LEASE A. IN GENERAL A. ELEMENTS B. OBLIGATIONS OF LESSOR AND LESSEE C. REMEDIES D. TERMINATION OF LEASE CASES: 1. Dee v.

CA, 176 SCRA 651 (1989) a. FACTS: Dee and his father went to the residence of Atty Mutuc to seek
his advice regarding the problem of the alleged indebtedness of petitioners brother Dewey Dee, to Ceasars Palace. Petitioners father was apprehensive over the safety of his son, Dewey having heard of a link between the mafia and Ceasars Palace and his possibility that his son may be harmed at the instance of the latter. Atty Mutuc assured petitioner and his father that he would inquire into the matter, after which his services were reportedly contracted for P100,000. Further investigations revealed that the alleged debt of Dewey had actually been incurred by Ramon Sy, with Dewey merely signing for the chits. Atty. Mutuc talked with the president of Ceasars palace and advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation, Dewey would be exculpated from liability. Ramon Sy acknowledged the obligation, thereafter, the account of Dewey was cleared. Atty Mutuc sent demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000 as attorneys fees. Petitioner Dee ignored said letters. Atty Mutuc filed a complaint against petitioner Dee for the collection of attorneys fees. Petitioner denied the existence of any professional relationship of attorney and client between him and Atty Mutuc. Dee insists that the visits made to Atty Mutuc were merely informal and that Atty Mutuc had not been specifically contacted to handle the problem. The P50,000 given to Atty Mutuc was alleged to be given not in the nature of attorneys fees but merely pocket money b. ISSUE: Whether or not there is an lawyer-client relationship c. HELD: The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a professional relationship which merits attorneys fees for professional services rendered. To establish the relationship, it is sufficient that the advice and assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his profession. An acceptance of the relation is implied on the part of the attorney from his acting on behalf of his client in pursuance of a request from the latter. Therefore, Mutuc is entitled to receive a reasonable compensation. Atty Mutuc did not represent conflicting interests as claimed by Dee when Dee alleged that Mutuc was acting as agent of Ceasars Palace. Mutucs representations in behalf of petitioner Dee were not in resistance to the casinos claim but were actually geared toward proving the liability of true debtor, Ramon Sy.

2. Herrera v. Herrera, 7 Phil 274 a. FACTS: b. ISSUE: Whether or not c. HELD: 3. Gonzales v. Mateo, 74 Phil 573 a. FACTS: Vicente Mateo et al. (lessors) went into business as an

unregistered partnership under the name "Samahang Sabungang Malaya." They leased to Gonzales their cockpit situated in Malolos, Bulacan, under a written contract for the period of six years at the agreed yearly rental of P100 with several conditions. Before using the cockpit, Gonzales made some improvements on the building to improve its structural support. A cockfight was held in said cockpit with a large attendance. The building broke down and collapsed during that event. Mateo et al demanded of Gonzales that he either reconstruct the cockpit or pay damages. But, Gonzales refused to comply, alleging that under his contract he was not obligated to make repairs, but only improvements, on the building and that its collapse was due to hidden defects which the lessors had concealed from him b. ISSUE: Whether or not Gonzales should be held liable for the collapse of the cockpit c. HELD: It is evident that Gonzales accepted the cockpit in question from the lessors in the condition in which it was found at the time under the express agreement that all that was necessary to put it in use had to be done by the petitioner at his own expense without any obligation on the part of the respondents to reimburse him or pay for the improvements thus made upon the expiration of the lease. While it is true that under the law (paragraph 2 article 1554 of the Civil Code) it is the duty of the lessor to make on the building leased all repairs necessary in order to keep it in serviceable condition for the purpose for which it was intended, the parties were at liberty to stipulate the contrary. The collapse of the building in question on the occasion of the heavily attended cockfight of September 12, 1937, was not due to any hidden defect but to the fact that thru petitioner's negligence in making the repairs he failed to place the posts on firm, solid, and sound foundation Under article 1563 of the Civil Code, "the lessee is liable for any deterioration or loss suffered by the thing leased, unless he proves that it took place without his fault."

4. Dakudao v. Judge Consalacion, 122 SCRA 877 (1983) a. FACTS: Petitioners are co-owners of a parcel of land. On this land
stands the house of defendant Ang Singco who had a verbal lease contract with herein petitioners. Without the knowledge and consent of petitioners, Ang Singco sold his house to the Laurecios. When Dakudao visited the premises in question, she was told of the transaction that transpired between Ang Singco and the Laurecios. Since the house is at present occupied by the Laurecios, Dakudao demanded that they vacate the premises and for the payment of the use and occupation of the same at P100.00 a month. But, for failure to reach an agreement

for the rental of the premises, no agreement took place. Hence, Petitioners filed this suit to eject the Laurecios. However, the court dismissed the case for unlawful detainer against the Laurecios because it believes that the essence of the action for unlawful detainer is the existence of a previous contract, expressed or implied, between the plaintiff and the defendant. Since no contract was entered into between Dakudao and the Laurecios, unlawful detainer is not a proper remedy b. ISSUE: Whether or not the Laurecios can be lawfully evicted from the property owned by Dakudao c. HELD: The primary argument of the respondents Laurecio in this petition is that they are not unlawfully withholding possession from the petitioners after the expiration or termination of the right to hold possession by virtue of any contract because there never was any contract express or implied between them and the petitioners. In its decision, the City Court of Davao City admitted that the petitioners had a right to recover possession of the land involved in the litigation but "unfortunately" for them their cause of action did not fit in an unlawful detainer case. Neither could it be a forcible entry case, according to the judge, because the plaintiffs failed to allege in the pleadings or prove with evidence the fact that the defendants occupied the land through stealth and strategy. Moreover, respondents further claim that they cannot be considered privies or successors-in-interest of the former lessee, Francisco Ang Singco, because Article 1649 of the Civil Code provides that "the lessee cannot assign the lease without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary." But, the provision was never intended to permit one who claims no right to the premises to avoid ejectment by such a dubious allegation. Since there was no contract between the lot owners and the Laurecios, the latter's occupation of the land is only as successors of Ang Singco from whom they purchased the house built on the lot. If Article 1649 had been followed and the consent of the owners to the sale secured, the Laurecios would be more than mere successors-in-interest. They would have become the new lessees. Hence, the unlawful detainer case was proper

5. Manlapat v. Salazar, 98 Phil 356 a. FACTS: A lease was entered into which would last until June 1, 1967.
The lessee, however, entered into a contract with Salazar wherein she would lease the same property to Salazar until May 31, 1967 (a shorter period than the orginal lease, by one day). Inasmuch as the contract was entered into without the consent of the lessor, he alleged that the contract was void on the ground that the same was an assignment, not a sublease. b. ISSUE: Whether or not it is a contract of assignment or sublease c. HELD: This is a sublease, and therefore it could be effected even without the lessors consent there being no express prohibition on a sublease. The sublessor has not stepped out of the original contract; she remains a party to it. All the terms (given above) of the sublease clearly indicate that indeed a sublease, not an assignment, has been

agreed upon. Moreover, the under letting for a period less than the entire term in this case (indeed, the reservation of even so short a period as the last day of the term) makes the transfer a sublease, and not an assignment

6. Pamintuan v. CA, 42 SCRA 344 a. FACTS: A lease contract was executed in favor of petitioners Tan and

Pamintuan for two. It provided for an agreed monthly rental of P15.00 payable promptly at the end of every month for each lot or P30.00 for the two. The lease was entered into on October 10, 1951 to expire at the discretion of the lessee after twenty years. There was another provision that failure on the part of the lessee to pay the rental for six consecutive months would automatically annul the contract. The complaint for rescission filed by private respondents as plaintiffs against petitioners as defendants alleged that with respect to the first lot, Tan was in arrears for the period of twelve months and, with respect to the second lot, for a period of eight months. Lower Court granted the petition to rescind the contract. Appeal to the CA affirmed lower courts decision. Hence, this appeal b. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners had violated the provision in the contract of lease as to the monthly rental being promptly paid at the end of every month as claimed by plaintiffs c. HELD: While claiming to have committed no such violations, the petitioners nevertheless admitted that they in their pleadings nor at any time during the trial, never claimed to have offered to pay the rental at the end of each month. On the contrary, they impliedly admitted in their pleadings that no such monthly payments were ever made. With their above admission that 'no such monthly payments were ever made' by them, it stands clear that they violated the aforequoted provision of paragraph 2 of the contract of lease. Clearly, said violation of lessees' obligation to pay the price of the lease according to the terms stipulated entitles the respondents to rescind said contract of lease under Article 1659 of the Civil Code providing that 'If the lessor or the lessee should not comply with the obligations set forth in articles 1654 and 1657, the aggrieved party may ask for the rescission of the, contract and indemnification for damages or only the latter, allowing the contract to remain in force.

7. Heirs of Dimaculangan v. IAC, 170 SCRA 393 (1989) a. FACTS: Dimaculangan and her children occupy by lease an apartment
at a monthly rental of P250.00. Respondent Uy sent Dimaculangan a letter informing her that the property, which she has been occupying, has been sold to him and should she desire to continue occupying the same, she should sign a contract of lease for a period of two (2) years at a monthly rental of P1,500.00. Uy received no reply to this demand. Thus, he wrote another letter, demanding payment of P750.00 covering unpaid rentals. But still, there was no word from Dimaculangan such that Uy was forced to file a complaint for ejectment

b. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may alter the agreement of the

parties by shortening the period of the lease from an indefinite period within the purview of Presidential Decree No. 20, the law in force at the time, and of the amendatory Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, to a fixed two (2) years c. HELD: Yes. It is exempt from the application of P.D. No. 20, it must be one with a definite period It has been established that petitioners have been occupying the leased premises on a verbal contract since 1961 at a monthly rent of P250.00, and that although no fixed period for the duration of the lease has been agreed upon the original lessor and lessee, the rentals were paid monthly. The SC had already ruled that leases are deemed on a "month-to-month basis", if rentals therefore are paid monthly.

8. Fermin v. CA, 196 SCRA 723 a. FACTS: Spouses Fermin and spouses Alpas as lessors and lessees,

respectively, entered into a contract of lease. Before the expiration of the ten (10) year period, defendants sent plaintiffs representative a document entitled 'Lease of Real Property' already signed by them. It was never signed by plaintiffs up to this day. AGRA & Co., Inc., as collection agent of the plaintiffs collected payment from the defendants for the annual rental. Key Management Corporation in a letter informed defendants that said company was appointed attorneyin-fact. In another letter, they advised Mr. Alpas that they were unilaterally terminating the lease effective 18 April 1987. Mr. Alpas responded that the lease was renewed. However, Key Mgt. reiterated its demand for him to vacate. b. ISSUE: Whether or not the spouses Alpas can be validly ejected from the property c. HELD: No, there was an implied renewal of the lease from year to year. From the foregoing set of facts, it cannot be said that the lease agreement had been effectively renewed for another 10 years. The stipulation of the parties is clear in that such a renewal is subject to the mutual agreement of the parties. While there is no question that private respondents expressed their desire to renew the lease by another 10 years at the rate of the rental stipulated in the lease agreement, apparently petitioners would be willing to renew said lease. Obviously, there was no meeting of the minds as to the rate of the rental. As there was no agreement reached, then the term of the lease may not be considered to have been renewed for another 10 years. However, since after the expiration of the lease agreement, the private respondents continued to occupy the premises for more than 15 days with the acquiescence of petitioners, then it is understood that there is an implied new lease, not for the period of the original contract, but from year to year. Article 1670 of the Civil Code so provides for this situation.