Distinguish rule 103, rule 108 and RA 9048 as amended by RA 10172 CASES: 1. RP VS.

MERCADERA THROUGH HER ATTORNEY-IN-FACT EVELYN M. OGA (Rule 108 vs. Rule 103 correction of misspelled given name) FACTS: On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth from Marilyn L. Mercadera to Merlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048. Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general is now authorized to effect the change of first name or nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry entries. The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to effect the correction unless a court order was obtained "because the Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by R.A. No. 9048." Mercadera then filed a Petition For Correction of Some Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birth under Rule 108 before the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order, dated June 10, 2005, for the hearing of said petition. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to assist in the case. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera never used the name "Marilyn" in any of her public or private transactions. In its September 28, 2005 Decision, the RTC granted the petition and ruled that the documentary evidence presented by Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition. Considering that she had used "Merlyn" as her given name since childhood until she discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was convinced that the correction was justified. The OSG timely appealed praying for the reversal and setting aside of the RTC decision. For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name "is in truth a material correction as it would modify or increase substantive rights", which would have been proper had she filed a petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, the appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC order.

On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of Mercadera, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment on July 3, 2009. ISSUES: WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENTS NAME UNDER RULE 103. HELD: Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. This rule provides the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter ones legal capacity or civil status. Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of the Civil Code. Entries in the civil register refer to "acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons," also as enumerated in Article 408 of the same law. In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from "MARILYN" to "MERLYN" is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule 103 can be granted, only on grounds provided by law, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official name. In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised. Considering that the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108 also includes "changes of name," the correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say, not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108. Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something with something else of the same kind or with something that serves as a substitute." From the allegations in her petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court "to remove the faults or error" from her registered given name "MARILYN," and "to make or set aright" the same to conform to the one she grew up to, "MERLYN." The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever since she could remember.

Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally defective. Wherefore, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. 2. GERBERT R. CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL (Law applicable in case of registration of divorce) FACTS: This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking a direct appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City. Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpus is a naturalized Canadian citizen who married respondent Daisylyn Tirol Sto. Tomas but subsequently left for Canada due to work and other professional commitments. When he returned to the Philippines, he discovered that Sto. Tomas was already romantically involved with another man. This brought about the filing of a petition for divorce by Corpuz in Canada which was eventually granted by the Court Justice of Windsor, Ontario, Canada. A month later, the divorce decree took effect. Two years later, Corpuz has fallen in love with another Filipina and wished to marry her. He went to Civil Registry Office of Pasig City to register the Canadian divorce decree of his marriage certificate with Sto. Tomas. However, despite the registration, an official of National Statistics Office informed Corpuz that the former marriage still subsists under the Philippine law until there has been a judicial recognition of the Canadian divorce by a competent judicial court in view of NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982. Consequently, he filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of dissolution of marriage with the RTC. However, the RTC denied the petition reasoning out that Corpuz cannot institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree because he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It was provided further that Sto. Tomas was the proper party who can institute an action under the principle of Article 26 of the Family Code which capacitates a Filipino citizen to remarry in case the alien spouse obtains a foreign divorce decree. ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code grants aliens like Corpuz the right to institute a petition for judicial recognition of a foreign divorce decree. HELD: Petition GRANTED. RTC Decision REVERSED. The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerberts petition before the RTC.In other words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. 3. EMMA K. LEE vs. CA, et. al. (Cancellation and correction of entries in the record of birth) Spouses Lee Tek Sheng (Lee) and Keh Shiok Cheng (Keh) entered the Philippines in the 1930s as immigrants from China. They had 11 children, namely, Rita K. Lee, Leoncio K. Lee, Lucia K. Lee-Ong, Julian K. Lee, Martin K. Lee, Rosa Lee-Vanderlek, Melody Lee-Chin, Henry K. Lee, Natividad Lee-Miguel, Victoriano K. Lee, and Thomas K. Lee (collectively, the Lee-Keh children). In 1948, Lee brought from China a young woman named Tiu Chuan (Tiu), supposedly to serve as housemaid. The respondent Lee-Keh children believe that Tiu left the Lee-Keh household, moved into another property of Lee nearby, and had a relation with him. Shortly after Keh died in 1989, the Lee-Keh children learned that Tius children with Lee (collectively, the Lees other children) claimed that they, too, were children of Lee and Keh. This prompted the Lee-Keh children to request the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the matter. After conducting such an investigation, the NBI concluded in its report: [I]t is very obvious that the mother of these 8 children is certainly not KEH SHIOK CHENG, but a much younger woman, most probably TIU CHUAN. Upon further evaluation and analysis by these Agents, LEE TEK SHENG is in a quandary in fixing the age of KEH SHIOK CHENG possibly to conform with his grand design of making his 8 children as their own legitimate children, consequently elevating the status of his second family and secure their future. The doctor lamented that this complaint would not have been necessary had not the father and his second family kept on insisting that the 8 children are the legitimate children of KEH SHIOK CHENG.1 The NBI found, for example, that in the hospital records, the eldest of the Lees other children, Marcelo Lee (who was recorded as the 12th child of Lee and Keh), was born of a 17-year-old

mother, when Keh was already 38 years old at the time. Another of the Lees other children, Mariano Lee, was born of a 23-year-old mother, when Keh was then already 40 years old, and so forth. In other words, by the hospital records of the Lees other children, Kehs declared age did not coincide with her actual age when she supposedly gave birth to such other children, numbering eight. On the basis of this report, the respondent Lee-Keh children filed two separate petitions, one of them before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Caloocan City2 in Special Proceeding C-1674 for the deletion from the certificate of live birth of the petitioner Emma Lee, one of Lees other children, the name Keh and replace the same with the name Tiu to indicate her true mothers name. In April 2005 the Lee-Keh children filed with the RTC an ex parte request for the issuance of a subpoena ad testificandum to compel Tiu, Emma Lees presumed mother, to testify in the case. The RTC granted the motion but Tiu moved to quash the subpoena, claiming that it was oppressive and violated Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the rule on parental privilege, she being Emma Lees stepmother.3 On August 5, 2005 the RTC quashed the subpoena it issued for being unreasonable and oppressive considering that Tiu was already very old and that the obvious object of the subpoena was to badger her into admitting that she was Emma Lees mother. Because the RTC denied the Lee-Keh childrens motion for reconsideration, they filed a special civil action of certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP 92555. On December 29, 2006 the CA rendered a decision,4 setting aside the RTCs August 5, 2005 Order. The CA ruled that only a subpoena duces tecum, not a subpoena ad testificandum, may be quashed for being oppressive or unreasonable under Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The CA also held that Tius advanced age alone does not render her incapable of testifying. The party seeking to quash the subpoena for that reason must prove that she would be unable to withstand the rigors of trial, something that petitioner Emma Lee failed to do. Since the CA denied Emma Lees motion for reconsideration by resolution of May 8, 2007,5 she filed the present petition with this Court. 4. The Question Presented The only question presented in this case is whether or not the CA erred in ruling that the trial court may compel Tiu to testify in the correction of entry case that respondent Lee-Keh children filed for the correction of the certificate of birth of petitioner Emma Lee to show that she is not Kehs daughter. 5. The Ruling of the Court Petitioner Emma Lee claims that the RTC correctly quashed the subpoena ad testificandum it issued against Tiu on the ground that it was unreasonable and oppressive, given the likelihood that the latter would be badgered on oral examination concerning the Lee-Keh childrens theory that she had illicit relation with Lee and gave birth to the other Lee children.

But, as the CA correctly ruled, the grounds citedunreasonable and oppressiveare proper for subpoena ad duces tecum or for the production of documents and things in the possession of the witness, a command that has a tendency to infringe on the right against invasion of privacy. Section 4, Rule 21 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thus provides: SECTION 4. Quashing a subpoena. The court may quash a subpoena duces tecum upon motion promptly made and, in any event, at or before the time specified therein if it is unreasonable and oppressive, or the relevancy of the books, documents or things does not appear, or if the person in whose behalf the subpoena is issued fails to advance the reasonable cost of the production thereof. Notably, the Court previously decided in the related case of Lee v. Court of Appeals6 that the Lee-Keh children have the right to file the action for correction of entries in the certificates of birth of Lees other children, Emma Lee included. The Court recognized that the ultimate object of the suit was to establish the fact that Lees other children were not children of Keh. Thus: It is precisely the province of a special proceeding such as the one outlined under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. The petitions filed by private respondents for the correction of entries in the petitioners' records of birth were intended to establish that for physical and/or biological reasons it was impossible for Keh Shiok Cheng to have conceived and given birth to the petitioners as shown in their birth records. Contrary to petitioners' contention that the petitions before the lower courts were actually actions to impugn legitimacy, the prayer therein is not to declare that petitioners are illegitimate children of Keh Shiok Cheng, but to establish that the former are not the latter's children. There is nothing to impugn as there is no blood relation at all between Keh Shiok Cheng and petitioners.7 (Underscoring supplied) Taking in mind the ultimate purpose of the Lee-Keh childrens action, obviously, they would want Tiu to testify or admit that she is the mother of Lees other children, including petitioner Emma Lee. Keh had died and so could not give testimony that Lees other children were not hers. The Lee-Keh children have, therefore, a legitimate reason for seeking Tius testimony and, normally, the RTC cannot deprive them of their right to compel the attendance of such a material witness. But petitioner Emma Lee raises two other objections to requiring Tiu to come to court and testify: a) considering her advance age, testifying in court would subject her to harsh physical and emotional stresses; and b) it would violate her parental right not to be compelled to testify against her stepdaughter. 1. Regarding the physical and emotional punishment that would be inflicted on Tiu if she were compelled at her age and condition to come to court to testify, petitioner Emma Lee must establish this claim to the satisfaction of the trial court. About five years have passed from the time the Lee-Keh children sought the issuance of a subpoena for Tiu to appear before the trial court. The RTC would have to update itself and determine if Tius current physical condition makes her fit to undergo the ordeal of coming to court and being questioned. If she is fit, she must obey the subpoena issued to her.

Tiu has no need to worry that the oral examination might subject her to badgering by adverse counsel. The trial courts duty is to protect every witness against oppressive behavior of an examiner and this is especially true where the witness is of advanced age.8 2. Tiu claimed before the trial court the right not to testify against her stepdaughter, petitioner Emma Lee, invoking Section 25, Rule 130 of the Rules of Evidence, which reads: SECTION 25. Parental and filial privilege.- No person may be compelled to testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other direct descendants. The above is an adaptation from a similar provision in Article 315 of the Civil Code that applies only in criminal cases. But those who revised the Rules of Civil Procedure chose to extend the prohibition to all kinds of actions, whether civil, criminal, or administrative, filed against parents and other direct ascendants or descendants. But here Tiu, who invokes the filial privilege, claims that she is the stepmother of petitioner Emma Lee. The privilege cannot apply to them because the rule applies only to "direct" ascendants and descendants, a family tie connected by a common ancestry.1avvphi1 A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother. Article 965 thus provides: Art. 965. The direct line is either descending or ascending. The former unites the head of the family with those who descend from him. The latter binds a person with those from whom he descends. Consequently, Tiu can be compelled to testify against petitioner Emma Lee. WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP 92555. 4. REPUBLIC VS. JULIA EDWARD ENERSIO COSETENG (Change of name)

FACTS: Born in Makati, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo is the son of Fulvio M.Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as Edward's certificate of livebirth shows, had contracted marriage.Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, Edward filed before theRTC of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez LimCoseteng. In support of his petition, he submitted a certification from the NSO stating that hismother Anna Dominique "does not appear in National Indices of Marriage." Edward also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college showing that he carried thesurname "Coseteng," and the birth certificate of his child where "Coseteng" appears as hissurname. In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City's 3rd District using the name "JULIAN M.L. COSETENG."No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present evidence ex parte. The trial court granted Edwards petition and directed the Civil Registrar of Makati City to: (a) delete in theCertificate of live Birth the entry March 26, 1972, for date and place of marriage of parties; (b)correct the entry of the surname from Magpayo to Coseteng; (c) delee the entry

Coseteng for middle name; and (d) delete the entry of the name of his father. The Republic, thru the OSG filed a petition for review before the SC contending that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of marriage of Edward's parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding. The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of Edwards parents' date of marriage and the name of his father from theentries in hisbirth certificate,the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in accord withEdwards prayer to allow him to change his name. Edward counters that the proceeding beforethe trial court was adversarial in nature and that he complied with Rule 103.ISSUE: a. Whether or not the order of the RTC is correct in allowing Edward to change hisname? b. Whether or not Rule 103 in this case is the proper remedy? c. Whether or not the RTCs order to delete the entry of Edwards parents date of marriage, as well as the name of his father in his Birth Certificate is correct?RULING: a. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using validand meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erasesigns of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) whenthe surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice publicinterest. Respondent's reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized grounds, however.