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INDIA - SEMINAR REPORT

#251, 4 March 2008

CONCEPTS OF LEFT-WING EXTREMISM

Chair: Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Dipankar Banerjee Speaker: D M Mitra, Director, National Institute of Criminology and Forensic Science Introductory Remarks Left wing extremism is a very complex threat that poses a fundamental challenge to the security of our nation. It is crucial to understand the nature of the threat which has often been described as the number one national security issue for the nation. This question itself may be debated, but the serious nature of the challenge cannot be ignored. D M Mitra A Theoretical Perspective on Indian Insurgencies Understanding the susceptibility of the population to revolt against the state is crucial for understanding the nature of an insurgency. According to Theda Skocpol, the probability of revolution against the state is determined by three factors: the degree of penetration of national territory by the state, which depends on the reach of the administration as well as the nature and quality of governance; the incorporation of the socially mobilized groups; and the degree of bureaucratization of the state administration and its armed forces. The degree of penetration by the state determines the degree of social control exercised by the state over the population. Joel Migdal points out that unlike western society, Third World states are weak and therefore have fragmented social control dispersed among various social organizations having their own rules, rather than centralized in the state or organizations authorized by the state. The roots of this fragmented social control can be traced to the colonial past where the imperial powers preferred to rule through fragmented, indigenous

leadership and local strongmen, rather than by establishing centralized social control in place of the old system. India, with a history of democratic governance for more than 50 years, ideally should score high on all three dimensions. Indeed, India has been able to handle the many insurgencies it has faced since independence in 1947. However, India has witnessed insurgencies in various areas, where Skocpol's model does not apply to India India's propensity for insurgency can be explained by three factors: the degree of inaccessibility of an area, the strength of separate social identity of its population, and the amount of external unifying influence on it. A remote area, due to forests, rugged mountains, inhospitable terrain or extreme climate, inhibits penetration by the state into its population and provides excellent havens for insurgents. Inaccessibility of an area inhibits economic development and causes a sense of relative deprivation among the population. It further affects the relative power position of its politicians in the state's politics thereby enhancing the sense of exclusion among the population. At the same time, large scale migration from these areas is impeded by the people's attachment to their ancestral lands, thereby insulating the area from social transformation. Due to lack of the state's penetration into these inaccessible areas, the population develops a strong sense of social identity. This in turn is very helpful to the insurgents as it provides them an opportunity to attract the target population by providing higher social control. By representing their local grievances, the insurgents are able to build trust among the local social networks on which they depend for their security. At the same time, if the insurgents are not linked to the entire population, it can be their weakness. The third crucial factor is the presence of an external unifying force. Among an isolated population, even though society is fragmented along several divisive factors such as religion, ethnicity, caste or kinship, a unifying external force can play a catalytic role in unifying and aligning the segments. An external unifying force is not necessarily from across the country's political boundary. It can be any influence external to the target population. Left-wing Extremism in India A survey of the areas affected by left-wing extremism confirms that those areas are also the most inaccessible areas in India, mainly due to heavy forests. The Maoists in India have grown in areas that are highly barren and unfit for irrigation but are rich in mineral resources. These areas were also found to have a strong sense of social identity based on language, ethnicity or religion, and an acute sense of relative deprivation. The Maoists take advantage of this. As part of their strategy, they spend 10-15 years surveying a particular area, studying its forests, tribes, and culture. Thereafter, they begin to interact with the population and make them aware of their relative deprivation. They only provide the population basic economic services, enough to garner support for themselves but also leave space to instigate people against the state. They also take advantage of the fact that the people do not want to leave their land and move to the plains. They demonstrate the use of violence to the target population and exploit the fact that the people in India are equally concerned about their political rights as about their socioeconomic rights. For instance, during the Emergency, people did not like surrendering their political rights in the name of socioeconomic rights. The Maoists are presently engaging in targeted attacks, realizing their limited capacity. They are mobilizing people in their support and are preparing to launch a complete war against the Indian state. They are totally against Indian multi-party democracy and seek to overthrow the Indian Constitution. Counterinsurgency Operations The counterinsurgency debate in India revolves around the security versus the development approach and the defensive versus the offensive approach. The understanding of an affected population or an insurgency is based on remote observation. There is poor understanding of the conditions as they exist on the ground. The state's defensive grid in dealing with internal security threats is very weak and there is a tendency to use the resources that are easily accessible rather than those that are appropriate. This explains the attitude of the state in relying on the security forces for counterinsurgency operations, for that is the only tool available to the state. There is also a tendency to do more of the same. Most of the police stations are in a devastated condition, the police strength is dismal - enough only to run the police station with no personnel left for intelligence work - and the personnel are poorly equipped. It is important to strike a balance between the security and development approach for the state has no legitimacy till it provides security. While it focuses on providing security in the heavily affected areas, it should, at the same time, focus on enhancing development of the other less sensitive areas. The state must also engage in perception management and expose the strategies being used by the Maoists. For instance, through an attack on a police station - the latest being the attack in Nayagarh, Orissa in February 2008 - the Maoists intend to project themselves as more efficient than the state and thereby garner support for themselves. It is important for the state to counter such propaganda. The counter-Naxal strategy developed by Andhra Pradesh has proven to be quite successful with the number of incidents recorded in the state going down considerably. Over a period of time, it has strengthened its police force, and improved its police stations. The creation of a specialized force by the name of Greyhounds proved to be very useful. They received

specialized training in guerilla warfare, had separate command structures from the regular police/army forces and worked closely with the local population. Similar operational forces need to be set up in other states with stand-alone structures, local personnel, high incentives, and adequately equipped and trained for jungle warfare. It is also important to factor in the fatigue factor, and therefore, the deployment of the forces should be need based and keep rotating. Given the federal structure of the Indian Constitution, where law and order falls under the jurisdiction of the Indian states, close coordination between the center and the state needs to be developed. The center should restrict itself to planning and determining the counter-Naxal policy, and the implementation should be left to the states entirely. DISCUSSION Comments Why is there reluctance on the part of the MHA to plan centrally? What is the prognosis on the Naxal threat? Where will it stand in the next 4-5 years? There is a contradiction in the Indian system - we continue to protect Naxalism under the garb of socioeconomic deprivation despite so many people getting killed. There needs to be a change in mindset. While there is great emphasis on providing security before development, inaccessibility of an area makes any development very difficult. For instance, in an area like Abhujmarh in the Dantewada district of Chhattisgarh, a lot of money is being sanctioned for development but yet no work is being undertaken there. How can these areas be opened up? Apart from improving security and development, strengthening political activity at the grassroots level is equally important to challenge the spread of Maoist ideology. In order to deal with any insurgency, be it separatist or Maoist or religious, central planning and management is extremely crucial despite law and order being a state subject. The center has to provide all the resources including troops, equipment and intelligence and must work in close coordination with the states. Why is the Naxal problem not referred to as terrorism when as an ideology, it stands out as equally destructive as the Taliban. If it were to be treated as terrorism, would that make central planning easier? What impact does the Maoist revolution in Nepal have on India?

The government is laying too much emphasis on the law and order aspect including augmenting police forces, modernization of police stations and so on. On human development issues including education, crime against the Scheduled Castes and Tribes, and healthcare, governments are simply not paying due attention. Are there lessons that can be drawn from the Israeli or British models of counterinsurgency? What are the ways of improving intelligence gathering by the state? What kind of technology apart from air power can be used for counterinsurgency? Responses The center has initiated several steps as part of its counter-Naxal strategy. These include police modernization schemes, security-related expenditure schemes, and funds for the development of remote areas. However, the center cannot go beyond a point, for the initiative must come from the states. In laying down strategies, the center at times faces a real dilemma. For instance, police stations were set up as public service centers; it is important for them to be people friendly and accessible. However, due to recent attacks on police stations, the center has suggested fortification of police stations, enclosing the area thereby. This is likely to have a psychological impact on the population. The center can only assist the state's efforts. The states are not receptive to a greater role of the center. For instance, in the last chief ministers meeting on internal security, the proposal of a central command especially on the border areas was ruled out by most of the states. The center has asked all states to submit their counter-Naxal plan and strategy. The center

however needs to take a uniform stance towards tackling violence. The Naxal threat is definitely expanding and is likely to grow further in states like Jharkhand, Bihar and West Bengal. However, with attacks like at Rani Bodli in Chhattisgarh and Nayagarh in Orissa, the governments too have become more proactive in their counter-Naxal efforts and are likely to step up action. Empowered task forces can play a crucial role in opening up the areas under Naxal control and facilitate development. A comprehensive force consisting of construction forces, electric and hydro-electric engineers and armed battalions have to move kilometre by kilometre together and take control of the land. Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand have adopted this approach but will take time to show results. Notwithstanding the fact that terrorism has several definitions, Naxalism cannot be referred to as terrorism. Terrorism is the use of terror to target civilian non-combatants for the purpose of creating terror. The Maoists in India are following a revolutionary strategy and have not targeted civilians. The human development issues are undoubtedly very important. The government is employing security measures only as a tool to provide immediate care. Since every insurgency functions in its unique set of conditions, the Andhra Pradesh model of counterinsurgency is most suited to India rather than the Israeli or the British models. Even for developing intelligence, the Andhra model is most suitable as it encompasses strengthening the local police force and close coordination among the security agencies in the state. The creation of Greyhound, however, was indeed based on the Israel model and it has proved to be very useful. As far as technology is concerned, it has limited role in the environment in which the Indian insurgencies are raging. However, it is definitely useful for mobilization of resources for troops and their movement. Better systems of tracking the insurgents can also be used. Concluding Remarks The Naxal problem has emerged as a serious internal security challenge for India. India recognizes the threat but is yet to implement effective counterinsurgency tools and measures. It needs to engage in a serious study of the nuances of leftwing extremism spreading across the length and breadth of the country and develop its own expertise in facing the challenge.

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