in family life, and, or course, improveraent in virtoous qualites. TUus, tUe BuddUa and Uis disciples began to offer usefal advice for lay people to succeed in worldly life, just as sophists offered professional assistance to make well-accomplished citzens out of the young generation. In fact, this kind of advice and guidance was a part of the expectatons of the lay communify from the Buddhist clergy. As the Vyaggapajja Sutta reveals, visitors to the Buddha told him that they were living a worldly Ufe, taking care of tUeir properfy, and feeding and protecting tUeir wives and cUildren TUese people requested tUe BuddUa, "What do you recommend for our well-being and benefit?'^ People wanted to know what advice and guidance the Buddha would offer to them in order to raake thefr very existence happier and raore raeaningfal. In fact, materialists and skeptics had afready challenged any existence aftei death and stiessed one's present existence as the only occasion to make oneself happy so that the Buddha and his disciples had to antcipate frequently a question as this from their listeners. In preparation for sucU sitoations, early Buddhism seems to have developed various topics related to worldly Ufe and prepared answers for tUose questons. Various aspects of Individual success sucU as management of one's business, maintenance of personal properfy and wealtU, establishment of fiiendships, and developraent of virtae were discussed in detail. This is how two different practcal philosophies came into existence in early Buddhism. Members of the Buddhist clergy who preserved these discourses mixed them all togetier since their method of categorization was based on tie exteraal appearance of

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those discourses such as the length and the dialogue form. Thus, one finds raany Buddhist Suttas of iramense practical value for the lay life sunounded by a great number of discourses preacUed for tUe raonks and nuns to highlight the uselessness of raaterial success. The discouises foi monks and nuns cleaily outnumbei the Suttas foi the lay community piobably because those who pieserved those discourses were the raembers of the clergy, who gave priority to the discourses preached for themselves. AIso, the centtal theme in the first and the second Buddhist councils, in which steps were taken to preserve original Buddhist Suttas, was the organization and maintenance of the order of monks and mms so that the predominant position of these discourses is understandable, Nevertheless, Buddhist clergy also preserved a considerable nuraber of the Buddha's and his contemporary disciples' discourses which contain usefal advise for the success of material life, but they have been unjustly ignored by the raodem Westem interpreters of Buddhism, Several of the early Buddhist Suttas that exclusively dealt with the worldly life are tUe Sigalovada, Vyaggapajja, Vasala, Mangala, and Parabhava. The Sigalovada Sutta instracted young people on how to eam honor from society, secure protection from dangers, and achieve prosperify in the material world while the Vyaggapajja Sutta offered instractions on saving, proper spending, and on maintaining social relationships, The Vasala Sutta, Mangala Sutta and the Parabhava Sutta identfied various factors that contribute to the individual's moral and spiritual degeneration and personal downfall in the material world. Advice, instmctons, and guidance offered in these Suttas for the lay

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life are too much for the present section, so attention may be focused just on one Sutta, preferably the Sigalovada Sutta," to see the similarify of these instt-uctions with those that the sophists offered to the youthfal Greeks. In this Sutta, the Buddha, responding to Sigala's request of how to raake his (Sigala's) life happy, initiated his long dialogue saying, "Hear then, young householder, give ear to my words, and I wiU speak" and emphasizing that one who followed the Buddha's advice would "taste success" by conquering bota this world and the next.'" First of all, praise from the wise is one criterion to judge the success of the lay life, and tUat praise raay be acUieved through moral behavior which is fourfold: abstnence from killing, stealing, lying, and adultery. AII sorts of iraraoral beUavior are raotivated by four factors: partiality, enmity, ignorance, and fear. The young householder Sigala must leam not to be motivated by these four factors. Again, wealth is an important aspect that makes life happy, and Sigala, whose father has just died, must know how to protect his wealth inherited from the family. There are six channels for dissipating wealth: getting addicted to intoxicants, frequenting streets at unseemly hours, hauntng fairs, being infatuated by garabling, associatng with evil companions, and living an idle life. By avoiding tUese unwUoIesome habits, Sigala would both protect and increase his wealth. The Buddha elaborated each of these six channels of dissipating wealth, identfying six dangers in each. The following six dangers are lurking in alcohohsm: actual loss of wealth, increase of quanels, susceptibility to disease, loss of good

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cUaracter, indecent exposure, and irapaired intelligence. Frequenting tUe streets at tUe wrong time retums tUe following six dangers: no protection for oneself, no protection for one's wife and cUiIdren, least protection for one's properfy, openness to tUe suspicion of undiscovered crimes, proneness to false ramors about unwholesome behavior, and susceptibility to many otUer unspecified probleras. Similarly, Uunting fairs retums six perils: addiction to dancing, singing, music, recitation, cyrabals, and acrobatic. Gambling causes the following six repercussions: the winner begets hatred; the looser experiences pain; personal wealth gradually declines; court of law no longer trasts the garabler's words; friends and officials despise him; and respectable families refase to establish marital relatonships with him. Six perils are awaiting for the one who associates with the evil companions: one can tura into a gambler, a libertine, a tippler, a cUeat, a swindler, or a violent person. Finally, idleness may prevent one from work with the following coraplaints: too much heat, too much coldness, too early time, too late time, and physical discomfort. Next, the discussion continued with the differentaton between genuine friends and the foes in the likeliness of friends. A rapacious person, a man of words, a mere flatterer, and the fellow-waster are the four enemies in the appearance of a friend. A rapacious person is the one who gives little and expects raore, does his duty out of fear, and pursues his own interest. A friend of words makes friendly profession with regard to the past and future and tries to gain favor with empty words, but when an opportimity for service arises, avows disability. A flatterer may consent to do wrong but dissents from

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doing rigUt and praise in the presence but speak ill to others. A fellow-waster is the one who accompanies and encouiages one who indulges in strong drinks, frequents the streets at untimely hours, haunts shows and fairs, and gambles. The Buddha proceeded with his discourse, offering equally usefal advice for Sigala to make his life Uonorable, Uappy, and prosperous, but, obviously, tUe sumraary of tUe Sutta's first half given so far may have provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate that personal success in worldly affairs was a predominanty significant topic in early Buddhist texts. The Buddha discussed these topics in public, offered his personal assistance to individuals who endeavored success in life, and made Uimself and Uis disciples practically usefal to the young generation. Now one may again retum to Greek sophist teaching to examine how close sophist practices were to those of the Buddha and his disciples. Sophists were the first Greek thinkers to offer professional assistance in shaping the fature of the young generation, and Protagoras was the first Greek to initiate this practice in Greece. Plato quoted Protagoras' own words as follows: Young men, if you associate with me, you shall, on the first day you enter ray company, go home better man for it, and so too on the next day; and every day you shall unfailingly iraprove. . . A pupil coming to rae wiU leam only tUe subject Ue Uas corae to leam. By tUis I mean pradence in Uis own affairs so tUat Ue raay raanage Uis own Uousehold in the best way and the pradence in the affairs of the cify so that he may be most effectve in action and in speech in matters conceraing the cify.'^ This important quotation offers usefal clues to what the inital sophist practce was. Protagoras aimed at training his pupils to maintain their properfy and to involve

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successfally in cify-affairs. Teaching virtoe was, undoubtedly, a part of this ttaining. Socrates' remarks about Protagoras' teaching-"You, openly advertising yourself throughout Greece under the title of sophist, have proclairaed yourself a teacher of cuUure and virtoe.""prove that Protagoras taught moral and cultural values. He did not teach any other subjects under sophistry. Other Greeks, who were attracted to the lucrative business of Protagoras, had little skill in and knowledge about what Protagoras actually did; therefore, they plunged their students "'once more into the arts, teaching them calculation and asttonoray and geometry and music."" At the beginning, only Protagoras was there as the introducer and the fally qualified person to lead the young Greeks towards self-proficiency in their personal and public affairs. It is reasonable to suggest tUat Protagoras acquired tUis knowledge and skill from tae Buddhist sources that probably came through Democritos or Protagoras' Persian educaton and used his knowledge to launch a lucrative profession in Greece. Imraediately befoie and during Piotagoias' fiist twenfy yeais in Athens, peace pievailed in the state, while moie than one hundied fifty Gieek colonies weie paying annual tributes to it. In consequence, money and wealth lemained in the countt^, Athenian business and tiade impioved tiemendously, and peisonal wealta of Athenian families incieased diamatcally. In tUis social backgiound, Piotagoias seeras to Uave stmulated a social need among well-to-do families to educate their young sons about business manageraent, properfy care, and character developraent. Training young people to speak well and to participate in cify-affairs, of course, was a need inherent in Greek deraocracy.

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but Protagoras' approach to the young generaton, "a course entirely different from his predecessors" according to his own words,'" was alraost the same as tae practices of the early Buddhist traditon in india. Protagoras could have familiarized himself with the detailed analysis and the systemic categorization of the Buddhist instractions in this field and used them in his own practices. Another Buddhist concept that closely resembles that of Protagoras and the rest of the sophists is the absence of any reliance on divine power as a part of one's personal philosophy. In the Tittayatana Sutta, the Buddha categoricaUy denied divine will as a determinant factor of one's failure, success, happiness, or sonow: Monks, there are certain recluses and Brahmins who teach thus, who hold this view: "Whatever weal, woe, or neuttal feeling is experienced, all that is due to the creation of a suprerae god. I approach them and say: "Is it trae, as they say, that you hold the view and teach that whatever weal, woe, or neufral feeling is experienced, all tUis is due to the creation of a supreme god?" Thus questioned by me, they reply, "Yes, we do." Then, I say to them: "So then, owing to the creation of a suprerae god, men will become murders, thieves, unchaste liars, slanders, covetous, malicious, and heretcal. Those who rely on the creation of a supreme god, those lack the desire and energy, to do what is to be done and to refrain frora doing what is not to be done. So then, the necessify for acton or inacton not being found to exist in them, the term 'recluse' cannot leasonably be applied to youiself since you live in a state of bewildeiment witUout Ueed 01 lesfraint."" This stiong argument against the creator played a major role in the Buddha's advice to sociefy on material success. While the Brahmin tradition recognized praying as an act of invoking blessing for life, the Buddha denied it, emphasizing one's ovra effort as the determinant factor of one's own success or failure. None of the Buddhist Suttas that addressed the issue of worldly success encouraged people to pray but persuaded them to

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rely on their own action such as planning, care, and raaintenance of personal property and business and self-adjustraent and iraprovement of behaviorpatteras forhealthy interpersonal relatonships. Huraan effort itself was recognized as the basis for huraan success. This appears to be the cenfral philosophy of all sophist thinkers who either rejected or doubted the existence of an absolute divinify. Protagoras, who excluded the existence of gods frora his speeches and writing, instracted youths to rely on their own abilify and skill as a means to achieve success, an approach that earaed utter indignation of Socrates and Plato. Plato's remarks in the words of Socrates that Protagoras "hoodwinked all of Greece for more than forfy years, corrapting his associates and sending them away in worse condition than he had found taera"^ are most probably based on Protagoras' rejection of divine power as a contributory factor for worldly success. If Protagoras ttained his stadents to be personally successfal and socially acceptable and taught them virtaes to improve their moral values, there is absolutely no reason to believe tUat Ue corrapted youtUs. Socrates repeatedly asserted that virtaes could not be taught, frnplying that without belief in divinify people would not improve morally. Protagoras belied this metaphysical myth for forfy years just like the Buddha defied the Brahmin myth of Brahma as a supporter for one's worldly success. Just like the Brahmin fradition identified the Buddha as a heretic for his rejection of Brahma, the Greek Brahmin ttadition probably branded Protagoras as an impostor for his refasal to teach ie absolute trath to his stodents.

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It is also an interesting point tiat, while rejecting ttie power of a creator as an influential force for human hfe, the Buddha occasionally mentoned about other gods in his instractons to youths. One such occasion was when a senior meraber of the Licchavi clan brought to the Buddha's notce the following behavior problems of young Licchavis and requested the Buddha's assistance to mold thefr behavior: Lord, these Licchavi young men are quick-tempered, rough, greedy fellows. Such presents as are sent by clanfoUcsugar-cane, jujube fruit, s\\ eet cakes, sweetmeats, and lolly-pops [Sakkhlaka]they go about plundering and eatng; they slap the women and the girls of the clan on the back. Such are these fellows who now with upraised hands stand in silence revering you.^' Interestngly, this complaint seems to be an eteraal problem of any young generation as viewed by the adults. Behavior problems associated with adolescence and early youth are lucidly presented here. Those young Licchavis are "quick-tempered, rough, and greedy." Thefr lascivious behavior is presented in thefr act of slapping women and gfrls in the back. However, in the presence of a respectable person like the Buddha, they would behave as if they were saints. The Buddha's advice to these young Licchavis was based on the following summaiy: A clansman who, with wealth gotten by woik and zeal, gatheied by the sttength of the aim, eamed by the sweat by the brow, justly obtained in a lawfal way, honors parents, wife, children, his servants, workfolk and raen, laborers, gods, recluses, and godly raen. He offers gods who are wont to receive oblations. They, in retum, fondly regard hira with compassion, benevolence, and they will say, "Long life to you, and may your Ufe be protected!" To the clansman, who is thus blessed, growth may be expected not decline,^^

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Here, the existence of gods is accepted. As Helrauth Glasenapp conectly reraarked, these gods are subject to birth and death and their power "is Ifrnited to tie falfillraent of woridly petitions" (21), but the Buddha cites their blessing, as well as the best-wishes of all other social groups, as a usefal protecton for the woridly progress of the youth. Whether he genuinely accepted it or not, the Buddha apparently regarded the blessing of the gods as a usefal technique to shape the disorderly behavior of the Licchavi youths. What is notable in the Buddha's advice is the fact that all success in one's material life must be acquired witU one's own effort, and the blessing of the gods is there only for the protection of what one has acquired. There are close similarities to this teaching in sophists' instractions to youtas in worldly success. Prodicus, just like all sophist teachers did, highUgUted self-effort as the key to success and a means to obtain the blessing of gods: The gods give no real benefits or honors to men without straggle and perseverance; to obtain the gods' favor, you must serve them; to achieve the love of friends you must do well by them; to win the honor of a community, you must become its benefactor; to gain the admiration you might crave from all Greece, you must attempt to serve Greece well; . . . and finally, if you should wish to enjoy physical vigor, it is to the mind that the body must leara subjection, and discipline itself with hard-work and sweat.^' Prodicus clearly highligUts human effort as the key to success and apparenty inttoduced gods to the scene as a raeans to persuade youths to acton. So, the belief in gods was accepted at least by Prodicus as a part of personal philosophy for life since such a belief was practically usefal to guide tUe young generation. WitU regard to human effort. sophists were the first Greeks to highligUt such raodera concepts as the importance of

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having a goal in Ufe, interest in it, and perseverance. PerUaps, tUe original root of tUis emphasis goes down to Buddhism, which expIicUIy and specifically denied divine power as a determinant factor of one's personal success or failure. TUus it is evident that some major Buddhist concepts with regard to the personal philosopUy of Ufe, sucU as tUe development of imperturbable mentalify towards worldly problems, a middle path between asceticism and luxmy, iraproveraent of virtaous qualities in life, material success tUrougU proper planning and guidance, Uuman effort as tUe key to success, and tUe disregard for faith in divinity and prayer were clearly recognized by sophist thinkers as essential requirements in an individual life. PerUaps, it is unrealistic to suggest tUat all tUese concepts were closely followed by Greek sopUists witU every minute detail, but, wUen every major BuddUist concept about individual life recurs in Greek sophist thinking, one can hardly rale out the possibility of an influence.

Social Equality as a Major Aspect of BuddUist and SopUist Social EtUics Social equality may be regarded as tUe raost fimdaraental and revolutionary aspect in BuddUist etUics. It attained tUe highest posUion in early Buddhisra as a direct opposition to the caste-systera in the Brahmin ttadition. As the Buddha and his contemporary disciples endeavored to propagate this concept through various arguments, Brahmin theory of high birth encountered a formidable oppositon. The concept of social equality was also a major tUerae among Greek sopUist tUinkers, and tUerefore, a comparison of the two systeras of thought appears to be relevant.

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The conducive background for the Buddhist concept of social equality can be seen in the Brahmins' assertion about their own superiorify in sociefy and the growing social curiosity about this belief TUe following queston, refened to the Buddha's disciple Kacchana by the king of Madura, recurs consistently in the Sutta Pitaka in vanous forras: Good Kacchana, Brahmins speak thus: "Only Brahmins form the best caste, and all other castes are low; Only Brahrains form the fair caste, and all other castes are dark; only Brahmans are pure, not non-Brahmins, Brahrains are the own sons of the Brahraa, bora of his raouth, bom of Brahma, formed by Brahma, heirs to Brahma," What does the revered Kacchana say to this?" The Buddhist answer given to this and similar questions emphatically denied Brahmin superiority in sociefy, and the Buddha and his disciples systematically refated the Brahmin argument to highligUt that all human beings are equal. Kacchana began his denial of Brahmin high birth, saying "This is the way in which it can be said, sir. This is merely the sound in the world"^^ and put forward a nuraber of scientific and sociological arguments to crash the Brahmin assertion. As previously noted, the Buddha began one of his dialogues against Brahmin high birth with the following sarcastic and humorous remarks: Brahraan wives are known to have their seasons and to conceive and to give birth and to give suck. Yet, these Brahmans, bora of women like everyone else, speaks tUus: "Only BraUmans forra tUe best caste,.. . Only BraUraans are tUe own sons of tUe BraUma,. . . Ueirs to BraUma." ^' WUat tUese reraarks foretell is the strong Buddhist denial of social inequality. Nobody is higher or lower or better or worse by birth. Only the individual acton would determine the goodness or badness of an individual. The Buddha said:

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I, Brahmin, do not speak of "better' because of birth in a high class family. But, Brahman, I do not speak of "worse" because of birth in a high class family. I do not speak of "better' because of the splendor of complexion. I do not speak of "worse' because of the splendor of complexion. I do not speak of "better" because of the splendor of possession [wealth]. I do not speak of "worse" because of the splendor of possession. . . But, as to this Brahmin, someone from a high-class family [and from any faraily] may refrain frora onslaught on creatares, from taking what has not been given, from wrongfally enjoying the pleasure of the senses, from lying, from slanderous speech, from harsh speech, from gossiping, and be not covetous, of not malevolent in mind, of right view. Therefore, I call "better."" Thus, the ethical foimdation of the individual, not the high birth or color, was the criterion to call one "better" in society. Even this separaton did not mean to devaluate the morally corrapted person. With love and compassion, the entire sociefy was expected to help raise the moral standard of the corrapted person. Class, creed, and color were thus rejected in Buddhism as baseless standards. This atttude must properly be called a highly rational and remarkably modera approach to humanify. Retuming to Greece, one may discover that it was the Platonic ttadition that sfressed the importance of high birth as a criterion of social recogniton. One may recall the Aristotelian emphasis that high birth should necessarily be a requirement for happiness.^' In contrast, Greek sophist thinking cleaily stiessed social equaUfy, but what is striking heie is the identical sirailarity between the Buddhist and sophist views with legaid to high birth. Two sophist thinkers to deal with this subject were Lycophron and Antiphon, who presented the same arguments of the Buddha and Kacchana to reject the relationship between high birth and social privilege. The only extant fragraent of Lycophron in this regard runs as follows:

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{Stobaeus says:] 'What I raean is this: is (good birth) soraething valuable and worthwhile or, as Lycophron the sophist wrote, something altogether worthless? Comparing it with other goods, he asserts: "now the nobility of good birth is obscure, and its giandeui is a raattei of woids," on the giound that piefeience foi it looks to opinion, wheieas in fact theie is no diffeience between the ignoble and the well-bora.^' So, Lycophion cleaily denied that good birth as "altogethei worthless," but what is lemaikable heie is that the two-Iine fragment of Lycophion pieseived heie is the same statement that occuned five times in Kacchana's lefatation of high birth. Kacchana piesented five aiguraents against high birth, and each tme he piesented a diffeient aigument, he also repeated, "This [That high birth is worthy] is a way in which it can be said; this is raerely the sound of the world," to stress the senselessness of the high birth. Lycophron meant the same idea, saying "Now the nobilify of good birtU is obscure; and its grandeur is a matter of words." As Stobaeus noted, LycopUron's words meant that the "preference for it [high birth] looks to opinion," and, of course, this was clearly the thesis of Kacchana's dialogue with the king of Madura and of the Buddha's argument elsewhere. The Buddha explicitly said: What the world holds as name and lineage is indeed nominal terms arising here and there by popular opinion, views of the ignorant. The ignorant declare, "A Brahmin [good person] is by birth."" These similarites indicate that early Buddhistic views and Lycophron's ideas about high birth are the same not only in their overall meaning but also in their manner of presentng that meaning.

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As already noted, the other sophist thinker to stress the worthlessness of high birth was Antiphon, and his only extent fragment in this field again provides another similar example of the Buddha's argument against high birth. Antiphon said: We revere and honor those bora of noble fatheis, but tUose wUo are not bom of noble houses we neither revere nor honor, In this we are, in our relations with one another, like barbarians, since we are all by nature bom the sarae in every way, both barbarians and Hellenes, And it is open to all men to observe the laws of natare, which are corapulsory, Similarly, all of these things can be acquired by all and in none of these things is any of us distinguished as barbarian or hellene, We all breathe into the air through the raouth and the nostrils, and we all eat with hands," Here, Antiphon rejects high birth and endeavors to restore humanity, arguing as a natural philosopher, First, everybody is bora in the same way, Second, laws of natare are common to all human beings, Again, nobody is particular in the use of such natural requireraents as breathing. Therefore, he regards the people of the so-called high birth and low birth as equal. It should be asserted that the Buddha and his disciples used nature consistently as a powerfal ground to deny high birth arid to affirm social equality. A rUetorical analogy tUe Buddhist tradition used to highlight every individual's natural abilify is: "Is it only a Brahman who, taking a back-scratcher and bath-powder and going to a river, is capable of cleansing of himself of dust and raud, and not a noble, not a merchant, not a worker?"" This question is followed by the assertion that anybody is "capable of developing a mind of fiiendliness that is without enmity and without raalevolence." The raost cogent Buddhist argument in connection with nature and human equalify, however, appears in the Buddha's "Discourse to Vasettha:"

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Behold the grass and frees! They reason not, yet they possess tie mark After their kind, for kinds indeed divide. Consider then the beetles, moths, and ants: They, after their kind, too possess the mark. And so four-footed creatures, great and small, The reptiles, snakes, the long-backed animals Each after his kind bears his mark. In man there is not such marks. Not in the hafr or head or ears or eyes Not in the mouth or nose or lips or brows, Not in the throat, hips, belly, or the back, Not in the rump, sex-organs, or the breast, Not in the hands or feet, ftngers or nails Nothing unique is in men's bodies found. The difference in men is nominal." So, the entfre argument that all human beings are equal is grounded on nature, providing numerous examples to rale out the differences among human beings. Plants, animals, and insects are all divided into "the kinds" because of their visible marks of differences. In the case of the huraan being, such differences do not exist in any part of the body, and therefore, all humans are equal. Notably, human mental power had afready been recognized on many occasions as basically equal, and overall, neither mental sfrength nor bodily stractare justifes the superiorify of some people over others. Obviously, Lycophron's and Antiphon's rationalist views about social equalify retain an inefatable closeness to the Buddhist views about the same topic. Denial of high birth was a key Buddhist concept that achieved a prorainent place in most of the Suttas related to social ethics, and it is possible that Greek rationahsts, just as their predecessors leamed about other Buddhist concepts, carae to know about this predorainant Buddhist

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concept. Of course, as afready discussed in Chapter III, Pythagoras was probably the fiist Gieek to familiarize himself with social equaUfy piesent in Jainism. His acceptance of disciples from all Gieek laces and women was a levolutonaiy change in the ttaditional Gieek sociefy. Howevei, Athens was a rigid sociefy that did not accommodate such latonal thinking oi acton. It is piobable that Lycophion and Antiphon, in the raeantime, obtained frora Democritas, Empedocles, oi from the Peisian souices the leinfoiced Buddhist concept of social equalify that was widespiead in India during that tirae. Notably, Lycophion was the stadent of Goigias who leamed from Empedocles, and Antiphon was a followei of Empedocles whose concept of eleraents was piesent in Antiphon's physics. Undei these ciicurastances, taeie is a better possibilify that, through Empedocles and some other early Greek thinkers, Lycophron and Antiphon found their way towards the Buddhist teaching of social equality.

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Notes ' PIato,/Aeor/cl.5. ' ' DK79B9. Gradual Sayings III. p. 48.

" nDd.,p. 48. ' Katha Upanishad I ii 1 -13. ' Xenophon, Memorabilia 1 10, trans. J. S. Morrison in 77ie Sophists, ed. Rosamond Kent Sprague (Columbia: U. of South Carolina Press, 1972), 124. ' n)id., 1 11. * Plato, Proagora 315CD. ' Philosttatas, Lives ofthe Sophists 1 12. "' Xenophon, Memorabilia II121 -134. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 328. '^ Anguttara Nikaya 8. 2. 6. 4. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha 111, pp. 173-185. '" Ibid.,pp. 173-174. The next world means the rebirth after death. TheBuddha often cited moral conduct as a means to achieving a better life after death, following the teaching of Brahmins and Jains. "Ayara loko para loko" (this world and the next) or "Idha va hiu-anva" (here and taere) were the popular phrases both in Buddhisra and in other Indian moralistic groups often used. However, in metaphysical debates, the Buddha often left aside the question of after death existence. He also said that the belief of one's existence after deatU is highly doubtfal. ' Plato, Protagoras 318D.

" ftid., 349A. "ftid.,318D. "ftid.,317B.

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"

Gradual Sayings I, Tittayatana Sutta.

PIato,Meno91E. ^' Gradual Sayings III, p. 63. " Ujid., p. 64. ^' Xenophon, Memorabilia III 28. ^" Middle-Iength Sayings II, p. 273. ^' n)id.,p, 274. " " Ibid.,p. 341. n)id.,p. 368.

^' Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.5. " Stobaeus rv 29, 24.

" Middle-length Sayings II, p. 384. ^' DK87B44. " Middle-length Sayings II, p. 370. " n)id.,p. 381.

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Social Evoluton in Buddhism and Sophist Rhetoric One of the distinguishing achieveraents in early Buddhisra was the concept of social evolution grounded on ratonal thinking. From the origin of life on earth to the systematic organization of society, Buddhisra saw no mysterious causes behind; only nature and human effort determined the gradual advancement of society. Sophist histor>' of society also followed the same path. Law, religion, and goverrunent, tUe basic social requirements and institations, came into existence not because invisible/invincible causes predeterminated tUem, but because society itself caused them to appear. This interesting similarity between Buddhist and sophist teachings may deserve attenton as another possible manifestation of Buddhist influence on sophist thinking. This discussion raay be initiated with the Buddhist view about the origin of the world. Not only did the early Buddhist ttaditon specifically deny creatton of the world or anything in the world by a divine power, but the Buddha and his disciples also launched an all-out campaign to refate the concept of creation: There are certain recluses and Brahmins who declare it as their traditional doctrine that the beginning of things was a work of an overlord, of Brahma. To them I have gone and said, "Is it indeed trae that the reverend teachers declare it as their traditonal doctrine that the beginning of things was the work of an overlord, of Brahma?" And they, so questioned, have answered, "Yes,'' and then I have said, "But how do the reverend teachers declare in their traditional opinion that the beginning of things as the work of an overlord, of Brahma, was appointed?" They, so asked by me, were unable to go any farther into that matter, and in their confasion, they asked it of me as a counter-question.' These words of the Buddha echo the recunent theme in Buddhism: the emphatic denial of creaton or any invisible power behind the origin of the world. While the Brahmin

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traditon developed rhetoric so as not to allow questions challenging tie concept of creation, the Buddha, as well as other rationalist teacUers, defied it and openly challenged the concept of creation. Recalling into raind tUe Darwinian tUeory of evolution, the Buddha answered the "counter-queston" raentoned above, saying, "There comes a time, friends, when sooner of later, after the lapse of a long epoch, the world is dissolved," and again "there comes also a time when sooner or later this world begins to re-evolve."" During this process of evolution, "life" comes to this world from the outer space, frora a plane of existence naraed as "World of Radiance."' The newly formed world is characterized by its priraitive stage: Now at that tirae all had become one world of water, dark, and of darkness that makes blind. No moon nor sun appeared, no stars were seen, no constellations, neitUer was nigUt manifest nor day, neitUer months nor half-months, neither years nor seasons, neither female nor raale. Beings were reckoned just as beings only. And to those beings, sooner or later after a long tme, earth with its savor was spread out in the waters." What this and similar passages unequivocally recognized was the nataral origin and natural evolution of the world. "All had become one world" of water and darkness. After a long time of existence, surface of the earth became savory. Later on in the same discourse, the Buddha said that "night and day became manifest" and seasons, days, months, and years came to be known. Sex-differences also "appeared" among beings. Everything happened, not was determined by any invisible hand. In Greece, there are the indicatons that the same concept of the natural origin of the worid and life was discussed in greater details by tUe sophist thinkers, but only a few fragments of Prodicus and Critas exist in this field of stady. Sorae sophist tteates, of

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which only the naraes reraain, sfrongly suggest that this topic was popular among sophist thinkers. Protagoras' On the Original State ofThings, for instance, may have connected to his own myth about the origin of the world as described by Plato in Protagoras (Sprague 22). Prodicus' On the Nature ofGods, from which only a short fragment has been preserved, must have elaborated more on this subject. Despite the absence of these texts and their secondary interpretations, the available fragments, however scanty they are, offer evidence in support of sophist dealing with the natural origin of the world and life in tUe same manner of early BuddUism. As PUiIodemus noted, Prodicus was an atUeist,^ and therefore, apparently he never admitted the creaton of world or human life. From tUe priraordial elements originated "men wUo lived in a nataral state of weakness, just Uke tUe leaves wUicU corae into being and die, witUout sttengtU, compounded of clay, feeble Uerds, sUadowIike, wingless, destined to live for a day, unhappy mortals, dreamlike in form."' Other details of this natural origin of life are lost, but the little details available prove the point that both Buddhism and Prodicus shared the view that life was not created. Of course, there are differences between the two theories, Buddhism advocating hfe as coming frora another plane of existence and Prodicus saying that life originated frora tUe four elements. BeUind tUis difference lies tUe similar assertion tUat life evolved frora tUe original state. Prodicus apparently adopted Empedocles' concept of eleraents as tUe original primordial cause. As previously indicated, this concept had already provided Indian raaterialists sfrong argument against the Brahmin theory of creation, and the Buddha, in order to

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retain his spiritaal teaching of rebirth, discarded the concept of eleraents and asserted that life came to eartU from outer space. Apart from tUis difference, tUe underlying similarify tUat life was not subject to creation reraains tUe sarae. BuddUist texts also discussed in detail tUe origin of social problems, crimes, and law. According to the Aggajja Sutta, after a long existence of human life on eartU, Sexdifferences appeared among Uuman beings, and population was growing. People have now begun to do agriculture, and they have developed the habit of gathering and hoarding. No raler has yet been selected, nor has law or punishment been invented, but people were living in one community. Some members in society, in the meantme, have shown a marked tendency towards criminal acts: Now some being of greedy disposition, watching over his own plot, stole another plot and made use of it. They took him and holding him fast, said, "Trae, good being, thou hast wrought evil in that, while watching thine own plot, thou has stolen another plot and made used of it. See, good being, that thou do not such a thing again. "Ay, Sirs," he replied. And a second time he did so. And yet a third. Some smote him with the hand, some with clods, sorae with sticks. With such a beginning did stealing appear, and censure and lying and punisUment became known.' So, social evolution is at its best. In a social reaction to stop crime, law came into existence. While the Vedas and the Upanishads repeatedly asserted that law was a divine inttoduction to huraan society, Buddhisra held exacty the opposite: law itself is a social creation. The central Buddhist teaching of causality was eraployed to its raaxiraura effect as the Buddha explained the origin of social problems. In another discourse the Buddha said, "From goods not being bestowed on the destitate, poverty grew rife; from poverfy growing rife, stealing increased; from the increase of stealing, violence grew apace; from

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the growth of violence, the destraction of life became common."' Throughout its early discourses, Buddhism displayed a sfrong tendency to analyze social problems in terras of the causal argument, the most rationalisttc metUod in tUe early BuddUist teaching. Punishment was originally based on moral grounds but had not been systeraatized yet. Society felt that there should be an authorify to handle justice and law: Now those beings gathered theraselves together, and bewailed these things, saying, "From our evil deeds, sirs, becoming manifest, inasmuch as stealing, censure, lying, punisUment Uave become known, what if we were to select a certain being, who should be wrathfal when indignation is right, who should censure that which should rightly be censured and should banish hira who deserved to be banished?'" By mutaal consent, an authority to control law for the benefit of justice was thus invented. As the previous quotation indicated, when crimes first appeared, punishment was recommended, but the right to punish was evetybody' freedom. For instance, some would attack the criminal "with the hand, some with clods, some with sticks." Now a method has been invented to punish and censure "rightly" or to banish. Systematization of law was thus presented as a pure human invention. Sophist thinkers were the first Greeks to define human law from a similarly ratonalist point of view. As it is well-known, a systeraatc approach to the invention of law was a fraditional Greek practice, but ancient Greek legislators hardly separated law from divinity. For instance, Solon, Critias' grandfather and an earliest Greek to revise the existent Greek law, held that "Law was the expression of Justice, and Justice was personified as a divinity who, if revered, will bring intemal peace and prosperify, and, if flouted, will in time send punishment' (Freeraan, God, Man, and State 209). This

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concept was reconfirraed by Heracleitus who asserted that all Uuraan law derives from tUe Law, the universal justice.' However, sophist thinker Critias would think it otherwise: There was a tirae when the life of raen was uncivihzed and bestial and subservient to bratal force, a tme when neither was there any prize for the good nor for the wicked did any chastisement arise. It seems to me that men next set up laws as chastsers, that justice might become tyrant and raight have anogance as a slave. Should anyone commit an enor, he was penalized." For the first tirae in the history of Greece, justice and law was thus interpreted as a human invention. The Buddhist emphasis of natural origin of crime and people's mutaal consent to punish the crirainals and to select an authorify for this purpose are identical with Critias' views. Both Buddhisra and Critas held the view that justice and law are all huraan creations intended to curb crime, another natural growth in sociefy. Next, there is the topic of the raler. As noted in Chapter II, the Rig Veda, the earliest ever text to offer a defmite answer to tUis queston, asserted tUat king was originally anointed by the creator, the king of all kings. The divine power becarae "the one king of the world that breathes and blinks, wUo rales over Uis two-footed and fourfooted creatures.'^ He appointed a deputy, a sort of a satrap frora tUe Uuman world, to oversee tUe world. At the original consecraton the divine king told the human king, "I have brought you here; remain araong us. Stay steadfast and unwavering.'' and asserted that various rainor gods would help the huraan king to protect his kingship and to prosper with it." That is how the kingship belonged to the Shastriya caste, the descendants of the original king.

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Eariy Buddhism emphatcally and explicitly denied any divine power beUind kingship. Just as justce and law against crime were invented by social agreement, the kingship also origfriated as a resuU of a social contract. People in the original human society "went to the being among them who was the handsoraest, the best favored, the most attractive, the most capable" and requested him to be the leader of their society, promising a portion of each person's grain as a payment for leadership.'" He consented and thus originated the coUectively selected kingship: Chosen by the whole people is what is meant by Maha Sammata, so Maha Sammata (the Great Elect) was the first standing phrase to arise [for the king].'' Here the Buddha coined Maha Sammata, a new name for the original king, obviously to use the etymological meaning of the term to strengthen his arguraent that mutaal consent was in the background of kingship. With this interpretation, he completely discarded the Vedic teaching of Royal Consecraton, locating the origin of kingship just in human sociefy. Thus, the underlying trath of all forms of social concepts, according to Buddhism, eraerged and found a solid placement in society as a result of social agreement. TUis point, as already discussed briefly, clearly places tUe Buddhist teaching together with the Greek theory of the Social Contract and invites one to examine a possible Buddhist influence on its Greek counterpart. Obviously, there is no evidence in Greek history to prove that a similar concept existed before the age of the Older Sophists. If anybody suggests such an existence prior to sophists, that suggestion must be forraed only "with

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inevitable dose of speculation," and it would be perfectly right to assume that "theories of a social contract were first formulated in the fifth centaiy B.C" (Kahn 92). The eailiest evidence of tUis concept can be found in Antiphon's lemaiks about law: 'The demands of the laws are the results not of natural disposition but of agreement, but tae demands of nature are exactly the opposite."" This quotation hints at Antiphon's view that, because of the natural human tendency to break social norms, sociefy came to an agreement about law. Critias' Sisyphus, from which a quotation was cited above, elaborated this concept more and presented the Social Contract as a recognizable theory. "The spirit of lonian nataral philosophy" was in the center of the Greek social confract theory (Kahn 101), and it is needless to repeat the previous discussion about the possible sources of Greek nataral philosophers. At the time when Empedocles and Deraocritus believably familiarized tUemselves witU tUe Indian materialistic concepts of elements and atoms, tUe BuddUist teaching about the social evolution had already been popular in India. It is probable that Greek sophist thinkers learaed this concept from the Buddhist sources rather than invented it by themselves. This assuraption raay further be justified by the sameness in the Buddhist and sophist views about the origin and development of religion in sociefy. According to BuddUism, religion became a systematic organization after crime, punisUment, and social leadersUip appeared. Worried about tUe appearance of crime and punisUment, "some of tUose beings" in society began religious practices. They raade "leaf huts in woodland spots" and meditated. Some others settled down "on the outskirts

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of villages" and started making reUgious hyinns to various gods." They also would "pia\ to, and piaise, and woiship" Moon and Sun." They lepeated the verses and praised various gods similar to "a string of blmd men'' who, "chnging one to the other, neitier can the foremost see, nor can the middle one see, nor can the hindermost see."" "Omitting the practices of those qualites" that would make them trae religious leaders and adopting those qualites" which were not trae, they would say, "Indra we call upon, Soma we call upon, Varana we call upon, Isana we call upon, Pajapati we call upon, Brahma we call upon, ' and expected "by reason of their invoking and praying and hoping and praising" to unite themselves with Brahma in their next hfe.' Critias believed that religious beliefs emerged in sociefy after law and punishment failed to prevent people from cornmitting crimes secretly. 'What closely conesponds to Buddhism here is Critias' assertion that the concept of an alraighfy God who "will hear all that is said among mortals and will be able to see all that is done" is a false human creation that won social acceptance in tae process of social evoluton.^' The Buddha firmly held the view that Brahraa, the supreme god in early Hinduism, was a similar creation, and prayers, chanting, and hymns weie nonsensical utteiances. This lejection in Buddhisra of Biahma and othei gods also indicates the meaninglessness of the feai implanted in people's mind about divine punishment. The same Sutta highlighted the uselessness of faith in gods to obtain divine help. As afready asserted, early Buddhism emphatcally said that one's o-wn effort, not divine grace, is the cause of one's own success, and one's own awareness of good and bad, not fear for gods.

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is the way to conect oneself These concepts were drastically different from early Hindu beUefs, which sttessed blessing and curse both as coming from Brahma. This coraparison may elucidate the point that, similar to other similarites existed between early Buddhism and sophist thinking, the Buddhist concept of social equalify also shared a close resemblance to Greek thought in tae same field. Considering the natural development of this concept in Buddhism and the possible Buddhist influence on other Greek concepts, one may conclude that a Buddhist influence on sophist social philosophy would be the most plausible answer.

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Notes ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 25-26. ^ n3id.,p. 82. ' fbid., p. 82. " ftid., p. 82. ' Philodemus, On Piety cols. 9, 7. ' See Mario Untersteiner's notes in TTe Sophists (p. 221), frora which this franslated fragment was taken. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 87. * n)id.,p. 67. ' Tbid., p. 88. ' DK22B1. " DK88B25. " RigVeda 10. 121.3. " ftid., 10. 173. 1. '" Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 88. " fbid. " See TTe Sophists (p. 219) for this franslation. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, pp. 89-90. " Dialogues ofthe Buddha II, p. 306.

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n)id.,p.305.

' n)id.,p. 310. " DK88B25.

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CHAPTER V MORE EVIDENCE OF rNFLUENCE AND THE CONNECTIONS BETWEEN ANCIENT GREECE AND INDIA

In order to support a possible Indian ratonalist influence on Greek sopUist rUetoric, tUis dissertation has so far presented three arguments. The previous chapter pointed out that, since almost all sophist rational concepts bear striking similarities with their Indian counterparts, an Indian rationalist influence on Greek sopUist tUinkers could be a sfrong possibilify. Next, Chapter III revealed coraparatively unknown details about the Indian visit of Deraocritus and his and Erapedocles' familiarify with Indian rationalist thinking to indicate the possibility that the forefathers and the teachers of Greek sophist thinkers were prepared to pass their knowledge about Indian rational concepts to their stadents. Finally, Chapter III also highligUted that, since the time of the early Eleatics, Greeks displayed a conceivable fondness towards fabulous Indian thoughts, and therefore, there would be nothing unusual for the Older Sophists to follow the footsteps of their ancestors. StiII, more evidence awaits to strengthen tae overall argument that Indian rationalism may have helped constract Greek sophist rational movement. As asserted earlier, Deraocritus and Empedocles were the two persons who enkindled sophist interest in Indian rationalify, and, besides tUe previous revelation tUat botU of thera could have familiarized themselves with Indian rational concepts. there is still more support to reinforce this argument. Attention to this new evidence seems

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appropriate since the more one knows about Democritas' and Empedocles' possible awareness about Indian rational thinking, the better one understands the two thinkers' influence on the Older Sophists. To sttengthen the argument that Democritus directly contacted Indian rationalists, tUe foUowing fragments may provide more support: Of the reasoning raen, a few, laising theii hands thithei to what we Gieeks call the Afr nowadays, said: "Zeus consideis all things and he know s all and gives and takes away all and is king of all."' Scholais in philosophy disagiee ovei the exact meaning of this fragment. Some belie\e that Democritas has lefened to tae ancient people's invention of a divine ralei, otheis interpiet Democritos' woids as ancient people's attribution of divine powers to weather, and, still, some others "find it a beautifal and touching assertion of faita" (Bames 155). It should be asserted that all these three interpretations summarized by Jonathan Bames aie the ttaditionalist views about this fragment and piobably have missed Democritos' meaning. AII inteipieters have ignoied the important phiase "what we Gieeks call" and have foigotten that Democritos was a seaichei of knowledge in foieign lands. Peihaps Democritas has nanated his encounteis with the ratonal thinkers in India. In a previously discussed fragment, he instracted Greeks to "silently and quiety reconnoiter while they look and hsten to find out the reputaton of the wise men" m a foreign country.^ In another fragraent, Deraocritos reraarked proudly that he was the raost extensive fraveler in foreign lands among his contemporary Greeks, and that he "heard the greatest number of leamed raen."' Again, to repeat what has afready been discussed in detail, at least five Greek and Roraan writers have reported that Democritus went to India

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and leamed from Indian wise men. The period of his fridian visit was also tie time during which the Brahmin power was waning, only theraselves defending the concept of the divine Being and all other ratonalist fraditions denying tie existence of Brahma. It is more likely that "the reasoning men" in the fragment mean various Indian rationalists such as materialists, skeptcs, Jains, and BuddUists, and "a few" means tUe BraUmins who alone accepted the existence of BraUma. One migUt oppose this interpretation, arguing that Democritas used the word Zeus, the ttaditional Greek word for the divine Being, not Brahma, the absolute being in the Brahmin ttadition, and therefore, Democritas did not mean the Being in the Hindu ttadition. However, this counter-argument may hold little value because of two reasons: ffrst, similar to the modera Westem usage of "God" to mean the Middle Eastem Allah or the Indian Brahma, Democritas could have used the native word Zeus, the world that Democritas' listeners would understand well, to raean Brahma. It was a habit of Greeks to call Zeus to any supreme god in foreign lands. For instance, referring to the Persian worship of Ahura Mazda, Herodotas said, "Their worship of Zeus consists of going up to the highest mountain peaks and performing sacrifices."" Next, even if Democritas had used the word Brahma, the Platonic ttadition that derided Democritas, censored barbarian words from Greek philosophy, and probably purged Greek thought from any visible sign of Indian influence would have probably replaced the word Brahma witi Zeus. Moreover, the characteristcs of the divine being in the quotaton and of the sociefy from which the quotaton was taken raay further indicate that Democritas was

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talking about his experience in India. The fraditonal Greek Zeus was created in the mold of the Greek aristocracy with humanlike qualites attributed to Uim, but tUe Being in the quotaton under discussion "knows all and gives and takes away all and is king of all," reminding either Brahma or God in Judaism. God, at the same tme, seems to be an exception since the fragment itself indicates that a majorify of wise men rejected the divine being. 'WhiIe Indian ratonalists vehemently argued against the Brahrain concept of Brahma, it is highly unlikely tUat Jews argued against God, a speculatve belief tUat Uad persuaded tUeir society to defend tUemselves from extemal attacks. Considering both the consistent reports that Deraocritas went to India and Deraocritas' own reraarks that he patiently listened to wise raen in foreign lands, it raay not be difficult for one to conclude that this quotation refers to Deraocritus' becoraing farailiar witU Indian ratonal concepts. The importance of this probable discovery lies in tUe assuraption tUat it is impossible for Protagoras, in Uis ttaditional stadent-master relationsUip witU Democritas, not to leara tUe rational concepts Democritus tUus leamed from listening to "tUe reasoning men" in India. AnotUer curious and controversial fragment, tUis tme of Empedocles, awaits attention in support of sophist thinkers' awareness about Indian rational concepts. Again, this fragment, similar to the one discussed above, does not raake a direct suggestion that sophist thinkers knew about Indian rationaUsra, but it suggests tUe possibility tUat Gorgias' teacUer Erapedocles had known about the Buddha. Again, the objective of this discussion is to point out the accessibility to Indian rational concepts to the teachers of the sophist thinkers. This fragment runs as follows:

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There was living among them a man of surprising knowledge, who had acquired the extreraist wealth of the intellect, one expert in every kind of skilled activify. For whenever he reached out with his whole intellect, he easily disceraed each one of existing things, in ten and even twenty lifetimes of mankind.' "A raan of surprising knowledge" is anonymous and ambiguous; so tUree different Greeks have been named by later writers as the possible references of Empedocles. Some beUeved tUat tie person was PytUagoras, but Leartius remarked that it was the belief among some that Erapedocles raeant Parraenides (Wright 256). Again, Hermippus said that Empedocles' raan of intellect was not Parraenides but Xenophanes.' Amid all these conttoversies, it is perhaps justifiable to assume that Erapedocles here refened to the Buddha rather than to any of the persons mentoned above. First, the belief that Empedocles here meant Pythagoras is highly questonable. On the one hand, "Pythagoras did not live in a distant past, and if tUe references anonymous, wUat is the significance of an exceptonally wise but unknown person living tUen?" (WrigUt 257). On the other hand, Pythagoras, who had died just a half-centary before Empedocles' mature years, was well-known among Greeks, and Empedocles would not need to introduce him (Pythagoras) in the terms "there was living among tUem a man. . ." to Pausanias, Empedocles' disciple to wUora tUe fragment was addressed. The phrase "ten or twenty Ufetimes of mankind" may lefei to human incaraaton, but it is unlikely that Pythagoias claimed to have known about otheis' past existences except Xenophanes' saicastc lemaiks that Pythagoias stopped one from beating a dog since he

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(Pythagoias) lecognized the voice of the dog as of a fiiend in a previous life. In sUort, tUe fragment seems too inelevant to suggest tUat it was refened to Pythagoras. The other two assumptions that Erapedocles meant Parmenides or Xenophanes in this fragment seem much weaker than the one that has just been discussed. Even though Empedocles was said to have listened to tUeir lectures, Uis tUeories were totally against the Being adopted by Parmenides and the universal Oneness by Xenophanes, and therefore, it is impossible that Erapedocles would instract his disciple Pausanias to choose any of the two as a model for imitation. In the absence of any knowledge about the possible Buddhist influences on Erapedocles, M. R. Wright's following assertion, which admits undecidabilify of a particular wise raan in tUis fragraent, would be tUe best approach: The fragment sets out to describe a wise raan, to be an exaraple, for Pausanias. The wealth of wisdom acquired is emphasized in each of the frst three lines; tUe last tUree sUow tUat wUen tUis wisdora is applied there is understanding of a comprehensive range of topics, covering a considerable extent of time. The last line could refer to tUe fatare ratUer tUan tUe past, and more plausibly so, given in [tUe fragment] 146. TUe line is an adoptaton of tUe assumed range of tUe propUet's wisdom. . . (258) So, Wright's view is that no particular wise person in Greece can be recognizable as Empedocles' reference in this fragment, but it is unusual that nobody has ever thought about the possibility tUat the so-called wise man could have lived in a different land. Erapedocles' key pUrase in the fragment is "There was living among thera a man. . ." Unless he refened to a wise raan who lived in tUe distant past, the raost probable conclusion should be that Erapedocles was thinking about a wise person beyond the

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Greek territories. One raay recall Zoroaster, whom Empedocles could have certainly known from Persians, but, because Zoroastrianism was not a source of Empedocles' influence, one may easily rale out the possibilify that he (Empedocles) recoraraended Zoroaster to Pausanias as a source of imitation. In conttast, the Buddha appears to be the most probable wise man Erapedocles wished his disciple Pausanias to leam about mainly because Empedocles hiraself apparently followed the Buddha. Chapter III pointed out sttong evidence of how Erapedocles could have bonowed frora the Buddhist sources: he endeavored to launch his own mission in the form of the Buddha's initiation of his social engagement, cited same arguments and parables against animal bloodshed, and displayed much reverence for the idealistic concept of Nirvana. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that in this fragment Empedocles praised the Buddha's wisdora, reraerabered him fondly, and encouraged disciple Pausanias to take notice of the Buddha's intellectaal strength. Unlike of AtUenians, respect for foreign thinkers was a notable characteristc of lonian thinkers, their students, and followers. Strong natonalism, along witU tUe condemnation of foreigners as barbarians, probably developed in Athens as a reacton to the Persian invasions of Greece, destraction of Athens during Xerxes' invasion, and the immediate Greek victory in which Athens played a dominant role. Prior to these developments, Greek thinkers were ready to bonow openly from foreign sources and to appreciate the wise people in foreign lands. As noted earlier, Zeno wished to see an Indian Brahmin practicing austerities at fire. Deraocritas proudly announced his

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experience with wise raen in foreign lands. Under these circurastances, Erapedocles' probable exaltation of the Buddha could not be an unusual occunence at all. Interestngly, this discussion also reveals another important point with regard to the early Greek thinkers' influence on the Older Sophists, the point that Erapedocles' and Democritus' influence on their stodents Gorgias and Protagoras could have been inevitable. The above discussion has revealed that Empedocles confidently recommended for his disciple Pausanias the wise man he (Empedocles) thought to be worthy of imitaton. Other sections ofKatharmoi that carries this fragraent raake U clearer that Empedocles was genuinely interested in making his pupil better by offering usefal instractions from his (Empedocles') own leaming. It may be concluded that Erapedocles' guidance of Pausanias provides a typical example of how Empedocles trained his other disciple Gorgias as well and how Democritos taught his disciple Protagoras. Traditional master-pupil relationship that existed among Greek thinkers and their disciples inevitably made the master's influential sources highly influental for the student as well. In this situation, one can conclude that Empedocles' and Democritos' influence on Gorgias and Protagoras respectively is unmistakably great. It is reasonable to attribute the possible Indian influences on Protagoras partly to his leaming frora Democritus who seemingly acquired direct knowledge from Indian rationalists. Buddhist and other India rationalist influences on sophist rhetoric can farther be authentcated, arguing on the fact that, since the Buddha and his contemporary sociefy had known the social practces in the Greek society, Greeks theraselves could have

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known about Buddhist and other contemporary Indian thoughts. In one of the Buddha's arguments for baselessness of the caste-system alleged to have been created by Brahraa, the following conversation occuned between the Buddha and Assalayana, a visitor to the Buddha: The Buddha: 'What do you think about this, Assalayana? Have you heard that in Yona and Kamboja and other adjacent districts there are only two castes, the master and the slave? And that having been a master, one becomes a slave; having been a slave, one becomes a master? Assalayana: Yes, I have heard this, sir. In Yona and Kamboja . . . having been a slave, one becomes a master. The Buddha: fri referenced to this then Assalayana, on what sfrength and authorify do Brahmans speak thus: "Only Brahmans form the best caste, all other castes are low; only Brahmans forra the fair caste, all other castes are dark; only Brahraans are pure, not non-Brahmans; only Brahmans are own sons of the Brahma, formed by Brahma, heirs to Brahraa?' Here, the Buddha argues that, if the caste-system were an absolute trath, the same system should prevail in every sociefy, but in Yona and Kamboja the social system is altogether different, and therefore, the Brahmin caste-systera is a social creation. What is important in this discussion is, of course, not the Buddha argument against the caste-system. but his reference to the two countries Yona and Kamboja. Undoubtedly, Yona is the Pali adoptation of lonia, which later became Yavana to mean Greeks and other Westera natons, and Kamboja could possibly be Persia. The common assumption is that Kamboja could be a Northwestem state in India, but this belief may be enoneous. History provides no evidence to prove that such a state existed in Northwestem India. In confrast, the Persian name for both Carabyses I who initially helped build up the Persian erapire and Cambyses II who expanded the empire was Kambujiya, and the Buddha could

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have used "Kamboja" to mean tfie land of Kambujiya. This usage also conesponds witfi the Buddha's own usage of Kosala to mean tie frmer Indian state raled by die Buddha's contemporary king Kosala. Kambujiya n, who conquered Egypt, was a conteraporary of the Buddha, and it is very well possible tiat the Buddha used the word Kamboja to indicate the territory of Kambujiya. This conversation indicates that the Buddha and his society were well aware of both Persia and lonia and the social practces that were wellestabUshed in those societes. It is clear that the Buddha's and his society's knowledge about Persia and lonia is conect. In both societes there were only two social classes: masters and servants. Warprisoners became servants and worked as slaves for the victorious masters. A state that lost a war against another and consequently lost its war heroes as servants to the victorious state would, in the meantime, reorganize and launch a counter attack on the previously victorious state. A victoiy for the attacker would change the social situation upside down: in the space of a few days, the servants would become masters and the masters the servants. Thus, the Buddha's remarks that in those societies one, having been a master, would become a servant and vice versa are accurate. This information makes one accept that, similar to the Indian thoughts that entered Greece, Greek concepts also foimd its routes into India during the Indian rationalist age. However, lonian thinking left no visible marks in the Indian system of thought during this age probably due to the very obvious fact tfiat there were hardly any lonian concepts to influence Indian thought. By the time the lonians just began to emerge from

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darkness, India had already developed, out of its social conflicts, a complex systera of thought, and therefore, there were virtually nothing for Indians-or for any other ancient natons such as Egypt, Phoenicia, and Persia-to take from lonia. Indian metaphysical and ratonal concepts, those that were artificial in Greek society but were honored by tae Greek because of their apparent plausibilify, complexify, and beaufy, probably flew from India to lonia and from tUere to tUe entire Greek society as one-way ttaffic. India, in contrast, seems to Uave found notUing influential frora lonia except sucU social differences as tUe master-servant system, wUicU tUe rationalists such as the Buddha found usefal to repudiate the Indian caste-system. There is also evidence that the Indian caste-system, in which tae Brahmins were later lowered to the second position by the rationalists such as the Buddha, was already known to Greeks during the age of tae Older Sophists, and this is another indication of sophist awareness about other Indian ratonalist concepts as well. Plato's Republic provides sttong support in favor of Plato's awareness about the Indian caste-system as it was interpreted by the Buddha. Chapter II menttoned that the Buddha cited numerous examples to place the ralers above the Brahmins in the social order, thus denying the Brahmin supremacy. Not only does Republic indicate that Plato was aware of this social division, but the Platonic text also remarked that Socrates leamed about this system from an Eastem tale found in poetry and that he was willing to imitate it. In his dialogue with Glaucon, Socrates revealed his proposal as follows: Socrates: Nothing new; soraething like an Eastera tale of what, according to poets, has happened before now in raore than one part of the world.

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The poet has been believed; but the thing has not happened in our day, and it would be hard to persuade anyone that it could ever happen again. Glaucon: You seem rather shy of telling this story of yours. Socrates: With good reason, as you will see when I have told it. Glaucon: Out with it; don't be afraid. Socrates: Well. here fr is; though I hardly know how to find the course or the words to express it. I shall tty to convince, first the ralers and the soldiers, and then the whole coramunify that all nurture and education which we give them was only soraething they seemed to experience as it were in a dream. In realify, they were whole time down inside the earth, being molded and fostered while their arras and all their equipraent were being fashioned also; and at last, when they were complete, the earth sent them up from her womb into the light of day. So now they raust think of the land they dwell as a mother and nurse, whom they must take thought for and defend against any attack, and of their fellow citizens are brothers bora of the same soil.' The conversation continued with Socrates placing ralers at the highest social level and auxiliaries and farmers and craftsmen at tUe second and tUird positions, giving a clear indication of Plato's possible Indian influence, but tUe modera ttaditonalists seem to Uave ignored every notable sign of Indian links in tUis secton. Of course, as noted in tUe introducton, B. J. Urwick has not only highUgUted Indian parallels witU Plato's social system but also suggested possible Indian influence in Plato's Republic, but raost writers Uave atterapted to interpret Plato's suggested social system in terms of ttaditional Greek concepts. Francis M. Coraford, whose ttanslation has been quoted above, has provided the pith of this argument: It [the proposed social order of Plato] is to be recommended for popular acceptance by an allegorical myth, tae materials for which are drawn partly from the cunent belief that certain peoples were literally autochthonous, bom from the soul, partly from Hesiod's account of the Golden, Silver, and Bronze races which has succeeded one another before the present age of Iron. (103)

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These influential sources appear less significant in the presence of raore probable signs of Indian rationalist influence on Plato. Coraford's assuraption tUat tUe so-called "cunent belief tUat certain peoples were literally autocUthonous, bora from the soul" was partly influential for Plato to invent his social order seems too general to apply for a specific concept such as Plato's social order. Regarding Hesiod's influence on Plato, the four races Hesiod introduced in his Works and Days did not exist siraultaneously. The golden race, Silver race, Bronze race, and the Iron race followed one another, indicating the gradual deterioration of the human race from the highest state to the lowest. None of those races were recognized as ralers, soldiers, or farmers and craftsmen.' Plato's only interest in Hesiod seeras to be Hesiod's myth about the creator's addition of gold, silver, and iron and brass in creating various social orders, but the very pith of the Platonic myth may remain as an Indian concept. Indian atmosphere and characteristics present in Plato's myth clearly justify this assumption. Plato's social division, in which ralers came first, is "nothing new" but, similar to an "Eastem tale," an occunence "in more than one part of the world." Certainly, Plato is not introducing Hesiod's four ages, which followed one another, but is paving the way for introducing a concunently existent social division invented by an outside nation, presuraably by the Brahrains, and reinterpreted by the rationalists. This division is something that has actually existed in other parts of the world, not soraething that was invented in Boeotia where Hesiod lived. Again, tUe informaton about tUis social practice Uas reacUed Plato through poets, whose assertion about the idealistc origin

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of tiat social division Uad generally been accepted by tUat sociefy. The Brahmin concept of creation and entire development of this concept was preserved in verses, and it is probable that Plato refened to these verses in his words. Hesiod also presented his four ages in verses, but his enormous distance in other aspects to the social division given in Republic clearly excludes Hesiod as a possible poet in Plato's reference. Plato's concept about this social division is embodied in his words that begin with "Here it is." His utterance of "first, tUe ralers and soldiers and then the whole community" is the key phrase here. Apparently, what he means to convince in this passage is the concept that ralers and soldiers, according to the tale he had heard, belong to the highest social group and the rest of the sociefy comes next. The educaton and ttaining provided to the ralers and soldiers would be "only something they seem to experience as it were in a dreara" since the members of this highest social group were actoally bom as ralers and soldiers. The duty of this social group is to "take thought for and defend against any attack" and to regard the "fellow citizens as brother bom of the same soil." This concept is a unique thought for the Greek sociefy, indeed. If ralers and soldiers were the highest social division, most people in Greece would be equal since most Greeks were also soldiers. The unique combinaton of ralers and soldiers and the placeraent of this group above the other social groups existed only in ndia, especially at the trae of Plato. Brahrains, who first created the myth of social creaton, asserted that the dufy of the Shastriyas was to rale the country and to protect it, and as a result of this

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assertion the members of the Shastriya caste were known as the ralers and wamors. Wars were infrequent in India so that the caste of the ralers and waniors remained a minority in ancient fridia. According to the Brahrains, they theraselves were the highest social group, and the Shastriyas were second, but the rationalists sucU as tie Buddha consistently lowered the Brahrains to the second position, citing numerous arguments that have afready been discussed in previous chapters. The Buddha's repeated assertion that Shastriya is the best among this folk who put their trast in lineage. But one in wisdom and virtae clothed Is best of all 'mong spirits and men' gradually became a norm in Indian society. After the sixth century B.C.E., Brahmin power gradually declined because of tUe ratonalist upsurge, and subsequently, tUe SUastriyas became tUe best caste in society. TUis could very well be tUe tale tUat Plato nanated in his Republic. Among numerous routes through which knowledge about this social organizaton could have reached Socrates and Plato, the possibility that it came through thousands of Indian and Gandharian warriors who fought for two years in Greece is hardly objectionable. In 480 B.C.E., four years before the death of the Buddha, Persian emperor Xerxes invaded central Greece with the support of some lonian states and hundreds of thousands of soldiers enlisted from Persian safrapies. GandUara and Westem India were parts of tUe Persian erapire, and, out of necessify, India provided tUe erapire tUousands of fighters-foot soldiers who wore "cotton clothing" and carried "cane bows and cane anows with iron heads"" and horsemen who "rode war-ponies and chariots.'"^

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Interestngly, Eastera Greeks themselves supported, entertained, and provided troops for the Persian army. Herodotas remarked that Greeks themselves who fought for the Persian empire consisted of at least fifty thousand people." The war lasted for rwo years, and throughout the entire fighting, Gandharian, Indian, and lonian froops fought together. Eventaally, Persians lost the war and most of the Indian troops were killed, and the rest was captured as slaves mainly by Athenians who played a major role in tae Greek victory. lonian Greeks, while they were fighting in the same side with fridians against other Greeks, would have definitely leamed about Indian fighters' social positon in India, and Athenians and other Greeks could have known the same details frora the Indian war-slaves. Even though there is no specifc evidence to prove taat Indian fighters became Ataenian slaves, Herodotas' reports suggest the sfrong possibilify taat Indian solders were among tUose who were captared by the \'ictorious Greeks. After Xerxes' retteat from the Greek territories in the face of a possible defeat, Persian general Mardonius still made one last effort to defeat the cenfral Greeks, by reorganizing his army. In this effort, he "picked all the infantry and cavalry the Medes, Sacae, Bactrians, and the Indians had supplied."'" This is tie Persian array that Greeks finally defeated at Plataea and Mycale. Most of the Persian ttoops were kiUed, some others escaped, and stll sorae others sunendered to be the slaves of Greeks. Thus, "some Indians, in the aftermath of Persian Wars, were, no doubt, acquiring sorae ffrst-hand experience of Athens at least as slaves in tie bottom of its silver mines" (Lomperis 43). The members of the highest social class in

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India having thus been lowered below the ground in Greece, it is impossible for such Greek thinkers as Socrates and Plato not to have heard about the pathetic transforraation of the Indian warriors, those who enjoyed the highest social position back in India. This discussion also may provide reasonable ground to assume that Buddhist and other Indian rationalist concepts could also have reached the Older Sophists as a result of the Persian invasion of Greece. This assumpton, no doubt, seems less authoritative for the argument, compared with such raore soUd evidence as Democritos' visit to India, but the endeavor here is not to discover the one and only source of Indian ratonalist influence on Greek sophists, but to fmd out every possible route through which Indian concepts could have reached Greece. Naturally, in the ancient world just as the present day, the same thought could have entered one sociefy from another through various raeans, through travelers, fraders, war-prisoners, ambassadors, and several other means, and therefore it seems inelevant to search for the only way through which taey could have entered Greece from India. Athenians, for instance, would have heard both from Democritas and from the Indian war-prisoners the same Buddhist teaching about mental impeituibabilify, the concept that Democritas seems to have leamed during his fridian visit and the Indian soldieis knew in theii native sociefy. Thus, Peisian invasion of Greece could have provided Greeks at least to reconfirm, change, and to expand their previous knowledge about the then-predominant Indian rational concepts. The fact that most of tie Shastriyas (ralers and waniors) during the Buddha's tme were the ardent supporters of the Buddhist and other rationalist moveraents confirras

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the legitimacy of this argument. Since the social conflict between Brahmins and Shastnyas itself gave rise to the ratonal moveraent against the orthodox Brahmin ideology, one can understand why raost of the Shastriyas clearly supported tfie rational movement. Most of the soldiers who fought in Greece with the Persian anny could probably have belonged to this social division. Even thought the Buddha did not visit Gandhara or Westera India from where troops were gathered for the Persian army against Greeks, Indian raling classes in tUese areas, particularly in GandUara, could have certainly familiarized themselves with tfie Buddha's teaching. Bimbisara and Kosala, the two most powerfal ralers in cenfral Indian states, were the patrons and ardent supporters of the Buddha, and it is possible that the raling class in Northera states such as Gandhara leamed about the Buddha's teaching frora the powerfal kings in central states. At one time, the Buddha, addressing the kind Kosala, raised the Shastriyas to the highest level, saying that four objects-a member of the Shasttiya caste, a snake, fire, a disciple of the Buddha-should not be disregarded or despised." These remarks, which directly supported Shastriya ascendancy in the highly contested social order, could have easily spread among all Shastriyas living in the entire India, along with the Buddha's other ratonalist concepts. Besides, tUere is also the possibihfy that Indian materialistic, skeptic, and Jain ratonal thoughts, which were older than Buddhist thought, had already spread in Westem and Northem India. Under these circumstances, it is impossible to assume that at least a few hundreds of those who fought in Greece from Gandhara and

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Westem India were familiar with Buddhist and other fridian rationalist concepts and that Greeks did not hear from them about the ascending rationalist values in India. The annexation of Gandhara and the lonian islands to the Persian erapire dunng the raid-sixth century B.C.E. needs a special attenton with regard to the Indian rationalist influences on Greek sophist thinking. According to Herodotas, the Persian satrapy of Gandhara, which belonged to the seventh province of Persia, existed separately from the Indian satrapy of Persia." This inforraation is farther confirmed by Herodotas' remarks that Gandharians sent separate troops for Persian invasion of Greece in 479 B.C.E. and fought as a separated army from the Indian gear." Herodotus never said Gandharians as Indian but regarded them as people frora a separate satrapy. Gandhara was the first Indian state that was attached to the Persian empire during the mid-sixth centory B.C.E., and even after Darius captured Westera India a few decades later, Gandhara reraained as a separate safrapy. Some lonian islands, in the meantime, had already accepted Persian power before "lonia came to be enslaved for the second time" by the Persian empire in 545 B.C.E. with the Persian commander "Harpagus' conquest of the mainland lonians."" Notably, Miletus, the native land of such early Greek thinkers as Thales, Anaximander, and Anaximenes, had signed a peace-freaty with Persia before 545 B,C,E," Persia strengthened its power in the lonian territories with a suppression of an lonian opposition against the Persian erapire In 545 B.C.E. Thus, Persia had raade both Gandhara and the lonian islands its safrapies before the beginning of the fifth century B.C.E.

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Notably, Darius, the successor to Cyras, also invaded and captured some Westera parts of India during the eariy sixth century B.C.E. after sending a Greek missionary named Scylax of Caryanda to India in an inforraation-seeking mission,^' but, as far as Indian influence on Greek thinking is concemed, this invasion seems to have comparatively less significance than the earlier annexation of GandUara to tUe Persian Empire. There is no evidence to prove that the Westera Indian territories, which were separated from the mainland India by Rajaputana Desert, had gained a considerable knowledge about the rationalist concepts that were popular beyond the desert. Scylax, of cotfrse, wrote a book about India after retuming to Greece from his voyage that lasted for two-and-a-half years, but it is less likely tUat Darius' invasion of Westem India opened Indian rationalist concepts to Greece. However, Cyras' previous capturing of GandUara may reveal a totally different story. Connected to the state of Kura in which the Great Brahmin civilization originated, GandUarians were well known for tUeir great civilization, trade, wealtU, and educaton. They had familiarized theraselves with Indian metaphysical and rational concepts even before the time of the Buddha. Some of the earliest Upanishads were composed in Gandhara, a fact that would perhaps answer the queston why Xenophanes and the Eleatcs were so close to the Being of the Brahmin traditon. Citing an analogy to demonsttate the usefalness of a teacher for an amateur stodent, the Chandogya Upanishad once said: Just as someone, my dear, might lead a person, with his eyes covered, away from the country of Gandharas, and leave him [the blindfolded

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person] in a place where there were no human beings, . . . And as thereupon someone might loosen the covering and say to hira, "Gandhara is in that directon, go that way.". . . He would arrive at last at Gandhara. . .'' This utterance, a clear indicaton that Gandhara was well known to the composer of the hymns, also strongly supports the assurapton that the text was composed in the state of Gandhara itself It seems that there was no reason for the speaker to select Gandhara as the resident state of the blindfolded man otUer tUan GandUara was the home for the speaker and his disciple. It is nataral that, while selecting a state for an analogy that would be easily comprehensible to his disciple, the raaster could prefer a state that was best known to hiraself and his disciple, and that state could be no other place than the very state in which the master and the disciple lived. The importance of this discussion lies in the fact that the Brahmin speculations were available in Gandhara as early as the seventh centary B.C.E. The counter-argument against the Brahmin speculations also seeras to have reached Gandhara before the sixth century B.C.E. "For two or three generations before the birth of the Buddha, the so-called Wanderers [skeptics, materialists, and perhaps Jains] were in the habit of passing from Avant to Savatthi, from Takkasila [Taxila, the capital of Gandhara] to Champa, discussing in the veraacular, wherever they went or stayed, precisely such [speculative] questons" (Rhys Davids, "History of the Buddhists" 166). Interestingly, Takkasila, the original name for Gandhara's capital Taxila, contains an etymological meaning that sfrongly suggests the inherent tendency towards rational arguraent in this cify. The only meaning of the Pali word takka is associated witU rational

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thinking and argument. "Sila," when it is combined wita a prefix noun as takka, certainly means "rock," but the other possibilify is that "sala' (hall) became "sil" in the usage. Thus, the etymological meaning of Takkasila is "tiie rock on which rational arguments were conducted" or probably "tiie hall where rational arguments were held." Even before the time of the Buddha, Taxila was developing as a learaing center. "Jivaka, the physician of the Buddha, stodied for years at Taxila about 550 B.C" under Atreya, a professor of medicine, who wrote a treatise on senses (Vidyabushana 11). After the Buddha's death, this cify became the most famous learaing center in India. "Taxila, we are told in the Jatakas, was a famous univeisity town, wheie "sons of the uppei classes went to stody" (Rawlinson, India 58). This development was probably stimulated by the initial flavor of the cify towards rational thought even before the rise of Buddhism. Buddhist rational thinking probably reached Gandhara during the Buddha's lifetime. Even though the Buddha did not tour in the state of Gandhara during the tireless expansion of his teaching for forfy-six years, he actaally visited Kura, the neighboring district to Gandhara, with many monks. He establisUed tUe BuddUist Order in Kura and won many converts. TUe Ratanapala Sutta remarked that "at one time the Lord [the Buddha], waUdng on tour among the Kuras together with a large Order of monks, arrived at the market town of the Kuras called ThuIIakotthita."" After hearing "tae lovely report" about the Buddha, "Brahmans and householders" in the cify of ThuIIakotthita" visited the Buddha, listened to his discourses, and displayed their appreciation of the Buddha. He remained in the cify for two weeks and ordained Ratanapala, a local youth who dedicated

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his whole hfe for the propagation of tiie Buddha's teaching.^' Perhaps in ttie same tour, the Buddha visited another market-town in Kura called Kamraassaadharama where he converted the faraous wanderer (skeptic) Magandiya." AII tiese details provide reasonable evidence to assurae that Buddhist and other Indian rational thinking had spread in Gandhara while it (Gandhara) was a Persian safrapy. In fact, Kura and its Eastem state Panchala were "the center from which the spread of Brahminism and Brahmin culture may be fraced historically" (Rapson 45). The Buddha's mission in these areas indicates sfrong ratonalist challenge to the Brahman authorify during that time. Magandiya's encounter with the Buddha in Kura proves that Indian skeptcs and materialists had afready been active in Kura before tae Buddha visited there. During his conversation with the Buddha, Magandiya told the Buddha that "the teachers of the wanderers" never held the views similar to those of tae Buddha.'" These remarks show that the ttaditon of tae wanderers was an established school of thought in Kura during the sixth century B.C.E. It is more than likely that these rational concepts crossed the boundaries of Kura and reached the people of the neighboring Gandhara during the sarae period. What Alexander the Great found in Gandhara when he invaded India in 326 B.C.E confirms that Gandhara was a meltng pot of all Indian raetaphysical and ratonal concepts. Alexander found that "wives bumed themselves on the pyres of their deceased husbands; tiey did this of tiefr own accord, and tiose who refased were held in disgrace" (Rawlinson, India 58). This practice was certainly buried m the Brahmin ideological

341

traditon. In the outskirts of the capital Taxila, he found fifteen naked ascetics, most probably Jains or the so-called wanderers. They heard from Diogenes' disciple Onesicritos who accompanied Alexander in the expedition that in Greece too there were such thinkers as Pythagoras, Socrates, and Diogenes the cynic who were similar to the Indian ascetics.^' Whether those fifteen ascetcs were Jains or skeptics, their presence m Taxila indicates that the oppositon to the Brahmin tradition had establisUed itself in GandUara. Alexander did not stay long in GandUara, nor did Greek and Roraan writers had tme to exaraine other Indian concepts that were available in Gandhara, but based on the evidence discussed above, one can clearly conclude that raost of the ratonalist concepts had reached Gandhara prior to Alexander's invasion of that land. So, in the Northera end of the Persian empire, there was Gandhara, the land that was fally open to and acquainted with Indian rationalisra; in the Westera end of the empire, there were the lonian islands that were eager to leara from foreign sources. Persia was the distributon center of Indian thoughts to Greece. Once the India concepts reached the Persian capital of Susa, one can guess where they would go. \t is a fact that welI-establisUed nations with their own systems of thought are reluctant to embrace the concepts coming from outside. Persia was such a sociefy bound together with Zoroastrianism and the teaching of the Magi. lonian islands, in contrast, were stt-uggling to emerge as nations without complex systeras of thought. In this situation, Greeks, not only during the sophist age but also frora the sixth century B.CE.. could have found Indian concepts that were reaching Persia frora Gandhara highly entcing.

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Notably, Darius introduced in the sixth centary B.C.E. a comraon language to all Peisian satiapies to facilitate administiaton and communicaton. TUus, it is certain that both Gandhaia and the lonian islands undei Persian confrol used the sarae language w hile communicating with Persia since the mid-sixth century B.C.E. This unique occunence could also have facilitated direct comraunication between GandUara and lonia. Persia introduced this new language called Araraaic into Gandhara shortly after Gandhara was captured: Kharoshthi is derived from the Aramaic script, which was introduced into India in the sixth centuty B.C, when the North-West was under Persian rale, and when Araraaic was used as a coraraon means of communication for the purposes of government throughout the Persian empire. That originally the Aramaic language and alphabet pure and simple were thus iraported into Gandhara, as Buhler conjectared in 1895, has been proved recenty by Sir John Marshall's discovety of an Araraaic inscripton at Taxila. (Rapson 55) The important point here is that Persia directly cornmunicated with Gandhara with a special language shared by the lonians as weU. Probably, some lonian islanders had afready known Aramaic as a second language since Araraaeans, along with Phoenicians, had direct contact with lonia long before Persia captured lonia. In addition to the use of that language for adrainistration, Persians probably leamed about Indian customs, values, and concepts through the same language. This facilitation of communicaton could Uave easily opened Indian system of tUougUt to any interested Greek wUo was searching fascinating ideas in Persia or coming to lonia through Persia. Such Greek thinkers as Empedocles and Leucippus, whose eariy life is totally obscure but ideas are stiikingly

343

similar to Indian concepts, could have benefited from these communication facilities that made the leaning about fridian concepts comparatively easy for a Greek. Evidence suggests that, since the time of Cyras, Persia also employed a host of franslators and interpreters to understand the languages of the conquered, a step that apparently increased the Persian familiarify with foreign concepts, beliefs, and social practices. In 546 B.C.E., wUen Cyras captured Croesus, tUe Lydian raler wUo made lonians pay tributes to Uira, Cyras cornmunicated witU the latter with the help of translators who stayed with the king.^* It is possible that a group of professional translators of various languages traveled with the Persian king during his foreign conquests. Back in Susa, the capital of the Persian empire, Persian emperors employed ttanslators and interpreters from their sattapies. Darius constantly leamed about social values of his satrapies with the help of these translators and interpreters. According to Herodotus, Darius once talked about the social practices of the Indian Callatiae tribe "in the presence of Greeks with an interpreter present so that they [the Greeks] would understand what was being said."^' These details reveal the coraparative easiness of learaing Indian rational concepts in the Persian capital. Since the late sixth centuty B.C.E., any Greek coming to Susa would have easily learaed about Indian concepts. One would assume how easy it would have been for Protagoras to familiarize Uimself witU tUe Indian system of tUougUt when he obtained his Persian educaton probably in Susa. The easy access in Persian capital to the information about India was demonstrated by the Greek doctor Ktesias, who, after serving eight years as the physician

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to the emperor Artaxerxes, wrote Indica, a book about India, during the late fifth centuty B.C.E. Only fragments of this book remain, and therefore, it is difficult to summanze what he knew about India. One may assume, however, that "he sometiraes had occasion to meet Indians or Persian officials who had served in the empire's Indian territories" (Sedlar 13). Sedlar's view about India influences on Greek thought is negative in principle, but one can hardly believe tUat Ktesias failed to know about trvie information about both India and Indian systems of thought from the Indians and Persian officers with whom Ktesias communicated for eight years. Traveling facilities in tUe Persian empire, in tUe mean time, provided interested Greeks araple opportunites to travel to Susa and beyond for educaton. As Herodotas reported, tUere were "royal staging-posts and exceUent inns all along it [tUe route], and the entire area of the road was "inhabited and safe."' "Not only Greek artisans, but Greek exciles and erabassies passed along it" (Cook 127). One interested in learaing would either study in Susa as Protagoras probably did or go to Babylon and India as Deraocritus did, without facing any peril since a vast area including Babylon belonged to the Persian empire. Based on Democritus remarks that he met Darius in Susa, one may assurae that Democritas probably used this route in his visit to India. Traveling facilities provided by the Persian empire during the fifth centuty B.C.E. was an invitaton for Greeks to travel in the East and, subsequenty, to famiUarize theraselves with the Indian rational thought.

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Finally, there is the strong possibilify that Buddhist and other Indian rationalist concepts reached sophist Greece through the sea routes as well. It seems an undeniable trath that the lonian islanders began to emerge from intellectaal darkness taanks to the sea-fraders who constantly brought foreign goods to the lonian beaches. There was a time, according to Herodotas, that lonians themselves were ashamed to be recognized by that name since the lonian islands were "the weakest and most insignificant" territory of that area." However, as dscussed in Chapter IH, Phoenicians brought the alphabet, reUgious texts, and tUe knowledge of the developed world to the lonian islands through the sea. It was also mentioned in Chapter III that Phoenicians were engaged in ttade with India through the Red Sea even before the sixth centuty B.C.E. When Phoenicia became a Persian colony in 539 B.C.E., Phoenicians found their sea-ttade more convenient than ever before. "The Merchants of Phoenicia, absorbed into the Persian Empire, were none the less prosperous for their loss of autonomy. They enjoyed Persian protection and a considerable share of the ttade" (Parkinson 43). They certainly used their old destinations and routes as they, as well as other ttaders, brought Indian merchandise to lonia and centtal Greece. With these facilities, acquaintance with Indian goods becarae a common experience in Greece. In addition to numerous iteras brought to Greece before the fifth centuty, Indian rice and peacocks became well known in Greece. One would clearly wonder why Buddhist rational concepts did not reach Greece with these ttading relatons: In the fiftfi century ttade with India entered upon a new dimension. We know that from the fact that at this time certain Asian goods became

346

known in Greece under their Indian naraes. Rice, one of Ii exports, was widespread source of nourishment during the Sophocles (496-406 BC). The Greek term for rice is iden' arisi. Aristophanes often mentions peacocks.. . They [ric raust have been widely disserainated in Greece by 470 or to be thought generally known in the Athens of thirfy years later. Sellevident acquaintance with Indian goods is of great importance since it occurs in the epoch immediately after the Buddha's death, enabling us to pose the provocative queston: did initial knowledge of the Dharma [the Buddha's teaching] reach Athens along with establisUed trade witU distant India? (Graber and Kersten 51) Graber's and Kersten's rhetorical question seems perfectly legitimate because of several reasons. First, as afready discussed, speculatve ideas always reached Greece through sea-ttade since the early sixth centuty B.C.E., and a sirailar trend was clearly possible during the fifth centuty B.C.E. Second, the interest in foreign thoughts was an inherent characteristc of the entfre Greek naton, and a reversal of this tendency would be impossible during the fifth centtuy B.C.E. Finally, there is sfrong possibihty that some of the Indian ttaders who dispatched goods from Indian to the Greek world were Buddhists, whose awareness of the Buddha's teaching could hardly evade the attention of other seattaders. One may hardly hesitate to give an affrmative answer to the queston raised by Graber and Kersten in the quotaton cited above. Batygaza, sitaated in the westem coast of India, was the centtal port from which most of the merchandise of Eastera and Cenfral India was shipped to the Greek worid. The area in which this faraous port was located was just behind the state of Avanti, a major Buddhist power during the Buddha's time. "Several of the most eamest and zealous adherents of the Dhamma" such as Abhaya Kumara, Isidasi, Isidatta,

347

Dhammapala, Sona Kutikanna, and Maha Kaccana "were either bora or resided tiere," and among thera, Maha Kaccana in particular had won die Buddha's highest praise as one who was "able to expound at length, both as to forai and raeaning, that which had been said [by tie Buddha] in short" (Rhys Davids, "Histoty of the Buddhists" 165). These details reveal that, while tie teachfrig of the Buddha originated in the footsteps of Hmialayas, it spread to the far west of India during the Buddha's tfrne. This inforraaton is important because the Buddhist atmosphere around the port of Batygaza could possibly convey Buddhist concepts to the Phoenician and other Westera traders who did business at the port and probably associated with other fridian business partners and lodged in Indian inns. Two more factors may have contributed to the possibility that Westera ttaders would have farailiarized theraselves with Buddhist and other rationalist concepts in Indian and nearby ports. Ffrst, tUe giants of business community in India during tUat time were mostly tUe advocates of Buddhist and other rationalist movements. For instance, Anathapindika, the business tycoon in Savatthi under whose leadership the ttaders in Savatthi had formed a ttading organization (Caroline Davids, "Economic Conditons" 188), was the Buddha's chief supporter. His caravans, hundreds in number, discharged goods at various destinatons for sale in foreign countries. The other factor is that Benaras, a major place in the development of Buddhist rational concepts, was the 'chief industrial and commercial center in Early Buddhist days" (Caroline Davids, "Economic Conditions" 189). Indian caravans, apart frora going to Batygaza, 'raay [also] Uave

348

bound from Benaras. . . across tbe deserts of Rajaputana westward to tUe seaports of Bharakaccha, the modem Broach and the sea board of Sovira" (Caroline Davids, "Economic Conditons" 189). With these trade-connectons with the Westera world during the fifth centaty B.C.E., it is hard to assume that the contempory fridian rational thought failed to reach Greece through the trading routes. While Phoenician and other Westera sea-traders probably bequeathed some knowledge about Indian rationalist views at famous Indian and neigUboring ports, obscure sea-routes also existed in tUe NortU to deliver Indian goods, as well as thinking, to the Greek territories. "Strabo said on the authority of Petrocles, Seleucus Nector's admiral who sailed the shores of the Caspian, that there was a regular frade route frora India via the Oxus, the Hyrcanian Sea [Caspian Sea], and Albania to the Euxine" (Walbank 262). The Oxus river begins just above Gandhara, and it is possible that the merchandise from more industrialized areas sucU as Benaras found tUeir way to Greece tUrougU tUis route. It was also mentioned in Jatakas tUat Uundreds of caravans taat belonged to tUe BuddUa's cUief supporter AnatUapindika fraveled to GandUara to deliver goods (Caroline Davids, "Econoraic Condfrions" 190). TUis mercUandise would Uave been a part of tUe sUipments that sailed towards the Caspian Sea. No details are available about who ttansported these goods to the Greek world, but it is possible that the fraders knew about the ratonalist developraent in India and talked about it wita their Westem business people in the Greek territoty.

349

AU this inforraaton about the connections between India and Greece provides strong evidence in support of Indian rattonalist influence on Greek sopUist tUinkers. So many routes were open for sopUist tUinkers from all directons to familiarize themselves with Buddhist and other ratonalist concepts: from tUe Indians who fought in Greece, from Persia through Greek, Persian, and Indian eraployers, from the South through the traders in the Red Sea, and from the North through the merchants coming from Gandhara. Notably, these were the probable routes that brought Indian concepts to the Greek world without demanding much effort from the Greeks who readily imitated those concepts, but Greeks were not the people who were just waitng for foreign thoughts. While they probably absorbed the concepts that came home, they, just like PytUagoras and Democritus, also displayed an inherent tendency to go and get those concepts from the vety lands where they originated, existed, and circulated among people. Both of these factors-the possible availability of Buddhist and other Indian rationalist concepts in Greece and tUe certain search by some Greeks for such concepts in India, Persia, and Babylon-strongly support the argument that sophist rhetoric was nourished by Indian ratonalism. This argument is fiirther strengthened by the presence of specific signs of Indian ratonal thought, the signs that appeared as a resuU of a unique power sttTiggle in the ancient Indian society, in Greek sophist rhetoric as well.

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Notes ' DK68B30. ' DK68B303.

^ DK68B299. " Herodotus, Histories I. 131. ' DK31B129.

' Diogenes Leartius, Lives of Eminentphilosophers VIII 56 (AI). ' Middle-Iength Sayings, p. 341-342. * The Republic ofPIato, trans. Francis M. Coraford (London: Oxford U. Press, 1941), 106. ' Hesiod, Works andDays, lines 109-201. ' Dialogues ofthe Buddha III, p. 94. " Herodotus, Histories 7. 65.

'^ Herodotos, Histories 7. 86. " ftid., 9. 32. '" ftid., 8. 113. " Kindred Sayings I, p. 94. " Herodotos, Histories 3.91. " fbid.,1.66.

" njid., 1. 169. " ftid., 1. 143. ^ fbid., 1. 169. " n)id4.44.

351

" " " "

Chandogya Upanishad V\ \iv 1-2. Middle-Iength Sayings, p. 251. n)id.,p.255. bid.,p. 181.

' ' n)id.,p. 188. " " Stt-abo, Geograp/iyXVC 715. Herodottis,///ories 1. 87.

" ftid., 3. 38. " ftid., 5. 50. " ftid., 1. 143.

352

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