GENSON vs. ADARLE This is a Petition for review which seeks to set aside the decision in CA-G.R. No.

00783 on the ground that the findings of the respondent Court of Appeals are based on misapprehension of facts and conflict with those of the trial court and that the conclusions drawn therefrom are based on speculations and conjectures. Arturo Arbatin was the successful bidder in the sale at public auction of junk and other unserviceable government property located at the compound of the Highway District Engineer's Office of Roxas City. Private respondent Eduardo Adarle was hired as a laborer by Arbatin to gather and take away scrap iron from the said compound with a daily wage of P12.00 or about 312.00 a month. On September 8, 1979, at 4:00 o'clock in the morning, on a Saturday and a non-working day, while the private respondent was tying a cable to a pile of scrap iron to be loaded on a truck inside the premises of the compound, and while the bucket of the payloader driven by Ramon Buensalido was being raised, the bucket suddenly fell and hit Adarle on the right back portion of his head just below the nape of his neck. Adarle was rushed to the St. Anthony Hospital, Roxas City. According to the medical certificate issued by the attending physician, the private respondent suffered the following injuries: 1) Comminuted fracture of the vertebral body of 13 with extreme Kyphosis of the segment by x-ray. 2) Cord compression 2nd to the injury with paralysis of the lower extremity, inability to defecate and urinate. (E Exh. A, Exhibits for the plaintiff-appellant, Original Records.) The medical certificate also reported that: The patient recovered the use of his urinary bladder and was able to defecate 2 months after surgery. He is paralyzed from the knee down to his toes. He can only sit on a wheel chair. The above residual damage is permanent 2nd to the injury incurred by Mr. Adarle, he is still confined in the Hospital. (idem) While still in the hospital, the private respondent instituted the action below for damages against Arbatin, his employer; Buensalido, the payloader operator; Candelario Marcelino, the civil engineer; and petitioner, the Highway District Engineer. During the trial on the merits, the petitioner put up the defense that he had no knowledge of or participation in the accident and that, when it happened, he was not present in the government compound. Apart from the fact that it was a Saturday and a non-working day, he was in Iloilo. As part of his evidence, the petitioner presented a memorandum directed to a certain Mr. Orlando Panaguiton ordering the latter to take charge of the district until his return (Exh. 1). The trial court found that, with the exception of the petitioner, all of the defendants were present at the Highway's compound when the accident occurred. However, it still adjudged the petitioner liable for damages because the petitioner was supposed to know what his men do with their government equipment within an area under his supervision. Thus, on January 19, 1982, the trial court rendered a decision finding all the defendants liable for damages under Articles 1172 and 2176 of the New Civil Code. The dispositive portion of the decision reads: WHEREFORE, this court orders the defendants to pay to plaintiff the amounts stated in the complainant's prayer as follows: Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of 312.00 monthly from September 8, 1979 until his release from the hospital.

Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P7,410.63 for hospital expenses up to January 14, 1980 and an additional amount for further hospitalization until the release of plaintiff from the hospital; Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of at least P100,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages, considering that plaintiff Eduardo Adarle is totally incapacitated for any employment for life; Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P20,000.00 as moral damages and another sum for exemplary damages which we leave to the sound discretion of the Honorable Court; Ordering the defendants jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. (pp. 129- 130, Original Records). The petitioner appealed to the Intermediate Appellate Court which affirmed the decision of the trial court and further ordered the defendants to pay P5,000.00 exemplary damages. Defendant Candelario Marcelino was, however, absolved from liability. In its decision, the appellate court ruled: That payloader owned by the Government, as found by the lower court, should not have been operated that Saturday, September 8, 1979, a Saturday, a non-working holiday. There is no official order from the proper authorities authorizing Arbatin and plaintiff to work and Buensalido to operate the payloader on that day inside the Highway compound. Thereabouts, we can logically deduce that Arbatin and plaintiff went to the compound to work with the previous knowledge and consent of Highway District Engineer Jose E. Genson. And allowed him, probably upon the request of Arbatin. We have noted that Genson testified that his office does not authorize work on Saturdays. Genson testified that he was in Iloilo from September 9 and 10, 1979. The accident occurred on September 8, in the morning. In his answer, Genson did not allege his presence in Iloilo on September 9 and 10 ... . We fully concur with the lower court's conclusions regarding the physical presence of appellants inside the compound on that fateful day, pursuant to a previous understanding with Arbatin for plaintiff to work on the scrap iron and for Buensalido to operate the payloader inside the compound. Arbatin and plaintiff would not go to the compound on that Saturday, if there was no previous understanding with Genson and Buensalido. The liability of Genson is based on fault, intentional and voluntary or negligent (Eleano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 106; Jimena v. Lincallo, 63 O.G. 11,15, 8 C. A.R. 2567). He gave permission to Arbatin, plaintiff and Buensalido to work on Saturday, a non-working day, in contravention of his office' rules and regulations outlawing work on Saturdays.. (pp. 29-30, Rollo) In this present petition, the petitioner contends that the appellate court committed a palpable error when it ruled that the petitioner was present when the accident happened and that he had given permission to the other defendants to work on a Saturday, a non-working day. The petitioner argues that considering these were the facts relied upon by the said court in holding that he was negligent and thus liable for damages, such a conclusion, is without basis. The petitioner further contends that the appellate court erred in not holding that the suit against the petitioner was, in effect, a suit against the government and, therefore, should be dismissed under the principle of non-suability of the state.

As regards the petitioner's second contention, we hold that the petitioner's Identification as the Highway District Engineer in the complaint filed by the private respondent did not result in the said complaint's becoming a suit against the government or state. In Belizar v. Brazas, (2 SCRA 526), we ruled that "the fact that the duties and positions of the defendants are indicated does not mean that they are being sued in their official capacities, especially as the present action is not one against the Government." Furthermore, the accident in the case at bar happened on a non-working day and there was no showing that the work performed on that day was authorized by the government. While the equipment used belongs to the Government, the work was private in nature, for the benefit of a purchaser of junk. As we have held in the case of Republic v. Palacio (23 SCRA 899,906). xxx xxx xxx the ISU liability thus arose from tort and not from contract, and it is a well-entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, embodied in Article 2180 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, that the State is liable only for torts caused by its special agents, specially commissioned to carry out the acts complained of outside of such agent's regular duties (Merritt v. Insular Government, supra; Rosete v. Auditor General, 81 Phil. 453) There being no proof that the making of the tortious inducement was authorized, neither the State nor its funds can be made liable therefor. Therefore, the defense of the petitioner that he cannot be made liable under the principle of non-suability of the state cannot be sustained. With regard to the main contention of the petitioner that the appellate court based its conclusions on an erroneous finding of fact, we agree with him that the appellate court's finding that he was present within the premises when the accident happened is not supported by evidence indisputably showing that he was indeed there. Since the evidence fails to establish petitioner Genson's presence when the payloader's bucket fell on the head of Mr. Adarle, any liability on his part would be based only on his alleged failure to exercise proper supervision over his subordinates (See Umali v. Bacani, 69 SCRA 263, 267-268). According to the trial court, Mr. Genson authorized work on a Saturday when no work was supposed to be done. It stated that the petitioner should know what his men do with their government equipment and he should neither be lax nor lenient in his supervision over them. The petitioner contends that: 1. No evidence on record exists that Genson gave authority to Adarle and Arbatin, either verbally or in writing, to enter the work inside the Highways Compound on September 8, 1979; 2. Genson never knew or met Arbatin until the trial of the case. This fact was never denied by Arbatin nor rebutted by Adarle. How then could Genson have ordered or allowed Arbatin to enter the Highways Compound with Adarle? 3. Adarle himself repeatedly admitted that Arbatin, his employer, gave him the instructions to enter the compound, thus: Q. Now particularly on September 8, 1979, did Arbatin ask you to go to the compound in the Highway? A. Yes sr. Q. Are you sure of that? A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where did he say that to you? A. We went to the Highway compound for many times already and that was the time when I met the incident. Q. The particular day in question September 8. 1979, did you see Arturo Arbatin and he asked you to go the compound on that day? A. That date was included on the first day when "he instructed us to gather scrap ironuntil that work could be finished." (pp. 25-26, tsn., October 10, 1980) (Emphasis supplied) Q. Who told you to work there? A. "Through the instruction of Arturo Arbatin" (pp. 32, tsn., Oct. 10, 1980) (Emphasis supplied) (pp. 12-13, Rollo). Insofar as work on a Saturday is concerned, and assuming Mr. Genson verbally allowed it, we see nothing wrong in the petitioner's authorizing work on that day. As a matter of fact, it could even be required that the hauling of junk and unserviceable equipment sold at public auction must be done on non-working days. The regular work of the District Engineer's office would not be disturbed or prejudiced by a private bidder bringing in his trucks and obstructing the smooth flow of traffic and the daily routine within the compound. Obviously, it would also be safer for all concerned to effect the clearing of the junk pile when everything is peaceful and quiet. There is no showing from the records that it is against regulations to use government cranes and payloaders to load items sold at public auction on the trucks of the winning bidder. The items were formerly government property. Unless the contract specifies otherwise, it may be presumed that all the parties were in agreement regarding the use of equipment already there for that purpose. Of course, it would be different if the junk pile is in a compound where there is no equipment for loading or unloading and the cranes or payloaders have to be brought there. There is likewise no sufficient basis for the "master-servant" doctrine in tort law to apply. Buensalido was not working overtime as a government employee. It is doubtful if the district engineer can be considered an "employer" for purposes of tort liability who may be liable even if he was not there. No evidence was presented to show that an application for overtime work or a claim for overtime pay from the district engineer's office was ever filed. It is more logical to presume that Buensalido, the operator of the payloader, was trying to earn a little money on the side from the junk buyer and that his presence in the compound on that Saturday was a purely private arrangement. From the records of this case, we are not disposed to rule that a supervisor who tolerates his subordinates to moonlight on a non-working day in their office premises can be held liable for everything that happens on that day. It would have been preferable if Mr. Arbatin brought his own payloader operator and perhaps, his own equipment but we are not dealing with sound office practice in this case. The issue before us is subsidiary liability for tort comitted by a government employee who is moonlighting on a non-working day. This Court ruled in Dumlao v. Court of Appeals (114 SCRA 247, 251): Nevertheless, it is a well-settled principle of law that a public official may be liable in his personal private capacity for whatever damage he may have caused by his act done with malice and in bad faith, (Mindanao realty Corp. v. Kintanar, 6 SCRA 814) or beyond the scope of his authority or jurisdiction. (the Philippine Racing Club v. Bonifacio, G.R. No. L-11844, August 31, 1960) The question, therefore, is whether petitioner did act in any of the manner aforesaid. Petitioner contends that, contrary to the holding of the respondent Court of Appeals, he was not sued in his personal capacity, but in his official capacity. Neither was malice or bad faith alleged against him in the complaint, much less proven by the evidence, as the respondent court made no such finding of malice or bad faith.

Examining the allegations of the complaint and reviewing the evidence it would indeed be correct to say that petitioner was sued in his official capacity, and that the most that was imputed to him is act of culpable neglect, inefficiency and gross indifference in the performance of his official duties. Verily, this is not imputation of bad faith or malice, and what is more was not convincingly proven. According to the respondent court, "Genson and Buensalido divested themselves of their public positions and privileges to accomodate an acquaintance or probably for inordinate gain." (p. 31, Rollo). There is no showing from the records that Genson received anything which could be called "inordinate gain." It is possible that he permitted work on a Saturday to accomodate an acquaintance but it is more plausible that he simply wanted to clear his compound of junk and the best time for the winning bidder to do it was on a non-working day. At any rate, we see no malice, bad faith, or gross negligence on the part of Genson to hold him liable for the acts of Buensalido and Arbatin. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The complaint against Jesus Genson is DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur. RUBIO vs. CA Eladio Ch. Rubio for and in his own behalf. Nemesio R. Baclao for Dominga A. San Pablo and her nine children. RESOLUTION PER CURIAM: The petitioner was found guilty of direct contempt and sentenced to five (5) days imprisonment and a fine of P 200.00 by Judge Martin B. Badong of the Regional Trial Court of Albay. He questioned this order in a petition forcertiorari with the Court of Appeals, which denied the same on the ground that certiorari was not the proper remedy and that, in any case, the record showed that the respondent judge had immediately rectified the errors imputed to him in his earlier impugned order. The petitioner has now come before us to protest this decision. We hold at the outset that the respondent Court of Appeals has committed no reversible error and that, on the contrary, the challenged decision is in accordance with law and jurisprudence. Accordingly, it must be, as it is hereby, affirmed. But the matter does not end here. There is still the questionable conduct of the petitioner in this case that has elicited the concern of the Court. Disagreeing with the choice of administrator made by Judge Badong in the estate proceedings, the petitioner filed in the trial court what he captioned an "Urgent Ex-Parte Motion Praying that Judge Martin P. Badong Himself motu proprio Reconsider and Set Aside Immediately His Own Order Dated July 9, 1987 Appointing Oppositor Eugenia Tabinas as the Regular Administrator in this Case Special Proceeding No. T105, Etc." In this motion, he accused Judge Badong of the crime of "FALSIFICATION for recognizing Eugenia Tabinas San Pablo as the legitimate wife of the decedent" and stressed that the judge was subject to the penalties imposed by the Revised Penal Code. He averred that the judge was "engaged in gross misconduct and serious misbehavior and in violating his lawyer's oath," and was "doing falsehood in his own court and violating his lawyer's oath" for which he should be "DISBARRED." In addition, he attached to his motion a copy of a petition for certiorari with a notation on the margin that it would be filed with the Court of Appeals unless the judge immediately rectified his order. 5

When asked to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt, the petitioner filed a 16-page compliance in which he repeated substantially the same allegations in his motion in the same venomous language and without any sign of repentance or apology. The judge therefore imposed upon him the above-mentioned penalty. In his present petition, Atty. Rubio has turned his bile on the three members of the Court of Appeals who dismissed his petition and in effect sustained Judge Badong's questioned decision. The same obvious malice and disdain reveal all too tellingly the petitioner's contemptuous attitude toward the said justices whom he also accuses of "THE CRIME of FALSIFICATION intentionally maliciously, feloniously, and OPENLY being committed" by them. He claims that they have made "untruthful statements" and that they 'ALL ARE FULLY AWARE of the UNTRUTHFUL STATEMENTS IN THEIR OWN DECISION and that they are openly committing the crime of FALSIFICATION." Repeatedly, he insists that the said justices are "ALL FULLY AWARE of THEIR OWN FALSEHOODS IN THEIR OWN DECISION and that "they are doing FALSEHOODS RIGHT IN THEIR OWN COURT AND VIOLATING WITH IMPUNITY THEIR LAWYERS' OATH " He stresses that the said justices "are now actively ENGAGED IN VERY SERIOUS MISCONDUCT IN THE PERFORMANCE OF THEIR JUDICIAL DUTIES and VERY MUCH WORSE than former Judge Dionisio N. Capistrano who was recently dishonorably dismissed from the judiciary." He concludes that the said justices "deserve NOW to be DISHONORABLY DISMISSED from the judiciary which they have intentionally dishonored and continue to OPENLY dishonor until now (a) with their own FALSEHOOD in court; (b) with their CRIME OF FALSIFICATION, and with their VERY, VERY SERIOUS MISCONDUCT." There are similar statements found elsewhere in the records of this case, most of them capitalized to stress the petitioner's arguments and also (although this was not intended) his malice and boorishness. The petition is worded in scurrilous and offensive language that clearly manifests the petitioner's gross disrespect for the trial judge and the members of the Court of Appeals who rendered the challenged decision. This conduct and attitude of the petitioner cannot be simply disregarded by this Court or excused as a mere eccentricity. While every lawyer is entitled to present his case before the courts of justice with vigor and courage, he is not permitted to manifest such enthusiasm through threatening and abusive language, as in the case before us. The insolence displayed by the petitioner all too clearly demonstrates not only his spiteful character but as well his lack of respect for the courts of justice. Intimidating judges and accusing them of personal wrongdoing, especially if such accusations are clearly unfounded, ill becomes a member of the bar who, as such, owes a fitting courtesy and respect to those who sit on the bench and before whom he pleads. While there is no doubt that counsel have every right to impute to judges honest mistakes in their decisions, ascribing to them personal shortcomings and vices and even deliberate attempts to falsify the truth, cannot be condoned under the Code of Professional Responsibility which every lawyer must observe. The damning evidence of the petitioner's own verified pleadings has indubitably established is grossly improper conduct without need of further proof or proceedings. The petitioner has clearly shown by his arrogant conduct that he does not deserve to remain in the Philippine Bar, which requires the highest standards of decorum and courtesy among its members. Lacking the proper spirit of respect for the courts of justice, which he has threatened and abused "with impunity," to use his own words, he must be excluded from the brotherhood he has dishonored until he has purged himself of his insolence. WHEREFORE, the Court holds as follows: 1. The petition is DENIED for lack of merit. 2. Atty. Eladio Ch. Rubio is hereby SUSPENDED as a member of the Philippine Bar and is prohibited from engaging in the practice of law until otherwise ordered by this Court. This resolution shall be spread in his personal record and is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Fernan (C.J.), Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortes, Gri;o-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.

BUNAG vs. CA The core of the controversy in this case is a thumb-marked. non-notarized and non-witnessed deed of sale of a parcel of unregistered land, which on its face cannot but cause a prudent man to doubt its due execution and authenticity. The facts are briefly summarized in the decision of the Court of Appeals: The evidence of the plaintiff consisting of the sole testimony of said plaintiff is to the effect that the property in question was originally owned by his father Apolonio Bunag Aguas as shown by Tax Declaration Nos. 546 for 1941 and 320 for 1960 (Exhs. B & E), located at San Nicolas, Betis, Pampanga; that he had been living in their house thereon with his father until 1920 when they transferred their residence to Tarlac; that in 1925 their house thereon was demolished as it was old; that they planted bamboos on the land; that Jose Bautista Santiago, a nephew-in-law, erected a house on said lot and lived therein for sometime until he became a widower when he transferred to another house; that said Jose Bautista Santiago one day accompanied his sister Estrudes Bautista to stay in that house; and that Santiago was allowed by his father to build a house on said lot on condition that he would pay for the land taxes as compensation for the use of the land. He admitted, however, that be only learned about this agreement from his father. On September 15,1962, and September 24,1962 he sent written demands to defendant Bruno Bautista, thru his lawyer, to vacate the lot and remove the houses thereon, (Exhs. A & B). The testimony of the other witness Juan Bunag was stricken from the records as he failed to return to court for cross-examination. On the other hand, the evidence for the defendant consist of the testimony of defendant Bruno Bautista who testified that he is the owner of the land in question by virtue of a deed of sale, of January 3, 1941, signed by Apolonio Bunag with his thumbmark; that Bunag first offered it for sale to his brother Jose Bautista, but as the latter had no money, he referred the matter to his father; that after he was contacted in Baguio by his father, he sent the P100.00 as consideration of the sale and so the sale was consummated between his father and Bunag; that he came down from Baguio and had the house repaired and he stayed there with his family until liberation when they left the house and allowed his sister Estrudes Bautista to live therein; that he planted bananas, chicos, trees, calamansi, eggplants, thereon; that he had been paying the land taxes thereon (Exhs. 5 to 5-M); that the property is declared in his name (Exh. 6); and he denies that her sister Estrudes requested Apolonio Bunag to allow her to stay on the property as her sister had a house of her own then. Brigida Bautista testified that her brother bought the said property from Apolonio Bunag and that she was present when Bunag affixed Ms thumbmark on the document (Exh. 1); that aside from this deed, there were other documents supporting the sale as the note (Exh. 2) containing the consideration and the parties. Assessor's Field Sheet of the property (Exh. 3) and the letter of the assessor to Bunag in 1941 informing him of the revision of the assessment. (Rollo, pp. 15-18). The trial court decided in favor of petitioner, the dispositive portion of the decision reading as follows: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered in favor of the plaintiff. The defendants, Bruno Bautista and Estrudes Bautista vda. de Bituin, are hereby ordered to vacate the property herein described and to deliver possession thereof to the plaintiff, Francisco Bunag; ordering the said defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the land taxes of the property up to and including the year 1968; and to pay the plaintiff the sum of P15.00 per month as reasonable rentals thereof from the date of this judgment until the property is delivered to the plaintiff; to pay the plaintiff the sum of P200.00 as expenses of litigation and costs. For lack of merit, the counterclaim of the defendants are dismiss (Rollo, pp. 14-15) The Court of Appeals, finding the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) to have been validly executed and, thus, concluding that "the preponderance of evidence leans heavily in favor of the claim of the ownership of defendant Bruno Bautista" [Rollo p. 18], set aside the decision of the trial court and dismissed the complaint. The motion for reconsideration was subsequently denied by the Court of Appeals in a minute resolution for lack of merit. Consequently, resolution of the instant petition primarily revolves around the issue of the due execution authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1). The petitioner assigned the following errors:

I THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DEED OF SALE (EXHIBIT "1") WAS DULY EXECUTED AND AUTHENTICATED. II THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN MAKING CONCLUSION (SIC) NOT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD. At the outset, it must be emphasized that the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) was not acknowledged before a notary public and neither are there any signatures in the blank spaces for the signatures of attesting witnesses. The document is typewritten in English and over the similarly typewritten words "APOLONIO BUNIAG" is a thumbprint. The deed of sale (Exhibit 1) is not notarized and is, therefore, a private writing (U.S. v. Orera, 11 Phil. 596 (1908)], whose due execution and authenticity must be proved before it can be received in evidence (Nolan v. Sales, 7 Phil. 1 (1906); U.S. v. Evangelists, 29 Phil. 215 (1915); Antillon v. Barcelon, 37 Phil. 148 (1917)]. Proof of the due execution and authenticity of private writings is required under Section 21, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court, to wit: Sec. 21. Private writing, its execution and authenticity, how proved. Before any private writing may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c) By a subscribing witness. To support its conclusion as to the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1), the Court of Appeals relied on the testimony of Brigida Bautista, a sister of private respondents. She testified as follows: Q. Who is the owner of the property? A My brother Bruno Bautista. Q. Do you know how your brother, Bruno Bautista, came to own the same property? A. Yes, sir. He bought it from Apolonio Bunag. Q. Do you know if there is any document evidencing the purchase of the said property from Apolonio Bunag.? A. Yes, sir. Q. Showing to you this document already marked as Exhibit 1, do you recognize this? A. Yes, sir, this is the document showing the purchase and sale of the lot in litigation. Q. At the bottom portion thereof, appears a thumbmark above the typewritten name Apolonio Bunag, do you know whose thumbmark this is? A. That is the thumbmark of Apolonio Bunag, sir, and I know that is his because I saw him affixed (sic) his thumbmark. TSN, March 25,1967, pp. 1-2).

However, the trial court found proof of the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1) wanting, reasoning that: The testimony of this witness (Brigida Bautista) has to be received with caution, coming as it does from a sister of the defendants. The circumstances other alleged presence during the "execution" of the deed of sale was not related. Neither does she give any light as to whether Apolonio Bunag understood the document. It should be noted that (Exhibit "1") was written in English. Since it appears that said document was merely thumb-marked, it could reasonably be inferred that Apolonio Bunag, the supposed vendor, was illiterate. Under the stances, the minimum proof necessary to establish due authenticity should, in the least, include evidence that the document (Exhibit "1") was duly read, explained and translated to Apolonio Bunag. Unfortunately, no such evidence was presented. Another fact which compels this Court to proceed with caution is the fact that there are no instrumental witnesses in the document. The mischief that lurks behind accepting at face value a document that is merely thumb-marked. without any witnesses to it, and not acknowledged before a notary public could be one of the reasons behind the requirement of the rules on evidence that a private writing must be shown to be duly executed and authenticated. The probative value of the testimony of Brigida Bautista, who did not furnish us with any details surrounding the execution of Exhibit "l," coming as it does from a person whose partisanship can not, and should not, be overlook (sic), fags short from (sic) the minimum requirements of credibility. Indeed it has been said that the testimony of an eye-witness as to the execution of a private document must be positive. He must state that the document was actually executed by the person whose name is subscribed thereto. It is not sufficient if he states in a general manner that such person made the writing (Nolan vs. Salas, Bail. More so if the document was merely thumbmarked. Regretably, this Court can not accept, for failure of proof as to its due execution and authenticity, the probative value of Exhibit "1". (Record on Appeal, pp.38-39). The Court sustains and adopts the trial court's findings and its conclusion that private respondents have failed to prove the due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1). The due execution and authenticity of the deed of sale, (Exhibit 1) not having been satisfactorily proven, such private document should be excluded [Paz v. Santiago, 47 Phil. 334 (1925); Alejandrino v. Reyes, 53 Phil. 973 (1929); Chapman v. Garcia, 64 Phil. 618 (1937); General Enterprises v. Lianga Bay Logging Co., G.R. No. L-18487, August 31, 1964, 11 SCRA 733]. 2. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred in arriving at a conclusion not supported by the record, when it said: The pretension of the plaintiff that the defendant bound himself to pay the taxes for the use of the land is belied by the fact that the defendant paid the taxes in his own name and not in the name of Bunag, and the defendant kept the receipts of payment and did not deliver even one of those receipts to Bunag. (Rollo, p. 19.) Petitioner argues that this finding is grossly erroneous, considering that in the stipulation of facts submitted by both parties before the trial court, it is expressly provided: 3. That the parties hereto hereby stipulate and agree that the defendant, Bruno Bautista, has been paying the land taxes due on the aforesaid property, personally or thru his wife, Consolacion Capati, for the period from 1940 to 1964, as shown by the corresponding official land tax receipts duly issued by the Municipal Treasurer of Guagua, Pampanga; however, under the column NAME OF DECLARED OWNER thereof, the name Bunag Aguas Apolonio is written. As this fact was stipulated by the parties, it need not be proven, it cannot be contradicted by evidence to the contrary, and it is conclusive upon the parties, unless it is shown that the admission was made through a palpable mistake [Irlanda v. Pitargue, 22 Phil. 383 (1912); Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration v. Agcaoili, G.R. No. L-38129, July 23,1974, 58 SCRA 72].

There being no allegation of a palpable mistake that would relieve private respondents from the stipulation of facts, the stipulated fact above-quoted is conclusive upon the parties. The Court of Appeals cannot arbitrarily disregard the statement of facts agreed upon by the parties [Siping v. Cacob, 10 Phil. 717 (1908)]. It is duty bound to render judgment strictly in accordance with the stipulation of facts [Cabrera v. Lacson, 71 Phil. 182 (1940)]. It may also be added that, indeed, in the Real Estate Tax Receipts (Exhibits 5-5-M) covering the years 1947 to 1964 presented by private respondents as their evidence, under the column entitled "NAME OF DECLARED OWNER" the name "Bunag Aguas Apolonio" is written. This assumes greater significance considering that the payors in these receipts were either private respondent Bruno Bautista, his wife Consolacion Capati or Ambrosio Bautista. Thus, this Court finds merit in petitioner's contention that the Court of Appeals's conclusion is not supported by the record, for said conclusion is contrary to the stipulated fact and the evidence offered by private respondents, which support petitioner's contention that his father did not sen the disputed property to private respondents' father, but merely allowed their brother to build a house on the land on the condition that the latter would pay for the realty taxes due. With the exclusion of the deed of sale (Exhibit 1), the conclusiveness of the stipulation regarding the payment of realty taxes and the declaration of Apolonio Bunag Aguas as the owner in the Real Estate Tax Receipts (Exhibits 55-M) it becomes apparent that petitioner's father never ceased to own the disputed property. At this juncture, it would be opportune to address private respondent's submission that the questions raised in petitioner's petition for review are questions of fact and not of law and, therefore, this Court should not disturb the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals. While the Court agrees with private respondents that, ordinarily, the Supreme Court should not review questions of fact in appeals of this nature, the Court finds, however, that an exception obtains in the instant case, for clearly evident is a misapprehension of facts [De la Cruz v. Sosing, 94 Phil. 26 (1953); Castillo v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 1,48290, September 29, 1983, 124 SCRA 808]. As summarized by the Court in a recent decision: The jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought to us from the Court of Appeals (now Intermediate Appellate Court) is limited to the review of errors of law, said appellate court's findings of fact being conclusive upon us except (1) when the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when the inference made is manifestly absurd, mistaken or impossible; (3) when there is grave abuse of discretion in the appreciation of facts; (4) when the judgment is premised on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; and (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee ... [Rizal Cement Co., Inc. v. Villareal, G.R. No. L-30272, February 28, 1985, 135 SCRA 151]. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED, the decision of the Court of Appeals is set aside and the decision of the trial court is affirmed in toto. This Decision is immediately executory. SO ORDERED. Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

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