NORJANNAH D.

PACATUA ELECTION LAWS CASE DIGEST / SATURDAY 11:00-12:00 noon

1.) DOMINO VS COMELEC FACTS: DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his certificate of candidacy. On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had not yet become final and executory. The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani. On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Domino prayed: for Petition for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not meet the one-year residence requirement. The candidate who gathered the second highest number of votes intervened in the case and said that she should be declared as a winner since Domino was disqualified from running for the position.

ISSUES: a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the whole world, including the Commission on Elections. b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner. HELD: a. The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained. The Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the transfer of his voters. It is not within the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precinct in which he is registered, specifying the ground of the voters disqualification. b. No. He did not meet the residency requirement.

A persons domicile once established is considered to continue and will not be deemed lost until a new one is established. To successfully effect a change of domicile one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi. The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual. The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINOs intention to reside in Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of ones original domicile (Ilocos Sur to Quezon City). While, Dominos intention to establish residence in Sarangani can be gleaned from the fact that be bought the house he was renting on November 4, 1997, that he sought cancellation of his previous registration in Quezon City on 22 October 1997, and that he applied for transfer of registration from Quezon City to Sarangani by reason of change of residence on 30 August 1997, DOMINO still falls short of the one year residency requirement under the Constitution.. c. DOMINOs contention that the COMELEC has no jurisdiction in the present petition is bereft (lacking) of merit. The COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.

Considering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the House of Representative. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate. It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election, the peoples choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place. It would be extremely repugnant to the basic concept of the constitutionally guaranteed right to suffrage if a candidate who has not acquired the majority or plurality of votes is proclaimed a winner and imposed as the representative of a constituency, the majority of which have positively declared through their ballots that they do not choose him. The petition of Domino is denied. The resolution of the COMELEC en banc is affirmed.

2.) JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR., et. al. vs COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MANUEL A. ROXAS II, FRANKLIN M. DRILON and J.R. NEREUS O. ACOSTA FACTS: On July 5, 2005 respondent Franklin M. Drilon (Drilon), as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his partys withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr. (Atienza), LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilons move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party. On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference, but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LPs ruling body vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president. Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to nullify the elections claiming that it was illegal considering that the partys electing bodies, the National Executive Council (NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened. Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007. Petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LPs NECO and NAPOLCO attended the March 2, 2006 assembly. On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution, partially granting respondent Drilons petition. It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC supervision. It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution. But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilons term may be deemed to have ended. Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected. Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilons petition and denying that of petitioner Atienza. The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had

been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent Drilons term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007. Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilons term expired. Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president. ISSUE: Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party. HELD: The COMELECs jurisdiction over intra-party disputes is limited. It does not have blanket authority to resolve any and all controversies involving political parties. Political parties are generally free to conduct their activities without interference from the state. The COMELEC may intervene in disputes internal to a party only when necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions. The validity of respondent Roxas election as LP president is a leadership issue that the COMELEC had to settle. Under the amended LP Constitution, the LP president is the issuing authority for certificates of nomination of party candidates for all national elective positions. It is also the LP president who can authorize other LP officers to issue certificates of nomination for candidates to local elective posts. In simple terms, it is the LP president who certifies the official standard bearer of the party. To conclude, the COMELEC did not gravely abuse its discretion when it upheld Roxas election as LP president but refused to rule on the validity of Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the party. While the question of party leadership has implications on the COMELECs performance of its functions under Section 2, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the same cannot be said of the issue pertaining to Atienza, et al.s expulsion from the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot intervene, given the limited scope of its power over political parties. WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the

petition and UPHOLDS the Resolution of the Commission on Elections dated June 18, 2009 in COMELEC Case SPP 08-001.

3.) ALDOVINO VS COMELEC FACTS: The present petition seeks to annul and set aside this COMELEC ruling for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) ruled that preventive suspension is an effective interruption because it renders the suspended public official unable to provide complete service for the full term; thus, such term should not be counted for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. Wilfredo F. Asilo (Asilo) was elected councilor of Lucena City for three consecutive terms: for the 1998-2001, 2001-2004, and 2004-2007 terms, respectively. In September 2005 or during his 2004-2007 term of office, the Sandiganbayan preventively suspended him for 90 days in relation with a criminal case he then faced. This Court, however, subsequently lifted the Sandiganbayans suspension order; hence, he resumed performing the functions of his office and finished his term. In the 2007 election, Asilo filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. The petitioners Simon B. Aldovino, Jr., Danilo B. Faller, and Ferdinand N. Talabong (the petitioners) sought to deny due course to Asilos certificate of candidacy or to cancel it on the ground that he had been elected and had served for three terms; his candidacy for a fourth term therefore violated the three-term limit rule under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution and Section 43(b) of RA 7160. The COMELECs Second Division ruled against the petitioners and in Asilos favor in its Resolution of November 28, 2007. It reasoned out that the three-term limit rule did not apply, as Asilo failed to render complete service for the 2004-2007 term because of the suspension the Sandiganbayan had ordered.

ISSUE: Whether or not preventive suspension of an elected local official is an interruption of the three-term limit rule; and Whether or not preventive suspension is considered involuntary renunciation as contemplated in Section 43(b) of RA 7160. HELD: NEGATIVE. Petition is meritorious. As worded, the constitutional provision fixes the term of a local elective office and limits an elective officials stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms. This is the first branch of the rule embodied in Section 8, Article X. Significantly, this provision refers to a "term" as a period of time three years during which an official has title to office and can serve. The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office., preventive suspension is not a qualified interruption. In Lonzanida v. Commission on Elections presented the question of whether the disqualification on the basis of the three-term limit applies if the election of the public official (to be strictly accurate, the proclamation as winner of the public official) for his supposedly third term had been declared invalid in a final and executory judgment. We ruled that the two requisites for the application of the disqualification (viz., 1. that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local government post; and 2. that he has fully served three consecutive terms). The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term. "Interruption" of a term exempting an elective official from the three-term limit rule is one that involves no less than the involuntary loss of title to office. The elective official must have involuntarily left his office for a length of time, however short, for an effective

interruption to occur. This has to be the case if the thrust of Section 8, Article X and its strict intent are to be faithfully served, i.e., to limit an elective officials continuous stay in office to no more than three consecutive terms, using "voluntary renunciation" as an example and standard of what does not constitute an interruption. Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no vacancy exists. 4.) NICOLAS-LEWIS VS COMELEC, GR no. 162759 August 4, 2006 FACTS: Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others. Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter only to be advised by the Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003, they have yet no right to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections. Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling in Macalintal vs. COMELEC on the residency requirement, the COMELEC wrote in response:Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee Voters,

petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for certiorari and mandamus. A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the COMELEC filed a Comment, therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation (in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that "all qualified overseas Filipinos, including dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so" , observing, however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot and academic. The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing "duals" to participate and vote as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved. ISSUE: whether or not petitioners and others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189. HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.

5.) BANAT v COMELEC G.R. No. 179271 April 21, 2009 FACTS: On 27 June 2002, BANAT filed a Petition to Proclaim the Full Number of PartyList Representatives Provided by the Constitution, docketed as NBC No. 07-041 (PL) before the NBC. BANAT filed its petition because "the Chairman and the Members of the COMELEC have recently been quoted in the national papers that the COMELEC is duty bound to and shall implement the Veterans ruling, that is, would apply the Panganiban formula in allocating party-list seats." BANAT filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus assailing the ruling in NBC Resolution No. 07-88. BANAT did not file a motion for reconsideration of NBC Resolution No. 07-88. On 9 July 2007, Bayan Muna, Abono, and A Teacher asked the COMELEC, acting as NBC, to reconsider its decision to use the Veterans formula as stated in its NBC Resolution No. 07-60 because the Veterans formula is violative of the Constitution and of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. No. 7941). On the same day, the COMELEC denied reconsideration during the proceedings of the NBC. ISSUES: Considering the allegations in the petitions and the comments of the parties in these cases, we defined the following issues in our advisory for the oral arguments set on 22 April 2008: 1. Is the twenty percent allocation for party-list representatives in Section 5(2), Article VI of the Constitution mandatory or merely a ceiling? 2. Is the three-seat limit in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 constitutional? 3. Is the two percent threshold prescribed in Section 11(b) of RA 7941 to qualify for one seat constitutional? 4. How shall the party-list representative seats be allocated?

5. Does the Constitution prohibit the major political parties from participating in the party-list elections? If not, can the major political parties be barred from participating in the party-list elections? HELD: In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not limit our allocation of additional seats to the two-percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a partys share in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining 38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified party-list candidate is entitled.

Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the major political parties to participate in party-list elections through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list system to the sectoral groups. In defining a "party" that participates in party-list elections as either "a political party or a sectoral party," R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major political parties will participate in the party-list elections. Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional Commission, and

R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of major political parties from the party-list elections in patent violation of the Constitution and the law.

The Court today effectively reversed the ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani v. COMELEC with regard to the computation of seat allotments and the participation of major political parties in the party-list system. I vote for the formula propounded by the majority as it benefits the party-list system but I regret that my interpretation of Article VI, Section 5 of the Constitution with respect to the participation of the major political parties in the election of party-list representatives is not in direct congruence with theirs, hence, There is no gainsaying the fact that the party-list parties are no match to our traditional political parties in the political arena. This is borne out in the party-list elections held in 2001 where major political parties were initially allowed to campaign and be voted for. The results confirmed the fear expressed by some commissioners in the Constitutional Commission that major political parties would figure in the disproportionate distribution of votes: of the 162 parties which participated, the seven major political parties made it to the top 50. These seven parties garnered an accumulated 9.54% of the total number of votes counted, yielding an average of 1.36% each, while the remaining 155 parties (including those whose qualifications were contested) only obtained 90.45% or an average of 0.58% each. Of these seven, three parties or 42.8% of the total number of the major parties garnered more than 2% of the total number of votes each, a feat that would have entitled them to seat their members as party-list representatives. In contrast, only about 4% of the total number of the remaining parties, or only 8 out of the 155 parties garnered more than 2%. In sum, the evils that faced our marginalized and underrepresented people at the time of the framing of the 1987 Constitution still haunt them today. It is through the party-list system that the Constitution sought to address this systemic dilemma. In ratifying the Constitution, our people recognized how the interests of our poor and powerless sectoral groups can be frustrated by the traditional political parties who have the machinery and chicanery to dominate our political institutions. If we allow

major political parties to participate in the party-list system electoral process, we will surely suffocate the voice of the marginalized, frustrate their sovereignty and betray the democratic spirit of the Constitution. That opinion will serve as the graveyard of the party-list system. Lest I be misunderstood, I do not advocate doing away completely with a threshold vote requirement. The need for such a minimum vote requirement was explained in careful and elaborate detail by Chief Justice Puno in his separate concurring opinion in Veterans Federation Party. I fully agree with him that a minimum vote requirement is needed 1. to avoid a situation where the candidate will just use the party-list system as a fallback position; 2. to discourage nuisance candidates or parties, who are not ready and whose chances are very low, from participating in the elections; 3. to avoid the reserve seat system by opening up the system;

4. to encourage the marginalized sectors to organize, work hard, and earn their seats within the system; 5. to enable sectoral representatives to rise to the same majesty as that of the elected representatives in the legislative body, rather than owing to some degree their seats in the legislative body either to an outright constitutional gift or to an appointment by the President of the Philippines; 6. if no threshold is imposed, this will actually proliferate political party groups and those who have not really been given by the people sufficient basis for them to represent their constituents and, in turn, they will be able to get to the Parliament through the backdoor under the name of the party-list system; and

7. to ensure that only those with a more or less substantial following can be represented. However, with the burgeoning of the population, the steady increase in the party-list seat allotment as it keeps pace with the creation of additional legislative districts, and the foreseeable growth of party-list groups, the fixed 2% vote requirement is no longer viable. It does not adequately respond to the inevitable changes that come with time; and it is, in fact, inconsistent with the Constitution, because it prevents the fundamental law from ever being fully operative. It is correct to say, and I completely agree with Veterans Federation Party, that Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution, is not mandatory, that it merely provides a ceiling for the number of party-list seats in Congress. But when the enabling law, R.A. 7941, enacted by Congress for the precise purpose of implementing the constitutional provision, contains a condition that places the constitutional ceiling completely beyond reach, totally impossible of realization, then we must strike down the offending condition as an affront to the fundamental law. This is not simply an inquiry into the wisdom of the legislative measure; rather it involves the duty of this Court to ensure that constitutional provisions remain effective at all times. No rule of statutory construction can save a particular legislative enactment that renders a constitutional provision inoperative and ineffectual.

6.) G.R. No. 147589

June 26, 2001

ANG BAGONG BAYANI vs. Comelec / G.R. No. 147613 June 26, 2001 FACTS: Petitioners challenged the Comelecs Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, which approved the participation of 154 organizations and parties, including those herein impleaded, in the 2001 party-list elections. Petitioners sought the disqualification of private respondents, arguing mainly that the party-list system was intended to benefit the

marginalized and underrepresented; not the mainstream political parties, the nonmarginalized or overrepresented. Unsatisfied with the pace by which Comelec acted on their petition, petitioners elevated the issue to the Supreme Court. ISSUES: 1. 2. 3. Whether or not petitioners recourse to the Court was proper. Whether or not political parties may participate in the party list elections. Whether or not the Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in

promulgating Omnibus Resolution No. 3785. HELD: 1. The Court may take cognizance of an issue notwithstanding the availability of other remedies "where the issue raised is one purely of law, where public interest is involved, and in case of urgency." The facts attendant to the case rendered it justiciable. 2. Political parties even the major ones -- may participate in the party-list elections subject to the requirements laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941, which is the statutory law pertinent to the Party List System. Under the Constitution and RA 7941, private respondents cannot be disqualified from the party-list elections, merely on the ground that they are political parties. Section 5, Article VI of the Constitution provides that members of the House of Representatives may "be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations . It is however, incumbent upon the Comelec to determine proportional representation of the marginalized and underrepresented, the criteria for participation, in relation to the cause of the party list applicants so as to avoid desecration of the noble purpose of the party-list system.

3.

The Court acknowledged that to determine the propriety of the inclusion of

respondents in the Omnibus Resolution No. 3785, a study of the factual allegations was necessary which was beyond the pale of the Court. The Court not being a trier of facts. However, seeing that the Comelec failed to appreciate fully the clear policy of the law and the Constitution, the Court decided to set some guidelines culled from the law and the Constitution, to assist the Comelec in its work. The Court ordered that the petition be remanded in the Comelec to determine compliance by the party lists. 7.) JOSE B. AZNAR, petitioner,vs.COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EMILIO MARIO RENNER OSMEA, FACTS: On November 19, 1987, private respondent Emilio "Lito" Osmea filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC for the position of Provincial Governor of Cebu Province in the January 18, 1988 local elections.2) On January 22, 1988, petitioner Jose B. Aznar in his capacity as its incumbent Provincial Chairman filed with theCOMELEC a petition for the disqualification of private respondent on the ground that he is allegedly not a Filipinocitizen, being a citizen of the United States of America. 3) On January 27, 1988, petitioner filed a Formal Manifestation submitting a Certificate issued by the thenImmigration and Deportation Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago certifying that private respondent is anAmerican and is a holder of Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR) No. B-21448 and Immigrant Certificate of Residence (ICR) No. 133911, issued at Manila on March 27 and 28, 1958, respectively. (Annex "B -1").4)

During the hearing at the COMELEC Private respondent, maintained that he is a Filipino citizen, alleging: that he is the legitimate child of Dr. Emilio D. Osmea, a Filipino and son of the late President Sergio Osmea, Sr.; that heis a holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine Passport No. 0855103 issued on March 25, 1987; that he has beencontinuously residing in the Philippines since birth and has not gone out of the country for more than six months;and that he has been a registered voter in the Philippines since 19 65.5) Thereafter, on June 11, 1988, COMELEC (First Division) dismissed the petition for disqualification for not havingbeen timely filed and for lack of sufficient proof that private respondent is not a Filipino citizen. Hence, thepetition for Certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Osmena is no longer a Filipino citizen by acquiring dual-citizenship? HELD: Supreme Court dismissed petition for certiorari upholding

COMELEC s decision. The petitioner failed to present direct proof that private respondent had lost his Filipino citizenship by any of the modes provided for under C.A. No. 63. these are: (1) by naturalization in a foreign country; (2) by express renunciation of citizenship; and (3) by subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. From the evidence, it is clear that private respondent Osmea did not lose his Philippine citizenship by any of the three mentioned hereinabove or by any other mode of losing Philippine citizenship.In the instant case, private respondent vehemently denies having taken the oath of allegiance of the United States. He is holder of a valid and subsisting Philippine passport and has continuously participated in the electoral process in this country since 1963 up to

the present, both as a voter and as a candidate. Thus, private respondent remains a Filipino andthe loss of his Philippine citizenship cannot be presumed. Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American, the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino. In the case of Osmea, the Certification that he is an American does not mean that he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or citizenships. Indeed, th ereis no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship; truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When we consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be "express", it stands toreason that there can be no such loss of Philippine 'citizenship when there is no renunciation either "'express" or "implied".

8.) TABASA vs. CA G.R. No. 125793 FACTS: Joevanie Arellano Tabasa was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. In 1968, when petitioner was seven years old (minor), his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, became a naturalized citizen1 of the United States. By derivative petitioner also acquired American citizenship. On August 3, 1995 Petitioner arrived in the Philippines, and was admitted as a balikbayan for one year. After that petitioner was arrested and detained by agent Wilson Soluren of the BID on May 23, 1996, pursuant to BID Mission Order No. LIV-96-72 in Baybay, Malay, Aklan. Subsequently, he was brought to the BID Detention Center in Manila. Petitioner was investigated by Special Prosecutor Atty. Edy D. Donato at the Law and Investigation Division of the BID on May 28, 1996. On the same day, Tabasa was accused of violating Section 8, Chapter 3, Title 1, Book 3 of the 1987 Administrative Code, in a charge sheet which alleged: 1. That on 3 August 1995, Tabasa arrived in the Philippines and was admitted as a balikbayan; 2. That in a letter dated 16 April 1996, Honorable Kevin Herbert, Consul General

of U.S. Embassy, informed the Bureau that respondents Passport had been revoked by the U.S. Department of State; 3. Hence, Tabasa is now an undocumented and undesirable alien and may be

summarily deported pursuant to Law and Intelligence Instructions No. 53 issued by then Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago to effect his deportation. On May 29, 1996 - BID ordered petitioners deportation to his country of origin, the United States. US Consul filed a request with the Bureau to apprehend and deport

the Tabasa on the ground that a standing warrant for several federal charges has been issued against him, and that the Tabasas passport has been revoked. Petitioner filed before the CA a Petition for Habeas Corpus with Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order Tabasa alleged that he was not afforded due process; that no warrant of arrest for deportation may be issued by immigration authorities before a final order of deportation is made; that no notice of the cancellation of his passport was made by the U.S. Embassy; that he is entitled to admission or to a change of his immigration status as a non-quota immigrant because he is married to a Filipino citizen as provided in Section 13, paragraph (a) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940; and that he was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines prior to his derivative naturalization when he was seven years old due to the naturalization of his father, Rodolfo Tabasa, in 1968. At the time Tabasa filed said petition, he was already 35 years old. On May 30, 1996, the CA ordered the respondent Bureau to produce the person of the petitioner on June 3, 1996 and show the cause of petitioners detention, and restrained the Bureau from summarily deporting him. On June 3, 1996, the BID presented Tabasa before the CA. On June 6, 1996, the CA granted both parties ten (10) days within which to file their memoranda, after which the case would be considered submitted for decision. Meanwhile, the Commissioner of Immigration granted the petitioners temporary release on bail on a PhP 20,000.00 cash bond. On June 13, 1996, petitioner filed a Supplemental Petition alleging that he had acquired Filipino citizenship by repatriation in accordance with RA 8171, and that because he is now a Filipino citizen, he cannot be deported or detained by the respondent Bureau. On August 7, 1996 Decision, denied Tabasas petition on the ground that he had not legally and successfully acquiredby repatriationhis Filipino citizenship as provided in RA 8171. The court said that although he became an American citizen by derivative naturalization when his father was naturalized in 1968, there is no evidence to show that he lost his Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, as explicitly provided in Section 1, RA 8171the law governing the repatriation of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their citizenship. The affidavit

does not state that political or economic necessity was the compelling reason for petitioners parents to give up their Filipino citizenship in 1968. CA concluded that his only reason to want to reacquire Filipino citizenship is to avoid criminal prosecution in the United States of America. The court ruled against Tabasa, whose petition is now before us. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner has validly reacquired Philippine citizenship under RA 8171. HELD: RA 8171, An Act Providing for the Repatriation of Filipino Women Who Have Lost Their Philippine Citizenship by Marriage to Aliens and of Natural-Born Filipinos, was enacted on October 23, 1995. Petitioner theorizes that he could be repatriated under RA 8171 because he is a child of a natural-born Filipino, and that he lost his Philippine citizenship by derivative naturalization when he was still a minor. Petitioner overlooks the fact that the privilege of repatriation under RA 8171 is available only to natural-born Filipinos who lost their citizenship on account of political or economic necessity, and to the minor children of said natural-born Filipinos. This means that if a parent who had renounced his Philippine citizenship due to political or economic reasons later decides to repatriate under RA 8171, his repatriation will also benefit his minor children according to the law. This includes a situation where a former Filipino subsequently had children while he was a naturalized citizen of a foreign country. The repatriation of the former Filipino will allow him to recover his natural-born citizenship and automatically vest Philippine citizenship on his children of jus sanguinis or blood relationship. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, however, the children must be of minor age at the time the petition for repatriation is filed by the parent.

He has to file his petition for repatriation with the Special Committee on Naturalization (SCN), which was designated to process petitions for repatriation pursuant to Administrative Order No. 285 (A.O. No. 285) Applicants for repatriation are required to submit documents in support of their petition such as their birth certificate and other evidence proving their claim to Filipino citizenship.These requirements were imposed to enable the SCN to verify the qualifications of the applicant particularly in light of the reasons for the renunciation of Philippine citizenship. What petitioner simply did was that he took his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; then, executed an affidavit of repatriation, which he registered, together with the certificate of live birth, with the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. The said office subsequently issued him a certificate of such registration. At that time, the SCN was already in place and operational by virtue of the June 8, 1995 Memorandum issued by President Fidel V. Ramos. Although A.O. No. 285 designating the SCN to process petitions filed pursuant to RA 8171 was issued only on August 22, 1996, it is merely a confirmatory issuance according to the Court in Angat v. Republic. Thus, petitioner should have instead filed a petition for repatriation before the SCN. Repatriation is not a matter of right, but it is a privilege granted by the State. This is mandated by the 1987 Constitution under Section 3, Article IV, which provides that citizenship may be lost or reacquired in the manner provided by law. The State has the power to prescribe by law the qualifications, procedure, and requirements for repatriation. It has the power to determine if an applicant for repatriation meets the requirements of the law for it is an inherent power of the State to choose who will be its citizens, and who can reacquire citizenship once it is lost. If the applicant, like petitioner Tabasa, fails to comply with said requirements, the State is justified in rejecting the petition for repatriation.

9.) CO vs. HRET FACTS: The HRET declared that respondent Jose Ong, Jr. is a natural born Filipino citizen and a resident of Laoang, Northern Samar for voting purposes. The congressional election for the second district of Northern Samar was held. Among the candidates who vied for the position of representative in the second legislative district are the petitioners, Sixto Balinquit and Antonio Co and the private respondent, Jose Ong, Jr. Respondent Ong was proclaimed the duly elected representative of the second district of Northern Samar. The petitioners filed election protests on the grounds that Jose Ong, Jr. is not a natural born citizen of the Philippines and not a resident of the second district of Northern Samar. ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Ong, Jr. is a citizen of the Philippines. HELD: Yes. In the year 1895, the private respondents grandfather, Ong Te, arrived in the Philippines from China and established his residence in the municipality of Laoang, Samar. The father of the private respondent, Jose Ong Chuan was born in China in 1905 but was brought by Ong Te to Samar in the year 1915, he filed with the court an application for naturalization and was declared a Filipino citizen. In 1984, the private respondent married a Filipina named Desiree Lim. For the elections of 1984 and 1986, Jose Ong, Jr. registered himself as a voter of Laoang, Samar, and voted there during those elections. Under the 1973 Constitution, those born of Filipino fathers and those born of Filipino mothers with an alien father were placed on equal footing. They were both

considered as natural born citizens. Besides, private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in the Philippines.On the issue of residence, it is not required that a person should have a house in order to establish his residence and domicile. It is enough that he should live in the municipality or in a rented house or in that of a friend or relative. To require him to own property in order to be eligible to run for Congress would be tantamount to a property qualification. The Constitution only requires that the candidate meet the age, citizenship, voting and residence requirements. 10.) Jacot vs. Dal GR NO. 179848 FACTS: Petitioner Nestor Jacot assails the Resolution of COMELEC disqualifying him from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, in the 14 May 2007 National and Local Elections, on the ground that he failed to make a personal renouncement of US citizenship. He was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. He sought to reacquire ISSUE: Did Nestor Jacot effectively renounce his US citizenship so as to qualify him to run as a vice-mayor? HELD: No. It bears to emphasize that the oath of allegiance is a general requirement for all those who wish to run as candidates in Philippine elections; while the renunciation of foreign citizenship is an additional requisite only for those who have retained or reacquired Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 and who seek his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225.

elective public posts, considering their special circumstance of having more than one citizenship. 11.) AKLAT-ASOSASYON PARA SA KAUNLARAN NG LIPUNAN AT ADHIKAIN PARA SA TAO, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC), FACTS : On November 20, 2003, Aklat filed a Petition for declaration of re-qualification as a party-list organization for purposes of the May 2004 elections. It alleged in its petition that it participated in the 2001 elections but was disqualified by the Comelec as it was found not to have complied with the guidelines set by the Court in the case of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Comelec(Bagong Bayani case)[6] for party-list organizations to qualify and participate as such in the party-list elections. Accordingly, Aklat re-organized itself in order that it will comply with the 8-point guidelines enunciated by the Supreme Court[7] in the said case. The Comelec dismissed the petition stating that Aklat cannot be considered as an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented groups as identified under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 7941 (R.A. 7941). Further, the Comelec held that AKLAT lumped all the sectoral groups imaginable under the classification of regular members just to convince us that it is now cured of its defect. Aklat filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The Comelec denied the motion in its questioned Resolution dated February 13, 2004, on three grounds, namely: the petition was filed beyond the deadline set by the Comelec in Resolution No. 6320 for registration of party-list organizations; the petition was not one for re-qualification as Aklat was never a registered party-list organization having failed to meet the eightpoint guidelines set by the Court in the Bagong Bayani case; and that its decision not to extend the deadline for registration of party-list organizations is valid, the Comelec being in the best position to make such a determination.

In the instant Petition, Aklat asserts that under Section 5 of R.A. 7941, petitions for registration as a party-list organization may be filed not later than ninety (90) days before the elections. It therefore had until February 10, 2004, the ninetieth (90th) day before the elections on May 10, 2004, within which to file its petition. Hence, its petition, which was filed on November 20, 2003, was filed within the allowed period. Section 5 of Resolution No. 6320[12] which requires the filing of such petitions not later than September 30, 2003, is null and void as it amends R.A. 7941. It further maintains that it has complied with the eight-point guidelines set in the Bagong Bayani case. Allegedly, Aklat has a total membership of over 4,000 persons who belong to the marginalized and underrepresented groups. It has established information and coordination centers throughout the country for the benefit and in representation of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory workers including fisherfolk and the youth. Aklat also asserts that it is different from Asosasyon Para sa Kaunlaran ng Industria ng Aklat (A.K.L.A.T.) which was previously de-registered by the Comelec. ISSUE: Whether or not the Comelec gravely abused its discretion when it denied its petition for re-qualification. HELD: The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated that the Comelec did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Resolutions. According to the OSG, Resolution No. 6320 is not in conflict with and is, in fact, germane to the purpose of R.A. 7941. It was within the scope of the authority granted to the Comelec that it issued Resolution No. 6320 setting the deadline for filing petitions for registration under the party-list system on September 30, 2003. In line with the purpose of R.A. 7941 to enable marginalized sectors to actively participate in

legislation, the Comelec must be given sufficient time to evaluate all petitions for registration, at the same time allowing oppositions to be filed to the end that only those truly qualified may be accredited under the party-list system. Besides, Republic Act No. 8436[13] allows the Comelec to change the periods and dates prescribed by law for certain pre-election acts to ensure their accomplishment. The OSG further maintains that the petition for re-qualification failed to comply with the provisions of Resolution No. 6320. According to the OSG, the petition was not properly verified there being no showing that Mr. Dominador Buhain, the signatory of the verification and certification of non-forum shopping, was duly authorized by Aklat to verify or cause the preparation and filing of the petition on its behalf. Moreover, Aklat was registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission only on October 20, 2003, a month before it filed its petition for re-qualification. Hence, it has not existed for a period of at least one (1) year prior to the filing of the petition as required by Section 6 of Resolution No. 6320. The OSG also points out that Aklat failed to support its petition with the documents required under Section 7 of Resolution No. 6320, namely: a list of its officers and members particularly showing that the majority of its membership belongs to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors it seeks to represent, and a track record or summary showing that it represents and seeks to uplift the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. Moreover, the OSG notes that the incorporators and directors of Aklat are invariably known as pillars of the book publishing industry or authors. Hence, even as re-organized, Aklat remains to be an association of authors, book publishers, and publishing companies, rather than the organization of indigenous cultural communities, farm and factory workers, fisherfolk and youth it claims to be. For its part, the Comelec filed a Comment dated March 29, 2004, stating that the period of ninety (90) days prescribed in R.A. 7941 refers to the prohibitive period beyond which petitions for registration may no longer be filed. Furthermore, the documents submitted by Aklat do not prove that its members belong to the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society.

Aklats contention that Resolution No. 6320 is null and void as it amends and amplifies R.A. 7941 deserves scant consideration. R.A. 7941 provides: Sec. 5. Registration Neither is there grave abuse of discretion in the Comelecs denial of Aklats petition on the ground that it failed to substantiate its claim that it represents the marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society. It should be noted that it was Aklat which asserted in its petition before the poll body that it has re-organized and is now applying for re-qualification after its de-registration for failure to comply with the guidelines set forth in the Bagong Bayani case. Thus, the Comelec cannot be faulted for relying on its earlier finding, absent any evidence in Aklats petition to the contrary, that Aklat is not an organization representing the marginalized and underrepresented sectors, but is actually a business interest or economic lobby group which seeks the promotion and protection of the book publishing industry. Significantly, Aklat and A.K.L.A.T. have substantially the same incorporators. In fact, four (4) of Aklats six (6) incorporators[14] are also incorporators of A.K.L.A.T.[15] This substantial similarity is hard to ignore and bolsters the conclusion that the supposed re-organization undertaken by Aklat is plain window-dressing as it has not really changed its character as a business interest of persons in the book publishing industry. The Court observes that Aklats articles of incorporation and document entitled The Facts About Aklat which were attached to its petition for re-qualification contain general averments that it supposedly represents marginalized groups such as the youth, indigenous communities, urban poor and farmers/fisherfolk. These general statements do not measure up to the first guideline set by the Bagong Bayani case for screening party-list participants, i.e., that the political party, sector, organization or coalition must represent the marginalized and underrepresented groups identified in Section 5 of R.A. 7941. In other words, it must showthrough its constitution, articles of incorporation, bylaws, history, platform of government and track record that it represents and seeks to uplift marginalized and underrepresented sectors.

12.) Tecson vs. Commission on Elections / GR 151434, 3 March 2004 Facts: On 31 December 2003, Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr. (FPJ), filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of President of the Republic of the Philippines under the Koalisyon ng Nagkakaisang Pilipino (KNP) Party, in the 2004 national elections. In his certificate of candidacy, FPJ, representing himself to be a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, stated his name to be "Fernando Jr.," or "Ronald Allan" Poe, his date of birth to be 20 August 1939 and his place of birth to be Manila. Victorino X. Fornier, (GR 161824) initiated, on 9 January 2004, a petition (SPA 04-003) before the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to disqualify FPJ and to deny due course or to cancel his certificate of candidacy upon the thesis that FPJ made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy by claiming to be a natural-born Filipino citizen when in truth, according to Fornier, his parents were foreigners; his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American, and his father, Allan Poe, was a Spanish national, being the son of Lorenzo Pou, a Spanish subject. Granting, Fornier asseverated, that Allan F. Poe was a Filipino citizen, he could not have transmitted his Filipino citizenship to FPJ, the latter being an illegitimate child of an alien mother. Fornier based the allegation of the illegitimate birth of FPJ on two assertions: (1) Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage to Bessie Kelley and, (2) even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year after the birth of FPJ. On 23 January 2004, the COMELEC dismissed SPA 04-003 for lack of merit. 3 days later, or on 26 January 2004, Fornier filed his motion for reconsideration. The motion was denied on 6 February 2004 by the COMELEC en banc. On 10 February 2004, Fornier assailed the decision of the COMELEC before the Supreme Court conformably with Rule 64, in relation to Rule 65, of the Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition likewise prayed for a temporary restraining order, a writ of preliminary injunction or any other resolution that would stay the finality and/or execution of the COMELEC resolutions. The other petitions, later consolidated with GR 161824, would include GR 161434 and GR 161634, both challenging the jurisdiction of the COMELEC and

asserting that, under Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution, only the Supreme Court had original and exclusive jurisdiction to resolve the basic issue on the case. Issue: Whether FPJ was a natural born citizen, so as to be allowed to run for the offcie of the President of the Philippines. Held: Section 2, Article VII, of the 1987 Constitution expresses that "No person may be elected President unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, a registered voter, able to read and write, at least forty years of age on the day of the election, and a resident of the Philippines for at least ten years immediately preceding such election." The term "natural-born citizens," is defined to include "those who are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine citizenship." Herein, the date, month and year of birth of FPJ appeared to be 20 August 1939 during the regime of the 1935 Constitution. Through its history, four modes of acquiring citizenship - naturalization, jus soli, res judicata and jus sanguinis had been in vogue. Only two, i.e., jus soli and jus sanguinis, could qualify a person to being a natural -born citizen of the Philippines. Jus soli, per Roa vs. Collector of Customs (1912), did not last long. With the adoption of the 1935 Constitution and the reversal of Roa in Tan Chong vs. Secretary of Labor (1947), jus sanguinis or blood relationship would now become the primary basis of citizenship by birth. Considering the reservations made by the parties on the veracity of some of the entries on the birth certificate of FPJ and the marriage certificate of his parents, the only conclusions that could be drawn with some degree of certainty from the documents would be that (1) The parents of FPJ were Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley; (2) FPJ was born to them on 20 August 1939; (3) Allan F. Poe and Bessie Kelley were married to each other on 16 September, 1940; (4) The father of Allan F. Poe was Lorenzo Poe; and (5) At the time of his death on 11 September 1954, Lorenzo Poe was 84 years old. The marriage certificate of Allan F.

Poe and Bessie Kelley, the birth certificate of FPJ, and the death certificate of Lorenzo Pou are documents of public record in the custody of a public officer. The documents have been submitted in evidence by both contending parties during the proceedings before the COMELEC. But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus Election Code. Fornier has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which, as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful. The petitions were dismissed. 13.) CODILLA SR. VS DE VENECIA FACTS: Petition for mandamus to compel De Venecia to proclaim Codilla as the duly elected Congressman of 4th District of Leyte. Codilla (incumbent Mayor of Ormoc) and Locsin (incumbent Representative) are both candidates for the Representative of the 4th District of Leyte in the 2001 elections. Josephine De La Cruz - a registered voter then filed a petition for Disqualification against Codilla for indirect solicitation of votes, prohibited by section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code. COMELEC (Division) delegated the hearing and reception of the evidence of such case to the Regional Director. Election times came, and yet still no hearing from the Regional Director. When it was apparent that Codilla garnered the most votes, Locsin intervened in the DQ case, and filed an urgent motion to suspend proclamation. Codilla was not served with the Motion. COMELEC issued an order suspending the proclamation due to the seriousness of the allegations. Again, Codilla was not served with a summons to air his side and provide contrary evidences. Although Codilla filed a petition to lift the

suspension, COMELEC nevertheless issued a Resolution finding Codilla guilty of indirect solicitation. As a result, COMELEC disqualified Codilla and considered votes cast for him as stray even though such resolution is still not yet final. Locsin was proclaimed the winner and assumed her seat in Congress as the Representative. Codilla then seasonably filed an MR to COMELEC (En banc), which reversed the Division Resolution. Locsin then questioned jurisdiction of COMELEC , stating that it was the HRET who has jurisdiction over the case now that she has assumed the post. De Venecia concurs with COMELEC, but since Locsin said in one of her privilege speeches that she will not obey the COMELEC reversal, he said that it was up to the SC to decide on the matter. Thus, the petition for Mandamus and Quo Warranto. ISSUE: Whether or not the proclamation divested the COMELEC en banc of jurisdiction to review its validity. HELD: The Proclamation of Locsin is void. The petitioner was denied due process during the entire proceedings leading to the proclamation of respondent Locsin. The Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division disqualifying the petitioner is not based on substantial evidence. The Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division cannot be considered to be based on substantial evidence. It relied merely on affidavits of witnesses attached to the petition for disqualification. As stressed, the COMELEC Second Division gave credence to the affidavits without hearing the affiants. Exclusion of the votes in favor of the petitioner and the proclamation of respondent Locsin was done with undue haste. The COMELEC Second Division ordered the exclusion of the votes cast in favor of the petitioner, and the proclamation of the respondent Locsin, without affording the petitioner the opportunity to challenge the same. In the morning of June 15, 2001, the Provincial Board of Canvassers convened, and on the strength of the said Resolution

excluding the votes received by the petitioner, certified that respondent Locsin received the highest number of votes. On this basis, respondent Locsin was proclaimed. Records reveal that the petitioner received notice of the Resolution of the COMELEC Second Division only through his counsel via a facsimile message in the afternoon of June 15, 200198 when everything was already fait accompli. Undoubtedly, he was not able to contest the issuance of the Certificate of Canvass and the proclamation of respondent Locsin. This is plain and simple denial of due process. The essence of due process is the opportunity to be heard. When a party is deprived of that basic fairness, any decision by any tribunal in prejudice of his rights is void. The votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray" and respondent cannot be validly proclaimed on that basis. As previously stated, the disqualification of the petitioner is null and void for being violative of due process and for want of substantial factual basis. Even assuming, however, that the petitioner was validly disqualified, it is still improper for the COMELEC Second Division to order the immediate exclusion of votes cast for the petitioner as stray, and on this basis, proclaim the respondent as having garnered the next highest number of votes. The order of disqualification is not yet final, hence, the votes cast in favor of the petitioner cannot be considered "stray." Respondent Locsin, as a mere second placer, cannot be proclaimed. 14.) LOONG vs. COMELEC, GR NO. 93986, DECEMBER 22, 1992 FACTS: Petitioner Benjamin Loong filed with the COMELEC his COC for the position of Vice-Governor of the Mindanao Autonomous Region in the election held on February 17, 1990 (January 15, 1990 being the last day of filing their COC); he prayed that the petition be dismissed alleging that it has never been a practice of Muslims to register a birth of child before the LCR; that prior to the election, he

consulted his mother about his true age and assured that his correct birthdate is July 4, 1954; that COMELEC has no jurisdiction since under Section 78 of the OEC, it should have been filed within 5 days following the last day for the filing of the COC; that the period has already prescribed Respondent Nurhussein Ututalum and Alim Bashir- filed a petition before the COMELEC to disqualify Loong on the ground that the latter made a false representation in his COC as to his age, said petition was filed on March 5, 1990 (16 days after the election and 49 days from the date that Loong filed his COC); that although the period has already prescribed, there is still cause of action on the petition since under Section 3,Rule 25 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure it states that the petition to disqualify a candidate on the grounds of ineligibility shall be filed any day after the last day for filing of COC but not later than the date of proclamation, hence, since there was no proclamation of winner yet when the petition was filed, the petition deserves a merit COMELEC held that the petition was timely filed applying sections 6 and 7 of RA 6646 and section 2, rule 23 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which states that the petition to deny course to or cancel a COC must be filed within 5 days following the last day of the filing of the COC ISSUE: Whether or not the petition to cancel the COC of Loong was filed within the period prescribed by law. HELD: No. The petition was filed beyond the period prescribed by law The age requirement to be qualified to run as V-Governor for autonomous region is at least 35 years old under RA 6734. Section 78 of the OEC, it states that

Section 78. Petition to deny due course to or cancel a certificate of candidacy. - A verified petition seeking to deny due course or to cancel a certificate of candidacy may be filed by the person exclusively on the ground that any material representation contained therein as required under Section 74 hereof is false. The petition may be filed at any time not later than twenty-five days from the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy and shall be decided, after due notice and hearing, not later than fifteen days before the election. In this case, clearly, the petition filed by the private respondents was filed beyond the 25-day period prescribed under Section 78 of the OEC. Thus, if a person qualified to file a petition to disqualification a certain candidate fails to file the petition within the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code for whatever reasons, the election laws do not leave him completely helpless as he has another chance to raise the disqualification of the candidate by filing a petition for quo warranto within ten (10) days from the proclamation of the results of the election, as provided under Section 253 of the Code. Section 1 Rule 21 of the Comelec Rules of procedure similarly provides that any voter contesting the election of any regional, provincial or city official on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic of the Philippines may file a petition for quo warranto with the Electoral Contest Adjudication Department. The petition may be filed within ten (10)days from the date the respondent is proclaimed (Section 2). It is true that the discovery of false representation as to material facts required to be stated in a certificate of candidacy, under Section 74 of the Code, may be made only after the lapse of the 25-day period prescribed by Section 78 of the Code, through no fault of the person who discovers such misrepresentations and who would want the disqualification of the candidate committing the misrepresentations. It would seem, therefore, that there could indeed be a gap between the time of the discovery of the misrepresentation, (when the discovery is made after the 25-day period under Sec. 78 of the Code has lapsed) and the time when the proclamation of the results of the election is made. During this so-called "gap" the would-be petitioner (who would seek the disqualification of the

candidate) is left with nothing to do except to wait for the proclamation of the results, so that he could avail of a remedy against the misrepresenting candidate, that is, by filing a petition for quo warranto against him. Respondent Commission sees this "gap" in what it calls a procedural gap which, according to it, it unnecessary and should be remedied. At the same time, it cannot be denied that it is the purpose and intent of the legislative branch of the government to fix a definite time within which petitions of protests related to eligibility of candidates for elective offices must be filed, as seen in Section 78 and 253 of the Code. Respondent Commission may have seen the need to remedy this so-called "procedural gap", but it is not for it to prescribed what the law does not provide, its function not being legislative. The question of whether the time to file these petitions or protests is too short or ineffective is one for the Legislature to decide and remedy. 15.) FRIVALDO vs. COMELEC / GR No. 87193, JUNE 23, 1989 FACTS: Petitioner Juan Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 1988; he admitted that he was naturalized in the US but pleaded special and affirmative defense that he had sought American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos; that he forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting persecution; that he is a Filipino citizen since his naturalization was not impressed with voluntriness; that he returned after the EDSA Revolution to help restore democracy; that in his oath in his COC that was a naturalborn Filipino should be a sufficient act of repatriation Respondent League of Municipalities, Sorsogon Chapter, represented by Salvador Nee Estuye filed a petition before the COMELEC for the Annulment of Frivaldos election and proclamation on the ground that he is not a qualified since he was not a Filipino citizen prior to the election Solicitor General supported respondents argument that Frivaldo is disqualified since he was not a citizen of the Philippines and had not repatriated himself after his naturalization as an American citizen; that his election did not cure the defect

because the electorate of Sorsogon could not amend the Constitution, LGC and the OEC.

ISSUE: Whether or not Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on Janurary 18, 1988.

HELD: No. Frivaldo is not a citizen of the Philippines at the time of the 1988 election, hence, he is disqualified. The reason for this inquiry is the provision in Article XI, Section 9, of the Constitution that all public officials and employees owe the State and the Constitution "allegiance at all times" and the specific requirement in Section 42 of the Local Government Code that a candidate for local elective office must be inter alia a citizen of the Philippines and a qualified voter of the constituency where he is running. In his COC, he described himself as natural-born Filipino, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of such status. The evidence shows that he was naturalized as a citizen of the US in 1983, such evidence was not denied by him. However, he interposed that he was naturalized as a measure to protect himself from the former dictator. The Court sees no reason not to believe that the petitioner was one of the enemies of the Marcos dictatorship. Even so, it cannot agree that as a consequence thereof he was coerced into embracing American citizenship. His feeble suggestion that his naturalization was not the result of his own free and voluntary choice is totally unacceptable and must be rejected outright.

There were many other Filipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who did not find it

necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their cherished status as Filipinos. . The martyred Ninoy Aquino heads the impressive list of those Filipinos in exile who, unlike the petitioner, held fast to their Philippine citizenship despite the perils of their resistance to the Marcos regime.

The Nottebohm case is not applicable in the case at bar. That case is not relevant to the petition before us because it dealt with a conflict between the nationality laws of two states as decided by a third state. No third state is involved in the case at bar; in fact, even the United States is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. The sole question presented to us is whether or not Frivaldo is a citizen of the Philippines under our own laws, regardless of other nationality laws. We can decide this question alone as sovereign of our own territory, conformably to Section 1 of the said Convention providing that "it is for each State to determine under its law who are its nationals."

Frivaldos claim for repatriation: If he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and reacquire Philippine citizenship, the petitioner should have done so in accordance with the laws of our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation. He contends that by simply filing his certificate of candidacy he had, without more, already effectively recovered Philippine citizenship. But that is hardly the formal declaration the law envisions surely, Philippine citizenship previously disowned is not that cheaply recovered. If the Special Committee had not yet been convened, what that meant simply was that the petitioner had to wait until this was done, or seek naturalization by legislative or judicial proceedings. Qualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during the officer's entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be seasonably challenged. This Court will not permit the anomaly of a person sitting as provincial governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country. The fact that he was elected by the

people of Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate was qualified. If a person seeks to serve in the Republic of the Philippines, he must owe his total loyalty to this country only, abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state. 16.) Labo, Jr. vs. COMELEC FACTS: Ramon Labo, Jr. married an Australian citizen in the Philippines. He was granted Australian citizenship in 1976. In 1980, the marriage was declared void for being bigamous. Labo returned to the Philippines in 1980, using an Australian passport, and obtained an Alien Certificate of Registration (ACR). He later applied for a change in status from immigrant to returning Filipino citizen. However, the Commission on Immigration and Deportation denied his application for the cancellation of his ACR since he has not applied for reacquisition of his Filipino citizenship. According to the records of the Australian Embassy (as certified by the Australian Consul), Labo was still an Australian citizen as of April 12, 1984. Although no direct evidence was presented to prove that he took an oath of allegiance as a naturalized Australian citizen, the laws of Australia at the time required any person over the age of 16 years who is granted Australian citizenship to take an oath of allegiance. The wording/text of this oath includes a renunciation of all other allegiance. Labo ran and won as Mayor of Baguio City in the local elections held on January 18, 1988. The second-placer, Luis Lardizabal, filed a petition for quo warranto, alleging that Labo is disqualified from holding public office on the grounds of alienage, and asking that the latter's proclamation as Mayor be annulled.

ISSUES: 1. Does the COMELEC have the jurisdiction to inquire into Labo's citizenship? 2. Is Ramon Labo, Jr. a Filipino citizen? 3. Is he qualified to hold public office in the Philippines? 4. If Labo is not eligible to serve as Mayor, can Lardizabal, as the runner-up in the elections, replace him? HELD: 1. Yes. Contrary to Labo's claim, the petition for quo warranto was filed on time. Lardizabal did not immediately pay the filing fee because the COMELEC had at first considered the petition as a pre-proclamation proceeding, which does not require the payment of such a fee. When the COMELEC reclassified the petition, Lardizabal immediately paid the filing fee -- thus, he still complied with the prescribed 10-day period. Furthermore, the Court held that such technicalities should not hinder judicial decisions on significant issues, such as the one being decided in this case. 2. Labo is not a Filipino citizen. He had lost his Philippine citizenship by all 3 modes specified in the Constitution: (1) naturalization in a foreign country, (2) express renunciation of citizenship, and (3) subscribing to an oath of allegiance to support the Constitution or laws of a foreign country. He has not reacquired Philippine citizenship by any of the 3 methods prescribed in the Constitution: (1) direct act of Congress, (2) naturalization, and (3) repatriation. Contrary to Labo's claim, his naturalization in Australia did not confer him with dual citizenship. The Constitution explicitly states that dual citizenship is inimical to national interest. The contention that his marriage to an Australian national did not automatically divest him of Filipino citizenship is irrelevant. There was no claim that Labo had automatically ceased to be a Filipino because of that marriage. Also, his Filipino

citizenship has not been automatically restored upon the annulment of his Australian citizenship, when his marriage was declared void on the grounds of bigamy. The Commission on Immigration and Deportation held in in 1988 that Labo was not a Filipino citizen. The earlier contrary decision by the COMELEC in 1982 is totally baseless, and is even alleged to have been politically motivated. The latter can be reversed because the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to questions of citizenship. 3. Labo is not eligible to hold public office in the Philippines. He was not even a qualified voter when he was elected.

4. Despite getting the second highest number of votes, Lardizabal cannot assume the position of Mayor because he has not been duly elected by the people of Baguio City. Labo's disqualification alone does not entitle him to take office. Instead, the elected Vice Mayor shall replace Labo. 17.) G.R. No. 157013, July 10, 2003 / MACALINTAL, petitioner VS. COMELEC, ROMULO, and BONCODIN, respondents FACTS: Petitioner Macalintal files a petition for certiorari and prohibition, seeking a declaration that certain provisions of R.A. No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003) are unconstitutional. The Court upholds petitioners right to file the instant petition, stating in essence that the petitioner has seriously and convincingly presented an issue of transcendental significance to the Filipino people, considering that public funds are to be used and appropriated for the implementation of said law. Petitioner raises three principal questions for contention:

(1)That Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 allowing the registration of voters who are immigrants or permanent residents in other countries, by their mere act of executing an affidavit expressing their intention to return to the Philippines, violates the residency requirement in Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution; (2)That Section 18.5 of the same law empowering the COMELEC to proclaim the winning candidates for national offices and party list representatives, including the President and the Vice-President, violates the constitutional mandate under Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution that the winning candidates for President and VicePresident shall be proclaimed as winners only by Congress; and (3)That Section 25 of the same law, allowing Congress (through the Joint Congressional Oversight Committee created in the same section) to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) that the COMELEC shall promulgate, violates the independence of the COMELEC under Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. ISSUES: 1)Whether or not Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. 2)Whether or not Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. 3)Whether or not Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189 is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. HELD: 1) NO. Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 is not violative of Art. V, Sec. 1 of the

Constitution. Contrary to petitioners claim that Section 5(d) circumvents the Constitution, Congress enacted the law prescribing a system of overseas absentee voting in compliance with the constitutional mandate. Such mandate expressly

requires that Congress provide a system of absentee voting that necessarily presupposes that the qualified citizen of the Philippines abroad is not physically present in the country. The provisions of Sections 5(d) and 11 are components of the system of overseas absentee voting established by R.A. No. 9189. The qualified Filipino abroad who executed the affidavit is deemed to have retained his domicile in the Philippines. He is presumed not to have lost his domicile by his physical absence from this country. His having become an immigrant or permanent resident of his host country does not necessarily imply an abandonment of his intention to return to his domicile of origin, the Philippines. Therefore, under the law, he must be given the opportunity to express that he has not actually abandoned his domicile in the Philippines by executing the affidavit required by Sections 5(d) and 8(c) of the law. 2) YES. Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the votes of the President and Vice-President, and not to the votes of the Senators and party-list representatives, is violative of Art. VII, Sec. 4 of the Constitution. Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly stated by petitioner, to encroach on the power of Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice-president and the power to proclaim the winners for the said positions. The provisions of the Constitution as the fundamental law of the land should be read as part of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and hence, the canvassing of the votes and the proclamation of the winning candidates for president and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in the hands of Congress. 3) YES. Section 25 of R.A. No. 9189, with respect only to the second sentence in its second paragraph allowing Congress to exercise the power to review, revise, amend, and approve the IRR that the COMELEC shall promulgate, is violative of Art. IX-A, Sec. 1 of the Constitution. Congress arrogates unto itself a function not specifically vested by the Constitution. Thus, it should be stricken out of the subject statute for constitutional infirmity.

18.) CAASI vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and MERITO MIGUEL, 191 SCRA 227, NOVEMBER 8, 1990 Petitioner Mateo Caasi sought the disqualification (under Section 68 of the OEC) of Miguel to run as municipal mayor of Bolinao, Pangasinan on the ground that he was a green card holder, hence, a permanent resident of the US; he alleged that Miguel entered in the US with the intention to live there permanently as evidenced by his application for immigrants visa and not as visitor or tourist Respondent Miguel he countered that he was a natural-born Filipino; that he is permanent resident is in Bolinao; that he voted in all previous election including the plebiscite for the ratification of the 1987 Constitution; that he admitted that he is a green card holder issued to him by the US Immigration Service; that he obtained such card for convenience in order to he may freely enter the US for his periodic medical examination and to visit his children; that is intention is not to permanently reside there COMELEC dismissed the Caasis petition holding that Miguels possession of a green card issued to him by the US Immigration Service does not sufficiently establish that he has abandoned his residence in the Philippines Dissenting opinion of Commissioner Badoy Jr. he cited that a green card holder being a permanent resident of or an immigrant of a foreign country, it is incumbent upon Miguel under Section 68 of the OEC, to prove that he has waived his status as a permanent resident or immigrant to be qualified to run for elected office, in this case, Miguel was unable to prove ISSUES: Whether or not Miguel green card is proof that the holder is a permanent resident of the US. Whether or not Miguel had waived his status as a permanent resident of or immigrant to the US prior to the 1988 election.

HELD: First Issue: YES. Section 18, Article XI, 1987 Constitution Section 18. Public officers and employees owe the State and this Constitution allegiance at all times and any public officer or employee who seeks to change his citizenship or acquire the status of an immigrant of another country during his tenure shall be dealt with by law. Section 68, BP Blg 661 x x x Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country shall not be qualified to run for any elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the residence requirement provided for in the election laws. The green card that was issued by the US to Miguel identifies him in clear and bold letters that the latter is a RESIDENT ALIEN. Despite Miguels vigorous disclaimer, his immigration to the US in 1984 constituted an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the Philippines for he did not there to visit his children or his doctor but with the intention to live there permanently as evidence by his application for an immigrants visa and not as visitor or tourist. Section 18, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution is not applicable to Miguel for he acquired his immigrant status BEFORE he was elected to public office and not DURING HIS TENURE as mayor. Second Issue: No. Miguel did not waived his immigrant status prior to the 1988 election. To be qualified to run for elective office in the Philippines, the law requires that the candidate who is a green card holder must have WAIVED his status as permanent resident of immigrant of a foreign country. The waiver of Miguels green

card should be manifested by some overt act independent of and done prior to the filing of his COC. Without such waiver, he is deemed disqualified to run for any elective office. Therefore, his act of filing of his COC did not constitute a waiver of his status as a permanent resident/immigrant of the US. 19.) BENGZON VS. HRET [357 SCRA 545; G. R. No. 142840; 7 May 2001] Facts: Respondent Teodoro Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente, Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935 Constitution. On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps and without the consent of theRepublic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United States. As a Consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63, section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among other, "rendering service to or acceptingcommission in the armed forces of a foreign country. He was naturalized in US in 1990. On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630. He ran for and was elected as the Representative of the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11,1998 elections. He won over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection. Issue: Whether or Not respondent Cruz is a natural born citizen of the Philippines in view of the constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representative unless he is a natural-born citizen. Held: Respondent is a natural born citizen of the Philippines. As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriationsimply consists of the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippine and registering said oath in the

Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided. This means that a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino. 20.) CELESTINO A. MARTINEZ III vs. HRET and BENHUR SALIMBANGON / G.R. No. 189034, January 11, 2010 Facts: In the May 14, 2007 elections, petitioner Martinez and private respondent Salimbangon were among the candidates for Representative in the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu Province. On March 29, 2007, Edilito C. Martinez, a resident of Barangay Tambongon, Daan-Bantayan, Cebu, filed his certificate of candidacy for the same position. On April 3, 2007, Martinez filed a petition to declare Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate. However, the Commission on Elections Second Division issued its Resolution declaring Edilito C. Martinez a nuisance candidate only on June 12, 2007 or almost one (1) month after the elections.

On July 9, 2007, Salimbangon was proclaimed winner in the congressional elections for the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu on the basis of official results showing that he garnered sixty-seven thousand two hundred seventy-seven (67,277) votes as against Martinez who garnered sixty-seven thousand one hundred seventy-three (67,173) votes, or a difference of one hundred four (104) votes.

Martinez filed an election protest before the HRET based on the 300 ballots more or less with only MARTINEZ or C. MARTINEZ written on the line for Representative which the Board of Election Inspectors did not count for Martinez on the ground that there was another congressional candidate (Edilito C. Martinez) who had the same surname. In its decision dated May 28, 2009, the HRET sustained the BEI in considering the ballots as stray in accordance with Sec. 211 (1) of the Omnibus

Election Code. Since the name of Edilito C. Martinez was still included in the official list of candidates on election day (May 14, 2007), the HRET held that five thousand four hundred one (5,401) ballots with "MARTINEZ" or "C. MARTINEZ" only written on the line for Representative were properly denied on the ground that there was no way of determining the real intention of the voter. The HRET dismissed the election protest, affirmed the proclamation of Salimbangon and declared him to be the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, having won by a plurality margin of 453 votes. Martinez moved for reconsideration of the Decision, but the HRET denied it by Resolution dated July 30, 2009. Hence, this petition for certiorari under Rule 65 which seeks to nullify the decision of HRET dismissing the election protest declaring private respondent as the duly elected Representative of the Fourth Legislative District of Cebu, and the Resolution dated July 30, 2009 denying Issue: petitioner's motion for reconsideration thereof.

1. What is the legal effect of declaring a nuisance candidate as such in a final judgment after the elections?

2. Should ballots containing only the similar surname of two (2) candidates be considered as stray votes or counted in favor of the bona fide candidate? Held: The court finds the petition meritorious.

1. Ensconced in our jurisprudence is the well-founded rule that laws and statutes governing election contests especially appreciation of ballots must be liberally construed to the end that the will of the electorate in the choice of public officials may not be defeated by technical infirmities. An election protest is imbued with public interest so much so that the need to dispel uncertainties which becloud the real choice of the people is imperative. The prohibition against nuisance candidates is aimed precisely at preventing uncertainty and confusion in

ascertaining the true will of the electorate. Thus, in certain situations as in the case at bar, final judgments declaring a nuisance candidate should effectively cancel the certificate of candidacy filed by such candidate as of election day. Otherwise, potential nuisance candidates will continue to put the electoral process into mockery by filing certificates of candidacy at the last minute and delaying resolution of any petition to declare them as nuisance candidates until elections are held and the votes counted and canvassed.

2. Ballots indicating only the similar surname of two (2) candidates for the same position may, in appropriate cases, be counted in favor of the bona fide candidate and not considered stray, even if the other candidate was declared a nuisance candidate by final judgment after the elections. 21.) Mo Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner of Immigration / GR L-21289, 4 October 1971 FACTS: On 8 February 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant, for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration. After repeated extensions, she was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction with preliminary injunction. The Court of First Instance of Manila (Civil Case 49705) denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

Issue: Whether Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a Filipino citizen. Held: Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case, Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962. 22.) NESTOR JACOT VS ROGEN DAL AND COMELEC / G.R. No. 179848 FACTS: Petitioner was a natural born citizen of the Philippines, who became a naturalized citizen of the US on 13 December 1989. [3]Petitioner sought to reacquire his Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, otherwise known as the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act. He filed a request for the

administration of his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines with the Philippine same day, Consulate petitioner General took his (PCG) Oath of Los of Angeles, California. The to the Republic Los of Angeles PCG issued an Order of Approval[4] of petitioners request, and on the Allegiance the Philippines before Vice Consul Edward C. Yulo. The Bureau of Immigration issued Identification Certificate recognizing petitioner as a citizen of the Philippines.[6]Six months after, petitioner filed his Certificate of Candidacy for the Position of ViceMayor of the Municipality of Catarman, Camiguin. [7]Respondent Rogen T. Dal filed a Petition for Disqualification[8] before the COMELEC latter Provincial Office in Camiguin against petitioner, arguing that the failed to renounce

his US citizenship, as required under Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225. Petitioner countered that his Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and the oath contained in his Certificate of Candidacy operated as an effective renunciation of his foreign citizenship. In the meantime, the National and Local Elections were held. Petitioner garnered the highest number of votes for the position of Vice Mayor. The COMELEC Second Division finally issued its Resolution disqualifying the petitioner from running for the position of Vice-Mayor of Catarman, Camiguin, for failure to make the requisite renunciation of his US citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division explained that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225 does not automatically bestow upon any person the privilege to run for any elective public office. It additionally ruled that the filing of a Certificate of Candidacy cannot be considered as a renunciation of foreign citizenship. The COMELEC Second Division did not consider Valles v.COMELEC and Mercado v. Manzano applicable to the instant case, since Valles and Mercado were dual citizens since birth, unlike the petitioner who lost his Filipino citizenship by means of naturalization. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Attached to the said Motion was an Oath of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Renunciation of Any and All Foreign Citizenship wherein petitioner explicitly renounced his US citizenship. The COMELEC en banc dismissed petitioners Motion for lack of merit.

Petitioner

sought

remedy via the

present

Special

Civil

Action

for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court, where he presented for the first time an Affidavit of Renunciation of Allegiance to the United States and Any and All Foreign Citizenship. ISSUE: Whether petitioner is disqualified from running as a candidate in the 14 May 2007 local elections for his failure to make a personal and sworn renunciation of his US citizenship. HELD: This Court finds that petitioner should indeed be disqualified. Contrary to the assertions made by petitioner, his oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines made before the Los Angeles PCG and his Certificate of Candidacy do not substantially comply with the requirement of a personal and sworn renunciation of foreign citizenship because these are distinct requirements to be complied with for different purposes. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225 requires that natural-born citizens of the Philippines, who are already naturalized citizens of a foreign country, must take the following oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines to reacquire or retain their Philippine citizenship: SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship.Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic: I __________ solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and

will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath. By the oath dictated in the afore-quoted provision, the Filipino swears allegiance to the Philippines, but there is nothing therein on his renunciation of foreign citizenship. Precisely, a situation might arise under Republic Act No. 9225 wherein said Filipino has dual citizenship by also reacquiring or retaining his Philippine citizenship, despite his foreign citizenship. The afore-quoted oath of allegiance is substantially similar to the one contained in the Certificate of Candidacy which must be executed by any person who wishes to run for public office in Philippine elections. Such an oath reads: I am eligible for the office I seek to be elected. I will support and defend the Constitution of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance thereto; that I will obey the laws, legal orders and decrees promulgated by the duly constituted authorities of the Republic of the Philippines; and that I impose this obligation upon myself voluntarily, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion. I hereby certify that the facts stated herein are true and correct of my own personal knowledge. Now, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 specifically provides that: Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities.Those who retain or reacquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the following conditions: (2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution and

existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to administer an oath. The law categorically requires persons seeking elective public office, who either retained their Philippine citizenship or those who reacquired it, to make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before a public officer authorized to administer an oath simultaneous with or before the filing of the certificate of candidacy. Hence, Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 compels natural-born Filipinos, who have been naturalized as citizens of a foreign country, but who reacquired or retained their Philippine citizenship (1) to take the oath of allegiance under Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9225, and (2) for those seeking elective public offices in the Philippines, to additionally execute a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before an authorized public officer prior or simultaneous to the filing of their certificates of candidacy, to qualify as candidates in Philippine elections. Clearly Section 5(2) of Republic Act No. 9225 (on the making of a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship) requires of the Filipinos availing themselves of the benefits under the said Act to accomplish an undertaking other than that which they have presumably complied with under Section 3 thereof (oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines). WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED.

23.) ANGAT vs. REPUBLIC FACTS: Order in RTC Marikina is in the Matter of Gerardo Legaspi Angat to be Readmitted as a Citizen of the Philippines under Commonwealth Act No. 63, as amended, and RA Nos. 965 and 263. March 96: Petitioner Gerardo Angat, originally a natural born citizen of the Philippines until he lost his citizenship by naturalization in USA, now resides in Marikina City, filed a petition to regain his status under CA statute cited above. In his petition applying for naturalization, he included the ff: His latest picture; Present place of residence (Marikina City); Trade/profession (buy & sell); Date of birth: June 22, 1954; Present citizenship: American; Marriage contract, W is Zenaida Lim, resident of Tondo; Copy of alien registration; 1991 was yr when he returned to Manila; He possesses all the qualifications required by CA No 63 and none of the disqualifications listed in CA No 473. He has resided in the Philippines at least 6 months before date of petition; He is not opposed to organized government nor affiliated w/ any group opposing such; not a polygamist; not been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude; not suffering from any mental alienation or incurable contagious disease. The nation of w/c he is a citizen is not at war w/ the Philippines. In reacquiring Phil citizenship, he will renounce absolutely and forever all allegiance & fidelity to US June 96: Petitioner sought to be allowed to take his oath of allegiance pursuant to RA 8171. July 1996: Motion denied by RTC. Subsequent motion for reconsideration denied. Aug 1996: Denial reconsidered by the Court. Petitioner ordered to take his oath of allegiance to RP on Oct 3 96, 11a.m. Oct 1996: Petitioner repatriated & declared as Phil citizen pursuant to RA No 8171. Copy of certificate/order to be registered in the Local Civil Registry of Marikina. March 97: Manifestation and Motion (or motion for reconsideration) was filed by OSG, as counsel of the State, asserting that petition should have been dismissed for lack of jurisdiction because the proper forum for it was the Special Committee on

Naturalization, as the implementing agency, consistent w/ AO 285 dated Aug 22, 1996. Consequently, order should be declared null and void. ISSUES: 1) Whether or not Court erred in dismissing the petition by giving retroactive

effect to AO 285, absent a provision on Retroactive Application 2) Whether or not Oct 96 Order was null and void

HELD: Angats petition for review denied. Order of dismissal of petition is affirmed for want of jurisdiction. 1) No, Court was right in maintaining that petition for repatriation should be filed

with the Special Committee on Naturalization and not with RTC w/c had no jurisdiction thereover for AO 285 promulgated on Aug 22 96 was merely then a confirmatory issuance of PD 725. The agency was indeed deactivated by virtue of Pres Aquinos Memorandum of March 1987, however it was not abrogated or abolished. It is obvious that no express repeal was made then because it did not categorically and/or impliedly state that PD 725, creating the Committee, was being repealed or was being rendered w/o any legal effect. It is a basic rule of statutory construction that repeals by implications are not favored. An implied repeal will not be allowed unless it is convincingly and unambiguously demonstrated that the two laws are clearly repugnant and patently inconsistent that they cannot co-exist. 2) Yes, such order was null and void, and it did not acquire finality nor could it be

a source of right on the part of the petitioner. Moreover, petitioner should not have invoked RA 965 for that law pertains to Phil citizens who lost said citizenship by rendering service to, or accepting commission in the armed forces of an allied foreign country or of USA.

24.) LONZANIDA VS COMELEC FACTS: Lonzanida was elected as mayor and served two consecutive terms from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC, which ruled that there was a failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC affirmed this decision and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate his post. In the 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed a certificate of candidacy for mayor but was protested against due to the reason that he allegedly had served 3 consecutive terms already. ISSUE: Whether or not it may be considered that petitioner had served 3 consecutive terms, granting that he did not finish his term in 1995. HELD: Negative. By reason of his involuntary relinquishment of office, petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term and became a private citizen.

25.) ADORMEO VS COMELEC

FACTS: Ramon Talaga was elected and served two consecutive terms as mayor. He then ran for a third term but lost to his opponent. In June 1998, his then opponent faced recall proceedings and in the recall elections of May 2000, Talaga won and served for the unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his COC for the mayoralty post. This was questioned on the ground that he had already served as mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

ISSUE: Whether or not an assumption to office through recall election should be considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. HELD: Negative. The court held that Talaga cannot be construed as having beenelected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the 1998 elections was considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, Talaga lived as a private citizen. 26.) SOCRATES VS COMELEC FACTS: Edward Hagedorn had already served for 3 consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001. He did not run in the immediately following regular elections. One July 2, 2002, the incumbent mayor, Socrates, faced a recall proceeding and was asked to step down from office. On August 23 of the same year, Hagedorn filed his COC for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification was filed by Socrates on the ground that he cannot run for the said post for his 4 th consecutive term. ISSUE: Whether or not Hagedorn was qualified to run for the 2003 recall election. HELD: AFFIRMATIVE. The court ruled that the rationale behind the 3-term rule was to prevent consecutiveness in holding office. In the case of Edward Hagedorn, there was a break after the end of his third term and before the recall election.

27.) BORJA VS COMELEC FACTS: Jose Capco was first elected as vice mayor but upon the death of the then incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was, thereafter, elected for 2 more terms as mayor. He again filed his candidacy for mayor for the succeeding election but was protested against. ISSUE: Whether or not a person who served in a position by operation of law could be considered as having served that term for the purpose of the three-term limit under the constitution. HELD: Negative. The court held that when Capco occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death and served for remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having served a full term as contemplated under the three term limit. The term he served must be one for which he was elected. Furthermore, before assuming the position of mayor, he served first as a vice mayor and the duties and responsibilities of the two positions are wholly different from each other. 28.) LATASA VS COMELEC FACTS: Arsenio Latasa was elected mayor of the Municipality of Digos in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998. During his third term, the municipality was declared as a component city. This event marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor of the Municipality of Digos. However, since the post is vacant, Latasa was mandated to serve a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new City of Digos. Latasa filed his COC for the 2001 elections but was protested against by Sunga, saying that Latasa is not eligible to run for mayor since he already served for three consecutive terms from 1992-2001.

ISSUE: Whether or not Latasa is disqualified from running again for mayor, but this time, for the CITY OF DIGOS. HELD: Affirmative. Upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city, Latasa continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial jurisdiction. There may be some changes in the political and economic rights of Digos as an LGU but no substantial changes occurred as to petitioners authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos. 29.) ONG VS ALEGRE FACTS: Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel the Certificate of Candidacy of Francis Ong. The petition to disqualify was predicated on the three-consecutive term rule. Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in the May 1995, 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and have assumed office as Mayor and discharged the duties thereof for three consecutive full terms corresponding to those elections. The First Division of COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a resolution dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing that Francis might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998; 1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004 but the mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001 cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The RTC of Daet, Camarines Norte Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when it held, in its decision that Alegre was the "legally elected Mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte."

ISSUE: Whether or not Ongs assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term 1998 to 2001 be considered as full service for the purpose of the three-term limit rule. HELD: Affirmative. Ong is disqualified as even if the COMELEC had declared Alegre to be the legally elected mayor in the 1998 elections, it was without effect as the declaration only took place AFTER the expiration of the contested office.

30.) MERCADO VS MANZANO Facts: Petitioner Ernesto Mercado and Private respondent Eduardo Manzano are candidates for the position of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May, 1998 elections. Private respondent was the winner of the said election but the proclamation was suspended due to the petition of Ernesto Mamaril regarding the citizenship of private respondent. Mamaril alleged that the private respondent is not a citizen of thePhilippines but of the United States. COMELEC granted the petition and disqualified the private respondent for being a dual citizen, pursuant to the Local Government code that provides that persons who possess dual citizenship are disqualified from running any public position. Private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration which remained pending until after election. Petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. COMELEC reversed the decision and declared private respondent qualified to run for the position. Pursuant to the ruling of the COMELEC, the board of canvassers proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor. This petition sought the reversal of the resolution of the COMELEC and to declare the private respondent disqualified to hold the office of the vice mayor of Makati.

Issue: Whether or Not private respondent is qualified to hold office as Vice-Mayor. Held: Dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is simultaneously considered a national by the said states. For instance, such a situation may arise when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Private respondent is considered as a dual citizen because he is born of Filipino parents but was born in San Francisco, USA. Such a person, ipso facto and without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both states. Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary, dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition. By filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship, effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen.

By declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned, effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a dual citizen. On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippine, when considered with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received

his education, practiced his profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his election of Philippine citizenship.